Fen, below is a comment to "#19 A Strategic Communication Follow-Up". Sorry it's in an email but I needed to go back and forth between what I'm writing and what was written.
Interesting exchange. As I read the SGM's email, it took a minute to realize who it was as I had read much of what he wrote in the not too distant past. This is, of course, because that SGM gave myself and the other junior enlisted in our office the same messages as "homework" during our brief time in his presence. As an example of mentorship, this particular SGM is perhaps unique from my perspective. I did not have to go to him seeking answers or guidance; He came to me to purposely impart knowledge and experience.
However, in the context of your original post on Gen. Caldwell's piece concerning Strategic Communication, I think he misunderstood what you were saying. I am in total agreement with your thesis that Strategic Communications in this war are not singly the purview of those who wear brass and operate at the CJTF or even Brigade level; That the individual soldier has a role to play in communicating the strategic message. I also think the leaders operating at the CJTF or higher levels of command realize this fact. The problem is at the intermediate and lower level, to include the individual soldier. At those levels, for multiple reasons, the idea that Pvt. Snuffy needs to be just as involved communicating the strategic message as LTG Sniffy is not realized, most critically by Pvt. Snuffy him/herself.
The strategic message is the basis for the overall mission of the organization. It is the purpose in Task, Purpose and Intent at the "Strategic" level. In the context of COIN, the organization's task is to defeat the insurgents by winning over the support of the people. The organization's purpose then is to convince the people that it is safer and more beneficial to work with the organization rather than the insurgents; Thus the message "We are friends, they are foes". The organizations intent is to communicate this message through words and deeds in order to demonstrate the validity of the message. If the words and deeds validate the message, convincing the people of the truth of the message, the people will gravitate to the organization and away from the insurgents thereby reducing the support for the insurgents. Without the support of the people, an insurgency will die thus bringing about the accomplishment of the task. That is a general, theoretical explanation of COIN. It is far more complicated.
The point is that the "words" put out at the strategic level are only validated in the eyes of the people by the "deeds" performed by the soldiers at the tactical/interpersonal level. Therefore, it is vital that ALL members of the organization be aware of and understand the impact their actions have on the accomplishment of the Strategic Mission. This requires more than an abstract awareness of the "message". It requires a constant awareness of the shifting environments the soldier is interacting within.
Having and maintaining that constant situational awareness requires the ability to see beyond your immediate physical and mental environment. In other words, to see the "Big Picture". The soldier, at all levels, will have smaller, individual missions (tasks) to accomplish. Accomplishing these smaller missions all play a part in the organization accomplishing it's overall strategic mission. Thus, it is required that all members of the organization, while accomplishing their immediate tasks, maintain an almost subdued or subliminal awareness of the overall, higher purpose of the organization; The Strategic Mission, the Strategic Message.
Far too often, even those of us who understand the Strategic Mission and Message in the abstract fail to contribute to its communication and success in the physical. We conceptualize it in the sense of, for example, the interactions of a PRT or a patrol in a village. In those instances, the effects of the message to be communicated is easier to visualize. Win the trust of the villagers, turn them to our side, deny the enemy support and sanctuary. You could say we communicate the message "outside the wire". But by limiting our understanding of the Strategic Message through the prism of "outside the wire", we render the implications of our interactions with local nationals "inside the wire" invisible. We hire hundreds, perhaps thousands of LNs to do work on our FOBs. They clean our latrines, mop our floors, build our buildings, wash our dishes and fuel our vehicles. They are paid to do these things. We do this as part of our Strategic Mission to build a viable, stable state part of which is a viable economy. It is better they earn a wage for building something instead of planting an IED. For some reason, because they are on the FOB, we take for granted that they have been "turned" to our side, never stopping to think that our words and deeds "inside the wire" may "turn" them to the other side. Therefore, though they are there, they are not there. They exist physically, we see them and are aware of there presence. But they are invisible in the abstract, larger picture so we fail to see the impact of our conduct on Strategic Communications within the confines of the FOB. I will give you an example.
While at Bagram working in the JOC, I got involved in a small peripheral way in an incident concerning a KBR foreman, the LNs working for him and an Afghan interpreter working for us. The project was the gym under construction on the JOC compound. I'll get into the dynamics of the situation later. For now, let's just say the interpreter had some concerns about the conduct of the KBR foreman and for some reason was directed to the J3 office to address them. He came to the office late at night when only myself and the Chief of Training were in the office. I got involved initially to steer him out of the office and to whoever may actually have been able to address his problem. It was not something that pertained to the operations of the J3 office. First we went to the gym to talk to subcontractor overseeing the project. From there we went to DIVENG for further guidance and found out the person to talk to was an Air Force LTC at the FET. Thinking my job was done I told him where to go the next day and wrote down the LTC's name. However, the interpreter was still lost and asked if I would go with him. I agreed to help him and told him to meet me at my office the next morning and we would walk down to the FET. I realized I had now become the interpreter for the interpreter. Maybe a better description would be the guide through the Byzantine corridors of the military bureaucracy. The next morning, he showed up and I told my immediate superior where I was going and then had to give a quick explanation why. My immediate superior was my NCOIC who told me not to get involved or wrapped up in something that was not my concern but did let me go. Basically, he told me that infamous line "stay in your lane". We went to the FET, talked to the LTC and from there I explained that there wasn't much more I could do to help since I had a job to do and by virtue of my rank would not be all that effective. I returned to my lane.
I mentioned the dynamics of the situation which were influential to my getting further involved than I normally would. The interpreter had witnessed the KBR foreman, an Iraqi-American oddly enough, verbally abusing and berating the Afghan workers. He tried to intervene to explain to the foreman that what he was doing was, in Afghan culture, insulting and humiliating and even offered to help talk to the workers to get the Foreman's point across in a more calmer manner. The foreman's response was belligerent and berating to the interpreter. It was also in front of the Afghan workers. Interestingly, the interpreter's concern was not about the treatment he received but the impact it and the the treatment of the workers might have on a wider level. In other words, how it effected the Strategic Message. You see, as he explained, those workers go home at night and they talk to the other Afghans who don't work on the FOB. The Taliban's Strategic Message is that the Americans and their allies are not in Afghanistan to help but to subjugate and exploit the Afghan people. The actions of that foreman had the potential to validate the Talibans message and invalidate ours. If those of us in uniform allowed that to happen with no repercussions on the foreman, not only would we help the enemy but we also might demoralize and turn our ally; i.e the interpreter. So I saw it as part of my duty in accomplishing the Strategic Mission to help the interpreter address his concerns. If I had followed the guidance of my NCOIC, I would have been shirking my part in accomplishing that mission.
My NCOIC at the time was SFC Fenlason who is now MSG Fenlason writng posts on a blog about Strategic Communication. Hmm...sooo tempting. But seriously, the purpose of this story is not as an indictment or attack on MSG Fenlason. It's more of an AAR or Lessons Learned purpose. I don't know if you were even considering Strategic Communication at the time. If so, it was probably in the context of what happened in Iraq or "outside the wire", which is understandable. Personally, I think far too many of us, myself included, who worked in the JOC far too often contextualized the Strategic Mission and Message in the framework of "outside the wire". It was that incident with the interpreter that made me more conscious of the Afghans working on Bagram thus more conscious of how our actions on the FOB effected the Strategic Mission. So I bring this story up more for the sake of contemplation.
The SGM wrote:
" Army leaders adopt and internalize Army values and develop the requisite mental, physical, and emotional attributes. They learn the interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills required to lead soldiers and accomplish missions. Leaders motivate subordinates, conduct operations, and continually develop and improve their units, their Soldiers, and themselves. Leadership is a life-long learning process—in the classroom, in personal study, and in practice.• Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment."
As a soldier and an NCO, I need to know my mission, both my immediate and strategic mission. How can I adapt, how can I motivate subordinates if I don't know the "why" of what I'm being ordered to do? The same applies to those NCOs and Officers above me. How do they motivate me without explaining to me the "why" of what they want me to do? We are told in the Army that shit rolls downhill. Is it too much to ask that a little info follow it?
There is much more to discuss in terms of what the SGM wrote. I hope others join the conversation. For now, I'm signing off. I've already spent all day, two packs of cigarettes, and not enough coffee writing this. I'm almost dreading Monday morning.
#19 A Strategic Communication Follow-Up
Below is an email response that I received from a retired Sergeant Major who I met for a short while in Afghanistan. He is replying to my comments regarding "Strategic Communication" in a blog by General Campbell (See Post #11):
MSG Fenlason,
Two things a leader is supposed to do: 1. Lead Soldiers and units during battle; 2. Prepare Soldiers and units to fight the battle.
COL Mike Malone
Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations are part of our Doctrine. We don't like to participate or take the lead in these operations, favoring offensive and defensive operations instead, but it doesn't mean we don't have competent doctrine to effectively manage and accomplish Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations. I hate what occurred with your element, and especially the outcome, but I can't see blaming the highest levels of command for this breakdown.
As you read these excerpts from FM-1, Chapter 1, remember the opening to the NCO Creed: I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of Soldiers. No one is more professional than I.
• Army professionalism is intellectual, physical, and moral in nature; it requires expert knowledge of the concepts and tools of its trade. It is intellectual because the unique body of expertise required in military operations is extensive. The conduct of war, its technology, and the execution of military strategy, operations, and tactics are complex matters, certainly as demanding as the practice of any other profession. Moreover, Army professionals must exercise their expertise against intelligent adversaries. The consequences of failure in our profession—both for the Soldier and the Nation—are more dire than those in any other.
• The need to master the intellectual, physical, and moral aspects of warfare forms the basis for our system of professional military education. Every Army leader must master all aspects of warfare, personally committing to the career-long process of learning, evaluating, and adapting to changing security environments, technologies, and military operations. Through this process, The Army professional continually develops expertise in the practice of the art and science of war.
• Leadership is vital to maintaining an agile and versatile force. Leaders inspire Soldiers to behave professionally and to accomplish missions effectively.
• Army leaders adopt and internalize Army values and develop the requisite mental, physical, and emotional attributes. They learn the interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills required to lead soldiers and accomplish missions. Leaders motivate subordinates, conduct operations, and continually develop and improve their units, their Soldiers, and themselves. Leadership is a life-long learning process—in the classroom, in personal study, and in practice.
• Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.
• Today's environment demands more from Army leaders then ever before. The Army needs adaptive leaders—leaders that can successfully operate across the range of military operations. It needs adaptive leaders who can be home one day and, within hours, conduct military operations anywhere in the world. The Army needs adaptive leaders who can operate in all technological environments—from hand-to-hand combat to offensive information operations.
FM 3-0, the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations, presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience. It was published several months before 9/11 occurred, but we didn't focus on or teach in our institutions more than Offensive or Defensive Operations in chapters 7 and 8.
The answer to the current dilemma was always in FM 3-0, chapter 9, just as it was in FM 101-5 beforehand.
9-16. Stability operations are inherently complex and place great demands on small units. Small unit leaders are required to develop interpersonal skills such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and critical language phrases while maintaining warfighting skills. They must also remain calm and exercise good judgment under considerable pressure. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. Often, stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.
Considerations for Stability Operations
• Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions
• Display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner
• Act decisively to prevent escalation
• Apply force selectively and discriminately
The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, the Soldier’s soul, are everything. Unless the Soldier’s soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.
General George C. Marshall
What you had was a leadership breakdown. Where it occurred is open to debate. The pillars of leader development include operational assignments, institutional learning, and self development. I know ANCOC didn’t focus on these skill sets and I am convinced your previous assignments didn’t adequately prepare you or your troops for this type of combat. The same is probably true for your commander. In retrospect, you now have the insight to be a better Platoon Sergeant and would no doubt train and prepare your soldiers differently.
If I remember right, you took the helm of that platoon shortly before the deployment, so nothing may have made a difference. Still, I think you underestimated the gravity of your leadership responsibilities and are still failing to come to grips with your own shortcomings, or the shortcomings of the entire NCO development system.
Your argument is 75 years out of date:
"The commander who lacks the moral courage and the professional skill to develop and maintain a thoroughly competent corps of noncommissioned officers throughout his command thereby demonstrates his inability to assume the responsibilities of leadership in combat. Such a commander forfeits the confidence and respect of his subordinates. He destroys the morale of his organization. He will surely fail in battle. Success in combat depends upon the character and qualifications of the noncommissioned officers commanding small units. They must be outstanding leaders with a high sense of duty and a strong will. They must be resourceful and willing to assume responsibility. In order to insure that our noncommissioned officers are equal to the tasks that lie ahead of them, commanders of all echelons will give their personal attention to improving the quality and prestige of those noncommissioned officers who exercise command responsibilities." -1944 War Department Circular 70
Today, that is a leader responsibility, not a commanders.
What follows is my reply to him.
Thanks for replying to my post. It surprises me how few NCOs are paying attention to the discussions going on in higher echelons of the Army. I see that you are retired now, congratulations. I also see that you are back at Bagram, so I know that you will continue to assist leaders with the development tools they need. With regard to your specific comments regarding my post, I must admit on first reading to have become angry. However, as I read it again and again, those emotions passed and I would like to address it as best I can. Forgive me if my thoughts become somewhat disjointed.
First, there is no doubt that there were many leadership failures in 1st platoon and many people (investigators, lawyers, reporters, Senior Army Leaders etc) have all tried to place the correct accountability in the right places. All of us who were a part of that leadership team own a portion of that responsibility, not only the commissioned officer corps. As you rightfully stated though, nothing in my previous 16 years in the Army - operational, or institutional prepared me adequately for that particular set of circumstances. In fact, I and others, did the best we knew how to do under the circumstances. In the end, the were no Army "approved" solutions to those events except for people taking what they believed to be the morally correct actions when the incident came to light. Others are allowed to have their own opinions of our actions and decisions, and we have to live with their judgements. It is also pertinent to state that I took over the platoon in-country, after they had suffered 4 KIA (PL, SL, TL and Soldier), had a PSG quit, and another get fired. I was the 3rd Platoon Sergeant in a 45 day period. The day of my arrival, the American portion of their FOB burned to the ground. The murders of the Iraqi family happened on my 5th week in charge. On that day, I was short my Platoon Leader and 2 Squad Leaders due to EML. I am not making excuses here, those are statements of fact that represent the conditions at the time.
