Earlier this week I received a gift in the mail. It was sent to me by a friend I met through my writing here and on the Army's information-sharing website, Battle Command Knowledge System. It is an incredible book entitled, "War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning", written by Chris Hedges. I highly recommend it to everyone. Mr. Hedges has travelled the world as a foreign correspondent for The New York Times, the Dallas Morning News, and the Christian Science Monitor. I have not been able to put it down and it has provided me more moments of clarity and understanding that anything else I have read recently. If you want to understand the allure of combat and the reasons behind it's effect on people, I cannot commend this small masterpiece enough. You can find it on Amazon. It is worth the read and is also the driving force behind today's post.
There has been a huge effort over the last year or so in the Army to reduce the suicide rate among Soldiers and to remove the stigma of reaching out for help when you need it. Much like we used to see signs and posters exhorting us to buy war bonds or support the troops, now there are signs to reassure people that help is available if they need it and that it is a sign of strength and courage to reach out when you are no longer able to make sense of your world anymore. We all have times when we need to rely on others and the Army is trying really hard to get the message out to Soldiers that it will do the best it can to help them in their time of need.
As part of that campaign, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli, commissioned year long study of suicides in the Army to try and find indicators, and to help commanders find resources etc to stem the tide. In late July the results of that study were published in a 350 page report entitled, "Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention Report 2010". You can find a link to the report itself here:
http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/07/28/42934-army-health-promotion-risk-reduction-and-suicide-prevention-report/index.html
Consider the following two items from the report:
"Historically, the Army suicide rate has been significantly lower than the civilian rate (the civilian demographically adjusted rate typically is about 19.2 per 100,000). However, suicide and accidental death rates began trending upward in 2004, and in 2008, the Army suicide rate crested above the national average and reached a record of 20.2 per 100,000.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, 160 active duty Soldiers took their lives, making suicide the third leading cause of death among the Army population. If we include accidental death, which frequently is the result of high risk behavior (drinking and driving, drug overdose, etc.), we find that less young men and women die in combat than die by their own actions. Simply stated, we are often more dangerous to ourselves than the enemy."
And then this:
"At 24 years of age, a Soldier, on average, has moved from home, family and friends and has resided in two other states; has traveled the world (deployed); been promoted four times; bought a car and wrecked it; married and had children; has had relationship and financial problems; seen death; is responsible for dozens of Soldiers; maintains millions of dollars worth of equipment; and gets paid less than $40,000 a year."
Although we do not have all the data from FY 2010 available yet, the indication is that the trend of a higher than average death rate due to suicide and risky behavior will continue. Only time will tell if our recognition of the immense strain on the force and our efforts to combat destructive behaviors will be effective on a large scale, but if even one Soldier is assisted by this report, it's conclusions and recommendations, and the huge increase in resources being applied to the problem, then it will be worth it. This is not a cost analysis issue, it is a human being issue. The trust of the Soldier that the institution will keep it's promise to assist him/her in their hour of need, just as the Soldier did when the Army needed them.
But why do we have this problem in the first place? The Army report talks a lot about engaged leadership and structural issues, and recommends to leaders at all levels things that can be done, but maybe the answer is much more personal than that. Maybe, what needs to be considered is how war effects just one person. What if it's not the structure and bureaucracy of the Army? What if it's not the loss of friends? What if it's not the strain of fighting? Or OPTEMPO. More accurately, what if it is?
A few quotes from "War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning":
"The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with it's destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent. Trivia dominates our conversations and increasingly our airwaves. And war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause."
"When we ingest the anodyne of war we feel what those we seek to destroy feel...It is the same narcotic. I partook of it for many years. And like every recovering addict there is a part of me that remains nostalgic for wars simplicity and high, even as I cope with the scars it left behind, mourn the deaths of those I worked with, and struggle with the bestiality I would have been better off not witnessing. There is a part of me - maybe it is a part of many of us - that decided at certain moments that I would rather die like this than go back to the routine of life. The chance to exist for an intense and overpowering moment, even if it meant certain oblivion, seemed worth it in the midst of war - and very stupid once the war ended."
"The prospect of war is exciting. Many young men schooled in the notion that war is the ultimate definition of manhood, that only in war will they be tested and proven, that they can discover their worth as human beings in battle, willingly join the great enterprise. The admiration of the crowd, the high blown rhetoric, the chance to achieve the glory of the previous generation, the ideal of nobility beckon us forward. And people, ironically, enjoy righteous indignation and an object upon which to unleash their anger. War usually starts with collective euphoria."
These paragraphs and others brought together a lot of loosely connected ideas that have been swimming around the edges for a long time. Even now, though, I cannot bring them into sharp focus. They are only clearer than they were before. Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Ask yourself if it doesn't have a ring of truth to it....
I am a Soldier and I feel the need to serve a cause. I search for purpose and meaning and definition. I want to test myself on the stage of manhood and see how I will measure up against the heroes of my past and history. Will I stand tall in the face of fear? Can I move smoothly between the higher ideal of compassion and respect and the basic animalistic calling of killing and power? Will I become the next history book hero? Or will I not live up to those things? Will I reach the decision point and back down from the fight? Will I give in to my fear and need for self-preservation? Will I be a man?
And so I find a fight. I find a test. I join the Army and put myself in the arena. I grab my gun and start the examination of me. And as I take the test a new reality takes hold. I like it. I like the rush, the clarity, the singularity of purpose. My whole world is right here, right now. It is simple. I must kill him before he kills me. Nothing else exists. My focus is a sharp as a laser beam. And everything else becomes just noise....
A year later, I come back home. I convinced myself that my cause was just and that my actions are in keeping with tradition and honor and all that is expected of the warrior. And I passed the test. But there is an itch in my brain that will not go away. I crave that singular moment. The laser beam clarity. I want it back. But I'm afraid to admit it, for it means accepting something else as well. I miss the violence. I miss the power to end another person's life. I miss the destruction. I miss controlling my universe. Alone at night in the dark, I re-live those moments of perfection. Perfect power, perfect clarity, perfect fear. The adrenaline rush of randomness. But I am home now and the menial tasks of day to day life surround me. My wife and family see importance in things I do not. They are consumed with the daily routine as if it is the critical part of their being. The grass needs to be cut, the kids need school shoes, the car needs an oil change. There is nothing heroic here. It is all so very boring. My purpose has been removed and my addiction to that one crystal clear moment needs feeding. And there is nothing in my world to feed the beast...
And so I look around for things that will help me cope. Will remove the ache that the addiction has created. Alcohol, drugs - things like this ease the sharp need, but only for a little while. Fast cars, motorcycles, risk taking behaviors etc replicate the adrenaline rush, but without the sense of randomness that combat brings. I can drive as fast as the machine will go, but the decision to throttle back remains with me. In combat, that decision is not mine. It belongs to my adversary. And that is the critical difference. I quickly realize that I will never be able to replicate that crystal clear moment until I am once again in the fight. Until I can feed the beast. And the need to feed the beast drives me further away from those things that used to matter so very much. My original need for testing, for honor, for glory has now become nothing more than a need for a moment.
After 10 years of moving through this cycle 365 days at a time it all becomes too hard to take. I cannot move back and forth anymore. I cannot live in this world of trivial encounters and meaningless platitudes. And yet I realize that I have given myself over to the addiction of one clear moment and now my purpose in fighting is no longer for some higher noble purpose, but rather to feed my addiction. My struggle is that I cannot admit that I enjoy the requirements of the moment. I get off on the rush. I accept fate. I like physical power. I enjoyed trying to destroy another person who was trying to destroy me. I have embraced the lesser angels of my nature. I moved downward on Mazlow's hierarchy....and I like it. But to admit these things will only drive me further from the society that I return home to. I become a nomad sliding between two worlds and neither will accept me as their own.
In the Army study, you can find a lot of demographic data that searches for common causes to the issues that confront us. You'll find that the average suicide victim is this old, of that ethnicity, has served X long etc. You will find that facts that the investigations have revealed. But maybe something critical is missing. Maybe it's not the financial problems, or the children's issues, or the marital strife. Maybe those aren't the issues at all. Because we all have those types of problems. Soldier or civilian. We all have stress. What then might be the difference for the Soldier? It's actually pretty simple. The Soldier has experienced that one clear moment. He/She is twenty something years old and recognizes that they cannot feed the addiction any more. The entire world becomes mundane and boring. It's not that my wife is yapping at me, it's that what she is yapping about doesn't matter in the context of one clear moment. It's not that my kids are crying, it's that I cannot control my universe and exercise power. It's not that the grass needs cutting, it's that I no longer give a damn about what my neighbors may say about me because I know that I have experienced the test and I have passed it. I have survived and prospered in one clear moment. Their opinion no longer matters. I beat randomness, fate, the enemy and fear. I felt every emotion more sharply than anyone who hadn't been there possibly can. How do you think you can help me Mr. Behavioral Health guy? Mr. Civilian? Mama family member? Really, how do you think you can help? Because when I look at you I do not see in your eyes someone who has experienced one clear moment. I really don't. Thanks for your time.
As leaders, we need to see things like this on a personal level. Without moral judgement. Somewhere, there is a group of people sitting around telling war stories. And those stories will likely hover around but never admit that they miss that moment. When we can have a Soldier come to us and say, "Sergeant, I miss the clarity of combat. I miss the excitement of a firefight. I miss the chance to measure up. I miss the power of ending a life" When we create leader conditions for that to occur, then we can begin to get to the root cause of many Soldier issues.
Most Soldiers do not want to hurt themselves. The just cannot take being nomads. Maybe the answer to the problem is to accept their addiction and slowly replace it over time with the beauty of the mundane. To turn their family and friends from a ideal to their reality.
Our problem with suicide and reckless behavior is real. It deserves nothing less than our full efforts to reduce it. But, just as real must be our acceptance that war is a very powerful behavior agent. It cannot be replicated anywhere else. When a person gets to a point where they have either measured up, or finds they cannot, that is the most vulnerable point. For those who have we must replace that crystal clear purpose. For those who cannot, we must help them redefine their individual value and meaning. For both groups, we must remain aware that they have been fundamentally changed for the rest of their lives. For both the ability to stand in the arena and the inability to do so will be decided very quickly, but it will have everlasting effects. That choice will happen in one clear moment.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. I look forward to hearing from you.
#85 Vision
I found the following paragraph the other day in a monograph by Dr. Anna Simons of the Naval Post Graduate School, entitled: "Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy - What It is, and Why We Need It"
"Essentially, the argument to be outlined here is that far more attention should be paid to the who rather than the what of cross-cultural conflict. Bottom line up front: if we get the who right, the right what will follow.
Unfortunately, Washington, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Services lavish far more attention, money and, ironically, manpower on the what. Just witness the effort expended over the past several years hashing out Joint, never mind Service-specific, definitions for irregular and unconventional warfare. But—perhaps the ground is beginning to shift. Take Andrew Krepinevich’s and Barry Watts’s recent assertion that it is “past time to recognize that not everyone has the cognitive abilities and insight to be a competent strategist.” As they note, “strategy is about insight, creativity, and synthesis.” According to Krepinevich and Watts, “it appears that by the time most individuals reach their early twenties, they either have developed the cognitive skills for strategy or they have not.” "
The same argument holds true for leader development. All other things being equal, why is it that one person will succeed at an endeavor and another will not? If everyone has been developed in the same manner, and given the same opportunities to master their craft, and exposed to the same stimuli, then why is it that some folks can view the challenge in front of them clearly, and holistically, and others cannot see the forest through the trees? The answer seems to be that there are those who posses a certain type of thought process that allows them to express a 'vision' that others can recognize and follow. And, conversely, there are those who do not. For the time being, it is not critical to give that vision any moral weight good or bad, it is simply important to realize that some people have the ability to impart 'vision' better than others.
Leadership is the ability to influence the behavior of others in pursuit of a common goal. The methods used will vary in relation to what the goal is, but the singular purpose of leadership is to influence people.
I think this is a very important recognition because it highlights the critical importance of the traits that the leader possesses that make the subordinate want to follow his or her lead. This is why I have continually pushed for more self-awareness in our leader development programs. Instead of focusing our efforts on the outside stimuli and structural requirements of title and position, we should be focusing our efforts inwards on the behavioral, emotional, moral and influential dynamics of both the leader and the led.
