In 1989, Max DePree authored a book entitled "Leadership is an Art". I picked it up this morning and randomly opened to a page and found the following quote:
"Roving leaders are those indispensable people in our lives who are there when we need them. Roving leaders take charge in varying degrees in many companies every day. More than simple initiative, roving leadership is a key element in the day-to-day expression of a participative process. Participation is the opportunity and responsibility to have a say in your job, to have influence over the management of organizational resources based on your own competence and your willingness to accept problem ownership. No one person is the 'expert' at everything. In many organizations there are two kinds of leaders, both hierarchical leaders and roving leaders. In special situations, the hierarchical leader is obligated to identify the roving leader and then support and follow him or her, and also exhibit the grace that enables the roving leader to lead. It's not easy to else take the lead. To do this demands a special openness and the ability to recognize what is best for the organization and how best to respond to a given issue. Roving leadership is an issue-oriented idea. Roving leadership is the expression of the ability of hierarchical leaders to permit others to share ownership of problems - in effect, to take possession of a situation."
Obviously, the Army is very much a hierarchical organization. By history and necessity its' rank and organization structure creates lines of authority and delegations of responsibility. There has to be a chain of command through which the vision or intent of the organization is achieved. Anything that is comprised of over a million people and expends over 500 billion dollars annually of the nations resources demands some form of structure to keep it moving forward. I am not advocating the removal of the chain of command, nor of the rank structure.
However, I think DePree's paragraph above is very instructive for today's Army and the types of wars we are currently waging. There has been a lot of talk over the past 10 years about decentralization and the empowerment of junior leaders to make decisions based upon the situation they are facing. You often hear of it as the 'Strategic Corporal'. The title alone implies and understanding that on the modern battlefield, in a counterinsurgency war, in an age of instant communication and relentless political punditry, there is a recognition that the actions of one person, in charge of a fire team or squad can have a critical impact on the perception and outcome of the larger national goals.
The question then becomes, how do you blend the hierarchical structure of the chain of command with the recognition that many critical decisions will actually be made by people very far down on the organizational ladder? How do we recognize, grow, and develop the 'Strategic Corporal' without losing the recognized need for structure? Are these two types of leadership styles mutually exclusive, or is it possible to bring them together in a manner that moves the entire organization forward toward achieving it's goals?
I believe that not only is it possible to successfully blend the 2, I think it is absolutely critical that we retain and develop talent in both the hierarchical and roving styles simultaneously. In order to do that however, will probably take some reprioritizing of the current manner of leader development. Here are my thoughts on how to bring these 2 parts together:
1. Start with an emphasis on the Values and institutional Ethos of the organization. For both the hierarchical leader and the roving one, an understanding of the shared Values, Ethos, and Norms sets the framework for success. Both groups remain bound by all 3.
2. Place human being development in the form of trust, responsibility and situational ownership as the first priority at every level. From the moment a Soldier joins the Army there should be problems for him or her to solve that develop trust and confidence and force them to accept and take individual responsibility for themselves, and their decision making process. I think this is beginning to happen in some of our commissioning and Initial Entry training centers right now, through the work of AWG, Don Vandergriff, COL Casey Haskins and others. Developing young Soldiers and leaders are being trusted and allowed to take ownership of a problem and then develop solutions to that problem. If you think about it for a second, the idea of Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E) is to grow roving leaders; people who are capable of understanding the diverse effects of their decisions on a strategic level. By removing institutional roadblocks and keeping the Values, Ethos and Norms ever present, OBT&E develops a Soldier who absorbs the character of the Army, possesses the ability to act accordingly and can think three dimensionally on the modern battlefield.
3. Connect the bottom and the top. Many times throughout this blog I have brought up the idea that the top must value the input of those at the bottom. Since roving leadership is much more likely to be exercised in numbers by people at the bottom of the chain of command, the top of the chain has to ensure that the 'rovers' posses a clear sense of the mission, it's purpose, the intended outcome and their piece in its' success. We are starting to see a lot of this right now as Gen McChrystal and other senior Army leaders are trying to communicate to the bottom most members of the Army and are by-passing a lot of the middle of the hierarchy to do it. Blogs started by the Vice Chief of Staff, the AKO information sharing websites, using modern technology to communicate strategic reasoning, all of these things are examples of the empowerment of the roving leader at the point of impact by the hierarchical leader high in the organization.
As part of the 3 week program that I am in charge of that prepares Soldiers for deployment, one of our events is a driving lane that presents the Soldiers with practice in convoy operations, IED awareness and response drills, and a rudimentary look at operating in a COIN environment. The last time we did this training, we simply drove the students in along a route and then simulated them getting hit with an IED. They really didn't get much from it. After the first week, I challenged my subordinates to build a more comprehensive holistic event that would demonstrate to the Soldier the complexities and ambiguities of operating in a COIN environment. (The hierarchical leader sets the goal). I did not tell them what to do. I simply let them develop the scenario and trusted that they could do it. (Establishing trust and empowerment and reinforcing the Values, Ethics and Norms of the institution).
Here is the operation they designed: The mission for the students would be to deliver a Dr. and medical supplies to an Afghan village. The village elders and women were in need of medical care and their various illnesses were preventing them from attending council meetings where they could get needed government assistance to aid in their development. There were insurgent groups in the area who knew of the planned MEDCAP. Although IED activity had been low recently, the announcement of the operation might increase the threat. Once they got to the village, they would then have to find a way to assess what medical care was needed and to provide what assistance they could.
Now lets pull the mission apart:
1. The Dr. on the mission was a woman in order to provide assistance to female villagers. Effect: For US forces this changed a behavioral paradigm by emphasising the strategic importance of providing non-lethal forms of influence. The idea that a woman Dr. was the reason for the patrol in the first place, and that her safe delivery was the expected outcome forced decisions to be made that are outside of normal military thought processes. This wasn't just a mission to hunt bad guys.
2. There was a recognition of the threat environment and previous training in IED awareness was emphasized because the threat is often unseen and random. Effect: Reinforces the idea of situational awareness and threat knowledge at the lowest level.
3. Cultural considerations had to be recognized. Requesting permission from the villae elder to enter the village and the recognition that Afghan women will not be seen and cannot be examined by male personnel. However, language barriers will be created if we do not have a female interpretor. Effect: Emphasize the importance of the political and power constructs that exist in Afghan tribal settings.
4. The lack of participation of the village elders in local council meetings has a strategic impact and must be addressed in order to limit the impact of insurgent forces on local activities. Effect: The strategic impact of enabling the village to connect to the central government in the region thereby helping to reduce the impact of Taliban forces in the area.
Overall, the training event was very successful from both the student and instructor standpoint. The instructors were able to build a mission based upon their considerable knowledge of COIN concepts and environmental understanding. They were given the freedom to operate in a manner that suited both the institutional priorities and the individual Soldier's knowledge requirements. At the very lowest level, the strategic lessons of Gen McChrystal and his intent were being implemented. Roving leadership embedded with hierarchical leadership connecting the bottom to the top in keeping with the Values, Ethics and Norms of the United States Army.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#61 Nouns, Verbs and Adjectives
If you spend enough time outside somebodies office in the Army, you will inevitably come across a stack of military journals and other professional reading material. It is our version of the 'coffee table' book. Something to flip through while waiting for your appointment.
Earlier this week I came upon the Jan-Feb 2009 edition of Military Review, a journal produced by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. In it I found an article by MAJ Jason Pape entitled "Reassessing Army Leadership in the 21st Century". The article won 2nd place in the MacArthur Writing Contest and can be found at the link below:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art012.pdf
In the very first paragraph I came across the following which, given the purpose of this blog, and my own thoughts, caught my eye.
"Despite efforts by leaders like retired General Eric Shinseki to evaluate leader development programs and then examine organizational culture as it affects leadership and leader development, our doctrine and practices remain deeply rooted in historical traditions and heavily biased by relatively sophomoric assumptions about what leadership is and how it is best practiced. We lack critical reflection on the subject—an appreciation of other ways to look at leadership and leader development. We need to understand why our leadership doctrine is the way it is rather than simply what it is. "
I couldn't agree more with those statements. For many reasons, most of which I have outlined in other posts, I believe that we are at a defining period in the manner in which the Army thinks about itself, it's place in the greater national dialogue, and the methods we will use to prepare leaders for a rapidly paced and uncertain future. Maj Pape's opening assertions that our current organizational, historical, and educational approaches to leader development are lacking, and that the Army needs to look at what 21st century leader requirements are is a critical first step for preparing for the multi-faceted challenges we will face.
A little later in the introduction, MAJ Pape lays out what he believes the Army currently lacks in it's leader development programs:
"Furthermore, descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22’s discussion of leadership. Fundamentally, the Army lacks the following:
(1) Critical reflection on our assumptions about leadership.
(2) Appropriate emphasis on leadership as a skill and subject that needs to be continually discussed and developed throughout the Army.
(3) Consistency of what we espouse for leadership when looking at our practice, systems, and doctrine across the Army at large."
In another posting on AKO, I opened a discussion by stating that leadership is intensely personal and we each exercise it in our own manner. Because the Army calls every sergeant and higher a 'leader', in essence we have assigned each person a very important title, but have not necessarily provided them the appropriate tools, skills, or understandings required by the title itself.
I think that in order to have a discussion like this, one almost has to look at the word 'leader' as three separate things. A noun, an adjective, and a verb. As a noun, it becomes the person who is in charge (the title). As an adjective it expands it's scope and feel a little bit to include the viewpoint of others (a set of qualities and behaviors observable by others). He or she will be defined by others as a good or bad leader. As a verb, it becomes the vehicle through which the mission and vision get accomplished (The engine).
Part of the Army's problem with leader development is that it often confuses or juxtaposes the word leader with the word manager. MAJ Pape alludes to this when he states that, "Descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22's discussion of leadership." In reality, very few people in the Army are actually serving as leaders. even those who might have what we term 'leadership positions'. Most are managers of assets. For example, in my current position, I am 'in charge' of 12 subordinates. I am termed the 'leader' of the organization. However, most of what I really do is the management of Soldiers through a proscribed system. I make decisions, but they are mostly in the realm of resource allocation (people, time or equipment) to ensure a professional outcome for the Soldier who goes through the program. These are skills that I have been taught over the course of my career. Because most of my formative Army education happened during the mid to late 90's when the Army was going through the 'zero defect' phase, I learned to become an extremely effective manager of assets. The right people and equipment, in the right place, at the right time. Make a list of what you need, put together an effective schedule and supervise the different parts until all the dominoes were in line. What that leaves out however is what happens after you hit the switch and the assets are put in motion. It is an efficiency model better suited to business than an army at war.
One of the outcomes of that development process was an emphasis on timeliness. Because the wars we were preparing to fight would rely on the synchronization of assets, the ability to bring differing parts together all at once became critical. Time became the big player. I still work that way. There is an old phrase that I grew up with that has stuck with me my whole career, "Ten minutes early beats two minutes late." I view time as a commodity just as much as bullets, water or food. The effectiveness of it's use is a measurable way to view my skills as the 'leader'.
My subordinates do not see it this way. They don't see the criticality of timeliness the same way I do. Their Army experience has been characterized by a slow paced, 'ground hog day' reality. COIN operations and the deployment experience is inherently inefficient. It's effectiveness cannot be measured using the western understanding of time as a commodity. If you get held up coming out of the motorpool on the day of a mission, you just slip the mission until the vehicle gets fixed, or pause the whole thing for 24 hours. No problem, the war will still be here tomorrow. They do not see this as a failure like I do. And no matter how efficient you are, or how prepared, you don't get to go home if you get everything done faster than the next guy. In fact, you'll probably end up having more stuff put on your plate. COIN operations require a much longer - almost glacial -view of time. It is not the critical factor that it once was. It has been replaced by the idea of slow, steady, progress characterized by pressure and perseverance rather than one highly focused shot. It is the equivalent of Muhammed Ali's famed 'rope a dope' versus a Mike Tyson knock out punch. Tyson was efficient. Especially if you viewed his fights in a dollars per minute manner. Ali was not as efficient, but is still considered by many to be the best fighter ever.
The efficiency model, institutionalized in the 90's and the cornerstone of my development, makes no sense to my Soldiers. There is no reason for them to count time as a resource, because tomorrow will look the same as today. They are not lazy, they just haven't developed in the same manner I did. And in many ways, their viewpoint is precisely the correct one to fully understand the current manner of waging war.
I also think that MAJ Pape's very first bullet above, "Critical reflections on our assumptions about leadership" is important. Most of you are probably getting tired of my continual emphasis on the world of the Millennial, but Pape's call for a reflection on our assumptions is in large part determined by the perceptions and requirements of our subordinates. I'm not sure why so many people don't seem to understand that how a leader is viewed through his/her subordinates understanding is absolutely critical to the success or failure of the unit. This promotes the idea of the leader as an adjective. Without presupposing that they do, assume for a second that my soldiers now term me a 'good' leader. What does that mean? It means that seen through their eyes, I posses skills, abilities, characteristics and judgement that they see merit in and may want to follow, learn from or emulate. Compare that with my platoon in Iraq who may not have (the majority did not) viewed me that way. Most saw me as a 'bad' leader. That means that they did not see any value in the skills, abilities, characteristics and judgements I possessed. Therefore, they did not want to follow, learn from or emulate me in any manner. The leader as the adjective is much more reliant upon the views and understandings of his/her subordinates than is the leader as the noun. The noun is the title, the adjective becomes the person.
The third part is the leader as the verb. As the vehicle through which the vision of the organization is executed. Again, and especially in the non-commissioned officer corps, we spend little to no time studying this. This is where OODA is so vitally important. If the Noun leader cannot understand, process, communicate or demonstrate the Verb because of built in filters and orientation, then the organization cannot advance. In the article, MAJ Pape is challenging our current orientation and attempting to outline how the institutional filters are getting in the way of successful leader development.
