When I started this discussion a year and a half ago, I didn't really have any idea where the journey would lead. I knew going through the "Black Hearts" experience had changed the way I viewed my world and that I would be a different type of leader because of it. I just didn't know what type. I had lost the anchor points that had previously shown me the way. I started writing the blog as a way to sort out my own thoughts and see what I could learn from that time. What I did not want to do was dictate where the discussions took me. I determined early on that I would simply let things go and follow where they led. And it has certainly been a learning experience to do that. Since writing each week requires some sort of reference material to work from, I have been forced to look a little deeper at leadership - what it is, why its' needed, and in what forms it is most and least successful. Because of that search I have gained an awareness that there are four or five recurring themes that have risen to the top of my consciousness. First, the requirement for self-awareness and self-study. You cannot simply put on a title or a rank and then call yourself a leader. Or worse, let the institution term you one. Your leadership abilities encompass much more than that. Second, the idea of using the OODA cycle at the human being level. While Boyd extrapolated OODA outward from the individual to grand strategy, I have found that it is a great method of focusing inward which leads to a much greater understanding of your immediate surroundings. And, as you have routinely seen throughout these posts, the idea of Orientation as the linchpin of that process. Third, the notion of servant leadership. I see the concept of leadership now as a choice between two paths: The leader is served by the led, or the leader serves the led. I think there are pros and cons to each, but I do believe that every one of us has to choose which road they will follow. And finally, that the institution itself acts as force upon all of the above. Maybe others have an innate understanding of this concept, but I did not. The idea that the Army as an institution is a living entity that, in many ways, acts exactly like its' people do. It has almost human needs to be fed, nurtured, approved and corrected. It has wants and needs and those two work to form the ethic and the manner in which it operates. Tied closely to that is the idea that the skeletal structure of the Army, it's hierarchy, also plays a large role in determining how the institution itself receives those things. As the Army takes a look at itself over the coming months and tries to figure out what adjustments it needs to make to it's leader development programs, hopefully some of my thoughts might help to inform the discussion. And, while that might sound like a pretty arrogant statement, I do believe that I can help, if for no other reason than because my writing has forced me to do some research and to look at the problem from a variety of points of view.
Leadership is an intensely personal experience and in order to lead others, you must first have a solid understanding of yourself. Self-awareness and self-study are critical parts of leader development and encompass the entirety of your life. What are your priorities, values, weaknesses, blind spots etc? Why are you the way you are? Why do you view your world the way you do? A large portion of our earliest leader development programs should focus on this area for a couple important reasons. First, it alerts us to how we view our world and the different filters that we drop in place that color our understandings. What motivates us and what does not? Second, this awareness recognizes that others will have a much different viewpoint based upon their understandings and filters. Self study allows for those differences of view without moral judgment of those who you are opposed to. Leadership at the human being level is recognizing those differences and finding ways to either reconcile them, or to ensure that the right people are put in the right place to accomplish the mission. Sometimes the most critical decision a leader will make isn't what to do, but rather who will do it. The arguments regarding 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' will probably demonstrate this very well, as will the discussions regarding mission command and decentralized operations down to the squad level. The idea of the right person will play a much greater role than people think. A leader fundamentally opposed to homosexuals openly serving in the Army will make decisions in line with their belief and value system. A leader who is not opposed will make other decisions in line with their belief and value system. The issue will not be the institution's response, the issue will be how it is interpreted and enacted at the lowest level. As a leader of others, one of my jobs is to understand my feelings about an issue and to understand how they affect my actions. And my self-awareness presupposes that the same is true in others. In periods of change the ability to determine who to place where and when is an important skill. We'll no longer be 'plug and play' with interchangeable leaders. In fact, we'll probably find ourselves moving in the opposite direction all together. We'll probably end up emphasizing the merits of one individual over another for a particular task and the leader piece will be the ability to recognize which person is more suited to that mission and why. That will require programs of instruction in our development schools that are less 'mass production' and much more personalized. I go to school in order to find out about myself, in order to understand my influences, in order to learn how I think, in order to recognize that others do not think the same way, in order to take advantage of those differences, in order to effect the outcome successfully. In short, I'm learning how to put the right person in the right place at the right time instead of just anyone who happens to have been spit out of the leader development machine. Personal leader development takes advantage of the differences between individuals and spends less time trying to make everyone homogeneous.
Once we have impressed upon people the importance of figuring out who they are and why they are that way, we can move on to another theme - that "How to think is more important than what to think". My constant references to the OODA cycle reinforce this. To me, it is the single most important teaching lesson we need in the Army right now. OODA is not a discreet process. It really has no beginning and no end. It is not a finite thing. It's a way of interacting critically with our world that, when developed, brings clarity, and the ability to see ourselves and our adversary more clearly which reveals opportunities and identifies shortfalls faster. OODA accepts the differences of filter and then presents ways to work through them dynamically. The more you do it, the faster you can act. Now, you are operating inside other people's decision (and behavior) cycles and affecting the outcome. While Boyd originally saw this concept as happening between two adversaries, I believe that it can also be used very successfully within our own formations. If leadership is defined as influencing someones behavior in pursuit of an objective, then the OODA cycle does not only happen outside of our formations. It happens inside them as well. It happens with every interaction we have with people. This is another critical viewpoint that we must develop as we try to work through some of the issues with destructive behavior and other human being problems that have surfaced after 10 years at war. The same skill sets we are developing that allow us to better understand the enemy and the populace in Afghanistan can (and should) be used to assist us in understanding our own Soldiers. The skills required are no different - the ability to define the problem, the judgment - the empathy, the willigness to set aside our own viewpoint and actively pursue another's - to understand it's causes, the determination to change an entrenched behavior and the willingness to constantly scrutinize those interactions to see whether or not they are positively or negatively affecting the outcome. It really doesn't take a year long study to find out why we are having difficulty with Soldiers who return from battle and behave differently than we expect. It takes people who are attuned to the behavioral changes in their subordinates and then act in an empathetic manner to assist them to return to a more healthy place. Without self-awareness and without the OODA cycle becoming an active concentration in our leader development schools, we will only be left with institutional answers to what are very personal situations. We are trying to find ways to increase the judgment abilities of our Soldiers both individually and tactically. OODA provides that way.
The third theme that has routinely appeared in my thoughts, sometimes less clearly than others, is the idea of servant leadership. I no longer see my Soldiers as the tools by which I affirm my place in the organization. I used to, and I think many people go through a period like this, but I don't anymore. I exist to serve downward to my subordinates. The most important parts of my job are to serve their needs, increase their knowledge, and provide the opportunity for them to develop themselves in their own personal manner. I will not allow myself to use them for my own self-enhancement. More importantly, I will not allow them to let me do so. They are the reason I continue to serve. Any success that we achieve is shared. I do my part, they do theirs and we work through the friction as equal parts of the system. We both have roles to play. Without them doing their part, I will fail to achieve the organizations goals. Without me doing mine, they will not be able to operate to achieve them. The recognition that there is an equality between us is an important one. Rank and stature based systems do not generally accept this notion and therefore the led become nothing more than the workforce upon which the leader stakes his/her reputation. As we continue to look at 'toxic' leadership, I think we're going to find that it is most prevalent in places where the leader believes in his/her own sense of rightness to such a degree that they cannot view their world in any other manner. They are right and everyone else is wrong.
Servant leadership also has another linked requirement that bottom-up leadership doesn't which is it's requirement for a dissent mechanism. I have brought this up before, but it hasn't really gotten all that much attention which surprises me. If I accept that my subordinates are an equal and critical part of the organization - if I really embrace that - then it will force me to accept that there must be a way for them to tell me I'm wrong. In effect, they do get a vote. In situations where their lives depend upon having a clear understanding of the possible outcomes, there must be a way to ensure that that understanding is shared by all. The different parts of the system are equal. A dissent mechanism is the ultimate equalizer in servant based leadership.
The last theme is how the institution - it's history, it's lineage, it's customs and traditions and method of operating affect the people inside it. We often say that the Army is people, but in truth, the skeletal structure of the Army is a force unto itself. The hierarchical structure acts in a manner than requires the flow of information up and down simultaneously. It is predicated on the idea that the top has a better understanding than the bottom. However, we have found that that type of structure can be slow to act and opportunities are lost in the time it takes to move information to the proper decision-making level. We need to take a hard look at how the institution itself is affecting the conduct of operations. Is it possible that Soldiers have died and opportunities have been lost not because of negligence or fault or lack of ability, but rather because the requirements of the institution have failed to keep pace with the speed of decision-making on the ground?
A few weeks back I was talking with my Dad and he mentioned that it appeared as if some of my posts were beginning to repeat themselves. I was simply finding new source material to back up a previously stated thesis. I think to a certain degree he is correct. As I come across something that fits one of the 4 main theme areas of the blog, I'll try to bring it to people's attention and see if it helps clarify my previous thoughts any better. I also do it because in some cases, while the reference might be new, the theme is something I've talked about previously and want to bring back up to people's attention. Having thought about his comment for a few weeks, I'm not sure that's likely to change. A year ago or more I was talking about values and ethics. A year or more ago I brought up the sticky issues regarding decentralization and personal judgment. Due to the events of my life, what happened in Iraq between February and September 2006 has changed how I view leadership and how I lead others. For better or worse, some of these ideas seem to be making their way into discussions at the larger level. I would encourage the reader to go back and read through some of my earlier posts and begin to form their own ideas and opinions on some of these issues. What's on these pages is just some of the things I've discovered along the way.
#94 The Investments We Make
I found the following yesterday in one of my source books and then found a copy of it online. This is one of the best documents ever on military leadership. Bar none. It is worth the read.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/bach.pdf
The amazing thing about MAJ Bach's writing is how clean, simple, timeless and pure it is. Written in 93 years ago in 1917 the document recognizes the universal truths of leading citizen Soldiers and is incredibly appropriate as a framework for our discussions on the profession of arms today. While there are some parts of the paper which obviously reflect the ideas, teachings and customs of that period in history, the vast majority of it has a very universal theme. Consider the following:
"In a short time each of you men will control the lives of a certain number of other men. You will have in your charge loyal but untrained citizens, who look to you for instruction and guidance. Your word will be their law. Your most casual remark will be remembered. Your mannerism will be aped. Your clothing, your carriage, your vocabulary, your manner of command will be imitated."
or
"In a few days the great mass of you men will receive commissions as officers. These commissions will not make you leaders; they will merely make you officers. They will place you in a position where you can become leaders if you possess the proper attributes. But you must make good—not so much with the men over you as with the men under you."
MAJ Bach's paper coincided with some research I was doing on human capital. Taking human capital at face value, I understood it to mean investing in the people within an organization. However, from a purely business sense, human capital investment is an investment in the development of people with a focus on making them more productive and therefore more profitable to the corporation. And this is where the private sector and the military will separate. The military does not turn a profit - or even try to. At best, the military attempts to improve functions and processes in order to be more efficient to save the taxpayer's money, but it will never pay a monetary dividend to its' shareholders. Any investment in human capital made by the military will have a much different, and arguably, much more important dividend - it will save lives. Any efforts the institution makes to increase the judgment, capabilities, and decisiveness of its leaders pays a much greater return on the investment than money. It provides the opportunity to increase understanding and see more deeply and clearly the possible outcomes of the decisions we make. Those decisions that affect lives, Soldiers, their families, communities, and ultimately the Nation.
But, back to Bach. In his opening paragraphs I found a lot of things that deserve consideration. First, the idea that title alone does not make one a leader. All it does is confer the title. And that title is worthless if it does not have meaning to those whom he or she serves. I think we often overlook that in our leader development programs. 1917, and the idea of servant leadership is expressed at Fort Sheridan, WY. Even then, MAJ Bach understood the idea of the role of the leader as a servant of the led. Today, we send a Soldier to a validating school, and then confer upon them a title. You go to the Warrior Leaders Course and validate that you are a Sergeant and then you are expected to know all those things that are expected of a Sergeant. You go to the Basic Officer Leader Course and are expected to know everything that is required of a Lieutenant. And on and on at each level. You come out of the school with some information (i.e. 'facts'), but we spend precious little time putting those facts into a context. Leader actions designed to serve the subordinate, or subordinate actions designed to serve the leader? What's the role of the leader? I don't remember that in the validating schools I have attended. Do you? And make no mistake, leadership will happen in that context. It will happen at a specific point in time, under specific circumstances, with a specific person. The context of that interaction will have a huge impact on the outcome. What will work for one, will not work for another. And, importantly, the outcome's success or failure can really only be judged by those who are affected by it. Will they perceive the leaders actions as enhancing them, or as enhancing the leader? A critical consideration. I can take two Soldiers through the exact same scenario and will inevitably end up with two different interpretations as to the outcome.
The notion of context also realizes something else that is quite important to human capitol investment which is the totality of a person's life. Not simply the role they are fulfilling now, but all those things that make up the sum total of who they are. My leader actions are taken through the prism of my life from my childhood through present day. They are formed by my Orientation to my world and my understanding of my reality. In effect, my leader actions are formed by my character, my viewpoints, and my individual skills and abilities. Most of which were formed before I ever joined the organization or was given a title. And they are uniquely mine. One goal of human capital investment is to find those unique things and allow me to use them for the betterment of the organization. I decide a lot of things based upon who I am. The value of those decisions is interpreted by my subordinates based upon who they are. Misunderstandings and misinterpretations and differing points of view happen in the gap in between. Part of the leaders job is to remain aware of that gap and work to close it. There must be the recognition that each Soldier is an individual person. They are not all the same. They will not have all had the same experiences or influencing events that we have had. They will not have the same value systems and character traits that we do. A large part of our leadership will be in the recognition of what does or does not influence them and then finding ways to bring those skills and understandings together in a manner that enhances both the person and the organization. As MAJ Bach rightly pointed out later in his speech, leadership must be exercised individually. It cannot be done with the universal application of a common methodology.