Having said that, my purpose in responding to that particular blog and bringing up the 1st platoon war crime was not to "blame" the Chain of Command, as you suggested, but to highlight the fact that there can be tactical, operational, and strategic impacts of an individual Soldier's action(s) and yet we do nothing to train the Soldier to be aware of this. In the case of first platoon, there is evidence that when my Soldiers were attacked and abducted at the AVLB in June, that that attack was in retaliation for the actions of the other Soldiers in March. Additionally, the 2BDE, 10th Mtn unit that replaced us in Sep 06 had 4 Soldiers abducted in the same general area. It was reported in the international press at the time of the attack against the Iraqi family that a local Imam stated that "It will take 10 American lives to avenge the rape and murder of that Iraqi girl." That message was reiterated when the video of the abduction of my Soldiers was released on the Internet. Today, I read an article in INFANTRY Magazine (Marcgh-June 09 issue) that outlined the efforts of C 1/187 who replaced the 2/10 unit in Yusifiyah. There, the actions of my Soldiers continued to have locally strategic effect on the decisions and actions of both AIF and US forces. So, 4 Soldiers commit a heinous crime in early 2006, the effect of which is felt in '07 by the 2/10 unit and has operational implications for the 187 unit that followed them. Being that the Sunni Triangle was also considered the southern route into Bagdad, and that the incident galvanized and solidified tribal support for AQI against US and Iraqi Army forces, it seems reasonable that there can be theater strategic consequences to local actions.
I think what bothered me the most about the blog was the post that followed mine where it was implied that Strategic Communication is the pervue of CJTF or 3 star officers. That I take offense to. As Admiral Mullen, General McChrystal and others have said, it's not what we say, it our actions that count. That is a lesson that can be taught to all Soldiers, and something recognized by the 1/187 article. The unit took special pains to remind Soldiers that even if they suffered casualties etc, that random violence or a disproportionate response was not going to lead to mission success. In fact, that is exactly the same message that General McChrystal published recently in his guidance to US forces in Afghanistan - it is our actions at the local level that will carry the day and provide the concrete proof of the loftier "Strategic Communication" of senior leaders. I found it interesting that none of the other posters picked up on that idea. Maybe because they were too interested in the theoretical implications etc. It really is a simple message. Why should it be a sort of cottage industry for senior leaders?
We live in an instant communication world. The actions of a Soldier at any point on the battlefield can have immediate world-wide impact. The actions of 1st platoon both in the March incident involving the Iraqi family and the June incident involving the Soldiers at the AVLB were reported internationally overnight, and caused responses at the very highest levels of the Army and our government. In light of that, the idea that message sculpting can only be done by very senior leaders in almost laughable. In my case it was done by Steven Dale Green, a 23 year old kid from Midland Texas.
Finally, the only part of your reply that personally bugged me was your assertion that I have not accepted personal responsibility for what happened. I will tell you that not a day has gone by in the intervening 3 years that I have not asked myself what, if anything, I could have done differently. I have paid an emotionally heavy price for my time as the Platoon Sergeant of 1st platoon, and believe that I did the best I could do, with the Soldiers I had, under the circumstances I was faced with. Others may have done things differently than I did - with potentially different results. We will never know. That is the burden of leadership and command. It is the burden that with neither pride nor regret I carry daily. You are correct when you said that that time has made me a better leader. Crucibles have a way of doing that.
I would very much like to continue this dialogue with you if you are so inclined. In the short time we shared in Bagram during RIP/TOA, I was very impressed by you, your actions and your committment to the NCO Corps. Thanks for your time. Jeff Fenlason
There is a lot of really good stuff in this exchange. Please read it and absorb what he said. All that doctrine and manual stuff is important. How you accomplish those things is critical. That is the very hard work of leadership.
MSG Fenlason,
Two things a leader is supposed to do: 1. Lead Soldiers and units during battle; 2. Prepare Soldiers and units to fight the battle.
COL Mike Malone
Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations are part of our Doctrine. We don't like to participate or take the lead in these operations, favoring offensive and defensive operations instead, but it doesn't mean we don't have competent doctrine to effectively manage and accomplish Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations. I hate what occurred with your element, and especially the outcome, but I can't see blaming the highest levels of command for this breakdown.
As you read these excerpts from FM-1, Chapter 1, remember the opening to the NCO Creed: I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of Soldiers. No one is more professional than I.
• Army professionalism is intellectual, physical, and moral in nature; it requires expert knowledge of the concepts and tools of its trade. It is intellectual because the unique body of expertise required in military operations is extensive. The conduct of war, its technology, and the execution of military strategy, operations, and tactics are complex matters, certainly as demanding as the practice of any other profession. Moreover, Army professionals must exercise their expertise against intelligent adversaries. The consequences of failure in our profession—both for the Soldier and the Nation—are more dire than those in any other.
• The need to master the intellectual, physical, and moral aspects of warfare forms the basis for our system of professional military education. Every Army leader must master all aspects of warfare, personally committing to the career-long process of learning, evaluating, and adapting to changing security environments, technologies, and military operations. Through this process, The Army professional continually develops expertise in the practice of the art and science of war.
• Leadership is vital to maintaining an agile and versatile force. Leaders inspire Soldiers to behave professionally and to accomplish missions effectively.
• Army leaders adopt and internalize Army values and develop the requisite mental, physical, and emotional attributes. They learn the interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills required to lead soldiers and accomplish missions. Leaders motivate subordinates, conduct operations, and continually develop and improve their units, their Soldiers, and themselves. Leadership is a life-long learning process—in the classroom, in personal study, and in practice.
• Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.
• Today's environment demands more from Army leaders then ever before. The Army needs adaptive leaders—leaders that can successfully operate across the range of military operations. It needs adaptive leaders who can be home one day and, within hours, conduct military operations anywhere in the world. The Army needs adaptive leaders who can operate in all technological environments—from hand-to-hand combat to offensive information operations.
FM 3-0, the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations, presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience. It was published several months before 9/11 occurred, but we didn't focus on or teach in our institutions more than Offensive or Defensive Operations in chapters 7 and 8.
The answer to the current dilemma was always in FM 3-0, chapter 9, just as it was in FM 101-5 beforehand.
9-16. Stability operations are inherently complex and place great demands on small units. Small unit leaders are required to develop interpersonal skills such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and critical language phrases while maintaining warfighting skills. They must also remain calm and exercise good judgment under considerable pressure. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. Often, stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.
Considerations for Stability Operations
• Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions
• Display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner
• Act decisively to prevent escalation
• Apply force selectively and discriminately
The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, the Soldier’s soul, are everything. Unless the Soldier’s soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.
General George C. Marshall
What you had was a leadership breakdown. Where it occurred is open to debate. The pillars of leader development include operational assignments, institutional learning, and self development. I know ANCOC didn’t focus on these skill sets and I am convinced your previous assignments didn’t adequately prepare you or your troops for this type of combat. The same is probably true for your commander. In retrospect, you now have the insight to be a better Platoon Sergeant and would no doubt train and prepare your soldiers differently.
If I remember right, you took the helm of that platoon shortly before the deployment, so nothing may have made a difference. Still, I think you underestimated the gravity of your leadership responsibilities and are still failing to come to grips with your own shortcomings, or the shortcomings of the entire NCO development system.
Your argument is 75 years out of date:
"The commander who lacks the moral courage and the professional skill to develop and maintain a thoroughly competent corps of noncommissioned officers throughout his command thereby demonstrates his inability to assume the responsibilities of leadership in combat. Such a commander forfeits the confidence and respect of his subordinates. He destroys the morale of his organization. He will surely fail in battle. Success in combat depends upon the character and qualifications of the noncommissioned officers commanding small units. They must be outstanding leaders with a high sense of duty and a strong will. They must be resourceful and willing to assume responsibility. In order to insure that our noncommissioned officers are equal to the tasks that lie ahead of them, commanders of all echelons will give their personal attention to improving the quality and prestige of those noncommissioned officers who exercise command responsibilities." -1944 War Department Circular 70
Today, that is a leader responsibility, not a commanders.
What follows is my reply to him.
Thanks for replying to my post. It surprises me how few NCOs are paying attention to the discussions going on in higher echelons of the Army. I see that you are retired now, congratulations. I also see that you are back at Bagram, so I know that you will continue to assist leaders with the development tools they need. With regard to your specific comments regarding my post, I must admit on first reading to have become angry. However, as I read it again and again, those emotions passed and I would like to address it as best I can. Forgive me if my thoughts become somewhat disjointed.
First, there is no doubt that there were many leadership failures in 1st platoon and many people (investigators, lawyers, reporters, Senior Army Leaders etc) have all tried to place the correct accountability in the right places. All of us who were a part of that leadership team own a portion of that responsibility, not only the commissioned officer corps. As you rightfully stated though, nothing in my previous 16 years in the Army - operational, or institutional prepared me adequately for that particular set of circumstances. In fact, I and others, did the best we knew how to do under the circumstances. In the end, the were no Army "approved" solutions to those events except for people taking what they believed to be the morally correct actions when the incident came to light. Others are allowed to have their own opinions of our actions and decisions, and we have to live with their judgements. It is also pertinent to state that I took over the platoon in-country, after they had suffered 4 KIA (PL, SL, TL and Soldier), had a PSG quit, and another get fired. I was the 3rd Platoon Sergeant in a 45 day period. The day of my arrival, the American portion of their FOB burned to the ground. The murders of the Iraqi family happened on my 5th week in charge. On that day, I was short my Platoon Leader and 2 Squad Leaders due to EML. I am not making excuses here, those are statements of fact that represent the conditions at the time.
Having said that, my purpose in responding to that particular blog and bringing up the 1st platoon war crime was not to "blame" the Chain of Command, as you suggested, but to highlight the fact that there can be tactical, operational, and strategic impacts of an individual Soldier's action(s) and yet we do nothing to train the Soldier to be aware of this. In the case of first platoon, there is evidence that when my Soldiers were attacked and abducted at the AVLB in June, that that attack was in retaliation for the actions of the other Soldiers in March. Additionally, the 2BDE, 10th Mtn unit that replaced us in Sep 06 had 4 Soldiers abducted in the same general area. It was reported in the international press at the time of the attack against the Iraqi family that a local Imam stated that "It will take 10 American lives to avenge the rape and murder of that Iraqi girl." That message was reiterated when the video of the abduction of my Soldiers was released on the Internet. Today, I read an article in INFANTRY Magazine (Marcgh-June 09 issue) that outlined the efforts of C 1/187 who replaced the 2/10 unit in Yusifiyah. There, the actions of my Soldiers continued to have locally strategic effect on the decisions and actions of both AIF and US forces. So, 4 Soldiers commit a heinous crime in early 2006, the effect of which is felt in '07 by the 2/10 unit and has operational implications for the 187 unit that followed them. Being that the Sunni Triangle was also considered the southern route into Bagdad, and that the incident galvanized and solidified tribal support for AQI against US and Iraqi Army forces, it seems reasonable that there can be theater strategic consequences to local actions.
I think what bothered me the most about the blog was the post that followed mine where it was implied that Strategic Communication is the pervue of CJTF or 3 star officers. That I take offense to. As Admiral Mullen, General McChrystal and others have said, it's not what we say, it our actions that count. That is a lesson that can be taught to all Soldiers, and something recognized by the 1/187 article. The unit took special pains to remind Soldiers that even if they suffered casualties etc, that random violence or a disproportionate response was not going to lead to mission success. In fact, that is exactly the same message that General McChrystal published recently in his guidance to US forces in Afghanistan - it is our actions at the local level that will carry the day and provide the concrete proof of the loftier "Strategic Communication" of senior leaders. I found it interesting that none of the other posters picked up on that idea. Maybe because they were too interested in the theoretical implications etc. It really is a simple message. Why should it be a sort of cottage industry for senior leaders?
We live in an instant communication world. The actions of a Soldier at any point on the battlefield can have immediate world-wide impact. The actions of 1st platoon both in the March incident involving the Iraqi family and the June incident involving the Soldiers at the AVLB were reported internationally overnight, and caused responses at the very highest levels of the Army and our government. In light of that, the idea that message sculpting can only be done by very senior leaders in almost laughable. In my case it was done by Steven Dale Green, a 23 year old kid from Midland Texas.
Finally, the only part of your reply that personally bugged me was your assertion that I have not accepted personal responsibility for what happened. I will tell you that not a day has gone by in the intervening 3 years that I have not asked myself what, if anything, I could have done differently. I have paid an emotionally heavy price for my time as the Platoon Sergeant of 1st platoon, and believe that I did the best I could do, with the Soldiers I had, under the circumstances I was faced with. Others may have done things differently than I did - with potentially different results. We will never know. That is the burden of leadership and command. It is the burden that with neither pride nor regret I carry daily. You are correct when you said that that time has made me a better leader. Crucibles have a way of doing that.
I would very much like to continue this dialogue with you if you are so inclined. In the short time we shared in Bagram during RIP/TOA, I was very impressed by you, your actions and your committment to the NCO Corps. Thanks for your time. Jeff Fenlason
There is a lot of really good stuff in this exchange. Please read it and absorb what he said. All that doctrine and manual stuff is important. How you accomplish those things is critical. That is the very hard work of leadership.
#18 OODAing (Not oogling!) Women In Combat Chap 3
I want to take a step back from the "Women in Combat" Posts because I think that this is one that can very easily get off track. My point in "Women in Combat #1" was to share my Orientation with others. By knowing where I come from generationally, and by Army conditioning, it helps frame the larger discussion. My point in "Women in Combat #2" was to point out that while this is a significant event, it will only have true merit when it is no longer an event at all.
To OODA this will take time but here's my shot:
OBSERVE: The manner in which the current war is being waged has placed more women into what has traditionally been termed "direct" combat. This method of warfare has brought the current tactical requirements into conflict with the Combat Exclusionary Laws as currently written.
ORIENT: This is the one that gets hard and happens at many levels at the same time. It will contain more assumptions than hard facts.
1. THE WAR: First, as stated earlier, this is a non-traditional method of warfare, one that the Army was not really manned, equipped, or trained to meet head on when it started. Up to 2001, the Army was designed to worked linearly and in depth. Every system we had was designed with that assumption as a start point. Units and equipment were designed to work in complimentary fashions across a front. It was also envisioned that wars would be between States/Nations with some form of nationally based political will to drive them. It is also reasonable to suggest that any war would be relatively short due to technological advances that allow immense amounts of violence over an extremely short period of time. Hence the idea of "Shock and Awe". That is not the current state of insurgent warfare. The current state suggests an amoebic, non-nation/state that is fighting an ideological war to be waged over long periods of time with no clearly defined "ultimate" winner or loser indicated by some formal surrender document. It is more likely a contest of moral and political will.
2. THE ARMY: Since the design was for a linear, in-depth Army, the separation of direct combatants from non-direct combatants was defined mostly by physical space and distance. It worked on a likelihood or probability model; and any adjustment related to the assignment policies of women was safely rooted in the notion of physical space, which provided a political 'comfort zone'. Policy adjustments made were more closely related to professional development / career enhancement reasons. Politically and socially, this probably began to occur in the mid-to late 70's and early '80's with the proliferation of women into the general workforce in more "white collar" jobs which ran along similar career progression paths. This implies that at the time when political and social change indicated an increased role for women in general, the Army found a similar way to increase professional opportunities by opening more and more career fields to them. But, still using the probability of a linear battlefield, this didn't present too much of a political risk - for either lawmakers, or the Army - because the likelihood of direct combat remained remote. A corollary to this is the move to the all volunteer force. Without the draft, the Army had to compete with the civilian workforce for Soldiers, and opening career fields to women was one way to enhance the Army's ability to attract talent. As a lawmaker, I can now support the inclusion of women into professional society - including the Armed Forces, while at the same time retaining my conditioned belief that they shouldn't be in direct combat. As long as the physical distance remains great enough, then all will be well.