We also need to move away from any leadership model that is purely positive outcome based. I had a conversation with someone at work the other day who brought up the idea that we generally only study the behaviors and actions of the guy who won or was successful. We rarely look at those attributes of the guy who lost. As if the outcome of a battle or event is, by itself, validation of the behavior of the leader. This discussion came about because of three separate events. First, a few months back there was an article in Army Times regarding a unit in Afghanistan where the Soldiers and junior leaders were very upset at their brigade chain of command because, as they perceived it, the unit was not following the COIN doctrine laid out by the U.S. high command at the time. You can find a link to that article here:
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/12/army_afghanistan_mixed_signals_122109w/
Second, was another Army Times cover story two weeks ago outlining alleged war crimes from another unit in the same brigade. Here are both the Army Times link, and one from the Washington Post that outlines the incident so far:
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/09/army-lewis-mcchord-platoon-charged-with-killing-civilians-091110w/
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39253561/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/
Finally, I was sent a document this week from a co-worker that outlined a different strategy for dealing with insurgents in Afghanistan. The document was being passed around as part of the the information sharing mechanism the Army has in place to rapidly disseminate lessons learned that might be used by other units and leaders. Interestingly, the document was produced by the same brigade mentioned in the two stories above. And with just a small bit of investigative work on my part to put things in a timeline, you can rapidly come to the following possible scenario:
First, the unit's leadership felt that they needed to conduct 'counter-guerrilla' operations in order to create space for 'counter-insurgent' operations to take place. Second, since the Army no longer has a 'counter-guerrilla' manual (it has been replaced by the counter-insurgency doctrine), the unit wrote their own. And finally, and most importantly, there was a breakdown in communication between the unit and it's subordinates as to how either policy was being implemented on the ground. Is it possible that the alleged crimes might have grown out of this? The unit took a lot of casualties during it's tour. According to the various articles, there appears to have been significant differences of opinion as to which approach (counter-guerrilla or counter-insurgency) was being implemented and followed. Having been in a similar situation with my platoon, I found all of it difficult to read.
[Note: The paragraph above should not be misconstrued by anyone as mitigation of the alleged crimes. As I have said numerous times before, nothing mitigates actions such as are alleged in these articles. Nothing. Each Soldier has a higher moral imperative to disobey any type of order or influence that might lead to crimes against innocents. That is not only morally correct, it is our doctrine.]
These examples do, however, speak to a whole lot of critical considerations of leadership and that the realization that the who of leadership is much more important than the what. It is not important what the results of the commander's decision were - the outcomes. What is more important is his vision and an awareness of how that vision, coupled with his place in the organization, and his ability to influence others can have many possible outcomes. I have no doubt that the commander personally is a successful, honorable, courageous, and adaptive thinker. I also have absolutely no doubt that he would not, and did not, have knowledge of, underwrite, or condone any of the alleged actions of his subordinates. What does matter though is that he had a vision - an understanding of what needed to be accomplished and more importantly, a responsibility to ensure that his subordinates clearly understood it. The question is whether or not his subordinates saw his vision in the same manner he did.
As I mentioned earlier, leadership is the ability to influence others. Initially, this influence may be nothing more than positional - the legal authorities given to the person in charge. Over time, however, this influence can become much more. It takes on a life of it's own. And it is generally speaking, personality driven. The personality of the leader - how they act, their manner and method, gets co-opted and is taken on by their subordinates. Rash and brash leaders build rash and brash units. Quiet and professional leaders create quiet and methodical units. The who of the organization becomes critical. We don't spend a whole lot of time on questions like these in our leader development schools, choosing rather to focus on battles won or lost, the tactics involved and the impact of the outcomes on future events. We don't often take a look at the makeup of the people in charge. Why 'rash and brash' worked for one unit while 'quiet and professional' might not have worked for another.
Everyone who is considered a leader has to possess a vision for their organization - no matter how small or how large. They have to have an idea of where they want it to go, how they want it to act, and what they expect it to be able to do. They also must realize that their vision is going to be 'Oriented' to differently by their subordinates, and that their unit will likely become an extension of their personality. If this is the case, then as an Army, we need to spend a lot more time on developing the self-awareness of our leaders in order to ensure that they have a very refined understanding why who they are is much more important to the life of the organization, than what they do.
The title of Dr. Simon's monograph caught my eye. The idea that unity of vision is critical to strategic success. The right person, who is able to see both the forest and the trees is the first cut. His or her vision of the outcome is the second. The ability to successfully communicate it to his/her subordinates in a manner that they can understand and relate to is even more important. Even with all that though, the actual outcome still has too many variables to count. Ultimately, success or failure can really come down to the 'who' of the leader, not the 'what' of their actions.
There are a lot of lessons to be learned from events that do not turn out as expected. It is too shallow to simply say that somewhere along the way a "leader" failed. More likely is that the "leader" had no idea how their actions, behaviors, and ideas were being interpreted by others. They had influence, but didn't understand it's power to sway. They had vision but did not communicate it clearly. They had personality and position, but did not understand that the unit would adopt it and make it their own.
Do you have a vision for those you lead? If so, do they know what it is? And how do you know they share the same vision as you do? These are things that we need to take long hard looks at as an institution. Without this self-awareness, there are too many things that can go wrong. And, we must accept, that even if our vision is crystal clear and shared by all, it is always possible that the outcome will not be what was intended. And those are the lessons we should be studying.
For me, I will pray for all involved. No matter the legal outcome of the allegations, there will be a lot of pain for a lot of people. I pray that they may find peace and strength for the journey ahead. They will need it.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"Essentially, the argument to be outlined here is that far more attention should be paid to the who rather than the what of cross-cultural conflict. Bottom line up front: if we get the who right, the right what will follow.
Unfortunately, Washington, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Services lavish far more attention, money and, ironically, manpower on the what. Just witness the effort expended over the past several years hashing out Joint, never mind Service-specific, definitions for irregular and unconventional warfare. But—perhaps the ground is beginning to shift. Take Andrew Krepinevich’s and Barry Watts’s recent assertion that it is “past time to recognize that not everyone has the cognitive abilities and insight to be a competent strategist.” As they note, “strategy is about insight, creativity, and synthesis.” According to Krepinevich and Watts, “it appears that by the time most individuals reach their early twenties, they either have developed the cognitive skills for strategy or they have not.” "
The same argument holds true for leader development. All other things being equal, why is it that one person will succeed at an endeavor and another will not? If everyone has been developed in the same manner, and given the same opportunities to master their craft, and exposed to the same stimuli, then why is it that some folks can view the challenge in front of them clearly, and holistically, and others cannot see the forest through the trees? The answer seems to be that there are those who posses a certain type of thought process that allows them to express a 'vision' that others can recognize and follow. And, conversely, there are those who do not. For the time being, it is not critical to give that vision any moral weight good or bad, it is simply important to realize that some people have the ability to impart 'vision' better than others.
Leadership is the ability to influence the behavior of others in pursuit of a common goal. The methods used will vary in relation to what the goal is, but the singular purpose of leadership is to influence people.
I think this is a very important recognition because it highlights the critical importance of the traits that the leader possesses that make the subordinate want to follow his or her lead. This is why I have continually pushed for more self-awareness in our leader development programs. Instead of focusing our efforts on the outside stimuli and structural requirements of title and position, we should be focusing our efforts inwards on the behavioral, emotional, moral and influential dynamics of both the leader and the led.
We also need to move away from any leadership model that is purely positive outcome based. I had a conversation with someone at work the other day who brought up the idea that we generally only study the behaviors and actions of the guy who won or was successful. We rarely look at those attributes of the guy who lost. As if the outcome of a battle or event is, by itself, validation of the behavior of the leader. This discussion came about because of three separate events. First, a few months back there was an article in Army Times regarding a unit in Afghanistan where the Soldiers and junior leaders were very upset at their brigade chain of command because, as they perceived it, the unit was not following the COIN doctrine laid out by the U.S. high command at the time. You can find a link to that article here:
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/12/army_afghanistan_mixed_signals_122109w/
Second, was another Army Times cover story two weeks ago outlining alleged war crimes from another unit in the same brigade. Here are both the Army Times link, and one from the Washington Post that outlines the incident so far:
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/09/army-lewis-mcchord-platoon-charged-with-killing-civilians-091110w/
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39253561/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/
Finally, I was sent a document this week from a co-worker that outlined a different strategy for dealing with insurgents in Afghanistan. The document was being passed around as part of the the information sharing mechanism the Army has in place to rapidly disseminate lessons learned that might be used by other units and leaders. Interestingly, the document was produced by the same brigade mentioned in the two stories above. And with just a small bit of investigative work on my part to put things in a timeline, you can rapidly come to the following possible scenario:
First, the unit's leadership felt that they needed to conduct 'counter-guerrilla' operations in order to create space for 'counter-insurgent' operations to take place. Second, since the Army no longer has a 'counter-guerrilla' manual (it has been replaced by the counter-insurgency doctrine), the unit wrote their own. And finally, and most importantly, there was a breakdown in communication between the unit and it's subordinates as to how either policy was being implemented on the ground. Is it possible that the alleged crimes might have grown out of this? The unit took a lot of casualties during it's tour. According to the various articles, there appears to have been significant differences of opinion as to which approach (counter-guerrilla or counter-insurgency) was being implemented and followed. Having been in a similar situation with my platoon, I found all of it difficult to read.
[Note: The paragraph above should not be misconstrued by anyone as mitigation of the alleged crimes. As I have said numerous times before, nothing mitigates actions such as are alleged in these articles. Nothing. Each Soldier has a higher moral imperative to disobey any type of order or influence that might lead to crimes against innocents. That is not only morally correct, it is our doctrine.]
These examples do, however, speak to a whole lot of critical considerations of leadership and that the realization that the who of leadership is much more important than the what. It is not important what the results of the commander's decision were - the outcomes. What is more important is his vision and an awareness of how that vision, coupled with his place in the organization, and his ability to influence others can have many possible outcomes. I have no doubt that the commander personally is a successful, honorable, courageous, and adaptive thinker. I also have absolutely no doubt that he would not, and did not, have knowledge of, underwrite, or condone any of the alleged actions of his subordinates. What does matter though is that he had a vision - an understanding of what needed to be accomplished and more importantly, a responsibility to ensure that his subordinates clearly understood it. The question is whether or not his subordinates saw his vision in the same manner he did.
As I mentioned earlier, leadership is the ability to influence others. Initially, this influence may be nothing more than positional - the legal authorities given to the person in charge. Over time, however, this influence can become much more. It takes on a life of it's own. And it is generally speaking, personality driven. The personality of the leader - how they act, their manner and method, gets co-opted and is taken on by their subordinates. Rash and brash leaders build rash and brash units. Quiet and professional leaders create quiet and methodical units. The who of the organization becomes critical. We don't spend a whole lot of time on questions like these in our leader development schools, choosing rather to focus on battles won or lost, the tactics involved and the impact of the outcomes on future events. We don't often take a look at the makeup of the people in charge. Why 'rash and brash' worked for one unit while 'quiet and professional' might not have worked for another.
Everyone who is considered a leader has to possess a vision for their organization - no matter how small or how large. They have to have an idea of where they want it to go, how they want it to act, and what they expect it to be able to do. They also must realize that their vision is going to be 'Oriented' to differently by their subordinates, and that their unit will likely become an extension of their personality. If this is the case, then as an Army, we need to spend a lot more time on developing the self-awareness of our leaders in order to ensure that they have a very refined understanding why who they are is much more important to the life of the organization, than what they do.
The title of Dr. Simon's monograph caught my eye. The idea that unity of vision is critical to strategic success. The right person, who is able to see both the forest and the trees is the first cut. His or her vision of the outcome is the second. The ability to successfully communicate it to his/her subordinates in a manner that they can understand and relate to is even more important. Even with all that though, the actual outcome still has too many variables to count. Ultimately, success or failure can really come down to the 'who' of the leader, not the 'what' of their actions.
There are a lot of lessons to be learned from events that do not turn out as expected. It is too shallow to simply say that somewhere along the way a "leader" failed. More likely is that the "leader" had no idea how their actions, behaviors, and ideas were being interpreted by others. They had influence, but didn't understand it's power to sway. They had vision but did not communicate it clearly. They had personality and position, but did not understand that the unit would adopt it and make it their own.
Do you have a vision for those you lead? If so, do they know what it is? And how do you know they share the same vision as you do? These are things that we need to take long hard looks at as an institution. Without this self-awareness, there are too many things that can go wrong. And, we must accept, that even if our vision is crystal clear and shared by all, it is always possible that the outcome will not be what was intended. And those are the lessons we should be studying.
For me, I will pray for all involved. No matter the legal outcome of the allegations, there will be a lot of pain for a lot of people. I pray that they may find peace and strength for the journey ahead. They will need it.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#84 Reflections
This was not the original idea for today's post. As they often do, this one showed up in my inbox a little earlier and sent me down a new path. The thoughts have not all been worked out yet but we'll see where it goes.
I received the following article from a friend of mine this morning. Bill called it an "interesting read." I agree. You can find the link here:
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/09/09/in-the-10th-year-of-war-a-harder-army-a-more-distant-america/
Take the first paragraph:
"The U.S. Army now begins its 10th continuous year in combat, the first time in its history the United States has excused the vast majority of its citizens from service and engaged in a major, decade-long conflict instead with an Army manned entirely by professional warriors."
As Mr. Wood points out, this is the first time in American history where a war (possibly 2 if you see Iraq and Afghanistan as two separate theaters) has been fought without the involvement of much of the American citizenry. Ours is an all-volunteer Army. No draft. No requirement for national sacrifice. Nothing more than a peripheral recognition that we are a nation at war proudly brought to you by your choice of news outlets and You Tube. We have managed to fight this war for 9 years and transform both the institution and the way we conduct operations using less than 5% of the American population. For many people, this has brought a sort of disconnectedness from combat and it's costs and consequences. As Mr. Wood rightly suggests, there is a divide between those who serve and those who have not.
