I want to take a step back from the "Women in Combat" Posts because I think that this is one that can very easily get off track. My point in "Women in Combat #1" was to share my Orientation with others. By knowing where I come from generationally, and by Army conditioning, it helps frame the larger discussion. My point in "Women in Combat #2" was to point out that while this is a significant event, it will only have true merit when it is no longer an event at all.
To OODA this will take time but here's my shot:
OBSERVE: The manner in which the current war is being waged has placed more women into what has traditionally been termed "direct" combat. This method of warfare has brought the current tactical requirements into conflict with the Combat Exclusionary Laws as currently written.
ORIENT: This is the one that gets hard and happens at many levels at the same time. It will contain more assumptions than hard facts.
1. THE WAR: First, as stated earlier, this is a non-traditional method of warfare, one that the Army was not really manned, equipped, or trained to meet head on when it started. Up to 2001, the Army was designed to worked linearly and in depth. Every system we had was designed with that assumption as a start point. Units and equipment were designed to work in complimentary fashions across a front. It was also envisioned that wars would be between States/Nations with some form of nationally based political will to drive them. It is also reasonable to suggest that any war would be relatively short due to technological advances that allow immense amounts of violence over an extremely short period of time. Hence the idea of "Shock and Awe". That is not the current state of insurgent warfare. The current state suggests an amoebic, non-nation/state that is fighting an ideological war to be waged over long periods of time with no clearly defined "ultimate" winner or loser indicated by some formal surrender document. It is more likely a contest of moral and political will.
2. THE ARMY: Since the design was for a linear, in-depth Army, the separation of direct combatants from non-direct combatants was defined mostly by physical space and distance. It worked on a likelihood or probability model; and any adjustment related to the assignment policies of women was safely rooted in the notion of physical space, which provided a political 'comfort zone'. Policy adjustments made were more closely related to professional development / career enhancement reasons. Politically and socially, this probably began to occur in the mid-to late 70's and early '80's with the proliferation of women into the general workforce in more "white collar" jobs which ran along similar career progression paths. This implies that at the time when political and social change indicated an increased role for women in general, the Army found a similar way to increase professional opportunities by opening more and more career fields to them. But, still using the probability of a linear battlefield, this didn't present too much of a political risk - for either lawmakers, or the Army - because the likelihood of direct combat remained remote. A corollary to this is the move to the all volunteer force. Without the draft, the Army had to compete with the civilian workforce for Soldiers, and opening career fields to women was one way to enhance the Army's ability to attract talent. As a lawmaker, I can now support the inclusion of women into professional society - including the Armed Forces, while at the same time retaining my conditioned belief that they shouldn't be in direct combat. As long as the physical distance remains great enough, then all will be well.
3. WOMEN: There is an often used phrase called "the role of....something...in society". We have heard it many times as, "the role of women in the Army". The very word 'role' implies a defined set of norms, behaviors and expectations. I think the word 'role' actually does women in general a disservice because it is limiting by definition. This holds true for everyone, but has had an extremely adverse impact on the progress of women in society. For Millennials, the idea that women can do or be anything they want is no longer just some hopeful dream of school aged children. It is a truth. Women hold high positions throughout society in business, politics, education, the arts etc. You name the field, and it will be filled with talented women who are advancing their particular endeavor to new levels. But, that has not always been the case. In my lifetime, going back from the expected 'roles' of my grandmother, my mother, and my sister there has been a dramatic shift. That fact is evidenced best by articles such as the one about CSM King. We are still at a point where the first woman to do anything is considered a novelty. And the problem with novelties is that while some become the standard bearer for future generations, some remain nothing more than novelties. Geraldine Ferraro was the first woman on a major political ticket in the mid-80's, but her short-lived candidacy was a novelty. Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton, Madeline Albright, Donna Shalala - to name a few- show the impact of women as standard bearers.
In all societies though, females play the singularly unique role of being able to give birth. Whatever other standard is applied, they are the ONLY way to guarantee the continuation of a species. That gives them the unique consideration of something that must be protected in order to guarantee survival. In plain terms, they are a natural resource - just like water and the other requirements to sustain life on the planet.
That understanding has led to behavior patterns in men and women that date back to beginning of history. Women as child-bearers and family leaders and men as providers. And war is a form of provision. If you see war as a way of providing or protecting a value system or political state of being, or the extension of a religious philosophy, then the idea that men provide those things by waging war is not that hard to grasp. The current state of women suggest an equality rarely seen in history which brings into question the behavioral norms for all of society.
4. DIRECT COMBAT: Combat is messy business. For those who have witnessed it, it has devastating effects. The more 'direct' it is, the more personalized the mess. Dropping a bomb from an aircraft can have a massive effect, but it will not have the same personalized effect of having to set gun sights on another human being and killing him/her. It takes 12lbs of finger pressure to pull the trigger on an M16 rifle. 12lbs of pressure and you can end a life. Hand-to-hand fighting is even more personalized. Men and women both are capable of exerting 12lbs of trigger pressure to equal effect. There is no other realistic physical requirement to be a combatant that gives men an advantage over women. The Army will let a 97 lb weakling join the infantry even though he lacks the endurance to carry the load, the strength to pick up a wounded comrade, or the physical stature to conduct hand-to-hand combat with a foe. Because he is male the Army will sign him up to be an infantryman if he so desires. No thought is ever given to his ability to carry out the messy business of direct combat. For women, this is not the case. Apparently, a vagina and breasts create some unknown form of physical limitation that does not exist in men. Any more fit person - larger, stronger, with greater endurance - will have an advantage in direct combat. There is no gender associated with that fact.
DECIDE: Looking solely at the current battlefield, the current law, the need for Soldiers and the demands placed upon them, as well as the societal evolution in expected norms and behaviors, it becomes apparent that the Exclusionary Laws as currently written have become out dated and require (a) abolition by willful choice, or (b) to be allowed to exist into antiquity until they are no longer relevant to the discussion. Currently, it appears that the Army has chosen plan B. By not facing the issue completely, the Army is accepting that the requirements of the war will simply render the current laws archaic and they will die out in time. That there is another option is not really being considered. Therefore, the Decide seems to be between (a) willful change and (b) the decline of relevancy over time.
ACT: Since the Army has not chosen to frame the argument with an A or B option to be studied or reviewed, the OODA loop cannot be fully formed. Since we are apparently working with only option B, then any new Observe can only be seen through that prism. The one thing that can absolutely stop the OODA cycle in it's track is a failure to allow the Act to create a new Observe.
Those are my initial thoughts on applying the OODA Loop to the Women in Combat question raised earlier. I encourage you to comment. When I wrote Chap 1, I intentionally included the "eat it, kill it, or fuck it" phrase to demonstrate the method or mindset that was ingrained in me as a young infantryman, and to admit it's relevance in the context of direct combat. It was not placed there to suggest that that mentality was the sole domain of men. Other arguments regarding physical differences between the sexes similarly are not the sole domain of one gender or the other. Ultimately, it is my belief that any Act taken with regard to Women in Combat is ultimately social in nature and as such is very much open to any change, positive or negative, in prevaling social norms.
# 17 Women in the Army Chap 2
This year we saw the first female 4 star general, General Dunwoody, and now the first female Commandant of the Drill Sergeant School. The glass ceiling has cracked. It will be broken when we have our first female Chief of Staff, or Sergeant Major of the Army. Link below:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/us/22sergeant.html?_r=1&emc=eta1
Another good day for all women. As strange as it may sound, examples like this have been relatively new for the Army. I'm not sure, but I believe it was only in the mid to late 70's that we saw the first class of female officers go through West Point. Congratulations to CSM King. A role model for all Soldiers who proves that hard work, determination and a sense of service are the exact things that make the Army a great place. While this a great story for female servicemembers, the truest measure of equality will be when this isn't a story at all. When we are no longer breaking gender / race barriers and the measure of worth is only viewed through the lense of ability and a desire for excellence.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/us/22sergeant.html?_r=1&emc=eta1
Another good day for all women. As strange as it may sound, examples like this have been relatively new for the Army. I'm not sure, but I believe it was only in the mid to late 70's that we saw the first class of female officers go through West Point. Congratulations to CSM King. A role model for all Soldiers who proves that hard work, determination and a sense of service are the exact things that make the Army a great place. While this a great story for female servicemembers, the truest measure of equality will be when this isn't a story at all. When we are no longer breaking gender / race barriers and the measure of worth is only viewed through the lense of ability and a desire for excellence.
# 16 Human Organization Link -
Check out the link at the bottom of this. It's entitled "Resilient Structures". I found it this morning and the very first paragraph jumped out at me.
"After awhile, human organizations seem to deteriorate. Often the individuals in them will be busy, spending long hours going to meetings, producing PowerPoints etc., but the amount of useful work - measured by successful new products, for example - keeps going down. This isn't a description of every organization, but you have to admit it's depressingly common."
Welcome to the United States Army. (Sarcasm intensified for effect)
The 2nd paragraph goes on to say, "You also know, however, that the pattern can be reversed IF energy - primarily in the form of new ideas- is brought in from the outside to keep the organization fresh and competitive. It's not easy, but through techniques...it is possible to reverse organizational decline."
As an aside, this may be yet another reason for the officer / NCO divide. For the NCO the unit pretty much remains the same. Same organization, same day-to-day tasks, same eventual deployment etc. The only thing that changes is the name of the person at the top. Each new chain of command says pretty much the same thing on Day 1 i.e., "we're going to be combat focused, take care of families, work hard, be a team etc etc, but that gets ground down pretty quickly by the daily requirements. Within 6 months or so in an average organization, it becomes hard to tell one set of leadership from another. "Oh great! Another good idea! Can anyone remember what happened to the last one? I can't seem to find it anymore." For the officer, however, this is another one of their very limited opportunities to gain valuable knowledge, experience, and career progression. And so the opportunity is faced with renewed energy and purpose and a sudden awareness of the weight and burden of command. The idea of being responsible for people, and events, sometimes outside of their direct control becomes all to real. (More on that in another post.)
The linked article goes on to say that bringing outside energy into the organization - in the form of new ideas that challenge current norms - is a requirement for it's continued growth. In fact, it goes on to point out that in some cases, that outside energy is an actual physical requirement for the organizations survival. This brings up the idea of entropy. As you read some of the comments below the main article, you find one that brings forth the idea that corporations sooner or later must implode. They do so because they reach a point where the successful ideas of the past coupled with a focus away from the original product and on to profit margin makes them work towards a status quo arrangement. The current state of General Motors would be a good example of this. What had worked before - a safe product, consistent profits etc, created a corporate culture that valued continuing along the same path. Although in the current market world I'm sure that there were folks at GM who foresaw the impending crisis, the corporate culture was so pervasive that they were probably seen as heretics within the company. From an Army perspective, "That's the way we've always done it". Add to that both the corporate and military aversion to risk and generational prisms, and it's pretty easy to see how the entropy can take hold. Now, after the bailout, GM is aggressively fighting to return to profitability with new products, new ideas, and a new focus on the customer. The entropy has been removed by force.
Another good example of this might be Microsoft and Apple. At first, the very introduction of new products and the low cost proliferation of technology was the focus for both companies. However, there was a time in the mid-to-late 90's when Microsoft had become so huge that it shifted focus away from the needs of the users and on to protecting it's market share. Only after a change in leadership at the top has there been a refocusing on what made them successful in the first place. Conversely, Apple stayed more closely tied to the customer (the bottom), took innovative steps (IPOD, I phone) and has remained people/product focused and therefore has created a class of products and technology that has gained them an extremely loyal following.
The Army works completely on people. Forget for a moment all the technology, equipment etc and recognize that the Army is people. In that manner it shares many of the same characteristics of any large corporation. While it is not culturally profit driven, the culture of "We can do anything the Nation asks us to, at any time, in any place" has the same effect on how we operate. There is a professional Soldier culture - absolute dedication, self and family sacrifice, the 24 hour work cycle. Maintaining the facade for the American people that they can relax because our wise sages have already worked out the correct answer to every possible scenario. There is no contingency that we don't already have a plan for. In fact, in many cases, that last sentence is true. Somewhere in the Pentagon, I'm sure that there is a huge room filled with contingency plans for all types of crises. The question is how may of them are relevant? The mere fact that they exist has the effect of providing a false sense of security and introducing a complacent mindset (entropy). "Don't sweat it...OP PLAN 123XYZ was written 5 years ago to provide the answer to the problem." Never mind that there have been huge political, technological, or historical changes in the intervening time. Ultimately, that room becomes a huge guessing game of trying to figure out the next fight and hoping to god you don't get it wrong.
In the link below, you begin to hear about dissonance. A discordant sound. Something out of harmony with the host environment. Ahhh, the Disgruntled Employees Club. The critical voice of dissent. The loyal opposition. That person or group that is waiving the red flag and talking of impending doom when everyone else is cheering and paddling the canoe. These folks are critical to organizational health. When I say loyal and critical, I mean exactly that. Soldiers who truly care about the unit and look at it with a critical eye. Not just bitching for bitching's sake, but those who feel out-of-step with the leadership. In general, one of the two groups, the Top and the Bottom has to be correct. So, if the Bottom is out-of-step then the Top will never be as successful as it could be. If the Top is out-of-step then the Bottom will soon lose faith and become self-protecting. Either way, entropy or organizational implosion will be the result. But those individuals in the unit/organization/corporation who truly value the people, the challenges and the mission (be it military or corporate) who feel out-of-step need to be sought out by the leadership and listened to.
We all need to look at ourselves critically and figure out whether or not we are creeping our way towards entropy, or are we seeking out the dissonance around us and using it to see our world more clearly and to stay ahead of emerging challenges.
http://www.chetrichards.com/c2w/2008/05/22/resilient-structures/
"After awhile, human organizations seem to deteriorate. Often the individuals in them will be busy, spending long hours going to meetings, producing PowerPoints etc., but the amount of useful work - measured by successful new products, for example - keeps going down. This isn't a description of every organization, but you have to admit it's depressingly common."
Welcome to the United States Army. (Sarcasm intensified for effect)
The 2nd paragraph goes on to say, "You also know, however, that the pattern can be reversed IF energy - primarily in the form of new ideas- is brought in from the outside to keep the organization fresh and competitive. It's not easy, but through techniques...it is possible to reverse organizational decline."