Another part of Bach's speech that struck me was his instant recognition that all leaders are role models. Role modeling is inherent to the position - it goes along with the title. I don't think that many 'leaders' understand that. I really don't. If a leader has a true understanding that they are a role model for everyone below them then I think they would scrutinize their own actions a lot more carefully. The full impact of understanding role modeling has never really been dealt with by the Army. We talk about the role of the leader a lot, but the idea that a leader acts as a powerful behavior agent simply through their personal behavior and carriage is not really something we deal with. We don't often express in explicit terms that what you do and how you act have a much greater impact on your subordinates than the decisions you make. One of the ways that this awareness demonstrates itself is when Soldiers think you are acting. When they think you are simply role playing. If you have fully absorbed the understanding of role modeling, then it will become very difficult for your subordinates to discern where the real you ends and the professional you begins. We need to spend some serious time looking at this if we are to truly enhance the profession.
Role-modeling also brings with it certain characteristics that good leaders possess. Principally, self-awareness and humility. I told one of my subordinates once that there are actually three you's. There is the real you - who you are left alone in the dark with no one watching. There is the professional you - the one that puts on the uniform and fulfills the role of the title. And then there is the you as seen through the prism of your subordinates. The goal of any leader should be to bring those three together in such a manner that no one can tell where one part stops and another part begins. We probably need to take a close look at this as we study the profession in the year ahead. What people are now throwing out there as examples of toxic or poor leadership are more likely the lack of self-awareness to recognize when the three parts do not match up. I have worked for people who I did not like, but as long as they were role modeling and not role playing, then ultimately, I could find things to respect them for. I may not like the way they did business, but at very least it was true and honest. The choice remained with me to accept their role modeling or not. Bach stated it like this:
"Be an example to your men. An officer can be a power for good or a power for evil. Don’t preach to them—that will be worse than useless. Live the kind of life you would have them lead, and you will be surprised to see the number that will imitate you."
The greatest compliment a leader can receive should be the desire of their subordinates to model themselves after that leader. If no one wants to be like you, then in all likelihood you have failed. On the other hand, if all of your subordinates can see something to aspire to in your actions, demeanor, and behavior, then you have fulfilled potentially the greatest requirement of leadership. You have been a role model. And if you use that tool to help them move beyond mere imitation and toward their own understandings, then you have moved to another important level of leader/servant which is mentor. You are no longer trying to create others in your own image, but trying to help them find their own.
In the Army, we do not produce a product that enhances any one's bottom line. We do not make human capitol expenditures like business with an eye toward enhancing profitability. What we produce are people. People with the character, wisdom, knowledge, skills, and human awareness to do the Nation's business in a manner consistent with it's expectations. When I was younger I used to tell folks that my job was not to produce Soldiers. Rather, that I used the process of soldiering to produce better people. Sometimes I think we lose sight of that. We get so caught up in the X's and O's of tactics and mission and training, that we lose sight of the fact that all of those things only serve to do one thing - to develop, for better or worse, the person. Tactics and combat and training can be the crucible by which that development is enhanced, or they can be the pyre on which a leader is broken. Our human capitol investment is in the young people who fill our ranks who are looking to us to develop in them those characteristics and traits that they can one day pass along to those who look up to them. Every ounce of our energies must be dedicated to that end.
In an earlier post dealing with calling subordinates by their first name, I made the comment that knowing who Jeff Fenlason is is a hell of a lot more important than knowing who Master Sergeant Fenlason is. If I am role modeling correctly then the two become almost seamless. If I am not, then I am just an actor. The human capitol that the organization invests in is me. The return on the investment is my ability to pass along to the Army another young leader who has the abilities and judgment necessary for the circumstance they are faced with. Someone whose subordinates view him or her as a role model and not a role player.
I received an email from a Soldier the other night that contained the following:
"....you really helped develop me as a human and as a leader."
Hopefully, that sentence is my return on the human capitol that was invested in me over the last 20 years or so. It is also the finest compliment I have ever received. I am humbled that the Soldier took the time. That's the return on the taxpayer's investment. It is our job to make sure it is money well spent.
As always, your thoughts, comments and ideas are welcome.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/bach.pdf
The amazing thing about MAJ Bach's writing is how clean, simple, timeless and pure it is. Written in 93 years ago in 1917 the document recognizes the universal truths of leading citizen Soldiers and is incredibly appropriate as a framework for our discussions on the profession of arms today. While there are some parts of the paper which obviously reflect the ideas, teachings and customs of that period in history, the vast majority of it has a very universal theme. Consider the following:
"In a short time each of you men will control the lives of a certain number of other men. You will have in your charge loyal but untrained citizens, who look to you for instruction and guidance. Your word will be their law. Your most casual remark will be remembered. Your mannerism will be aped. Your clothing, your carriage, your vocabulary, your manner of command will be imitated."
or
"In a few days the great mass of you men will receive commissions as officers. These commissions will not make you leaders; they will merely make you officers. They will place you in a position where you can become leaders if you possess the proper attributes. But you must make good—not so much with the men over you as with the men under you."
MAJ Bach's paper coincided with some research I was doing on human capital. Taking human capital at face value, I understood it to mean investing in the people within an organization. However, from a purely business sense, human capital investment is an investment in the development of people with a focus on making them more productive and therefore more profitable to the corporation. And this is where the private sector and the military will separate. The military does not turn a profit - or even try to. At best, the military attempts to improve functions and processes in order to be more efficient to save the taxpayer's money, but it will never pay a monetary dividend to its' shareholders. Any investment in human capital made by the military will have a much different, and arguably, much more important dividend - it will save lives. Any efforts the institution makes to increase the judgment, capabilities, and decisiveness of its leaders pays a much greater return on the investment than money. It provides the opportunity to increase understanding and see more deeply and clearly the possible outcomes of the decisions we make. Those decisions that affect lives, Soldiers, their families, communities, and ultimately the Nation.
But, back to Bach. In his opening paragraphs I found a lot of things that deserve consideration. First, the idea that title alone does not make one a leader. All it does is confer the title. And that title is worthless if it does not have meaning to those whom he or she serves. I think we often overlook that in our leader development programs. 1917, and the idea of servant leadership is expressed at Fort Sheridan, WY. Even then, MAJ Bach understood the idea of the role of the leader as a servant of the led. Today, we send a Soldier to a validating school, and then confer upon them a title. You go to the Warrior Leaders Course and validate that you are a Sergeant and then you are expected to know all those things that are expected of a Sergeant. You go to the Basic Officer Leader Course and are expected to know everything that is required of a Lieutenant. And on and on at each level. You come out of the school with some information (i.e. 'facts'), but we spend precious little time putting those facts into a context. Leader actions designed to serve the subordinate, or subordinate actions designed to serve the leader? What's the role of the leader? I don't remember that in the validating schools I have attended. Do you? And make no mistake, leadership will happen in that context. It will happen at a specific point in time, under specific circumstances, with a specific person. The context of that interaction will have a huge impact on the outcome. What will work for one, will not work for another. And, importantly, the outcome's success or failure can really only be judged by those who are affected by it. Will they perceive the leaders actions as enhancing them, or as enhancing the leader? A critical consideration. I can take two Soldiers through the exact same scenario and will inevitably end up with two different interpretations as to the outcome.
The notion of context also realizes something else that is quite important to human capitol investment which is the totality of a person's life. Not simply the role they are fulfilling now, but all those things that make up the sum total of who they are. My leader actions are taken through the prism of my life from my childhood through present day. They are formed by my Orientation to my world and my understanding of my reality. In effect, my leader actions are formed by my character, my viewpoints, and my individual skills and abilities. Most of which were formed before I ever joined the organization or was given a title. And they are uniquely mine. One goal of human capital investment is to find those unique things and allow me to use them for the betterment of the organization. I decide a lot of things based upon who I am. The value of those decisions is interpreted by my subordinates based upon who they are. Misunderstandings and misinterpretations and differing points of view happen in the gap in between. Part of the leaders job is to remain aware of that gap and work to close it. There must be the recognition that each Soldier is an individual person. They are not all the same. They will not have all had the same experiences or influencing events that we have had. They will not have the same value systems and character traits that we do. A large part of our leadership will be in the recognition of what does or does not influence them and then finding ways to bring those skills and understandings together in a manner that enhances both the person and the organization. As MAJ Bach rightly pointed out later in his speech, leadership must be exercised individually. It cannot be done with the universal application of a common methodology.
Another part of Bach's speech that struck me was his instant recognition that all leaders are role models. Role modeling is inherent to the position - it goes along with the title. I don't think that many 'leaders' understand that. I really don't. If a leader has a true understanding that they are a role model for everyone below them then I think they would scrutinize their own actions a lot more carefully. The full impact of understanding role modeling has never really been dealt with by the Army. We talk about the role of the leader a lot, but the idea that a leader acts as a powerful behavior agent simply through their personal behavior and carriage is not really something we deal with. We don't often express in explicit terms that what you do and how you act have a much greater impact on your subordinates than the decisions you make. One of the ways that this awareness demonstrates itself is when Soldiers think you are acting. When they think you are simply role playing. If you have fully absorbed the understanding of role modeling, then it will become very difficult for your subordinates to discern where the real you ends and the professional you begins. We need to spend some serious time looking at this if we are to truly enhance the profession.
Role-modeling also brings with it certain characteristics that good leaders possess. Principally, self-awareness and humility. I told one of my subordinates once that there are actually three you's. There is the real you - who you are left alone in the dark with no one watching. There is the professional you - the one that puts on the uniform and fulfills the role of the title. And then there is the you as seen through the prism of your subordinates. The goal of any leader should be to bring those three together in such a manner that no one can tell where one part stops and another part begins. We probably need to take a close look at this as we study the profession in the year ahead. What people are now throwing out there as examples of toxic or poor leadership are more likely the lack of self-awareness to recognize when the three parts do not match up. I have worked for people who I did not like, but as long as they were role modeling and not role playing, then ultimately, I could find things to respect them for. I may not like the way they did business, but at very least it was true and honest. The choice remained with me to accept their role modeling or not. Bach stated it like this:
"Be an example to your men. An officer can be a power for good or a power for evil. Don’t preach to them—that will be worse than useless. Live the kind of life you would have them lead, and you will be surprised to see the number that will imitate you."
The greatest compliment a leader can receive should be the desire of their subordinates to model themselves after that leader. If no one wants to be like you, then in all likelihood you have failed. On the other hand, if all of your subordinates can see something to aspire to in your actions, demeanor, and behavior, then you have fulfilled potentially the greatest requirement of leadership. You have been a role model. And if you use that tool to help them move beyond mere imitation and toward their own understandings, then you have moved to another important level of leader/servant which is mentor. You are no longer trying to create others in your own image, but trying to help them find their own.
In the Army, we do not produce a product that enhances any one's bottom line. We do not make human capitol expenditures like business with an eye toward enhancing profitability. What we produce are people. People with the character, wisdom, knowledge, skills, and human awareness to do the Nation's business in a manner consistent with it's expectations. When I was younger I used to tell folks that my job was not to produce Soldiers. Rather, that I used the process of soldiering to produce better people. Sometimes I think we lose sight of that. We get so caught up in the X's and O's of tactics and mission and training, that we lose sight of the fact that all of those things only serve to do one thing - to develop, for better or worse, the person. Tactics and combat and training can be the crucible by which that development is enhanced, or they can be the pyre on which a leader is broken. Our human capitol investment is in the young people who fill our ranks who are looking to us to develop in them those characteristics and traits that they can one day pass along to those who look up to them. Every ounce of our energies must be dedicated to that end.
In an earlier post dealing with calling subordinates by their first name, I made the comment that knowing who Jeff Fenlason is is a hell of a lot more important than knowing who Master Sergeant Fenlason is. If I am role modeling correctly then the two become almost seamless. If I am not, then I am just an actor. The human capitol that the organization invests in is me. The return on the investment is my ability to pass along to the Army another young leader who has the abilities and judgment necessary for the circumstance they are faced with. Someone whose subordinates view him or her as a role model and not a role player.
I received an email from a Soldier the other night that contained the following:
"....you really helped develop me as a human and as a leader."
Hopefully, that sentence is my return on the human capitol that was invested in me over the last 20 years or so. It is also the finest compliment I have ever received. I am humbled that the Soldier took the time. That's the return on the taxpayer's investment. It is our job to make sure it is money well spent.
As always, your thoughts, comments and ideas are welcome.
#93 More Questions Than Answers
"The task of building an ethical environment where leaders and all personnel are instructed, encouraged, and rewarded for ethical behavior is a matter of first importance. All decisions, practices, goals, and values of the entire institutional structure which make ethical behavior difficult should be examined, beginning with the following:
First, blatant or subtle forms of ethical relativism which blur the issue of what is right or wrong or which bury it as a subject of little or no importance.
Second, the exaggerated loyalty syndrome, where people are afraid to tell the truth and are discouraged from it.
Third, the obsession with image, where people are not even interested in the truth.
And last, the drive for success, in which ethical sensitivity is bought off or sold because of the personal need to achieve."
Chaplain (Major General) Kermit D. Johnson Parameters Magazine 1974
I found this quote yesterday and it struck me how relevant it is to many of the discussions we are having right now throughout the Army. After nearly a decade of war, the time to take a hard look at the profession, what it stands for, and what behavioral requirements and demands it makes upon its’ members is incredibly important. I found the quote interesting because it also followed another long period of persistent conflict and raised many of the same issues that surround our Army today. 37 years have passed between the Army of the Vietnam Era and where we are today, and yet we are still asking the same questions now as he did back then.