Let me be clear. I am not judging either side one way or another. I am simply agreeing that the divide exists. I refuse to judge it as a positive or negative. If a person feels a calling to service, it can come in any form. Some feel called to educate, some to the clergy, some to their local communities. I am not elevating the warrior class above any other because I do not believe the warrior should be elevated above any other. I choose to do what I do. The same way that someone else chooses to teach or minister or work in a hospice. We are all servants to our communities whether they are local or national. I am not entitled to any extra recognition because of my choice.
What is true however, is that there is, and will remain a divide between those who have been to combat - in any role - and those who have not. This applies to all Servicemembers. Combat Arms or not. The mental strain, the separation from family, the forming of new bonds, the crucible of a firefight, the mourning of losses. These things to one degree or another apply to all who have served over the last nine years. We have all attended memorials for fallen comrades. We have all anxiously stared out an airplane or helicopter window on our way into the fight and as it lands at home and we search the small crowd for the face of a family member or friend who is there to greet us. There is a connection there that we all share. This too, is not new. There is a reason that we have reunions each year from those who have fought before us. There are so few who were there. And only those who were will understand.
However, I think this is the same type of feeling that a surgeon gets. They have just performed a difficult operation. They have worked for hours in the operating room and they walk out to meet the family. They are exhausted and dirty but finished the job and told the family the patient's prognosis. They brief them that the surgery was successful, but the days ahead will still be critical. The family is overjoyed and begins to hug each other and ask to see their loved one. In the midst of this the surgeon quietly slips away and goes about his business. No one but another surgeon, and those who understand the complexity of the task, will truly appreciate the skill and dedication the operation required. And so it is with the warrior class. We have performed our operations with skill and care, but they are hard for the Nation to put into perspective. They have no frame of reference. Only other warriors will recognize the difficulty and understand the implications. That's OK. Like any skilled profession, we take pride in earning the respect of our peers. For they are the ones who best understand the significance of our task.
The parades and thankyous' and tributes are nice, and they are appreciated, but maybe we ought to share them with other servants as well. The warrior class is no better and no worse. We serve because we want to. It's all we know how to do.
I also think that the words of General Casey in the article are pretty damn important as well. He said:
"Before 2001 we were largely a garrison-based army,' said Gen. George Casey, Army chief of staff. "We lived to train. I grew up training to fight a war I never fought.'' Since 9/11, Casey has spent 32 months in Iraq, as have many others. "We know war, now,' he said."
The Chief of Staff of the Army - it's most senior position - is filled by a person who grew up training and preparing for a type of war that never came, as did everyone including me, until September 11th, 2001. I had been in the Army for 11 years on that day, and 14 years before I deployed to Iraq in 2005. We have ended up fighting - and arguably winning - two wars with incredibly different dynamics. Our senior leaders recognize this and have worked very hard to ensure that the mental flexibility and adaptability required for this type of fight remains at the forefront of our leader development.
Last week, I mentioned LTG Hertling in my post and the Facebook exchange we had. Later on he sent me another message that in effect said that we have become very good at combat and deployments and the training/preparing cycles that the demands of these two fights have placed on us. Now, there needs to be an effort on the part of all leaders to look at how they will develop themselves to ensure that we don't return to a mindset that we can only prepare for what we think will happen. We need to also prepare for the unexpected. We need to ensure that we continue to develop active thinking, and a clear understanding of the requirements of the problem we are trying to solve. We may not face the situation we trained for. We have to develop ourselves for the situation we face. Like the surgeon who suddenly finds himself with a problem he didn't expect or couldn't see on the X-rays, we need to develop leaders who can recognize what is in front of them and choose the right tool to stem the bleeding. We need to develop quickness of thought, an understanding of consequences, and the ability to quickly shift our priorities when required.
The Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, MG John Campbell, sends updates to families and others on Facebook. This morning I read update number 5. You can find the link here:
http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/notes/rc-east/cg-update-5-sept-11-2010/108166705911130
For those who cannot access it, MG Campbell, in trying to answer the question why we are still in this fight said this:
"The simple reason why we are here is summarized very well by a slide GEN Petraeus uses entitled, “Why This War Matters”...Bottom line, we want to prevent attacks like those depicted on the slide from happening again in our country and other countries. The specific reasons we continue to fight in Afghanistan are more complex. We are here to disrupt Al Qaida and other transnational extremist organizations. We are here to prevent extremists from having a safehaven for training camps where they can plan future attacks. We are here to strengthen and enhance the government and security forces of a country attempting to re-establish some sense of normalcy in a war-ravaged country. For the people of Afghanistan this is important because it provides them hope for the future after nearly 30 years of war. For Americans and many other countries around the world, we are here to provide for safer environments for our Families, free from fear that terrorists will once again kill thousands of innocent people."
Sometimes the task and purpose is very clear-cut. Or, more accurately, it appears very clear-cut on the surface. We were attacked by extremists in Afghanistan. We must respond. 9 years later, however, we have entered a new world. We are still fighting extremists, but we are also trying to help a nation. We are still disrupting the ability of terrorist organizations to plan, plot, and train to attack us. Now, however, we have gained an immeasurable degree of wisdom regarding what that fight will cost, and what that fight requires. A warrior class once built on might and firepower has become so much more. Mr. Wood may be right that for the first time in history America has a truly professional, volunteer warrior. That one person with the skills, abilities, and judgement to serve and to prevail. The focus will always come back to one kid, one Sergeant, one Lieutenant, one person.
Yesterday, before changing direction, when I started thinking about what I was going to write about this morning, I came across the following quote from General Creighton Abrams:
"By people, I do not mean 'personnel'. I do not mean 'end strength'. I do not mean 'percent of fill' or any of those other labels which refer to people as a commodity. I mean living, breathing, serving human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They have spirit and will, strengths, and abilities. They have weaknesses and faults. And they have names."
Everything we do as an Army, and as a warrior class, must be oriented toward the development of that one person with a name. If we do that well, the Nation - while maybe not understanding exactly what we do - can be grateful that there is a class of servants who are willing to do it.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
I received the following article from a friend of mine this morning. Bill called it an "interesting read." I agree. You can find the link here:
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/09/09/in-the-10th-year-of-war-a-harder-army-a-more-distant-america/
Take the first paragraph:
"The U.S. Army now begins its 10th continuous year in combat, the first time in its history the United States has excused the vast majority of its citizens from service and engaged in a major, decade-long conflict instead with an Army manned entirely by professional warriors."
As Mr. Wood points out, this is the first time in American history where a war (possibly 2 if you see Iraq and Afghanistan as two separate theaters) has been fought without the involvement of much of the American citizenry. Ours is an all-volunteer Army. No draft. No requirement for national sacrifice. Nothing more than a peripheral recognition that we are a nation at war proudly brought to you by your choice of news outlets and You Tube. We have managed to fight this war for 9 years and transform both the institution and the way we conduct operations using less than 5% of the American population. For many people, this has brought a sort of disconnectedness from combat and it's costs and consequences. As Mr. Wood rightly suggests, there is a divide between those who serve and those who have not.
Let me be clear. I am not judging either side one way or another. I am simply agreeing that the divide exists. I refuse to judge it as a positive or negative. If a person feels a calling to service, it can come in any form. Some feel called to educate, some to the clergy, some to their local communities. I am not elevating the warrior class above any other because I do not believe the warrior should be elevated above any other. I choose to do what I do. The same way that someone else chooses to teach or minister or work in a hospice. We are all servants to our communities whether they are local or national. I am not entitled to any extra recognition because of my choice.
What is true however, is that there is, and will remain a divide between those who have been to combat - in any role - and those who have not. This applies to all Servicemembers. Combat Arms or not. The mental strain, the separation from family, the forming of new bonds, the crucible of a firefight, the mourning of losses. These things to one degree or another apply to all who have served over the last nine years. We have all attended memorials for fallen comrades. We have all anxiously stared out an airplane or helicopter window on our way into the fight and as it lands at home and we search the small crowd for the face of a family member or friend who is there to greet us. There is a connection there that we all share. This too, is not new. There is a reason that we have reunions each year from those who have fought before us. There are so few who were there. And only those who were will understand.
However, I think this is the same type of feeling that a surgeon gets. They have just performed a difficult operation. They have worked for hours in the operating room and they walk out to meet the family. They are exhausted and dirty but finished the job and told the family the patient's prognosis. They brief them that the surgery was successful, but the days ahead will still be critical. The family is overjoyed and begins to hug each other and ask to see their loved one. In the midst of this the surgeon quietly slips away and goes about his business. No one but another surgeon, and those who understand the complexity of the task, will truly appreciate the skill and dedication the operation required. And so it is with the warrior class. We have performed our operations with skill and care, but they are hard for the Nation to put into perspective. They have no frame of reference. Only other warriors will recognize the difficulty and understand the implications. That's OK. Like any skilled profession, we take pride in earning the respect of our peers. For they are the ones who best understand the significance of our task.
The parades and thankyous' and tributes are nice, and they are appreciated, but maybe we ought to share them with other servants as well. The warrior class is no better and no worse. We serve because we want to. It's all we know how to do.
I also think that the words of General Casey in the article are pretty damn important as well. He said:
"Before 2001 we were largely a garrison-based army,' said Gen. George Casey, Army chief of staff. "We lived to train. I grew up training to fight a war I never fought.'' Since 9/11, Casey has spent 32 months in Iraq, as have many others. "We know war, now,' he said."
The Chief of Staff of the Army - it's most senior position - is filled by a person who grew up training and preparing for a type of war that never came, as did everyone including me, until September 11th, 2001. I had been in the Army for 11 years on that day, and 14 years before I deployed to Iraq in 2005. We have ended up fighting - and arguably winning - two wars with incredibly different dynamics. Our senior leaders recognize this and have worked very hard to ensure that the mental flexibility and adaptability required for this type of fight remains at the forefront of our leader development.
Last week, I mentioned LTG Hertling in my post and the Facebook exchange we had. Later on he sent me another message that in effect said that we have become very good at combat and deployments and the training/preparing cycles that the demands of these two fights have placed on us. Now, there needs to be an effort on the part of all leaders to look at how they will develop themselves to ensure that we don't return to a mindset that we can only prepare for what we think will happen. We need to also prepare for the unexpected. We need to ensure that we continue to develop active thinking, and a clear understanding of the requirements of the problem we are trying to solve. We may not face the situation we trained for. We have to develop ourselves for the situation we face. Like the surgeon who suddenly finds himself with a problem he didn't expect or couldn't see on the X-rays, we need to develop leaders who can recognize what is in front of them and choose the right tool to stem the bleeding. We need to develop quickness of thought, an understanding of consequences, and the ability to quickly shift our priorities when required.
The Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, MG John Campbell, sends updates to families and others on Facebook. This morning I read update number 5. You can find the link here:
http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/notes/rc-east/cg-update-5-sept-11-2010/108166705911130
For those who cannot access it, MG Campbell, in trying to answer the question why we are still in this fight said this:
"The simple reason why we are here is summarized very well by a slide GEN Petraeus uses entitled, “Why This War Matters”...Bottom line, we want to prevent attacks like those depicted on the slide from happening again in our country and other countries. The specific reasons we continue to fight in Afghanistan are more complex. We are here to disrupt Al Qaida and other transnational extremist organizations. We are here to prevent extremists from having a safehaven for training camps where they can plan future attacks. We are here to strengthen and enhance the government and security forces of a country attempting to re-establish some sense of normalcy in a war-ravaged country. For the people of Afghanistan this is important because it provides them hope for the future after nearly 30 years of war. For Americans and many other countries around the world, we are here to provide for safer environments for our Families, free from fear that terrorists will once again kill thousands of innocent people."
Sometimes the task and purpose is very clear-cut. Or, more accurately, it appears very clear-cut on the surface. We were attacked by extremists in Afghanistan. We must respond. 9 years later, however, we have entered a new world. We are still fighting extremists, but we are also trying to help a nation. We are still disrupting the ability of terrorist organizations to plan, plot, and train to attack us. Now, however, we have gained an immeasurable degree of wisdom regarding what that fight will cost, and what that fight requires. A warrior class once built on might and firepower has become so much more. Mr. Wood may be right that for the first time in history America has a truly professional, volunteer warrior. That one person with the skills, abilities, and judgement to serve and to prevail. The focus will always come back to one kid, one Sergeant, one Lieutenant, one person.
Yesterday, before changing direction, when I started thinking about what I was going to write about this morning, I came across the following quote from General Creighton Abrams:
"By people, I do not mean 'personnel'. I do not mean 'end strength'. I do not mean 'percent of fill' or any of those other labels which refer to people as a commodity. I mean living, breathing, serving human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They have spirit and will, strengths, and abilities. They have weaknesses and faults. And they have names."
Everything we do as an Army, and as a warrior class, must be oriented toward the development of that one person with a name. If we do that well, the Nation - while maybe not understanding exactly what we do - can be grateful that there is a class of servants who are willing to do it.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#83 Inputs
I think today's post will be a mix of a lot of different inputs that have been stuck in my head and swimming around for a little while. None of the thoughts are fully formed yet, but they all seem to be loosely connected to one another.