Pape's second point that leadership requires continual study and emphasis cannot be overstated. I believe that studying it and reflecting on it should be the major portion of the time spent in all leader development schools. Instead, we continue to teach 'check list' type items without opening the student to the understanding of those items and their importance and relevance to the leader as a noun, adjective, and verb. Further on in the article he points out that the Army's way of teaching leadership is often through biographical studies of former successful leaders. By studying them, or reading heroic vignettes, we hope by osmosis that the student will then attempt to emulate the former leader and potentially gain similar results. This is a completely flawed argument for several reasons. First context. All great leaders became that way at a particular point in time. Can we definitively state that George Washington would be a great leader today? Would Eisenhower, Patton, or Schwartzkoff? What allows great leaders to be great is their understanding and orientation at a particular place in time. Although exciting to read about in a biography, it has little relevance to the developing leader today. For example, consider COL Joshua Chamberlain in the battle of Little Round Top. Chamberlain exhorts his almost over-run 20th Maine Regiment into a bayonet charge to break the Rebel advance and secure the flank of the Union line at Gettysburg. I can promise you that he would never make that decision, nor would his troops follow that order, today. Time, circumstance, behaviors, and understandings are much too different. COL Chamberlain saved the Union army with his bold move, but beyond it's demonstration of bravery and tactical success, it has little relevance for study on today's battlefield. What does deserve study however, are the characteristics that Chamberlain possessed that earned him the respect of his soldiers. What did a professor from tiny Bowdoin college have that made men want to follow him, and believe in him? Chamberlain the noun may or may not have been any good. Chamberlain the verb possessed the vision to foresee what needed to be done. But it was Chamberlain the adjective that accomplished it.
Finally, Pape's last thought that there must be some common consensus regarding what we consider the necessary institutional requirements for successful leader development across the Army. In many ways, this has been the what a lot of my posts here have centered on. I believe we need a less 'institutional' approach in favor of a more 'personal' one. I think we need to make people who aspire to become leaders more of the Noun, Verb, Adjective portions of the word and how absolutely important their personal orientations will be to the outcomes. Obviously, there are others who will feel differently; that if we do that we are creating thousands upon thousands of individualized views of leadership and the organization requires a common operating system to ensure it's readiness. My contention here is that those thousands upon thousands of viewpoints already exist and are at play every day. What is not recognized is their impact on organizational health and viability.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
Earlier this week I came upon the Jan-Feb 2009 edition of Military Review, a journal produced by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. In it I found an article by MAJ Jason Pape entitled "Reassessing Army Leadership in the 21st Century". The article won 2nd place in the MacArthur Writing Contest and can be found at the link below:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art012.pdf
In the very first paragraph I came across the following which, given the purpose of this blog, and my own thoughts, caught my eye.
"Despite efforts by leaders like retired General Eric Shinseki to evaluate leader development programs and then examine organizational culture as it affects leadership and leader development, our doctrine and practices remain deeply rooted in historical traditions and heavily biased by relatively sophomoric assumptions about what leadership is and how it is best practiced. We lack critical reflection on the subject—an appreciation of other ways to look at leadership and leader development. We need to understand why our leadership doctrine is the way it is rather than simply what it is. "
I couldn't agree more with those statements. For many reasons, most of which I have outlined in other posts, I believe that we are at a defining period in the manner in which the Army thinks about itself, it's place in the greater national dialogue, and the methods we will use to prepare leaders for a rapidly paced and uncertain future. Maj Pape's opening assertions that our current organizational, historical, and educational approaches to leader development are lacking, and that the Army needs to look at what 21st century leader requirements are is a critical first step for preparing for the multi-faceted challenges we will face.
A little later in the introduction, MAJ Pape lays out what he believes the Army currently lacks in it's leader development programs:
"Furthermore, descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22’s discussion of leadership. Fundamentally, the Army lacks the following:
(1) Critical reflection on our assumptions about leadership.
(2) Appropriate emphasis on leadership as a skill and subject that needs to be continually discussed and developed throughout the Army.
(3) Consistency of what we espouse for leadership when looking at our practice, systems, and doctrine across the Army at large."
In another posting on AKO, I opened a discussion by stating that leadership is intensely personal and we each exercise it in our own manner. Because the Army calls every sergeant and higher a 'leader', in essence we have assigned each person a very important title, but have not necessarily provided them the appropriate tools, skills, or understandings required by the title itself.
I think that in order to have a discussion like this, one almost has to look at the word 'leader' as three separate things. A noun, an adjective, and a verb. As a noun, it becomes the person who is in charge (the title). As an adjective it expands it's scope and feel a little bit to include the viewpoint of others (a set of qualities and behaviors observable by others). He or she will be defined by others as a good or bad leader. As a verb, it becomes the vehicle through which the mission and vision get accomplished (The engine).
Part of the Army's problem with leader development is that it often confuses or juxtaposes the word leader with the word manager. MAJ Pape alludes to this when he states that, "Descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22's discussion of leadership." In reality, very few people in the Army are actually serving as leaders. even those who might have what we term 'leadership positions'. Most are managers of assets. For example, in my current position, I am 'in charge' of 12 subordinates. I am termed the 'leader' of the organization. However, most of what I really do is the management of Soldiers through a proscribed system. I make decisions, but they are mostly in the realm of resource allocation (people, time or equipment) to ensure a professional outcome for the Soldier who goes through the program. These are skills that I have been taught over the course of my career. Because most of my formative Army education happened during the mid to late 90's when the Army was going through the 'zero defect' phase, I learned to become an extremely effective manager of assets. The right people and equipment, in the right place, at the right time. Make a list of what you need, put together an effective schedule and supervise the different parts until all the dominoes were in line. What that leaves out however is what happens after you hit the switch and the assets are put in motion. It is an efficiency model better suited to business than an army at war.
One of the outcomes of that development process was an emphasis on timeliness. Because the wars we were preparing to fight would rely on the synchronization of assets, the ability to bring differing parts together all at once became critical. Time became the big player. I still work that way. There is an old phrase that I grew up with that has stuck with me my whole career, "Ten minutes early beats two minutes late." I view time as a commodity just as much as bullets, water or food. The effectiveness of it's use is a measurable way to view my skills as the 'leader'.
My subordinates do not see it this way. They don't see the criticality of timeliness the same way I do. Their Army experience has been characterized by a slow paced, 'ground hog day' reality. COIN operations and the deployment experience is inherently inefficient. It's effectiveness cannot be measured using the western understanding of time as a commodity. If you get held up coming out of the motorpool on the day of a mission, you just slip the mission until the vehicle gets fixed, or pause the whole thing for 24 hours. No problem, the war will still be here tomorrow. They do not see this as a failure like I do. And no matter how efficient you are, or how prepared, you don't get to go home if you get everything done faster than the next guy. In fact, you'll probably end up having more stuff put on your plate. COIN operations require a much longer - almost glacial -view of time. It is not the critical factor that it once was. It has been replaced by the idea of slow, steady, progress characterized by pressure and perseverance rather than one highly focused shot. It is the equivalent of Muhammed Ali's famed 'rope a dope' versus a Mike Tyson knock out punch. Tyson was efficient. Especially if you viewed his fights in a dollars per minute manner. Ali was not as efficient, but is still considered by many to be the best fighter ever.
The efficiency model, institutionalized in the 90's and the cornerstone of my development, makes no sense to my Soldiers. There is no reason for them to count time as a resource, because tomorrow will look the same as today. They are not lazy, they just haven't developed in the same manner I did. And in many ways, their viewpoint is precisely the correct one to fully understand the current manner of waging war.
I also think that MAJ Pape's very first bullet above, "Critical reflections on our assumptions about leadership" is important. Most of you are probably getting tired of my continual emphasis on the world of the Millennial, but Pape's call for a reflection on our assumptions is in large part determined by the perceptions and requirements of our subordinates. I'm not sure why so many people don't seem to understand that how a leader is viewed through his/her subordinates understanding is absolutely critical to the success or failure of the unit. This promotes the idea of the leader as an adjective. Without presupposing that they do, assume for a second that my soldiers now term me a 'good' leader. What does that mean? It means that seen through their eyes, I posses skills, abilities, characteristics and judgement that they see merit in and may want to follow, learn from or emulate. Compare that with my platoon in Iraq who may not have (the majority did not) viewed me that way. Most saw me as a 'bad' leader. That means that they did not see any value in the skills, abilities, characteristics and judgements I possessed. Therefore, they did not want to follow, learn from or emulate me in any manner. The leader as the adjective is much more reliant upon the views and understandings of his/her subordinates than is the leader as the noun. The noun is the title, the adjective becomes the person.
The third part is the leader as the verb. As the vehicle through which the vision of the organization is executed. Again, and especially in the non-commissioned officer corps, we spend little to no time studying this. This is where OODA is so vitally important. If the Noun leader cannot understand, process, communicate or demonstrate the Verb because of built in filters and orientation, then the organization cannot advance. In the article, MAJ Pape is challenging our current orientation and attempting to outline how the institutional filters are getting in the way of successful leader development.
Pape's second point that leadership requires continual study and emphasis cannot be overstated. I believe that studying it and reflecting on it should be the major portion of the time spent in all leader development schools. Instead, we continue to teach 'check list' type items without opening the student to the understanding of those items and their importance and relevance to the leader as a noun, adjective, and verb. Further on in the article he points out that the Army's way of teaching leadership is often through biographical studies of former successful leaders. By studying them, or reading heroic vignettes, we hope by osmosis that the student will then attempt to emulate the former leader and potentially gain similar results. This is a completely flawed argument for several reasons. First context. All great leaders became that way at a particular point in time. Can we definitively state that George Washington would be a great leader today? Would Eisenhower, Patton, or Schwartzkoff? What allows great leaders to be great is their understanding and orientation at a particular place in time. Although exciting to read about in a biography, it has little relevance to the developing leader today. For example, consider COL Joshua Chamberlain in the battle of Little Round Top. Chamberlain exhorts his almost over-run 20th Maine Regiment into a bayonet charge to break the Rebel advance and secure the flank of the Union line at Gettysburg. I can promise you that he would never make that decision, nor would his troops follow that order, today. Time, circumstance, behaviors, and understandings are much too different. COL Chamberlain saved the Union army with his bold move, but beyond it's demonstration of bravery and tactical success, it has little relevance for study on today's battlefield. What does deserve study however, are the characteristics that Chamberlain possessed that earned him the respect of his soldiers. What did a professor from tiny Bowdoin college have that made men want to follow him, and believe in him? Chamberlain the noun may or may not have been any good. Chamberlain the verb possessed the vision to foresee what needed to be done. But it was Chamberlain the adjective that accomplished it.
Finally, Pape's last thought that there must be some common consensus regarding what we consider the necessary institutional requirements for successful leader development across the Army. In many ways, this has been the what a lot of my posts here have centered on. I believe we need a less 'institutional' approach in favor of a more 'personal' one. I think we need to make people who aspire to become leaders more of the Noun, Verb, Adjective portions of the word and how absolutely important their personal orientations will be to the outcomes. Obviously, there are others who will feel differently; that if we do that we are creating thousands upon thousands of individualized views of leadership and the organization requires a common operating system to ensure it's readiness. My contention here is that those thousands upon thousands of viewpoints already exist and are at play every day. What is not recognized is their impact on organizational health and viability.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
#60 Changing the Way We Think
A little over a year ago, I had the opportunity to attend a two day session at Johns Hopkins University where the Asymetric Warfare Group was hosting a conference on Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E). One of the principle members of the conference was Maj (Ret) Don Vandergriff, the author of the book "Raising the Bar".
In response to post number #59, Don sent me a note the other day and asked me if I would post a link to an article he had written for the AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare. I am happy to do so, and would ask you to check it out at the link below:
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/LWP/Documents/LWP73_DominantLandForcesv2_04212010.pdf
For just a moment, I would like to comment on 1 particular section of Don's article, because it seems to me that if you understand what I have been saying with regard to OODA loops, then this paragraph makes perfect sense and validates that teaching or mentoring or getting Soldiers to understand the OODA concept is a critical step to developing the leaders we need - in all walks of life - for the 21st centuy world.
Consider the following from the introduction portion of the article:
"The challenge the Army faces today is not one of over-thinking situations; rather, it
is the failure to think clearly in situations that require sound judgment at junior levels,
and leadership’s hesitation to believe that juniors can or will think clearly. Soldiers
and junior leaders who are trained or conditioned to “look” at the situation—i.e., to
assess, exercise judgment and make decisions—are more decisive, deliberate and
correct in their actions. This is particularly important in the complex environment of
full-spectrum operations. The most important capability needed for the Army Future
Force may well be thinking Soldiers and junior leaders who seek after the “why” of a
situation, task or directive, to understand and make better use of the purpose behind
it. And the future is now."
OODA. Pure and simple. People who are "trained or conditioned to 'look' at the situation-i.e, to assess, exercise judgment and make decisions - are more decisive, deliberate and correct in their actions."
In response to post number #59, Don sent me a note the other day and asked me if I would post a link to an article he had written for the AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare. I am happy to do so, and would ask you to check it out at the link below:
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/LWP/Documents/LWP73_DominantLandForcesv2_04212010.pdf
For just a moment, I would like to comment on 1 particular section of Don's article, because it seems to me that if you understand what I have been saying with regard to OODA loops, then this paragraph makes perfect sense and validates that teaching or mentoring or getting Soldiers to understand the OODA concept is a critical step to developing the leaders we need - in all walks of life - for the 21st centuy world.
Consider the following from the introduction portion of the article:
"The challenge the Army faces today is not one of over-thinking situations; rather, it
is the failure to think clearly in situations that require sound judgment at junior levels,
and leadership’s hesitation to believe that juniors can or will think clearly. Soldiers
and junior leaders who are trained or conditioned to “look” at the situation—i.e., to
assess, exercise judgment and make decisions—are more decisive, deliberate and
correct in their actions. This is particularly important in the complex environment of
full-spectrum operations. The most important capability needed for the Army Future
Force may well be thinking Soldiers and junior leaders who seek after the “why” of a
situation, task or directive, to understand and make better use of the purpose behind
it. And the future is now."
OODA. Pure and simple. People who are "trained or conditioned to 'look' at the situation-i.e, to assess, exercise judgment and make decisions - are more decisive, deliberate and correct in their actions."
One sentence that succinctly defines why the OODA cycle is critical to leader development. The ability to 'look' at the situation equals both the Observe and Orient portions of the equation. A young leader must be able to rapidly see something happening, process what it's potential outcomes are and why it is occurring and then make a decision that will take advantage of the rapidly changing circumstanes to effect the desired result.