Maybe though the real issue here is not that 37 years have passed, but rather that this particular discussion is one that should never have stopped in the first place. Any discussion of the ethic of a profession should not ever really have a defined starting or ending point. It should always be an ongoing dialogue. What the 37 intervening years says to me is that at some point, we felt as if we had ‘figured it out’ and now could take a break. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any profession’s relevancy lies clearly with how it defines itself, and what it stands for in the eyes of those for whom it provides a service. To suggest that those definitions and services happen in a finite point in time is simply untrue. The definitions and services happen in a dynamic and ever-changing world. Therefore, the ethic must be always be challenged and reviewed in light of that world. Of course, we need to ensure that we always maintain the ability to take the long view on present realities as well. While paying attention to the trees, we can never lose sight of the forest. Otherwise we run the risk of changing with every whim and popular thought of the moment. There are some things that must not change in any profession. As much as we need to continually review our thoughts and ideas and see if they remain true in present circumstances, we also need to ensure that the basic tenants of the profession remain. The larger question that deserves consideration is what those tenants are.
You cannot have a profession without having an ethic. The ethic defines the required behaviors and actions that any member must absorb and then display. Chaplain Johnson’s thoughts provide all of us a great start point for our current study of what the Army ethic is at this young point in the 21st century.
His idea of relativism struck a strong chord with me. Are there enduring values – immutable, non-negotiable rights and wrongs that define what it means to be a Soldier? If so, what are they? Are there actions that are always right or always wrong regardless of context? What happens when taking the ‘moral high ground’ means that you invite more attacks on your own Soldiers? What happens when your opponent is willing to use your moral/ethical boundaries to their own tactical advantage? How do you reconcile your leader decision to act in a manner consistent with the profession when it results in death or injury to your own Soldiers? More importantly, how do we imbue the importance of these immutable values into every Soldier in such a manner that they ultimately understand and accept that outcomes such as these are possible? Will these understandings stand up to the emotions of a grieving parent or spouse? Can these understandings survive a congressional inquiry? An After Action Review? At the local level, can we prepare leaders to be able to recognize that their Soldiers view of what happened, what should have happened, and why certain ethical decisions were made will have many varied interpretations and those interpretations could have an effect on future behaviors and actions of the platoon’s Soldiers? What about the many nights that will follow decisions such as these where someone lies in bed and wonders? Stares at the ceiling in the dark and wonders, “Did I do the right thing?” What about the emotions of our Soldiers? Can we imbue in them the ability to never lose the forest despite all the trees? For example, there was an attack on US Forces recently that resulted in a high casualty count. Already I have seen people writing about retribution. What do we need to do to ensure that the honest emotional response of wanting payback does not turn into actions that ultimately demean the ethic of being an American Soldier?
Chaplain Johnson’s second thought that there must be an institutional mechanism for ‘truth-telling’ is also important and falls directly in line with the thoughts expressed by LTG Caslen regarding candor. When loyalty or fealty to the boss becomes more important than the truth because of political or career implications, we as a profession will suffer. We must encourage – no, we must demand - ‘truth-telling’. I am certain that this is one of those immutable norms and expectations of the profession that we cannot survive without. But if, as LTG Caslen suggested, candor needs to be emphasized throughout the force, what conditions will it take for that to occur? How do we ensure that Soldiers always have the right (and obligation) to ask their questions, and speak their truth? For example, I got an email request last week to provide some data to our leaders overseas. A young Soldier had told one of the senior leaders that his unit had not received any replacement Soldiers for the entire deployment. The leader wanted to know why. It is certain, that the Soldier was mistaken – that I know for sure. What’s important though is that the exchange happened and that hopefully, the leader will help inform the Soldier on what the truth really is. The Soldier’s truth (his understanding) is not wrong – it is misinformed. However, without the mechanism for him to ask his question, the leader never knows what the Soldier is thinking. We must be able to tell the boss when our two understandings of the environment don’t add up. If all we do is nod our heads and agree then we do injustice to the communication process. As historians study this period in the Army, one thing they may discover is that once we all became convinced of our greatness, we did not have a mechanism in place to check our preconceptions against our realities.
Finally, careerism is most certainly the disease that leads to everything mentioned above. We must examine what it means to be a professional. Being a professional Soldier must once again take on the aura of an avocation. Something done not for money or security, but rather of true devotion. That is not to say that Soldiers should be paupers, but rather that we need to emphasize that ours is a lifestyle and a calling.
There are more questions now than there are answers. For some this lack of an absolutely clear direction will lead to blind faith in those around them. For others it will drive them to look deeply into their own hearts and attempt to find their own definition of the profession. Chaplain Johnson’s thoughts of a long time ago have come full circle. This time, lets ensure that we never think we’ve got it all figured out. The discussions of the profession of arms, what it means to serve, and the warrior’s vocation demand constant reflection. The blog serves part of that need for me. I hope it does for you as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
First, blatant or subtle forms of ethical relativism which blur the issue of what is right or wrong or which bury it as a subject of little or no importance.
Second, the exaggerated loyalty syndrome, where people are afraid to tell the truth and are discouraged from it.
Third, the obsession with image, where people are not even interested in the truth.
And last, the drive for success, in which ethical sensitivity is bought off or sold because of the personal need to achieve."
Chaplain (Major General) Kermit D. Johnson Parameters Magazine 1974
I found this quote yesterday and it struck me how relevant it is to many of the discussions we are having right now throughout the Army. After nearly a decade of war, the time to take a hard look at the profession, what it stands for, and what behavioral requirements and demands it makes upon its’ members is incredibly important. I found the quote interesting because it also followed another long period of persistent conflict and raised many of the same issues that surround our Army today. 37 years have passed between the Army of the Vietnam Era and where we are today, and yet we are still asking the same questions now as he did back then.
Maybe though the real issue here is not that 37 years have passed, but rather that this particular discussion is one that should never have stopped in the first place. Any discussion of the ethic of a profession should not ever really have a defined starting or ending point. It should always be an ongoing dialogue. What the 37 intervening years says to me is that at some point, we felt as if we had ‘figured it out’ and now could take a break. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any profession’s relevancy lies clearly with how it defines itself, and what it stands for in the eyes of those for whom it provides a service. To suggest that those definitions and services happen in a finite point in time is simply untrue. The definitions and services happen in a dynamic and ever-changing world. Therefore, the ethic must be always be challenged and reviewed in light of that world. Of course, we need to ensure that we always maintain the ability to take the long view on present realities as well. While paying attention to the trees, we can never lose sight of the forest. Otherwise we run the risk of changing with every whim and popular thought of the moment. There are some things that must not change in any profession. As much as we need to continually review our thoughts and ideas and see if they remain true in present circumstances, we also need to ensure that the basic tenants of the profession remain. The larger question that deserves consideration is what those tenants are.
You cannot have a profession without having an ethic. The ethic defines the required behaviors and actions that any member must absorb and then display. Chaplain Johnson’s thoughts provide all of us a great start point for our current study of what the Army ethic is at this young point in the 21st century.
His idea of relativism struck a strong chord with me. Are there enduring values – immutable, non-negotiable rights and wrongs that define what it means to be a Soldier? If so, what are they? Are there actions that are always right or always wrong regardless of context? What happens when taking the ‘moral high ground’ means that you invite more attacks on your own Soldiers? What happens when your opponent is willing to use your moral/ethical boundaries to their own tactical advantage? How do you reconcile your leader decision to act in a manner consistent with the profession when it results in death or injury to your own Soldiers? More importantly, how do we imbue the importance of these immutable values into every Soldier in such a manner that they ultimately understand and accept that outcomes such as these are possible? Will these understandings stand up to the emotions of a grieving parent or spouse? Can these understandings survive a congressional inquiry? An After Action Review? At the local level, can we prepare leaders to be able to recognize that their Soldiers view of what happened, what should have happened, and why certain ethical decisions were made will have many varied interpretations and those interpretations could have an effect on future behaviors and actions of the platoon’s Soldiers? What about the many nights that will follow decisions such as these where someone lies in bed and wonders? Stares at the ceiling in the dark and wonders, “Did I do the right thing?” What about the emotions of our Soldiers? Can we imbue in them the ability to never lose the forest despite all the trees? For example, there was an attack on US Forces recently that resulted in a high casualty count. Already I have seen people writing about retribution. What do we need to do to ensure that the honest emotional response of wanting payback does not turn into actions that ultimately demean the ethic of being an American Soldier?
Chaplain Johnson’s second thought that there must be an institutional mechanism for ‘truth-telling’ is also important and falls directly in line with the thoughts expressed by LTG Caslen regarding candor. When loyalty or fealty to the boss becomes more important than the truth because of political or career implications, we as a profession will suffer. We must encourage – no, we must demand - ‘truth-telling’. I am certain that this is one of those immutable norms and expectations of the profession that we cannot survive without. But if, as LTG Caslen suggested, candor needs to be emphasized throughout the force, what conditions will it take for that to occur? How do we ensure that Soldiers always have the right (and obligation) to ask their questions, and speak their truth? For example, I got an email request last week to provide some data to our leaders overseas. A young Soldier had told one of the senior leaders that his unit had not received any replacement Soldiers for the entire deployment. The leader wanted to know why. It is certain, that the Soldier was mistaken – that I know for sure. What’s important though is that the exchange happened and that hopefully, the leader will help inform the Soldier on what the truth really is. The Soldier’s truth (his understanding) is not wrong – it is misinformed. However, without the mechanism for him to ask his question, the leader never knows what the Soldier is thinking. We must be able to tell the boss when our two understandings of the environment don’t add up. If all we do is nod our heads and agree then we do injustice to the communication process. As historians study this period in the Army, one thing they may discover is that once we all became convinced of our greatness, we did not have a mechanism in place to check our preconceptions against our realities.
Finally, careerism is most certainly the disease that leads to everything mentioned above. We must examine what it means to be a professional. Being a professional Soldier must once again take on the aura of an avocation. Something done not for money or security, but rather of true devotion. That is not to say that Soldiers should be paupers, but rather that we need to emphasize that ours is a lifestyle and a calling.
There are more questions now than there are answers. For some this lack of an absolutely clear direction will lead to blind faith in those around them. For others it will drive them to look deeply into their own hearts and attempt to find their own definition of the profession. Chaplain Johnson’s thoughts of a long time ago have come full circle. This time, lets ensure that we never think we’ve got it all figured out. The discussions of the profession of arms, what it means to serve, and the warrior’s vocation demand constant reflection. The blog serves part of that need for me. I hope it does for you as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#92 Three Cups of Dissonance
A few weeks ago I was having a conversation with my Dad and he asked me how I develop my ideas for the blog. I told him that I really didn't know how I did it, but that I would generally hear or read something and a part of it would jump out at me as being either something I agreed with that I didn't feel people were paying enough attention to, or there would be something that didn't add up to me - something I couldn't Orient to. When I brought that up to a colleague of mine he defined the process as cognitive dissonance. Not exactly sure what he meant, I looked it up. Cognitive dissonance is described as "The uncomfortable feeling which comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the mind at the same time." I found a better explanation here:
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/cognitive_dissonance.htm
"Dissonance increases with:
Over on the Army information sharing site, BCKS, there are a few conversations going on that have caught my eye lately and deserve a little bit more consideration. The first has to do with the review of the Army's professional ethic. This conversation grew out of General Dempsey's "Weak signals" ideas from a few weeks back. We have a need in the Army to take a look at our professional ethic. What does it mean to be termed 'the profession of arms'? What makes us a profession? What service do we provide and how and to whom? What gives us permission to decide we are 'professionals'? These questions are important because they form the contractual relationship between the institution and the nation.
The second has to do with the idea of mission command and the difference between it and command and control. As I brought up last week, the Army has published a new training pamphlet and has decided to refocus it's efforts at developing a better understanding of how we need to operate in order to solve the complex problems that we are faced with. The idea that the more structured and rigid command and control methods of the past, which are highly successful against more formalized and structured foes, have not been as effective against the more amorphous and amoebic enemy that we have faced in the past 10 years. That pamphlet also emphasizes the art of command over the science of control, which will be a huge behavioral change for many leaders who grew up in a different era in the Army.
And finally, there is a professional reading forum that is discussing "Black Hearts". In essence, using a moderator, the forum is going through the book one chapter at a time and the moderator posts questions and solicits feedback from others to see what thoughts and ideas are generated. He and I have spoken about this - and I suspect we will talk a lot more in the weeks ahead- but for now, I am just sitting on the sidelines watching the discussions unfold. It will be interesting to see as the weeks go on how many different interpretations of people's actions and decisions (including mine) show up.
How are these things related?
First, there must be the realization that cognitive dissonance equals personal Orientation. That each individual Orients to their world and forms their understanding in a unique and personal manner. This Orientation is the sum total of their lives, their experiences, their knowledge, and their ability to make sense of their environment in light of all of their previous knowledge and experiences. This is critically important. If I am in charge of something and make a decision, that decision is very much informed and influenced by by previous experiences and development. It is unique to me and colored by everything that is me. Therefore, it is also true that my subordinates posses their own Orientation and cannot see the world or problem in exactly the same manner as I do. My decision or the action I wish them to take is being filtered by the sum total of their lives and experiences.
If we accept this filtering mechanism as a constant, then the discussion of the professional ethic becomes incredibly important. We must continually revisit the ethic of the organization to ensure that we can express it to our members in such a manner that they can Orient to. It must be universal. We must push as hard as we can to ensure that everyone's understanding of the institutional value system is in line - or at least within a set of parameters. Without that common understanding, the unique peculiarities of individual Orientation will collide and could produce results outside of the ethic of the profession. I believe that the "Black Hearts" discussion and the unfolding events in 5th brigade, 2nd Infantry Division will be instructive in this manner.