First: Yesterday I had a Facebook interaction with a 3 star General regarding the changes to physical training and rifle marksmanship that are being implemented in Basic Combat Training. What struck me about the exchange was that (1) It happened very quickly and (2) That it happened at all. LTG Hertling, the Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training, posted a link to a NY Times article regarding why, and how, physical fitness training is being modified to increase fitness and reduce injuries for our newest Soldiers. I responded to his post by telling him that I thought we needed a 'bridging' strategy to ensure that leaders in our line units properly understood the manner in which their newest Soldiers had been conditioned so that they wouldn't injure them by doing exercises that the Soldier was unfamiliar with, or are actually detrimental to their health. I also stated that we needed the same type of 'bridge' with regard to marksmanship.
Within an hour...on a Saturday, I received the following reply from him:
"Jeff, We're doing the best we can on the "education" program. I've talked to Division Commanders at the ATLDC, we're sending out MTTs as best we can to various posts (given we have limited resources), but the real issue: TC 3.22-20 is released to the field...it's up to commanders to follow doctrinal manuals. (emphasis added) As for the changes in Basic and Advanced Rifle Marksmanship, we're providing Soldiers to the field who understand marksmanship, and can shoot better...the expectation is for the units to link that to their own training plans. That's why the CSA is asking leaders to reframe the fundamentals that we've lost: Training Management, Leader Development, etc. (emphasis added) We gotta get out of the "train me!" mode that we've been in for the past several years, which was brought about by operational deployment timelines."
Talk about flattening the organization! Two things about this exchange that struck me. First, as I was composing it, I kept wondering if somehow I would 'get in trouble' for by-passing my local chain of command in such a public manner. Since I grew up in a more structured time in the Army, things like talking out of turn, or expressing your opinion to someone much higher than you on the totem pole still makes me nervous. That is a product of the Army that raised and cultured me. It's not that I don't have ideas and opinions, it's that I worry that someone else is going to get upset and that the interaction might have a negative effect. The second, was how quickly he responded. Generals are pretty busy people. The fact that he took my question seriously, and replied to it quickly implies that he respects and values the user-level perspective. It also occurred to me that this interaction would never have occurred if he came to my post for a visit. The visit structure would not allow for it. He would be escorted everywhere and briefed to death on what our post is doing in this or that area and then taken to observe some training events, but the interaction with Soldiers and leaders would probably be limited. And, most certainly, would not have included people like me who sometimes don't quite know when to be quiet.
Second: The following quote from a document that tracks trends throughout the Army. It came in an Issue/Recommendation format:
Issue: "Platoon leaders and troop commanders struggle understanding the squadron commander's intent. As a result, squadron commanders struggle with closing the experience gap between them and the platoon leadership."
Recommendation: "The squadron commander must be able to communicate his commander's intent to the platoon leader/sergeant level within the squadron. The commander's intent is his visualization of an operations based on a blend of his knowledge, experience, and intuition."
These two quotes struck me because they speak to a lot of different ideas I have previously discussed. There are only 2 levels between a Squadron (Battalion) Commander and a platoon leader. Only one between him and the Company Commander. And yet, a common theme is that the senior leader is having difficulty getting his junior leaders to understand his intent. Why? Could it be that Battalion level commander's aren't doing the right type of leader development that closes the experience gap through a better communication process? Is it their inability to 'see' themselves correctly? Is it heuristics and ego? Is it that the Orientations of the different levels are markedly different? I have repeatedly stated that it doesn't matter if I as the senior leader have a perfect view of what I expect to happen. If my subordinates do not understand it, if they do not, or cannot share the same vision - if the aren't Oriented in the same manner I am with regard to an expected outcome - then the mission will probably fail. If we are having this much trouble at the local level developing a common understanding problems and potential solutions, then it is likely to get exponentially worse the further up the hierarchy we go. These questions are not only limited to tactical operations either. In fact, they may be even more important in the more traditionally garrison realm of reintegrating Soldiers, families, Wounded Warriors etc. The battlefield can sometimes take care of itself. It is after the fight that some of our most important leader decisions will be made. We owe that to all our Soldiers.
Third: From FM 6.0 "Mission Command - Command and Control of Army Forces", paragraph 2-52 and 2-54:
" Human beings do not normally think in terms of data, or even knowledge; they generally think in terms of ideas or images—mental pictures of a given situation. There are three sources for these images:
First: Yesterday I had a Facebook interaction with a 3 star General regarding the changes to physical training and rifle marksmanship that are being implemented in Basic Combat Training. What struck me about the exchange was that (1) It happened very quickly and (2) That it happened at all. LTG Hertling, the Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training, posted a link to a NY Times article regarding why, and how, physical fitness training is being modified to increase fitness and reduce injuries for our newest Soldiers. I responded to his post by telling him that I thought we needed a 'bridging' strategy to ensure that leaders in our line units properly understood the manner in which their newest Soldiers had been conditioned so that they wouldn't injure them by doing exercises that the Soldier was unfamiliar with, or are actually detrimental to their health. I also stated that we needed the same type of 'bridge' with regard to marksmanship.
Within an hour...on a Saturday, I received the following reply from him:
"Jeff, We're doing the best we can on the "education" program. I've talked to Division Commanders at the ATLDC, we're sending out MTTs as best we can to various posts (given we have limited resources), but the real issue: TC 3.22-20 is released to the field...it's up to commanders to follow doctrinal manuals. (emphasis added) As for the changes in Basic and Advanced Rifle Marksmanship, we're providing Soldiers to the field who understand marksmanship, and can shoot better...the expectation is for the units to link that to their own training plans. That's why the CSA is asking leaders to reframe the fundamentals that we've lost: Training Management, Leader Development, etc. (emphasis added) We gotta get out of the "train me!" mode that we've been in for the past several years, which was brought about by operational deployment timelines."
Talk about flattening the organization! Two things about this exchange that struck me. First, as I was composing it, I kept wondering if somehow I would 'get in trouble' for by-passing my local chain of command in such a public manner. Since I grew up in a more structured time in the Army, things like talking out of turn, or expressing your opinion to someone much higher than you on the totem pole still makes me nervous. That is a product of the Army that raised and cultured me. It's not that I don't have ideas and opinions, it's that I worry that someone else is going to get upset and that the interaction might have a negative effect. The second, was how quickly he responded. Generals are pretty busy people. The fact that he took my question seriously, and replied to it quickly implies that he respects and values the user-level perspective. It also occurred to me that this interaction would never have occurred if he came to my post for a visit. The visit structure would not allow for it. He would be escorted everywhere and briefed to death on what our post is doing in this or that area and then taken to observe some training events, but the interaction with Soldiers and leaders would probably be limited. And, most certainly, would not have included people like me who sometimes don't quite know when to be quiet.
Second: The following quote from a document that tracks trends throughout the Army. It came in an Issue/Recommendation format:
Issue: "Platoon leaders and troop commanders struggle understanding the squadron commander's intent. As a result, squadron commanders struggle with closing the experience gap between them and the platoon leadership."
Recommendation: "The squadron commander must be able to communicate his commander's intent to the platoon leader/sergeant level within the squadron. The commander's intent is his visualization of an operations based on a blend of his knowledge, experience, and intuition."
These two quotes struck me because they speak to a lot of different ideas I have previously discussed. There are only 2 levels between a Squadron (Battalion) Commander and a platoon leader. Only one between him and the Company Commander. And yet, a common theme is that the senior leader is having difficulty getting his junior leaders to understand his intent. Why? Could it be that Battalion level commander's aren't doing the right type of leader development that closes the experience gap through a better communication process? Is it their inability to 'see' themselves correctly? Is it heuristics and ego? Is it that the Orientations of the different levels are markedly different? I have repeatedly stated that it doesn't matter if I as the senior leader have a perfect view of what I expect to happen. If my subordinates do not understand it, if they do not, or cannot share the same vision - if the aren't Oriented in the same manner I am with regard to an expected outcome - then the mission will probably fail. If we are having this much trouble at the local level developing a common understanding problems and potential solutions, then it is likely to get exponentially worse the further up the hierarchy we go. These questions are not only limited to tactical operations either. In fact, they may be even more important in the more traditionally garrison realm of reintegrating Soldiers, families, Wounded Warriors etc. The battlefield can sometimes take care of itself. It is after the fight that some of our most important leader decisions will be made. We owe that to all our Soldiers.
Third: From FM 6.0 "Mission Command - Command and Control of Army Forces", paragraph 2-52 and 2-54:
" Human beings do not normally think in terms of data, or even knowledge; they generally think in terms of ideas or images—mental pictures of a given situation. There are three sources for these images:
- Principles that guide commanders’ behavior: their military experience,
training, and education, including their knowledge of doctrine. - Force goals, the timetable for achieving them, and the end state: militarily,
they include the higher commander’s intent, the force mission,
and the commander’s own intent. - Decisions for allocating resources and sequencing activities to achieve
the force goals, including specific actions and expected events.
2-53. Visualizing military operations effectively depends on understanding
the human factors involved in operations and the dynamics of operations
themselves. Commanders consider both of these when performing their commander’s
visualization.
2-54. Human Factors. In operations, the quality of soldiers and cohesion of
units are critical to mission accomplishment. Commanders know the status
of their forces. They are aware that circumstances may prevent friendly
forces from performing to their doctrinal capabilities. Some units may have
just received new replacements or had an extended period of operations
under heavy stress. Others may be experiencing a lack of repair parts that
renders major equipment unavailable in expected quantities or limits their
capabilities. Still others may have sustained casualties that make them less
capable, experienced an enemy NBC attack, or just arrived in theater and are
not yet acclimated."
These 3 paragraphs all speak to the 'human' element of commanding/leading people. An awareness on the part of the leader of those things that science and technology cannot overcome. While on paper a unit may be at 100% personnel strength, those people may or may not be able to accomplish the assigned mission based upon various circumstances. This brings up the idea of selecting the right people or unit for the right job at the right time. What also struck me though was the idea of visualization. Painting a picture for everyone to see. I (as the leader) describe what I think the problem is, how I intend to solve it, and what I think I'll see after the operation. All of which is dependant on my Orientation. What is critical to remember however is that the Orientation of my subordinates may be (and very likely will be) very different from mine.
Fourth: From an email I received from Joe D. He recommended a book which included the following quote:
"Sometimes the problem in an organization is the leader, and he/she can't see the problem because it is them."
How are these things related? What do they mean? They all got me thinking about how I think. Not what, but how. To me, these are all related. We have a doctrine that speaks to the art of command. Those subtle things that often go unnoticed, but are actually the key ingredient of successful organizations. We struggle in organizations where the leader is so busy listening to themselves that they don't recognize that they are the problem. These two things come together in a report that says that folks only one or two levels below the leader routinely do not understand what his/her intent is.
A wide variety of inputs from official Army documents, email, and social media. All connected and interrelated. All saying the same thing in a slightly different manner. We need to return to human being based leadership. A model focused on the people in the organization. Why they are the way they are, and why they think the way they think. And that includes ourselves. It is not enough to make an effort to only understand and communicate with our subordinates. It is critically more important that they have a manner to communicate with us. They must be able to tell us when they don't understand our vision, or when our understanding of the situation does not match theirs. Without this function, neither side can fully Orient to the environment.
All of which leads me back to the exchange between the LTG Hertling and I. If you don't think that this was extraordinary, then you don't understand where we are in the today's Army. LTG Hertling in one paragraph on a social media site accomplished more than many will realize. First, my response to his posting helps to further inform him by providing a 'low end', 'user level' perspective on how to best solve the problems of Soldier fitness and marksmanship. Second, his response demonstrates a willingness to help develop a common 'visualization' of what must happen. Third, he set his rank and position aside to ensure I understood what the Army was doing to address a serious need. He is the antithesis of the quote from Joe D. Finally, this example demonstrates that cross-communication and a common visualization is possible from the very bottom to the very top of the organization. There are only one or two levels between a lieutenant or captain and their battalion commander. There are at least five or six between the General and I. It works because he recognizes that he must state his 'vision', his 'intent' in a manner that I can hear. He doesn't have to do it that way - his position does not demand this interaction - he chooses to. Which says a lot about leadership. And the people involved.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#82 "The Key Terrain"
"The best leader is the one who has sense enough to pick good men to do what he wants done, and self-restraint enough to keep from meddling with them while they do it." ~Theodore Roosevelt
Last night while looking through some old work files, I came across a slide show from the Combined Arms Center entitled "Counterinsurgency 101" produced by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. It is only 15 slides long, but may be the best general document to explain how to approach COIN operations that I have seen. On the second slide, I found two bullets that struck me.
The first said: "Conventional war is waged on physical terrain."
The second said: "Counterinsurgency is waged on human terrain."
Further on, I found a couple more quotes and thoughts that jumped out at me and form the basis for the ideas below.
"I underestimated one factor...culture. I was looking at the wrong map - I needed to look at the tribal map, not the geographic map." Former Brigade commander, Afghanistan
Slide number 10 contained the following three points regarding how to correctly Orient oneself to the contest. The title was "Ask the Right Questions"
1. " Not....Where is the enemy?"
2. "Or even...How are they organized?..."
3. "The question we should be asking is.....Where am I and why is the enemy there?"