3. WOMEN: There is an often used phrase called "the role of....something...in society". We have heard it many times as, "the role of women in the Army". The very word 'role' implies a defined set of norms, behaviors and expectations. I think the word 'role' actually does women in general a disservice because it is limiting by definition. This holds true for everyone, but has had an extremely adverse impact on the progress of women in society. For Millennials, the idea that women can do or be anything they want is no longer just some hopeful dream of school aged children. It is a truth. Women hold high positions throughout society in business, politics, education, the arts etc. You name the field, and it will be filled with talented women who are advancing their particular endeavor to new levels. But, that has not always been the case. In my lifetime, going back from the expected 'roles' of my grandmother, my mother, and my sister there has been a dramatic shift. That fact is evidenced best by articles such as the one about CSM King. We are still at a point where the first woman to do anything is considered a novelty. And the problem with novelties is that while some become the standard bearer for future generations, some remain nothing more than novelties. Geraldine Ferraro was the first woman on a major political ticket in the mid-80's, but her short-lived candidacy was a novelty. Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton, Madeline Albright, Donna Shalala - to name a few- show the impact of women as standard bearers.
In all societies though, females play the singularly unique role of being able to give birth. Whatever other standard is applied, they are the ONLY way to guarantee the continuation of a species. That gives them the unique consideration of something that must be protected in order to guarantee survival. In plain terms, they are a natural resource - just like water and the other requirements to sustain life on the planet.
That understanding has led to behavior patterns in men and women that date back to beginning of history. Women as child-bearers and family leaders and men as providers. And war is a form of provision. If you see war as a way of providing or protecting a value system or political state of being, or the extension of a religious philosophy, then the idea that men provide those things by waging war is not that hard to grasp. The current state of women suggest an equality rarely seen in history which brings into question the behavioral norms for all of society.
4. DIRECT COMBAT: Combat is messy business. For those who have witnessed it, it has devastating effects. The more 'direct' it is, the more personalized the mess. Dropping a bomb from an aircraft can have a massive effect, but it will not have the same personalized effect of having to set gun sights on another human being and killing him/her. It takes 12lbs of finger pressure to pull the trigger on an M16 rifle. 12lbs of pressure and you can end a life. Hand-to-hand fighting is even more personalized. Men and women both are capable of exerting 12lbs of trigger pressure to equal effect. There is no other realistic physical requirement to be a combatant that gives men an advantage over women. The Army will let a 97 lb weakling join the infantry even though he lacks the endurance to carry the load, the strength to pick up a wounded comrade, or the physical stature to conduct hand-to-hand combat with a foe. Because he is male the Army will sign him up to be an infantryman if he so desires. No thought is ever given to his ability to carry out the messy business of direct combat. For women, this is not the case. Apparently, a vagina and breasts create some unknown form of physical limitation that does not exist in men. Any more fit person - larger, stronger, with greater endurance - will have an advantage in direct combat. There is no gender associated with that fact.
DECIDE: Looking solely at the current battlefield, the current law, the need for Soldiers and the demands placed upon them, as well as the societal evolution in expected norms and behaviors, it becomes apparent that the Exclusionary Laws as currently written have become out dated and require (a) abolition by willful choice, or (b) to be allowed to exist into antiquity until they are no longer relevant to the discussion. Currently, it appears that the Army has chosen plan B. By not facing the issue completely, the Army is accepting that the requirements of the war will simply render the current laws archaic and they will die out in time. That there is another option is not really being considered. Therefore, the Decide seems to be between (a) willful change and (b) the decline of relevancy over time.
ACT: Since the Army has not chosen to frame the argument with an A or B option to be studied or reviewed, the OODA loop cannot be fully formed. Since we are apparently working with only option B, then any new Observe can only be seen through that prism. The one thing that can absolutely stop the OODA cycle in it's track is a failure to allow the Act to create a new Observe.
Those are my initial thoughts on applying the OODA Loop to the Women in Combat question raised earlier. I encourage you to comment. When I wrote Chap 1, I intentionally included the "eat it, kill it, or fuck it" phrase to demonstrate the method or mindset that was ingrained in me as a young infantryman, and to admit it's relevance in the context of direct combat. It was not placed there to suggest that that mentality was the sole domain of men. Other arguments regarding physical differences between the sexes similarly are not the sole domain of one gender or the other. Ultimately, it is my belief that any Act taken with regard to Women in Combat is ultimately social in nature and as such is very much open to any change, positive or negative, in prevaling social norms.
To OODA this will take time but here's my shot:
OBSERVE: The manner in which the current war is being waged has placed more women into what has traditionally been termed "direct" combat. This method of warfare has brought the current tactical requirements into conflict with the Combat Exclusionary Laws as currently written.
ORIENT: This is the one that gets hard and happens at many levels at the same time. It will contain more assumptions than hard facts.
1. THE WAR: First, as stated earlier, this is a non-traditional method of warfare, one that the Army was not really manned, equipped, or trained to meet head on when it started. Up to 2001, the Army was designed to worked linearly and in depth. Every system we had was designed with that assumption as a start point. Units and equipment were designed to work in complimentary fashions across a front. It was also envisioned that wars would be between States/Nations with some form of nationally based political will to drive them. It is also reasonable to suggest that any war would be relatively short due to technological advances that allow immense amounts of violence over an extremely short period of time. Hence the idea of "Shock and Awe". That is not the current state of insurgent warfare. The current state suggests an amoebic, non-nation/state that is fighting an ideological war to be waged over long periods of time with no clearly defined "ultimate" winner or loser indicated by some formal surrender document. It is more likely a contest of moral and political will.
2. THE ARMY: Since the design was for a linear, in-depth Army, the separation of direct combatants from non-direct combatants was defined mostly by physical space and distance. It worked on a likelihood or probability model; and any adjustment related to the assignment policies of women was safely rooted in the notion of physical space, which provided a political 'comfort zone'. Policy adjustments made were more closely related to professional development / career enhancement reasons. Politically and socially, this probably began to occur in the mid-to late 70's and early '80's with the proliferation of women into the general workforce in more "white collar" jobs which ran along similar career progression paths. This implies that at the time when political and social change indicated an increased role for women in general, the Army found a similar way to increase professional opportunities by opening more and more career fields to them. But, still using the probability of a linear battlefield, this didn't present too much of a political risk - for either lawmakers, or the Army - because the likelihood of direct combat remained remote. A corollary to this is the move to the all volunteer force. Without the draft, the Army had to compete with the civilian workforce for Soldiers, and opening career fields to women was one way to enhance the Army's ability to attract talent. As a lawmaker, I can now support the inclusion of women into professional society - including the Armed Forces, while at the same time retaining my conditioned belief that they shouldn't be in direct combat. As long as the physical distance remains great enough, then all will be well.
3. WOMEN: There is an often used phrase called "the role of....something...in society". We have heard it many times as, "the role of women in the Army". The very word 'role' implies a defined set of norms, behaviors and expectations. I think the word 'role' actually does women in general a disservice because it is limiting by definition. This holds true for everyone, but has had an extremely adverse impact on the progress of women in society. For Millennials, the idea that women can do or be anything they want is no longer just some hopeful dream of school aged children. It is a truth. Women hold high positions throughout society in business, politics, education, the arts etc. You name the field, and it will be filled with talented women who are advancing their particular endeavor to new levels. But, that has not always been the case. In my lifetime, going back from the expected 'roles' of my grandmother, my mother, and my sister there has been a dramatic shift. That fact is evidenced best by articles such as the one about CSM King. We are still at a point where the first woman to do anything is considered a novelty. And the problem with novelties is that while some become the standard bearer for future generations, some remain nothing more than novelties. Geraldine Ferraro was the first woman on a major political ticket in the mid-80's, but her short-lived candidacy was a novelty. Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton, Madeline Albright, Donna Shalala - to name a few- show the impact of women as standard bearers.
In all societies though, females play the singularly unique role of being able to give birth. Whatever other standard is applied, they are the ONLY way to guarantee the continuation of a species. That gives them the unique consideration of something that must be protected in order to guarantee survival. In plain terms, they are a natural resource - just like water and the other requirements to sustain life on the planet.
That understanding has led to behavior patterns in men and women that date back to beginning of history. Women as child-bearers and family leaders and men as providers. And war is a form of provision. If you see war as a way of providing or protecting a value system or political state of being, or the extension of a religious philosophy, then the idea that men provide those things by waging war is not that hard to grasp. The current state of women suggest an equality rarely seen in history which brings into question the behavioral norms for all of society.
4. DIRECT COMBAT: Combat is messy business. For those who have witnessed it, it has devastating effects. The more 'direct' it is, the more personalized the mess. Dropping a bomb from an aircraft can have a massive effect, but it will not have the same personalized effect of having to set gun sights on another human being and killing him/her. It takes 12lbs of finger pressure to pull the trigger on an M16 rifle. 12lbs of pressure and you can end a life. Hand-to-hand fighting is even more personalized. Men and women both are capable of exerting 12lbs of trigger pressure to equal effect. There is no other realistic physical requirement to be a combatant that gives men an advantage over women. The Army will let a 97 lb weakling join the infantry even though he lacks the endurance to carry the load, the strength to pick up a wounded comrade, or the physical stature to conduct hand-to-hand combat with a foe. Because he is male the Army will sign him up to be an infantryman if he so desires. No thought is ever given to his ability to carry out the messy business of direct combat. For women, this is not the case. Apparently, a vagina and breasts create some unknown form of physical limitation that does not exist in men. Any more fit person - larger, stronger, with greater endurance - will have an advantage in direct combat. There is no gender associated with that fact.
DECIDE: Looking solely at the current battlefield, the current law, the need for Soldiers and the demands placed upon them, as well as the societal evolution in expected norms and behaviors, it becomes apparent that the Exclusionary Laws as currently written have become out dated and require (a) abolition by willful choice, or (b) to be allowed to exist into antiquity until they are no longer relevant to the discussion. Currently, it appears that the Army has chosen plan B. By not facing the issue completely, the Army is accepting that the requirements of the war will simply render the current laws archaic and they will die out in time. That there is another option is not really being considered. Therefore, the Decide seems to be between (a) willful change and (b) the decline of relevancy over time.
ACT: Since the Army has not chosen to frame the argument with an A or B option to be studied or reviewed, the OODA loop cannot be fully formed. Since we are apparently working with only option B, then any new Observe can only be seen through that prism. The one thing that can absolutely stop the OODA cycle in it's track is a failure to allow the Act to create a new Observe.
Those are my initial thoughts on applying the OODA Loop to the Women in Combat question raised earlier. I encourage you to comment. When I wrote Chap 1, I intentionally included the "eat it, kill it, or fuck it" phrase to demonstrate the method or mindset that was ingrained in me as a young infantryman, and to admit it's relevance in the context of direct combat. It was not placed there to suggest that that mentality was the sole domain of men. Other arguments regarding physical differences between the sexes similarly are not the sole domain of one gender or the other. Ultimately, it is my belief that any Act taken with regard to Women in Combat is ultimately social in nature and as such is very much open to any change, positive or negative, in prevaling social norms.
# 17 Women in the Army Chap 2
This year we saw the first female 4 star general, General Dunwoody, and now the first female Commandant of the Drill Sergeant School. The glass ceiling has cracked. It will be broken when we have our first female Chief of Staff, or Sergeant Major of the Army. Link below:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/us/22sergeant.html?_r=1&emc=eta1
Another good day for all women. As strange as it may sound, examples like this have been relatively new for the Army. I'm not sure, but I believe it was only in the mid to late 70's that we saw the first class of female officers go through West Point. Congratulations to CSM King. A role model for all Soldiers who proves that hard work, determination and a sense of service are the exact things that make the Army a great place. While this a great story for female servicemembers, the truest measure of equality will be when this isn't a story at all. When we are no longer breaking gender / race barriers and the measure of worth is only viewed through the lense of ability and a desire for excellence.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/us/22sergeant.html?_r=1&emc=eta1
Another good day for all women. As strange as it may sound, examples like this have been relatively new for the Army. I'm not sure, but I believe it was only in the mid to late 70's that we saw the first class of female officers go through West Point. Congratulations to CSM King. A role model for all Soldiers who proves that hard work, determination and a sense of service are the exact things that make the Army a great place. While this a great story for female servicemembers, the truest measure of equality will be when this isn't a story at all. When we are no longer breaking gender / race barriers and the measure of worth is only viewed through the lense of ability and a desire for excellence.
# 16 Human Organization Link -
Check out the link at the bottom of this. It's entitled "Resilient Structures". I found it this morning and the very first paragraph jumped out at me.
"After awhile, human organizations seem to deteriorate. Often the individuals in them will be busy, spending long hours going to meetings, producing PowerPoints etc., but the amount of useful work - measured by successful new products, for example - keeps going down. This isn't a description of every organization, but you have to admit it's depressingly common."
Welcome to the United States Army. (Sarcasm intensified for effect)
The 2nd paragraph goes on to say, "You also know, however, that the pattern can be reversed IF energy - primarily in the form of new ideas- is brought in from the outside to keep the organization fresh and competitive. It's not easy, but through techniques...it is possible to reverse organizational decline."
As an aside, this may be yet another reason for the officer / NCO divide. For the NCO the unit pretty much remains the same. Same organization, same day-to-day tasks, same eventual deployment etc. The only thing that changes is the name of the person at the top. Each new chain of command says pretty much the same thing on Day 1 i.e., "we're going to be combat focused, take care of families, work hard, be a team etc etc, but that gets ground down pretty quickly by the daily requirements. Within 6 months or so in an average organization, it becomes hard to tell one set of leadership from another. "Oh great! Another good idea! Can anyone remember what happened to the last one? I can't seem to find it anymore." For the officer, however, this is another one of their very limited opportunities to gain valuable knowledge, experience, and career progression. And so the opportunity is faced with renewed energy and purpose and a sudden awareness of the weight and burden of command. The idea of being responsible for people, and events, sometimes outside of their direct control becomes all to real. (More on that in another post.)
The linked article goes on to say that bringing outside energy into the organization - in the form of new ideas that challenge current norms - is a requirement for it's continued growth. In fact, it goes on to point out that in some cases, that outside energy is an actual physical requirement for the organizations survival. This brings up the idea of entropy. As you read some of the comments below the main article, you find one that brings forth the idea that corporations sooner or later must implode. They do so because they reach a point where the successful ideas of the past coupled with a focus away from the original product and on to profit margin makes them work towards a status quo arrangement. The current state of General Motors would be a good example of this. What had worked before - a safe product, consistent profits etc, created a corporate culture that valued continuing along the same path. Although in the current market world I'm sure that there were folks at GM who foresaw the impending crisis, the corporate culture was so pervasive that they were probably seen as heretics within the company. From an Army perspective, "That's the way we've always done it". Add to that both the corporate and military aversion to risk and generational prisms, and it's pretty easy to see how the entropy can take hold. Now, after the bailout, GM is aggressively fighting to return to profitability with new products, new ideas, and a new focus on the customer. The entropy has been removed by force.
