"The task of building an ethical environment where leaders and all personnel are instructed, encouraged, and rewarded for ethical behavior is a matter of first importance. All decisions, practices, goals, and values of the entire institutional structure which make ethical behavior difficult should be examined, beginning with the following:
First, blatant or subtle forms of ethical relativism which blur the issue of what is right or wrong or which bury it as a subject of little or no importance.
Second, the exaggerated loyalty syndrome, where people are afraid to tell the truth and are discouraged from it.
Third, the obsession with image, where people are not even interested in the truth.
And last, the drive for success, in which ethical sensitivity is bought off or sold because of the personal need to achieve."
Chaplain (Major General) Kermit D. Johnson Parameters Magazine 1974
I found this quote yesterday and it struck me how relevant it is to many of the discussions we are having right now throughout the Army. After nearly a decade of war, the time to take a hard look at the profession, what it stands for, and what behavioral requirements and demands it makes upon its’ members is incredibly important. I found the quote interesting because it also followed another long period of persistent conflict and raised many of the same issues that surround our Army today. 37 years have passed between the Army of the Vietnam Era and where we are today, and yet we are still asking the same questions now as he did back then.
Maybe though the real issue here is not that 37 years have passed, but rather that this particular discussion is one that should never have stopped in the first place. Any discussion of the ethic of a profession should not ever really have a defined starting or ending point. It should always be an ongoing dialogue. What the 37 intervening years says to me is that at some point, we felt as if we had ‘figured it out’ and now could take a break. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any profession’s relevancy lies clearly with how it defines itself, and what it stands for in the eyes of those for whom it provides a service. To suggest that those definitions and services happen in a finite point in time is simply untrue. The definitions and services happen in a dynamic and ever-changing world. Therefore, the ethic must be always be challenged and reviewed in light of that world. Of course, we need to ensure that we always maintain the ability to take the long view on present realities as well. While paying attention to the trees, we can never lose sight of the forest. Otherwise we run the risk of changing with every whim and popular thought of the moment. There are some things that must not change in any profession. As much as we need to continually review our thoughts and ideas and see if they remain true in present circumstances, we also need to ensure that the basic tenants of the profession remain. The larger question that deserves consideration is what those tenants are.
You cannot have a profession without having an ethic. The ethic defines the required behaviors and actions that any member must absorb and then display. Chaplain Johnson’s thoughts provide all of us a great start point for our current study of what the Army ethic is at this young point in the 21st century.
His idea of relativism struck a strong chord with me. Are there enduring values – immutable, non-negotiable rights and wrongs that define what it means to be a Soldier? If so, what are they? Are there actions that are always right or always wrong regardless of context? What happens when taking the ‘moral high ground’ means that you invite more attacks on your own Soldiers? What happens when your opponent is willing to use your moral/ethical boundaries to their own tactical advantage? How do you reconcile your leader decision to act in a manner consistent with the profession when it results in death or injury to your own Soldiers? More importantly, how do we imbue the importance of these immutable values into every Soldier in such a manner that they ultimately understand and accept that outcomes such as these are possible? Will these understandings stand up to the emotions of a grieving parent or spouse? Can these understandings survive a congressional inquiry? An After Action Review? At the local level, can we prepare leaders to be able to recognize that their Soldiers view of what happened, what should have happened, and why certain ethical decisions were made will have many varied interpretations and those interpretations could have an effect on future behaviors and actions of the platoon’s Soldiers? What about the many nights that will follow decisions such as these where someone lies in bed and wonders? Stares at the ceiling in the dark and wonders, “Did I do the right thing?” What about the emotions of our Soldiers? Can we imbue in them the ability to never lose the forest despite all the trees? For example, there was an attack on US Forces recently that resulted in a high casualty count. Already I have seen people writing about retribution. What do we need to do to ensure that the honest emotional response of wanting payback does not turn into actions that ultimately demean the ethic of being an American Soldier?