Counterinsurgent warfare is much more a matter of perspective and awareness than it is firepower. It relies very heavily on the Orientation of both parties. Each must understand the other's motivations, desires, methods and expected outcomes in order to prevail. It truly is a battle for the people. In a physical fight, whatever side causes enough destruction to force the enemy to give in will prevail. In that sense then, massive firepower and destructive capability is the key. Bigger, faster, more potent. This idea is what drove the Cold War and the arms race between the former Soviet Union and America for more than 40 years. In a COIN fight however, where the decisive terrain is the people, a lot of these bigger, faster, more potent weapons prove relatively useless against the will of the people. Destructive power does not necessarily have a direct influence on political or social will. As a matter of fact, the greater the destructive force, the more the political and social will can be turned against those who possess that force.
The same is true for leader development. By changing some words around, and changing our Orientation a bit, the same paradigms that were outlined above can be used to look at, and challenge, the manner by which we develop future leaders. For example, if you rewrite the first two quotes from the slide show, you can end up with the following:
"Conventional leader development is waged on the physical terrain (hierarchy) of the organization."
"Unconventional leader development is waged on the human terrain of the organization."
And, if you take the bullets from the "Asking the Right Questions" slide, you can end up with this:
"Not...where are my Soldiers?"
"Or even...how do they think?"
"The question we should be asking is...Where am I and why do (or don't) my Soldiers follow me?"
This is about repositioning ourselves to see our leadership role differently. The Army's definition of leadership is "The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization." By that definition, the accomplishment of the mission is not the key to leadership. The key to leadership is the successful influencing of people. The mission is used as the framework for that influence to be exercised. From that sense, the mindset required to be successful at counterinsurgent warfare is exactly the same mindset needed to successfully develop future leaders. The key terrain is the people we are attempting to develop.
While a lot of people might be saying to themselves, "Well, duh." as if the above was obvious, I don't really think it is. Most people see leadership in terms of mission accomplishment. They receive their orders and go about creating a method to fulfill those directives. I am told to take the hill or secure the village or deliver the supplies etc, and I go about organizing my unit and my resources toward that aim. Over time, I will be judged by my superiors by my ability to accomplish my missions. The more I accomplish, the more successful I will be. Very quickly, I come to see accomplishing the mission as being of greater importance than anything else.
If you use the Army's definition of leadership as the starting point, however, you see that a leader's task is to use the mission to develop the people, not the people to accomplish the mission. I still have to take the hill, secure the village, or deliver the supplies, but now those things are seen as opportunities for me to influence and develop those underneath me. Ahhh, the mission is not the key. The mission only provides a framework and perspective for my true task - to influence and develop the people.
For a long time now, I have been struggling to explain this re-Orientation. It has come up a lot in other posts regarding the hierarchical nature of the Army and the effects the structure itself has on leader development. I see the Army structure as the 'physical' terrain of conventional warfare. I see the people development as the 'human' terrain of counterinsurgent warfare. Once again, it seems as if the Army has it backwards and is working at cross purposes. By placing primacy on mission accomplishment, it has driven a system that places the human being secondary to the mission's aim. This has created a sense of 'prevailing at all costs' mindset. The people become nothing more than a resource no more or less important than food, fuel, or bullets.
If you re-Orient yourself toward focusing on influencing the people however, and you place them - and their development - as the central point, then the mission becomes the experience by which that development occurs. I believe this is a very key understanding. It's not about getting the job done, it's is about using the job to develop the judgment, abilities, and increasing the value of the people within the organization. By doing that, it is far more likely that the job will be accomplished more effectively and your influence on the subordinate will be greater.
Now take the quote from the brigade commander and re-look it in this new light. It could sound like this:
"I underestimated one factor...my people. I was looking at the wrong map - I needed to look at the influence map, not the hierarchical structure map." Not, where am I and how can I move further up the structural ladder, but rather, where am I and how do I increase the skills, abilities, and judgment of my subordinates?
The people are the prize in both counterinsurgent warfare and leader development. Everything else, firepower, money, mission, etc is nothing more than a means of influencing them one way or another.
In a counterinsurgency this understanding means that we must gain insight into the values, orientations, understandings, customs, traditions and history of the local villager. In leader development it means we must gain insight into the orientations, understandings, customs, traditions and history of our Soldiers. Our purpose in both cases is to influence them. Only by understanding them and seeing their world from their point of view will we be able to do that. We have to know where they started from in order to develop a plan for where we need them to go. We spends millions of dollars a year explaining the culture and orientation of Afghans to American Soldiers in hopes of providing some insight to a young Soldier on why the Afghan is the way he is. What he values, what he does not. What his history, customs and traditions are. All aimed at providing us a way to exert positive influence on him during our interactions. By developing our understanding we hope to gain insight into how we can better achieve our goal of having him reject the enemy and embrace the central government and nationhood.
Our leader development programs however, do not do this. We still provide formulaic answers that fit into a hierarchical design. We send Soldiers to leader development schools and provide them an 'education' on something that really has nothing to do with leadership. We 'educate' them on how to work their way through the structure; we do not necessarily focus them on the key terrain which is their people.
The critical component of this re-Orientation is the idea that it starts with you. It is the "Where am I and why do my people follow me?" part. In order for counterinsurgent leader development to work, the leader (the one doing the influencing) has to first clearly understand where they are and understand the reasons their subordinates follow them. You have to see you clearly. You have to know what your purpose as a leader is. If, for example, your purpose is centered on you and enhancing your place in the organization, then your Soldiers follow for one reason (probably because they have to). If the purpose is focused on them, then they might follow for a different reason (maybe because they want to). Both might accomplish the mission, but will be perceived by the followers in wholly different manners. This is the same as conducting a cordon and search of a village. While your purpose may be to enhance security by capturing or killing the enemy, the villager may interpret your actions as trying to occupy the terrain and restrict their freedom of movement. Your cordon mission may be a military success, but it might be a counterinsurgent failure. On the other hand, if your purpose is to enhance the safety of the villager and increase their freedom of movement, then you can choose a variety of methods to accomplish this. In both cases however, your Orientation and definition of the outcome for those who you hope to influence will be the most important consideration.
I consider myself a counterinsurgent type of leader. My position and stature in the hierarchy is only important in that it allows me to use my 'people first' method with a little more freedom of movement than I could at lower levels of the structure. However, the self awareness requirement constantly reminds me that it is not so much important what I say or do, but rather how what I say or do is understood by my subordinates. I frame my communication from their interpretation. The mission becomes the way to put in into action.
This week, my group will be responsible to conduct, or oversee the training of more than 700 Soldiers. This is twice our normal student load. The key outcome will not be the number of students trained however. The key outcome will be the increased development of my subordinates as they train, move, assist, and account for the accomplishment of the mission. And, along the way, we will have done much more for leader development than many might think. As Roosevelt said above, I have done my best to put the right people in the right place. Now, all I have to do is not meddle in it and screw it up. I have emphasized to them to think, anticipate, and react. They now have to use those skills on their own. 700 people is the size of an average battalion. We're going to accomplish our mission with 8 Staff Sergeants and 4 Sergeants. That is insurgent leadership at it's best.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
Last night while looking through some old work files, I came across a slide show from the Combined Arms Center entitled "Counterinsurgency 101" produced by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. It is only 15 slides long, but may be the best general document to explain how to approach COIN operations that I have seen. On the second slide, I found two bullets that struck me.
The first said: "Conventional war is waged on physical terrain."
The second said: "Counterinsurgency is waged on human terrain."
Further on, I found a couple more quotes and thoughts that jumped out at me and form the basis for the ideas below.
"I underestimated one factor...culture. I was looking at the wrong map - I needed to look at the tribal map, not the geographic map." Former Brigade commander, Afghanistan
Slide number 10 contained the following three points regarding how to correctly Orient oneself to the contest. The title was "Ask the Right Questions"
1. " Not....Where is the enemy?"
2. "Or even...How are they organized?..."
3. "The question we should be asking is.....Where am I and why is the enemy there?"
Counterinsurgent warfare is much more a matter of perspective and awareness than it is firepower. It relies very heavily on the Orientation of both parties. Each must understand the other's motivations, desires, methods and expected outcomes in order to prevail. It truly is a battle for the people. In a physical fight, whatever side causes enough destruction to force the enemy to give in will prevail. In that sense then, massive firepower and destructive capability is the key. Bigger, faster, more potent. This idea is what drove the Cold War and the arms race between the former Soviet Union and America for more than 40 years. In a COIN fight however, where the decisive terrain is the people, a lot of these bigger, faster, more potent weapons prove relatively useless against the will of the people. Destructive power does not necessarily have a direct influence on political or social will. As a matter of fact, the greater the destructive force, the more the political and social will can be turned against those who possess that force.
The same is true for leader development. By changing some words around, and changing our Orientation a bit, the same paradigms that were outlined above can be used to look at, and challenge, the manner by which we develop future leaders. For example, if you rewrite the first two quotes from the slide show, you can end up with the following:
"Conventional leader development is waged on the physical terrain (hierarchy) of the organization."
"Unconventional leader development is waged on the human terrain of the organization."
And, if you take the bullets from the "Asking the Right Questions" slide, you can end up with this:
"Not...where are my Soldiers?"
"Or even...how do they think?"
"The question we should be asking is...Where am I and why do (or don't) my Soldiers follow me?"
This is about repositioning ourselves to see our leadership role differently. The Army's definition of leadership is "The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization." By that definition, the accomplishment of the mission is not the key to leadership. The key to leadership is the successful influencing of people. The mission is used as the framework for that influence to be exercised. From that sense, the mindset required to be successful at counterinsurgent warfare is exactly the same mindset needed to successfully develop future leaders. The key terrain is the people we are attempting to develop.
While a lot of people might be saying to themselves, "Well, duh." as if the above was obvious, I don't really think it is. Most people see leadership in terms of mission accomplishment. They receive their orders and go about creating a method to fulfill those directives. I am told to take the hill or secure the village or deliver the supplies etc, and I go about organizing my unit and my resources toward that aim. Over time, I will be judged by my superiors by my ability to accomplish my missions. The more I accomplish, the more successful I will be. Very quickly, I come to see accomplishing the mission as being of greater importance than anything else.
If you use the Army's definition of leadership as the starting point, however, you see that a leader's task is to use the mission to develop the people, not the people to accomplish the mission. I still have to take the hill, secure the village, or deliver the supplies, but now those things are seen as opportunities for me to influence and develop those underneath me. Ahhh, the mission is not the key. The mission only provides a framework and perspective for my true task - to influence and develop the people.
For a long time now, I have been struggling to explain this re-Orientation. It has come up a lot in other posts regarding the hierarchical nature of the Army and the effects the structure itself has on leader development. I see the Army structure as the 'physical' terrain of conventional warfare. I see the people development as the 'human' terrain of counterinsurgent warfare. Once again, it seems as if the Army has it backwards and is working at cross purposes. By placing primacy on mission accomplishment, it has driven a system that places the human being secondary to the mission's aim. This has created a sense of 'prevailing at all costs' mindset. The people become nothing more than a resource no more or less important than food, fuel, or bullets.
If you re-Orient yourself toward focusing on influencing the people however, and you place them - and their development - as the central point, then the mission becomes the experience by which that development occurs. I believe this is a very key understanding. It's not about getting the job done, it's is about using the job to develop the judgment, abilities, and increasing the value of the people within the organization. By doing that, it is far more likely that the job will be accomplished more effectively and your influence on the subordinate will be greater.
Now take the quote from the brigade commander and re-look it in this new light. It could sound like this:
"I underestimated one factor...my people. I was looking at the wrong map - I needed to look at the influence map, not the hierarchical structure map." Not, where am I and how can I move further up the structural ladder, but rather, where am I and how do I increase the skills, abilities, and judgment of my subordinates?
The people are the prize in both counterinsurgent warfare and leader development. Everything else, firepower, money, mission, etc is nothing more than a means of influencing them one way or another.
In a counterinsurgency this understanding means that we must gain insight into the values, orientations, understandings, customs, traditions and history of the local villager. In leader development it means we must gain insight into the orientations, understandings, customs, traditions and history of our Soldiers. Our purpose in both cases is to influence them. Only by understanding them and seeing their world from their point of view will we be able to do that. We have to know where they started from in order to develop a plan for where we need them to go. We spends millions of dollars a year explaining the culture and orientation of Afghans to American Soldiers in hopes of providing some insight to a young Soldier on why the Afghan is the way he is. What he values, what he does not. What his history, customs and traditions are. All aimed at providing us a way to exert positive influence on him during our interactions. By developing our understanding we hope to gain insight into how we can better achieve our goal of having him reject the enemy and embrace the central government and nationhood.
Our leader development programs however, do not do this. We still provide formulaic answers that fit into a hierarchical design. We send Soldiers to leader development schools and provide them an 'education' on something that really has nothing to do with leadership. We 'educate' them on how to work their way through the structure; we do not necessarily focus them on the key terrain which is their people.