Another good example of this might be Microsoft and Apple. At first, the very introduction of new products and the low cost proliferation of technology was the focus for both companies. However, there was a time in the mid-to-late 90's when Microsoft had become so huge that it shifted focus away from the needs of the users and on to protecting it's market share. Only after a change in leadership at the top has there been a refocusing on what made them successful in the first place. Conversely, Apple stayed more closely tied to the customer (the bottom), took innovative steps (IPOD, I phone) and has remained people/product focused and therefore has created a class of products and technology that has gained them an extremely loyal following.
The Army works completely on people. Forget for a moment all the technology, equipment etc and recognize that the Army is people. In that manner it shares many of the same characteristics of any large corporation. While it is not culturally profit driven, the culture of "We can do anything the Nation asks us to, at any time, in any place" has the same effect on how we operate. There is a professional Soldier culture - absolute dedication, self and family sacrifice, the 24 hour work cycle. Maintaining the facade for the American people that they can relax because our wise sages have already worked out the correct answer to every possible scenario. There is no contingency that we don't already have a plan for. In fact, in many cases, that last sentence is true. Somewhere in the Pentagon, I'm sure that there is a huge room filled with contingency plans for all types of crises. The question is how may of them are relevant? The mere fact that they exist has the effect of providing a false sense of security and introducing a complacent mindset (entropy). "Don't sweat it...OP PLAN 123XYZ was written 5 years ago to provide the answer to the problem." Never mind that there have been huge political, technological, or historical changes in the intervening time. Ultimately, that room becomes a huge guessing game of trying to figure out the next fight and hoping to god you don't get it wrong.
In the link below, you begin to hear about dissonance. A discordant sound. Something out of harmony with the host environment. Ahhh, the Disgruntled Employees Club. The critical voice of dissent. The loyal opposition. That person or group that is waiving the red flag and talking of impending doom when everyone else is cheering and paddling the canoe. These folks are critical to organizational health. When I say loyal and critical, I mean exactly that. Soldiers who truly care about the unit and look at it with a critical eye. Not just bitching for bitching's sake, but those who feel out-of-step with the leadership. In general, one of the two groups, the Top and the Bottom has to be correct. So, if the Bottom is out-of-step then the Top will never be as successful as it could be. If the Top is out-of-step then the Bottom will soon lose faith and become self-protecting. Either way, entropy or organizational implosion will be the result. But those individuals in the unit/organization/corporation who truly value the people, the challenges and the mission (be it military or corporate) who feel out-of-step need to be sought out by the leadership and listened to.
We all need to look at ourselves critically and figure out whether or not we are creeping our way towards entropy, or are we seeking out the dissonance around us and using it to see our world more clearly and to stay ahead of emerging challenges.
http://www.chetrichards.com/c2w/2008/05/22/resilient-structures/
"After awhile, human organizations seem to deteriorate. Often the individuals in them will be busy, spending long hours going to meetings, producing PowerPoints etc., but the amount of useful work - measured by successful new products, for example - keeps going down. This isn't a description of every organization, but you have to admit it's depressingly common."
Welcome to the United States Army. (Sarcasm intensified for effect)
The 2nd paragraph goes on to say, "You also know, however, that the pattern can be reversed IF energy - primarily in the form of new ideas- is brought in from the outside to keep the organization fresh and competitive. It's not easy, but through techniques...it is possible to reverse organizational decline."
As an aside, this may be yet another reason for the officer / NCO divide. For the NCO the unit pretty much remains the same. Same organization, same day-to-day tasks, same eventual deployment etc. The only thing that changes is the name of the person at the top. Each new chain of command says pretty much the same thing on Day 1 i.e., "we're going to be combat focused, take care of families, work hard, be a team etc etc, but that gets ground down pretty quickly by the daily requirements. Within 6 months or so in an average organization, it becomes hard to tell one set of leadership from another. "Oh great! Another good idea! Can anyone remember what happened to the last one? I can't seem to find it anymore." For the officer, however, this is another one of their very limited opportunities to gain valuable knowledge, experience, and career progression. And so the opportunity is faced with renewed energy and purpose and a sudden awareness of the weight and burden of command. The idea of being responsible for people, and events, sometimes outside of their direct control becomes all to real. (More on that in another post.)
The linked article goes on to say that bringing outside energy into the organization - in the form of new ideas that challenge current norms - is a requirement for it's continued growth. In fact, it goes on to point out that in some cases, that outside energy is an actual physical requirement for the organizations survival. This brings up the idea of entropy. As you read some of the comments below the main article, you find one that brings forth the idea that corporations sooner or later must implode. They do so because they reach a point where the successful ideas of the past coupled with a focus away from the original product and on to profit margin makes them work towards a status quo arrangement. The current state of General Motors would be a good example of this. What had worked before - a safe product, consistent profits etc, created a corporate culture that valued continuing along the same path. Although in the current market world I'm sure that there were folks at GM who foresaw the impending crisis, the corporate culture was so pervasive that they were probably seen as heretics within the company. From an Army perspective, "That's the way we've always done it". Add to that both the corporate and military aversion to risk and generational prisms, and it's pretty easy to see how the entropy can take hold. Now, after the bailout, GM is aggressively fighting to return to profitability with new products, new ideas, and a new focus on the customer. The entropy has been removed by force.
Another good example of this might be Microsoft and Apple. At first, the very introduction of new products and the low cost proliferation of technology was the focus for both companies. However, there was a time in the mid-to-late 90's when Microsoft had become so huge that it shifted focus away from the needs of the users and on to protecting it's market share. Only after a change in leadership at the top has there been a refocusing on what made them successful in the first place. Conversely, Apple stayed more closely tied to the customer (the bottom), took innovative steps (IPOD, I phone) and has remained people/product focused and therefore has created a class of products and technology that has gained them an extremely loyal following.
The Army works completely on people. Forget for a moment all the technology, equipment etc and recognize that the Army is people. In that manner it shares many of the same characteristics of any large corporation. While it is not culturally profit driven, the culture of "We can do anything the Nation asks us to, at any time, in any place" has the same effect on how we operate. There is a professional Soldier culture - absolute dedication, self and family sacrifice, the 24 hour work cycle. Maintaining the facade for the American people that they can relax because our wise sages have already worked out the correct answer to every possible scenario. There is no contingency that we don't already have a plan for. In fact, in many cases, that last sentence is true. Somewhere in the Pentagon, I'm sure that there is a huge room filled with contingency plans for all types of crises. The question is how may of them are relevant? The mere fact that they exist has the effect of providing a false sense of security and introducing a complacent mindset (entropy). "Don't sweat it...OP PLAN 123XYZ was written 5 years ago to provide the answer to the problem." Never mind that there have been huge political, technological, or historical changes in the intervening time. Ultimately, that room becomes a huge guessing game of trying to figure out the next fight and hoping to god you don't get it wrong.
In the link below, you begin to hear about dissonance. A discordant sound. Something out of harmony with the host environment. Ahhh, the Disgruntled Employees Club. The critical voice of dissent. The loyal opposition. That person or group that is waiving the red flag and talking of impending doom when everyone else is cheering and paddling the canoe. These folks are critical to organizational health. When I say loyal and critical, I mean exactly that. Soldiers who truly care about the unit and look at it with a critical eye. Not just bitching for bitching's sake, but those who feel out-of-step with the leadership. In general, one of the two groups, the Top and the Bottom has to be correct. So, if the Bottom is out-of-step then the Top will never be as successful as it could be. If the Top is out-of-step then the Bottom will soon lose faith and become self-protecting. Either way, entropy or organizational implosion will be the result. But those individuals in the unit/organization/corporation who truly value the people, the challenges and the mission (be it military or corporate) who feel out-of-step need to be sought out by the leadership and listened to.
We all need to look at ourselves critically and figure out whether or not we are creeping our way towards entropy, or are we seeking out the dissonance around us and using it to see our world more clearly and to stay ahead of emerging challenges.
http://www.chetrichards.com/c2w/2008/05/22/resilient-structures/
#15 Women in the Army Chapter 1
As you may have figured out by reading this blog, I usually work from small to big to small. That is, I take something that I have seen, find it's larger thematic idea and then try to return to the original thought. In essence, without always knowing I was doing it, I have learned to OODA my immediate environment and then tried to make it fit into a larger scale or scope. Yesterday's post "What a Week" is an example. A small comment by one person, coupled with a normal training event by a unit, take on much larger thematic views ( i.e that leadership requires a very honest sense of self and that any training properly conducted can have 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order effects that may actually outweigh the actual purpose of the training itself), but always returned back to the original person or observation.
This method of thinking has allowed me to develop an ability to take large themes and give them an immediate local impact, or conversely, take a small local observation and follow it outward to it's larger thematic implication(s). Sometimes this thought process works very well and other times it doesn't, but when it fails, it allows for another OODA cycle and forces a reevaluation of the original premise.
To the right of this post are a listing of websites that I follow or use for resource material. Last night I found the "Women in Combat Compendium" http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=830 on the Strategic Studies Institute page and began to read it. It presents a historical, anecdotal, and scientific review of the issues surrounding the assignment of women in the Army - a subject that I have an interest in due to my involvement with units that are gender neutral.
In an earlier post "Further Up the Road" I included a thought from my friend Erica that Millennials might be more comfortable dealing with vague and ambiguous situations than are earlier generations. As I was reading the "Women in Combat Compendium" (WICC) document last night that thought came back to me in a different light. As you read the it you see that (1) We have a policy in place that is almost impossible to strictly enforce and therefore leads to local interpretations based upon senior leader thoughts and feelings about the issue, (2) The Army absolutely needs all the Soldiers it has - male and female - in order to function, (3) Social attitudes towards women have changed greatly (at least in current generations) and slide back and forth along a generational scale, and finally that the actual physical nature of the current fight could be the final straw that breaks the back of exclusionary practices throughout the Services. It's awfully hard to find the 'front line' anymore both literally in combat and figuratively with regard to the current law. Additionally, I had never considered the cultural effects that the current laws have on female Soldiers, both officer and enlisted. It's an interesting read, and the comment section that begins on page 13 of Appendix 1, shows how much societal expectations and norms in the Army have changed - in some cases - and how much they have not in others. But I also think it is critical to point out that the respondents in this study are all senior (Lieutenant Colonel and above) officers who would be approximately 40 - 50 years old.
The second O in the OODA cycle stands for Orient. As I have mentioned before, this is the most critical and complex part of the cycle because it requires self awareness - why you are the way you are - and an awareness of why the adversary is the way he/she is. All seen without judgement or moral implication. Your attitudes, beliefs and behaviors become the prism through which you make your Observations (the first part of the loop) and will likely guide your Decide (the third part), which will determine your Act(the final part). So, in order for me to explore this issue fairly, it is helpful that I try to understand my Orientation. Without it, there is no frame of reference to explain my attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.
I was cultured into the Army in an all male infantry unit in 1990. I remained in that world until 2001 when I was assigned as a Drill Sergeant at Ft. Jackson, SC. My early frame of reference therefor is from an 18-24 year old, all male environment. I am also a Gen Xer, born in 1968, who brings with him the prevalent attitudes and ideas of my formative years, roughly 1980 - 1990. As infantrymen, we were bred to eat it, kill it, or fuck it. We lived in a type A, macho world of young men trying to prove who was the toughest. Alpha male stacked against Alpha male. Women were so rare in our barracks and unit area that when the pizza delivery girl would show up at the staff duty desk, you could smell her perfume and deodorant. The smell of baby powder was so foreign to the antiseptic smell of floor wax and pine oil coupled with sweat, funky clothes, and testosterone that it stuck out, and we would go find a reason to pass the staff duty desk to see what she looked like. She was an object. Wallpapering our rooms with centerfolds was acceptable behavior. We were guys. We believed we were the kings of the world. And, as harsh as the "eat it, kill it"sentence above may sound, in many ways those things are a baseline requirement for inculcating the required behaviors for the violent, disturbing contest that is direct, close-quarters combat. You really don't ever want to completely lose the basic human domination, survival oriented, kill-or-be-killed, behavior mechanism. Not if you intend to survive close combat.
By the year 2000, women had begun to show up in Infantry brigades in staff sections and in support roles and I somewhat understood that we were slowly turning a corner with regard to the assignment of women in general, so when I went to Drill Sergeant school, I did not protest when I was assigned to serve at Ft. Jackson. In fact, I welcomed the assignment because I knew that my first real interaction with female Soldiers would happen in a very well controlled environment. There were rules and regulations and policies for training and safety that would both protect her and me if required. If the Army was going to have more women in it, what better place to see how they work than a hugely controlled environment like Basic Training?
Ft. Jackson is the Army's largest Basic Combat Training center, assimilating almost 30,000 Soldiers a year into the Army. Using the generalized figure that 15% of the Army is female, that equates to 4,500 enlisted Soldiers per year. That number does not account for officer assimilation's from West Point or ROTC programs. However, it is likely that the Ft. Jackson number is actually higher than 4,500 because the Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) that regularly enter the Army there are all coded mixed gender. There are no male only units on Ft. Jackson, as there are at Ft. Benning where all Soldiers who have chosen infantry as their MOS attend Bsaic Training.
Sometimes the Army can be quite progressive. An example is a small line in the training guidelines that mandates that 2 training events must be gender neutral - combatives and pugil stick. The regulation specifically stated that you could not intentionally seperate the genders during these events. Soldiers would only be separated by general body size and weight. If you had a small, medium, or large framed male and a similarly sized female, then they could fight each other during these events. In fact when our company conducted combatives training, we intentionally trained one male and female per platoon and they would become the demonstrators during larger unit training. This had the effect of (1) Showing males that their female counterparts could present an equal threat on the battlefield; thereby discounting the western cultural belief that women are not combatants and are to be protected, and (2) It proved to women that they could compete and win in physical events against male counterparts. The same held true for pugil sticks. Watching a male and female Soldier battle each other with an huge padded jousting stick is to watch an entire behavioral and cultural system turned inside out in 3 minutes or less. Once she hit him hard enough to ring his bell during a bout, he rapidly ceased to see her a a woman and only as a threat. Conversely, once she figured out that it was possible to beat a man in this physical challenge, she fought as viciously as any of her male counterparts. Mutual respect for the warrior abilities of the Soldier (not male or female) was the general outcome.
In 2004, I had the opportunity to be the first 1SG for a Forward Support Company as the Army went through the transformation process. By definition, my company - while legally assigned to a Brigade Support Battalion (therefore skirting the legal issue of women in direct combat) - it would be permanently attached to an Infantry battalion. Our company would provide the cooks, mechanics, truck drivers, fuelers etc to an Infantry battalion preparing to deploy to Iraq. There I saw men and women serving equally next to each other without regard for gender. We all slept in the same tent in the field, we grew the company together, my Soldiers lived in the same barracks complex etc. We were E Co, and E Co had men and women in it. We were also supported by an awesome Infantry battalion chain of command who accepted, respected, and supported our efforts. We faced some unique challenges in the early days, but overall, the infantry battalion treated us as much a member of their family as they did any of their all male infantry companies. Gender didn't matter - work ethic did.