As an aside, this may be yet another reason for the officer / NCO divide. For the NCO the unit pretty much remains the same. Same organization, same day-to-day tasks, same eventual deployment etc. The only thing that changes is the name of the person at the top. Each new chain of command says pretty much the same thing on Day 1 i.e., "we're going to be combat focused, take care of families, work hard, be a team etc etc, but that gets ground down pretty quickly by the daily requirements. Within 6 months or so in an average organization, it becomes hard to tell one set of leadership from another. "Oh great! Another good idea! Can anyone remember what happened to the last one? I can't seem to find it anymore." For the officer, however, this is another one of their very limited opportunities to gain valuable knowledge, experience, and career progression. And so the opportunity is faced with renewed energy and purpose and a sudden awareness of the weight and burden of command. The idea of being responsible for people, and events, sometimes outside of their direct control becomes all to real. (More on that in another post.)
The linked article goes on to say that bringing outside energy into the organization - in the form of new ideas that challenge current norms - is a requirement for it's continued growth. In fact, it goes on to point out that in some cases, that outside energy is an actual physical requirement for the organizations survival. This brings up the idea of entropy. As you read some of the comments below the main article, you find one that brings forth the idea that corporations sooner or later must implode. They do so because they reach a point where the successful ideas of the past coupled with a focus away from the original product and on to profit margin makes them work towards a status quo arrangement. The current state of General Motors would be a good example of this. What had worked before - a safe product, consistent profits etc, created a corporate culture that valued continuing along the same path. Although in the current market world I'm sure that there were folks at GM who foresaw the impending crisis, the corporate culture was so pervasive that they were probably seen as heretics within the company. From an Army perspective, "That's the way we've always done it". Add to that both the corporate and military aversion to risk and generational prisms, and it's pretty easy to see how the entropy can take hold. Now, after the bailout, GM is aggressively fighting to return to profitability with new products, new ideas, and a new focus on the customer. The entropy has been removed by force.
Another good example of this might be Microsoft and Apple. At first, the very introduction of new products and the low cost proliferation of technology was the focus for both companies. However, there was a time in the mid-to-late 90's when Microsoft had become so huge that it shifted focus away from the needs of the users and on to protecting it's market share. Only after a change in leadership at the top has there been a refocusing on what made them successful in the first place. Conversely, Apple stayed more closely tied to the customer (the bottom), took innovative steps (IPOD, I phone) and has remained people/product focused and therefore has created a class of products and technology that has gained them an extremely loyal following.
The Army works completely on people. Forget for a moment all the technology, equipment etc and recognize that the Army is people. In that manner it shares many of the same characteristics of any large corporation. While it is not culturally profit driven, the culture of "We can do anything the Nation asks us to, at any time, in any place" has the same effect on how we operate. There is a professional Soldier culture - absolute dedication, self and family sacrifice, the 24 hour work cycle. Maintaining the facade for the American people that they can relax because our wise sages have already worked out the correct answer to every possible scenario. There is no contingency that we don't already have a plan for. In fact, in many cases, that last sentence is true. Somewhere in the Pentagon, I'm sure that there is a huge room filled with contingency plans for all types of crises. The question is how may of them are relevant? The mere fact that they exist has the effect of providing a false sense of security and introducing a complacent mindset (entropy). "Don't sweat it...OP PLAN 123XYZ was written 5 years ago to provide the answer to the problem." Never mind that there have been huge political, technological, or historical changes in the intervening time. Ultimately, that room becomes a huge guessing game of trying to figure out the next fight and hoping to god you don't get it wrong.
In the link below, you begin to hear about dissonance. A discordant sound. Something out of harmony with the host environment. Ahhh, the Disgruntled Employees Club. The critical voice of dissent. The loyal opposition. That person or group that is waiving the red flag and talking of impending doom when everyone else is cheering and paddling the canoe. These folks are critical to organizational health. When I say loyal and critical, I mean exactly that. Soldiers who truly care about the unit and look at it with a critical eye. Not just bitching for bitching's sake, but those who feel out-of-step with the leadership. In general, one of the two groups, the Top and the Bottom has to be correct. So, if the Bottom is out-of-step then the Top will never be as successful as it could be. If the Top is out-of-step then the Bottom will soon lose faith and become self-protecting. Either way, entropy or organizational implosion will be the result. But those individuals in the unit/organization/corporation who truly value the people, the challenges and the mission (be it military or corporate) who feel out-of-step need to be sought out by the leadership and listened to.
We all need to look at ourselves critically and figure out whether or not we are creeping our way towards entropy, or are we seeking out the dissonance around us and using it to see our world more clearly and to stay ahead of emerging challenges.
http://www.chetrichards.com/c2w/2008/05/22/resilient-structures/
#15 Women in the Army Chapter 1
As you may have figured out by reading this blog, I usually work from small to big to small. That is, I take something that I have seen, find it's larger thematic idea and then try to return to the original thought. In essence, without always knowing I was doing it, I have learned to OODA my immediate environment and then tried to make it fit into a larger scale or scope. Yesterday's post "What a Week" is an example. A small comment by one person, coupled with a normal training event by a unit, take on much larger thematic views ( i.e that leadership requires a very honest sense of self and that any training properly conducted can have 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order effects that may actually outweigh the actual purpose of the training itself), but always returned back to the original person or observation.
This method of thinking has allowed me to develop an ability to take large themes and give them an immediate local impact, or conversely, take a small local observation and follow it outward to it's larger thematic implication(s). Sometimes this thought process works very well and other times it doesn't, but when it fails, it allows for another OODA cycle and forces a reevaluation of the original premise.
To the right of this post are a listing of websites that I follow or use for resource material. Last night I found the "Women in Combat Compendium" http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=830 on the Strategic Studies Institute page and began to read it. It presents a historical, anecdotal, and scientific review of the issues surrounding the assignment of women in the Army - a subject that I have an interest in due to my involvement with units that are gender neutral.
In an earlier post "Further Up the Road" I included a thought from my friend Erica that Millennials might be more comfortable dealing with vague and ambiguous situations than are earlier generations. As I was reading the "Women in Combat Compendium" (WICC) document last night that thought came back to me in a different light. As you read the it you see that (1) We have a policy in place that is almost impossible to strictly enforce and therefore leads to local interpretations based upon senior leader thoughts and feelings about the issue, (2) The Army absolutely needs all the Soldiers it has - male and female - in order to function, (3) Social attitudes towards women have changed greatly (at least in current generations) and slide back and forth along a generational scale, and finally that the actual physical nature of the current fight could be the final straw that breaks the back of exclusionary practices throughout the Services. It's awfully hard to find the 'front line' anymore both literally in combat and figuratively with regard to the current law. Additionally, I had never considered the cultural effects that the current laws have on female Soldiers, both officer and enlisted. It's an interesting read, and the comment section that begins on page 13 of Appendix 1, shows how much societal expectations and norms in the Army have changed - in some cases - and how much they have not in others. But I also think it is critical to point out that the respondents in this study are all senior (Lieutenant Colonel and above) officers who would be approximately 40 - 50 years old.
The second O in the OODA cycle stands for Orient. As I have mentioned before, this is the most critical and complex part of the cycle because it requires self awareness - why you are the way you are - and an awareness of why the adversary is the way he/she is. All seen without judgement or moral implication. Your attitudes, beliefs and behaviors become the prism through which you make your Observations (the first part of the loop) and will likely guide your Decide (the third part), which will determine your Act(the final part). So, in order for me to explore this issue fairly, it is helpful that I try to understand my Orientation. Without it, there is no frame of reference to explain my attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.
I was cultured into the Army in an all male infantry unit in 1990. I remained in that world until 2001 when I was assigned as a Drill Sergeant at Ft. Jackson, SC. My early frame of reference therefor is from an 18-24 year old, all male environment. I am also a Gen Xer, born in 1968, who brings with him the prevalent attitudes and ideas of my formative years, roughly 1980 - 1990. As infantrymen, we were bred to eat it, kill it, or fuck it. We lived in a type A, macho world of young men trying to prove who was the toughest. Alpha male stacked against Alpha male. Women were so rare in our barracks and unit area that when the pizza delivery girl would show up at the staff duty desk, you could smell her perfume and deodorant. The smell of baby powder was so foreign to the antiseptic smell of floor wax and pine oil coupled with sweat, funky clothes, and testosterone that it stuck out, and we would go find a reason to pass the staff duty desk to see what she looked like. She was an object. Wallpapering our rooms with centerfolds was acceptable behavior. We were guys. We believed we were the kings of the world. And, as harsh as the "eat it, kill it"sentence above may sound, in many ways those things are a baseline requirement for inculcating the required behaviors for the violent, disturbing contest that is direct, close-quarters combat. You really don't ever want to completely lose the basic human domination, survival oriented, kill-or-be-killed, behavior mechanism. Not if you intend to survive close combat.
By the year 2000, women had begun to show up in Infantry brigades in staff sections and in support roles and I somewhat understood that we were slowly turning a corner with regard to the assignment of women in general, so when I went to Drill Sergeant school, I did not protest when I was assigned to serve at Ft. Jackson. In fact, I welcomed the assignment because I knew that my first real interaction with female Soldiers would happen in a very well controlled environment. There were rules and regulations and policies for training and safety that would both protect her and me if required. If the Army was going to have more women in it, what better place to see how they work than a hugely controlled environment like Basic Training?
Ft. Jackson is the Army's largest Basic Combat Training center, assimilating almost 30,000 Soldiers a year into the Army. Using the generalized figure that 15% of the Army is female, that equates to 4,500 enlisted Soldiers per year. That number does not account for officer assimilation's from West Point or ROTC programs. However, it is likely that the Ft. Jackson number is actually higher than 4,500 because the Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) that regularly enter the Army there are all coded mixed gender. There are no male only units on Ft. Jackson, as there are at Ft. Benning where all Soldiers who have chosen infantry as their MOS attend Bsaic Training.
Sometimes the Army can be quite progressive. An example is a small line in the training guidelines that mandates that 2 training events must be gender neutral - combatives and pugil stick. The regulation specifically stated that you could not intentionally seperate the genders during these events. Soldiers would only be separated by general body size and weight. If you had a small, medium, or large framed male and a similarly sized female, then they could fight each other during these events. In fact when our company conducted combatives training, we intentionally trained one male and female per platoon and they would become the demonstrators during larger unit training. This had the effect of (1) Showing males that their female counterparts could present an equal threat on the battlefield; thereby discounting the western cultural belief that women are not combatants and are to be protected, and (2) It proved to women that they could compete and win in physical events against male counterparts. The same held true for pugil sticks. Watching a male and female Soldier battle each other with an huge padded jousting stick is to watch an entire behavioral and cultural system turned inside out in 3 minutes or less. Once she hit him hard enough to ring his bell during a bout, he rapidly ceased to see her a a woman and only as a threat. Conversely, once she figured out that it was possible to beat a man in this physical challenge, she fought as viciously as any of her male counterparts. Mutual respect for the warrior abilities of the Soldier (not male or female) was the general outcome.
In 2004, I had the opportunity to be the first 1SG for a Forward Support Company as the Army went through the transformation process. By definition, my company - while legally assigned to a Brigade Support Battalion (therefore skirting the legal issue of women in direct combat) - it would be permanently attached to an Infantry battalion. Our company would provide the cooks, mechanics, truck drivers, fuelers etc to an Infantry battalion preparing to deploy to Iraq. There I saw men and women serving equally next to each other without regard for gender. We all slept in the same tent in the field, we grew the company together, my Soldiers lived in the same barracks complex etc. We were E Co, and E Co had men and women in it. We were also supported by an awesome Infantry battalion chain of command who accepted, respected, and supported our efforts. We faced some unique challenges in the early days, but overall, the infantry battalion treated us as much a member of their family as they did any of their all male infantry companies. Gender didn't matter - work ethic did.
I guess my point in this post is that we are in a strange new world with regard to the Combat Exclusion Rule and the assignment of female Soldiers. I have been fortunate enough to see the positive change that they have had on units both in garrison and deployed. Although they may find it somewhat confusing that we even have this law, it grew out of a cultural norm that colored the Army (and society at large) for many years. It is very much a product of my lifetime. Now we find ourselves in a place where senior leaders need to examine the practical realities of the current war, the requirement for talented Soldiers in all aspects of the Army, and look at what the future requirements are likely to be and have the political and practical courage to make the appropriate adjustments to the law. Only then can we make assignment and administrative policies aimed at retaining the female Soldiers that we have - and attracting more - instead of forcing them into jobs they don't want, with rules that aren't applied equally and putting them on the slippery-slope side of political intervention.
If we do this, we will be one step closer to achieving the parity that all Soldiers deserve. That being, the right of an individual to serve their country in the manner that best suits their talents, motivations and professional desire.
This method of thinking has allowed me to develop an ability to take large themes and give them an immediate local impact, or conversely, take a small local observation and follow it outward to it's larger thematic implication(s). Sometimes this thought process works very well and other times it doesn't, but when it fails, it allows for another OODA cycle and forces a reevaluation of the original premise.
To the right of this post are a listing of websites that I follow or use for resource material. Last night I found the "Women in Combat Compendium" http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=830 on the Strategic Studies Institute page and began to read it. It presents a historical, anecdotal, and scientific review of the issues surrounding the assignment of women in the Army - a subject that I have an interest in due to my involvement with units that are gender neutral.
In an earlier post "Further Up the Road" I included a thought from my friend Erica that Millennials might be more comfortable dealing with vague and ambiguous situations than are earlier generations. As I was reading the "Women in Combat Compendium" (WICC) document last night that thought came back to me in a different light. As you read the it you see that (1) We have a policy in place that is almost impossible to strictly enforce and therefore leads to local interpretations based upon senior leader thoughts and feelings about the issue, (2) The Army absolutely needs all the Soldiers it has - male and female - in order to function, (3) Social attitudes towards women have changed greatly (at least in current generations) and slide back and forth along a generational scale, and finally that the actual physical nature of the current fight could be the final straw that breaks the back of exclusionary practices throughout the Services. It's awfully hard to find the 'front line' anymore both literally in combat and figuratively with regard to the current law. Additionally, I had never considered the cultural effects that the current laws have on female Soldiers, both officer and enlisted. It's an interesting read, and the comment section that begins on page 13 of Appendix 1, shows how much societal expectations and norms in the Army have changed - in some cases - and how much they have not in others. But I also think it is critical to point out that the respondents in this study are all senior (Lieutenant Colonel and above) officers who would be approximately 40 - 50 years old.
The second O in the OODA cycle stands for Orient. As I have mentioned before, this is the most critical and complex part of the cycle because it requires self awareness - why you are the way you are - and an awareness of why the adversary is the way he/she is. All seen without judgement or moral implication. Your attitudes, beliefs and behaviors become the prism through which you make your Observations (the first part of the loop) and will likely guide your Decide (the third part), which will determine your Act(the final part). So, in order for me to explore this issue fairly, it is helpful that I try to understand my Orientation. Without it, there is no frame of reference to explain my attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.