The critical component of this re-Orientation is the idea that it starts with you. It is the "Where am I and why do my people follow me?" part. In order for counterinsurgent leader development to work, the leader (the one doing the influencing) has to first clearly understand where they are and understand the reasons their subordinates follow them. You have to see you clearly. You have to know what your purpose as a leader is. If, for example, your purpose is centered on you and enhancing your place in the organization, then your Soldiers follow for one reason (probably because they have to). If the purpose is focused on them, then they might follow for a different reason (maybe because they want to). Both might accomplish the mission, but will be perceived by the followers in wholly different manners. This is the same as conducting a cordon and search of a village. While your purpose may be to enhance security by capturing or killing the enemy, the villager may interpret your actions as trying to occupy the terrain and restrict their freedom of movement. Your cordon mission may be a military success, but it might be a counterinsurgent failure. On the other hand, if your purpose is to enhance the safety of the villager and increase their freedom of movement, then you can choose a variety of methods to accomplish this. In both cases however, your Orientation and definition of the outcome for those who you hope to influence will be the most important consideration.
I consider myself a counterinsurgent type of leader. My position and stature in the hierarchy is only important in that it allows me to use my 'people first' method with a little more freedom of movement than I could at lower levels of the structure. However, the self awareness requirement constantly reminds me that it is not so much important what I say or do, but rather how what I say or do is understood by my subordinates. I frame my communication from their interpretation. The mission becomes the way to put in into action.
This week, my group will be responsible to conduct, or oversee the training of more than 700 Soldiers. This is twice our normal student load. The key outcome will not be the number of students trained however. The key outcome will be the increased development of my subordinates as they train, move, assist, and account for the accomplishment of the mission. And, along the way, we will have done much more for leader development than many might think. As Roosevelt said above, I have done my best to put the right people in the right place. Now, all I have to do is not meddle in it and screw it up. I have emphasized to them to think, anticipate, and react. They now have to use those skills on their own. 700 people is the size of an average battalion. We're going to accomplish our mission with 8 Staff Sergeants and 4 Sergeants. That is insurgent leadership at it's best.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#81 "Getting To Know You"
One of the more interesting dynamics of the blog has been that while many people read it each week, there are actually very few folks who publicly comment on my thoughts and ideas. Most prefer to respond by email and I'll usually end up with 3 or 4 notes each week from friends and readers who either ask more questions, or use the space to further develop their own thoughts. Although when I began this I somewhat envisioned an on-line dialogue between the readers and me, I have found that for a variety of reasons, many prefer to remain anonymous - which is fine with me. I am grateful for the feedback whether it is shared publicly or not.
One person who has participated in both manners has been Joe D. Joe has been a supporter of mine almost since the beginning of the blog. He is a recently retired officer and we met, almost by accident, when some folks were trying to locate me to discuss my time as a platoon sergeant in Iraq. Since then Joe and I have talked on the phone, exchanged numerous emails, and he has been the most public responder to many of my thoughts and ideas.
Last week Joe sent me an email detailing a conversation he had with a senior officer friend of his. During the course of their conversation regarding knowing your Soldiers, the senior officer commented that, "Junior leaders need to be taught that this is their responsibility and how to do it...they don't know they are supposed to 'know' their Soldiers like that or like we used to do when we were 2LTs." This surprised Joe a little and he asked me my thoughts on the matter. Below is my response:
"I think your friend is correct, but the issue is a little deeper than that. The way he laid it out implies that the leader doesn't have many of the same issues that the Soldier has. Therefore, we could send the leader to a class or school and teach them techniques etc for dealing with Soldier issues. The real problem seems to me to be that both the leader and the led are suffering equally. The leader who is also suffering really can't assist the Soldier who is suffering because they haven't yet figured out how to help themselves either. Your friends model implies the hierarchical leadership structure. And that structure relies on the experience of the senior to help the junior. The new paradigm is that the senior AND the junior are both 'lost' together which makes them somewhat equal. In fact, in the 'lost' model, it could be that while the junior has problems and issues, it is actually the senior who is suffering more and is less capable of making sound judgments.
We have never really 'taught' leaders how to take care of Soldiers. What we did was teach them leadership principles etc. We all learned 'how' to do it through experiential learning. I figured out how to fill out a AER form, or how to get the right paperwork to replace an ID card etc. The issues Soldiers face now are much more complicated than that.
'Knowing your Soldiers' is a tough subject right now, because as I have written about before, it seems to make 'old' army nervous. But, what really seems to be going on works like this....
I am a Sergeant (E5) coming back from my 2nd or 3rd tour. I have been blown up and been shot at....I have lost members of my platoon....I am having problems reintegrating with my spouse and family....I drink to fall asleep.....I am almost consumed with just making it through each day and trying to find some space to rest my brain.....My Solider is going through much the same experience I am except that he is looking at me to provide answers that I don't have. Now, I'm feeling even worse, because I know that he is counting on me (as are my family, friends, coworkers etc) and I cannot be everything to everyone. Something has to give. Selfishly, I have to take care of me first. From my Soldiers perspective I abandoned him......He loses trust in me.
All because I couldn't say to him, "I don't know the answer, but we're going through the same things. Let's figure it out together."
Joe wrote back that my outline of the situation made a lot of sense to him, but he questioned why I thought that getting to know your Soldiers on a personal level, "Made 'old' Army nervous?"
My response is pretty simple and yet very complex at the same time. And although I hope I don't lose any of the faith and trust Joe has shared with me by reprinting parts of the discussion here, I believe that the topic itself is too important not to share with others. The road ahead for leader development, and for taking care of our Soldiers depends upon it. The various crisis in our ranks (suicide, domestic violence, prescription drug abuse etc) will not go away by themselves. They are going to require leaders who are very very 'tuned-in' to their Soldiers. They are going to require leaders who develop a sixth sense and awareness of the subtle shifts and adjustments in behavior that alert us to Soldiers in need. They will require more than formulaic responses to critical situations and will put a premium on human being interaction over institutional reporting and charting. We must return to the people.
This 'people-based' model will break down many of the 'class systems' which are inherent in any hierarchical organization and are extremely prevalent in the Army where tradition, custom and fear of change are firmly entrenched. We teach new leaders the traditions of the officer and noncommissioned officers corps and then tell them that they are a part of that storied lineage and charge them to conduct themselves at all times to not bring discredit to their respective corps. They are constantly reminded that there are walls and barriers and distinctions between officers, noncommissioned officers and lower enlisted Soldiers and that those walls and barriers must be maintained. We see it every day when people talk about 'Officer business', or 'NCO business'. There are things that are theirs and things that are ours. There are norms and behaviors appropriate to each group, and there are invisible lines that are not to be crossed.
The problem with that model is that while we are all busy maintaining the various walls and barriers, we are losing the person who needs our help. That person might be a young officer struggling to understand the current battlefield, a senior NCO who has been pushed to the edge by repeated deployments and the stress of constantly worrying about his/her Soldiers, or a young Soldier who doesn't understand what to do when the adrenaline rush of combat wears off and he/she cannot replace the feeling by any other means than dangerous behaviors. The need to maintain the walls overrides the need to reach people where they are. And too assist them without judging them. It may be that I can help my young officer counterpart to understand his responsibilities in the current fight, or that he might help me come to grips with the strain of multiple deployments, or that he can communicate with our younger Soldiers better because they have shared experiences due to age and background. It may be that crisis can be averted by these interactions if the walls and barriers can be removed.
In many ways, I think this conversation started a few weeks back with the whole 'first name' business. You could plainly see that my desire to use my subordinates first names rather than their last had somehow upset the apple cart. That the tradition of separation and distinction between the classes of Soldiers (Officer, NCO, Enlisted) was so strong that it invoked an automatic response when challenged. And quite honestly, if people read many of the responses written by 'Old Army' NCO's, you can walk away feeling quite disheartened by their dogmatic reliance on 'it has always been that way' type responses. Interestingly, they could not provide anything more than ill-founded worries that this human being approach might lead to some form of 'issues' down the road. That without the barrier in place everyone was going to suddenly forget who the boss was and it would lead to anarchy. Or, the other fear that somehow there would be too much familiarity introduced into the organization and then discipline would be corrupted. And yet, for those who did try to find the regulatory guidance that supported one method over another, the best they could come up with is that every Soldier be treated with basic human dignity and individual respect. The walls had gotten in the way. A person's name is their ultimate possession. To the world it represents who they are and what they stand for. It recognizes their individuality. To me, it is the ultimate form of the respect I have for them. The walls we have built for the institution don't really seem to recognize that.
Deployments and combat are uniquely binding events. When you spend a year living day-in and day-out with the same people, experiencing the same fears, joys, hardships and celebrations, you rapidly break down a lot of the artificial barriers that exist it home. Your rank, status, and position in the platoon doesn't make your feet stink any less in a tent crammed with 30 people, it doesn't make your personal hygiene habits any more or less acceptable to others, it doesn't make you any more or less able to love and miss your family. What does happen is that everyone gets to know, see, and respect the value of everyone else. The titular leader becomes as much a person as the lowest member of the hierarchy. A person in some ways like me and in other ways different. They get to see me as a husband and a father as much as a platoon sergeant or squad leader. And I gain the same understanding of them. To return home and in the name of tradition, heritage, and roles, forget those things is what leads to the feelings of abandonment and loss of faith.
Leaders are responsible to know their Soldiers. Not because the Army says so but because knowing them represents the ultimate respect for them. This kid who has put his faith in me and believes that I know the right thing to do in every situation had better have more than some superficial understanding of who I am. He is betting his life on it. I disrespect his service and our shared sacrifices if I will not meet him anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances when he needs me. When the barriers and walls prevent me from dealing with the person, and not their place in the organization, it is time to remove them and replace them with a new model.
A final thought: We routinely hear senior officers and noncommissioned officers speak about 'engaged leadership' as the answer to many of our institutional troubles. The problem seems to be that when these young people try to be engaged, the system is sending them a mixed message about the manner and method of their engagement. The system needs to accept that any manner or method that will help a Soldier to recover, to reach out, to accept help...to walk back from the brink... is acceptable. Any. Whatever it takes to provide each of us, no matter the stature or station the help we need - from anyone who can provide it, is the only way to enhance the organization. To recognize and support that is the job of every leader. And that happens by getting to know them.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
One person who has participated in both manners has been Joe D. Joe has been a supporter of mine almost since the beginning of the blog. He is a recently retired officer and we met, almost by accident, when some folks were trying to locate me to discuss my time as a platoon sergeant in Iraq. Since then Joe and I have talked on the phone, exchanged numerous emails, and he has been the most public responder to many of my thoughts and ideas.
Last week Joe sent me an email detailing a conversation he had with a senior officer friend of his. During the course of their conversation regarding knowing your Soldiers, the senior officer commented that, "Junior leaders need to be taught that this is their responsibility and how to do it...they don't know they are supposed to 'know' their Soldiers like that or like we used to do when we were 2LTs." This surprised Joe a little and he asked me my thoughts on the matter. Below is my response:
"I think your friend is correct, but the issue is a little deeper than that. The way he laid it out implies that the leader doesn't have many of the same issues that the Soldier has. Therefore, we could send the leader to a class or school and teach them techniques etc for dealing with Soldier issues. The real problem seems to me to be that both the leader and the led are suffering equally. The leader who is also suffering really can't assist the Soldier who is suffering because they haven't yet figured out how to help themselves either. Your friends model implies the hierarchical leadership structure. And that structure relies on the experience of the senior to help the junior. The new paradigm is that the senior AND the junior are both 'lost' together which makes them somewhat equal. In fact, in the 'lost' model, it could be that while the junior has problems and issues, it is actually the senior who is suffering more and is less capable of making sound judgments.
We have never really 'taught' leaders how to take care of Soldiers. What we did was teach them leadership principles etc. We all learned 'how' to do it through experiential learning. I figured out how to fill out a AER form, or how to get the right paperwork to replace an ID card etc. The issues Soldiers face now are much more complicated than that.
'Knowing your Soldiers' is a tough subject right now, because as I have written about before, it seems to make 'old' army nervous. But, what really seems to be going on works like this....
I am a Sergeant (E5) coming back from my 2nd or 3rd tour. I have been blown up and been shot at....I have lost members of my platoon....I am having problems reintegrating with my spouse and family....I drink to fall asleep.....I am almost consumed with just making it through each day and trying to find some space to rest my brain.....My Solider is going through much the same experience I am except that he is looking at me to provide answers that I don't have. Now, I'm feeling even worse, because I know that he is counting on me (as are my family, friends, coworkers etc) and I cannot be everything to everyone. Something has to give. Selfishly, I have to take care of me first. From my Soldiers perspective I abandoned him......He loses trust in me.
All because I couldn't say to him, "I don't know the answer, but we're going through the same things. Let's figure it out together."
Joe wrote back that my outline of the situation made a lot of sense to him, but he questioned why I thought that getting to know your Soldiers on a personal level, "Made 'old' Army nervous?"
My response is pretty simple and yet very complex at the same time. And although I hope I don't lose any of the faith and trust Joe has shared with me by reprinting parts of the discussion here, I believe that the topic itself is too important not to share with others. The road ahead for leader development, and for taking care of our Soldiers depends upon it. The various crisis in our ranks (suicide, domestic violence, prescription drug abuse etc) will not go away by themselves. They are going to require leaders who are very very 'tuned-in' to their Soldiers. They are going to require leaders who develop a sixth sense and awareness of the subtle shifts and adjustments in behavior that alert us to Soldiers in need. They will require more than formulaic responses to critical situations and will put a premium on human being interaction over institutional reporting and charting. We must return to the people.