Finally, the idea of mission command over command and control. Command and control is a semi-rigid system that uses the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to generate orders. It is a complicated and difficult staff process that ends up most times with execution and synchronization matrices that put everything into a production line type order. The process continually breaks down the problem into smaller and smaller chunks and then stacks all those small chunks into a particular sequence to provide an expected result. It is very effective when opposing someone who uses roughly the same process - generally another professional Army or enemy. Something with a structure to oppose. Mission command on the other hand will be wholly dependent on the ability of the leader to paint a much broader picture, a mosaic, that describes in more general terms the intended outcome and allows maximum freedom of execution at every subordinate level. All the way down to the individual Soldier. It will be much less rigid and therefore (to use the most overused word in the Army today) more adaptable. Instead of proscribing each and every step of every Soldier and unit, mission command keeps the entire organization focused on the ultimate endstate. To put it another way, while command and control focuses on the trees, mission command focuses on not losing sight of the forest. COL Boyd expressed it like this:
"A system whose secret lies in what's unstated or not communicated to one another (in an explicit sense) - in order to exploit lower level initiative yet realize higher level intent, thereby diminish friction and compress time, hence gain both quickness and security."
In order to be successful at mission command, the Army will have to do a number of things up front. First, it will have to define it's ethic clearly in order to produce a common Orientation within its members. Second, it will have to accept dissonance as a vital part of the dialogue. Every aspect of leader development should be taught in light of an understanding that your subordinates cannot and will not Orient to their world in the same manner you do and that one of your key responsibilities is to ensure that the common understanding is achieved. Third, it will accept and learn to look for those times and places where a particular Orientation has moved outside of the intent and is adaptable enough to intercede earlier than it currently does. Finally, any discussion of decentralization must be informed by all of the above. Central to that discussion will be trust. And what are we trusting? Ultimately I believe that we are trusting that the institution can hear and respond to the cognitive dissonance among its' members, develop a method of dialogue that can reduce it through a commonly held ethic, and enhance the trust that allows for mission command over command and control.
A final very small example of how this all plays out. We had a brand new Soldier on a rifle range the other day who told one of my instructors that he had never fired his rifle without using an optic. That he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights. There are huge dissonance issues here for me. His statement that he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights (but can with an optic) implies that he really doesn't know how to shoot at all. Somewhere along the line he was never taught the real fundamentals of marksmanship. If he had been, then he would have known what successful shooting requires, and that an optic is only an enhancement to it. The principles are the same, the optic simply adds a more precise tool to use. My instructor couldn't believe that this was possible. How could someone be taught to use an optic before being taught to shoot well without one? He has never been a drill sergeant and so cannot Orient to that world. I saw this as a product of a training system where a decision was made to introduce the technology we posses earlier in training to alleviate the need for a lot of training further down the road. The training base would provide the operational Army a Soldier who already knew how to use the equipment attached to his/her rifle. I am certain, however, that not teaching a Soldier the basic requirements of successful target engagement was not part of the training idea. It probably never occurred to those who pushed the technology down to the trainee that the Drill Sergeant would skip over iron sight shooting. They believed they were enhancing the Soldier. Multiple Orientations. A lot of concentration on trees. What got lost in the translation was the forest. The Soldier still doesn't truly understand the fundamentals of marksmanship. My instructor heard something that didn't sound right. He listened to the dissonance. Thankfully, my team has one last chance to get that knowledge across to the Soldier. His next experience with a rifle could very likely be in a firefight.
Learning to listen to the dissonance is critical. People's lives depend upon it. It's that important.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/cognitive_dissonance.htm
"Dissonance increases with:
- The importance of the subject to us.
- How strongly the dissonant thoughts conflict.
- Our inability to rationalize and explain away the conflict.
Dissonance is often strong when we believe something about ourselves and then do something against that belief. If I believe I am good but do something bad, then the discomfort I feel as a result is cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance is a very powerful motivator which will often lead us to change one or other of the conflicting belief or action. The discomfort often feels like a tension between the two opposing thoughts. To release the tension we can take one of three actions:
- Change our behavior.
- Justify our behavior by changing the conflicting cognition.
- Justify our behavior by adding new cognitions.
Dissonance is most powerful when it is about our self-image. Feelings of foolishness, immorality and so on (including internal projections during decision-making) are dissonance in action.
If an action has been completed and cannot be undone, then the after-the-fact dissonance compels us to change our beliefs. If beliefs are moved, then the dissonance appears during decision-making, forcing us to take actions we would not have taken before.
Cognitive dissonance appears in virtually all evaluations and decisions and is the central mechanism by which we experience new differences in the world. When we see other people behave differently to our images of them, when we hold any conflicting thoughts, we experience dissonance.
Dissonance increases with the importance and impact of the decision, along with the difficulty of reversing it. Discomfort about making the wrong choice of car is bigger than when choosing a lamp."
In the past, and with regard to the conversations going on throughout the Army, I have called those who experience and then use this discordant feeling as the 'loyal opposition'. Those people whose Orientation is such that they critically evaluate every word to ensure understanding and then learn to listen to the inner clamoring when some parts of it do not add up to them. I believe that the development of this skill set is critical to any leader development program. We must continually push people to learn how to listen for the discordant sound, figure out why it sounds that way to them, and then provide methods to settle the discord through dialogue, discussion, or decision that will increase their awareness and depth of judgment. This is also why I continually return to the idea of Orientation. I must understand me well enough to understand how all those things that make me unique come together in order for me to form my understanding of my world. Only by having a clear understanding of them, can I use that awareness to then take calculated pauses and search out the Orientation of others. In essence, my awareness of me causes me to recognize that everyone else has there own awareness and there exists the possibility the two don't match up. This creates multiple possible outcomes to any situation. The job of any leader is to ensure that (1) the subordinate has a clear understanding of the desired outcome from the leaders orientation, and (2) the leader has an awareness of dissonance, expects it, does not view it as disrespect or a challenge to authority, and can use it to ensure a common operating picture for his/her subordinates. Dissonance will play a critical part in many of the current discussions we are having regarding the future needs and requirements of the Army. And as the most combat experienced Army of the last 40 years, that dissonance must not only be expressed by those at the top of the hierarchy. There will have to be a concerted effort to search out those in the middle and at the bottom. Remember, there are a lot more Specialists and Sergeants in the Army than there are Colonels and Generals and Command Sergeants Major. The dissonance at those intermediate levels will be crucial to formulating the road ahead.
Over on the Army information sharing site, BCKS, there are a few conversations going on that have caught my eye lately and deserve a little bit more consideration. The first has to do with the review of the Army's professional ethic. This conversation grew out of General Dempsey's "Weak signals" ideas from a few weeks back. We have a need in the Army to take a look at our professional ethic. What does it mean to be termed 'the profession of arms'? What makes us a profession? What service do we provide and how and to whom? What gives us permission to decide we are 'professionals'? These questions are important because they form the contractual relationship between the institution and the nation.
The second has to do with the idea of mission command and the difference between it and command and control. As I brought up last week, the Army has published a new training pamphlet and has decided to refocus it's efforts at developing a better understanding of how we need to operate in order to solve the complex problems that we are faced with. The idea that the more structured and rigid command and control methods of the past, which are highly successful against more formalized and structured foes, have not been as effective against the more amorphous and amoebic enemy that we have faced in the past 10 years. That pamphlet also emphasizes the art of command over the science of control, which will be a huge behavioral change for many leaders who grew up in a different era in the Army.
And finally, there is a professional reading forum that is discussing "Black Hearts". In essence, using a moderator, the forum is going through the book one chapter at a time and the moderator posts questions and solicits feedback from others to see what thoughts and ideas are generated. He and I have spoken about this - and I suspect we will talk a lot more in the weeks ahead- but for now, I am just sitting on the sidelines watching the discussions unfold. It will be interesting to see as the weeks go on how many different interpretations of people's actions and decisions (including mine) show up.
How are these things related?
First, there must be the realization that cognitive dissonance equals personal Orientation. That each individual Orients to their world and forms their understanding in a unique and personal manner. This Orientation is the sum total of their lives, their experiences, their knowledge, and their ability to make sense of their environment in light of all of their previous knowledge and experiences. This is critically important. If I am in charge of something and make a decision, that decision is very much informed and influenced by by previous experiences and development. It is unique to me and colored by everything that is me. Therefore, it is also true that my subordinates posses their own Orientation and cannot see the world or problem in exactly the same manner as I do. My decision or the action I wish them to take is being filtered by the sum total of their lives and experiences.
If we accept this filtering mechanism as a constant, then the discussion of the professional ethic becomes incredibly important. We must continually revisit the ethic of the organization to ensure that we can express it to our members in such a manner that they can Orient to. It must be universal. We must push as hard as we can to ensure that everyone's understanding of the institutional value system is in line - or at least within a set of parameters. Without that common understanding, the unique peculiarities of individual Orientation will collide and could produce results outside of the ethic of the profession. I believe that the "Black Hearts" discussion and the unfolding events in 5th brigade, 2nd Infantry Division will be instructive in this manner.
Finally, the idea of mission command over command and control. Command and control is a semi-rigid system that uses the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to generate orders. It is a complicated and difficult staff process that ends up most times with execution and synchronization matrices that put everything into a production line type order. The process continually breaks down the problem into smaller and smaller chunks and then stacks all those small chunks into a particular sequence to provide an expected result. It is very effective when opposing someone who uses roughly the same process - generally another professional Army or enemy. Something with a structure to oppose. Mission command on the other hand will be wholly dependent on the ability of the leader to paint a much broader picture, a mosaic, that describes in more general terms the intended outcome and allows maximum freedom of execution at every subordinate level. All the way down to the individual Soldier. It will be much less rigid and therefore (to use the most overused word in the Army today) more adaptable. Instead of proscribing each and every step of every Soldier and unit, mission command keeps the entire organization focused on the ultimate endstate. To put it another way, while command and control focuses on the trees, mission command focuses on not losing sight of the forest. COL Boyd expressed it like this:
"A system whose secret lies in what's unstated or not communicated to one another (in an explicit sense) - in order to exploit lower level initiative yet realize higher level intent, thereby diminish friction and compress time, hence gain both quickness and security."
In order to be successful at mission command, the Army will have to do a number of things up front. First, it will have to define it's ethic clearly in order to produce a common Orientation within its members. Second, it will have to accept dissonance as a vital part of the dialogue. Every aspect of leader development should be taught in light of an understanding that your subordinates cannot and will not Orient to their world in the same manner you do and that one of your key responsibilities is to ensure that the common understanding is achieved. Third, it will accept and learn to look for those times and places where a particular Orientation has moved outside of the intent and is adaptable enough to intercede earlier than it currently does. Finally, any discussion of decentralization must be informed by all of the above. Central to that discussion will be trust. And what are we trusting? Ultimately I believe that we are trusting that the institution can hear and respond to the cognitive dissonance among its' members, develop a method of dialogue that can reduce it through a commonly held ethic, and enhance the trust that allows for mission command over command and control.
A final very small example of how this all plays out. We had a brand new Soldier on a rifle range the other day who told one of my instructors that he had never fired his rifle without using an optic. That he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights. There are huge dissonance issues here for me. His statement that he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights (but can with an optic) implies that he really doesn't know how to shoot at all. Somewhere along the line he was never taught the real fundamentals of marksmanship. If he had been, then he would have known what successful shooting requires, and that an optic is only an enhancement to it. The principles are the same, the optic simply adds a more precise tool to use. My instructor couldn't believe that this was possible. How could someone be taught to use an optic before being taught to shoot well without one? He has never been a drill sergeant and so cannot Orient to that world. I saw this as a product of a training system where a decision was made to introduce the technology we posses earlier in training to alleviate the need for a lot of training further down the road. The training base would provide the operational Army a Soldier who already knew how to use the equipment attached to his/her rifle. I am certain, however, that not teaching a Soldier the basic requirements of successful target engagement was not part of the training idea. It probably never occurred to those who pushed the technology down to the trainee that the Drill Sergeant would skip over iron sight shooting. They believed they were enhancing the Soldier. Multiple Orientations. A lot of concentration on trees. What got lost in the translation was the forest. The Soldier still doesn't truly understand the fundamentals of marksmanship. My instructor heard something that didn't sound right. He listened to the dissonance. Thankfully, my team has one last chance to get that knowledge across to the Soldier. His next experience with a rifle could very likely be in a firefight.
Learning to listen to the dissonance is critical. People's lives depend upon it. It's that important.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#91 The Future is Now
Throughout my writing there are a few themes that have popped up time after time. Primarily that we lead human beings not organizations, and that the development of the human being should be the primary purpose of all leader development programs. More importantly, we need to force people through those programs to study themselves - who they are, what formed them, how they think, and the potential consequences of those thought processes. That we need to make self-awareness a primary focus of leader development. My contention is that by concentrating our efforts inward, we will develop leaders of known moral character, with the ability to critically view their environment and make decisions consistent with the values of the nation and the Army and that advance the commander's intent and mission accomplishment. They gain the understanding of why they make the choices or decisions they do and then possess the character to stand by them once made, or adapt them when they become aware that they will not work. In my early posts, these ideas didn't generate a lot of discussion or thought mainly because I think that most folks found the ideas to 1) be self evident and 2) they believed that the institution was already doing those things. Obviously, I do not believe that they are self-evident, nor that the institution is doing them. My personal experiences in Iraq had given me a 'front row seat' to the limitations of many of our current leader development programs - including mine, and had awakened me to a different set of possibilities. However, because my experiences are relatively unique and don't happened often, many folks probably didn't see much value in them because they are highly unlikely to occur in their world. And that is a fair assumption. War crimes, while providing high drama, a lot of emotion and capturing people's attention, are extremely rare and therefore are almost an anomaly that can be easily disregarded. Additionally, the posts regarding risk, trust, ethical development, individual responsibility etc didn't get much attention early on because those subjects call for a lot of individual 'gray area' interpretation and no institution likes gray. Institutions like black and white. They like structure and rules and orders and definiteness. They do not like chaos and ambiguity and personal interpretation. Counterinsurgencies, what happened to my platoon, and what is currently going on in 5th brigade, 2nd ID, however, highlight what can happen when we don't make an attempt to understand that we live in an inherently gray world, and one that is becoming more so each day. The Army calls it "..conditions of uncertainty and complexity." Of course, the Army's "..conditions of uncertainty and complexity" are focused outward towards our adversaries while I have often contended that we can use the development of those very same skill sets necessary for counterinsurgencies to look inward at ourselves and our own people.