I was cultured into the Army in an all male infantry unit in 1990. I remained in that world until 2001 when I was assigned as a Drill Sergeant at Ft. Jackson, SC. My early frame of reference therefor is from an 18-24 year old, all male environment. I am also a Gen Xer, born in 1968, who brings with him the prevalent attitudes and ideas of my formative years, roughly 1980 - 1990. As infantrymen, we were bred to eat it, kill it, or fuck it. We lived in a type A, macho world of young men trying to prove who was the toughest. Alpha male stacked against Alpha male. Women were so rare in our barracks and unit area that when the pizza delivery girl would show up at the staff duty desk, you could smell her perfume and deodorant. The smell of baby powder was so foreign to the antiseptic smell of floor wax and pine oil coupled with sweat, funky clothes, and testosterone that it stuck out, and we would go find a reason to pass the staff duty desk to see what she looked like. She was an object. Wallpapering our rooms with centerfolds was acceptable behavior. We were guys. We believed we were the kings of the world. And, as harsh as the "eat it, kill it"sentence above may sound, in many ways those things are a baseline requirement for inculcating the required behaviors for the violent, disturbing contest that is direct, close-quarters combat. You really don't ever want to completely lose the basic human domination, survival oriented, kill-or-be-killed, behavior mechanism. Not if you intend to survive close combat.
By the year 2000, women had begun to show up in Infantry brigades in staff sections and in support roles and I somewhat understood that we were slowly turning a corner with regard to the assignment of women in general, so when I went to Drill Sergeant school, I did not protest when I was assigned to serve at Ft. Jackson. In fact, I welcomed the assignment because I knew that my first real interaction with female Soldiers would happen in a very well controlled environment. There were rules and regulations and policies for training and safety that would both protect her and me if required. If the Army was going to have more women in it, what better place to see how they work than a hugely controlled environment like Basic Training?
Ft. Jackson is the Army's largest Basic Combat Training center, assimilating almost 30,000 Soldiers a year into the Army. Using the generalized figure that 15% of the Army is female, that equates to 4,500 enlisted Soldiers per year. That number does not account for officer assimilation's from West Point or ROTC programs. However, it is likely that the Ft. Jackson number is actually higher than 4,500 because the Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) that regularly enter the Army there are all coded mixed gender. There are no male only units on Ft. Jackson, as there are at Ft. Benning where all Soldiers who have chosen infantry as their MOS attend Bsaic Training.
Sometimes the Army can be quite progressive. An example is a small line in the training guidelines that mandates that 2 training events must be gender neutral - combatives and pugil stick. The regulation specifically stated that you could not intentionally seperate the genders during these events. Soldiers would only be separated by general body size and weight. If you had a small, medium, or large framed male and a similarly sized female, then they could fight each other during these events. In fact when our company conducted combatives training, we intentionally trained one male and female per platoon and they would become the demonstrators during larger unit training. This had the effect of (1) Showing males that their female counterparts could present an equal threat on the battlefield; thereby discounting the western cultural belief that women are not combatants and are to be protected, and (2) It proved to women that they could compete and win in physical events against male counterparts. The same held true for pugil sticks. Watching a male and female Soldier battle each other with an huge padded jousting stick is to watch an entire behavioral and cultural system turned inside out in 3 minutes or less. Once she hit him hard enough to ring his bell during a bout, he rapidly ceased to see her a a woman and only as a threat. Conversely, once she figured out that it was possible to beat a man in this physical challenge, she fought as viciously as any of her male counterparts. Mutual respect for the warrior abilities of the Soldier (not male or female) was the general outcome.
In 2004, I had the opportunity to be the first 1SG for a Forward Support Company as the Army went through the transformation process. By definition, my company - while legally assigned to a Brigade Support Battalion (therefore skirting the legal issue of women in direct combat) - it would be permanently attached to an Infantry battalion. Our company would provide the cooks, mechanics, truck drivers, fuelers etc to an Infantry battalion preparing to deploy to Iraq. There I saw men and women serving equally next to each other without regard for gender. We all slept in the same tent in the field, we grew the company together, my Soldiers lived in the same barracks complex etc. We were E Co, and E Co had men and women in it. We were also supported by an awesome Infantry battalion chain of command who accepted, respected, and supported our efforts. We faced some unique challenges in the early days, but overall, the infantry battalion treated us as much a member of their family as they did any of their all male infantry companies. Gender didn't matter - work ethic did.
I guess my point in this post is that we are in a strange new world with regard to the Combat Exclusion Rule and the assignment of female Soldiers. I have been fortunate enough to see the positive change that they have had on units both in garrison and deployed. Although they may find it somewhat confusing that we even have this law, it grew out of a cultural norm that colored the Army (and society at large) for many years. It is very much a product of my lifetime. Now we find ourselves in a place where senior leaders need to examine the practical realities of the current war, the requirement for talented Soldiers in all aspects of the Army, and look at what the future requirements are likely to be and have the political and practical courage to make the appropriate adjustments to the law. Only then can we make assignment and administrative policies aimed at retaining the female Soldiers that we have - and attracting more - instead of forcing them into jobs they don't want, with rules that aren't applied equally and putting them on the slippery-slope side of political intervention.
If we do this, we will be one step closer to achieving the parity that all Soldiers deserve. That being, the right of an individual to serve their country in the manner that best suits their talents, motivations and professional desire.
#14 A Boydism..just because
“Tiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road,” he (Boyd) said. “And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go.” He raised his hand and pointed. “If you go that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.” Then Boyd raised his other hand and pointed another direction. “Or you can go that way and you can do something – something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won’t have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference.” He paused and stared into the officer’s eyes and heart. “To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do. Which way will you go?
# 13 What a Week
This has been one of those weeks. They come along every once in a while, and you have to be ready for them when they show up. I had no expectation on Monday that it would be as great as it was. It'll take a little bit today to work through it all. Bear with me. The thoughts aren't fully formed yet.
Periods of my life seem to define themselves by associations with others - either individual people, or groups. When the marksmanship program started, it was marked by an almost magical time that a unit and I went through. Erica, LD and the whole staff at that unit embraced me and the training and it led to the formation of friendships and many many conversations about training and Soldiers and leadership etc. Now, that time has passed. When I think back on it, I realize that it was 2 years, and a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, ago. People have moved on and the unit is no longer the same. While some folks remain, and those friendships still exist, and I expect that I'll work with the unit again, it won't be exactly the same. New people, new leadership, new expectations. I'll need to remember that when I walk through their doors. Can't live backwards.
There is a new group now, different but just as special. They are a company of folks who have embraced me, and the training philosophy I espouse. It's an exciting time. What started out as the marksmanship program has quickly become much more. We have become friends. Tuesday night, I was invited to a gathering of the officers of the unit to kick around thoughts and ideas and to talk about my thoughts and experiences on why the Army is the way it is today. I had a really great time. I think most of them did too. At least I hope so! Sometime during that conversation - which was pretty far ranging for only 3 hours, the issue came up that these officers don't feel like many of their NCO's are meeting their expectations. That the NCO's aren't quite the "ultimate professionals" that the officers had been told they would be during their commissioning training. In fact, their actions, attitudes and behaviors - in many cases - fell well short of the mark. That led me to ask the question, "Do they know your expectations?" "Do they know what it is that you are looking for them to do or be?" I also went on to explain that today's senior NCO corps came of age - their formative years - were in the mid to late 90's and that Army was very much different from the one we are in today. The old one actually has a name now. It's called the "Legacy" Army. Today, we are trying, in fits and starts, to become an "Expeditionary" Army. Very different focuses for both. The "Legacy" Army was going to fight the former Soviet Union in some grand WW 3 scenario in Europe that would settle once and for all the Democracy / Communism debate. Massive force thrown against massive force in one huge cataclysmic battle for the world's soul. Today, we face multiple, ill-formed, ideological threats from non-nation entities that are not necessarily tied to one national political aim. We have been attacked on our homeland with no way to strike back. While the threat is violent and real, it is amoebic. Hard to define, much less pin down. Even more difficult to explain to the general public. There are as many reasons for insurgencies as their are insurgent groups. The ally themselves together when necessary and break apart when their needs no longer converge. The threat is vague, the fighting is done on every level - military, political, technological, religious, etc - and is marked by rapidly changing realities. The "Legacy" NCO corps was not designed for this fight. Generally speaking, it cannot think fast enough nor broadly enough, nor deep enough. It wasn't trained to. Nor can the institutional Army keep up with the pace of change necessary for this fight. If it takes 2 years to formalize a program of instruction for a class or school, my guess is by the time it gets taught for the first time, it'll be 1 year and 11 months out of date. That's just the nature of this war.
The next day I went to work and started an email chain with the folks who had participated the evening prior. In it I outlined what I thought were the highlights of the conversation. Interestingly, one of the officers responded and replied that he wasn't even sure he could identify clearly what his expectations were. That he didn't know exactly what he was looking for in himself, let alone how to express it to others. His quote is below:
"I'm taught by a book how to be an S6 and what the expectations are of the shop. Nowhere does it say how to deal with people. Nowhere does it say how an Aviation unit operates completely different from an Infantry unit. And they do, different requirements. It's my job to figure out how things need to be. I'm running into an issue of the shop running a score of "par for the course". The NCOs feel that that is enough, just enough to get by. As a leader, how do I empower them to do better and do more even though the mission requirements are being met? I don't know how to communicate very well, I'm not taught how to deal with people."
I spent Thursday and Friday with the same unit a rifle range. They were going to run my marksmanship program by themselves with new folks who hadn't done it before, so they asked me to assist them to get things moving and keep everything safe and on track. The LT in charge had been part of the discussion a few nights prior, and was trying very hard to run a successful training event. The first day went fine until late in the afternoon when he and I became aware that maybe some of the results the Soldiers were getting were a little too good. See, it's supposed to be 40 rounds for 40 targets, NOT 45 or 50 rounds. But, it happens. It was easy to see that he was upset. He had put a lot of hard work and energy into the training event, and now he questioned the legitimacy of the whole day. We had both watched NCO's, who were supposed to be coaching the shooters blatantly break the rules. They were helping the Soldier cheat by over-stacking the magazines. Whether the shooter knew that or not was hard to tell. Another people issue. How to deal with the situation? We couldn't force the Soldiers to reshoot - not enough time or ammunition, we couldn't determine how many previous shooters had been "assisted", nor did we want to ruin something that, by all Soldier comments, was an otherwise excellent training event. There was no denying though that this was just another example of the NCO Corps not meeting an officer's expectations. Another nail in the coffin of trust that is essential for units and people to be successful. We made an adjustment for the 2nd day of shooting and the situation was resolved, but in many ways the damage was done.
I mentioned at one point that I felt as if I were somehow defending the incompetencies and failures of the NCO corps to these young officers. That it would appear as if I were making excuses for their lack of ability, or knowledge, or moral short-comings. But although that's how it felt, that's not what I'm doing. I am trying to explain how we got to this place and how some things have gone on for so long that they have become the norm. The "Legacy" Army, with no war to fight and no immediate need to justify it's expense, became an Army of numbers and efficiency ratings. Charts and graphs and green blocks became the standard for the effectiveness of the unit. An indicator of it's combat readiness - since without a fight we had no other benchmark to use. In many ways, even though we have been at war for 7 years now, the same mentality still pervades the institution. It is only slowly beginning to change.
But back to Nick's comments quoted above. I think the key to leading others is having a very clear understanding of yourself first. You have to be comfortable in your own skin. And that takes time. You have to know and understand what you value and what you don't. A sense of self. A willingness to see yourself as both your personal and professional selves. They are not necessarily the same. When you can define for subordinates those qualities, characteristics and traits that you value, then they have an understanding of what your motivations and priorities are. Then you put them into play on a day to day basis. He mentions that his NCO's are willing to settle for "Par for the course". What's wrong with that? Why work harder to improve something that works just fine right now? The issue may be that he values a higher level of personal excellence and professional behavior than they do. He defines himself partially by the comparison of his work against his predecessor's. His NCOs may not. They may see it as a system that works with or without their personalized input. Is it broken, or just not being executed to the high level that he personally desires? If it's actually broken, then change is easy. He will be expected to fix it. And he will have the latitude and backing to do so. If it's not actually broken, though, and is only underperforming based upon his high expectation level, then he's got a tough road ahead of him. How can he effect change when no one else sees a problem?
And so I went searching, as I normally do, to see what's out there in Army cyberspace and found the following link: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/slp2ndEd.pdf . Chapter 7 of this document deals with the human dimension of sustained combat. While the entire document is designed as strategic (global) leader primer, I took particular interest in this chapter. I found some quotes that jumped out at me. "A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved through personal study and contemplation." Chapter 7 goes on to look at leader qualities and requirements as outlined in FM 22-100 "Leadership", and also to look at strategic leader requirements. It identifies 6 competencies that strategic leaders need to focus on. They are Identity, Mental Agility, Cross-Cultural Savy, Interpersonal Maturity, World-Class Warrior, and Professional Astuteness. Since I believe that in the current environment, every single Soldier has the capacity to have strategic importance, these competencies are as relevant to the lieutenants and captains as they are to the colonels and generals. Here is what the document says about identity.
"Identity. This metacompetency is derived from the work of Douglas Hall who heavily influenced the conclusions of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel-Officer (ATLD Panel). According to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather self- feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.” The ATLD describes self-awareness, and describes it as the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. The metacompetency of identity moves beyond simply knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-awareness. It includes the understanding of one’s self-concept as an officer in the Army. Identity also includes an understanding of one’s values and how they match up to the values of the Army. Identity implies maturation beyond self-awareness as officers come to an understanding of who they are, not just how well they do things. Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also brings in aspects of development over a career. As senior leaders gain responsibility, they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others. The metacompetency of identity acknowledges that as an officer develops strategic leadership capability, his role extends beyond personal contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success for subordinates."
I think that both Nick and Leo can be found in that quotation. Nick's thought that he might or might not know what it is he expects from his subordinates might be generated from a not fully formed understanding of what he expects of himself. I think for all leaders, the sentence "As senior leaders gain responsibility they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others", is critical. During your young leader development, it's all about you being better than the other guy/girl. I know it was for me. As you grow, that becomes a zero sum game because there are too many other variables - interpersonal relationships, politics, the structure of the system etc. Eventually, you realize that focusing your efforts on the development of those you serve becomes the truest measure of your leadership. It becomes your legacy and you form your legacy each and every day. One Soldier at a time. But those people who create your legacy might have very little understanding of what you are actually trying to accomplish.
Which brings me back to the rifle range: Identity: A young leader running a new type of training event and wanting to do well. Mental Agility: His ability to see the non-quantifiable goodness in the Soldiers who went through the training. Cross-Cultural Savy: His awareness that the norms of the past are hard to break and ability to see it as a cultural difference, not a moral difference. World-Class Warrior: A very tiny first step taken by a group of people to create a more confident, competent and capable Soldier and person. Professional Astuteness: The gained awareness of training design and where the cracks are in the details.