This 'people-based' model will break down many of the 'class systems' which are inherent in any hierarchical organization and are extremely prevalent in the Army where tradition, custom and fear of change are firmly entrenched. We teach new leaders the traditions of the officer and noncommissioned officers corps and then tell them that they are a part of that storied lineage and charge them to conduct themselves at all times to not bring discredit to their respective corps. They are constantly reminded that there are walls and barriers and distinctions between officers, noncommissioned officers and lower enlisted Soldiers and that those walls and barriers must be maintained. We see it every day when people talk about 'Officer business', or 'NCO business'. There are things that are theirs and things that are ours. There are norms and behaviors appropriate to each group, and there are invisible lines that are not to be crossed.
The problem with that model is that while we are all busy maintaining the various walls and barriers, we are losing the person who needs our help. That person might be a young officer struggling to understand the current battlefield, a senior NCO who has been pushed to the edge by repeated deployments and the stress of constantly worrying about his/her Soldiers, or a young Soldier who doesn't understand what to do when the adrenaline rush of combat wears off and he/she cannot replace the feeling by any other means than dangerous behaviors. The need to maintain the walls overrides the need to reach people where they are. And too assist them without judging them. It may be that I can help my young officer counterpart to understand his responsibilities in the current fight, or that he might help me come to grips with the strain of multiple deployments, or that he can communicate with our younger Soldiers better because they have shared experiences due to age and background. It may be that crisis can be averted by these interactions if the walls and barriers can be removed.
In many ways, I think this conversation started a few weeks back with the whole 'first name' business. You could plainly see that my desire to use my subordinates first names rather than their last had somehow upset the apple cart. That the tradition of separation and distinction between the classes of Soldiers (Officer, NCO, Enlisted) was so strong that it invoked an automatic response when challenged. And quite honestly, if people read many of the responses written by 'Old Army' NCO's, you can walk away feeling quite disheartened by their dogmatic reliance on 'it has always been that way' type responses. Interestingly, they could not provide anything more than ill-founded worries that this human being approach might lead to some form of 'issues' down the road. That without the barrier in place everyone was going to suddenly forget who the boss was and it would lead to anarchy. Or, the other fear that somehow there would be too much familiarity introduced into the organization and then discipline would be corrupted. And yet, for those who did try to find the regulatory guidance that supported one method over another, the best they could come up with is that every Soldier be treated with basic human dignity and individual respect. The walls had gotten in the way. A person's name is their ultimate possession. To the world it represents who they are and what they stand for. It recognizes their individuality. To me, it is the ultimate form of the respect I have for them. The walls we have built for the institution don't really seem to recognize that.
Deployments and combat are uniquely binding events. When you spend a year living day-in and day-out with the same people, experiencing the same fears, joys, hardships and celebrations, you rapidly break down a lot of the artificial barriers that exist it home. Your rank, status, and position in the platoon doesn't make your feet stink any less in a tent crammed with 30 people, it doesn't make your personal hygiene habits any more or less acceptable to others, it doesn't make you any more or less able to love and miss your family. What does happen is that everyone gets to know, see, and respect the value of everyone else. The titular leader becomes as much a person as the lowest member of the hierarchy. A person in some ways like me and in other ways different. They get to see me as a husband and a father as much as a platoon sergeant or squad leader. And I gain the same understanding of them. To return home and in the name of tradition, heritage, and roles, forget those things is what leads to the feelings of abandonment and loss of faith.
Leaders are responsible to know their Soldiers. Not because the Army says so but because knowing them represents the ultimate respect for them. This kid who has put his faith in me and believes that I know the right thing to do in every situation had better have more than some superficial understanding of who I am. He is betting his life on it. I disrespect his service and our shared sacrifices if I will not meet him anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances when he needs me. When the barriers and walls prevent me from dealing with the person, and not their place in the organization, it is time to remove them and replace them with a new model.
A final thought: We routinely hear senior officers and noncommissioned officers speak about 'engaged leadership' as the answer to many of our institutional troubles. The problem seems to be that when these young people try to be engaged, the system is sending them a mixed message about the manner and method of their engagement. The system needs to accept that any manner or method that will help a Soldier to recover, to reach out, to accept help...to walk back from the brink... is acceptable. Any. Whatever it takes to provide each of us, no matter the stature or station the help we need - from anyone who can provide it, is the only way to enhance the organization. To recognize and support that is the job of every leader. And that happens by getting to know them.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#80 The Trust Cycle
Yesterday morning I went searching for a topic for this week's post and came across an article on Management-issues.com entitled, "Breakdown in Trust Heralds Retention Crisis". You can find the link here:
www.management-issues.com/2010/8/6/research/breakdown-in-trust-heralds-retention-crisis.asp
The first two paragraphs really caught my eye:
"According to the fourth annual Ethics & Workplace Survey from consultants Deloitte, 34 per cent of employed Americans plan to look for a new job as the economy picks up, with half of these (48 per cent) citing a loss of trust in their employer as the main reason for wanting to leave.
A similar proportion point to a lack of transparent communication from their company's leadership, while four out of 10 say that they have been treated unfairly or unethically."
Consider that. 34% of the civilian workforce plans to plans to search for new employment when the opportunity arises and 48% of those people cite a lack of trust with their present employer as the reason why. That is roughly 16% of the total workforce not trusting their boss, and another 16% who believe they have been treated unfairly or unethically. Wow!
While there are vast differences between corporate America and the military related to purpose, there are also a lot of similarities as well. In fact, I would contend that at the institutional level, corporations and the Army are actually pretty much the same. If you substitute mission accomplishment for profit margin, and switch General for CEO, and shareholder for taxpayer, in many cases, you can interchange all the rest and aptly describe any large company and any Army organization. The cultures of the two organizations may be different, but generically, the same issues faced by the civilian work place are present in the Army.
The Army is a microcosm of society. A junior corporate executive comes from the same society as the mid-grade officer and noncommissioned officer. They have both been conditioned in roughly the same manner by the world they grew up and presently live in. It stands to reason therefore that if 16% of the workforce doesn't trust the boss, that same 16% is probably present in the Army.
Some questions: Where did the trust go, and how was it lost? Was it ever really present at all, or was it the unbridled optimism of the young executive who believed it was there when it really wasn't? Did the company sell the organization as one who would take care of its' people and then cut and run when the economy turned sour? Did the two groups (company and employee) have fundamentally different interpretations of how trust is demonstrated? For corporate America these are important considerations. Constantly turning over 16% of the middle management workforce cannot help but have a detrimental effect on production and profit. At best, it means that the corporate machine can only work at 84% effectiveness.
For the Army, that 16% is also critical. Consider this: An infantry brigade has approximately 3,500 people divided into 6 battalions. And that's its' base structure. Once deployed, the number can easily reach 5,000 or more. 16% of 3,500 is 560 people. That equals one battalions worth of disenfranchised Soldiers at any one time. In essence, the leadership has within it's ranks one entire infantry battalion that has one eye on the fight in front of it, and one on the door leading to the next opportunity. 560 is a lot of unhappy folks.
How do we regain that trust? Again, corporate America can provide a possible solution. I found an article entitled "How Leaders Build Trust" by George Ambler at (www.thepracticeofleadership.net). You can find the link to the article itself here:
www.thepracticeofleadership.net/2008/09/14/how-leaders-build-trust/
The article starts out by stating that, "Trust is one of the most critical requirements for effective leadership." It then goes on to outline a trust model called 'Transaction Trust'.
Much like the OODA Loop, the Transaction Trust model has 3 main parts which work together in a never-ending cycle. The 3 parts are (1) Contractual Trust or 'trust of character', (2) Communication Trust or 'trust of disclosure', and (3) Competence Trust or 'trust of capability'.
Under Contractual Trust or trust of character, the model lists the following requirements:
1. Manage Expectations
2. Establish boundaries
3. Delegate appropriately
4. Encourage mutually serving intentions
5. Keep agreements
6. Be consistent
Under Communication Trust or trust of disclosure, the model lists the following:
1. Share information
2. Tell the truth
3. Admit mistakes
4. Give and receive constructive feedback
5. Maintain confidentiality
6. Speak with good purpose
Under Competence Trust or Trust of capability. the model list the following:
1. Acknowledge people's skills and abilities
2. Allow people to make decisions
3. Involve others and seek their input
4. Help people learn skills.
The lack of trust in workforce - and the Army - is likely due to the failure of multiple parts of all three. The danger of this model however is that people will believe that by doing all those things in order, they are in fact demonstrating trust. The leader believes that he/she is meeting the requirements of the trust model. The problem is that the subordinate may not see it that way at all. This points out that even in matters of personal interaction, the OODA Loop and an understanding of the Orientation of both the leader and the subordinate are critical. If I were to realign the 16 parts to regain trust in the Army, I would put them in the following order:
Army leaders must:
1. Tell the truth - Good, bad or ugly, the truth must be told. Transparency is the key to credibility both personally and organizationally.
2. Speak with good purpose - Always speak with an eye toward improvement
3. Be consistent - Don't get caught up in following the latest trend, or pandering to popular opinion.
4. Encourage mutually serving intentions - Tie the individual parts to a whole that is larger than them.
5. Acknowledge people's skills and abilities - People are the Army. Value and respect their unique individual talents.
6. Involve others and seek their input - Decentralized operations require this.
7. Share information - There is no value in not sharing. That world doesn't exist anymore.
8. Manage expectations - Clearly lay out the risks and the possibilities for everyone. After all, it's the kid in the truck or on the patrol who's betting his/her life on your credibility.
9. Delegate appropriately - You'll be surprised what a little responsibility can do for a person.
10. Give and receive constructive feedback - Remember, they think you're wrong at least half the time. Give them an opportunity to say so and explain yourself.
11. Allow people to make decisions - Why not trust them? Do you really have any other choice?
12. Establish boundaries - These can be personal, professional or experiential. Nobody has a monopoly on being right, but for the operation to be successful, it has to move. At some point, decisions get made, and it is leaders who make them.
13. Admit mistakes - Your humanity demonstrates more than you know.
14. Keep agreements - Their trust in you is as good as your word to them.
15. Maintain confidentiality - There are no secrets anymore, but you can do your best to protect those you serve from undue humiliation or embarrassment.
16. Help people learn new skills - If you do all of the above, they will hand you their heart, their soul and their intellect and ask you to help them keep growing. Number 16 will be your legacy to the organization and the individual. Understand that and respect it. It is an awesome gift.
My reasoning for aligning the different portions the way I did should be pretty self evident. People trust people. Any discussion of the gaining or losing of trust ultimately boils down to the simple question of how I feel about the people around me. The institution is made up of thousands of people. The myriad interactions and decisions made by those thousands are what ultimately gives it its' ethos and value system. It is very difficult to establish an ethos and then try to cram people into it. It is the people who ultimately define it. To enhance trust, you always have to start with people.
By telling the truth - popular or not - the leader sends a message to the subordinate that honesty in word and deed is prized by the leader. What the subordinate will likely be forming is their understanding of what the leader thinks the 'truth' is. Again, it will always come back to interpretation and any time a leader states what they believe, the subordinate will be trying to match that statement up against their own belief system. Telling the truth leads directly to speaking with good purpose and to encouraging mutually serving intentions. A common understanding of the truth and a shared purpose and vision generally help to align all the parts of the organization and get it moving in a particular direction. For the Army, this equals vision and commander's intent. My commander plainly states what he/she knows to be the truth about our current situation. Then he/she provides the purpose of the operation and how it's success or failure affects everyone. Once that has happened, and I (the subordinate) understand why my individual well-being is tied to the organization's accomplishment of the mission, then I get my part. Now, if the leader then acknowledges my abilities, seeks my input, and shares information with me, then I have become part of the solution to the mission. I am now personally tied to it's success or failure. I am invested. Part of the leaders job however is to recognize my limitations and experience and help manage my expectations, set boundaries and delegate tasks to me that are appropriate to my skills, abilities and experience. Another portion of that will be the interaction I have with my leader in the form of dialogue, feedback and appropriate constructive criticism. Both the leader and I have to have a constant interchange of ideas and possible solutions. We must both be able to listen and adjust as the situation dictates. We both admit our mistakes quickly and thoroughly so that their outcomes don't impact the over-all mission in a negative manner. However, if my mistakes will not dramatically affect the outcome of the mission and can be used to help me learn new skills without demoralizing me or publicly embarrassing me, then when I tell my leader the mistake I've made truthfully, then it should be treated confidentially and used as an opportunity to grow and gain experience and wisdom.
All of which leads to trust. A trust that is returned from the led to the leader ten-fold once earned.
Last week, I included the link to the Army's report on suicide prevention. Because it was part of a different discussion, most people overlooked it and it didn't receive a lot of feedback throughout the week. However, I think the Transaction Trust model outlined above would be a great place for the Army to start dealing with the crisis it faces. However, to do so will require a re-ordering of the different parts of the model in the manner I posited above.