Recently the Army has published a series of pamphlets outlining how it intends to operate for the next decade or so. What its' projected missions look like, how the system will function, and what it thinks it's requirements will be in different areas. This started with something called the Army Capstone Concept published in Dec 2009, which outlines very broadly what the Army predicts the future will look like in terms of threat, and what will be needed to meet it's requirements. In general, the ACC takes advantage of lessons learned from the last decade of conflict and combines them with the most likely course of events for the next 10 years or more to determine what capabilities the Army must possess in order to remain a predominant power and conduct the nation's land warfare business. The Capstone Concept was followed by The Army Operating Concept which outlined two broad functions that the Army must provide - combined arms maneuver and wide area security. And just two weeks ago, another volume was published entitled "The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command". You can find the link to all of these papers below:
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm
The "Mission Command" pamphlet is a critically important document and well worth the read for both military and non-military alike for it speaks more to the human element of leading people in decentralized environments (business or war) than anything I have seen to date. It moves the discussion from one of command and control, to one of mission command. Two very different things. Importantly, this document begins with an explicit recognition that technology has limitations and wars are fought in and amongst people.
"The renewed emphasis on mission command corrects the 1990s defense transformation view that emerging technologies would lift the fog of war and allow unprecedented awareness of every aspect of future operations. This view argued that operational images and graphics displayed on computer screens, in combination with processes such as system-of-systems analysis and operational net assessment, would permit an all-knowing headquarters to develop detailed plans, make near-perfect decisions, closely control organizations, and direct operations toward mission accomplishment.
In fact, however, operations over the past decade have reminded the Army that armed conflict is first a human undertaking and what matters most are the opaque intentions, dynamic relationships, and covert actions of human groups, mostly invisible to technical intelligence. Additionally, the same technology that provides greater awareness to higher headquarters also enables subordinates to be better informed and to make better and timelier decisions. Thus, the U.S. Army is more committed than ever to the concept of mission command."
It then goes on to say:
"It establishes operational adaptability as its central tenet and asserts success in future armed conflict depends on the ability of Army leaders and forces to understand the situation in breadth, depth, and context; then develop the situation through action in close contact with enemies and civil populations."
and
"TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full-Spectrum Operations 2015-2024 emphasizes optimization of the cognitive, physical, and social components of every Soldier with the objective to improve the acquisition and selection of personnel; maximize leader and organizational development; establish the ability to rapidly adjust, deliver, and provide accessibility of training and education ultimately balancing Soldier knowledge, skills, and abilities with full-spectrum operations mission requirements."
The "Human Dimension" document is one that I referenced very early on in my writings as something we all need to study and use in our daily interactions. I continue to suggest it to all leaders as they attempt to understand their subordinates and how to develop them and make use of their particular skills and abilities.
The "Functional Concept for Mission Command" pamphlet contains a lot of things that also reinforce many of my personal observations and thoughts as the blog has progressed. Consider the following:
"The purpose of military action is never purely destructive. In every case, it is to influence the behavior of various groups of human beings toward some greater purpose. Since humans are products of their genetic inheritance, education, and experience, they perceive the world selectively, making judgments of fact and of value. They continually negotiate their perceptions and interpretations of the world with others. Thus, key individuals in any mission are as influenced from inside this system of humans as much as they are by outside intervention. Not surprisingly, therefore, they do not always behave in a logical and rational way....Prevailing in the contest of wills will require acute understanding of human behavior and place increasing demands on leaders to make decisions and act without the benefit of complete information."
While these statements are generally focused on the idea of understanding with regard to potential adversaries, I believe that their central themes of exercising influence over human beings towards the achievement of a common goal, understanding the vaguaries and individuality of human beings, and decision making in context are equally applicable to leading our own Soldiers. Remember, the Army defines leadership as:
"The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."
Seems the same as "Influencing the behavior of various groups of human beings towards some greater purpose" to me. Only that by Orientation we read the paragraph from the "Mission Command" document as being outward focused and the leadership definition as being inward focused. In fact they are both saying the same thing.
Paragraph 2-3 of the document states the following:
"Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, that fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers subordinate leaders to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively within the commander’s intent."
Suddenly, the idea of leadership, or the role of the leader, begins to shift away from commanding something and more towards themes of trust development, the exercise of initiative and the empowerment of subordinates. A fundamental role of the commander or leader becomes the enhancement of his or her subordinates to be able to act quickly, make ethical decisions and take actions with the faith and confidence of their seniors. This paragraph explicitly affirms the need for leaders to spend significant time and energy in articulating the desired outcomes and allowing their subordinates as much freedom as possible to achieve them, all in support of the mission and the ethical/moral expectations of the institution and the nation. This is a direct refutation of the micro-management and fear based development that many leaders today have experienced. We have finally accepted that the complexities of the decentralized environment are too much for any one person to be able to exert direct command and control over. The changed environment is dictating that we cannot control every action therefore we have to trust that our subordinates can understand what must be done, understand their left and right limits, and can recognize when a changing situation requires a new understanding.
We have come full circle. And whether or not they acknowledge it, the Army has certainly returned to the OODA cycle and the work of John Boyd. The emphasis on "Orientation" is found throughout the "Mission Command" document. Of everything I have read since learning about Boyd two years ago, this pamphlet is a very close interpretation of Boyd's "Organic Design for Command and Control".
Consider the following from Boyd:
"Commanders need insight and vision in order to unveil adversary plans and actions as well as 'foresee our own goals and appropriate plans and actions."
"Commanders need focus and direction to achieve some goal or aim."
"Commanders need adaptability to cope with uncertain and ever-changing circumstances."
"Commanders need security to remain unpredictable."
Compare that to the following:
"Commander tasks. Execute the role of the commander by understanding the problem, visualizing the end state, and nature and design of the operation, describing the time, space, resources, and purpose action, direct the warfighting functions, and constantly assess the process. Develop teams among modular formations, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must build teams with assigned and supporting organizations as well as with joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must lead inform and influence activities by establishing themes and messages and personally engaging key players. Effective full-spectrum operations require commanders to establish and synchronize information themes and messages and integrate with actions to achieve a desired end state."
"Mission command envisions commanders enabling agile and adaptive leaders and organizations to execute dutiful initiative within the commander’s intent as part of unified action in a complex and ambiguous environment. Mission command offers no panacea or rigid formula for success. Instead, it is integral to successful full-spectrum operations, challenging leaders to cultivate a bias for action in subordinates, develop mutual trust and understanding, and exercise moral nerve and restraint."
"(1) Mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative. These are keystones of mission command, energizing subordinates to accomplish assigned missions (tasks) in accord with the commander’s intent (purpose). Mission command thrives where mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative outweigh the sum of all fears."
Insight and Vision = Understanding the problem and its' context
Focus and Direction = Themes and messages
Adaptability = Agility and dutiful initiative
Security = Trust
I blog about human being leader development and how it happens (or does not happen) in the context of the Army. These same processes happen in industry or academia, just with a different vocabulary. The themes themselves are universal. Any industry that wants to survive must see itself clearly, understand the human beings who reside in it, develop them in context with it's expected norms and do the same for the environment it is working in. The acronyms and abbreviations might be different, but the concepts remain the same. That is why you don't have to be in the Army to read this as long as you don't get too wrapped up in the language of the Army.
There will be a return to emphasizing personal leader development throughout the Army in the next 5 to 10 years. The circumstances demand it. Thankfully, we have some leaders in the Army today who recognized this need and are already addressing it. If you follow my work at all, I routinely cite the work of Don Vandergriff, LTG Hertling, and recently, the ideas and comments of LTG Caslen and General Demspey because these are the people who are leading this process. I also hope that my thoughts here contribute a little to that discussion. It is now time for the rest of us to study what has been put out there, embrace the requirements of the next 25 years, and do everything in our power to ensure we provide the next generation of leaders the tools they need and a proper climate to prevail in the 'contest of wills' that is warfare.
The future is now. The development of one young Lieutenant, one young Noncommissioned officer, and one young Soldier is our responsibility. Done correctly, it will become our legacy. Done incorrectly, we will do a disservice to the nation.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. The blog gained an additional 120 viewers this week. I am grateful to everyone who follows it.
Recently the Army has published a series of pamphlets outlining how it intends to operate for the next decade or so. What its' projected missions look like, how the system will function, and what it thinks it's requirements will be in different areas. This started with something called the Army Capstone Concept published in Dec 2009, which outlines very broadly what the Army predicts the future will look like in terms of threat, and what will be needed to meet it's requirements. In general, the ACC takes advantage of lessons learned from the last decade of conflict and combines them with the most likely course of events for the next 10 years or more to determine what capabilities the Army must possess in order to remain a predominant power and conduct the nation's land warfare business. The Capstone Concept was followed by The Army Operating Concept which outlined two broad functions that the Army must provide - combined arms maneuver and wide area security. And just two weeks ago, another volume was published entitled "The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command". You can find the link to all of these papers below:
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm
The "Mission Command" pamphlet is a critically important document and well worth the read for both military and non-military alike for it speaks more to the human element of leading people in decentralized environments (business or war) than anything I have seen to date. It moves the discussion from one of command and control, to one of mission command. Two very different things. Importantly, this document begins with an explicit recognition that technology has limitations and wars are fought in and amongst people.
"The renewed emphasis on mission command corrects the 1990s defense transformation view that emerging technologies would lift the fog of war and allow unprecedented awareness of every aspect of future operations. This view argued that operational images and graphics displayed on computer screens, in combination with processes such as system-of-systems analysis and operational net assessment, would permit an all-knowing headquarters to develop detailed plans, make near-perfect decisions, closely control organizations, and direct operations toward mission accomplishment.
In fact, however, operations over the past decade have reminded the Army that armed conflict is first a human undertaking and what matters most are the opaque intentions, dynamic relationships, and covert actions of human groups, mostly invisible to technical intelligence. Additionally, the same technology that provides greater awareness to higher headquarters also enables subordinates to be better informed and to make better and timelier decisions. Thus, the U.S. Army is more committed than ever to the concept of mission command."
It then goes on to say:
"It establishes operational adaptability as its central tenet and asserts success in future armed conflict depends on the ability of Army leaders and forces to understand the situation in breadth, depth, and context; then develop the situation through action in close contact with enemies and civil populations."
and
"TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full-Spectrum Operations 2015-2024 emphasizes optimization of the cognitive, physical, and social components of every Soldier with the objective to improve the acquisition and selection of personnel; maximize leader and organizational development; establish the ability to rapidly adjust, deliver, and provide accessibility of training and education ultimately balancing Soldier knowledge, skills, and abilities with full-spectrum operations mission requirements."
The "Human Dimension" document is one that I referenced very early on in my writings as something we all need to study and use in our daily interactions. I continue to suggest it to all leaders as they attempt to understand their subordinates and how to develop them and make use of their particular skills and abilities.
The "Functional Concept for Mission Command" pamphlet contains a lot of things that also reinforce many of my personal observations and thoughts as the blog has progressed. Consider the following:
"The purpose of military action is never purely destructive. In every case, it is to influence the behavior of various groups of human beings toward some greater purpose. Since humans are products of their genetic inheritance, education, and experience, they perceive the world selectively, making judgments of fact and of value. They continually negotiate their perceptions and interpretations of the world with others. Thus, key individuals in any mission are as influenced from inside this system of humans as much as they are by outside intervention. Not surprisingly, therefore, they do not always behave in a logical and rational way....Prevailing in the contest of wills will require acute understanding of human behavior and place increasing demands on leaders to make decisions and act without the benefit of complete information."
While these statements are generally focused on the idea of understanding with regard to potential adversaries, I believe that their central themes of exercising influence over human beings towards the achievement of a common goal, understanding the vaguaries and individuality of human beings, and decision making in context are equally applicable to leading our own Soldiers. Remember, the Army defines leadership as:
"The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."
Seems the same as "Influencing the behavior of various groups of human beings towards some greater purpose" to me. Only that by Orientation we read the paragraph from the "Mission Command" document as being outward focused and the leadership definition as being inward focused. In fact they are both saying the same thing.
Paragraph 2-3 of the document states the following:
"Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, that fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers subordinate leaders to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively within the commander’s intent."
Suddenly, the idea of leadership, or the role of the leader, begins to shift away from commanding something and more towards themes of trust development, the exercise of initiative and the empowerment of subordinates. A fundamental role of the commander or leader becomes the enhancement of his or her subordinates to be able to act quickly, make ethical decisions and take actions with the faith and confidence of their seniors. This paragraph explicitly affirms the need for leaders to spend significant time and energy in articulating the desired outcomes and allowing their subordinates as much freedom as possible to achieve them, all in support of the mission and the ethical/moral expectations of the institution and the nation. This is a direct refutation of the micro-management and fear based development that many leaders today have experienced. We have finally accepted that the complexities of the decentralized environment are too much for any one person to be able to exert direct command and control over. The changed environment is dictating that we cannot control every action therefore we have to trust that our subordinates can understand what must be done, understand their left and right limits, and can recognize when a changing situation requires a new understanding.
We have come full circle. And whether or not they acknowledge it, the Army has certainly returned to the OODA cycle and the work of John Boyd. The emphasis on "Orientation" is found throughout the "Mission Command" document. Of everything I have read since learning about Boyd two years ago, this pamphlet is a very close interpretation of Boyd's "Organic Design for Command and Control".
Consider the following from Boyd:
"Commanders need insight and vision in order to unveil adversary plans and actions as well as 'foresee our own goals and appropriate plans and actions."
"Commanders need focus and direction to achieve some goal or aim."