My Mother sent me a book once. It's title is "And Wisdom Comes Quietly". I didn't get to this place overnight. It took time and people and experiences. I'm looking forward to the future.
Periods of my life seem to define themselves by associations with others - either individual people, or groups. When the marksmanship program started, it was marked by an almost magical time that a unit and I went through. Erica, LD and the whole staff at that unit embraced me and the training and it led to the formation of friendships and many many conversations about training and Soldiers and leadership etc. Now, that time has passed. When I think back on it, I realize that it was 2 years, and a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, ago. People have moved on and the unit is no longer the same. While some folks remain, and those friendships still exist, and I expect that I'll work with the unit again, it won't be exactly the same. New people, new leadership, new expectations. I'll need to remember that when I walk through their doors. Can't live backwards.
There is a new group now, different but just as special. They are a company of folks who have embraced me, and the training philosophy I espouse. It's an exciting time. What started out as the marksmanship program has quickly become much more. We have become friends. Tuesday night, I was invited to a gathering of the officers of the unit to kick around thoughts and ideas and to talk about my thoughts and experiences on why the Army is the way it is today. I had a really great time. I think most of them did too. At least I hope so! Sometime during that conversation - which was pretty far ranging for only 3 hours, the issue came up that these officers don't feel like many of their NCO's are meeting their expectations. That the NCO's aren't quite the "ultimate professionals" that the officers had been told they would be during their commissioning training. In fact, their actions, attitudes and behaviors - in many cases - fell well short of the mark. That led me to ask the question, "Do they know your expectations?" "Do they know what it is that you are looking for them to do or be?" I also went on to explain that today's senior NCO corps came of age - their formative years - were in the mid to late 90's and that Army was very much different from the one we are in today. The old one actually has a name now. It's called the "Legacy" Army. Today, we are trying, in fits and starts, to become an "Expeditionary" Army. Very different focuses for both. The "Legacy" Army was going to fight the former Soviet Union in some grand WW 3 scenario in Europe that would settle once and for all the Democracy / Communism debate. Massive force thrown against massive force in one huge cataclysmic battle for the world's soul. Today, we face multiple, ill-formed, ideological threats from non-nation entities that are not necessarily tied to one national political aim. We have been attacked on our homeland with no way to strike back. While the threat is violent and real, it is amoebic. Hard to define, much less pin down. Even more difficult to explain to the general public. There are as many reasons for insurgencies as their are insurgent groups. The ally themselves together when necessary and break apart when their needs no longer converge. The threat is vague, the fighting is done on every level - military, political, technological, religious, etc - and is marked by rapidly changing realities. The "Legacy" NCO corps was not designed for this fight. Generally speaking, it cannot think fast enough nor broadly enough, nor deep enough. It wasn't trained to. Nor can the institutional Army keep up with the pace of change necessary for this fight. If it takes 2 years to formalize a program of instruction for a class or school, my guess is by the time it gets taught for the first time, it'll be 1 year and 11 months out of date. That's just the nature of this war.
The next day I went to work and started an email chain with the folks who had participated the evening prior. In it I outlined what I thought were the highlights of the conversation. Interestingly, one of the officers responded and replied that he wasn't even sure he could identify clearly what his expectations were. That he didn't know exactly what he was looking for in himself, let alone how to express it to others. His quote is below:
"I'm taught by a book how to be an S6 and what the expectations are of the shop. Nowhere does it say how to deal with people. Nowhere does it say how an Aviation unit operates completely different from an Infantry unit. And they do, different requirements. It's my job to figure out how things need to be. I'm running into an issue of the shop running a score of "par for the course". The NCOs feel that that is enough, just enough to get by. As a leader, how do I empower them to do better and do more even though the mission requirements are being met? I don't know how to communicate very well, I'm not taught how to deal with people."
I spent Thursday and Friday with the same unit a rifle range. They were going to run my marksmanship program by themselves with new folks who hadn't done it before, so they asked me to assist them to get things moving and keep everything safe and on track. The LT in charge had been part of the discussion a few nights prior, and was trying very hard to run a successful training event. The first day went fine until late in the afternoon when he and I became aware that maybe some of the results the Soldiers were getting were a little too good. See, it's supposed to be 40 rounds for 40 targets, NOT 45 or 50 rounds. But, it happens. It was easy to see that he was upset. He had put a lot of hard work and energy into the training event, and now he questioned the legitimacy of the whole day. We had both watched NCO's, who were supposed to be coaching the shooters blatantly break the rules. They were helping the Soldier cheat by over-stacking the magazines. Whether the shooter knew that or not was hard to tell. Another people issue. How to deal with the situation? We couldn't force the Soldiers to reshoot - not enough time or ammunition, we couldn't determine how many previous shooters had been "assisted", nor did we want to ruin something that, by all Soldier comments, was an otherwise excellent training event. There was no denying though that this was just another example of the NCO Corps not meeting an officer's expectations. Another nail in the coffin of trust that is essential for units and people to be successful. We made an adjustment for the 2nd day of shooting and the situation was resolved, but in many ways the damage was done.
I mentioned at one point that I felt as if I were somehow defending the incompetencies and failures of the NCO corps to these young officers. That it would appear as if I were making excuses for their lack of ability, or knowledge, or moral short-comings. But although that's how it felt, that's not what I'm doing. I am trying to explain how we got to this place and how some things have gone on for so long that they have become the norm. The "Legacy" Army, with no war to fight and no immediate need to justify it's expense, became an Army of numbers and efficiency ratings. Charts and graphs and green blocks became the standard for the effectiveness of the unit. An indicator of it's combat readiness - since without a fight we had no other benchmark to use. In many ways, even though we have been at war for 7 years now, the same mentality still pervades the institution. It is only slowly beginning to change.
But back to Nick's comments quoted above. I think the key to leading others is having a very clear understanding of yourself first. You have to be comfortable in your own skin. And that takes time. You have to know and understand what you value and what you don't. A sense of self. A willingness to see yourself as both your personal and professional selves. They are not necessarily the same. When you can define for subordinates those qualities, characteristics and traits that you value, then they have an understanding of what your motivations and priorities are. Then you put them into play on a day to day basis. He mentions that his NCO's are willing to settle for "Par for the course". What's wrong with that? Why work harder to improve something that works just fine right now? The issue may be that he values a higher level of personal excellence and professional behavior than they do. He defines himself partially by the comparison of his work against his predecessor's. His NCOs may not. They may see it as a system that works with or without their personalized input. Is it broken, or just not being executed to the high level that he personally desires? If it's actually broken, then change is easy. He will be expected to fix it. And he will have the latitude and backing to do so. If it's not actually broken, though, and is only underperforming based upon his high expectation level, then he's got a tough road ahead of him. How can he effect change when no one else sees a problem?
And so I went searching, as I normally do, to see what's out there in Army cyberspace and found the following link: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/slp2ndEd.pdf . Chapter 7 of this document deals with the human dimension of sustained combat. While the entire document is designed as strategic (global) leader primer, I took particular interest in this chapter. I found some quotes that jumped out at me. "A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved through personal study and contemplation." Chapter 7 goes on to look at leader qualities and requirements as outlined in FM 22-100 "Leadership", and also to look at strategic leader requirements. It identifies 6 competencies that strategic leaders need to focus on. They are Identity, Mental Agility, Cross-Cultural Savy, Interpersonal Maturity, World-Class Warrior, and Professional Astuteness. Since I believe that in the current environment, every single Soldier has the capacity to have strategic importance, these competencies are as relevant to the lieutenants and captains as they are to the colonels and generals. Here is what the document says about identity.
"Identity. This metacompetency is derived from the work of Douglas Hall who heavily influenced the conclusions of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel-Officer (ATLD Panel). According to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather self- feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.” The ATLD describes self-awareness, and describes it as the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. The metacompetency of identity moves beyond simply knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-awareness. It includes the understanding of one’s self-concept as an officer in the Army. Identity also includes an understanding of one’s values and how they match up to the values of the Army. Identity implies maturation beyond self-awareness as officers come to an understanding of who they are, not just how well they do things. Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also brings in aspects of development over a career. As senior leaders gain responsibility, they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others. The metacompetency of identity acknowledges that as an officer develops strategic leadership capability, his role extends beyond personal contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success for subordinates."
I think that both Nick and Leo can be found in that quotation. Nick's thought that he might or might not know what it is he expects from his subordinates might be generated from a not fully formed understanding of what he expects of himself. I think for all leaders, the sentence "As senior leaders gain responsibility they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others", is critical. During your young leader development, it's all about you being better than the other guy/girl. I know it was for me. As you grow, that becomes a zero sum game because there are too many other variables - interpersonal relationships, politics, the structure of the system etc. Eventually, you realize that focusing your efforts on the development of those you serve becomes the truest measure of your leadership. It becomes your legacy and you form your legacy each and every day. One Soldier at a time. But those people who create your legacy might have very little understanding of what you are actually trying to accomplish.
Which brings me back to the rifle range: Identity: A young leader running a new type of training event and wanting to do well. Mental Agility: His ability to see the non-quantifiable goodness in the Soldiers who went through the training. Cross-Cultural Savy: His awareness that the norms of the past are hard to break and ability to see it as a cultural difference, not a moral difference. World-Class Warrior: A very tiny first step taken by a group of people to create a more confident, competent and capable Soldier and person. Professional Astuteness: The gained awareness of training design and where the cracks are in the details.
My Mother sent me a book once. It's title is "And Wisdom Comes Quietly". I didn't get to this place overnight. It took time and people and experiences. I'm looking forward to the future.
# 12 Rounding Yourself Out
One of the most interesting things I found when reading about COL Boyd, was the way he studied so many various different things. He drew inspiration and learning points from history, science, philosophy etc. Although he had effectively redesigned the F16 and incidentally stumbled upon the idea of the OODA Loop, he never stopped following his varied interests and discovering new opportunities to learn from them. Often, one small passage from a biography or scientific text would provide him a new insight into an idea or theory he was kicking around himself, but had not fully come to grasp. In that light, I searched around on my bookshelves this morning and pulled out 3 different books. The first is called "Don't Sweat the Small Stuff...And It's All Small Stuff", by Richard Carlson. The 2nd is "Leadership is an Art", by Max DePree. The 3rd is "Common Sense Training", by LTG Arthur Collins, jr. Finally, I found the attached link at BNET.com http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=2829&tag=nl.e713. I want to highlight certain passages of each to illustrate (hopefully) the larger thematic idea behind my writing and training philosophy.
From "Don't Sweat the Small Stuff" comes the following passage: "Almost everyone feels that their own opinions are good, otherwise they wouldn't be sharing them with you. One of the destructive things that many of us do, however, in compare someone else's opinion to our own. And when it doesn't fall in line with our belief we either dismiss it, or find fault with it. ....Almost every opinion has some merit, especially if we are looking for merit, rather than looking for errors."
From "Leadership is an Art" comes this: We need a system of Response - leaders must make involvement genuine. A great error is to invite people to be involved and contribute their ideas and then to exclude them from the evaluation, the decision-making process and the implementation."
From "Common Sense Training": "In addressing a new generation of leaders, I cannot emphasize to strongly that the fundamentals of training do not change. Weapons change, technology advances and tactics adjust to what is new. The fundamentals of training however - to prepare an army to fight in some national crisis with whatever means are at hand-change but little. The major changes in training come from the social changes that affect the human condition. The enlightened trainer takes advantage of these changes to forge a better fighting force."
Finally, from the link above: "Change for its own sake also causes cynicism and resistance on the part of the rank and file. Since employees know that management approaches come and go as leaders transition in and out, they don’t take the new initiatives very seriously."
Interestingly, "Don't Sweat.." is a self-help type book designed to find your inner peace, written in 1997. "Leadership" is considered a business management classic written in 1989, and "Common Sense Training" was written by LTG Collins in 1978!
I think the first passage underscores my belief that you cannot totally by into your own bullshit and that it must be tested against new challenges and points of view to see how it stacks up under the pressure of changing conditions and understandings. It is what drives my fascination with Millennials. By looking for their input, challenging my preconceptions, and constantly searching for those individuals who are skeptical of the status quo, I continually have the opportunity to look at my reality in a fresh manner. Sometimes I fight for my preconceptions very hard, and sometimes I quickly give ground when the light bulb finally comes on. That is why I feel very comfortable challenging the 7 Principles of Army Training. I know that the way the Principles are currently constructed will not lead to effective leader development. I know this because my blind faith and experiences in "Big Army" don't stack up against the reality of talking with a bunch of young officers or NCOs'. I also see the challenges of comparing new ideas against a senior leader's opinion at the top, especially in such a hierarchical organization like the Army where conspicuous rank is often considered to equal intelligence and wisdom. Sometimes it truly does. Sometimes however, the lack of willingness to consider alternate opinions, and refusal to find the merit in them, only demonstrates the 'believing your own bullshit' that causes junior leaders and middle management to become bitter and disenfranchised.
The second quote is an almost automatic outcome of a failure to understand the first one. If you are only paying lip-service to subordinate ideas and opinions and not truly willing to allow them to be tested to find whether they really do have merit; or to co-opt them and not allow the subordinate to execute and take ownership of them, you stand to quickly lose the support, and faith of those who had them. Again, in the Army there is a real danger of this because of the top-down structure. The idea that a young sergeant or lieutenant could actually have a smart, well thought out, common sense answer to an immediate tactical need has become so strange sounding that it is taking a revolution of ideas to remind our institution that young leadership is the cornerstone of the Army and without it, we will not prevail in the current or future conflicts.
The 3rd quote struck me because it is 30 years old, and yet never more relevant than right now. Train the best you can, for the fight you face, with what you have. Everything else will change, but acknowledging the social change, accepting it's impact positively and negatively and developing training that forges a better Army and meets that need is immutable.
Finally, from the blog link. If you fail at all of the above, and start to 'believe your own bullshit' or that rank, status, and position demand personalized change with your stamp on it, you will almost inevitably lose the faith and support of the rank and file.
From "Don't Sweat the Small Stuff" comes the following passage: "Almost everyone feels that their own opinions are good, otherwise they wouldn't be sharing them with you. One of the destructive things that many of us do, however, in compare someone else's opinion to our own. And when it doesn't fall in line with our belief we either dismiss it, or find fault with it. ....Almost every opinion has some merit, especially if we are looking for merit, rather than looking for errors."
From "Leadership is an Art" comes this: We need a system of Response - leaders must make involvement genuine. A great error is to invite people to be involved and contribute their ideas and then to exclude them from the evaluation, the decision-making process and the implementation."