I guess my point in this post is that we are in a strange new world with regard to the Combat Exclusion Rule and the assignment of female Soldiers. I have been fortunate enough to see the positive change that they have had on units both in garrison and deployed. Although they may find it somewhat confusing that we even have this law, it grew out of a cultural norm that colored the Army (and society at large) for many years. It is very much a product of my lifetime. Now we find ourselves in a place where senior leaders need to examine the practical realities of the current war, the requirement for talented Soldiers in all aspects of the Army, and look at what the future requirements are likely to be and have the political and practical courage to make the appropriate adjustments to the law. Only then can we make assignment and administrative policies aimed at retaining the female Soldiers that we have - and attracting more - instead of forcing them into jobs they don't want, with rules that aren't applied equally and putting them on the slippery-slope side of political intervention.
If we do this, we will be one step closer to achieving the parity that all Soldiers deserve. That being, the right of an individual to serve their country in the manner that best suits their talents, motivations and professional desire.
This method of thinking has allowed me to develop an ability to take large themes and give them an immediate local impact, or conversely, take a small local observation and follow it outward to it's larger thematic implication(s). Sometimes this thought process works very well and other times it doesn't, but when it fails, it allows for another OODA cycle and forces a reevaluation of the original premise.
To the right of this post are a listing of websites that I follow or use for resource material. Last night I found the "Women in Combat Compendium" http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=830 on the Strategic Studies Institute page and began to read it. It presents a historical, anecdotal, and scientific review of the issues surrounding the assignment of women in the Army - a subject that I have an interest in due to my involvement with units that are gender neutral.
In an earlier post "Further Up the Road" I included a thought from my friend Erica that Millennials might be more comfortable dealing with vague and ambiguous situations than are earlier generations. As I was reading the "Women in Combat Compendium" (WICC) document last night that thought came back to me in a different light. As you read the it you see that (1) We have a policy in place that is almost impossible to strictly enforce and therefore leads to local interpretations based upon senior leader thoughts and feelings about the issue, (2) The Army absolutely needs all the Soldiers it has - male and female - in order to function, (3) Social attitudes towards women have changed greatly (at least in current generations) and slide back and forth along a generational scale, and finally that the actual physical nature of the current fight could be the final straw that breaks the back of exclusionary practices throughout the Services. It's awfully hard to find the 'front line' anymore both literally in combat and figuratively with regard to the current law. Additionally, I had never considered the cultural effects that the current laws have on female Soldiers, both officer and enlisted. It's an interesting read, and the comment section that begins on page 13 of Appendix 1, shows how much societal expectations and norms in the Army have changed - in some cases - and how much they have not in others. But I also think it is critical to point out that the respondents in this study are all senior (Lieutenant Colonel and above) officers who would be approximately 40 - 50 years old.
The second O in the OODA cycle stands for Orient. As I have mentioned before, this is the most critical and complex part of the cycle because it requires self awareness - why you are the way you are - and an awareness of why the adversary is the way he/she is. All seen without judgement or moral implication. Your attitudes, beliefs and behaviors become the prism through which you make your Observations (the first part of the loop) and will likely guide your Decide (the third part), which will determine your Act(the final part). So, in order for me to explore this issue fairly, it is helpful that I try to understand my Orientation. Without it, there is no frame of reference to explain my attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.
I was cultured into the Army in an all male infantry unit in 1990. I remained in that world until 2001 when I was assigned as a Drill Sergeant at Ft. Jackson, SC. My early frame of reference therefor is from an 18-24 year old, all male environment. I am also a Gen Xer, born in 1968, who brings with him the prevalent attitudes and ideas of my formative years, roughly 1980 - 1990. As infantrymen, we were bred to eat it, kill it, or fuck it. We lived in a type A, macho world of young men trying to prove who was the toughest. Alpha male stacked against Alpha male. Women were so rare in our barracks and unit area that when the pizza delivery girl would show up at the staff duty desk, you could smell her perfume and deodorant. The smell of baby powder was so foreign to the antiseptic smell of floor wax and pine oil coupled with sweat, funky clothes, and testosterone that it stuck out, and we would go find a reason to pass the staff duty desk to see what she looked like. She was an object. Wallpapering our rooms with centerfolds was acceptable behavior. We were guys. We believed we were the kings of the world. And, as harsh as the "eat it, kill it"sentence above may sound, in many ways those things are a baseline requirement for inculcating the required behaviors for the violent, disturbing contest that is direct, close-quarters combat. You really don't ever want to completely lose the basic human domination, survival oriented, kill-or-be-killed, behavior mechanism. Not if you intend to survive close combat.
By the year 2000, women had begun to show up in Infantry brigades in staff sections and in support roles and I somewhat understood that we were slowly turning a corner with regard to the assignment of women in general, so when I went to Drill Sergeant school, I did not protest when I was assigned to serve at Ft. Jackson. In fact, I welcomed the assignment because I knew that my first real interaction with female Soldiers would happen in a very well controlled environment. There were rules and regulations and policies for training and safety that would both protect her and me if required. If the Army was going to have more women in it, what better place to see how they work than a hugely controlled environment like Basic Training?
Ft. Jackson is the Army's largest Basic Combat Training center, assimilating almost 30,000 Soldiers a year into the Army. Using the generalized figure that 15% of the Army is female, that equates to 4,500 enlisted Soldiers per year. That number does not account for officer assimilation's from West Point or ROTC programs. However, it is likely that the Ft. Jackson number is actually higher than 4,500 because the Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) that regularly enter the Army there are all coded mixed gender. There are no male only units on Ft. Jackson, as there are at Ft. Benning where all Soldiers who have chosen infantry as their MOS attend Bsaic Training.
Sometimes the Army can be quite progressive. An example is a small line in the training guidelines that mandates that 2 training events must be gender neutral - combatives and pugil stick. The regulation specifically stated that you could not intentionally seperate the genders during these events. Soldiers would only be separated by general body size and weight. If you had a small, medium, or large framed male and a similarly sized female, then they could fight each other during these events. In fact when our company conducted combatives training, we intentionally trained one male and female per platoon and they would become the demonstrators during larger unit training. This had the effect of (1) Showing males that their female counterparts could present an equal threat on the battlefield; thereby discounting the western cultural belief that women are not combatants and are to be protected, and (2) It proved to women that they could compete and win in physical events against male counterparts. The same held true for pugil sticks. Watching a male and female Soldier battle each other with an huge padded jousting stick is to watch an entire behavioral and cultural system turned inside out in 3 minutes or less. Once she hit him hard enough to ring his bell during a bout, he rapidly ceased to see her a a woman and only as a threat. Conversely, once she figured out that it was possible to beat a man in this physical challenge, she fought as viciously as any of her male counterparts. Mutual respect for the warrior abilities of the Soldier (not male or female) was the general outcome.
In 2004, I had the opportunity to be the first 1SG for a Forward Support Company as the Army went through the transformation process. By definition, my company - while legally assigned to a Brigade Support Battalion (therefore skirting the legal issue of women in direct combat) - it would be permanently attached to an Infantry battalion. Our company would provide the cooks, mechanics, truck drivers, fuelers etc to an Infantry battalion preparing to deploy to Iraq. There I saw men and women serving equally next to each other without regard for gender. We all slept in the same tent in the field, we grew the company together, my Soldiers lived in the same barracks complex etc. We were E Co, and E Co had men and women in it. We were also supported by an awesome Infantry battalion chain of command who accepted, respected, and supported our efforts. We faced some unique challenges in the early days, but overall, the infantry battalion treated us as much a member of their family as they did any of their all male infantry companies. Gender didn't matter - work ethic did.
I guess my point in this post is that we are in a strange new world with regard to the Combat Exclusion Rule and the assignment of female Soldiers. I have been fortunate enough to see the positive change that they have had on units both in garrison and deployed. Although they may find it somewhat confusing that we even have this law, it grew out of a cultural norm that colored the Army (and society at large) for many years. It is very much a product of my lifetime. Now we find ourselves in a place where senior leaders need to examine the practical realities of the current war, the requirement for talented Soldiers in all aspects of the Army, and look at what the future requirements are likely to be and have the political and practical courage to make the appropriate adjustments to the law. Only then can we make assignment and administrative policies aimed at retaining the female Soldiers that we have - and attracting more - instead of forcing them into jobs they don't want, with rules that aren't applied equally and putting them on the slippery-slope side of political intervention.
If we do this, we will be one step closer to achieving the parity that all Soldiers deserve. That being, the right of an individual to serve their country in the manner that best suits their talents, motivations and professional desire.
#14 A Boydism..just because
“Tiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road,” he (Boyd) said. “And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go.” He raised his hand and pointed. “If you go that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.” Then Boyd raised his other hand and pointed another direction. “Or you can go that way and you can do something – something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won’t have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference.” He paused and stared into the officer’s eyes and heart. “To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do. Which way will you go?
# 13 What a Week
This has been one of those weeks. They come along every once in a while, and you have to be ready for them when they show up. I had no expectation on Monday that it would be as great as it was. It'll take a little bit today to work through it all. Bear with me. The thoughts aren't fully formed yet.
Periods of my life seem to define themselves by associations with others - either individual people, or groups. When the marksmanship program started, it was marked by an almost magical time that a unit and I went through. Erica, LD and the whole staff at that unit embraced me and the training and it led to the formation of friendships and many many conversations about training and Soldiers and leadership etc. Now, that time has passed. When I think back on it, I realize that it was 2 years, and a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, ago. People have moved on and the unit is no longer the same. While some folks remain, and those friendships still exist, and I expect that I'll work with the unit again, it won't be exactly the same. New people, new leadership, new expectations. I'll need to remember that when I walk through their doors. Can't live backwards.
There is a new group now, different but just as special. They are a company of folks who have embraced me, and the training philosophy I espouse. It's an exciting time. What started out as the marksmanship program has quickly become much more. We have become friends. Tuesday night, I was invited to a gathering of the officers of the unit to kick around thoughts and ideas and to talk about my thoughts and experiences on why the Army is the way it is today. I had a really great time. I think most of them did too. At least I hope so! Sometime during that conversation - which was pretty far ranging for only 3 hours, the issue came up that these officers don't feel like many of their NCO's are meeting their expectations. That the NCO's aren't quite the "ultimate professionals" that the officers had been told they would be during their commissioning training. In fact, their actions, attitudes and behaviors - in many cases - fell well short of the mark. That led me to ask the question, "Do they know your expectations?" "Do they know what it is that you are looking for them to do or be?" I also went on to explain that today's senior NCO corps came of age - their formative years - were in the mid to late 90's and that Army was very much different from the one we are in today. The old one actually has a name now. It's called the "Legacy" Army. Today, we are trying, in fits and starts, to become an "Expeditionary" Army. Very different focuses for both. The "Legacy" Army was going to fight the former Soviet Union in some grand WW 3 scenario in Europe that would settle once and for all the Democracy / Communism debate. Massive force thrown against massive force in one huge cataclysmic battle for the world's soul. Today, we face multiple, ill-formed, ideological threats from non-nation entities that are not necessarily tied to one national political aim. We have been attacked on our homeland with no way to strike back. While the threat is violent and real, it is amoebic. Hard to define, much less pin down. Even more difficult to explain to the general public. There are as many reasons for insurgencies as their are insurgent groups. The ally themselves together when necessary and break apart when their needs no longer converge. The threat is vague, the fighting is done on every level - military, political, technological, religious, etc - and is marked by rapidly changing realities. The "Legacy" NCO corps was not designed for this fight. Generally speaking, it cannot think fast enough nor broadly enough, nor deep enough. It wasn't trained to. Nor can the institutional Army keep up with the pace of change necessary for this fight. If it takes 2 years to formalize a program of instruction for a class or school, my guess is by the time it gets taught for the first time, it'll be 1 year and 11 months out of date. That's just the nature of this war.
The next day I went to work and started an email chain with the folks who had participated the evening prior. In it I outlined what I thought were the highlights of the conversation. Interestingly, one of the officers responded and replied that he wasn't even sure he could identify clearly what his expectations were. That he didn't know exactly what he was looking for in himself, let alone how to express it to others. His quote is below:
"I'm taught by a book how to be an S6 and what the expectations are of the shop. Nowhere does it say how to deal with people. Nowhere does it say how an Aviation unit operates completely different from an Infantry unit. And they do, different requirements. It's my job to figure out how things need to be. I'm running into an issue of the shop running a score of "par for the course". The NCOs feel that that is enough, just enough to get by. As a leader, how do I empower them to do better and do more even though the mission requirements are being met? I don't know how to communicate very well, I'm not taught how to deal with people."
I spent Thursday and Friday with the same unit a rifle range. They were going to run my marksmanship program by themselves with new folks who hadn't done it before, so they asked me to assist them to get things moving and keep everything safe and on track. The LT in charge had been part of the discussion a few nights prior, and was trying very hard to run a successful training event. The first day went fine until late in the afternoon when he and I became aware that maybe some of the results the Soldiers were getting were a little too good. See, it's supposed to be 40 rounds for 40 targets, NOT 45 or 50 rounds. But, it happens. It was easy to see that he was upset. He had put a lot of hard work and energy into the training event, and now he questioned the legitimacy of the whole day. We had both watched NCO's, who were supposed to be coaching the shooters blatantly break the rules. They were helping the Soldier cheat by over-stacking the magazines. Whether the shooter knew that or not was hard to tell. Another people issue. How to deal with the situation? We couldn't force the Soldiers to reshoot - not enough time or ammunition, we couldn't determine how many previous shooters had been "assisted", nor did we want to ruin something that, by all Soldier comments, was an otherwise excellent training event. There was no denying though that this was just another example of the NCO Corps not meeting an officer's expectations. Another nail in the coffin of trust that is essential for units and people to be successful. We made an adjustment for the 2nd day of shooting and the situation was resolved, but in many ways the damage was done.
I mentioned at one point that I felt as if I were somehow defending the incompetencies and failures of the NCO corps to these young officers. That it would appear as if I were making excuses for their lack of ability, or knowledge, or moral short-comings. But although that's how it felt, that's not what I'm doing. I am trying to explain how we got to this place and how some things have gone on for so long that they have become the norm. The "Legacy" Army, with no war to fight and no immediate need to justify it's expense, became an Army of numbers and efficiency ratings. Charts and graphs and green blocks became the standard for the effectiveness of the unit. An indicator of it's combat readiness - since without a fight we had no other benchmark to use. In many ways, even though we have been at war for 7 years now, the same mentality still pervades the institution. It is only slowly beginning to change.