Chaplain Johnson’s second thought that there must be an institutional mechanism for ‘truth-telling’ is also important and falls directly in line with the thoughts expressed by LTG Caslen regarding candor. When loyalty or fealty to the boss becomes more important than the truth because of political or career implications, we as a profession will suffer. We must encourage – no, we must demand - ‘truth-telling’. I am certain that this is one of those immutable norms and expectations of the profession that we cannot survive without. But if, as LTG Caslen suggested, candor needs to be emphasized throughout the force, what conditions will it take for that to occur? How do we ensure that Soldiers always have the right (and obligation) to ask their questions, and speak their truth? For example, I got an email request last week to provide some data to our leaders overseas. A young Soldier had told one of the senior leaders that his unit had not received any replacement Soldiers for the entire deployment. The leader wanted to know why. It is certain, that the Soldier was mistaken – that I know for sure. What’s important though is that the exchange happened and that hopefully, the leader will help inform the Soldier on what the truth really is. The Soldier’s truth (his understanding) is not wrong – it is misinformed. However, without the mechanism for him to ask his question, the leader never knows what the Soldier is thinking. We must be able to tell the boss when our two understandings of the environment don’t add up. If all we do is nod our heads and agree then we do injustice to the communication process. As historians study this period in the Army, one thing they may discover is that once we all became convinced of our greatness, we did not have a mechanism in place to check our preconceptions against our realities.
Finally, careerism is most certainly the disease that leads to everything mentioned above. We must examine what it means to be a professional. Being a professional Soldier must once again take on the aura of an avocation. Something done not for money or security, but rather of true devotion. That is not to say that Soldiers should be paupers, but rather that we need to emphasize that ours is a lifestyle and a calling.
There are more questions now than there are answers. For some this lack of an absolutely clear direction will lead to blind faith in those around them. For others it will drive them to look deeply into their own hearts and attempt to find their own definition of the profession. Chaplain Johnson’s thoughts of a long time ago have come full circle. This time, lets ensure that we never think we’ve got it all figured out. The discussions of the profession of arms, what it means to serve, and the warrior’s vocation demand constant reflection. The blog serves part of that need for me. I hope it does for you as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#92 Three Cups of Dissonance
A few weeks ago I was having a conversation with my Dad and he asked me how I develop my ideas for the blog. I told him that I really didn't know how I did it, but that I would generally hear or read something and a part of it would jump out at me as being either something I agreed with that I didn't feel people were paying enough attention to, or there would be something that didn't add up to me - something I couldn't Orient to. When I brought that up to a colleague of mine he defined the process as cognitive dissonance. Not exactly sure what he meant, I looked it up. Cognitive dissonance is described as "The uncomfortable feeling which comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the mind at the same time." I found a better explanation here:
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/cognitive_dissonance.htm
"Dissonance increases with:
Over on the Army information sharing site, BCKS, there are a few conversations going on that have caught my eye lately and deserve a little bit more consideration. The first has to do with the review of the Army's professional ethic. This conversation grew out of General Dempsey's "Weak signals" ideas from a few weeks back. We have a need in the Army to take a look at our professional ethic. What does it mean to be termed 'the profession of arms'? What makes us a profession? What service do we provide and how and to whom? What gives us permission to decide we are 'professionals'? These questions are important because they form the contractual relationship between the institution and the nation.
The second has to do with the idea of mission command and the difference between it and command and control. As I brought up last week, the Army has published a new training pamphlet and has decided to refocus it's efforts at developing a better understanding of how we need to operate in order to solve the complex problems that we are faced with. The idea that the more structured and rigid command and control methods of the past, which are highly successful against more formalized and structured foes, have not been as effective against the more amorphous and amoebic enemy that we have faced in the past 10 years. That pamphlet also emphasizes the art of command over the science of control, which will be a huge behavioral change for many leaders who grew up in a different era in the Army.
And finally, there is a professional reading forum that is discussing "Black Hearts". In essence, using a moderator, the forum is going through the book one chapter at a time and the moderator posts questions and solicits feedback from others to see what thoughts and ideas are generated. He and I have spoken about this - and I suspect we will talk a lot more in the weeks ahead- but for now, I am just sitting on the sidelines watching the discussions unfold. It will be interesting to see as the weeks go on how many different interpretations of people's actions and decisions (including mine) show up.
How are these things related?