From "Common Sense Training": "In addressing a new generation of leaders, I cannot emphasize to strongly that the fundamentals of training do not change. Weapons change, technology advances and tactics adjust to what is new. The fundamentals of training however - to prepare an army to fight in some national crisis with whatever means are at hand-change but little. The major changes in training come from the social changes that affect the human condition. The enlightened trainer takes advantage of these changes to forge a better fighting force."
Finally, from the link above: "Change for its own sake also causes cynicism and resistance on the part of the rank and file. Since employees know that management approaches come and go as leaders transition in and out, they don’t take the new initiatives very seriously."
Interestingly, "Don't Sweat.." is a self-help type book designed to find your inner peace, written in 1997. "Leadership" is considered a business management classic written in 1989, and "Common Sense Training" was written by LTG Collins in 1978!
I think the first passage underscores my belief that you cannot totally by into your own bullshit and that it must be tested against new challenges and points of view to see how it stacks up under the pressure of changing conditions and understandings. It is what drives my fascination with Millennials. By looking for their input, challenging my preconceptions, and constantly searching for those individuals who are skeptical of the status quo, I continually have the opportunity to look at my reality in a fresh manner. Sometimes I fight for my preconceptions very hard, and sometimes I quickly give ground when the light bulb finally comes on. That is why I feel very comfortable challenging the 7 Principles of Army Training. I know that the way the Principles are currently constructed will not lead to effective leader development. I know this because my blind faith and experiences in "Big Army" don't stack up against the reality of talking with a bunch of young officers or NCOs'. I also see the challenges of comparing new ideas against a senior leader's opinion at the top, especially in such a hierarchical organization like the Army where conspicuous rank is often considered to equal intelligence and wisdom. Sometimes it truly does. Sometimes however, the lack of willingness to consider alternate opinions, and refusal to find the merit in them, only demonstrates the 'believing your own bullshit' that causes junior leaders and middle management to become bitter and disenfranchised.
The second quote is an almost automatic outcome of a failure to understand the first one. If you are only paying lip-service to subordinate ideas and opinions and not truly willing to allow them to be tested to find whether they really do have merit; or to co-opt them and not allow the subordinate to execute and take ownership of them, you stand to quickly lose the support, and faith of those who had them. Again, in the Army there is a real danger of this because of the top-down structure. The idea that a young sergeant or lieutenant could actually have a smart, well thought out, common sense answer to an immediate tactical need has become so strange sounding that it is taking a revolution of ideas to remind our institution that young leadership is the cornerstone of the Army and without it, we will not prevail in the current or future conflicts.
The 3rd quote struck me because it is 30 years old, and yet never more relevant than right now. Train the best you can, for the fight you face, with what you have. Everything else will change, but acknowledging the social change, accepting it's impact positively and negatively and developing training that forges a better Army and meets that need is immutable.
Finally, from the blog link. If you fail at all of the above, and start to 'believe your own bullshit' or that rank, status, and position demand personalized change with your stamp on it, you will almost inevitably lose the faith and support of the rank and file.
#11 The Strategic Millennial
The other day I was surfing around the Army website and came across an article by members of Booze/Allen/Hamilton, a government "think tank" type contractor. The authors had been asked by the U.S Air Force to look at a concern about the proliferation of social networking sites and the impact on command and control within the organization. Unfortunately, I printed the article and cannot find the link to it, or I would add it here.
There are a ton of sections that ended up under my yellow highlighter. I'll start with a few that - although I was latently aware of - had not really paid much attention to. "Few members of this generation (Millennials), born after 1978 can recall a time when the Internet was not at their disposal." Another, "...those born after Desert Storm in 1992 are currently in High School. Within the next 10-20 years, the members of this generation will become the majors, colonels and Navy captains with similar progress through the enlisted ranks."
I was a 24 year old Specialist in the Army in 1992. The Internet didn't really exist then. Digital media equaled Cd's, and most of us still had cassette players in our cars and not everyone had cable TV. I actually remember when MTV played music videos and Nina Blackwood was a VJ. The cell phone was 3 times the size of some current models and looked a lot like your home phone does now -for those of you who still have a land line phone. I can recall when CNN first broadcast and people wondered if there was enough news to fill a 24 hour news program. Consider that question - Will there be enough news to fill a 24 hour news cycle? Wow! Today, information happens in 30 minute cycles which equals 48 distinct cycles within a 24 hour period. Almost anything in the world can be covered in real time if necessary. In '92, we were in the last throws of the analog world. We just didn't know it. Many who read this blog were less than 6 years old at the time. Only 17 years ago and yet in many ways, it may as well have been the stone age.
Obviously, I have become almost consumed lately with the idea that within the context of the military and more pointedly within the context of the current war, I believe that generational shifts in motivations, behaviors, expectations and priorities is an area that we must start paying a lot of attention to. The explosion of technology that has occurred since the Millennials were born has lead them to live in an extremely different world than I grew up in. And in order for me to reach them, I must start listening and understanding them. Another important part of the equation is that it's not our world of today, per say, that matters but the world that we grew up in as children and young adults that has a major 'shaping' effect on our adult views, values, priorities and actions. Take that 'shaping' add to it the 'military culture' and the generational understanding gaps become even more acute. The people at the top of many organizations have failed to keep pace with the technological world that their subordinates live in.
As an example, the driving force behind the Booze/Allen/Hamilton document was that junior officers in the Air force were using Facebook to organize their units. What a genius idea. Instant communication of information to hundreds of people within the organization, using a medium that they are already addicted to and can't live without. Beats the hell out of the old phone tree! However, the use of a public social networking site to organize an official DoD unit was frightening to senior leaders and filled them with concerns regarding security and command and control issues. A generational and technological rift. They, (the seniors) simply couldn't process the idea of the equal sharing of information i.e., if I can get my information directly from my company commander, why do I need a squad leader or platoon sergeant? By god, we've gotta have structure. There'll be anarchy!
Facebook and other social networking sites 'flatten' an organization and allow for instant communication across an entire spectrum at once. This allows people to communicate in near real time. The military, and many private organizations and corporations are top down, hierarchical, and work at compartmentalization rather than cross-pollination. Structurally, even without the human element the two are very much at odds. Flat organizations are more likely to share information broadly and work collaboratively to achieve a common goal or objective, whereas top-down organizations are much more inclined to information hording and stove pipe chains of command. Information is a commodity to be closely held and distributed as necessary in the top-down world. Information is to be shared and mutually acted upon in the flattened world.
The paper goes on to suggest that the 'flatter', interconnected, and technologically advanced Millenials may run into a problem when confronted with their 'top-down', compartmentalized, and hierarchical organizations. Or, more accurately, their bosses in the top-down organizations will likely struggle to maintain control over the Millenial - if they cannot find a way to retain some form of control of either the message or the messenger either by restricting it or possibly by embracing it.
This point is evidenced by a blog that is run by General Campbell http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/why_i_serve/archive/2009/09/02/what-s-the-hubbub-about-strategic-communication.aspx. Campbell posed the question, "What's all the hubbub about Strategic Communication?" Commenting on another post by Adm Mullen, CJCS, who put forth that Strategic Communication is a process, not a thing. It's a way of thinking about how we communicate our message to the rest of the world, not the message itself. The manner is as important as the message. Follow the General Campbell post and you'll see some very interesting comments. There is a claim by one responder, that Strategic Communication is the purview of 3 star generals or higher. That only they can have the wisdom, understanding, and broad reach to understand the global impacts of the message intent. I almost laughed out loud. I weighed in that the Army has done an extremely poor job of explaining the Strategic Message to Soldiers, let alone to foreigners that it doesn't culturally understand, so when a young Soldier or Airmen or Marine takes an action (good or bad), that Soldier in our present world, can have a strategic impact - almost immediately. As evidence, I presented a broad overview of the events that occurred within my platoon in Iraq. Yet another poster posited that we have the means to win the Strategic communication aspect of this war, but we are not paying close enough attention to it, thereby allowing the enemy - who is making maximum use of his Strategic capabilities - to work inside of our decision cycle. In effect, we are continually sending a message that is defensive in nature because it is reactionary, too late to be of any use because the top-down bureaucracy requires too many levels of approval, and therefore worthless. Just another example of the opposition using Boyd's Law extremely efficiently. I wonder, just how many satellites does Osama bin Laden own? The US owns a bunch, and yet bin Laden can seem to communicate at any time he chooses and we can't manage to keep the American people informed in a timely manner. Let one Afghan or Iraqi local national get inadvertently injured or killed by a Soldier, and you know that it will be on the air within minutes. Immediately, we will say "We're looking into it." The investigation takes 2 weeks - 672 thirty minute news cycles later! In the Millenial world - and for most of the rest of the world - the original event cannot even be recalled.
And we wonder why Millennials are getting frustrated. They were raised in a 30 minute cycle world, have been cultured and socialized to think, act and work in a flattened manner and then find themselves in an archaic, top-down hierarchical organization being run by people who were conditioned in a wholly different manner. As I keep saying, we had better find a way to effectively communicate to the folks at the bottom what we expect of them, or we will lose them. At issue is the way we do it. In order for that to occur, the message we send has to be sent in a manner that they can understand and appreciate. Not the manner that we may be the most comfortable sending it in.
One last thought....Admiral Mullen - the most senior member of the entire military, has a Twitter account.....Let me think, don't know what my boss wants me to do tomorrow morning, can't get my 'good news' story past the battalion commander, can't share the latest good idea on how to defeat people who are trying to kill me and my Soldiers, but I can keep up with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as equally as I can Ashton Krutcher. Hmmm.
There are a ton of sections that ended up under my yellow highlighter. I'll start with a few that - although I was latently aware of - had not really paid much attention to. "Few members of this generation (Millennials), born after 1978 can recall a time when the Internet was not at their disposal." Another, "...those born after Desert Storm in 1992 are currently in High School. Within the next 10-20 years, the members of this generation will become the majors, colonels and Navy captains with similar progress through the enlisted ranks."
I was a 24 year old Specialist in the Army in 1992. The Internet didn't really exist then. Digital media equaled Cd's, and most of us still had cassette players in our cars and not everyone had cable TV. I actually remember when MTV played music videos and Nina Blackwood was a VJ. The cell phone was 3 times the size of some current models and looked a lot like your home phone does now -for those of you who still have a land line phone. I can recall when CNN first broadcast and people wondered if there was enough news to fill a 24 hour news program. Consider that question - Will there be enough news to fill a 24 hour news cycle? Wow! Today, information happens in 30 minute cycles which equals 48 distinct cycles within a 24 hour period. Almost anything in the world can be covered in real time if necessary. In '92, we were in the last throws of the analog world. We just didn't know it. Many who read this blog were less than 6 years old at the time. Only 17 years ago and yet in many ways, it may as well have been the stone age.
Obviously, I have become almost consumed lately with the idea that within the context of the military and more pointedly within the context of the current war, I believe that generational shifts in motivations, behaviors, expectations and priorities is an area that we must start paying a lot of attention to. The explosion of technology that has occurred since the Millennials were born has lead them to live in an extremely different world than I grew up in. And in order for me to reach them, I must start listening and understanding them. Another important part of the equation is that it's not our world of today, per say, that matters but the world that we grew up in as children and young adults that has a major 'shaping' effect on our adult views, values, priorities and actions. Take that 'shaping' add to it the 'military culture' and the generational understanding gaps become even more acute. The people at the top of many organizations have failed to keep pace with the technological world that their subordinates live in.
As an example, the driving force behind the Booze/Allen/Hamilton document was that junior officers in the Air force were using Facebook to organize their units. What a genius idea. Instant communication of information to hundreds of people within the organization, using a medium that they are already addicted to and can't live without. Beats the hell out of the old phone tree! However, the use of a public social networking site to organize an official DoD unit was frightening to senior leaders and filled them with concerns regarding security and command and control issues. A generational and technological rift. They, (the seniors) simply couldn't process the idea of the equal sharing of information i.e., if I can get my information directly from my company commander, why do I need a squad leader or platoon sergeant? By god, we've gotta have structure. There'll be anarchy!
Facebook and other social networking sites 'flatten' an organization and allow for instant communication across an entire spectrum at once. This allows people to communicate in near real time. The military, and many private organizations and corporations are top down, hierarchical, and work at compartmentalization rather than cross-pollination. Structurally, even without the human element the two are very much at odds. Flat organizations are more likely to share information broadly and work collaboratively to achieve a common goal or objective, whereas top-down organizations are much more inclined to information hording and stove pipe chains of command. Information is a commodity to be closely held and distributed as necessary in the top-down world. Information is to be shared and mutually acted upon in the flattened world.
The paper goes on to suggest that the 'flatter', interconnected, and technologically advanced Millenials may run into a problem when confronted with their 'top-down', compartmentalized, and hierarchical organizations. Or, more accurately, their bosses in the top-down organizations will likely struggle to maintain control over the Millenial - if they cannot find a way to retain some form of control of either the message or the messenger either by restricting it or possibly by embracing it.
This point is evidenced by a blog that is run by General Campbell http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/why_i_serve/archive/2009/09/02/what-s-the-hubbub-about-strategic-communication.aspx. Campbell posed the question, "What's all the hubbub about Strategic Communication?" Commenting on another post by Adm Mullen, CJCS, who put forth that Strategic Communication is a process, not a thing. It's a way of thinking about how we communicate our message to the rest of the world, not the message itself. The manner is as important as the message. Follow the General Campbell post and you'll see some very interesting comments. There is a claim by one responder, that Strategic Communication is the purview of 3 star generals or higher. That only they can have the wisdom, understanding, and broad reach to understand the global impacts of the message intent. I almost laughed out loud. I weighed in that the Army has done an extremely poor job of explaining the Strategic Message to Soldiers, let alone to foreigners that it doesn't culturally understand, so when a young Soldier or Airmen or Marine takes an action (good or bad), that Soldier in our present world, can have a strategic impact - almost immediately. As evidence, I presented a broad overview of the events that occurred within my platoon in Iraq. Yet another poster posited that we have the means to win the Strategic communication aspect of this war, but we are not paying close enough attention to it, thereby allowing the enemy - who is making maximum use of his Strategic capabilities - to work inside of our decision cycle. In effect, we are continually sending a message that is defensive in nature because it is reactionary, too late to be of any use because the top-down bureaucracy requires too many levels of approval, and therefore worthless. Just another example of the opposition using Boyd's Law extremely efficiently. I wonder, just how many satellites does Osama bin Laden own? The US owns a bunch, and yet bin Laden can seem to communicate at any time he chooses and we can't manage to keep the American people informed in a timely manner. Let one Afghan or Iraqi local national get inadvertently injured or killed by a Soldier, and you know that it will be on the air within minutes. Immediately, we will say "We're looking into it." The investigation takes 2 weeks - 672 thirty minute news cycles later! In the Millenial world - and for most of the rest of the world - the original event cannot even be recalled.