While I thoroughly agree with Don's assessment of both the problem, and the solution being offered, I personally believe that we must start this process with a much more thorough understanding of our personal Orientation. Without developing the individual's ability to see himself/herself accurately and then recognize where that Orientation is actually affecting how they view their environment, I believe we there is still the possibility to create negative outcomes based upon a faulty understanding of the operating environment.
My concerns notwithstanding, what this article points out to the rest of the Army is that OBT&E and the Adaptive Leader Methodology are the way the institution will effect leader training for years to come. It is encumbent upon the Operating Force to learn how this shift in training method will impact them, their units and their expectation of Soldiers. OBT&E breifings and workshops are available and anyone with an interest in creating a dynamic leader development program that translates into increased battlefield capability should avail themselves of these resources.
I want to thank Don for taking the time to read my postings. Along with the folks from the Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic, I believe that my place in the discussion is centered around the idea that OODA is a manner of thinking and acting at the individual level that has a place in leader training venues whether they are ethical, tactical, or global. We all live in a complex world. OODA, OBT&E, and ALM are critical ingredients for successful engagement in any forum.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#59 Three Perspectives
This has been an emotionally exhausting week. It has also been a defining one. One of those weeks that crystallizes very neatly many of the points concerning leadership, perception, and the arbitrary nature of human being interaction that I have tried to make at other times throughout the blog.
I received two different emails this week. They are completely opposite in tone and tenor, and yet both are incredibly important.
On Wednesday I received the first from a person who stated that in their opinion I was a complete leadership failure and that I (and others) were responsible for the rape and murders of the Al Janabis, and the death of three members of my platoon.
To be honest, I have always had an awareness that sentiments such as these existed, but to see the words on the page, to have someone finally say out loud what others have thought, to finally be confronted with the 'elephant in the room' was both relieving and frightening. There it was, the accusation that follows me around like a ghost everywhere I go: Fenlason failed and people died.
On Thursday, someone who I served with during that time sent me an email that contained the following: "I think that your leadership has really shaped who I am. I still talk about lessons I learned from you and try to impress them on my Soldiers. I only wish that I could understand how ahead of your time your guidance was. I consider you a friend."
That note came out of the blue and was completely unexpected. No member of 1st platoon from that period has ever reached out to me before. Coming on the heels of the one the night before, I was extremely grateful
As I have said before, I do not expect, nor do I want, any reader of this blog to jump to my defense or to attack either of these people. They have an absolute right to their opinions and their convictions. While I obviously disagree with the former and am grateful for the latter, the important part is that they represent both sides of the equation and raise interesting questions of perspective and perception. Neither of these folks are bad or evil people, they are simply trying to understand and come to grips with that time, much the same way I am. In fact, I have offered to continue a dialogue with both of them. I have no intention of trying to change any one's mind about me. What I am offering is another point of view - mine - to add to their understanding. Whether they choose to accept or reject my opinion is on them. My responsibility is to provide my recollections, my intentions, and my point of view. It might only serve to reaffirm their existing beliefs, or it might add information that changes something they previously believed. I cannot control that. However, I do feel that I have a responsibility to try my best to help them gain insight and understanding by offering my perceptions, my decisions, and my observations. That I feel is something that I have a moral obligation to do. Nobody will learn anything from this if we do not respectfully admit that each person is entitled to their own opinion and that it is only inside of that context will any moral or leadership lessons be learned.
Here then is the question: Is it possible that both of them are correct? If you look at the incident from one point of view, namely that I was in charge and horrible things happened and therefore I am responsible for the failure, then sure. But what of the other point of view? How do you measure that? A former Soldier of mine who now leads troops of his own, found leadership traits and behaviors that he respects, emulates, and has adapted to his own style.
If you start with the first reaction (you failed), then the second might seem naive and the continuation of failed leadership onto the next generation. If you start with the second reaction (you are good leader), then the first seems capricious and mean spirited. In a black and white world, get ready to cast your vote. Fenlason failed to lead, Fenlason is a good leader who was ahead of his time. Check box A or B.
The A or B scenario is why I keep returning to the idea that we must develop leaders who start with a very strong understanding of who they are and what they stand for. It is the only way to live with both sides of the equation. It would be too easy to jump up and scream at the person who thinks I failed and simply say you don't know what you're talking about. It would also be too easy to simply wrap myself up in the warm words sent by a former colleague. For my own health, to run from one side to the other would be a dangerous and futile game. I have to become comfortable with the idea that some people will always hold me responsible for the crimes that were committed and the death of 3 American Soldiers. I also have to become comfortable that there will be others who see value in the manner and method with which I led that platoon despite the atrocities and losses. I cannot tilt at the windmills on either side too strongly. I would lose myself running back and forth between the two. Without a sense of who I am, what I stand for, and the courage of my convictions I will either be crushed by the emotional weight of the consequences of failure, or become blissfully deluded that everyone sees the merit in the choices I made. I will not allow either to happen.
A few months back, a friend of mine brought up that in many of my posts I keep mentioning the word perception. That perception in many cases is stronger than reality because it is yours. It is how your brain interprets what you see and forms your understanding of your environment. It is the most personal thing you have, and because of that, it equals your truth. Not the truth, your truth. I very much agree with that statement but want to emphasize the idea that the truth is yours. This means that everyone has a different view of true. That implies that there is no absolute truth. There is no black and white. There are only shades of grey.
The Army does not recognize this in it's leader development programs. By offering nothing more than 7 Values and saying: "Here they are. Absorb them and live with them. Either you get them or you don't." By doing this, the institution is creating the black and white argument. A choice between A or B. And then situations like the one I faced come up and for the first time a young leader is forced to recognize that a third option really does exist. Grey is a color, and in fact, is the most prevalent one on the morality and values color wheel. For the institution to not recognize and study that does a disservice to all who would lead others. Especially if that leadership includes asking them to do things that might cost them their lives, or the lives of those they lead.
I have opened the correspondence with the person who believes I failed because I do not believe they are malintentioned. In fact, my belief is that they are struggling to come to their own understanding of the events and to come grips with what happened, why, and to be able to proceed with their life. I choose to trust their motives. There is inherent risk is this for me, but it allows me to gain understanding of how other people view the decisions I made. To find a closer view of the truth. Realizing that I will never gain complete understanding, I will at least gain a more complete one. The same can be said for the person who found something to respect in what I did. Their perceptions and understanding will also help move me one step closer to a better understanding. I am grateful for both of them because we do not live in a simple black and white world. Without being pushed, prodded and forced to study ourselves and our version of true, we will never grow.
Finally, a third person weighed in this week. Their perception is wholly different. They bought the book before they ever knew me and now have questions and thoughts about it, but worry that it will change the nature of our current relationship. Balancing what they read against what they see is challenging. Different parts of the book's representation of me and their interpretation of me keep bouncing into one another. Which is true? The book? Me? Maybe both?
Three perspectives. All valid. All fair. All personal. All true.
There are reasons I write each week. First, it is cathartic and helps me come to grips with the vagaries of leading human beings. Second, for those who read it, it is my contribution to leader development. As a nation at war, with young people being given extraordinary responsibility, I feel very strongly that we owe them a character development program that recognizes 'grey', and forces them to gain insight into themselves and their character. Without it, I am afraid that many more people will find themselves in situations such as mine. As the Army and the most public representation of America and her values, we owe them much more than that.
The offer to speak about this, to write about this, and to share my interpretations of the time and the circumstances remains open to all. If we do not study ourselves in times of tragedy, loss, and confusion we will never grow. Not as people. Not as the Army, and not as Americans.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
I received two different emails this week. They are completely opposite in tone and tenor, and yet both are incredibly important.
On Wednesday I received the first from a person who stated that in their opinion I was a complete leadership failure and that I (and others) were responsible for the rape and murders of the Al Janabis, and the death of three members of my platoon.
To be honest, I have always had an awareness that sentiments such as these existed, but to see the words on the page, to have someone finally say out loud what others have thought, to finally be confronted with the 'elephant in the room' was both relieving and frightening. There it was, the accusation that follows me around like a ghost everywhere I go: Fenlason failed and people died.
On Thursday, someone who I served with during that time sent me an email that contained the following: "I think that your leadership has really shaped who I am. I still talk about lessons I learned from you and try to impress them on my Soldiers. I only wish that I could understand how ahead of your time your guidance was. I consider you a friend."
That note came out of the blue and was completely unexpected. No member of 1st platoon from that period has ever reached out to me before. Coming on the heels of the one the night before, I was extremely grateful
As I have said before, I do not expect, nor do I want, any reader of this blog to jump to my defense or to attack either of these people. They have an absolute right to their opinions and their convictions. While I obviously disagree with the former and am grateful for the latter, the important part is that they represent both sides of the equation and raise interesting questions of perspective and perception. Neither of these folks are bad or evil people, they are simply trying to understand and come to grips with that time, much the same way I am. In fact, I have offered to continue a dialogue with both of them. I have no intention of trying to change any one's mind about me. What I am offering is another point of view - mine - to add to their understanding. Whether they choose to accept or reject my opinion is on them. My responsibility is to provide my recollections, my intentions, and my point of view. It might only serve to reaffirm their existing beliefs, or it might add information that changes something they previously believed. I cannot control that. However, I do feel that I have a responsibility to try my best to help them gain insight and understanding by offering my perceptions, my decisions, and my observations. That I feel is something that I have a moral obligation to do. Nobody will learn anything from this if we do not respectfully admit that each person is entitled to their own opinion and that it is only inside of that context will any moral or leadership lessons be learned.
Here then is the question: Is it possible that both of them are correct? If you look at the incident from one point of view, namely that I was in charge and horrible things happened and therefore I am responsible for the failure, then sure. But what of the other point of view? How do you measure that? A former Soldier of mine who now leads troops of his own, found leadership traits and behaviors that he respects, emulates, and has adapted to his own style.
If you start with the first reaction (you failed), then the second might seem naive and the continuation of failed leadership onto the next generation. If you start with the second reaction (you are good leader), then the first seems capricious and mean spirited. In a black and white world, get ready to cast your vote. Fenlason failed to lead, Fenlason is a good leader who was ahead of his time. Check box A or B.
The A or B scenario is why I keep returning to the idea that we must develop leaders who start with a very strong understanding of who they are and what they stand for. It is the only way to live with both sides of the equation. It would be too easy to jump up and scream at the person who thinks I failed and simply say you don't know what you're talking about. It would also be too easy to simply wrap myself up in the warm words sent by a former colleague. For my own health, to run from one side to the other would be a dangerous and futile game. I have to become comfortable with the idea that some people will always hold me responsible for the crimes that were committed and the death of 3 American Soldiers. I also have to become comfortable that there will be others who see value in the manner and method with which I led that platoon despite the atrocities and losses. I cannot tilt at the windmills on either side too strongly. I would lose myself running back and forth between the two. Without a sense of who I am, what I stand for, and the courage of my convictions I will either be crushed by the emotional weight of the consequences of failure, or become blissfully deluded that everyone sees the merit in the choices I made. I will not allow either to happen.
A few months back, a friend of mine brought up that in many of my posts I keep mentioning the word perception. That perception in many cases is stronger than reality because it is yours. It is how your brain interprets what you see and forms your understanding of your environment. It is the most personal thing you have, and because of that, it equals your truth. Not the truth, your truth. I very much agree with that statement but want to emphasize the idea that the truth is yours. This means that everyone has a different view of true. That implies that there is no absolute truth. There is no black and white. There are only shades of grey.
The Army does not recognize this in it's leader development programs. By offering nothing more than 7 Values and saying: "Here they are. Absorb them and live with them. Either you get them or you don't." By doing this, the institution is creating the black and white argument. A choice between A or B. And then situations like the one I faced come up and for the first time a young leader is forced to recognize that a third option really does exist. Grey is a color, and in fact, is the most prevalent one on the morality and values color wheel. For the institution to not recognize and study that does a disservice to all who would lead others. Especially if that leadership includes asking them to do things that might cost them their lives, or the lives of those they lead.
I have opened the correspondence with the person who believes I failed because I do not believe they are malintentioned. In fact, my belief is that they are struggling to come to their own understanding of the events and to come grips with what happened, why, and to be able to proceed with their life. I choose to trust their motives. There is inherent risk is this for me, but it allows me to gain understanding of how other people view the decisions I made. To find a closer view of the truth. Realizing that I will never gain complete understanding, I will at least gain a more complete one. The same can be said for the person who found something to respect in what I did. Their perceptions and understanding will also help move me one step closer to a better understanding. I am grateful for both of them because we do not live in a simple black and white world. Without being pushed, prodded and forced to study ourselves and our version of true, we will never grow.
Finally, a third person weighed in this week. Their perception is wholly different. They bought the book before they ever knew me and now have questions and thoughts about it, but worry that it will change the nature of our current relationship. Balancing what they read against what they see is challenging. Different parts of the book's representation of me and their interpretation of me keep bouncing into one another. Which is true? The book? Me? Maybe both?
Three perspectives. All valid. All fair. All personal. All true.
There are reasons I write each week. First, it is cathartic and helps me come to grips with the vagaries of leading human beings. Second, for those who read it, it is my contribution to leader development. As a nation at war, with young people being given extraordinary responsibility, I feel very strongly that we owe them a character development program that recognizes 'grey', and forces them to gain insight into themselves and their character. Without it, I am afraid that many more people will find themselves in situations such as mine. As the Army and the most public representation of America and her values, we owe them much more than that.
The offer to speak about this, to write about this, and to share my interpretations of the time and the circumstances remains open to all. If we do not study ourselves in times of tragedy, loss, and confusion we will never grow. Not as people. Not as the Army, and not as Americans.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#58 The Hardest Part
In his book "Americans At War", noted military historian Stephen Ambrose wrote the following when offering an historical perspective regarding the incident at My Lai during the Vietnam War:
"This is a painful task - to examine a side of war that is hard to face up to but is always there. When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, twenty years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you wish had never happened. This is a reality that stretches across time and across continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time of the ancient Greeks up to the present. My Lai was not an exception or an aberration. Atrocity is a part of war that needs to be recognized and discussed. It is not the job of historians to condemn or judge, but to describe, try to explain, and, even more so, attempt to understand.