"Commanders need adaptability to cope with uncertain and ever-changing circumstances."
"Commanders need security to remain unpredictable."
Compare that to the following:
"Commander tasks. Execute the role of the commander by understanding the problem, visualizing the end state, and nature and design of the operation, describing the time, space, resources, and purpose action, direct the warfighting functions, and constantly assess the process. Develop teams among modular formations, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must build teams with assigned and supporting organizations as well as with joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must lead inform and influence activities by establishing themes and messages and personally engaging key players. Effective full-spectrum operations require commanders to establish and synchronize information themes and messages and integrate with actions to achieve a desired end state."
"Mission command envisions commanders enabling agile and adaptive leaders and organizations to execute dutiful initiative within the commander’s intent as part of unified action in a complex and ambiguous environment. Mission command offers no panacea or rigid formula for success. Instead, it is integral to successful full-spectrum operations, challenging leaders to cultivate a bias for action in subordinates, develop mutual trust and understanding, and exercise moral nerve and restraint."
"(1) Mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative. These are keystones of mission command, energizing subordinates to accomplish assigned missions (tasks) in accord with the commander’s intent (purpose). Mission command thrives where mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative outweigh the sum of all fears."
Insight and Vision = Understanding the problem and its' context
Focus and Direction = Themes and messages
Adaptability = Agility and dutiful initiative
Security = Trust
I blog about human being leader development and how it happens (or does not happen) in the context of the Army. These same processes happen in industry or academia, just with a different vocabulary. The themes themselves are universal. Any industry that wants to survive must see itself clearly, understand the human beings who reside in it, develop them in context with it's expected norms and do the same for the environment it is working in. The acronyms and abbreviations might be different, but the concepts remain the same. That is why you don't have to be in the Army to read this as long as you don't get too wrapped up in the language of the Army.
There will be a return to emphasizing personal leader development throughout the Army in the next 5 to 10 years. The circumstances demand it. Thankfully, we have some leaders in the Army today who recognized this need and are already addressing it. If you follow my work at all, I routinely cite the work of Don Vandergriff, LTG Hertling, and recently, the ideas and comments of LTG Caslen and General Demspey because these are the people who are leading this process. I also hope that my thoughts here contribute a little to that discussion. It is now time for the rest of us to study what has been put out there, embrace the requirements of the next 25 years, and do everything in our power to ensure we provide the next generation of leaders the tools they need and a proper climate to prevail in the 'contest of wills' that is warfare.
The future is now. The development of one young Lieutenant, one young Noncommissioned officer, and one young Soldier is our responsibility. Done correctly, it will become our legacy. Done incorrectly, we will do a disservice to the nation.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. The blog gained an additional 120 viewers this week. I am grateful to everyone who follows it.
#90 The Professional Ethic vol. 1
A few weeks back in an earlier post, I attached a video from General Martin Dempsey, the commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, where he mentioned that 2011 was going to be "The Year of the Professional Military Ethic". He had determined that it might be time for the Army to revisit it's ethic - what it stands for, and how it operates; to ask what is it that makes us a profession in the first place? After almost a decade of war, the requirement to rapidly adjust the manner and method by which it has been prosecuted, and in the face of public scrutiny as to it's purpose, he has determined that the Army needs to take a look at itself and ask if we are living up to those requirements that grant us our special place in society. What does it mean to be the 'profession of arms'?
So, as usual, I went looking for source material and I came across a 1989 article by Mark S. Frankel from the American Association for the Advancement of Science entitled, "Professional Codes: Why? How? And With What Impact" which I think provides a great starting point for this post, and the overall discussion. There is almost no part of the article that didn't resonate with me. Although it is not specifically addressed toward the military, Mr. Frankel has provided a very appropriate framework for the discussion of any profession and this could certainly be used by the Army as we look at ourselves in the early part of the 21st century.
You can find the link here:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt675454l5j72v3h/fulltext.pdf
The first paragraph of the introduction says a lot about the changing conditions that we live in:
"Not too long ago, discussions of professional ethics were confined mainly within the professions themselves. This is no longer the case, however. In recent years, a blend of economic, social, legal, and political events has had a profound effect not only on the behavior and performance of professionals, but also on the public's expectations of them. The days of unquestioned trust and admiration on the part of clients or the general public are past."
This is an important consideration. In earlier periods, people had a rather blind faith in their institutions. There was an unspoken and comforting trust that the government was always looking out for the best interests of the citizenry. That the corporation would take care of you after you had given it 20 years of hard work and dedication. That if Walter Cronkite said the world was safe that night, then you could take it to the bank. There was comfort that the we were the 'good guys' and that America always worked altruistically to care for its' people. There was a faith that doctors were diligently working to stop the spread of disease, that the law always possessed some higher ideal of justice, and that our faith organizations were always centered on providing the moral framework by which we lead our lives.
Sadly, none of us are that naive anymore. We know that governments are no better than the people who inhabit them, that both doctors and lawyers keep a steady eye on their bottom line, and that faith organizations often have political agendas well beyond (and sometimes outside of) their moral and spiritual teachings.
The Army is no different. The Army as an institution is inhabited by people whose character and values are no better or no worse than the society that produces them. Due to the proliferation of technology and the availability of information, the institution is no longer allowed to be self-policing and immune from public scrutiny. The moral underpinnings of who we are as an Army, and how we define ourselves both inside the organization and with an eye toward our relationship with the nation have been tested by the requirements of the conflicts we are involved in. General Dempsey is correct, it is time to re-look our professional military ethic.
Consider the following paragraph from a paper entitled "The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict" written by Don Snyder, Paul Oh, and Kevin Toner in October 2009 and published by the Strategic Studies Institute:
"...Release in May 2007 of a Military Health Advisory Team (MHAT-IV) survey of fewer than 2,000 soldiers and Marines who had served in units with “the highest level of combat exposure” in Iraq found that: “approximately 10 percent of soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants or damaging property when it was not necessary. Only 47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Well over a third of all soldiers and Marines reported that torture should be allowed to save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine. And less than half of soldiers or Marines would report a team member for unethical behavior. Although Army doctrine (FM 3-24) specifies an embedded ethic that “preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment” in counterinsurgency, the survey reported that between one-third and one-half of soldiers and Marines who answered the survey dismissed the importance or truth of non-combatants’ dignity and respect."
While that paragraph is attributed in the monologue to an unpublished paper by Maj Celestino Perez, the statistics outlined in it should give us all pause for thought.
The SSI monologue can be found here and is well worth reading:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=895
What is it that makes us a profession and not a gang? What moral, social, behavioral, and structural constructs define us? What mechanisms do we have for policing ourselves and are they effective? What indicators do we have that our ethic is commonly understood by all our members? What method do we use to ensure their understanding? These are all incredibly important and complex questions but I do think that by using the two sources above we can begin to at least frame the discussion.
Since I generally concentrate my writing on the more personal aspects of leadership at the micro level, all of the above may seem to be an extremely long introduction to these ideas:
1. Servitude: We must make a distinction between the institution that serves the nation and the leader who serves the subordinate. They are not interchangeable. While the words we use may be similar, they have vastly different connotations. The dynamics of the interaction between the Army and the nation is structural while the interaction between a leader and the led is much more personal. I am not equipped or knowledgeable enough to understand the mechanics of how the institution works but I can speak to the servitude of leaders toward their subordinates. There must be a renewed sense in our officer and non-commissioned officer corps that a significant portion of a leader's responsibility is to serve their subordinates, not the other way around. This emphasis on servant leadership cannot only be that the individual leader is a servant of the organization or the nation, but that they fulfill that ideal by serving their subordinates.
2. Moral (Ethical) Development: The basis for any application of the warrior's professional skills must be rooted in the ethical and moral framework of the nation. The nation is our client. We need to understand what the nation expects of us and how we respond to it at the personal level. Our Soldiers need to be constantly exposed in training and every day encounters to morally ambiguous situations and forced to make decisions. Much like we practice the same battle drills and maneuvers over and over until we have mastered them, we should make moral and ethical decision making an imperative at all levels. Ethical decision games should share equal (or maybe even higher) footing with tactical decision games. Beating the enemy is easy. Beating the enemy in a manner consistent with the nation's ethical expectations is infinitely more difficult. Because we draw the members of our profession from all walks and stations of society, we must have some mechanism to impress our behavioral requirements and their importance upon our members. The Soldier must understand why and how their behavior as a professional has an impact on how we conduct our business and why those things must remain consistent with the nation's expectations. We must also accept that simply putting on the uniform and reciting an oath does not make one a professional. Only when we absorb the moral and behavioral understandings of the institution do we begin to move from employee to professional. From mercenary to warrior. Ethical decision making, consistent with our charter with the nation is arguably more important than our ability to fight. Without a binding set of acceptable norms and behaviors, we are nothing more than a federally sanctioned gang. What are those norms and behaviors? Are they relevant? Do they reflect the nation's needs? Are they real, or simply entrenched ideas from past generations?
3. The Institution vs Reality: Part of the discussion of any professional ethic must address the self-preservation inclination of the institution itself versus the relevancy of that institution to the current situation. You cannot call yourself a profession if the service you provide has no customer who desires and accepts it. Not only the product, but also the method of delivery. We will certainly need to look at ourselves and ask if our particular set of skills actually do provide the nation what it expects, or are we simply selling a product that the consumer does not want? Have we been oversold to the nation and had promises made on our behalf that we cannot live up to? Principle to that, we must claim as a virtue the requirement for open dialogue, disagreement, and learning as it applies to adaptation and agility. We must create climates that encourage transparency and if the structure doesn't support that, then the structure must be changed. When the needs of the consumer (the nation or the Soldier) are being addressed appropriately by the service provider (the Army, or the leader) in a manner of clear understanding and expectation, then respect and trust are gained. When they are not, the standing of any profession is diminished. In short, we and the nation must see ourselves clearly.
4. Individual Value: We must value each and every member of the profession. Everything we do, say, demonstrate and teach must begin with the recognition that the profession has a responsibility to develop and care for its' members. And since each member is unique, each method of development and caring must be as well. We must require, support, and enhance mental, moral, spiritual and physical growth. We need to hang our hat on the development of just one 18 year old kid.
Servant Leadership at the personal level, based upon a commonly understood ethical and moral construct, coupled with a valued recognition for candor, respect and dialogue, all of which is focused on the development of a citizen soldier into a professional warrior. Although the discussion is much more complex than that, this might be a good place to start.
I titled this post "The Professional Ethic vol. 1" for a reason. As this year progresses, I'm pretty sure there will be a couple more volumes to this series.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. I look forward to hearing from you.
So, as usual, I went looking for source material and I came across a 1989 article by Mark S. Frankel from the American Association for the Advancement of Science entitled, "Professional Codes: Why? How? And With What Impact" which I think provides a great starting point for this post, and the overall discussion. There is almost no part of the article that didn't resonate with me. Although it is not specifically addressed toward the military, Mr. Frankel has provided a very appropriate framework for the discussion of any profession and this could certainly be used by the Army as we look at ourselves in the early part of the 21st century.
You can find the link here:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt675454l5j72v3h/fulltext.pdf
The first paragraph of the introduction says a lot about the changing conditions that we live in:
"Not too long ago, discussions of professional ethics were confined mainly within the professions themselves. This is no longer the case, however. In recent years, a blend of economic, social, legal, and political events has had a profound effect not only on the behavior and performance of professionals, but also on the public's expectations of them. The days of unquestioned trust and admiration on the part of clients or the general public are past."
This is an important consideration. In earlier periods, people had a rather blind faith in their institutions. There was an unspoken and comforting trust that the government was always looking out for the best interests of the citizenry. That the corporation would take care of you after you had given it 20 years of hard work and dedication. That if Walter Cronkite said the world was safe that night, then you could take it to the bank. There was comfort that the we were the 'good guys' and that America always worked altruistically to care for its' people. There was a faith that doctors were diligently working to stop the spread of disease, that the law always possessed some higher ideal of justice, and that our faith organizations were always centered on providing the moral framework by which we lead our lives.
Sadly, none of us are that naive anymore. We know that governments are no better than the people who inhabit them, that both doctors and lawyers keep a steady eye on their bottom line, and that faith organizations often have political agendas well beyond (and sometimes outside of) their moral and spiritual teachings.
The Army is no different. The Army as an institution is inhabited by people whose character and values are no better or no worse than the society that produces them. Due to the proliferation of technology and the availability of information, the institution is no longer allowed to be self-policing and immune from public scrutiny. The moral underpinnings of who we are as an Army, and how we define ourselves both inside the organization and with an eye toward our relationship with the nation have been tested by the requirements of the conflicts we are involved in. General Dempsey is correct, it is time to re-look our professional military ethic.
Consider the following paragraph from a paper entitled "The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict" written by Don Snyder, Paul Oh, and Kevin Toner in October 2009 and published by the Strategic Studies Institute:
"...Release in May 2007 of a Military Health Advisory Team (MHAT-IV) survey of fewer than 2,000 soldiers and Marines who had served in units with “the highest level of combat exposure” in Iraq found that: “approximately 10 percent of soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants or damaging property when it was not necessary. Only 47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Well over a third of all soldiers and Marines reported that torture should be allowed to save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine. And less than half of soldiers or Marines would report a team member for unethical behavior. Although Army doctrine (FM 3-24) specifies an embedded ethic that “preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment” in counterinsurgency, the survey reported that between one-third and one-half of soldiers and Marines who answered the survey dismissed the importance or truth of non-combatants’ dignity and respect."
While that paragraph is attributed in the monologue to an unpublished paper by Maj Celestino Perez, the statistics outlined in it should give us all pause for thought.
The SSI monologue can be found here and is well worth reading:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=895
What is it that makes us a profession and not a gang? What moral, social, behavioral, and structural constructs define us? What mechanisms do we have for policing ourselves and are they effective? What indicators do we have that our ethic is commonly understood by all our members? What method do we use to ensure their understanding? These are all incredibly important and complex questions but I do think that by using the two sources above we can begin to at least frame the discussion.