And we wonder why Millennials are getting frustrated. They were raised in a 30 minute cycle world, have been cultured and socialized to think, act and work in a flattened manner and then find themselves in an archaic, top-down hierarchical organization being run by people who were conditioned in a wholly different manner. As I keep saying, we had better find a way to effectively communicate to the folks at the bottom what we expect of them, or we will lose them. At issue is the way we do it. In order for that to occur, the message we send has to be sent in a manner that they can understand and appreciate. Not the manner that we may be the most comfortable sending it in.
One last thought....Admiral Mullen - the most senior member of the entire military, has a Twitter account.....Let me think, don't know what my boss wants me to do tomorrow morning, can't get my 'good news' story past the battalion commander, can't share the latest good idea on how to defeat people who are trying to kill me and my Soldiers, but I can keep up with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as equally as I can Ashton Krutcher. Hmmm.
#10 The Folks who will Fight It
I found the following quotation in an anthology titled "Patriot Hearts" by Maj. William T. Coffey, Jr. It struck me because of it's similarities to many refrains I hear today.
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell." - General Edward C. Meyer
Many units I work with fit this general description. The Army simply cannot fill them fast enough with the exactly right mix as described by the organization charts. And even if the Army could, many units are serving in ways that they were not designed for, so some of the skill sets called for in the organization chart have no bearing on the mission they are confronted with.
The difference between Gen Meyer's comment and many I hear today though is profound. Meyer accepts that although his unit was understrength, they worked to the best of their collective abilities. The situation could not wait. Today, many units routinely complain that they cannot do what they have to because the right people are not in the right places. They complain that the Soldiers they do have aren't capable of doing what must get done. While there is truth that they are short critical personnel, and there may be truth that the Soldiers they do have cannot accomplish what must get done - my point here is that fixing part 2 of the above and not worrying so much about part 1 is the key. The acceptance of the personnel limitation plus the understanding of the limitations of those you do have on hand and the recognition of what must get done is the critical first step in creating a cohesive and mission focused organization. Meyer's quote also lends credence to my personal belief that you have to train people first and then take care of the task. If a twenty something Corporal is serving as a platoon leader, don't expect a lot of MDMP (Military Decision Making Process), it's just not in his/her vocabulary. They don't teach it at NCO education schools. That doesn't mean that they can't do it, just that the manner and method used to teach it might have to be different. A 2nd Lieutenant as a company commander? In combat? The thought frightens people. Why? While modern Full Spectrum Operations are complex, multi-layered and evolve rapidly, that doesn't mean that you had to have attended the Captains Career Course to be able to figure out what to do when people start shooting at you, your vehicle gets blown up, or you have casualties.
We have to start training the folks we have, with whatever their experience levels are, and adjust how we do it to match what must get done. But how? First, I think it begins with trust and a thorough review of the problem(s). A leader has to outline for the group - whatever its composition - the challenges they mutually face. Second, the recognition and determination that they will solve their collective problem together. That each of them must participate. That there is a sense of interdependence. When a unit or group does those 2 things, they have begun to solve the issues that confront them.
But, then there is the 'politics'. The need to accurately convey to others the realities (personnel and otherwise) the unit faces. Sometimes, the very manner in which that conversation takes place can profoundly effect what happens to the unit. Senior leaders may be able to change the make-up of the unit once they are aware of the critical need. They also may not. If the senior leader cannot affect a personnel change, they may have to consider a mission change. If that is not possible then possibly they will have to accept a different training method - outside of standard Army doctrine - that will assist the unit to accomplish it's requirements. If the senior leader is supportive of this an understrength unit can be extremely successful. If not, the results can be disastrous. If the senior leader expects an understrength, and incorrectly assimilated (personnel serving in positions they have no training for) to act in the same manner as a full strength unit, then that unit will likely fail. And the Soldiers will lose trust and faith in their leadership.
So, 3 points here. First, understrength units can be extremely successful. Their success is reliant on the recognition of the personnel and skills they do have - not who they are missing. Second, since this is the reality that many units face today, quit complaining and figure out how to solve your problem. Finally, commanders at all levels need to honestly "see" their unit, report that to higher, and then explain how they intend to go about accomplishing their mission in spite of their challenges. As I often say when conducting marksmanship training, the task (combat) and the standard (winning) will not change. The conditions are always the variable. And changing conditions require changing solutions to ensure that the standard is always maintained.
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell." - General Edward C. Meyer
Many units I work with fit this general description. The Army simply cannot fill them fast enough with the exactly right mix as described by the organization charts. And even if the Army could, many units are serving in ways that they were not designed for, so some of the skill sets called for in the organization chart have no bearing on the mission they are confronted with.
The difference between Gen Meyer's comment and many I hear today though is profound. Meyer accepts that although his unit was understrength, they worked to the best of their collective abilities. The situation could not wait. Today, many units routinely complain that they cannot do what they have to because the right people are not in the right places. They complain that the Soldiers they do have aren't capable of doing what must get done. While there is truth that they are short critical personnel, and there may be truth that the Soldiers they do have cannot accomplish what must get done - my point here is that fixing part 2 of the above and not worrying so much about part 1 is the key. The acceptance of the personnel limitation plus the understanding of the limitations of those you do have on hand and the recognition of what must get done is the critical first step in creating a cohesive and mission focused organization. Meyer's quote also lends credence to my personal belief that you have to train people first and then take care of the task. If a twenty something Corporal is serving as a platoon leader, don't expect a lot of MDMP (Military Decision Making Process), it's just not in his/her vocabulary. They don't teach it at NCO education schools. That doesn't mean that they can't do it, just that the manner and method used to teach it might have to be different. A 2nd Lieutenant as a company commander? In combat? The thought frightens people. Why? While modern Full Spectrum Operations are complex, multi-layered and evolve rapidly, that doesn't mean that you had to have attended the Captains Career Course to be able to figure out what to do when people start shooting at you, your vehicle gets blown up, or you have casualties.
We have to start training the folks we have, with whatever their experience levels are, and adjust how we do it to match what must get done. But how? First, I think it begins with trust and a thorough review of the problem(s). A leader has to outline for the group - whatever its composition - the challenges they mutually face. Second, the recognition and determination that they will solve their collective problem together. That each of them must participate. That there is a sense of interdependence. When a unit or group does those 2 things, they have begun to solve the issues that confront them.
But, then there is the 'politics'. The need to accurately convey to others the realities (personnel and otherwise) the unit faces. Sometimes, the very manner in which that conversation takes place can profoundly effect what happens to the unit. Senior leaders may be able to change the make-up of the unit once they are aware of the critical need. They also may not. If the senior leader cannot affect a personnel change, they may have to consider a mission change. If that is not possible then possibly they will have to accept a different training method - outside of standard Army doctrine - that will assist the unit to accomplish it's requirements. If the senior leader is supportive of this an understrength unit can be extremely successful. If not, the results can be disastrous. If the senior leader expects an understrength, and incorrectly assimilated (personnel serving in positions they have no training for) to act in the same manner as a full strength unit, then that unit will likely fail. And the Soldiers will lose trust and faith in their leadership.
So, 3 points here. First, understrength units can be extremely successful. Their success is reliant on the recognition of the personnel and skills they do have - not who they are missing. Second, since this is the reality that many units face today, quit complaining and figure out how to solve your problem. Finally, commanders at all levels need to honestly "see" their unit, report that to higher, and then explain how they intend to go about accomplishing their mission in spite of their challenges. As I often say when conducting marksmanship training, the task (combat) and the standard (winning) will not change. The conditions are always the variable. And changing conditions require changing solutions to ensure that the standard is always maintained.
#9 Further Up the Road
This post is dedicated to my friend Erica.
Around 2:00 am this past Saturday morning, standing in my driveway, I said goodbye to a friend of mine. We had just completed a 12 hour odyssey to get home from Boston after a 2 day conference at Natick Labs to look at the improvements being made in body armor and also to ensure that people understood the impact body armor has on small statured Soldiers - principally women. Exhausted,we hugged and she quietly backed out of the driveway and drove away.
I first met her 2 years ago when her unit was the first to implement the marksmanship course. She was their Assistant S3 at the time, but still young, and still learning. She would go on to have her own Operations shop in Iraq later that year. Many injured Soldiers have passed through her hospital and she and her staff have cared for them as if they were their very own children. She carries the burden of those whom they could not save. At 26, she has seen the absolute best and the absolute worst of the human condition. She has grown a lot. She is wise beyond her years.
In an earlier post, I made mention of learning from the next generation. The idea that you had to understand how they see their world, how they process information, how they make decisions, in order to effectively make use of their talents. That the mentor/mentee relationship has to work on equal footing. Being older does not always imply being wiser. And, even if it does, if they can't hear you then the wisdom in your message may be lost anyway. She and I always worked that way, and I am better for it.
In this case, Erica taught me more than I ever taught her. She commented the other day that Millennials may be more comfortable dealing in ambiguity than Gen Xers. I prefer structure while she is comfortable with change and uncertainty. I prefer time to consider all points, she can work off of the 70% solution. No less effective, and possibly more because she keeps pace with her environment much better than I. Just another lesson from the kid. I'll spend hours mulling over the implication of that in Soldier training.
But she is more than a philosophical abstraction. She, LJ, and others have been good friends to me during a particularly difficult period in my life. I cannot express my gratitude enough for their patience and support. After hearing my stories and complaints and frustrations for the 10,000th time, she still listened, still cared and still offered me things to think about or a fresh perspective to consider. She has been kind and empathetic without allowing me to wallow. She has pushed me to be better because of this struggle. She allows me my passion and emotions but never ceases to bring me back to reason.
Good luck, EK. As we laughed about it the other night, the Army is actually a very small world. No doubt our paths will cross again. As Bruce said in the song driving home "Further up the road, Further up the road, I'll meet you further on up the road, When the way is dark and the night is cold, I'll meet you further on up the road....."
Around 2:00 am this past Saturday morning, standing in my driveway, I said goodbye to a friend of mine. We had just completed a 12 hour odyssey to get home from Boston after a 2 day conference at Natick Labs to look at the improvements being made in body armor and also to ensure that people understood the impact body armor has on small statured Soldiers - principally women. Exhausted,we hugged and she quietly backed out of the driveway and drove away.
I first met her 2 years ago when her unit was the first to implement the marksmanship course. She was their Assistant S3 at the time, but still young, and still learning. She would go on to have her own Operations shop in Iraq later that year. Many injured Soldiers have passed through her hospital and she and her staff have cared for them as if they were their very own children. She carries the burden of those whom they could not save. At 26, she has seen the absolute best and the absolute worst of the human condition. She has grown a lot. She is wise beyond her years.
In an earlier post, I made mention of learning from the next generation. The idea that you had to understand how they see their world, how they process information, how they make decisions, in order to effectively make use of their talents. That the mentor/mentee relationship has to work on equal footing. Being older does not always imply being wiser. And, even if it does, if they can't hear you then the wisdom in your message may be lost anyway. She and I always worked that way, and I am better for it.
In this case, Erica taught me more than I ever taught her. She commented the other day that Millennials may be more comfortable dealing in ambiguity than Gen Xers. I prefer structure while she is comfortable with change and uncertainty. I prefer time to consider all points, she can work off of the 70% solution. No less effective, and possibly more because she keeps pace with her environment much better than I. Just another lesson from the kid. I'll spend hours mulling over the implication of that in Soldier training.
But she is more than a philosophical abstraction. She, LJ, and others have been good friends to me during a particularly difficult period in my life. I cannot express my gratitude enough for their patience and support. After hearing my stories and complaints and frustrations for the 10,000th time, she still listened, still cared and still offered me things to think about or a fresh perspective to consider. She has been kind and empathetic without allowing me to wallow. She has pushed me to be better because of this struggle. She allows me my passion and emotions but never ceases to bring me back to reason.
Good luck, EK. As we laughed about it the other night, the Army is actually a very small world. No doubt our paths will cross again. As Bruce said in the song driving home "Further up the road, Further up the road, I'll meet you further on up the road, When the way is dark and the night is cold, I'll meet you further on up the road....."
#8 A Quick Follow-Up
The Future Operational Learner
"The introductory chapter describes many of the different characteristics and attitudes of the
millennial generation that will most affect the Army in 2015 to 2024 and how the expectations of this future generation about jobs and careers are different from those of their parents and
grandparents. In spite of these differences, the Army can be certain that future learners will share many of the needs and preferences of today’s adult learners. For example, they will have a need to know why learning is required, a need to direct their learning, a need to contribute their experiences to the learning situation, a need to apply what they have learned to solve real world problems and a need to feel competent and experience success throughout the learning program. What is far less certain is whether and how future learners will be “unique learners,” different in identifiable ways from today’s learners, and the implications, if any, for the Army. For example, some believe that the brains and thinking patterns of this generation of computer-users
may be different from those of previous generations. Marc Prensky posits that people brought up with computers: …think differently than the rest of us. They develop hypertext minds...Thinking skills enhanced by repeated exposure to computer games and other digital media include reading visual images as representations of three-dimensional space (representational competence), multidimensional visual-spatial skills, mental maps,…inductive discovery…attentional deployment, and responding faster to expected and unexpected stimuli. According to Prensky, a unique feature of future learners is that they may choose to pay attention in bursts rather than continuously. He states that they: “Tune in just enough to get the gist and be sure it makes sense.” Numerous sources acknowledge this propensity for millennials to pay attention in “twitch speed” bursts while multitasking, and bricolaging (or piecing together information). This has in turn led to a concern that the millennials’ thinking may be characterized by short attention spans and a lack of reflection. If true, the latter characterization would be especially troubling given that reflective thought contributes to adaptive thinking and adaptive thinking is a critical future Soldier competency.97 However, others have suggested that the reported short attention spans and lack of reflection among millennials merely signify that these learners possess an invaluable attribute—the ability to evaluate information rapidly. Puchta and others point out that the most valuable skill in the twenty-first century probably won’t be attention span, but rather the ability to multitask—another characteristic that may be more common among millennials."
The above is another quotation from the TRADOC Pam referenced in my earlier post. My reason for placing it here should be relatively obvious by now, namely that if we don't start focusing our leader development and training efforts around the youngest generation of Soldiers - using the current operational environment as the canvas for learning rather than the ultimate endstate (wining the war) then we will forever work backwards.