In the case of My Lai, the question is who was responsible? Was it one person? Was it a bad platoon leader who was inadequately trained all his life, including by the Army and by his society? Was it that he just could not handle the responsibility, and he broke? Maybe it is as simple as that. I know a lot of Vietnam War veterans who would take very extreme action if they could get Lt. Calley in their hands. They blame him for besmirching their reputation and the reputation of the United States Army and the reputation of the American armed forces in Vietnam. Then there are others who say: "No, no, you can't blame Calley. What you need to do is look at the U.S. Army as a whole, the Army as an institution, the way the Army was fighting that war, and the things Westmoreland was demanding from his platoon leaders." The problem here is that you have the whole U.S. Army going berserk. Yet others would argue: "No, no, the Army is but a reflection of society, it was American society that made this happen. The racism that permeates all levels of American society is where you look for the cause of what happened at My Lai. It is America's sense of exceptionalism, America's self-appointed task of cleansing the world, that made My Lai happen." In this view, responsibility rests with society as a whole."
At the end of another paragraph a little further along, Ambrose finishes with the following:
"In combat, Soldiers are always afraid, always enraged, and very often seeking revenge."
In another place, he stated the following:
"A feature of the contemporary experience which seems to apply to My Lai is that men seldom see their enemy. In the nineteenth century, this was not so true."
Finally, at the very end of the chapter, Ambrose sums up his feelings in this way:
"One of the things that stands out about My Lai in my mind and makes it not only possible for me to live with it but to be once again proud of the institution that I have spent most of my life studying, the United States Army, was that the Army itself investigated the incident, made the investigation public and did it's best to punish the perpetrators of this outrage. I would defy anybody to name another army in the world that would do that."
As I read those opening paragraphs, I was overcome by a sense of, "Yes! Somebody finally gets it! This is exactly how I feel!" While My Lai has been long held as the model of unethical decision making, loss of control, and the singular importance of retaining one's core value system in the midst of combat, in reality, life on the ground is never quite so cut and dry.
As I have done before, I went back and substituted "Mahmudiyah Incident" in every place where Ambrose used My Lai, and re-read the paragraph. I have heard, and had, those very same arguments and questions over the last 4 years. Somehow it seems, 40 years later, and not a single thing has changed. My Lai and the Mahmudiyah incident both raise the same questions of responsibility, accountability, the behavior of men under extreme duress, the value system of the individual, the country, and the institution.
In the book "Black Hearts" the author very clearly chose to focus his efforts on the leadership aspect when searching for an answer to why those Soldiers committed that crime. Why did they decide to leave their post and go commit such a terrible act of violence on that family? He chose to find fault with the leadership, implying that personality struggles and conflicts throughout the battalion created conditions of extreme frustration and anger among the Soldiers and battalion leadership. By portraying the battalion commander as an extremely toxic leader, we get a ready-made villain for the remainder of the story. The truth however, is very much more complicated than that. That condition alone did not create the conditions of this tragedy.
As Ambrose succinctly pointed out, "In combat, men are always afraid, always enraged and very often seeking revenge." When you couple that with his later idea that in 21st century warfare - at least in Iraq and Afghanistan - Soldiers often do not see their enemy, a whole other line of reasoning is raised. When I am surrounded by a faceless enemy who blends in completely with the local populace and it is impossible to discern who is my friend and who isn't, the level of fear and anxiety rises exponentially. To maintain a super-human level of awareness in order to foresee every potential threat is exhausting work. You cannot sustain that indefinitely. I found that for me, I had to choose between believing everyone was friendly until proven otherwise, or the opposite, believing everyone was a threat until proven friendly. Most of my platoon chose the latter as their mode of operating and surviving their environment. By personality and inclination I chose the former. I cannot reconcile being at war and believing that everyone around me is the enemy. Certainly my Soldiers might find that naive, but in reality it is no more absurd than the opposite idea that everyone is trying to kill you. In fact, most people don't really give a damn about you and just want to get on with their lives. If you can help them with that, that's great. If not, go away and don't bother me. In any case, feeling as if you are surrounded by ghosts who wish to harm you and your friends creates a fear that is very difficult to explain. Logic and emotion crash headlong into each other day after day after day until you begin to question the very structure of your beliefs and reasoning. When I was young my father sent me a copy of a document called "The Desiderata". There is a line in it which has always stuck with me. "Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness." Can fear and loneliness create the condition for horrendous crime? Maybe, but then as Ambrose pointed out with regard to Vietnam, it would imply that crime and evil acts would be the norm rather than the exception. Every person in Iraq in 2005 - 2006 had to live under the same conditions my Soldiers did. So, why weren't crimes like these being committed every day?
And then there is the institution. The Army. Can we look to the Army to find accountability and responsibility when something happens that is so squarely outside the realm of believability? Certainly, as I have said before, nothing in my previous training had ever prepared me for the conditions I found myself in. I had never taken a class where the instructor said, "This is how you repair a platoon which has suffered the catastrophic loss of a third of it's leadership in 12 days and had it's home base burn to the ground. Step one do this. Step two do that." The idea that any institution can do 'teach' a prescribed response to every situation is ludicrous. The sheer number of potential responses is astronomical. But, did the Army fail? In a way I think it did because it taught prescribed responses instead of dynamic thought. It led me, and others, to believe that there was a 'correct' answer to every problem and clearly there is not. We have recognized that now and are taking steps in out training centers and commissioning sources to create adaptive and thinking Soldiers, but it will take time to weed out those of us who grew up in the proscribed response world in order to make room for the multi-tasker who is comfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty.
Finally, much like Ambrose, I remain proud of the organization for it's actions when the Mahmudiyah incident came to light. Knowing it would be a black-eye on the entire organization and feed the emotional political drama over the course of the war, the Army did not waiver and went forward with the investigations and prosecutions. While incredibly difficult to live through personally, the fact is that the Army did the right thing. And while the cynics might say that it was only trying to cover it's ass, the truth is that no matter why the Army took responsibility for these events, it did, and in doing so reaffirmed that they are an institution worthy of the trust of the people. To live up to it's charter with America, the Army must always be willing to look very hard at itself when there are lessons to be learned.
I am realizing now that I will never have a complete understanding of that time. That it will be something that happened in my life that I will carry as part of the whole story of Fenlason. There are lessons to be learned from it, tragedies and ruined lives to feel badly about, and triumphs of principle and decency to be honored. Trying to balance all of those things is the hardest part.
"This is a painful task - to examine a side of war that is hard to face up to but is always there. When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, twenty years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you wish had never happened. This is a reality that stretches across time and across continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time of the ancient Greeks up to the present. My Lai was not an exception or an aberration. Atrocity is a part of war that needs to be recognized and discussed. It is not the job of historians to condemn or judge, but to describe, try to explain, and, even more so, attempt to understand.
In the case of My Lai, the question is who was responsible? Was it one person? Was it a bad platoon leader who was inadequately trained all his life, including by the Army and by his society? Was it that he just could not handle the responsibility, and he broke? Maybe it is as simple as that. I know a lot of Vietnam War veterans who would take very extreme action if they could get Lt. Calley in their hands. They blame him for besmirching their reputation and the reputation of the United States Army and the reputation of the American armed forces in Vietnam. Then there are others who say: "No, no, you can't blame Calley. What you need to do is look at the U.S. Army as a whole, the Army as an institution, the way the Army was fighting that war, and the things Westmoreland was demanding from his platoon leaders." The problem here is that you have the whole U.S. Army going berserk. Yet others would argue: "No, no, the Army is but a reflection of society, it was American society that made this happen. The racism that permeates all levels of American society is where you look for the cause of what happened at My Lai. It is America's sense of exceptionalism, America's self-appointed task of cleansing the world, that made My Lai happen." In this view, responsibility rests with society as a whole."
At the end of another paragraph a little further along, Ambrose finishes with the following:
"In combat, Soldiers are always afraid, always enraged, and very often seeking revenge."
In another place, he stated the following:
"A feature of the contemporary experience which seems to apply to My Lai is that men seldom see their enemy. In the nineteenth century, this was not so true."
Finally, at the very end of the chapter, Ambrose sums up his feelings in this way:
"One of the things that stands out about My Lai in my mind and makes it not only possible for me to live with it but to be once again proud of the institution that I have spent most of my life studying, the United States Army, was that the Army itself investigated the incident, made the investigation public and did it's best to punish the perpetrators of this outrage. I would defy anybody to name another army in the world that would do that."
As I read those opening paragraphs, I was overcome by a sense of, "Yes! Somebody finally gets it! This is exactly how I feel!" While My Lai has been long held as the model of unethical decision making, loss of control, and the singular importance of retaining one's core value system in the midst of combat, in reality, life on the ground is never quite so cut and dry.
As I have done before, I went back and substituted "Mahmudiyah Incident" in every place where Ambrose used My Lai, and re-read the paragraph. I have heard, and had, those very same arguments and questions over the last 4 years. Somehow it seems, 40 years later, and not a single thing has changed. My Lai and the Mahmudiyah incident both raise the same questions of responsibility, accountability, the behavior of men under extreme duress, the value system of the individual, the country, and the institution.
In the book "Black Hearts" the author very clearly chose to focus his efforts on the leadership aspect when searching for an answer to why those Soldiers committed that crime. Why did they decide to leave their post and go commit such a terrible act of violence on that family? He chose to find fault with the leadership, implying that personality struggles and conflicts throughout the battalion created conditions of extreme frustration and anger among the Soldiers and battalion leadership. By portraying the battalion commander as an extremely toxic leader, we get a ready-made villain for the remainder of the story. The truth however, is very much more complicated than that. That condition alone did not create the conditions of this tragedy.
As Ambrose succinctly pointed out, "In combat, men are always afraid, always enraged and very often seeking revenge." When you couple that with his later idea that in 21st century warfare - at least in Iraq and Afghanistan - Soldiers often do not see their enemy, a whole other line of reasoning is raised. When I am surrounded by a faceless enemy who blends in completely with the local populace and it is impossible to discern who is my friend and who isn't, the level of fear and anxiety rises exponentially. To maintain a super-human level of awareness in order to foresee every potential threat is exhausting work. You cannot sustain that indefinitely. I found that for me, I had to choose between believing everyone was friendly until proven otherwise, or the opposite, believing everyone was a threat until proven friendly. Most of my platoon chose the latter as their mode of operating and surviving their environment. By personality and inclination I chose the former. I cannot reconcile being at war and believing that everyone around me is the enemy. Certainly my Soldiers might find that naive, but in reality it is no more absurd than the opposite idea that everyone is trying to kill you. In fact, most people don't really give a damn about you and just want to get on with their lives. If you can help them with that, that's great. If not, go away and don't bother me. In any case, feeling as if you are surrounded by ghosts who wish to harm you and your friends creates a fear that is very difficult to explain. Logic and emotion crash headlong into each other day after day after day until you begin to question the very structure of your beliefs and reasoning. When I was young my father sent me a copy of a document called "The Desiderata". There is a line in it which has always stuck with me. "Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness." Can fear and loneliness create the condition for horrendous crime? Maybe, but then as Ambrose pointed out with regard to Vietnam, it would imply that crime and evil acts would be the norm rather than the exception. Every person in Iraq in 2005 - 2006 had to live under the same conditions my Soldiers did. So, why weren't crimes like these being committed every day?
And then there is the institution. The Army. Can we look to the Army to find accountability and responsibility when something happens that is so squarely outside the realm of believability? Certainly, as I have said before, nothing in my previous training had ever prepared me for the conditions I found myself in. I had never taken a class where the instructor said, "This is how you repair a platoon which has suffered the catastrophic loss of a third of it's leadership in 12 days and had it's home base burn to the ground. Step one do this. Step two do that." The idea that any institution can do 'teach' a prescribed response to every situation is ludicrous. The sheer number of potential responses is astronomical. But, did the Army fail? In a way I think it did because it taught prescribed responses instead of dynamic thought. It led me, and others, to believe that there was a 'correct' answer to every problem and clearly there is not. We have recognized that now and are taking steps in out training centers and commissioning sources to create adaptive and thinking Soldiers, but it will take time to weed out those of us who grew up in the proscribed response world in order to make room for the multi-tasker who is comfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty.
Finally, much like Ambrose, I remain proud of the organization for it's actions when the Mahmudiyah incident came to light. Knowing it would be a black-eye on the entire organization and feed the emotional political drama over the course of the war, the Army did not waiver and went forward with the investigations and prosecutions. While incredibly difficult to live through personally, the fact is that the Army did the right thing. And while the cynics might say that it was only trying to cover it's ass, the truth is that no matter why the Army took responsibility for these events, it did, and in doing so reaffirmed that they are an institution worthy of the trust of the people. To live up to it's charter with America, the Army must always be willing to look very hard at itself when there are lessons to be learned.
I am realizing now that I will never have a complete understanding of that time. That it will be something that happened in my life that I will carry as part of the whole story of Fenlason. There are lessons to be learned from it, tragedies and ruined lives to feel badly about, and triumphs of principle and decency to be honored. Trying to balance all of those things is the hardest part.
#57 Mentorship
Two weeks ago over in the Army Knowledge On-line (AKO) blogosphere, a question was posted asking, "Where Have All the Mentors Gone?" I posted a response, as did a few others, but the post itself sat relatively idle for about a week.
Then suddenly, as a result of one of the AKO moderators moving the question to a larger forum, it blew up. Now there are 30 or more responses and the post has taken on a new life. I am glad to see that, since the ideas of leadership and mentorship are very closely related. They are not exactly the same, but share many similarities that should be examined in greater depth.
For me, the writing I do here and on AKO, and my approach to leading my small organization is probably much more mentor oriented than it is leader oriented. I see much of my role in the unit to be the passing along of my experiential knowledge to those who will lead the Army long after I choose to retire. (My Orientation). I'm not quite sure how they perceive this relationship though, because it cannot be denied that by positional authority and rank, they sort of don't have a choice as to whether or not they follow my suggestions. They might very well just see my long-winded homily's as nothing more than a boss who likes to hear himself talk. (Their Orientation). And for the sake of literary honesty, they wouldn't be the only ones. Just ask my family!