I have a Soldier in crisis. That Soldier has lost hope and can no longer see their personal place among their family, friends and work place and is contemplating suicide. They feel both un-valued and hopeless and have lost their basic trust in the organization to assist them. Using the steps of the model at the personal level in the same manner that they were applied to mission accomplishment however, I believe that we can directly influence this terrible trend and regain the trust of the Soldier in the Army. We will just have to demonstrate it personally. I will always be honest with my Soldier. A Soldier cannot take word games when they are in a dire situation. Simple, plain spoken truth - no matter how bad - works. Scimming around the edges and allowing vague interpretations only makes the situation more confusing and dangerous. I must speak with good purpose and help a Soldier see the mutually serving intention. They must understand that I do not wish them harm and that by assisting them in their crisis, I am trying to help them, and the organization. That the organization will be worse off without them. In effect that they are valued. But that has to be truthful and without guile. I cannot promise them that they will remain with the Army after the crisis ends, but rather that the Army values them right now in a very personal manner. We can deal with the institution later. I also need to share the responsibility for their well-being with them. They must do their part. They must give me as much effort as I give them. They must provide feedback and dialogue. As the leader, I have to suspend my own thoughts and listen to their interpretation of their situation. I must also provide them honestly and forthrightly the limits of my ability to assist them. They cannot become wholly dependant on me for every answer. I must be able to tell them the things I will not be able to provide them as quickly as I tell them the things I can. These boundaries are important because they keep the troubled Soldier inside a manageable box of decisions, not one that has an infinite number of possibilities that they might find overwhelming. And finally, if I make them a promise, I must see that promise through. A Soldier in crisis has placed their trust in me. Why? I don't know, and frankly, at that particular moment it is not important. What is important is that they believe that I can help them. If I tell them I will, then I must follow through on that promise. It may be all they have left to hold onto. And once lost, trust like that cannot be regained.
I believe that the 16% of corporate America that has lost trust and faith in the leadership has a similar, if not higher, percentage in the Army. That loss is demonstrating itself in dangerous and life-threatening decisions being made by Soldiers. The trend is reversible. The Transaction Trust model is a person-based technique for leading others. It also seems to me to have provide a way to help us help ourselves. Soldiers are the reason we get to be leaders. Let's not lose sight of that. Without those below you expressing their faith, trust, and confidence that you can, ate least, meet half of their Transaction needs, you wouldn't have anyone to lead at all.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
www.management-issues.com/2010/8/6/research/breakdown-in-trust-heralds-retention-crisis.asp
The first two paragraphs really caught my eye:
"According to the fourth annual Ethics & Workplace Survey from consultants Deloitte, 34 per cent of employed Americans plan to look for a new job as the economy picks up, with half of these (48 per cent) citing a loss of trust in their employer as the main reason for wanting to leave.
A similar proportion point to a lack of transparent communication from their company's leadership, while four out of 10 say that they have been treated unfairly or unethically."
Consider that. 34% of the civilian workforce plans to plans to search for new employment when the opportunity arises and 48% of those people cite a lack of trust with their present employer as the reason why. That is roughly 16% of the total workforce not trusting their boss, and another 16% who believe they have been treated unfairly or unethically. Wow!
While there are vast differences between corporate America and the military related to purpose, there are also a lot of similarities as well. In fact, I would contend that at the institutional level, corporations and the Army are actually pretty much the same. If you substitute mission accomplishment for profit margin, and switch General for CEO, and shareholder for taxpayer, in many cases, you can interchange all the rest and aptly describe any large company and any Army organization. The cultures of the two organizations may be different, but generically, the same issues faced by the civilian work place are present in the Army.
The Army is a microcosm of society. A junior corporate executive comes from the same society as the mid-grade officer and noncommissioned officer. They have both been conditioned in roughly the same manner by the world they grew up and presently live in. It stands to reason therefore that if 16% of the workforce doesn't trust the boss, that same 16% is probably present in the Army.
Some questions: Where did the trust go, and how was it lost? Was it ever really present at all, or was it the unbridled optimism of the young executive who believed it was there when it really wasn't? Did the company sell the organization as one who would take care of its' people and then cut and run when the economy turned sour? Did the two groups (company and employee) have fundamentally different interpretations of how trust is demonstrated? For corporate America these are important considerations. Constantly turning over 16% of the middle management workforce cannot help but have a detrimental effect on production and profit. At best, it means that the corporate machine can only work at 84% effectiveness.
For the Army, that 16% is also critical. Consider this: An infantry brigade has approximately 3,500 people divided into 6 battalions. And that's its' base structure. Once deployed, the number can easily reach 5,000 or more. 16% of 3,500 is 560 people. That equals one battalions worth of disenfranchised Soldiers at any one time. In essence, the leadership has within it's ranks one entire infantry battalion that has one eye on the fight in front of it, and one on the door leading to the next opportunity. 560 is a lot of unhappy folks.
How do we regain that trust? Again, corporate America can provide a possible solution. I found an article entitled "How Leaders Build Trust" by George Ambler at (www.thepracticeofleadership.net). You can find the link to the article itself here:
www.thepracticeofleadership.net/2008/09/14/how-leaders-build-trust/
The article starts out by stating that, "Trust is one of the most critical requirements for effective leadership." It then goes on to outline a trust model called 'Transaction Trust'.
Much like the OODA Loop, the Transaction Trust model has 3 main parts which work together in a never-ending cycle. The 3 parts are (1) Contractual Trust or 'trust of character', (2) Communication Trust or 'trust of disclosure', and (3) Competence Trust or 'trust of capability'.
Under Contractual Trust or trust of character, the model lists the following requirements:
1. Manage Expectations
2. Establish boundaries
3. Delegate appropriately
4. Encourage mutually serving intentions
5. Keep agreements
6. Be consistent
Under Communication Trust or trust of disclosure, the model lists the following:
1. Share information
2. Tell the truth
3. Admit mistakes
4. Give and receive constructive feedback
5. Maintain confidentiality
6. Speak with good purpose
Under Competence Trust or Trust of capability. the model list the following:
1. Acknowledge people's skills and abilities
2. Allow people to make decisions
3. Involve others and seek their input
4. Help people learn skills.
The lack of trust in workforce - and the Army - is likely due to the failure of multiple parts of all three. The danger of this model however is that people will believe that by doing all those things in order, they are in fact demonstrating trust. The leader believes that he/she is meeting the requirements of the trust model. The problem is that the subordinate may not see it that way at all. This points out that even in matters of personal interaction, the OODA Loop and an understanding of the Orientation of both the leader and the subordinate are critical. If I were to realign the 16 parts to regain trust in the Army, I would put them in the following order:
Army leaders must:
1. Tell the truth - Good, bad or ugly, the truth must be told. Transparency is the key to credibility both personally and organizationally.
2. Speak with good purpose - Always speak with an eye toward improvement
3. Be consistent - Don't get caught up in following the latest trend, or pandering to popular opinion.
4. Encourage mutually serving intentions - Tie the individual parts to a whole that is larger than them.
5. Acknowledge people's skills and abilities - People are the Army. Value and respect their unique individual talents.
6. Involve others and seek their input - Decentralized operations require this.
7. Share information - There is no value in not sharing. That world doesn't exist anymore.
8. Manage expectations - Clearly lay out the risks and the possibilities for everyone. After all, it's the kid in the truck or on the patrol who's betting his/her life on your credibility.
9. Delegate appropriately - You'll be surprised what a little responsibility can do for a person.
10. Give and receive constructive feedback - Remember, they think you're wrong at least half the time. Give them an opportunity to say so and explain yourself.
11. Allow people to make decisions - Why not trust them? Do you really have any other choice?
12. Establish boundaries - These can be personal, professional or experiential. Nobody has a monopoly on being right, but for the operation to be successful, it has to move. At some point, decisions get made, and it is leaders who make them.
13. Admit mistakes - Your humanity demonstrates more than you know.
14. Keep agreements - Their trust in you is as good as your word to them.
15. Maintain confidentiality - There are no secrets anymore, but you can do your best to protect those you serve from undue humiliation or embarrassment.
16. Help people learn new skills - If you do all of the above, they will hand you their heart, their soul and their intellect and ask you to help them keep growing. Number 16 will be your legacy to the organization and the individual. Understand that and respect it. It is an awesome gift.
My reasoning for aligning the different portions the way I did should be pretty self evident. People trust people. Any discussion of the gaining or losing of trust ultimately boils down to the simple question of how I feel about the people around me. The institution is made up of thousands of people. The myriad interactions and decisions made by those thousands are what ultimately gives it its' ethos and value system. It is very difficult to establish an ethos and then try to cram people into it. It is the people who ultimately define it. To enhance trust, you always have to start with people.
By telling the truth - popular or not - the leader sends a message to the subordinate that honesty in word and deed is prized by the leader. What the subordinate will likely be forming is their understanding of what the leader thinks the 'truth' is. Again, it will always come back to interpretation and any time a leader states what they believe, the subordinate will be trying to match that statement up against their own belief system. Telling the truth leads directly to speaking with good purpose and to encouraging mutually serving intentions. A common understanding of the truth and a shared purpose and vision generally help to align all the parts of the organization and get it moving in a particular direction. For the Army, this equals vision and commander's intent. My commander plainly states what he/she knows to be the truth about our current situation. Then he/she provides the purpose of the operation and how it's success or failure affects everyone. Once that has happened, and I (the subordinate) understand why my individual well-being is tied to the organization's accomplishment of the mission, then I get my part. Now, if the leader then acknowledges my abilities, seeks my input, and shares information with me, then I have become part of the solution to the mission. I am now personally tied to it's success or failure. I am invested. Part of the leaders job however is to recognize my limitations and experience and help manage my expectations, set boundaries and delegate tasks to me that are appropriate to my skills, abilities and experience. Another portion of that will be the interaction I have with my leader in the form of dialogue, feedback and appropriate constructive criticism. Both the leader and I have to have a constant interchange of ideas and possible solutions. We must both be able to listen and adjust as the situation dictates. We both admit our mistakes quickly and thoroughly so that their outcomes don't impact the over-all mission in a negative manner. However, if my mistakes will not dramatically affect the outcome of the mission and can be used to help me learn new skills without demoralizing me or publicly embarrassing me, then when I tell my leader the mistake I've made truthfully, then it should be treated confidentially and used as an opportunity to grow and gain experience and wisdom.
All of which leads to trust. A trust that is returned from the led to the leader ten-fold once earned.
Last week, I included the link to the Army's report on suicide prevention. Because it was part of a different discussion, most people overlooked it and it didn't receive a lot of feedback throughout the week. However, I think the Transaction Trust model outlined above would be a great place for the Army to start dealing with the crisis it faces. However, to do so will require a re-ordering of the different parts of the model in the manner I posited above.
I have a Soldier in crisis. That Soldier has lost hope and can no longer see their personal place among their family, friends and work place and is contemplating suicide. They feel both un-valued and hopeless and have lost their basic trust in the organization to assist them. Using the steps of the model at the personal level in the same manner that they were applied to mission accomplishment however, I believe that we can directly influence this terrible trend and regain the trust of the Soldier in the Army. We will just have to demonstrate it personally. I will always be honest with my Soldier. A Soldier cannot take word games when they are in a dire situation. Simple, plain spoken truth - no matter how bad - works. Scimming around the edges and allowing vague interpretations only makes the situation more confusing and dangerous. I must speak with good purpose and help a Soldier see the mutually serving intention. They must understand that I do not wish them harm and that by assisting them in their crisis, I am trying to help them, and the organization. That the organization will be worse off without them. In effect that they are valued. But that has to be truthful and without guile. I cannot promise them that they will remain with the Army after the crisis ends, but rather that the Army values them right now in a very personal manner. We can deal with the institution later. I also need to share the responsibility for their well-being with them. They must do their part. They must give me as much effort as I give them. They must provide feedback and dialogue. As the leader, I have to suspend my own thoughts and listen to their interpretation of their situation. I must also provide them honestly and forthrightly the limits of my ability to assist them. They cannot become wholly dependant on me for every answer. I must be able to tell them the things I will not be able to provide them as quickly as I tell them the things I can. These boundaries are important because they keep the troubled Soldier inside a manageable box of decisions, not one that has an infinite number of possibilities that they might find overwhelming. And finally, if I make them a promise, I must see that promise through. A Soldier in crisis has placed their trust in me. Why? I don't know, and frankly, at that particular moment it is not important. What is important is that they believe that I can help them. If I tell them I will, then I must follow through on that promise. It may be all they have left to hold onto. And once lost, trust like that cannot be regained.
I believe that the 16% of corporate America that has lost trust and faith in the leadership has a similar, if not higher, percentage in the Army. That loss is demonstrating itself in dangerous and life-threatening decisions being made by Soldiers. The trend is reversible. The Transaction Trust model is a person-based technique for leading others. It also seems to me to have provide a way to help us help ourselves. Soldiers are the reason we get to be leaders. Let's not lose sight of that. Without those below you expressing their faith, trust, and confidence that you can, ate least, meet half of their Transaction needs, you wouldn't have anyone to lead at all.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
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