First, there must be the realization that cognitive dissonance equals personal Orientation. That each individual Orients to their world and forms their understanding in a unique and personal manner. This Orientation is the sum total of their lives, their experiences, their knowledge, and their ability to make sense of their environment in light of all of their previous knowledge and experiences. This is critically important. If I am in charge of something and make a decision, that decision is very much informed and influenced by by previous experiences and development. It is unique to me and colored by everything that is me. Therefore, it is also true that my subordinates posses their own Orientation and cannot see the world or problem in exactly the same manner as I do. My decision or the action I wish them to take is being filtered by the sum total of their lives and experiences.
If we accept this filtering mechanism as a constant, then the discussion of the professional ethic becomes incredibly important. We must continually revisit the ethic of the organization to ensure that we can express it to our members in such a manner that they can Orient to. It must be universal. We must push as hard as we can to ensure that everyone's understanding of the institutional value system is in line - or at least within a set of parameters. Without that common understanding, the unique peculiarities of individual Orientation will collide and could produce results outside of the ethic of the profession. I believe that the "Black Hearts" discussion and the unfolding events in 5th brigade, 2nd Infantry Division will be instructive in this manner.
Finally, the idea of mission command over command and control. Command and control is a semi-rigid system that uses the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to generate orders. It is a complicated and difficult staff process that ends up most times with execution and synchronization matrices that put everything into a production line type order. The process continually breaks down the problem into smaller and smaller chunks and then stacks all those small chunks into a particular sequence to provide an expected result. It is very effective when opposing someone who uses roughly the same process - generally another professional Army or enemy. Something with a structure to oppose. Mission command on the other hand will be wholly dependent on the ability of the leader to paint a much broader picture, a mosaic, that describes in more general terms the intended outcome and allows maximum freedom of execution at every subordinate level. All the way down to the individual Soldier. It will be much less rigid and therefore (to use the most overused word in the Army today) more adaptable. Instead of proscribing each and every step of every Soldier and unit, mission command keeps the entire organization focused on the ultimate endstate. To put it another way, while command and control focuses on the trees, mission command focuses on not losing sight of the forest. COL Boyd expressed it like this:
"A system whose secret lies in what's unstated or not communicated to one another (in an explicit sense) - in order to exploit lower level initiative yet realize higher level intent, thereby diminish friction and compress time, hence gain both quickness and security."
In order to be successful at mission command, the Army will have to do a number of things up front. First, it will have to define it's ethic clearly in order to produce a common Orientation within its members. Second, it will have to accept dissonance as a vital part of the dialogue. Every aspect of leader development should be taught in light of an understanding that your subordinates cannot and will not Orient to their world in the same manner you do and that one of your key responsibilities is to ensure that the common understanding is achieved. Third, it will accept and learn to look for those times and places where a particular Orientation has moved outside of the intent and is adaptable enough to intercede earlier than it currently does. Finally, any discussion of decentralization must be informed by all of the above. Central to that discussion will be trust. And what are we trusting? Ultimately I believe that we are trusting that the institution can hear and respond to the cognitive dissonance among its' members, develop a method of dialogue that can reduce it through a commonly held ethic, and enhance the trust that allows for mission command over command and control.
A final very small example of how this all plays out. We had a brand new Soldier on a rifle range the other day who told one of my instructors that he had never fired his rifle without using an optic. That he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights. There are huge dissonance issues here for me. His statement that he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights (but can with an optic) implies that he really doesn't know how to shoot at all. Somewhere along the line he was never taught the real fundamentals of marksmanship. If he had been, then he would have known what successful shooting requires, and that an optic is only an enhancement to it. The principles are the same, the optic simply adds a more precise tool to use. My instructor couldn't believe that this was possible. How could someone be taught to use an optic before being taught to shoot well without one? He has never been a drill sergeant and so cannot Orient to that world. I saw this as a product of a training system where a decision was made to introduce the technology we posses earlier in training to alleviate the need for a lot of training further down the road. The training base would provide the operational Army a Soldier who already knew how to use the equipment attached to his/her rifle. I am certain, however, that not teaching a Soldier the basic requirements of successful target engagement was not part of the training idea. It probably never occurred to those who pushed the technology down to the trainee that the Drill Sergeant would skip over iron sight shooting. They believed they were enhancing the Soldier. Multiple Orientations. A lot of concentration on trees. What got lost in the translation was the forest. The Soldier still doesn't truly understand the fundamentals of marksmanship. My instructor heard something that didn't sound right. He listened to the dissonance. Thankfully, my team has one last chance to get that knowledge across to the Soldier. His next experience with a rifle could very likely be in a firefight.