Since I was the first person to respond on the AKO site, my thoughts and ideas naturally framed some of the replies that followed. Here is what I originally posted:
"Sir -
In my opinion there are a couple of issues with the mentoring 'program' today.
First, successful mentoring happens in an environment where the mentee accepts and finds something in the mentor that they wish to emulate. It really is a bottom up process. If we try to do it from the top down, we will inevitably end up with a young NCO or officer who can't find any similarities between the mentoring they are requesting, and the mentoring they are receiving.
Second, I think that the amount of change that has taken place throughout the Army over the past 8 years has made mentoring difficult. Instead of a senior person knowing - and therefore passing along - what doctrine etc are all about, both groups are doing a significant amount of experiential learning on the fly. That makes knowledge sharing difficult because it's hard to say whether or not that knowledge has permanence, or is situationally and time dependant.
Third, we spend very little time mentoring people instead of positions. Someone who commanded a company or battalion 10 years ago is attempting to mentor someone who commands a company or battalion today. The emphasis is on the position, not the person. Interestingly, if you read most 'leadership' books by retired military however, they spend most of their time dealing with the people side of leadership. I do not mentor a Squad Leader or Platoon Leader, I actually mentor the person who fills that role. We have lost the ability to see each person as a unique individual who requires individual approaches to their leader development.
Fourth, the current generation of young leaders is significantly different from the last few due to the proliferation of technology. As the older generations are trying to catch up with the digital age, the younger generation has already passed them by. They think, act, communicate, process, and interact differently than their predecessors did. A lot of valuable information gets lost in translation.
Finally, I had a boss once who said to me, "The Army never taught me how to mentor someone." While that struck me as an absurd statement at the time, it does show that there is a generational gap between those whose Army experience has been to follow the directives of those above them and let the system tell them how to do things, and the generation of Soldiers who have come of age during a period of rapid change and advancement.
I have found that taking a very personalized approach and actively looking for the differences in interpretation has assisted me in becoming a mentor for others. By reaching out to them, hearing what they are saying, and validating their Army experience, I can then begin to discuss the human being who is trying to come of age in a rapidly changing Army. That is where mentoring can begin."
In response to that, I want to share some of the other thoughts that were posted along the way. They are important and point to some larger issues facing the organization:
Ron wrote:
"My philosophy is that partly because we are at war, partly because our military is becoming more and more "corporate" that we have become less about the traditions, customs and courtesies that make us unique as a profession. Most importantly, the changes are generational. As a Lieutenant in Germany in the mid-90's I and my fellow officers had to go to our BN CDR's house and present our personal cards, we had right-army nights, officer calls, dining in and dining out. My company commander in Bosnia took us out on the berm of the basecamp at night after patrols and smoked cigars with us and metered out his leadership philosophy. Incidentally, he was also the first - and sadly, last - to counsel me in writing on a quarterly basis for another ten years. I did not forget his efforts - which, incidentally - made me a better officer and leader."
Robert wrote:
"Concerning a commitment to mentoring. I would challenge that mentoring is occurring. It's happening every day on the streets of Baghdad and the mountains of Afghanistan. However, I think we should all carefully consider the warning that Jeff provides concerning mentoring people serving in positions and not people as professionals. Of course there is varying types of mentorship based on the need of the mentee. I assume the thread we are running is tied to job selection, promotion potential and leadership development. This should consume a majority of the mentors time...assisting mentees in enhancing self awareness and identifying where they can best contribute. I think most senior folks spend a good deal of time engaged in this on an informal level and most commonly when the mentee reaches out. I'm a believer that it works and should be fostered, not formalized, across the force."
Joyce wrote:
"I enjoyed reading all the comments and agree with the views presented. Why? Because we are probably all from the same generation - Baby boomers! The two to three generations that followed us have different values and concerns. No matter what, leadership responsibilities do include coaching and guiding the younger members of their team or unit. Why aren't leaders doing their job? (PS: I am a civilian and do not have military experience. I always thought the military leaders were the ones who set the example for us civilians.)"
Richard wrote:
"I think that all leaders are mentors whether they realize it or not, our actions or lack thereof set examples for others to follow. I believe I am mentoring my peers, superiors and subordinates every day I am very approachable and willing to assist in any way I can. I am approaching my 19th year of service, during these 19 years I have been privileged to work with/for good and bad leaders alike, their actions/words have been something I have carried along the way during my career."
Richard wrote:
"I'm wondering if perhaps part of the problem is a difference of perspective between mentor and mentee. For example, is the mentee consciously aware that he or she is being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is? Likewise, could some mentors have a different definition of mentorship? One might consider technical development to be mentorship while another focuses on personal development."
Tamara wrote:
"First that there is no longer a clear definition of what mentorship is. The responsibilities and expectations for both mentor and mentee are fuzzy at best. As someone else said earlier, it's lost in translation between generations.
Second that the younger generation is so in tuned with email, texting, Facebook, Twitter, the list goes on...that they don't know how to interact with the real people standing right next to them. I see this with my own kids. They've got their buddy sitting right next to them and rather than just talking to one another, they're sending text messages back and forth on their cell phones. (OOO they get mad when I confiscate the cell phones for using them that way. I've stolen their "coolness factor".) I think that this is also part of the problem with our suicide rates as well. The younger leaders don't know how to properly read body language, so they can't spot issues that need to be addressed quickly."
Eric wrote:
"The first thing we all need to do is define mentorship. I think a lot of people mix mentorship with leadership."
Jessica wrote:
"Mentoring is a special bond between a mentor and their mentee. This is a unique and special relationship because in order to become a mentor, you have to be chosen. I believe a person can only realistically mentor three people at any one time – anymore than that and you detract from the value of the mentor/mentee relationship. A mentor does not have to be from your same branch or organization (it’s often helpful if they are not a part of your organization so they can give fresh insight). To be an accomplished mentor, it takes time, effort, and commitment.
If you ask many of our junior NCOs and officers, they will tell you they’ve never been mentored. It seems to be a common theme. However, when you ask for more details, you discover, they haven’t initiated a mentor/mentee relationship. It is a bottom up driven function. Again, you must be chosen."
Here then are some of my follow-up thoughts. The Mentor/Mentee relationship is first and foremost, a bottom-up process. The subordinate seeks out a senior whom they believe possesses qualities, traits and abilities that they would like to emulate. Importantly, however, it must be the senior who creates the opportunity for that to happen. I have to open - and leave open - my door for a subordinate to knock on when they are ready. My responsibility is to create the opportunity, theirs is to seize it. I would also contend that in many cases the subordinates willingness to seize that opportunity will be mostly based upon their interpretation of me as a person, not because of position. This again, seems to highlight the absolutely critical aspect of 'whole person' development. They see me as more than a position, they are seeing me a man, a husband, a father, a son, a brother, a leader, a follower etc.
Second, I believe that accessability and day-to-day interaction within the organization are critical. As Richard asked in a quote above, "Is the mentee consciously aware that they are being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is?" This is an extremely important point, because I might believe that I am mentoring all the time, and if they have no awareness of it, then it might have significantly less value than I think it does. The same is true if they have a different expectation of what mentorship looks like. Again we go back to the idea of the human factors of OODA. My Orientation, and theirs must be at least similar with regard to the developmental environment. I must be aware that I might be perceived as a mentor - and then accept responsibility for protecting the relationship, and they must also be aware that mentoring is taking place and help me create the environment that best suits their ability to receive it.
Finally, it appears that I'm not the only one recognizing that generational differences have a lot to do with successful mentoring processes. I happen to think that this particular generation is significantly different from the preceding 2, but also believe that the large gap that exists right now will slowly close until the next hugely impactful sociological or technological advancement. Historical events such as the Industrial Revolution and the movement away from agrarian society, electricity, women's suffrage, the automobile, mass media etc all create generational bubbles that impact one generation significantly. Over the next 2 or 3 however that change becomes muted as those changes move from novelty to routine. I think it will be interesting to see how leadership and mentorship are affected when all 3 generations who serve in the Army grew up in some form of the digital age. Although I will certainly be too old to be aware of it then, I have a sneaky suspicion that when they are all technologically equal, they will still be looking to be mentored by those who share a common value system. At the end of the day, it will still be our need as human beings for personal growth and affirmation that will drive the Mentor/Mentee realtionship.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
Then suddenly, as a result of one of the AKO moderators moving the question to a larger forum, it blew up. Now there are 30 or more responses and the post has taken on a new life. I am glad to see that, since the ideas of leadership and mentorship are very closely related. They are not exactly the same, but share many similarities that should be examined in greater depth.
For me, the writing I do here and on AKO, and my approach to leading my small organization is probably much more mentor oriented than it is leader oriented. I see much of my role in the unit to be the passing along of my experiential knowledge to those who will lead the Army long after I choose to retire. (My Orientation). I'm not quite sure how they perceive this relationship though, because it cannot be denied that by positional authority and rank, they sort of don't have a choice as to whether or not they follow my suggestions. They might very well just see my long-winded homily's as nothing more than a boss who likes to hear himself talk. (Their Orientation). And for the sake of literary honesty, they wouldn't be the only ones. Just ask my family!
Since I was the first person to respond on the AKO site, my thoughts and ideas naturally framed some of the replies that followed. Here is what I originally posted:
"Sir -
In my opinion there are a couple of issues with the mentoring 'program' today.
First, successful mentoring happens in an environment where the mentee accepts and finds something in the mentor that they wish to emulate. It really is a bottom up process. If we try to do it from the top down, we will inevitably end up with a young NCO or officer who can't find any similarities between the mentoring they are requesting, and the mentoring they are receiving.
Second, I think that the amount of change that has taken place throughout the Army over the past 8 years has made mentoring difficult. Instead of a senior person knowing - and therefore passing along - what doctrine etc are all about, both groups are doing a significant amount of experiential learning on the fly. That makes knowledge sharing difficult because it's hard to say whether or not that knowledge has permanence, or is situationally and time dependant.
Third, we spend very little time mentoring people instead of positions. Someone who commanded a company or battalion 10 years ago is attempting to mentor someone who commands a company or battalion today. The emphasis is on the position, not the person. Interestingly, if you read most 'leadership' books by retired military however, they spend most of their time dealing with the people side of leadership. I do not mentor a Squad Leader or Platoon Leader, I actually mentor the person who fills that role. We have lost the ability to see each person as a unique individual who requires individual approaches to their leader development.
Fourth, the current generation of young leaders is significantly different from the last few due to the proliferation of technology. As the older generations are trying to catch up with the digital age, the younger generation has already passed them by. They think, act, communicate, process, and interact differently than their predecessors did. A lot of valuable information gets lost in translation.
Finally, I had a boss once who said to me, "The Army never taught me how to mentor someone." While that struck me as an absurd statement at the time, it does show that there is a generational gap between those whose Army experience has been to follow the directives of those above them and let the system tell them how to do things, and the generation of Soldiers who have come of age during a period of rapid change and advancement.
I have found that taking a very personalized approach and actively looking for the differences in interpretation has assisted me in becoming a mentor for others. By reaching out to them, hearing what they are saying, and validating their Army experience, I can then begin to discuss the human being who is trying to come of age in a rapidly changing Army. That is where mentoring can begin."
In response to that, I want to share some of the other thoughts that were posted along the way. They are important and point to some larger issues facing the organization:
Ron wrote:
"My philosophy is that partly because we are at war, partly because our military is becoming more and more "corporate" that we have become less about the traditions, customs and courtesies that make us unique as a profession. Most importantly, the changes are generational. As a Lieutenant in Germany in the mid-90's I and my fellow officers had to go to our BN CDR's house and present our personal cards, we had right-army nights, officer calls, dining in and dining out. My company commander in Bosnia took us out on the berm of the basecamp at night after patrols and smoked cigars with us and metered out his leadership philosophy. Incidentally, he was also the first - and sadly, last - to counsel me in writing on a quarterly basis for another ten years. I did not forget his efforts - which, incidentally - made me a better officer and leader."
Robert wrote:
"Concerning a commitment to mentoring. I would challenge that mentoring is occurring. It's happening every day on the streets of Baghdad and the mountains of Afghanistan. However, I think we should all carefully consider the warning that Jeff provides concerning mentoring people serving in positions and not people as professionals. Of course there is varying types of mentorship based on the need of the mentee. I assume the thread we are running is tied to job selection, promotion potential and leadership development. This should consume a majority of the mentors time...assisting mentees in enhancing self awareness and identifying where they can best contribute. I think most senior folks spend a good deal of time engaged in this on an informal level and most commonly when the mentee reaches out. I'm a believer that it works and should be fostered, not formalized, across the force."
Joyce wrote:
"I enjoyed reading all the comments and agree with the views presented. Why? Because we are probably all from the same generation - Baby boomers! The two to three generations that followed us have different values and concerns. No matter what, leadership responsibilities do include coaching and guiding the younger members of their team or unit. Why aren't leaders doing their job? (PS: I am a civilian and do not have military experience. I always thought the military leaders were the ones who set the example for us civilians.)"
Richard wrote:
"I think that all leaders are mentors whether they realize it or not, our actions or lack thereof set examples for others to follow. I believe I am mentoring my peers, superiors and subordinates every day I am very approachable and willing to assist in any way I can. I am approaching my 19th year of service, during these 19 years I have been privileged to work with/for good and bad leaders alike, their actions/words have been something I have carried along the way during my career."
Richard wrote:
"I'm wondering if perhaps part of the problem is a difference of perspective between mentor and mentee. For example, is the mentee consciously aware that he or she is being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is? Likewise, could some mentors have a different definition of mentorship? One might consider technical development to be mentorship while another focuses on personal development."
Tamara wrote:
"First that there is no longer a clear definition of what mentorship is. The responsibilities and expectations for both mentor and mentee are fuzzy at best. As someone else said earlier, it's lost in translation between generations.
Second that the younger generation is so in tuned with email, texting, Facebook, Twitter, the list goes on...that they don't know how to interact with the real people standing right next to them. I see this with my own kids. They've got their buddy sitting right next to them and rather than just talking to one another, they're sending text messages back and forth on their cell phones. (OOO they get mad when I confiscate the cell phones for using them that way. I've stolen their "coolness factor".) I think that this is also part of the problem with our suicide rates as well. The younger leaders don't know how to properly read body language, so they can't spot issues that need to be addressed quickly."