Since I generally concentrate my writing on the more personal aspects of leadership at the micro level, all of the above may seem to be an extremely long introduction to these ideas:
1. Servitude: We must make a distinction between the institution that serves the nation and the leader who serves the subordinate. They are not interchangeable. While the words we use may be similar, they have vastly different connotations. The dynamics of the interaction between the Army and the nation is structural while the interaction between a leader and the led is much more personal. I am not equipped or knowledgeable enough to understand the mechanics of how the institution works but I can speak to the servitude of leaders toward their subordinates. There must be a renewed sense in our officer and non-commissioned officer corps that a significant portion of a leader's responsibility is to serve their subordinates, not the other way around. This emphasis on servant leadership cannot only be that the individual leader is a servant of the organization or the nation, but that they fulfill that ideal by serving their subordinates.
2. Moral (Ethical) Development: The basis for any application of the warrior's professional skills must be rooted in the ethical and moral framework of the nation. The nation is our client. We need to understand what the nation expects of us and how we respond to it at the personal level. Our Soldiers need to be constantly exposed in training and every day encounters to morally ambiguous situations and forced to make decisions. Much like we practice the same battle drills and maneuvers over and over until we have mastered them, we should make moral and ethical decision making an imperative at all levels. Ethical decision games should share equal (or maybe even higher) footing with tactical decision games. Beating the enemy is easy. Beating the enemy in a manner consistent with the nation's ethical expectations is infinitely more difficult. Because we draw the members of our profession from all walks and stations of society, we must have some mechanism to impress our behavioral requirements and their importance upon our members. The Soldier must understand why and how their behavior as a professional has an impact on how we conduct our business and why those things must remain consistent with the nation's expectations. We must also accept that simply putting on the uniform and reciting an oath does not make one a professional. Only when we absorb the moral and behavioral understandings of the institution do we begin to move from employee to professional. From mercenary to warrior. Ethical decision making, consistent with our charter with the nation is arguably more important than our ability to fight. Without a binding set of acceptable norms and behaviors, we are nothing more than a federally sanctioned gang. What are those norms and behaviors? Are they relevant? Do they reflect the nation's needs? Are they real, or simply entrenched ideas from past generations?
3. The Institution vs Reality: Part of the discussion of any professional ethic must address the self-preservation inclination of the institution itself versus the relevancy of that institution to the current situation. You cannot call yourself a profession if the service you provide has no customer who desires and accepts it. Not only the product, but also the method of delivery. We will certainly need to look at ourselves and ask if our particular set of skills actually do provide the nation what it expects, or are we simply selling a product that the consumer does not want? Have we been oversold to the nation and had promises made on our behalf that we cannot live up to? Principle to that, we must claim as a virtue the requirement for open dialogue, disagreement, and learning as it applies to adaptation and agility. We must create climates that encourage transparency and if the structure doesn't support that, then the structure must be changed. When the needs of the consumer (the nation or the Soldier) are being addressed appropriately by the service provider (the Army, or the leader) in a manner of clear understanding and expectation, then respect and trust are gained. When they are not, the standing of any profession is diminished. In short, we and the nation must see ourselves clearly.
4. Individual Value: We must value each and every member of the profession. Everything we do, say, demonstrate and teach must begin with the recognition that the profession has a responsibility to develop and care for its' members. And since each member is unique, each method of development and caring must be as well. We must require, support, and enhance mental, moral, spiritual and physical growth. We need to hang our hat on the development of just one 18 year old kid.
Servant Leadership at the personal level, based upon a commonly understood ethical and moral construct, coupled with a valued recognition for candor, respect and dialogue, all of which is focused on the development of a citizen soldier into a professional warrior. Although the discussion is much more complex than that, this might be a good place to start.
I titled this post "The Professional Ethic vol. 1" for a reason. As this year progresses, I'm pretty sure there will be a couple more volumes to this series.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. I look forward to hearing from you.
#89 A Craftsman's Touch
Throughout my Army career, there has always existed the idea that you can 'teach' leadership. All our schooling, both officer and non-commissioned officer, is centered around things that can be learned, memorized and then replicated. The teaching follows a very empirical, scientific and programmatic model. For example, I was raised to believe that there are essentially three types of leaders, directive, delagative, and combined. There were attributes and skills associated with each of the three types and the young NCO was supposed to be able to work with each of them as the situation required. Sometimes I would be required to be directive, sometimes I could be delagative and sometimes the task would require a mix of the two. The complexities of human behavior and interaction had been whittled down to 3 options. Of course, as brand new leaders, we were asked to describe which of those 3 options fit us best. Because no one likes extremes, most of us decided that we mostly worked in a combined manner but one that leaned heavily towards directive. I believe that this has a lot to do with a hidden realization that behaviorally Americans don't like, or respond well to autocratic people, but that the Army is in fact structured to support autocracy (which is clear and clean-cut) better than it supports the less clear forms of delegation or some variable combination of styles. Either way, a delagative style was not perceived to be a very strong option. You would hear a lot of, "I'm pretty directive with my Soldiers, they do what I tell them to do, when I tell them to do it." That statement would then be tempered with something like, "But if they already know the task, then I'll leave them alone and if there's a better way to do it then I'll let them try it." I still hear a lot of those same thoughts today from our youngest leaders. The concept of leadership in our Army is taught very clearly in analytical and scientific terms. Westerners like order, structure, and measurable outcomes. We prefer the assembly line over the craftsman. While there is an appreciation for the craftsman's skill and the beauty of his projects, there still remains the notion that his skill and the time it takes to produce one item is wasteful and that an assembly line approach will be better. I can sell one Rolls Royce, or I can sell one hundred Chevrolets.
This sort of assembly line model pervades everything we do. As soon as someone identifies a need for anything in the Army and that need is institutionally validated, the solution will be crafted in such a manner as to produce an outcome that can be replicated over and over. This is the whole notion of Task, Condition, and Standard. A need to train on this or that task is identified and validated. From that point an arbitrary condition will be created which will allow the developer to create a consistent measurable standard that can be applied uniformly across the entire Army spectrum. Every Soldier will be faced with this task, under these conditions, and be required to achieve this minimum standard. In fact, there is a whole subset of folks who work for the Army and their sole job in life is to develop the Tasks, the Conditions, and the Standards.
In light of this, I came across an article on the Small Wars Journal website last week by Col (Ret) Christopher Paparone entitled, "Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis" that caught my attention. You can find the link here:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/569-paparone.pdf
In general the article states that using an empirical scientific model, most conventional armies attempt to keep dissecting a problem into smaller and smaller bite-sized tasks (missions) that when stacked together become the building blocks that solve a strategic issue. The Soldier maintains his/her rifle. That rifle functions properly as the squad lays in an ambush position. The squad ambushes the enemy. The enemy is killed. The squad fulfills their portion of the platoon mission which fulfills their portion of the company mission, which fulfills their portion of the battalion mission etc until all those blocks together fulfill a national strategic objective. Col Paparone and others describe this as a "scientific method" or "empirical realism" view of problem solving. This is then compared/contrasted with a more personal, intuitive, and behavioral model which is termed "critical realism". The difference between the two as outlined in the article:
"From the viewpoint on left side of the continuum, tasks are ―mission-analyzable, that is they can be pre-programmed or planned. Organization theorist Charles Perrow called these types routine tasks (accomplished by standing, requisite organized capabilities—core competencies or, for the US military, ―METLs) and engineering (planning organized capabilities in combination—task organizations) tasks. Looking from the right side of the continuum, tasks are unpredictable and improvisational; hence, Perrow called these craftwork (the creative, improvisational use of already organized capabilities) or emergent (requiring the localized reforming into novel organizational entities) tasks."
Routine Tasks and Engineering Tasks vs Craftwork or Emergent Tasks
We lead human beings. Individual, emotive, thoughtful, distinct, people. No two are exactly the same. You cannot build an assembly line to produce the exact same model over and over. The 'scientific method' will not work when trying to influence people. People - and their development into leaders - is the work of the craftsman, not the stacking of thousands of parts that all come together to complete the aim of the organization.
This example might make more sense if you see the development of the leader as the 'strategic goal' of the mission. The institutional model of programmatic design stacks blocks on top of each other from the individual Soldier all the way up to the national interest, in the same manner that the scientific leader development model stacks finite options together to achieve some defined view of a 'leader'. What this scientific model leaves out are the idiosyncrasies and vagaries of person, the environment and the point in time that a leadership decision needs to be made.
This is a critically important realization. By using a 'scientific' quantifiable model of leader development we have essentially discarded a learning model that is much more well suited to creating thoughtful, adaptive, unique individual leaders with the skills, abilities and attributes we need for our current conflicts. I don't think most of our leader developers today see themselves as craftsman. They are more likely to view themselves as production line managers.
At this point I'd like you to go to the following link:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/11/the-last-patrol/8266
This article was sent to me this week by a colleague and it struck such a chord that I posted it to Facebook that night and it was picked up by BCKS the next day. Please be careful to both read the article and watch the video. The video will give people a really good view of some of the behaviors I was talking about in post #86, "One Clear Moment", but it should also make everyone consider the leadership methods were used in their own development and ask themselves whether or not those methods would work under the conditions described in the article. As powerful as the video is, the written portion is more important. Take the following paragraph:
"The day after the joint patrol, the 101st leadership met with Gerhart, Knollinger, Farnsworth, and Lachance for an after-action review, to discuss what had gone right and wrong during the mission. Gerhart flipped through index cards on which he’d prepared notes. His suggestions were sound—better hydration, classes on patrolling techniques and using radios, pre-patrol inspections of soldiers’ equipment—but his delivery was abrasive and accusatory. Why, he asked, had it taken the reinforcements from Combat Outpost Tynes six hours to show up after the first casualties were reported?
This sort of assembly line model pervades everything we do. As soon as someone identifies a need for anything in the Army and that need is institutionally validated, the solution will be crafted in such a manner as to produce an outcome that can be replicated over and over. This is the whole notion of Task, Condition, and Standard. A need to train on this or that task is identified and validated. From that point an arbitrary condition will be created which will allow the developer to create a consistent measurable standard that can be applied uniformly across the entire Army spectrum. Every Soldier will be faced with this task, under these conditions, and be required to achieve this minimum standard. In fact, there is a whole subset of folks who work for the Army and their sole job in life is to develop the Tasks, the Conditions, and the Standards.
In light of this, I came across an article on the Small Wars Journal website last week by Col (Ret) Christopher Paparone entitled, "Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis" that caught my attention. You can find the link here:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/569-paparone.pdf
In general the article states that using an empirical scientific model, most conventional armies attempt to keep dissecting a problem into smaller and smaller bite-sized tasks (missions) that when stacked together become the building blocks that solve a strategic issue. The Soldier maintains his/her rifle. That rifle functions properly as the squad lays in an ambush position. The squad ambushes the enemy. The enemy is killed. The squad fulfills their portion of the platoon mission which fulfills their portion of the company mission, which fulfills their portion of the battalion mission etc until all those blocks together fulfill a national strategic objective. Col Paparone and others describe this as a "scientific method" or "empirical realism" view of problem solving. This is then compared/contrasted with a more personal, intuitive, and behavioral model which is termed "critical realism". The difference between the two as outlined in the article:
"From the viewpoint on left side of the continuum, tasks are ―mission-analyzable, that is they can be pre-programmed or planned. Organization theorist Charles Perrow called these types routine tasks (accomplished by standing, requisite organized capabilities—core competencies or, for the US military, ―METLs) and engineering (planning organized capabilities in combination—task organizations) tasks. Looking from the right side of the continuum, tasks are unpredictable and improvisational; hence, Perrow called these craftwork (the creative, improvisational use of already organized capabilities) or emergent (requiring the localized reforming into novel organizational entities) tasks."
Routine Tasks and Engineering Tasks vs Craftwork or Emergent Tasks
We lead human beings. Individual, emotive, thoughtful, distinct, people. No two are exactly the same. You cannot build an assembly line to produce the exact same model over and over. The 'scientific method' will not work when trying to influence people. People - and their development into leaders - is the work of the craftsman, not the stacking of thousands of parts that all come together to complete the aim of the organization.
This example might make more sense if you see the development of the leader as the 'strategic goal' of the mission. The institutional model of programmatic design stacks blocks on top of each other from the individual Soldier all the way up to the national interest, in the same manner that the scientific leader development model stacks finite options together to achieve some defined view of a 'leader'. What this scientific model leaves out are the idiosyncrasies and vagaries of person, the environment and the point in time that a leadership decision needs to be made.
This is a critically important realization. By using a 'scientific' quantifiable model of leader development we have essentially discarded a learning model that is much more well suited to creating thoughtful, adaptive, unique individual leaders with the skills, abilities and attributes we need for our current conflicts. I don't think most of our leader developers today see themselves as craftsman. They are more likely to view themselves as production line managers.
At this point I'd like you to go to the following link:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/11/the-last-patrol/8266
This article was sent to me this week by a colleague and it struck such a chord that I posted it to Facebook that night and it was picked up by BCKS the next day. Please be careful to both read the article and watch the video. The video will give people a really good view of some of the behaviors I was talking about in post #86, "One Clear Moment", but it should also make everyone consider the leadership methods were used in their own development and ask themselves whether or not those methods would work under the conditions described in the article. As powerful as the video is, the written portion is more important. Take the following paragraph:
"The day after the joint patrol, the 101st leadership met with Gerhart, Knollinger, Farnsworth, and Lachance for an after-action review, to discuss what had gone right and wrong during the mission. Gerhart flipped through index cards on which he’d prepared notes. His suggestions were sound—better hydration, classes on patrolling techniques and using radios, pre-patrol inspections of soldiers’ equipment—but his delivery was abrasive and accusatory. Why, he asked, had it taken the reinforcements from Combat Outpost Tynes six hours to show up after the first casualties were reported?