But back to Nick's comments quoted above. I think the key to leading others is having a very clear understanding of yourself first. You have to be comfortable in your own skin. And that takes time. You have to know and understand what you value and what you don't. A sense of self. A willingness to see yourself as both your personal and professional selves. They are not necessarily the same. When you can define for subordinates those qualities, characteristics and traits that you value, then they have an understanding of what your motivations and priorities are. Then you put them into play on a day to day basis. He mentions that his NCO's are willing to settle for "Par for the course". What's wrong with that? Why work harder to improve something that works just fine right now? The issue may be that he values a higher level of personal excellence and professional behavior than they do. He defines himself partially by the comparison of his work against his predecessor's. His NCOs may not. They may see it as a system that works with or without their personalized input. Is it broken, or just not being executed to the high level that he personally desires? If it's actually broken, then change is easy. He will be expected to fix it. And he will have the latitude and backing to do so. If it's not actually broken, though, and is only underperforming based upon his high expectation level, then he's got a tough road ahead of him. How can he effect change when no one else sees a problem?
And so I went searching, as I normally do, to see what's out there in Army cyberspace and found the following link: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/slp2ndEd.pdf . Chapter 7 of this document deals with the human dimension of sustained combat. While the entire document is designed as strategic (global) leader primer, I took particular interest in this chapter. I found some quotes that jumped out at me. "A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved through personal study and contemplation." Chapter 7 goes on to look at leader qualities and requirements as outlined in FM 22-100 "Leadership", and also to look at strategic leader requirements. It identifies 6 competencies that strategic leaders need to focus on. They are Identity, Mental Agility, Cross-Cultural Savy, Interpersonal Maturity, World-Class Warrior, and Professional Astuteness. Since I believe that in the current environment, every single Soldier has the capacity to have strategic importance, these competencies are as relevant to the lieutenants and captains as they are to the colonels and generals. Here is what the document says about identity.
"Identity. This metacompetency is derived from the work of Douglas Hall who heavily influenced the conclusions of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel-Officer (ATLD Panel). According to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather self- feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.” The ATLD describes self-awareness, and describes it as the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. The metacompetency of identity moves beyond simply knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-awareness. It includes the understanding of one’s self-concept as an officer in the Army. Identity also includes an understanding of one’s values and how they match up to the values of the Army. Identity implies maturation beyond self-awareness as officers come to an understanding of who they are, not just how well they do things. Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also brings in aspects of development over a career. As senior leaders gain responsibility, they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others. The metacompetency of identity acknowledges that as an officer develops strategic leadership capability, his role extends beyond personal contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success for subordinates."
I think that both Nick and Leo can be found in that quotation. Nick's thought that he might or might not know what it is he expects from his subordinates might be generated from a not fully formed understanding of what he expects of himself. I think for all leaders, the sentence "As senior leaders gain responsibility they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others", is critical. During your young leader development, it's all about you being better than the other guy/girl. I know it was for me. As you grow, that becomes a zero sum game because there are too many other variables - interpersonal relationships, politics, the structure of the system etc. Eventually, you realize that focusing your efforts on the development of those you serve becomes the truest measure of your leadership. It becomes your legacy and you form your legacy each and every day. One Soldier at a time. But those people who create your legacy might have very little understanding of what you are actually trying to accomplish.
Which brings me back to the rifle range: Identity: A young leader running a new type of training event and wanting to do well. Mental Agility: His ability to see the non-quantifiable goodness in the Soldiers who went through the training. Cross-Cultural Savy: His awareness that the norms of the past are hard to break and ability to see it as a cultural difference, not a moral difference. World-Class Warrior: A very tiny first step taken by a group of people to create a more confident, competent and capable Soldier and person. Professional Astuteness: The gained awareness of training design and where the cracks are in the details.
My Mother sent me a book once. It's title is "And Wisdom Comes Quietly". I didn't get to this place overnight. It took time and people and experiences. I'm looking forward to the future.
Periods of my life seem to define themselves by associations with others - either individual people, or groups. When the marksmanship program started, it was marked by an almost magical time that a unit and I went through. Erica, LD and the whole staff at that unit embraced me and the training and it led to the formation of friendships and many many conversations about training and Soldiers and leadership etc. Now, that time has passed. When I think back on it, I realize that it was 2 years, and a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, ago. People have moved on and the unit is no longer the same. While some folks remain, and those friendships still exist, and I expect that I'll work with the unit again, it won't be exactly the same. New people, new leadership, new expectations. I'll need to remember that when I walk through their doors. Can't live backwards.
There is a new group now, different but just as special. They are a company of folks who have embraced me, and the training philosophy I espouse. It's an exciting time. What started out as the marksmanship program has quickly become much more. We have become friends. Tuesday night, I was invited to a gathering of the officers of the unit to kick around thoughts and ideas and to talk about my thoughts and experiences on why the Army is the way it is today. I had a really great time. I think most of them did too. At least I hope so! Sometime during that conversation - which was pretty far ranging for only 3 hours, the issue came up that these officers don't feel like many of their NCO's are meeting their expectations. That the NCO's aren't quite the "ultimate professionals" that the officers had been told they would be during their commissioning training. In fact, their actions, attitudes and behaviors - in many cases - fell well short of the mark. That led me to ask the question, "Do they know your expectations?" "Do they know what it is that you are looking for them to do or be?" I also went on to explain that today's senior NCO corps came of age - their formative years - were in the mid to late 90's and that Army was very much different from the one we are in today. The old one actually has a name now. It's called the "Legacy" Army. Today, we are trying, in fits and starts, to become an "Expeditionary" Army. Very different focuses for both. The "Legacy" Army was going to fight the former Soviet Union in some grand WW 3 scenario in Europe that would settle once and for all the Democracy / Communism debate. Massive force thrown against massive force in one huge cataclysmic battle for the world's soul. Today, we face multiple, ill-formed, ideological threats from non-nation entities that are not necessarily tied to one national political aim. We have been attacked on our homeland with no way to strike back. While the threat is violent and real, it is amoebic. Hard to define, much less pin down. Even more difficult to explain to the general public. There are as many reasons for insurgencies as their are insurgent groups. The ally themselves together when necessary and break apart when their needs no longer converge. The threat is vague, the fighting is done on every level - military, political, technological, religious, etc - and is marked by rapidly changing realities. The "Legacy" NCO corps was not designed for this fight. Generally speaking, it cannot think fast enough nor broadly enough, nor deep enough. It wasn't trained to. Nor can the institutional Army keep up with the pace of change necessary for this fight. If it takes 2 years to formalize a program of instruction for a class or school, my guess is by the time it gets taught for the first time, it'll be 1 year and 11 months out of date. That's just the nature of this war.
The next day I went to work and started an email chain with the folks who had participated the evening prior. In it I outlined what I thought were the highlights of the conversation. Interestingly, one of the officers responded and replied that he wasn't even sure he could identify clearly what his expectations were. That he didn't know exactly what he was looking for in himself, let alone how to express it to others. His quote is below:
"I'm taught by a book how to be an S6 and what the expectations are of the shop. Nowhere does it say how to deal with people. Nowhere does it say how an Aviation unit operates completely different from an Infantry unit. And they do, different requirements. It's my job to figure out how things need to be. I'm running into an issue of the shop running a score of "par for the course". The NCOs feel that that is enough, just enough to get by. As a leader, how do I empower them to do better and do more even though the mission requirements are being met? I don't know how to communicate very well, I'm not taught how to deal with people."
I spent Thursday and Friday with the same unit a rifle range. They were going to run my marksmanship program by themselves with new folks who hadn't done it before, so they asked me to assist them to get things moving and keep everything safe and on track. The LT in charge had been part of the discussion a few nights prior, and was trying very hard to run a successful training event. The first day went fine until late in the afternoon when he and I became aware that maybe some of the results the Soldiers were getting were a little too good. See, it's supposed to be 40 rounds for 40 targets, NOT 45 or 50 rounds. But, it happens. It was easy to see that he was upset. He had put a lot of hard work and energy into the training event, and now he questioned the legitimacy of the whole day. We had both watched NCO's, who were supposed to be coaching the shooters blatantly break the rules. They were helping the Soldier cheat by over-stacking the magazines. Whether the shooter knew that or not was hard to tell. Another people issue. How to deal with the situation? We couldn't force the Soldiers to reshoot - not enough time or ammunition, we couldn't determine how many previous shooters had been "assisted", nor did we want to ruin something that, by all Soldier comments, was an otherwise excellent training event. There was no denying though that this was just another example of the NCO Corps not meeting an officer's expectations. Another nail in the coffin of trust that is essential for units and people to be successful. We made an adjustment for the 2nd day of shooting and the situation was resolved, but in many ways the damage was done.
I mentioned at one point that I felt as if I were somehow defending the incompetencies and failures of the NCO corps to these young officers. That it would appear as if I were making excuses for their lack of ability, or knowledge, or moral short-comings. But although that's how it felt, that's not what I'm doing. I am trying to explain how we got to this place and how some things have gone on for so long that they have become the norm. The "Legacy" Army, with no war to fight and no immediate need to justify it's expense, became an Army of numbers and efficiency ratings. Charts and graphs and green blocks became the standard for the effectiveness of the unit. An indicator of it's combat readiness - since without a fight we had no other benchmark to use. In many ways, even though we have been at war for 7 years now, the same mentality still pervades the institution. It is only slowly beginning to change.
But back to Nick's comments quoted above. I think the key to leading others is having a very clear understanding of yourself first. You have to be comfortable in your own skin. And that takes time. You have to know and understand what you value and what you don't. A sense of self. A willingness to see yourself as both your personal and professional selves. They are not necessarily the same. When you can define for subordinates those qualities, characteristics and traits that you value, then they have an understanding of what your motivations and priorities are. Then you put them into play on a day to day basis. He mentions that his NCO's are willing to settle for "Par for the course". What's wrong with that? Why work harder to improve something that works just fine right now? The issue may be that he values a higher level of personal excellence and professional behavior than they do. He defines himself partially by the comparison of his work against his predecessor's. His NCOs may not. They may see it as a system that works with or without their personalized input. Is it broken, or just not being executed to the high level that he personally desires? If it's actually broken, then change is easy. He will be expected to fix it. And he will have the latitude and backing to do so. If it's not actually broken, though, and is only underperforming based upon his high expectation level, then he's got a tough road ahead of him. How can he effect change when no one else sees a problem?
And so I went searching, as I normally do, to see what's out there in Army cyberspace and found the following link: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/slp2ndEd.pdf . Chapter 7 of this document deals with the human dimension of sustained combat. While the entire document is designed as strategic (global) leader primer, I took particular interest in this chapter. I found some quotes that jumped out at me. "A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved through personal study and contemplation." Chapter 7 goes on to look at leader qualities and requirements as outlined in FM 22-100 "Leadership", and also to look at strategic leader requirements. It identifies 6 competencies that strategic leaders need to focus on. They are Identity, Mental Agility, Cross-Cultural Savy, Interpersonal Maturity, World-Class Warrior, and Professional Astuteness. Since I believe that in the current environment, every single Soldier has the capacity to have strategic importance, these competencies are as relevant to the lieutenants and captains as they are to the colonels and generals. Here is what the document says about identity.
"Identity. This metacompetency is derived from the work of Douglas Hall who heavily influenced the conclusions of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel-Officer (ATLD Panel). According to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather self- feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.” The ATLD describes self-awareness, and describes it as the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. The metacompetency of identity moves beyond simply knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-awareness. It includes the understanding of one’s self-concept as an officer in the Army. Identity also includes an understanding of one’s values and how they match up to the values of the Army. Identity implies maturation beyond self-awareness as officers come to an understanding of who they are, not just how well they do things. Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also brings in aspects of development over a career. As senior leaders gain responsibility, they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others. The metacompetency of identity acknowledges that as an officer develops strategic leadership capability, his role extends beyond personal contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success for subordinates."
I think that both Nick and Leo can be found in that quotation. Nick's thought that he might or might not know what it is he expects from his subordinates might be generated from a not fully formed understanding of what he expects of himself. I think for all leaders, the sentence "As senior leaders gain responsibility they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others", is critical. During your young leader development, it's all about you being better than the other guy/girl. I know it was for me. As you grow, that becomes a zero sum game because there are too many other variables - interpersonal relationships, politics, the structure of the system etc. Eventually, you realize that focusing your efforts on the development of those you serve becomes the truest measure of your leadership. It becomes your legacy and you form your legacy each and every day. One Soldier at a time. But those people who create your legacy might have very little understanding of what you are actually trying to accomplish.
Which brings me back to the rifle range: Identity: A young leader running a new type of training event and wanting to do well. Mental Agility: His ability to see the non-quantifiable goodness in the Soldiers who went through the training. Cross-Cultural Savy: His awareness that the norms of the past are hard to break and ability to see it as a cultural difference, not a moral difference. World-Class Warrior: A very tiny first step taken by a group of people to create a more confident, competent and capable Soldier and person. Professional Astuteness: The gained awareness of training design and where the cracks are in the details.
My Mother sent me a book once. It's title is "And Wisdom Comes Quietly". I didn't get to this place overnight. It took time and people and experiences. I'm looking forward to the future.
# 12 Rounding Yourself Out
One of the most interesting things I found when reading about COL Boyd, was the way he studied so many various different things. He drew inspiration and learning points from history, science, philosophy etc. Although he had effectively redesigned the F16 and incidentally stumbled upon the idea of the OODA Loop, he never stopped following his varied interests and discovering new opportunities to learn from them. Often, one small passage from a biography or scientific text would provide him a new insight into an idea or theory he was kicking around himself, but had not fully come to grasp. In that light, I searched around on my bookshelves this morning and pulled out 3 different books. The first is called "Don't Sweat the Small Stuff...And It's All Small Stuff", by Richard Carlson. The 2nd is "Leadership is an Art", by Max DePree. The 3rd is "Common Sense Training", by LTG Arthur Collins, jr. Finally, I found the attached link at BNET.com http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=2829&tag=nl.e713. I want to highlight certain passages of each to illustrate (hopefully) the larger thematic idea behind my writing and training philosophy.
From "Don't Sweat the Small Stuff" comes the following passage: "Almost everyone feels that their own opinions are good, otherwise they wouldn't be sharing them with you. One of the destructive things that many of us do, however, in compare someone else's opinion to our own. And when it doesn't fall in line with our belief we either dismiss it, or find fault with it. ....Almost every opinion has some merit, especially if we are looking for merit, rather than looking for errors."
From "Leadership is an Art" comes this: We need a system of Response - leaders must make involvement genuine. A great error is to invite people to be involved and contribute their ideas and then to exclude them from the evaluation, the decision-making process and the implementation."
From "Common Sense Training": "In addressing a new generation of leaders, I cannot emphasize to strongly that the fundamentals of training do not change. Weapons change, technology advances and tactics adjust to what is new. The fundamentals of training however - to prepare an army to fight in some national crisis with whatever means are at hand-change but little. The major changes in training come from the social changes that affect the human condition. The enlightened trainer takes advantage of these changes to forge a better fighting force."