Eric wrote:
"The first thing we all need to do is define mentorship. I think a lot of people mix mentorship with leadership."
Jessica wrote:
"Mentoring is a special bond between a mentor and their mentee. This is a unique and special relationship because in order to become a mentor, you have to be chosen. I believe a person can only realistically mentor three people at any one time – anymore than that and you detract from the value of the mentor/mentee relationship. A mentor does not have to be from your same branch or organization (it’s often helpful if they are not a part of your organization so they can give fresh insight). To be an accomplished mentor, it takes time, effort, and commitment.
If you ask many of our junior NCOs and officers, they will tell you they’ve never been mentored. It seems to be a common theme. However, when you ask for more details, you discover, they haven’t initiated a mentor/mentee relationship. It is a bottom up driven function. Again, you must be chosen."
Here then are some of my follow-up thoughts. The Mentor/Mentee relationship is first and foremost, a bottom-up process. The subordinate seeks out a senior whom they believe possesses qualities, traits and abilities that they would like to emulate. Importantly, however, it must be the senior who creates the opportunity for that to happen. I have to open - and leave open - my door for a subordinate to knock on when they are ready. My responsibility is to create the opportunity, theirs is to seize it. I would also contend that in many cases the subordinates willingness to seize that opportunity will be mostly based upon their interpretation of me as a person, not because of position. This again, seems to highlight the absolutely critical aspect of 'whole person' development. They see me as more than a position, they are seeing me a man, a husband, a father, a son, a brother, a leader, a follower etc.
Second, I believe that accessability and day-to-day interaction within the organization are critical. As Richard asked in a quote above, "Is the mentee consciously aware that they are being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is?" This is an extremely important point, because I might believe that I am mentoring all the time, and if they have no awareness of it, then it might have significantly less value than I think it does. The same is true if they have a different expectation of what mentorship looks like. Again we go back to the idea of the human factors of OODA. My Orientation, and theirs must be at least similar with regard to the developmental environment. I must be aware that I might be perceived as a mentor - and then accept responsibility for protecting the relationship, and they must also be aware that mentoring is taking place and help me create the environment that best suits their ability to receive it.
Finally, it appears that I'm not the only one recognizing that generational differences have a lot to do with successful mentoring processes. I happen to think that this particular generation is significantly different from the preceding 2, but also believe that the large gap that exists right now will slowly close until the next hugely impactful sociological or technological advancement. Historical events such as the Industrial Revolution and the movement away from agrarian society, electricity, women's suffrage, the automobile, mass media etc all create generational bubbles that impact one generation significantly. Over the next 2 or 3 however that change becomes muted as those changes move from novelty to routine. I think it will be interesting to see how leadership and mentorship are affected when all 3 generations who serve in the Army grew up in some form of the digital age. Although I will certainly be too old to be aware of it then, I have a sneaky suspicion that when they are all technologically equal, they will still be looking to be mentored by those who share a common value system. At the end of the day, it will still be our need as human beings for personal growth and affirmation that will drive the Mentor/Mentee realtionship.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#56 OODA, COIN and Leadership
Since the 'Surge' in Iraq beginning in 2007, the Army has been involved in a counterinsurgency (COIN) in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Insurgent and counter insurgent warfare is an ages old type of war that is much more holistic than the traditional force-on-force warfare of WW II, or the expected large scale war that characterized the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Insurgent warfare does not follow the same 'playbook' that conventional war does and it very clearly demonstrated a vulnerability in the vaunted American military equipping and training paradigm. This vulnerability led to huge doctrinal shifts and prioritization of assets throughout the force. As such, and in trying to quickly figure out how to best prosecute this type of conflict, there has been a proliferation of written material throughout the force on successful methods and strategies etc for achieving success in a counterinsurgency.
I found one of those articles in the August - December issue of Infantry Magazine, It was entitled, "COIN Operations in Afghanistan" written by Captain Brad Israel. As I started to read it, I came across the following paragraph which immediately caught me eye:
"A unit’s leaders build relationships through constant interaction with the local populace and Afghan Forces. The establishment of a strong relationship requires more than just an occasional village visit; it requires that leaders get to know the people as individuals. The unit leadership should know the village elders’ names, their tribe, and their unique tribal history. I would also encourage leaders to learn the names of some of the children, local shop-keepers and farmers; they will provide useful information from time to time. The more locals recognize the leader as a familiar friend – one that is committed to them and not someone they or their children should fear – then the better the chance the leader has to build a bridge between the host nation government and its people. By genuinely listening to the people and addressing their concerns, leaders can actively facilitate relationship building. It is important that the unit, not just the leadership, act in kind.”
What leaped out at me as I read that was the idea that the requirements for successful interaction on the COIN battlefield are precisely the same types of requirements we have to address with regard to leadership and Soldier welfare.
Watch what happens when you change a few simple words throughout the paragraph.
“A unit’s leaders build relationships through constant interaction with the Soldiers. The establishment of a strong relationship requires more than just an occasional barracks visit; it requires that leaders get to know the people as individuals. The unit leadership should know the Soldier’s names, their background, and their unique personal history. I would also encourage leaders to learn the names of some of their children, their local environment; both will provide useful information from time to time. The more Soldiers recognize the leader as a familiar friend – one that is committed to them and not someone they or their families should fear – then the better the chance the leader has to build a bridge between the Army organization and its people. By genuinely listening to the Soldiers and addressing their concerns, leaders can actively facilitate relationship building. It is important that the whole unit, not just the leadership, act in kind.”
Same sentiment, same concept, same successful outcome. CPT Israel's article provides other units some very solid ideas on how to successfully interact with the local population in Afghanistan. Build relationships, establish trust, demonstrate commitment etc. There is an entire field manual dedicated to that and people are reading, digesting, arguing, and tearing it apart trying to figure out exactly the right way to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. The Army is literally spending millions of dollars a year to hire very knowledgeable people to come in and teach the 'How to do COIN' classes at every level of the organization from Private to General. In essence, we are acting as if COIN is something new and unknown to the organization. Something that we must learn how to do in order to win the war.
My contention is that we already have that manual and in many ways, we already know how to do this, it just requires a different Orientation. Consider this short paragraph from FM 6-22, Army Leadership:
"Many leaders connect at a personal level with their followers so they will be able to understand the individual's circumstances and needs. As discussed previously in the chapter, building relationships is one way to gain influence and commitment from followers. Knowing others is the basis that many successful leaders use to treat people well. It includes everything from making sure a Soldier has time for an annual dental exam, to finding out about a person's preferred hobbies and pastimes."
What these 3 paragraphs demonstrate is a perfect example of how OODA works and clearly outline why the ability to quickly adjust your Orientation to your environment is an absolutely critical leader tool. By adjusting leader Orientation what becomes obvious is that the COIN concepts that we are spending huge dollar amounts and massive amounts of time on, show up again in the 2nd paragraph where I substituted the word Soldiers in place of Afghans, and again in the Army leadership manual. In fact, all three paragraphs are exactly the same except for the ethnicity and the locale of the principle people involved. If Army leaders would follow CPT Israel's COIN advice when dealing with their own subordinates, I contend that we could very quickly begin to deal with some of the social and behavioral issues that are plaguing the Army today.
I then realized that both paragraphs also demonstrate the concept of 'winning hearts and minds' just with a different audience to be influenced. 'Hearts and minds' gained a rather negative connotation after the failure of US counterinsurgent operations during the Vietnam War, but in truth it is the only way to win against an insurgent. This type of warfare requires a short list of things that must be done in order to prevail. First, you must separate the enemy from the populace. Second, you must provide provide the populace the basic necessities of life. Third, you must create a governmental system capable of providing for and protecting the population. And finally, you must demonstrate to the population that their lives will be better without the insurgent than they are with. These things are not done quickly and require equal amounts of violence, compassion, iron-handedness, patience, understanding and care. It will often require that all of these actions be demonstrated at the same time.
Funny, but that sounds an awful lot like leadership to me....
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
I found one of those articles in the August - December issue of Infantry Magazine, It was entitled, "COIN Operations in Afghanistan" written by Captain Brad Israel. As I started to read it, I came across the following paragraph which immediately caught me eye:
"A unit’s leaders build relationships through constant interaction with the local populace and Afghan Forces. The establishment of a strong relationship requires more than just an occasional village visit; it requires that leaders get to know the people as individuals. The unit leadership should know the village elders’ names, their tribe, and their unique tribal history. I would also encourage leaders to learn the names of some of the children, local shop-keepers and farmers; they will provide useful information from time to time. The more locals recognize the leader as a familiar friend – one that is committed to them and not someone they or their children should fear – then the better the chance the leader has to build a bridge between the host nation government and its people. By genuinely listening to the people and addressing their concerns, leaders can actively facilitate relationship building. It is important that the unit, not just the leadership, act in kind.”
What leaped out at me as I read that was the idea that the requirements for successful interaction on the COIN battlefield are precisely the same types of requirements we have to address with regard to leadership and Soldier welfare.
Watch what happens when you change a few simple words throughout the paragraph.
“A unit’s leaders build relationships through constant interaction with the Soldiers. The establishment of a strong relationship requires more than just an occasional barracks visit; it requires that leaders get to know the people as individuals. The unit leadership should know the Soldier’s names, their background, and their unique personal history. I would also encourage leaders to learn the names of some of their children, their local environment; both will provide useful information from time to time. The more Soldiers recognize the leader as a familiar friend – one that is committed to them and not someone they or their families should fear – then the better the chance the leader has to build a bridge between the Army organization and its people. By genuinely listening to the Soldiers and addressing their concerns, leaders can actively facilitate relationship building. It is important that the whole unit, not just the leadership, act in kind.”
Same sentiment, same concept, same successful outcome. CPT Israel's article provides other units some very solid ideas on how to successfully interact with the local population in Afghanistan. Build relationships, establish trust, demonstrate commitment etc. There is an entire field manual dedicated to that and people are reading, digesting, arguing, and tearing it apart trying to figure out exactly the right way to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. The Army is literally spending millions of dollars a year to hire very knowledgeable people to come in and teach the 'How to do COIN' classes at every level of the organization from Private to General. In essence, we are acting as if COIN is something new and unknown to the organization. Something that we must learn how to do in order to win the war.
My contention is that we already have that manual and in many ways, we already know how to do this, it just requires a different Orientation. Consider this short paragraph from FM 6-22, Army Leadership:
"Many leaders connect at a personal level with their followers so they will be able to understand the individual's circumstances and needs. As discussed previously in the chapter, building relationships is one way to gain influence and commitment from followers. Knowing others is the basis that many successful leaders use to treat people well. It includes everything from making sure a Soldier has time for an annual dental exam, to finding out about a person's preferred hobbies and pastimes."
What these 3 paragraphs demonstrate is a perfect example of how OODA works and clearly outline why the ability to quickly adjust your Orientation to your environment is an absolutely critical leader tool. By adjusting leader Orientation what becomes obvious is that the COIN concepts that we are spending huge dollar amounts and massive amounts of time on, show up again in the 2nd paragraph where I substituted the word Soldiers in place of Afghans, and again in the Army leadership manual. In fact, all three paragraphs are exactly the same except for the ethnicity and the locale of the principle people involved. If Army leaders would follow CPT Israel's COIN advice when dealing with their own subordinates, I contend that we could very quickly begin to deal with some of the social and behavioral issues that are plaguing the Army today.
I then realized that both paragraphs also demonstrate the concept of 'winning hearts and minds' just with a different audience to be influenced. 'Hearts and minds' gained a rather negative connotation after the failure of US counterinsurgent operations during the Vietnam War, but in truth it is the only way to win against an insurgent. This type of warfare requires a short list of things that must be done in order to prevail. First, you must separate the enemy from the populace. Second, you must provide provide the populace the basic necessities of life. Third, you must create a governmental system capable of providing for and protecting the population. And finally, you must demonstrate to the population that their lives will be better without the insurgent than they are with. These things are not done quickly and require equal amounts of violence, compassion, iron-handedness, patience, understanding and care. It will often require that all of these actions be demonstrated at the same time.
Funny, but that sounds an awful lot like leadership to me....
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#55 A Follow-Up
I have a few follow-up thoughts from both last week's post and the reply by JH. Although I wasn't really considering continuing this line of ideas regarding Post #53, two separate incidents have spurred a connecting line of thought that might be worth exploring.
The idea of the leader as an anchor has really struck a chord with me this week. I hadn't thought of the person or the position that way before. Probably because the Army definition of leadership concentrates around providing "Purpose, direction and motivation..." but doesn't spend much time talking about providing a place - and a face - for relationships, trust and a shelter from the storm.
First, from JH's post, the idea that Millennial's have very little faith in the institutions that surround them since almost from their youth they have seen nothing but scandal from their supposed heroes. Whether in government, sports, or entertainment, not a day goes by without some new form of scandalous behavior played out in an almost real-time news cycle. Couple that with the disintegration of the two parent household that became prevalent in the 1980's and you get a generation with no one to look up to, or respect. They have been let down, in many cases, by the very things that they were told are bedrock qualities of American life - namely faith in family, faith in government, faith in community and the idea that, in America, your dream to someday be a big league ball player can come true just by hard work and dedication. If only it were so. They just don't believe in Mom, Dad, apple pie, Chevrolet, and the American way. That just hasn't been their experience. Theirs has been quite the opposite.
Consider this: In their lifetimes, Millennial's have witnessed a public circumventing of the law in the Iran Contra hearings played out for weeks on television, a president impeached for lying and the public humiliation of having had an affair, the supreme court decide an election in which the guy with the most votes didn't win on a constitutional technicality that most people didn't understand, and a war started and prosecuted under faulty information and assumptions. A war in which many of their friends have either been killed or maimed. They had their faith in sports heroes dashed when the challenges to Roger Maris' single season home run record were found to be based on performance enhancing drug use. Remember when Mark McGuire and Sammy Sosa were both chasing that record? Remember the excitement when the boys of summer were having a good time and there was excitement in waiting to see who would launch the next great shot out of the park? Remember when baseball became fun? When a ritual of the American summer made a triumphant return to glory? Turns out it was all an illusion. They had cheated and let us all down. Remember Olympic athlete Marion Jones? We were all so proud of her accomplishments.....Just another message that you cannot trust what is not right in front of you. Our hero's lives all become just as tawdry and cheap as our own.