If, in fact, Millennials think differently - actually process raw data faster, are more capable of discarding unneeded or unuseful information, and multi-task more completely than previous generations, then the need for different training solutions and leader development models becomes absolutely imperative. For example, raw data in and of itself without a contemplative component will have very little value. So, it may be that one of the things that needs to be impressed upon a Millennial is sorting through reams of data and then finding the pieces tat require more contemplative thought in order to fully understand it's value. This is somewhat the opposite of earlier generations who were given to long ponderings on esoteric ideas, but often these had no immediate impact, or lacked a practical way of being implemented.
"The introductory chapter describes many of the different characteristics and attitudes of the
millennial generation that will most affect the Army in 2015 to 2024 and how the expectations of this future generation about jobs and careers are different from those of their parents and
grandparents. In spite of these differences, the Army can be certain that future learners will share many of the needs and preferences of today’s adult learners. For example, they will have a need to know why learning is required, a need to direct their learning, a need to contribute their experiences to the learning situation, a need to apply what they have learned to solve real world problems and a need to feel competent and experience success throughout the learning program. What is far less certain is whether and how future learners will be “unique learners,” different in identifiable ways from today’s learners, and the implications, if any, for the Army. For example, some believe that the brains and thinking patterns of this generation of computer-users
may be different from those of previous generations. Marc Prensky posits that people brought up with computers: …think differently than the rest of us. They develop hypertext minds...Thinking skills enhanced by repeated exposure to computer games and other digital media include reading visual images as representations of three-dimensional space (representational competence), multidimensional visual-spatial skills, mental maps,…inductive discovery…attentional deployment, and responding faster to expected and unexpected stimuli. According to Prensky, a unique feature of future learners is that they may choose to pay attention in bursts rather than continuously. He states that they: “Tune in just enough to get the gist and be sure it makes sense.” Numerous sources acknowledge this propensity for millennials to pay attention in “twitch speed” bursts while multitasking, and bricolaging (or piecing together information). This has in turn led to a concern that the millennials’ thinking may be characterized by short attention spans and a lack of reflection. If true, the latter characterization would be especially troubling given that reflective thought contributes to adaptive thinking and adaptive thinking is a critical future Soldier competency.97 However, others have suggested that the reported short attention spans and lack of reflection among millennials merely signify that these learners possess an invaluable attribute—the ability to evaluate information rapidly. Puchta and others point out that the most valuable skill in the twenty-first century probably won’t be attention span, but rather the ability to multitask—another characteristic that may be more common among millennials."
The above is another quotation from the TRADOC Pam referenced in my earlier post. My reason for placing it here should be relatively obvious by now, namely that if we don't start focusing our leader development and training efforts around the youngest generation of Soldiers - using the current operational environment as the canvas for learning rather than the ultimate endstate (wining the war) then we will forever work backwards.
If, in fact, Millennials think differently - actually process raw data faster, are more capable of discarding unneeded or unuseful information, and multi-task more completely than previous generations, then the need for different training solutions and leader development models becomes absolutely imperative. For example, raw data in and of itself without a contemplative component will have very little value. So, it may be that one of the things that needs to be impressed upon a Millennial is sorting through reams of data and then finding the pieces tat require more contemplative thought in order to fully understand it's value. This is somewhat the opposite of earlier generations who were given to long ponderings on esoteric ideas, but often these had no immediate impact, or lacked a practical way of being implemented.
#7 The Baby AND the Bath Water
First, I want to thank ConnectingtheDots, who commented on my Post yesterday and introduced me to Generation Jones. By following the links provided in his/her reply, one finds that there is an emerging intermediate generation - those born ~ 1954 to 1965, that fits in between the Baby Boomers and Generation X. This is an important addition to my thoughts from yesterday due to the fact that GenJones comprise an age range from 44 to 55 years, basically, the middle and upper management of today's western society. Since this demographic also serves in the Army, and is at this point the Lieutenant Colonels and higher, it stands to reason that their influence, perception and viewpoint of their environment is a necessary and critical understanding we must face as it relates to interaction with the Millennials and the changing face of the Army culture in the years ahead.
But, that is not the purpose of today's post. Today, I want to look at the interaction between Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E) and Task, Condition, Standards (T/C/S) training. Earlier this year I attended a 2 day conference on OBT&E at Johns Hopkins University. Many of the prominent players - both military and civilian - in the Outcome movement were present, as were many folks who work in the current T/C/S environment. While everyone was civil and people listened politely to the positions being advanced, it became apparent to me early on the the T/C/S folks were having some difficulty wrapping their head around the idea of prescribing a 'less is more' approach to training. At times it almost appeared that the T/C/S crowd felt threatened by the notion that that they might no longer be the driving force behind Soldier training. Over and over a Resource Manager or Training Support Package writer would stand up and proclaim that the Army simply couldn't do away with T/C/S. That we had to have a baseline, concrete competency against which we could measure the effectiveness of training and - in no small measure - its' efficiency. With equal resolve, the OBT&E folks very patiently stated that OBT&E does not replace or render T/C/S obsolete. They would only contend that the focus needs to shift from the measurable inputs (bullets, hours, student ratios etc) to training that is focused on the output. What kind of Soldier, with what kind of skill sets do we need to produce? That was the prize for the OBT&E camp. A Soldier who possessed both the learnable skills required, but also met a commander's requirement for confidence, sound judgement and adaptability. It seemed that we were well on our way to an either/or argument with neither camp giving in easily.
As the only person present who represented a current warfighting Division, I tried to influence this discussion by reminding both camps that I have to live daily with whatever type of Soldier I am given by the Generating Force. Upon reflection, I did a poor job of this because I became frustrated and angry with both groups, and because I don't see this as an either/or discussion. It seemed to me that both camps were advocates for their singular position and that the 20,000 plus Soldiers of my Division were merely pawns in their larger chess game. I lost my perspective, personalized the discussion and therefore lost their willingness to listen to my points. A valuable personal lesson.
All that is background for this: I believe there is room for both T/C/S and OBT&E in the Soldier training arena. I believe this because I see it every time I run a marksmanship program. Organizations hire me to essentially increase their productivity and efficiency, which the program does. It provides measurable data to compare against previous exercises and determine it's value. I predict an 80% 'First time Go' rate and an 'Average score of 30 for First time Go shooters'. This is generally significantly higher than the units' previous experiences. The unit values the numeric assessment of bullets, time, through-put, scores etc. They can chart it. They can present it to others. It can be graphed and predicted. Plus or minus 2 points, it is an almost certainty. The task and standard remain the same. Soldiers are still required to hit a minimum of 23 targets on a standard qualification range. There is a definite T/C/S feel to it. Take X amount of resources, set Y conditions, achieve Z results. Extremely programmatic. In fact, many units like the program so much, that they turn it into THE way they will conduct marksmanship training in the future. In essence, they hire me to make them more productive and efficient. A very business-like model and one that is very necessary right now in order to get my foot in the door. Just selling the good idea of a better training method to someone who has 900 things to do and very little time to get them done doesn't generate a lot of excitement. However, the idea that the unit could get one of those tasks completed in a more effective, efficient manner does generate some excitement. Because, for the unit, this is all about meeting the deadline.
Once I'm hired though, the discussion begins to change. As part of the introduction, I plainly state that I really don't care about qualification scores, but rather on creating a more competent, confident and capable shooter. In fact, I emphasize the point that if we do that, if we can create conditions for a Soldier to become more confident in their ability to handle their weapon and engage targets, and, if we can teach them the basic skills associated with shooting, then we will achieve the numbers improvement almost automatically. So, I'm still playing to the command by keeping them focused on what they still think is important - efficiency. It is rare that a commander, at this point, sees the larger thematic view that competent, confident and capable will generate a better overall Soldier, not just a better marksman.
The rest of the training is derived from that point. What do the shooters already know? What do they not know? Are they aware of the implications of each of the mechanical steps to shooting well? How do I need to talk to them to ensure they understand the importance of the class? Because I have done this a lot, and because I also grew up in the current training system, I already know the answers to most of those questions. They don't know much, they need to know a lot more than they do, we are going to have fun, and soon enough they would begin to understand the importance of taking ownership of their skills and responsibility for their actions. Because I am not restricted in manner or method, I have a freedom to expand and contract the class as necessary based upon the group I'm working with. This is a key point in the OBT&E camp - that trainers have the freedom necessary to adjust the method of instruction to meet the needs of the students while at the same time always moving the class towards achieving the commanders intent.
Another key point to make here is that I am responsible for the outcome that the training produces. That is not to say that it's about me, but that I have a real responsibility to produce for the unit what I said I would - a Soldier capable of safely and competently able to handle his/her weapon with the confidence that they know how to use it if the situation dictates.
So, how do you do all that? How do you meet the unit's desire for better training at equal cost? How do you begin to change the training culture of the unit in a compressed environment? How do you meet the needs of every group (shooters, coaches, trainers, resourcers and commanders) that participates in the event? Essentially, you do it by keeping the baby (T/C/S) and the bathwater (OBT&E). You find a way to introduce change inside the current construct, and then find opportunities during the training to reinforce the free-thinking and decision making responsibilities for all of the groups participating. In effect, once the classroom portion is complete, I do less, not more. I have given the Soldiers a basic understanding of what they must accomplish, now I try create an environment for them to put it into practice. For example, positional stability is a requirement for good shooting. A stable body platform helps keep the weapon still and makes it much easier to keep the weapon on target. In the class I teach them a method of achieving that stable platform, but on the range the Soldier is free to adjust themselves as necessary. As long as they can keep the weapon still then I'll leave them alone. Less is more. Another would be range commands. There are only 2 commands on my range - Hot and Cold. By removing all other extraneous commands, Soldiers are forced to pay close attention to their surroundings and what condition they and their weapon are in at all times. Teaching responsibility and safety by doing less, not more.
There is room for both OBT&E and T/C/S in Army training. They can - and for the near future probably will - have to coexist. There is a definite need to look beyond the inputs and throughput based training that characterized the Army of the 90's and early in the current war and move to a more free-thinking and Soldier oriented training system represented by OBT&E. But, culture change is hard work and often has to be taken in incremental bites. Sometimes, the best way to do that is to do less, not more
But, that is not the purpose of today's post. Today, I want to look at the interaction between Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E) and Task, Condition, Standards (T/C/S) training. Earlier this year I attended a 2 day conference on OBT&E at Johns Hopkins University. Many of the prominent players - both military and civilian - in the Outcome movement were present, as were many folks who work in the current T/C/S environment. While everyone was civil and people listened politely to the positions being advanced, it became apparent to me early on the the T/C/S folks were having some difficulty wrapping their head around the idea of prescribing a 'less is more' approach to training. At times it almost appeared that the T/C/S crowd felt threatened by the notion that that they might no longer be the driving force behind Soldier training. Over and over a Resource Manager or Training Support Package writer would stand up and proclaim that the Army simply couldn't do away with T/C/S. That we had to have a baseline, concrete competency against which we could measure the effectiveness of training and - in no small measure - its' efficiency. With equal resolve, the OBT&E folks very patiently stated that OBT&E does not replace or render T/C/S obsolete. They would only contend that the focus needs to shift from the measurable inputs (bullets, hours, student ratios etc) to training that is focused on the output. What kind of Soldier, with what kind of skill sets do we need to produce? That was the prize for the OBT&E camp. A Soldier who possessed both the learnable skills required, but also met a commander's requirement for confidence, sound judgement and adaptability. It seemed that we were well on our way to an either/or argument with neither camp giving in easily.
As the only person present who represented a current warfighting Division, I tried to influence this discussion by reminding both camps that I have to live daily with whatever type of Soldier I am given by the Generating Force. Upon reflection, I did a poor job of this because I became frustrated and angry with both groups, and because I don't see this as an either/or discussion. It seemed to me that both camps were advocates for their singular position and that the 20,000 plus Soldiers of my Division were merely pawns in their larger chess game. I lost my perspective, personalized the discussion and therefore lost their willingness to listen to my points. A valuable personal lesson.
All that is background for this: I believe there is room for both T/C/S and OBT&E in the Soldier training arena. I believe this because I see it every time I run a marksmanship program. Organizations hire me to essentially increase their productivity and efficiency, which the program does. It provides measurable data to compare against previous exercises and determine it's value. I predict an 80% 'First time Go' rate and an 'Average score of 30 for First time Go shooters'. This is generally significantly higher than the units' previous experiences. The unit values the numeric assessment of bullets, time, through-put, scores etc. They can chart it. They can present it to others. It can be graphed and predicted. Plus or minus 2 points, it is an almost certainty. The task and standard remain the same. Soldiers are still required to hit a minimum of 23 targets on a standard qualification range. There is a definite T/C/S feel to it. Take X amount of resources, set Y conditions, achieve Z results. Extremely programmatic. In fact, many units like the program so much, that they turn it into THE way they will conduct marksmanship training in the future. In essence, they hire me to make them more productive and efficient. A very business-like model and one that is very necessary right now in order to get my foot in the door. Just selling the good idea of a better training method to someone who has 900 things to do and very little time to get them done doesn't generate a lot of excitement. However, the idea that the unit could get one of those tasks completed in a more effective, efficient manner does generate some excitement. Because, for the unit, this is all about meeting the deadline.
Once I'm hired though, the discussion begins to change. As part of the introduction, I plainly state that I really don't care about qualification scores, but rather on creating a more competent, confident and capable shooter. In fact, I emphasize the point that if we do that, if we can create conditions for a Soldier to become more confident in their ability to handle their weapon and engage targets, and, if we can teach them the basic skills associated with shooting, then we will achieve the numbers improvement almost automatically. So, I'm still playing to the command by keeping them focused on what they still think is important - efficiency. It is rare that a commander, at this point, sees the larger thematic view that competent, confident and capable will generate a better overall Soldier, not just a better marksman.
The rest of the training is derived from that point. What do the shooters already know? What do they not know? Are they aware of the implications of each of the mechanical steps to shooting well? How do I need to talk to them to ensure they understand the importance of the class? Because I have done this a lot, and because I also grew up in the current training system, I already know the answers to most of those questions. They don't know much, they need to know a lot more than they do, we are going to have fun, and soon enough they would begin to understand the importance of taking ownership of their skills and responsibility for their actions. Because I am not restricted in manner or method, I have a freedom to expand and contract the class as necessary based upon the group I'm working with. This is a key point in the OBT&E camp - that trainers have the freedom necessary to adjust the method of instruction to meet the needs of the students while at the same time always moving the class towards achieving the commanders intent.
Another key point to make here is that I am responsible for the outcome that the training produces. That is not to say that it's about me, but that I have a real responsibility to produce for the unit what I said I would - a Soldier capable of safely and competently able to handle his/her weapon with the confidence that they know how to use it if the situation dictates.