Finally, from the link above: "Change for its own sake also causes cynicism and resistance on the part of the rank and file. Since employees know that management approaches come and go as leaders transition in and out, they don’t take the new initiatives very seriously."
Interestingly, "Don't Sweat.." is a self-help type book designed to find your inner peace, written in 1997. "Leadership" is considered a business management classic written in 1989, and "Common Sense Training" was written by LTG Collins in 1978!
I think the first passage underscores my belief that you cannot totally by into your own bullshit and that it must be tested against new challenges and points of view to see how it stacks up under the pressure of changing conditions and understandings. It is what drives my fascination with Millennials. By looking for their input, challenging my preconceptions, and constantly searching for those individuals who are skeptical of the status quo, I continually have the opportunity to look at my reality in a fresh manner. Sometimes I fight for my preconceptions very hard, and sometimes I quickly give ground when the light bulb finally comes on. That is why I feel very comfortable challenging the 7 Principles of Army Training. I know that the way the Principles are currently constructed will not lead to effective leader development. I know this because my blind faith and experiences in "Big Army" don't stack up against the reality of talking with a bunch of young officers or NCOs'. I also see the challenges of comparing new ideas against a senior leader's opinion at the top, especially in such a hierarchical organization like the Army where conspicuous rank is often considered to equal intelligence and wisdom. Sometimes it truly does. Sometimes however, the lack of willingness to consider alternate opinions, and refusal to find the merit in them, only demonstrates the 'believing your own bullshit' that causes junior leaders and middle management to become bitter and disenfranchised.
The second quote is an almost automatic outcome of a failure to understand the first one. If you are only paying lip-service to subordinate ideas and opinions and not truly willing to allow them to be tested to find whether they really do have merit; or to co-opt them and not allow the subordinate to execute and take ownership of them, you stand to quickly lose the support, and faith of those who had them. Again, in the Army there is a real danger of this because of the top-down structure. The idea that a young sergeant or lieutenant could actually have a smart, well thought out, common sense answer to an immediate tactical need has become so strange sounding that it is taking a revolution of ideas to remind our institution that young leadership is the cornerstone of the Army and without it, we will not prevail in the current or future conflicts.
The 3rd quote struck me because it is 30 years old, and yet never more relevant than right now. Train the best you can, for the fight you face, with what you have. Everything else will change, but acknowledging the social change, accepting it's impact positively and negatively and developing training that forges a better Army and meets that need is immutable.
Finally, from the blog link. If you fail at all of the above, and start to 'believe your own bullshit' or that rank, status, and position demand personalized change with your stamp on it, you will almost inevitably lose the faith and support of the rank and file.
From "Don't Sweat the Small Stuff" comes the following passage: "Almost everyone feels that their own opinions are good, otherwise they wouldn't be sharing them with you. One of the destructive things that many of us do, however, in compare someone else's opinion to our own. And when it doesn't fall in line with our belief we either dismiss it, or find fault with it. ....Almost every opinion has some merit, especially if we are looking for merit, rather than looking for errors."
From "Leadership is an Art" comes this: We need a system of Response - leaders must make involvement genuine. A great error is to invite people to be involved and contribute their ideas and then to exclude them from the evaluation, the decision-making process and the implementation."
From "Common Sense Training": "In addressing a new generation of leaders, I cannot emphasize to strongly that the fundamentals of training do not change. Weapons change, technology advances and tactics adjust to what is new. The fundamentals of training however - to prepare an army to fight in some national crisis with whatever means are at hand-change but little. The major changes in training come from the social changes that affect the human condition. The enlightened trainer takes advantage of these changes to forge a better fighting force."
Finally, from the link above: "Change for its own sake also causes cynicism and resistance on the part of the rank and file. Since employees know that management approaches come and go as leaders transition in and out, they don’t take the new initiatives very seriously."
Interestingly, "Don't Sweat.." is a self-help type book designed to find your inner peace, written in 1997. "Leadership" is considered a business management classic written in 1989, and "Common Sense Training" was written by LTG Collins in 1978!
I think the first passage underscores my belief that you cannot totally by into your own bullshit and that it must be tested against new challenges and points of view to see how it stacks up under the pressure of changing conditions and understandings. It is what drives my fascination with Millennials. By looking for their input, challenging my preconceptions, and constantly searching for those individuals who are skeptical of the status quo, I continually have the opportunity to look at my reality in a fresh manner. Sometimes I fight for my preconceptions very hard, and sometimes I quickly give ground when the light bulb finally comes on. That is why I feel very comfortable challenging the 7 Principles of Army Training. I know that the way the Principles are currently constructed will not lead to effective leader development. I know this because my blind faith and experiences in "Big Army" don't stack up against the reality of talking with a bunch of young officers or NCOs'. I also see the challenges of comparing new ideas against a senior leader's opinion at the top, especially in such a hierarchical organization like the Army where conspicuous rank is often considered to equal intelligence and wisdom. Sometimes it truly does. Sometimes however, the lack of willingness to consider alternate opinions, and refusal to find the merit in them, only demonstrates the 'believing your own bullshit' that causes junior leaders and middle management to become bitter and disenfranchised.
The second quote is an almost automatic outcome of a failure to understand the first one. If you are only paying lip-service to subordinate ideas and opinions and not truly willing to allow them to be tested to find whether they really do have merit; or to co-opt them and not allow the subordinate to execute and take ownership of them, you stand to quickly lose the support, and faith of those who had them. Again, in the Army there is a real danger of this because of the top-down structure. The idea that a young sergeant or lieutenant could actually have a smart, well thought out, common sense answer to an immediate tactical need has become so strange sounding that it is taking a revolution of ideas to remind our institution that young leadership is the cornerstone of the Army and without it, we will not prevail in the current or future conflicts.
The 3rd quote struck me because it is 30 years old, and yet never more relevant than right now. Train the best you can, for the fight you face, with what you have. Everything else will change, but acknowledging the social change, accepting it's impact positively and negatively and developing training that forges a better Army and meets that need is immutable.
Finally, from the blog link. If you fail at all of the above, and start to 'believe your own bullshit' or that rank, status, and position demand personalized change with your stamp on it, you will almost inevitably lose the faith and support of the rank and file.
#11 The Strategic Millennial
The other day I was surfing around the Army website and came across an article by members of Booze/Allen/Hamilton, a government "think tank" type contractor. The authors had been asked by the U.S Air Force to look at a concern about the proliferation of social networking sites and the impact on command and control within the organization. Unfortunately, I printed the article and cannot find the link to it, or I would add it here.
There are a ton of sections that ended up under my yellow highlighter. I'll start with a few that - although I was latently aware of - had not really paid much attention to. "Few members of this generation (Millennials), born after 1978 can recall a time when the Internet was not at their disposal." Another, "...those born after Desert Storm in 1992 are currently in High School. Within the next 10-20 years, the members of this generation will become the majors, colonels and Navy captains with similar progress through the enlisted ranks."
I was a 24 year old Specialist in the Army in 1992. The Internet didn't really exist then. Digital media equaled Cd's, and most of us still had cassette players in our cars and not everyone had cable TV. I actually remember when MTV played music videos and Nina Blackwood was a VJ. The cell phone was 3 times the size of some current models and looked a lot like your home phone does now -for those of you who still have a land line phone. I can recall when CNN first broadcast and people wondered if there was enough news to fill a 24 hour news program. Consider that question - Will there be enough news to fill a 24 hour news cycle? Wow! Today, information happens in 30 minute cycles which equals 48 distinct cycles within a 24 hour period. Almost anything in the world can be covered in real time if necessary. In '92, we were in the last throws of the analog world. We just didn't know it. Many who read this blog were less than 6 years old at the time. Only 17 years ago and yet in many ways, it may as well have been the stone age.
Obviously, I have become almost consumed lately with the idea that within the context of the military and more pointedly within the context of the current war, I believe that generational shifts in motivations, behaviors, expectations and priorities is an area that we must start paying a lot of attention to. The explosion of technology that has occurred since the Millennials were born has lead them to live in an extremely different world than I grew up in. And in order for me to reach them, I must start listening and understanding them. Another important part of the equation is that it's not our world of today, per say, that matters but the world that we grew up in as children and young adults that has a major 'shaping' effect on our adult views, values, priorities and actions. Take that 'shaping' add to it the 'military culture' and the generational understanding gaps become even more acute. The people at the top of many organizations have failed to keep pace with the technological world that their subordinates live in.
As an example, the driving force behind the Booze/Allen/Hamilton document was that junior officers in the Air force were using Facebook to organize their units. What a genius idea. Instant communication of information to hundreds of people within the organization, using a medium that they are already addicted to and can't live without. Beats the hell out of the old phone tree! However, the use of a public social networking site to organize an official DoD unit was frightening to senior leaders and filled them with concerns regarding security and command and control issues. A generational and technological rift. They, (the seniors) simply couldn't process the idea of the equal sharing of information i.e., if I can get my information directly from my company commander, why do I need a squad leader or platoon sergeant? By god, we've gotta have structure. There'll be anarchy!
Facebook and other social networking sites 'flatten' an organization and allow for instant communication across an entire spectrum at once. This allows people to communicate in near real time. The military, and many private organizations and corporations are top down, hierarchical, and work at compartmentalization rather than cross-pollination. Structurally, even without the human element the two are very much at odds. Flat organizations are more likely to share information broadly and work collaboratively to achieve a common goal or objective, whereas top-down organizations are much more inclined to information hording and stove pipe chains of command. Information is a commodity to be closely held and distributed as necessary in the top-down world. Information is to be shared and mutually acted upon in the flattened world.
The paper goes on to suggest that the 'flatter', interconnected, and technologically advanced Millenials may run into a problem when confronted with their 'top-down', compartmentalized, and hierarchical organizations. Or, more accurately, their bosses in the top-down organizations will likely struggle to maintain control over the Millenial - if they cannot find a way to retain some form of control of either the message or the messenger either by restricting it or possibly by embracing it.
This point is evidenced by a blog that is run by General Campbell http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/why_i_serve/archive/2009/09/02/what-s-the-hubbub-about-strategic-communication.aspx. Campbell posed the question, "What's all the hubbub about Strategic Communication?" Commenting on another post by Adm Mullen, CJCS, who put forth that Strategic Communication is a process, not a thing. It's a way of thinking about how we communicate our message to the rest of the world, not the message itself. The manner is as important as the message. Follow the General Campbell post and you'll see some very interesting comments. There is a claim by one responder, that Strategic Communication is the purview of 3 star generals or higher. That only they can have the wisdom, understanding, and broad reach to understand the global impacts of the message intent. I almost laughed out loud. I weighed in that the Army has done an extremely poor job of explaining the Strategic Message to Soldiers, let alone to foreigners that it doesn't culturally understand, so when a young Soldier or Airmen or Marine takes an action (good or bad), that Soldier in our present world, can have a strategic impact - almost immediately. As evidence, I presented a broad overview of the events that occurred within my platoon in Iraq. Yet another poster posited that we have the means to win the Strategic communication aspect of this war, but we are not paying close enough attention to it, thereby allowing the enemy - who is making maximum use of his Strategic capabilities - to work inside of our decision cycle. In effect, we are continually sending a message that is defensive in nature because it is reactionary, too late to be of any use because the top-down bureaucracy requires too many levels of approval, and therefore worthless. Just another example of the opposition using Boyd's Law extremely efficiently. I wonder, just how many satellites does Osama bin Laden own? The US owns a bunch, and yet bin Laden can seem to communicate at any time he chooses and we can't manage to keep the American people informed in a timely manner. Let one Afghan or Iraqi local national get inadvertently injured or killed by a Soldier, and you know that it will be on the air within minutes. Immediately, we will say "We're looking into it." The investigation takes 2 weeks - 672 thirty minute news cycles later! In the Millenial world - and for most of the rest of the world - the original event cannot even be recalled.
And we wonder why Millennials are getting frustrated. They were raised in a 30 minute cycle world, have been cultured and socialized to think, act and work in a flattened manner and then find themselves in an archaic, top-down hierarchical organization being run by people who were conditioned in a wholly different manner. As I keep saying, we had better find a way to effectively communicate to the folks at the bottom what we expect of them, or we will lose them. At issue is the way we do it. In order for that to occur, the message we send has to be sent in a manner that they can understand and appreciate. Not the manner that we may be the most comfortable sending it in.
One last thought....Admiral Mullen - the most senior member of the entire military, has a Twitter account.....Let me think, don't know what my boss wants me to do tomorrow morning, can't get my 'good news' story past the battalion commander, can't share the latest good idea on how to defeat people who are trying to kill me and my Soldiers, but I can keep up with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as equally as I can Ashton Krutcher. Hmmm.
There are a ton of sections that ended up under my yellow highlighter. I'll start with a few that - although I was latently aware of - had not really paid much attention to. "Few members of this generation (Millennials), born after 1978 can recall a time when the Internet was not at their disposal." Another, "...those born after Desert Storm in 1992 are currently in High School. Within the next 10-20 years, the members of this generation will become the majors, colonels and Navy captains with similar progress through the enlisted ranks."
I was a 24 year old Specialist in the Army in 1992. The Internet didn't really exist then. Digital media equaled Cd's, and most of us still had cassette players in our cars and not everyone had cable TV. I actually remember when MTV played music videos and Nina Blackwood was a VJ. The cell phone was 3 times the size of some current models and looked a lot like your home phone does now -for those of you who still have a land line phone. I can recall when CNN first broadcast and people wondered if there was enough news to fill a 24 hour news program. Consider that question - Will there be enough news to fill a 24 hour news cycle? Wow! Today, information happens in 30 minute cycles which equals 48 distinct cycles within a 24 hour period. Almost anything in the world can be covered in real time if necessary. In '92, we were in the last throws of the analog world. We just didn't know it. Many who read this blog were less than 6 years old at the time. Only 17 years ago and yet in many ways, it may as well have been the stone age.
Obviously, I have become almost consumed lately with the idea that within the context of the military and more pointedly within the context of the current war, I believe that generational shifts in motivations, behaviors, expectations and priorities is an area that we must start paying a lot of attention to. The explosion of technology that has occurred since the Millennials were born has lead them to live in an extremely different world than I grew up in. And in order for me to reach them, I must start listening and understanding them. Another important part of the equation is that it's not our world of today, per say, that matters but the world that we grew up in as children and young adults that has a major 'shaping' effect on our adult views, values, priorities and actions. Take that 'shaping' add to it the 'military culture' and the generational understanding gaps become even more acute. The people at the top of many organizations have failed to keep pace with the technological world that their subordinates live in.
As an example, the driving force behind the Booze/Allen/Hamilton document was that junior officers in the Air force were using Facebook to organize their units. What a genius idea. Instant communication of information to hundreds of people within the organization, using a medium that they are already addicted to and can't live without. Beats the hell out of the old phone tree! However, the use of a public social networking site to organize an official DoD unit was frightening to senior leaders and filled them with concerns regarding security and command and control issues. A generational and technological rift. They, (the seniors) simply couldn't process the idea of the equal sharing of information i.e., if I can get my information directly from my company commander, why do I need a squad leader or platoon sergeant? By god, we've gotta have structure. There'll be anarchy!