JH summed this idea up very well when he wrote:
"There is a cultural realization that, “I can no longer trust outside of myself to help define who I am, because if I do, I will soon realize I was anchored in something false and unstable. The Millennial Generation has turned to the only thing certain to be real, themselves."
And so they trust themselves. And pretty much only themselves and others of their generation. They don't give damn about your institution, or your history, or your heraldry. They enter the world with their eyes set firmly on protecting and providing for the one thing they do trust. Themselves. And we contributed to that. As we adults watched our own lives slip into pettiness and disarray, we came together around the idea that this would not happen to our children. So we did everything we could to affirm their sense of individual identity, goodness and hope. They would be better than we were. If everything else in the world was hope less, we would make sure that they were individually hope full.
And that the outcome of that may be evidenced by something that another reader sent me this week. Check out the link below:
http://news.discovery.com/human/narcissism-epidemic-college-students.html
What the article states is that this is the most narcissistic and self absorbed generation ever. There are 3 paragraphs in the article that caught my eye. They are:
"Narcissism has increased among Americans over the past 15 years, a joint study from San Diego State University (SDSU) and the University of South Alabama has concluded. The results suggest that the United States is poised to experience social problems as younger narcissists age and move into positions of power."
and
"These traits include an unfounded sense of entitlement and overly high self-regard. "
and
"What this means is that we have generations of people entering the workforce that expect special treatment, are demanding of others and making risky decisions."
I have said many times before throughout my writings, that the struggle right now in the Army is one of basic trust. Anyone who calls themselves a leader or holds any form of leadership position must make a concerted effort to gain, or regain, the trust of their subordinates. It is not a given. We will have to make a large investment of time - on a person to person level, to establish that bond between the leader and the led. It is not natural for them to trust that institution will take care of them. All their learning and experiences say otherwise. Blind faith will not come easily. In fact, if you ever can get to a point where your subordinates have blind faith in your decisions, I would contend that it will be because of the amount of time and energy you put into gaining their trust and affirmation.
Here then is the circle: The Millennial is raised with a heightened sense of self-worth and a loss of traditional anchoring points of faith. They then grow up believing in their individual sense of their world and find others of their generation who feel the same way. They are no longer tied to the older generation's definitions of success and value. They define themselves in the context of a global economy, the web, and instant processing of information. If it resonates with them locally, they grab ahold of it - as a point of self-definition. If not, they let it slide by without acknowledging it's presence. They believe they are unique and different from any generation before them. That they have value. That they are equal. And that you should accept them as such.
And then they join the Army or any other large organization. They run into the top-down, hierarchy that says that you must start at the bottom and pay your dues. They run into structure and the nuances of human behavior, ego, power, toxic leadership and position. And they become disenfranchised very very quickly. In their eyes, it is just another example of the institution letting them down. This great and wonderful thing called the United States Army that supposedly represents the absolute pinnacle of the essence of being an American, honor, integrity, and service, is filled with people no better than their parents, communities, sports stars and government.
Interestingly though, I have read somewhere that Millennials are the first generation to select their parents as their role models. I can't remember where I saw that, but consider for a second what it means. They have come to respect Mom and Dad, not for their failings, but rather for their trying to provide as well as they could for their children. They may not like everything their parents did, or how they lived their lives, but they do give them credit for trying. And that is a very common trait among them. They want credit just for trying. Not for winning, not for being the best - in fact they often don't really seem to care - they want credit just for being on the field.
As we try to lead them, it seems to me that we first need to acknowledge these central points of their Orientation. As I have said before, if we don't we will miss each other in translation. We may be using the same words, but they will have much different interpretations. Once we overcome the language problem, the next step will be to provide a local face to an institutional idea. If we want them to be loyal to the country, and the Army, we will first have to demonstrate our loyalty to them. If we want them to espouse all the Army values, they will first have to be demonstrated by us to them. Locally, person-to-person. We will have to work to prove that not only does the institution value them, but that they too can place their faith in the institution. Their development might come more slowly. They will have to learn that sometimes simply being on the field isn't good enough. Sometimes you must win. Regardless of the cost. That there are things out there that are larger and more important than their individual wants and needs. And that if you lose, you cannot say, "Well, at least I tried." That you must get better until you do win. While that may seem like an obvious statement to previous generations, it may not be that way for this one.
In order to do these things, here is what I think must happen at the senior levels of the Army.
First, there must be an acknowledgement that this generation is a pivotal one, much like any generation where social dynamics are changed dramatically by technological advancement. We simply cannot underestimate the critical importance of global communications and information expansion. Second, we have to look beyond corporate responses and develop more personal ones to help them reorient to their Army world in a way that helps connect their individualism to the larger ethic of the organization. Third, we need constantly place the values requirements in front of them. The values need to be part of every class, training event, and daily integration. That is the only way to make the larger themes have a local impact. Finally, we have to develop the strength of character that makes losing unacceptable and honorable winning the only imaginable result.
Earlier this past week I gave a presentation on OODA loops in the Human Dimension to some of the leaders of a unit on post. The briefing is designed to offer young leaders a way to reach out to their Soldiers and consider the many different option available to assist those who are struggling. When I got back to my office I received an email from one of the company commanders who had attended. This person thanked me for the brief and told me that for the first time in a long time, she didn't feel like she was on the outside looking in. That my briefing had validated a lot of her personal thoughts and feelings.....
Maybe, in some small way, I had provided her an anchor. We can build from there.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
The idea of the leader as an anchor has really struck a chord with me this week. I hadn't thought of the person or the position that way before. Probably because the Army definition of leadership concentrates around providing "Purpose, direction and motivation..." but doesn't spend much time talking about providing a place - and a face - for relationships, trust and a shelter from the storm.
First, from JH's post, the idea that Millennial's have very little faith in the institutions that surround them since almost from their youth they have seen nothing but scandal from their supposed heroes. Whether in government, sports, or entertainment, not a day goes by without some new form of scandalous behavior played out in an almost real-time news cycle. Couple that with the disintegration of the two parent household that became prevalent in the 1980's and you get a generation with no one to look up to, or respect. They have been let down, in many cases, by the very things that they were told are bedrock qualities of American life - namely faith in family, faith in government, faith in community and the idea that, in America, your dream to someday be a big league ball player can come true just by hard work and dedication. If only it were so. They just don't believe in Mom, Dad, apple pie, Chevrolet, and the American way. That just hasn't been their experience. Theirs has been quite the opposite.
Consider this: In their lifetimes, Millennial's have witnessed a public circumventing of the law in the Iran Contra hearings played out for weeks on television, a president impeached for lying and the public humiliation of having had an affair, the supreme court decide an election in which the guy with the most votes didn't win on a constitutional technicality that most people didn't understand, and a war started and prosecuted under faulty information and assumptions. A war in which many of their friends have either been killed or maimed. They had their faith in sports heroes dashed when the challenges to Roger Maris' single season home run record were found to be based on performance enhancing drug use. Remember when Mark McGuire and Sammy Sosa were both chasing that record? Remember the excitement when the boys of summer were having a good time and there was excitement in waiting to see who would launch the next great shot out of the park? Remember when baseball became fun? When a ritual of the American summer made a triumphant return to glory? Turns out it was all an illusion. They had cheated and let us all down. Remember Olympic athlete Marion Jones? We were all so proud of her accomplishments.....Just another message that you cannot trust what is not right in front of you. Our hero's lives all become just as tawdry and cheap as our own.
JH summed this idea up very well when he wrote:
"There is a cultural realization that, “I can no longer trust outside of myself to help define who I am, because if I do, I will soon realize I was anchored in something false and unstable. The Millennial Generation has turned to the only thing certain to be real, themselves."
And so they trust themselves. And pretty much only themselves and others of their generation. They don't give damn about your institution, or your history, or your heraldry. They enter the world with their eyes set firmly on protecting and providing for the one thing they do trust. Themselves. And we contributed to that. As we adults watched our own lives slip into pettiness and disarray, we came together around the idea that this would not happen to our children. So we did everything we could to affirm their sense of individual identity, goodness and hope. They would be better than we were. If everything else in the world was hope less, we would make sure that they were individually hope full.
And that the outcome of that may be evidenced by something that another reader sent me this week. Check out the link below:
http://news.discovery.com/human/narcissism-epidemic-college-students.html
What the article states is that this is the most narcissistic and self absorbed generation ever. There are 3 paragraphs in the article that caught my eye. They are:
"Narcissism has increased among Americans over the past 15 years, a joint study from San Diego State University (SDSU) and the University of South Alabama has concluded. The results suggest that the United States is poised to experience social problems as younger narcissists age and move into positions of power."
and
"These traits include an unfounded sense of entitlement and overly high self-regard. "
and
"What this means is that we have generations of people entering the workforce that expect special treatment, are demanding of others and making risky decisions."
I have said many times before throughout my writings, that the struggle right now in the Army is one of basic trust. Anyone who calls themselves a leader or holds any form of leadership position must make a concerted effort to gain, or regain, the trust of their subordinates. It is not a given. We will have to make a large investment of time - on a person to person level, to establish that bond between the leader and the led. It is not natural for them to trust that institution will take care of them. All their learning and experiences say otherwise. Blind faith will not come easily. In fact, if you ever can get to a point where your subordinates have blind faith in your decisions, I would contend that it will be because of the amount of time and energy you put into gaining their trust and affirmation.
Here then is the circle: The Millennial is raised with a heightened sense of self-worth and a loss of traditional anchoring points of faith. They then grow up believing in their individual sense of their world and find others of their generation who feel the same way. They are no longer tied to the older generation's definitions of success and value. They define themselves in the context of a global economy, the web, and instant processing of information. If it resonates with them locally, they grab ahold of it - as a point of self-definition. If not, they let it slide by without acknowledging it's presence. They believe they are unique and different from any generation before them. That they have value. That they are equal. And that you should accept them as such.
And then they join the Army or any other large organization. They run into the top-down, hierarchy that says that you must start at the bottom and pay your dues. They run into structure and the nuances of human behavior, ego, power, toxic leadership and position. And they become disenfranchised very very quickly. In their eyes, it is just another example of the institution letting them down. This great and wonderful thing called the United States Army that supposedly represents the absolute pinnacle of the essence of being an American, honor, integrity, and service, is filled with people no better than their parents, communities, sports stars and government.
Interestingly though, I have read somewhere that Millennials are the first generation to select their parents as their role models. I can't remember where I saw that, but consider for a second what it means. They have come to respect Mom and Dad, not for their failings, but rather for their trying to provide as well as they could for their children. They may not like everything their parents did, or how they lived their lives, but they do give them credit for trying. And that is a very common trait among them. They want credit just for trying. Not for winning, not for being the best - in fact they often don't really seem to care - they want credit just for being on the field.
As we try to lead them, it seems to me that we first need to acknowledge these central points of their Orientation. As I have said before, if we don't we will miss each other in translation. We may be using the same words, but they will have much different interpretations. Once we overcome the language problem, the next step will be to provide a local face to an institutional idea. If we want them to be loyal to the country, and the Army, we will first have to demonstrate our loyalty to them. If we want them to espouse all the Army values, they will first have to be demonstrated by us to them. Locally, person-to-person. We will have to work to prove that not only does the institution value them, but that they too can place their faith in the institution. Their development might come more slowly. They will have to learn that sometimes simply being on the field isn't good enough. Sometimes you must win. Regardless of the cost. That there are things out there that are larger and more important than their individual wants and needs. And that if you lose, you cannot say, "Well, at least I tried." That you must get better until you do win. While that may seem like an obvious statement to previous generations, it may not be that way for this one.
In order to do these things, here is what I think must happen at the senior levels of the Army.
First, there must be an acknowledgement that this generation is a pivotal one, much like any generation where social dynamics are changed dramatically by technological advancement. We simply cannot underestimate the critical importance of global communications and information expansion. Second, we have to look beyond corporate responses and develop more personal ones to help them reorient to their Army world in a way that helps connect their individualism to the larger ethic of the organization. Third, we need constantly place the values requirements in front of them. The values need to be part of every class, training event, and daily integration. That is the only way to make the larger themes have a local impact. Finally, we have to develop the strength of character that makes losing unacceptable and honorable winning the only imaginable result.
Earlier this past week I gave a presentation on OODA loops in the Human Dimension to some of the leaders of a unit on post. The briefing is designed to offer young leaders a way to reach out to their Soldiers and consider the many different option available to assist those who are struggling. When I got back to my office I received an email from one of the company commanders who had attended. This person thanked me for the brief and told me that for the first time in a long time, she didn't feel like she was on the outside looking in. That my briefing had validated a lot of her personal thoughts and feelings.....
Maybe, in some small way, I had provided her an anchor. We can build from there.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#54 Guest Post from JH
The following is a guest post from JH. I have done this once before when I thought the subject and the writing were relevant to the content of the larger discussion. JH is a current Army officer with an interest similar to mine in human leader development. He is also a Millennial who provides the blog with a first-hand accounting of his perspective. He is specifically referencing and replying to my post, #53.
"I agree with everything you said, however I would like to look at a few points from a different angle. Specifically I want to address the Millennial Generation, anchors, and lack of confidence in leadership by those in the Millennial Generation and how it relates back to the Army structure and its mission.
I think first, as you have done, and you and I have discussed previously, we need to look at what created the Millennial Generation. In the hierarchy, you referenced the need for security as a key. Before we define what this security feels like, we first need to address a different topic. In order to satisfy the question of security, one internally has to answer the question, am I secure? That cannot be done until one first is able to define the word “I.” Defining ourselves and having a complete sense of self is an impossible task, and I believe Bennis’s points play into that more than we realize at first glance.