So, how do you do all that? How do you meet the unit's desire for better training at equal cost? How do you begin to change the training culture of the unit in a compressed environment? How do you meet the needs of every group (shooters, coaches, trainers, resourcers and commanders) that participates in the event? Essentially, you do it by keeping the baby (T/C/S) and the bathwater (OBT&E). You find a way to introduce change inside the current construct, and then find opportunities during the training to reinforce the free-thinking and decision making responsibilities for all of the groups participating. In effect, once the classroom portion is complete, I do less, not more. I have given the Soldiers a basic understanding of what they must accomplish, now I try create an environment for them to put it into practice. For example, positional stability is a requirement for good shooting. A stable body platform helps keep the weapon still and makes it much easier to keep the weapon on target. In the class I teach them a method of achieving that stable platform, but on the range the Soldier is free to adjust themselves as necessary. As long as they can keep the weapon still then I'll leave them alone. Less is more. Another would be range commands. There are only 2 commands on my range - Hot and Cold. By removing all other extraneous commands, Soldiers are forced to pay close attention to their surroundings and what condition they and their weapon are in at all times. Teaching responsibility and safety by doing less, not more.
There is room for both OBT&E and T/C/S in Army training. They can - and for the near future probably will - have to coexist. There is a definite need to look beyond the inputs and throughput based training that characterized the Army of the 90's and early in the current war and move to a more free-thinking and Soldier oriented training system represented by OBT&E. But, culture change is hard work and often has to be taken in incremental bites. Sometimes, the best way to do that is to do less, not more
#6 My Silent Partner - Mr. Boyd Rules the World
"We will seek individuals ready and willing for warrior service. Bound to each
other by integrity and trust, the young Americans we welcome to our ranks will
learn that in the Army, every Soldier is a leader responsible for what happens in
his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability
at every level, particularly as it contributes to initiative: creating situations for an
adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army’s culture is
one of selfless service, a warrior culture rather than a corporate one. As such, it is
not important who gets the credit, either within the Army or within the joint team;
what’s important is that the Nation is served."
Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee
Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Schoomaker
Serving a Nation at War
My friend COL Boyd keeps showing up all over the place. I found the quotation above in a TRADOC study entitled The US Army Study of the Human Dimension in the Future, TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 the other morning and have been almost devouring it's contents for the past 2 days. The study is an attempt to look into future requirements for the Army both in terms of operations and in terms of what types of training and education it will take to produce Soldiers capable of fighting and winning in future conflict. In essence, it's a look at people in 3 domains, moral, physical, and mental.
For me, the key phrase in the above quotation is the following: "They will value learning and adaptability at every level; particularly as it contributes to initiative: creating situations for an adversary rather than reacting to them." This is the absolute essence of the OODA loop. In order to win in a conflict, one side must be able to so disrupt the oppositions decision cycle that the opponent is continually not able to execute his strategy, but rather spends all of his efforts reacting to what is being done to him. By being able to dictate the 'terms' of the battle - be they moral, physical, technological or otherwise, one organization gains a distinct advantage over the other in the contest. Generally, this does not bring about a grand victory where one adversary formally surrenders to the other, but rather victory occurs when one adversary does not posses the mental and moral character to continue the contest and quits.
In further writings, COL Boyd went on to talk at length about the moral, mental, physical conflict (see link: http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf) a theme that continually shows up in the TRADOC Pam. To me, these slides show up as almost a primer for any organization or nation on what is required to 'win' in the 21st century. Any discussion of the advantage of technology can, and is, being tempered by the reality that a small band of men on donkeys, living in caves who posses the 'moral' certitude of their cause is arguably winning our current conflict. And why? Because by acting with absolute 'moral' certitude they also imbue an ethos - dare we call it a Warrior Ethos? - that is stronger than their adversaries and allows them to draw upon a reserve of strength and willingness to persevere that their adversary does not posses.
The TRADOC Pamphlet, which envisions the Army from 2015 - 2024, then goes on to ponder the idea of what types of citizens the Army will have as a prospective pool in the years ahead. Looking generationally, these young people are called "Millennials". For reference, Baby Boomers, Gen X, Gen Y, Millenials. The study forwards the following thought,
"People born between 1980 and 2000 will have the greatest influence on the nature of the
Army in 2015-2024, either as experienced Soldiers or new recruits. These learners belong to a
generation known by several names including the Millennials. Although each millennial is an
individual with unique characteristics, when viewed collectively certain broad conclusions can be drawn about them as a generation. Ethnically and culturally, they are a diverse generation.
According to the Washington Post, “Forty-five percent of the nation's children under age 5 are
racial or ethnic minorities. The percentage is increasing mainly because the Hispanic population
is growing so rapidly. The country as a whole is 33 percent minority. Due to these changing demographics, the use of languages other than English is common. Americans are
more tolerant of other languages now, whereas assimilation was the norm in the past."
Socially, “[the Millennials are] the ‘Babies on Board’ of the early Reagan years, the ‘Have
You Hugged Your Child Today?’ sixth graders of the early Clinton years, and the teen
contemporaries of Columbine. They are the children of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
and the first generation to grow up in the post 9/11 world. Their structured lives included
parents shuffling them from one activity to another all under the watchful eyes of teachers,
coaches, tutors, and music instructors. Wide-ranging child protection laws and safety products
that came out of the 1980s have made Millennials one of the most sheltered generations.
Consequently, they have emerged as a tolerant, pragmatic, ambitious, and optimistic group. They believe themselves to be influential and unique. They are familiar with all things digital, having grown up immersed in computer games, MP3 players, DVDs, digital video recorders, cell phones, and the Internet. Their values are not constant, but are variable according to the
exigencies of the moment. Their perception of right and wrong will probably differ from their
leaders. The majority of high school students freely admit to lying, cheating, and stealing, yet see nothing wrong with their ethics and character. These factors if left unchanged will have a
major impact on future recruiting and training policies."
Let me try to string together some other thoughts here and try to discover a theme. 1) The Army needs to be a values based organization... 2) Those values are embedded in the Constitution, and the fabric of American culture.... 3) That fabric is changing based on various global outside influences... 4) Values are shaped by common, shared experiences... 5)Generations have differing understandings of the meaning or interpretation of the shared values... 6) Consequently, they have emerged as a tolerant, pragmatic, ambitious, and optimistic group. 7) "Man is the first weapon of battle. Let us study the Soldier, for it is he who brings reality to it." - Ardant du Pique...8) The second O of Boyd's OODA Loop is Orient...9) "First and foremost, the Army is Soldiers. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve; it is Soldiers who use them to accomplish their mission. Soldiers committed to selfless service to the Nation are the centerpiece of Army organizations."
FM 1, The Army, June 2005
So, we must raise a generation of Soldiers who came of age in a rapidly changing world, with a different value system than their predecessors, who are less likely to be swayed by grand value themes (Freedom vs Oppression, Good vs Evil etc), who have a more practical interconnected and global view of their environment and who will continually keep a sharp eye to their own self-interest. Hmmm. And we must find a way to combine that reality into the organizational requirement of the Army as a value based organization.
The Top must start paying very very careful attention to the Bottom. Using OODA, we now reach a point where we have begun a cursory look at the Observe (a problem with Soldier and leader development) and the Orient (the why outlined above) and now we come to the Act. How will we combine the moral components of a values based Army with the moral needs of a changing Soldier population? How must we change our current actions to ensure that we can adequately prepare Soldiers and leaders for the changing face of conflict in the early 21st century?
One quick answer may be to simply ask the Bottom what it values. Enquire of it what is important. Ask why it thinks/acts/feels the way it does. Principally, respect it. Treat it in reality the way it is outlined in FM 1. Treat is as the most precious commodity that the Army has. We must study the Soldier and leader requirements for the world we are living in and become so committed to their success, that they feel so valued that they willingly absorb the organizational ethos that sustains them and gives them purpose. In essence, while not surrendering those organizational, immutable, moral constructs that are required of the Army, we must listen to what the Bottom is telling us and communicate our understanding of them in a way that resonates to them. Not us. Them. That is the key. If we keep talking to ourselves at the Top and using words that have meaning only to us, then we will lose the Bottom. We will lose the singularity of purpose that an Army requires. We will lose the moral/mental component of the Soldier.
COL Boyd knew this. And his thoughts keep showing up in my life everyday.
other by integrity and trust, the young Americans we welcome to our ranks will
learn that in the Army, every Soldier is a leader responsible for what happens in
his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability
at every level, particularly as it contributes to initiative: creating situations for an
adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army’s culture is
one of selfless service, a warrior culture rather than a corporate one. As such, it is
not important who gets the credit, either within the Army or within the joint team;
what’s important is that the Nation is served."
Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee
Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Schoomaker
Serving a Nation at War
My friend COL Boyd keeps showing up all over the place. I found the quotation above in a TRADOC study entitled The US Army Study of the Human Dimension in the Future, TRADOC Pam 525-3-7-01 the other morning and have been almost devouring it's contents for the past 2 days. The study is an attempt to look into future requirements for the Army both in terms of operations and in terms of what types of training and education it will take to produce Soldiers capable of fighting and winning in future conflict. In essence, it's a look at people in 3 domains, moral, physical, and mental.
For me, the key phrase in the above quotation is the following: "They will value learning and adaptability at every level; particularly as it contributes to initiative: creating situations for an adversary rather than reacting to them." This is the absolute essence of the OODA loop. In order to win in a conflict, one side must be able to so disrupt the oppositions decision cycle that the opponent is continually not able to execute his strategy, but rather spends all of his efforts reacting to what is being done to him. By being able to dictate the 'terms' of the battle - be they moral, physical, technological or otherwise, one organization gains a distinct advantage over the other in the contest. Generally, this does not bring about a grand victory where one adversary formally surrenders to the other, but rather victory occurs when one adversary does not posses the mental and moral character to continue the contest and quits.
In further writings, COL Boyd went on to talk at length about the moral, mental, physical conflict (see link: http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf) a theme that continually shows up in the TRADOC Pam. To me, these slides show up as almost a primer for any organization or nation on what is required to 'win' in the 21st century. Any discussion of the advantage of technology can, and is, being tempered by the reality that a small band of men on donkeys, living in caves who posses the 'moral' certitude of their cause is arguably winning our current conflict. And why? Because by acting with absolute 'moral' certitude they also imbue an ethos - dare we call it a Warrior Ethos? - that is stronger than their adversaries and allows them to draw upon a reserve of strength and willingness to persevere that their adversary does not posses.
The TRADOC Pamphlet, which envisions the Army from 2015 - 2024, then goes on to ponder the idea of what types of citizens the Army will have as a prospective pool in the years ahead. Looking generationally, these young people are called "Millennials". For reference, Baby Boomers, Gen X, Gen Y, Millenials. The study forwards the following thought,
"People born between 1980 and 2000 will have the greatest influence on the nature of the
Army in 2015-2024, either as experienced Soldiers or new recruits. These learners belong to a
generation known by several names including the Millennials. Although each millennial is an
individual with unique characteristics, when viewed collectively certain broad conclusions can be drawn about them as a generation. Ethnically and culturally, they are a diverse generation.
According to the Washington Post, “Forty-five percent of the nation's children under age 5 are
racial or ethnic minorities. The percentage is increasing mainly because the Hispanic population
is growing so rapidly. The country as a whole is 33 percent minority. Due to these changing demographics, the use of languages other than English is common. Americans are
more tolerant of other languages now, whereas assimilation was the norm in the past."
Socially, “[the Millennials are] the ‘Babies on Board’ of the early Reagan years, the ‘Have
You Hugged Your Child Today?’ sixth graders of the early Clinton years, and the teen
contemporaries of Columbine. They are the children of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
and the first generation to grow up in the post 9/11 world. Their structured lives included
parents shuffling them from one activity to another all under the watchful eyes of teachers,
coaches, tutors, and music instructors. Wide-ranging child protection laws and safety products
that came out of the 1980s have made Millennials one of the most sheltered generations.
Consequently, they have emerged as a tolerant, pragmatic, ambitious, and optimistic group. They believe themselves to be influential and unique. They are familiar with all things digital, having grown up immersed in computer games, MP3 players, DVDs, digital video recorders, cell phones, and the Internet. Their values are not constant, but are variable according to the
exigencies of the moment. Their perception of right and wrong will probably differ from their
leaders. The majority of high school students freely admit to lying, cheating, and stealing, yet see nothing wrong with their ethics and character. These factors if left unchanged will have a
major impact on future recruiting and training policies."
Let me try to string together some other thoughts here and try to discover a theme. 1) The Army needs to be a values based organization... 2) Those values are embedded in the Constitution, and the fabric of American culture.... 3) That fabric is changing based on various global outside influences... 4) Values are shaped by common, shared experiences... 5)Generations have differing understandings of the meaning or interpretation of the shared values... 6) Consequently, they have emerged as a tolerant, pragmatic, ambitious, and optimistic group. 7) "Man is the first weapon of battle. Let us study the Soldier, for it is he who brings reality to it." - Ardant du Pique...8) The second O of Boyd's OODA Loop is Orient...9) "First and foremost, the Army is Soldiers. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve; it is Soldiers who use them to accomplish their mission. Soldiers committed to selfless service to the Nation are the centerpiece of Army organizations."
FM 1, The Army, June 2005
So, we must raise a generation of Soldiers who came of age in a rapidly changing world, with a different value system than their predecessors, who are less likely to be swayed by grand value themes (Freedom vs Oppression, Good vs Evil etc), who have a more practical interconnected and global view of their environment and who will continually keep a sharp eye to their own self-interest. Hmmm. And we must find a way to combine that reality into the organizational requirement of the Army as a value based organization.
The Top must start paying very very careful attention to the Bottom. Using OODA, we now reach a point where we have begun a cursory look at the Observe (a problem with Soldier and leader development) and the Orient (the why outlined above) and now we come to the Act. How will we combine the moral components of a values based Army with the moral needs of a changing Soldier population? How must we change our current actions to ensure that we can adequately prepare Soldiers and leaders for the changing face of conflict in the early 21st century?
One quick answer may be to simply ask the Bottom what it values. Enquire of it what is important. Ask why it thinks/acts/feels the way it does. Principally, respect it. Treat it in reality the way it is outlined in FM 1. Treat is as the most precious commodity that the Army has. We must study the Soldier and leader requirements for the world we are living in and become so committed to their success, that they feel so valued that they willingly absorb the organizational ethos that sustains them and gives them purpose. In essence, while not surrendering those organizational, immutable, moral constructs that are required of the Army, we must listen to what the Bottom is telling us and communicate our understanding of them in a way that resonates to them. Not us. Them. That is the key. If we keep talking to ourselves at the Top and using words that have meaning only to us, then we will lose the Bottom. We will lose the singularity of purpose that an Army requires. We will lose the moral/mental component of the Soldier.
COL Boyd knew this. And his thoughts keep showing up in my life everyday.
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