The IED threat was extreme, Tom Banister, the new unit’s first sergeant, said, and he hadn’t wanted to risk more heat casualties while trying to reach the compound on foot. So they ended up waiting for helicopters.
“I guess I’m just used to being out there with hard-charging guys,” Gerhart said.
Since arriving at Tynes, Banister had found himself in the bizarre situation of deferring to men who weren’t yet born when he’d joined the Army, 24 years earlier. He accepted that his and his soldiers’ learning curve was steep. But he couldn’t tolerate Gerhart’s near-constant impertinence, and the general condescension from the 82nd paratroopers toward their replacements. “We appreciate all you guys have done, we really do,” he said. “What I don’t appreciate, what gives me the ass, is your holier-than-thou attitude that we’re incompetent and unprepared for this mission. Roger. I got that. We’re a field artillery unit tasked with an infantry job. Are we going to take casualties? Hell yeah, we are. We know that.” His vocal cords tightened with emotion. He paused. “Don’t count us out,” he said. “We’re a fighting force. We’re not going to leave you hanging. We evacuated our guys, but we brought you 20 more.”
This is only one example from a very powerful piece about why leader development needs to take a much less 'scientific' approach and a much more 'craftsman' approach. For every reason laid out in a schoolhouse that 1SG Banister should have crushed SSG Gerhart's action and attitude, it is only his absolute appreciation of the immense challenges faced by this young leader that prevented him from doing so. He had to choose. The option for a directive style based upon seniority and rank was always available to him. But his ability to recognize that using that approach would not advance anything was critically more important. This speaks volumes about judgment, recognition, respect, value, candor, honesty and real vs perceived power than almost anything else I've read lately. At age 22, SSG Gerhart has seen things that many will never see in a lifetime. He is "One Clear Moment" personified. For Banister to understand that reveals a lot. And none of those revealing things were taught in any leader school he attended. I guarantee it. I've been to those same schools. Banister's ability to read, recognize, respect and move through what could have been a horrible interchange speaks volumes about the craft of leadership and acts as a powerful message about the need to replace in our schoolhouses task driven, black and white, yes or no approaches and start to replace them with an artist's perception, a craftsman's feel for how our leader development programs should be tailored. Gerhart wasn't even born when Banister joined the Army. Their exchange exemplifies what happens when everything else gets stripped away. They were dealing from a position of mutual respect and trust. Two guys, worlds apart trying to accomplish a mission. There is a lot of craftsmanship involved.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#88 It Seems So Simple
Yesterday on Facebook I came across a link to a video presentation by COL (Ret) Jim Helis of the U.S. Army War College given on September 8, 2010, entitled "An Introduction to Clausewitz". I decided to watch it to see what is being taught at the Army's premier senior leader development school. If you are interested you can find the link to the video here:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AA8PUzLcacs
(If for some reason, the link doesn't work, you can go to You Tube and type US Army War College into the search bar. The video will be towards the top of the page.)
Toward the end of Dr. Helis' presentation there are a series of slides that seek to clarify Clausewitz's theories in bullet form. With regard to the role of theory, Clausewitz said:
"Theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that, as it were, have become confused and entangled."
"Theory is used to educate the mind of the commander."
"Theory is used to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry."
The next slide outlined Clausewitz's thoughts on all previous military theory...
"Previous attempts at theory are absolutely useless." "They aim at fixed values, but in war everything is uncertain."
"Dominance of psychological forces and effects."
"War is a continuous interaction of opposites." In the final slide that caught my eye, Dr. Helis outlined some key ideas of Clausewitian theory.
"War is an instrument of policy." "Battle is the decisive means in war which is "An act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." "Friction and fog are inevitable, which together can bring chance and uncertainty into play."
A final bullet that caught my attention was the idea that in war there exists a "Play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam"
What struck me about these quotations is how simple they are. "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" Well, duh! What else would it be? "Friction and fog are inevitable, which together bring chance and uncertainty into play." Welcome to my everyday life! These quotes seemed almost self-evident to me and seemed to beg the question why is Clausewitz considered one of the greatest military theorists of all time? This stuff is pretty obvious. And then it struck me. Like any other scientific theory, the beauty of Clausewitz may lie precisely in it's simplicity and universal appeal. He is speaking much more to the art of observation, consideration and thought and much less to the science of maneuver, mass and structure.
So then I started to turn the idea of simplicity towards leadership. Could it be that leadership is not really all that hard after all? Maybe all we need to look for are the basic principles of leadership and accept that the manner and method is really just technique. Has the Army confused leadership with management and tried to replace the dynamic environment of human interaction with the structural environment of institutional management? Maybe, like Clausewitz stated we could use theory "to clarify concepts that have become confused and entangled." Consider these ideas....
1. You lead people. You manage structures. (Seems pretty obvious)
2. In leading people, there must be an understanding that due to individual free will, there will always be friction, uncertainty, psychological interaction and chance. (This is an intuitive understanding that people do not really think about.)
Pretty simple ideas actually, but they are both layered with complexities that deserve a lot more consideration. For example, the recognition that leadership happens on human terrain, while management happens on structural terrain. If you take that idea and look at the Army or any other large entity, one thing you will find is an effort to impose the structure and it's ethics and norms, on the human terrain. We call it order and discipline. It is, at it's core, a restriction of individual free will by the structure in order to increase efficiency. Willful or not, the structure works against free will. The quest for an orderly structure - the perfect system - works against the the development of individual people. Almost our entire military education system is built upon learning how to manage the structure, not lead the people.
Take the second thought, that in order to lead people there must be an awareness and understanding that they retain some level of individual free will and because of that there will always be confrontations of interaction, uncertainty of understanding and the ability to take advantage of chance and circumstance. This is leadership completely independent of the organizational structure.
I think these ideas are pretty important. As I have mentioned in the last couple of posts, some very senior Army leaders are starting to look at how we lead. The idea that, as Gen Dempsey stated, "There are weak signals out there." Maybe some of our ideas on leadership have become overly confused and entangled but there is beginning to be an awareness that our concentration on structure and roles has had a significant impact on the people. If you look at the Army leader development schools, at least the ones I have attended, they paid scant attention to the difference between leading people and managing structures. What the institution called 'leading' a squad, platoon, company etc was actually a series of classes on how to efficiently manage it. How to use this or that tool, program, or process, to increase it's efficiency and effectiveness. The study of the people was not part of the curriculum. More importantly, neither was the study of ourselves. There was an assumption that each of us was fully formed in our understanding of the human being that we are and the human beings that we led. There was no real recognition that all human beings retain some degree of free will that will effect their interaction with the structure and can lead to friction and confusion. The behavioral problems we are struggling with now may be a result of not providing titular leaders with the ability to recognize and deal with this friction.
To bring this idea forward, go back and look at a lot of the people issues I have been mentioning lately such as suicide, domestic violence, the allure of combat, drug and alcohol abuse etc. It seems to me that there is a possibility that we may be struggling with these human issues because almost all of our study and consideration has been on the structure of the institution and not the basic principle that we lead human beings who posses free will and individual orientations towards their world. Maybe if we spent more time looking at the basic premise that leadership is vastly different than management we could begin to effect some necessary changes that the institution is struggling with. Maybe these are Gen Dempsey's 'weak signals' and LTG Caslen's recognition of the need for candor.
Watch what happens when you replace some words in Clausewitz's theories: Leadership is the continuous interaction of opposites.
In leadership everything is uncertain.
The very first sentence of FM 1, "The Army" is, "First and foremost the Army is Soldiers." That is a very profound sentence because it recognizes the primacy of the human being and recognizes that without the people, there is no institution. We have a tendency to overlook that when we make statements such as "the Army is bigger than the individual." When we do that we are replacing the primacy of the person with the primacy of the institution and thereby rendering the opening line of FM 1 untrue. This has also led directly to the concentration in our leader development programs on the institution and not the people.
Free flowing thought: The Army is people...People possess free will and independent thought...Human interaction leads to the friction and fog of differing orientation's...Leadership may be the continuous interaction of those differing orientations...There must be a primacy of psychological understanding...The outcome of leadership at the human being level is uncertain...The structure imposes it's own force on the individual in the form of management.
If you accept the thoughts above, then the recognition that we need to change our 'leader' development strategies to do three things become clear. First, we need to separate leading and managing. Second, we need to accept that a significant portion of leadership is the recognition of the psychological forces that work upon the individual. Finally, there is need to study the area where human being leadership and institutional management intersect. The solution to most of our current struggles with behavioral issues is most likely hovering around this intersection.
As Clausewitz recognized, a theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused. While my thoughts above are not complete (and have likely added confusion, not clarifying it), they do meet certain criteria for a theory of leadership. They are universal and they are simple. What seems obvious on the surface however, is actually very nuanced and complex. By looking at the institution and its' effect on the people and then looking at the people themselves, and most critically by advancing our self-study and orientation, we can likely gain a wider understanding of leadership and it's applications in a dynamic world.
As always, your thought and comments are welcome.
(If for some reason, the link doesn't work, you can go to You Tube and type US Army War College into the search bar. The video will be towards the top of the page.)
Toward the end of Dr. Helis' presentation there are a series of slides that seek to clarify Clausewitz's theories in bullet form. With regard to the role of theory, Clausewitz said:
"Theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that, as it were, have become confused and entangled."
"Theory is used to educate the mind of the commander."
"Theory is used to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry."
The next slide outlined Clausewitz's thoughts on all previous military theory...
"Dominance of psychological forces and effects."
"War is a continuous interaction of opposites."
"War is an instrument of policy."
A final bullet that caught my attention was the idea that in war there exists a "Play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam"
What struck me about these quotations is how simple they are. "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" Well, duh! What else would it be? "Friction and fog are inevitable, which together bring chance and uncertainty into play." Welcome to my everyday life! These quotes seemed almost self-evident to me and seemed to beg the question why is Clausewitz considered one of the greatest military theorists of all time? This stuff is pretty obvious. And then it struck me. Like any other scientific theory, the beauty of Clausewitz may lie precisely in it's simplicity and universal appeal. He is speaking much more to the art of observation, consideration and thought and much less to the science of maneuver, mass and structure.
So then I started to turn the idea of simplicity towards leadership. Could it be that leadership
1. You lead people. You manage structures. (Seems pretty obvious)
2. In leading people, there must be an understanding that due to individual free will, there will always be friction, uncertainty, psychological interaction and chance. (This is an intuitive understanding that people do not really think about.)
Pretty simple ideas actually, but they are both layered with complexities that deserve a lot more consideration. For example, the recognition that leadership happens on human terrain, while management happens on structural terrain. If you take that idea and look at the Army or any other large entity, one thing you will find is an effort to impose the structure and it's ethics and norms, on the human terrain. We call it order and discipline. It is, at it's core, a restriction of individual free will by the structure in order to increase efficiency. Willful or not, the structure works against free will. The quest for an orderly structure - the perfect system - works against the the development of individual people. Almost our entire military education system is built upon learning how to manage the structure, not lead the people.
Take the second thought, that in order to lead people there must be an awareness and understanding that they retain some level of individual free will and because of that there will always be confrontations of interaction, uncertainty of understanding and the ability to take advantage of chance and circumstance. This is leadership completely independent of the organizational structure.
I think these ideas are pretty important. As I have mentioned in the last couple of posts, some very senior Army leaders are starting to look at how we lead. The idea that, as Gen Dempsey stated, "There are weak signals out there." Maybe some of our ideas on leadership have become overly confused and entangled but there is beginning to be an awareness that our concentration on structure and roles has had a significant impact on the people.
To bring this idea forward, go back and look at a lot of the people issues I have been mentioning lately such as suicide, domestic violence, the allure of combat, drug and alcohol abuse etc. It seems to me that there is a possibility that we may be struggling with these human issues because almost all of our study and consideration has been on the structure of the institution and not the basic principle that we lead human beings who posses free will and individual orientations towards their world. Maybe if we spent more time looking at the basic premise that leadership is vastly different than management we could begin to effect some necessary changes that the institution is struggling with. Maybe these are Gen Dempsey's 'weak signals' and LTG Caslen's recognition of the need for candor.
Watch what happens when you replace some words in Clausewitz's theories:
In leadership everything is uncertain.
The very first sentence of FM 1, "The Army" is, "First and foremost the Army is Soldiers." That is a very profound sentence because it recognizes the primacy of the human being and recognizes that without the people, there is no institution. We have a tendency to overlook that when we make statements such as "the Army is bigger than the individual." When we do that we are replacing the primacy of the person with the primacy of the institution and thereby rendering the opening line of FM 1 untrue. This has also led directly to the concentration in our leader development programs on the institution and not the people.
Free flowing thought: The Army is people...People possess free will and independent thought...Human interaction leads to the friction and fog of differing orientation's...Leadership may be the continuous interaction of those differing orientations...There must be a primacy of psychological understanding...The outcome of leadership at the human being level is uncertain...The structure imposes it's own force on the individual in the form of management.
If you accept the thoughts above, then the recognition that we need to change our 'leader' development strategies to do three things become clear. First, we need to separate leading and managing. Second, we need to accept that a significant portion of leadership is the recognition of the psychological forces that work upon the individual. Finally, there is need to study the area where human being leadership and institutional management intersect. The solution to most of our current struggles with behavioral issues is most likely hovering around this intersection.
As Clausewitz recognized, a theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused. While my thoughts above are not complete (and have likely added confusion, not clarifying it), they do meet certain criteria for a theory of leadership. They are universal and they are simple. What seems obvious on the surface however, is actually very nuanced and complex. By looking at the institution and its' effect on the people and then looking at the people themselves, and most critically by advancing our self-study and orientation, we can likely gain a wider understanding of leadership and it's applications in a dynamic world.
As always, your thought and comments are welcome.
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