A prominent Christian Theologian, Michael Himes explains it best in his book, "Doing the Truth in Love: Conversations About God, Relationships and Service." He cites an example from Lewis Carroll’s book, "Alice in Wonderland." In this passage, Alice finds herself in a conversation with the caterpillar and asks him how she can get to a particular destination. The caterpillar, being a strict logistician, replies, “Who are you?” The caterpillar cannot answer Alice’s question until all the parts of his question have been defined, namely, who is Alice. Alice tries to answer the question by giving her name, where she is from etc. The caterpillar cannot accept her answers which are descriptions of who Alice is, not a definition.
This story illustrates for us our inability to actually define ourselves. In actuality, until our journey through life is complete, who we are is not quite finished. Himes argues the point further stating, if we were to give one sweeping statement that defines who we are at a specific point in time, the second we do that we immediately become different than before we gave that definition. Himes argues that the only true answer to who we are is a mystery, yet we continually must describe, refine and attempt to define ourselves. The answer of who we are is integral in how we see ourselves and act in our environment and function as a person.
In an effort to attempt to define who we are, we continually rely on descriptions and identification of self with other entities. It helps us try and zero in on the answer. When asked the question who are you, one may answer, “I am in the Army,” “I am from Florida,” or “I work with Fenlason.” These answers begin to arrive closer to who we are. Looking for deeper answers than occupation or geographical origin, one can use ideologies to describe themselves. “I am a republican,” “I am a democrat,” “I am a Soldier.” Many people often identify with a hero or popular person to try and get closer to a definition. The technique is to associate or anchor one’s self with the image of a personal hero. Heroes can come from anywhere, politics, work, family; virtually any place that a person can identify an ideology represented by a specific person. In politics, a great number of Americans were able to anchor themselves with heroes such as JFK. In the sports arena, many people once anchored themselves with the image of OJ Simpson, or Tiger Woods, evidenced purely by the number of companies who have used these figures to sell products, or how many sports jerseys people buy with a specific player’s name on them. These particular examples illustrate clearly what is one key factor in the creation of the Millennial Generation. Increasingly prevalent through media attention and publicity, public heroes whose ideologies we associate with to help describe ourselves, have become toppled by scandal and dishonesty. As the symbols prove inconsistent with the ideologies we attributed to them, it causes us to question the existence of the ideology itself. We lose trust in where we once felt anchored, and inherently lose a sense of who we are. In politics, while people like JFK from the 60’s, practiced behavior inconsistent with attributed ideology, it was not prevalent public concern or knowledge at the time. Not until the Watergate scandal when the President, a symbol of our national identity, American ideals, and most importantly a symbol of leadership truly undermined the public’s ability to anchor themselves in the idea that we can trust our leadership. What once was a firm anchor, (politics aside) as a symbol of leadership proved definitively that any leader, even the President, can betray our trust. The removal of that safety blanket has been a significant contribution to what we now see with the Millennial Generation. There is a cultural realization that, “I can no longer trust outside of myself to help define who I am, because if I do, I will soon realize I was anchored in something false and unstable. The Millennial Generation has turned to the only thing certain to be real, themselves. This makes even self description impossible.
Using yourself to define you is like using a word in its own definition. You find more and more those in the Millennial Generation feel unable to anchor. They float with the wind, the tide, and their feelings. Their initial response to potential anchors of sports heroes, political leaders and ideologies is distrust and skepticism. Not able to describe or refine the definition of self makes one stop searching for answers to who and what I am and, am I secure? As a leader of this generation, the only way to truly provide security is to have a strong sense of self and earn the trust of those you lead that you can be that anchor.
Those who work in the Army can provide a good anchor and teach others to answers the question of “who am I,” but only through personal relationships with those they lead. Reflecting back on my “leadership training,” what was emphasized was a high PT score, taking charge when in charge, and being able to display confidence. Absent from my training was any emphasis on getting to know others, increasing my ability to interact with people, or EO type discussions or assessments. Throughout my Army experience, zero or no tolerance for mistakes has been a constant theme. Results have been more important than process. Focus on people and the “business of people” is often echoed, but seldom practiced. Bennis says audacity is an integral part of leadership. With audacity comes an increase in the opportunity for mistakes. You either function as part of the team, or you’re outside. If you diminish the image of a leader then you are no longer allowed as part of the team. Common military stereotypes of poor social skills and rigid personalities contribute to this idea. These stereotypes come from a generation that bought into the system for the systems sake. They were able to anchor themselves in the organization and help define themselves by it. The nature of leadership has since changed. The large face of the organization is no longer a strong anchor. We have to personally assure through relationship and example those we lead in smaller units; we must demonstrate that it is safe to trust. We continually have to reaffirm that trust. Only when a Soldier is anchored and confident in that anchor will they feel secure. It is then that we can teach them to further define themselves, become productive leaders and become anchors to others. Only when all that takes place, can we teach them to achieve self actualization.
A word on how this relates to the integral part of the Army’s definition of leadership, “…operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.” The current “mission” very clearly appears to be something similar to, “Partner with local nationals in our OEF/OIF missions to influence stability.” One could argue, with the numbers of junior officers and Soldiers getting out, what we mean by “Improving the organization” could best be defined by examples such as the study on, “Retaining Officer Talent” and other initiatives to make the organization better for its people, and make the people better for the organization. Being able to “influence” those in the organization to operate to accomplish those missions can be found in the essence of the missions themselves.
The revamp of the counseling system, additional cultural or leadership training, a new system for evaluating leadership and increased emphasis on language training are all programs aimed at achieving those goals. They can provide technical skills to enhance mission accomplishment, but do not ever teach individuals the “tactical” art required to achieve or even prove mission accomplishment. The tactical art of influencing those to partner effectively or influencing those to make the organization better for its people must be taught on an individual level with a master and apprentice. It cannot be accomplished through a series of steps or by doing a task. It cannot be explained, it must be demonstrated. The apprentice must immerse themselves in the deepest understanding of how to practice the art, or they will never successfully be able to practice the art on their own. The two missions ironically, are identical at their core. They are the two areas in which our organization appears to have the most difficulty achieving success. Fenlason said it best when he said, “One of my responsibilities is to provide them the place and opportunity to do that.” If every leader in the organization “influenced” by attempting to form a relationship with those they led to provide a “place and opportunity” to feel anchored and work towards self actualization, they would understand the art required in today’s missions of partnership and leadership because they would be practicing it. Those missions cannot be answered with a “how we partner” smart card or taught in a “leadership 101” course. Providing security for Soldiers we lead and security for local nationals in the combat operating environment cannot be approached as a science, measured or quantified. One either feels it, or they don’t. One either has the finesse to perceive its presence in others, or they don’t. If we, as an organization are not effectively “operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization,” then by our own definition are we really leading, or are we floating, unanchored, and unsecured? Are we constantly rowing, believing if we do something hard enough or enough times, someday the organization will be able to anchor and answer the question, “Am I secure?” I think the best answer to that question is, “Who are you?”
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"I agree with everything you said, however I would like to look at a few points from a different angle. Specifically I want to address the Millennial Generation, anchors, and lack of confidence in leadership by those in the Millennial Generation and how it relates back to the Army structure and its mission.
I think first, as you have done, and you and I have discussed previously, we need to look at what created the Millennial Generation. In the hierarchy, you referenced the need for security as a key. Before we define what this security feels like, we first need to address a different topic. In order to satisfy the question of security, one internally has to answer the question, am I secure? That cannot be done until one first is able to define the word “I.” Defining ourselves and having a complete sense of self is an impossible task, and I believe Bennis’s points play into that more than we realize at first glance.
A prominent Christian Theologian, Michael Himes explains it best in his book, "Doing the Truth in Love: Conversations About God, Relationships and Service." He cites an example from Lewis Carroll’s book, "Alice in Wonderland." In this passage, Alice finds herself in a conversation with the caterpillar and asks him how she can get to a particular destination. The caterpillar, being a strict logistician, replies, “Who are you?” The caterpillar cannot answer Alice’s question until all the parts of his question have been defined, namely, who is Alice. Alice tries to answer the question by giving her name, where she is from etc. The caterpillar cannot accept her answers which are descriptions of who Alice is, not a definition.
This story illustrates for us our inability to actually define ourselves. In actuality, until our journey through life is complete, who we are is not quite finished. Himes argues the point further stating, if we were to give one sweeping statement that defines who we are at a specific point in time, the second we do that we immediately become different than before we gave that definition. Himes argues that the only true answer to who we are is a mystery, yet we continually must describe, refine and attempt to define ourselves. The answer of who we are is integral in how we see ourselves and act in our environment and function as a person.
In an effort to attempt to define who we are, we continually rely on descriptions and identification of self with other entities. It helps us try and zero in on the answer. When asked the question who are you, one may answer, “I am in the Army,” “I am from Florida,” or “I work with Fenlason.” These answers begin to arrive closer to who we are. Looking for deeper answers than occupation or geographical origin, one can use ideologies to describe themselves. “I am a republican,” “I am a democrat,” “I am a Soldier.” Many people often identify with a hero or popular person to try and get closer to a definition. The technique is to associate or anchor one’s self with the image of a personal hero. Heroes can come from anywhere, politics, work, family; virtually any place that a person can identify an ideology represented by a specific person. In politics, a great number of Americans were able to anchor themselves with heroes such as JFK. In the sports arena, many people once anchored themselves with the image of OJ Simpson, or Tiger Woods, evidenced purely by the number of companies who have used these figures to sell products, or how many sports jerseys people buy with a specific player’s name on them. These particular examples illustrate clearly what is one key factor in the creation of the Millennial Generation. Increasingly prevalent through media attention and publicity, public heroes whose ideologies we associate with to help describe ourselves, have become toppled by scandal and dishonesty. As the symbols prove inconsistent with the ideologies we attributed to them, it causes us to question the existence of the ideology itself. We lose trust in where we once felt anchored, and inherently lose a sense of who we are. In politics, while people like JFK from the 60’s, practiced behavior inconsistent with attributed ideology, it was not prevalent public concern or knowledge at the time. Not until the Watergate scandal when the President, a symbol of our national identity, American ideals, and most importantly a symbol of leadership truly undermined the public’s ability to anchor themselves in the idea that we can trust our leadership. What once was a firm anchor, (politics aside) as a symbol of leadership proved definitively that any leader, even the President, can betray our trust. The removal of that safety blanket has been a significant contribution to what we now see with the Millennial Generation. There is a cultural realization that, “I can no longer trust outside of myself to help define who I am, because if I do, I will soon realize I was anchored in something false and unstable. The Millennial Generation has turned to the only thing certain to be real, themselves. This makes even self description impossible.
Using yourself to define you is like using a word in its own definition. You find more and more those in the Millennial Generation feel unable to anchor. They float with the wind, the tide, and their feelings. Their initial response to potential anchors of sports heroes, political leaders and ideologies is distrust and skepticism. Not able to describe or refine the definition of self makes one stop searching for answers to who and what I am and, am I secure? As a leader of this generation, the only way to truly provide security is to have a strong sense of self and earn the trust of those you lead that you can be that anchor.
Those who work in the Army can provide a good anchor and teach others to answers the question of “who am I,” but only through personal relationships with those they lead. Reflecting back on my “leadership training,” what was emphasized was a high PT score, taking charge when in charge, and being able to display confidence. Absent from my training was any emphasis on getting to know others, increasing my ability to interact with people, or EO type discussions or assessments. Throughout my Army experience, zero or no tolerance for mistakes has been a constant theme. Results have been more important than process. Focus on people and the “business of people” is often echoed, but seldom practiced. Bennis says audacity is an integral part of leadership. With audacity comes an increase in the opportunity for mistakes. You either function as part of the team, or you’re outside. If you diminish the image of a leader then you are no longer allowed as part of the team. Common military stereotypes of poor social skills and rigid personalities contribute to this idea. These stereotypes come from a generation that bought into the system for the systems sake. They were able to anchor themselves in the organization and help define themselves by it. The nature of leadership has since changed. The large face of the organization is no longer a strong anchor. We have to personally assure through relationship and example those we lead in smaller units; we must demonstrate that it is safe to trust. We continually have to reaffirm that trust. Only when a Soldier is anchored and confident in that anchor will they feel secure. It is then that we can teach them to further define themselves, become productive leaders and become anchors to others. Only when all that takes place, can we teach them to achieve self actualization.
A word on how this relates to the integral part of the Army’s definition of leadership, “…operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.” The current “mission” very clearly appears to be something similar to, “Partner with local nationals in our OEF/OIF missions to influence stability.” One could argue, with the numbers of junior officers and Soldiers getting out, what we mean by “Improving the organization” could best be defined by examples such as the study on, “Retaining Officer Talent” and other initiatives to make the organization better for its people, and make the people better for the organization. Being able to “influence” those in the organization to operate to accomplish those missions can be found in the essence of the missions themselves.
The revamp of the counseling system, additional cultural or leadership training, a new system for evaluating leadership and increased emphasis on language training are all programs aimed at achieving those goals. They can provide technical skills to enhance mission accomplishment, but do not ever teach individuals the “tactical” art required to achieve or even prove mission accomplishment. The tactical art of influencing those to partner effectively or influencing those to make the organization better for its people must be taught on an individual level with a master and apprentice. It cannot be accomplished through a series of steps or by doing a task. It cannot be explained, it must be demonstrated. The apprentice must immerse themselves in the deepest understanding of how to practice the art, or they will never successfully be able to practice the art on their own. The two missions ironically, are identical at their core. They are the two areas in which our organization appears to have the most difficulty achieving success. Fenlason said it best when he said, “One of my responsibilities is to provide them the place and opportunity to do that.” If every leader in the organization “influenced” by attempting to form a relationship with those they led to provide a “place and opportunity” to feel anchored and work towards self actualization, they would understand the art required in today’s missions of partnership and leadership because they would be practicing it. Those missions cannot be answered with a “how we partner” smart card or taught in a “leadership 101” course. Providing security for Soldiers we lead and security for local nationals in the combat operating environment cannot be approached as a science, measured or quantified. One either feels it, or they don’t. One either has the finesse to perceive its presence in others, or they don’t. If we, as an organization are not effectively “operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization,” then by our own definition are we really leading, or are we floating, unanchored, and unsecured? Are we constantly rowing, believing if we do something hard enough or enough times, someday the organization will be able to anchor and answer the question, “Am I secure?” I think the best answer to that question is, “Who are you?”
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
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