Facebook and other social networking sites 'flatten' an organization and allow for instant communication across an entire spectrum at once. This allows people to communicate in near real time. The military, and many private organizations and corporations are top down, hierarchical, and work at compartmentalization rather than cross-pollination. Structurally, even without the human element the two are very much at odds. Flat organizations are more likely to share information broadly and work collaboratively to achieve a common goal or objective, whereas top-down organizations are much more inclined to information hording and stove pipe chains of command. Information is a commodity to be closely held and distributed as necessary in the top-down world. Information is to be shared and mutually acted upon in the flattened world.
The paper goes on to suggest that the 'flatter', interconnected, and technologically advanced Millenials may run into a problem when confronted with their 'top-down', compartmentalized, and hierarchical organizations. Or, more accurately, their bosses in the top-down organizations will likely struggle to maintain control over the Millenial - if they cannot find a way to retain some form of control of either the message or the messenger either by restricting it or possibly by embracing it.
This point is evidenced by a blog that is run by General Campbell http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/why_i_serve/archive/2009/09/02/what-s-the-hubbub-about-strategic-communication.aspx. Campbell posed the question, "What's all the hubbub about Strategic Communication?" Commenting on another post by Adm Mullen, CJCS, who put forth that Strategic Communication is a process, not a thing. It's a way of thinking about how we communicate our message to the rest of the world, not the message itself. The manner is as important as the message. Follow the General Campbell post and you'll see some very interesting comments. There is a claim by one responder, that Strategic Communication is the purview of 3 star generals or higher. That only they can have the wisdom, understanding, and broad reach to understand the global impacts of the message intent. I almost laughed out loud. I weighed in that the Army has done an extremely poor job of explaining the Strategic Message to Soldiers, let alone to foreigners that it doesn't culturally understand, so when a young Soldier or Airmen or Marine takes an action (good or bad), that Soldier in our present world, can have a strategic impact - almost immediately. As evidence, I presented a broad overview of the events that occurred within my platoon in Iraq. Yet another poster posited that we have the means to win the Strategic communication aspect of this war, but we are not paying close enough attention to it, thereby allowing the enemy - who is making maximum use of his Strategic capabilities - to work inside of our decision cycle. In effect, we are continually sending a message that is defensive in nature because it is reactionary, too late to be of any use because the top-down bureaucracy requires too many levels of approval, and therefore worthless. Just another example of the opposition using Boyd's Law extremely efficiently. I wonder, just how many satellites does Osama bin Laden own? The US owns a bunch, and yet bin Laden can seem to communicate at any time he chooses and we can't manage to keep the American people informed in a timely manner. Let one Afghan or Iraqi local national get inadvertently injured or killed by a Soldier, and you know that it will be on the air within minutes. Immediately, we will say "We're looking into it." The investigation takes 2 weeks - 672 thirty minute news cycles later! In the Millenial world - and for most of the rest of the world - the original event cannot even be recalled.
And we wonder why Millennials are getting frustrated. They were raised in a 30 minute cycle world, have been cultured and socialized to think, act and work in a flattened manner and then find themselves in an archaic, top-down hierarchical organization being run by people who were conditioned in a wholly different manner. As I keep saying, we had better find a way to effectively communicate to the folks at the bottom what we expect of them, or we will lose them. At issue is the way we do it. In order for that to occur, the message we send has to be sent in a manner that they can understand and appreciate. Not the manner that we may be the most comfortable sending it in.
One last thought....Admiral Mullen - the most senior member of the entire military, has a Twitter account.....Let me think, don't know what my boss wants me to do tomorrow morning, can't get my 'good news' story past the battalion commander, can't share the latest good idea on how to defeat people who are trying to kill me and my Soldiers, but I can keep up with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as equally as I can Ashton Krutcher. Hmmm.
#10 The Folks who will Fight It
I found the following quotation in an anthology titled "Patriot Hearts" by Maj. William T. Coffey, Jr. It struck me because of it's similarities to many refrains I hear today.
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell." - General Edward C. Meyer
Many units I work with fit this general description. The Army simply cannot fill them fast enough with the exactly right mix as described by the organization charts. And even if the Army could, many units are serving in ways that they were not designed for, so some of the skill sets called for in the organization chart have no bearing on the mission they are confronted with.
The difference between Gen Meyer's comment and many I hear today though is profound. Meyer accepts that although his unit was understrength, they worked to the best of their collective abilities. The situation could not wait. Today, many units routinely complain that they cannot do what they have to because the right people are not in the right places. They complain that the Soldiers they do have aren't capable of doing what must get done. While there is truth that they are short critical personnel, and there may be truth that the Soldiers they do have cannot accomplish what must get done - my point here is that fixing part 2 of the above and not worrying so much about part 1 is the key. The acceptance of the personnel limitation plus the understanding of the limitations of those you do have on hand and the recognition of what must get done is the critical first step in creating a cohesive and mission focused organization. Meyer's quote also lends credence to my personal belief that you have to train people first and then take care of the task. If a twenty something Corporal is serving as a platoon leader, don't expect a lot of MDMP (Military Decision Making Process), it's just not in his/her vocabulary. They don't teach it at NCO education schools. That doesn't mean that they can't do it, just that the manner and method used to teach it might have to be different. A 2nd Lieutenant as a company commander? In combat? The thought frightens people. Why? While modern Full Spectrum Operations are complex, multi-layered and evolve rapidly, that doesn't mean that you had to have attended the Captains Career Course to be able to figure out what to do when people start shooting at you, your vehicle gets blown up, or you have casualties.
We have to start training the folks we have, with whatever their experience levels are, and adjust how we do it to match what must get done. But how? First, I think it begins with trust and a thorough review of the problem(s). A leader has to outline for the group - whatever its composition - the challenges they mutually face. Second, the recognition and determination that they will solve their collective problem together. That each of them must participate. That there is a sense of interdependence. When a unit or group does those 2 things, they have begun to solve the issues that confront them.
But, then there is the 'politics'. The need to accurately convey to others the realities (personnel and otherwise) the unit faces. Sometimes, the very manner in which that conversation takes place can profoundly effect what happens to the unit. Senior leaders may be able to change the make-up of the unit once they are aware of the critical need. They also may not. If the senior leader cannot affect a personnel change, they may have to consider a mission change. If that is not possible then possibly they will have to accept a different training method - outside of standard Army doctrine - that will assist the unit to accomplish it's requirements. If the senior leader is supportive of this an understrength unit can be extremely successful. If not, the results can be disastrous. If the senior leader expects an understrength, and incorrectly assimilated (personnel serving in positions they have no training for) to act in the same manner as a full strength unit, then that unit will likely fail. And the Soldiers will lose trust and faith in their leadership.
So, 3 points here. First, understrength units can be extremely successful. Their success is reliant on the recognition of the personnel and skills they do have - not who they are missing. Second, since this is the reality that many units face today, quit complaining and figure out how to solve your problem. Finally, commanders at all levels need to honestly "see" their unit, report that to higher, and then explain how they intend to go about accomplishing their mission in spite of their challenges. As I often say when conducting marksmanship training, the task (combat) and the standard (winning) will not change. The conditions are always the variable. And changing conditions require changing solutions to ensure that the standard is always maintained.
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell." - General Edward C. Meyer
Many units I work with fit this general description. The Army simply cannot fill them fast enough with the exactly right mix as described by the organization charts. And even if the Army could, many units are serving in ways that they were not designed for, so some of the skill sets called for in the organization chart have no bearing on the mission they are confronted with.
The difference between Gen Meyer's comment and many I hear today though is profound. Meyer accepts that although his unit was understrength, they worked to the best of their collective abilities. The situation could not wait. Today, many units routinely complain that they cannot do what they have to because the right people are not in the right places. They complain that the Soldiers they do have aren't capable of doing what must get done. While there is truth that they are short critical personnel, and there may be truth that the Soldiers they do have cannot accomplish what must get done - my point here is that fixing part 2 of the above and not worrying so much about part 1 is the key. The acceptance of the personnel limitation plus the understanding of the limitations of those you do have on hand and the recognition of what must get done is the critical first step in creating a cohesive and mission focused organization. Meyer's quote also lends credence to my personal belief that you have to train people first and then take care of the task. If a twenty something Corporal is serving as a platoon leader, don't expect a lot of MDMP (Military Decision Making Process), it's just not in his/her vocabulary. They don't teach it at NCO education schools. That doesn't mean that they can't do it, just that the manner and method used to teach it might have to be different. A 2nd Lieutenant as a company commander? In combat? The thought frightens people. Why? While modern Full Spectrum Operations are complex, multi-layered and evolve rapidly, that doesn't mean that you had to have attended the Captains Career Course to be able to figure out what to do when people start shooting at you, your vehicle gets blown up, or you have casualties.
We have to start training the folks we have, with whatever their experience levels are, and adjust how we do it to match what must get done. But how? First, I think it begins with trust and a thorough review of the problem(s). A leader has to outline for the group - whatever its composition - the challenges they mutually face. Second, the recognition and determination that they will solve their collective problem together. That each of them must participate. That there is a sense of interdependence. When a unit or group does those 2 things, they have begun to solve the issues that confront them.
But, then there is the 'politics'. The need to accurately convey to others the realities (personnel and otherwise) the unit faces. Sometimes, the very manner in which that conversation takes place can profoundly effect what happens to the unit. Senior leaders may be able to change the make-up of the unit once they are aware of the critical need. They also may not. If the senior leader cannot affect a personnel change, they may have to consider a mission change. If that is not possible then possibly they will have to accept a different training method - outside of standard Army doctrine - that will assist the unit to accomplish it's requirements. If the senior leader is supportive of this an understrength unit can be extremely successful. If not, the results can be disastrous. If the senior leader expects an understrength, and incorrectly assimilated (personnel serving in positions they have no training for) to act in the same manner as a full strength unit, then that unit will likely fail. And the Soldiers will lose trust and faith in their leadership.
So, 3 points here. First, understrength units can be extremely successful. Their success is reliant on the recognition of the personnel and skills they do have - not who they are missing. Second, since this is the reality that many units face today, quit complaining and figure out how to solve your problem. Finally, commanders at all levels need to honestly "see" their unit, report that to higher, and then explain how they intend to go about accomplishing their mission in spite of their challenges. As I often say when conducting marksmanship training, the task (combat) and the standard (winning) will not change. The conditions are always the variable. And changing conditions require changing solutions to ensure that the standard is always maintained.
#9 Further Up the Road
This post is dedicated to my friend Erica.
Around 2:00 am this past Saturday morning, standing in my driveway, I said goodbye to a friend of mine. We had just completed a 12 hour odyssey to get home from Boston after a 2 day conference at Natick Labs to look at the improvements being made in body armor and also to ensure that people understood the impact body armor has on small statured Soldiers - principally women. Exhausted,we hugged and she quietly backed out of the driveway and drove away.
I first met her 2 years ago when her unit was the first to implement the marksmanship course. She was their Assistant S3 at the time, but still young, and still learning. She would go on to have her own Operations shop in Iraq later that year. Many injured Soldiers have passed through her hospital and she and her staff have cared for them as if they were their very own children. She carries the burden of those whom they could not save. At 26, she has seen the absolute best and the absolute worst of the human condition. She has grown a lot. She is wise beyond her years.
In an earlier post, I made mention of learning from the next generation. The idea that you had to understand how they see their world, how they process information, how they make decisions, in order to effectively make use of their talents. That the mentor/mentee relationship has to work on equal footing. Being older does not always imply being wiser. And, even if it does, if they can't hear you then the wisdom in your message may be lost anyway. She and I always worked that way, and I am better for it.
In this case, Erica taught me more than I ever taught her. She commented the other day that Millennials may be more comfortable dealing in ambiguity than Gen Xers. I prefer structure while she is comfortable with change and uncertainty. I prefer time to consider all points, she can work off of the 70% solution. No less effective, and possibly more because she keeps pace with her environment much better than I. Just another lesson from the kid. I'll spend hours mulling over the implication of that in Soldier training.
But she is more than a philosophical abstraction. She, LJ, and others have been good friends to me during a particularly difficult period in my life. I cannot express my gratitude enough for their patience and support. After hearing my stories and complaints and frustrations for the 10,000th time, she still listened, still cared and still offered me things to think about or a fresh perspective to consider. She has been kind and empathetic without allowing me to wallow. She has pushed me to be better because of this struggle. She allows me my passion and emotions but never ceases to bring me back to reason.
Good luck, EK. As we laughed about it the other night, the Army is actually a very small world. No doubt our paths will cross again. As Bruce said in the song driving home "Further up the road, Further up the road, I'll meet you further on up the road, When the way is dark and the night is cold, I'll meet you further on up the road....."
Around 2:00 am this past Saturday morning, standing in my driveway, I said goodbye to a friend of mine. We had just completed a 12 hour odyssey to get home from Boston after a 2 day conference at Natick Labs to look at the improvements being made in body armor and also to ensure that people understood the impact body armor has on small statured Soldiers - principally women. Exhausted,we hugged and she quietly backed out of the driveway and drove away.
I first met her 2 years ago when her unit was the first to implement the marksmanship course. She was their Assistant S3 at the time, but still young, and still learning. She would go on to have her own Operations shop in Iraq later that year. Many injured Soldiers have passed through her hospital and she and her staff have cared for them as if they were their very own children. She carries the burden of those whom they could not save. At 26, she has seen the absolute best and the absolute worst of the human condition. She has grown a lot. She is wise beyond her years.
In an earlier post, I made mention of learning from the next generation. The idea that you had to understand how they see their world, how they process information, how they make decisions, in order to effectively make use of their talents. That the mentor/mentee relationship has to work on equal footing. Being older does not always imply being wiser. And, even if it does, if they can't hear you then the wisdom in your message may be lost anyway. She and I always worked that way, and I am better for it.
In this case, Erica taught me more than I ever taught her. She commented the other day that Millennials may be more comfortable dealing in ambiguity than Gen Xers. I prefer structure while she is comfortable with change and uncertainty. I prefer time to consider all points, she can work off of the 70% solution. No less effective, and possibly more because she keeps pace with her environment much better than I. Just another lesson from the kid. I'll spend hours mulling over the implication of that in Soldier training.
But she is more than a philosophical abstraction. She, LJ, and others have been good friends to me during a particularly difficult period in my life. I cannot express my gratitude enough for their patience and support. After hearing my stories and complaints and frustrations for the 10,000th time, she still listened, still cared and still offered me things to think about or a fresh perspective to consider. She has been kind and empathetic without allowing me to wallow. She has pushed me to be better because of this struggle. She allows me my passion and emotions but never ceases to bring me back to reason.
Good luck, EK. As we laughed about it the other night, the Army is actually a very small world. No doubt our paths will cross again. As Bruce said in the song driving home "Further up the road, Further up the road, I'll meet you further on up the road, When the way is dark and the night is cold, I'll meet you further on up the road....."
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