Learning to listen to the dissonance is critical. People's lives depend upon it. It's that important.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/cognitive_dissonance.htm
"Dissonance increases with:
- The importance of the subject to us.
- How strongly the dissonant thoughts conflict.
- Our inability to rationalize and explain away the conflict.
Dissonance is often strong when we believe something about ourselves and then do something against that belief. If I believe I am good but do something bad, then the discomfort I feel as a result is cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance is a very powerful motivator which will often lead us to change one or other of the conflicting belief or action. The discomfort often feels like a tension between the two opposing thoughts. To release the tension we can take one of three actions:
- Change our behavior.
- Justify our behavior by changing the conflicting cognition.
- Justify our behavior by adding new cognitions.
Dissonance is most powerful when it is about our self-image. Feelings of foolishness, immorality and so on (including internal projections during decision-making) are dissonance in action.
If an action has been completed and cannot be undone, then the after-the-fact dissonance compels us to change our beliefs. If beliefs are moved, then the dissonance appears during decision-making, forcing us to take actions we would not have taken before.
Cognitive dissonance appears in virtually all evaluations and decisions and is the central mechanism by which we experience new differences in the world. When we see other people behave differently to our images of them, when we hold any conflicting thoughts, we experience dissonance.
Dissonance increases with the importance and impact of the decision, along with the difficulty of reversing it. Discomfort about making the wrong choice of car is bigger than when choosing a lamp."
In the past, and with regard to the conversations going on throughout the Army, I have called those who experience and then use this discordant feeling as the 'loyal opposition'. Those people whose Orientation is such that they critically evaluate every word to ensure understanding and then learn to listen to the inner clamoring when some parts of it do not add up to them. I believe that the development of this skill set is critical to any leader development program. We must continually push people to learn how to listen for the discordant sound, figure out why it sounds that way to them, and then provide methods to settle the discord through dialogue, discussion, or decision that will increase their awareness and depth of judgment. This is also why I continually return to the idea of Orientation. I must understand me well enough to understand how all those things that make me unique come together in order for me to form my understanding of my world. Only by having a clear understanding of them, can I use that awareness to then take calculated pauses and search out the Orientation of others. In essence, my awareness of me causes me to recognize that everyone else has there own awareness and there exists the possibility the two don't match up. This creates multiple possible outcomes to any situation. The job of any leader is to ensure that (1) the subordinate has a clear understanding of the desired outcome from the leaders orientation, and (2) the leader has an awareness of dissonance, expects it, does not view it as disrespect or a challenge to authority, and can use it to ensure a common operating picture for his/her subordinates. Dissonance will play a critical part in many of the current discussions we are having regarding the future needs and requirements of the Army. And as the most combat experienced Army of the last 40 years, that dissonance must not only be expressed by those at the top of the hierarchy. There will have to be a concerted effort to search out those in the middle and at the bottom. Remember, there are a lot more Specialists and Sergeants in the Army than there are Colonels and Generals and Command Sergeants Major. The dissonance at those intermediate levels will be crucial to formulating the road ahead.
Over on the Army information sharing site, BCKS, there are a few conversations going on that have caught my eye lately and deserve a little bit more consideration. The first has to do with the review of the Army's professional ethic. This conversation grew out of General Dempsey's "Weak signals" ideas from a few weeks back. We have a need in the Army to take a look at our professional ethic. What does it mean to be termed 'the profession of arms'? What makes us a profession? What service do we provide and how and to whom? What gives us permission to decide we are 'professionals'? These questions are important because they form the contractual relationship between the institution and the nation.
The second has to do with the idea of mission command and the difference between it and command and control. As I brought up last week, the Army has published a new training pamphlet and has decided to refocus it's efforts at developing a better understanding of how we need to operate in order to solve the complex problems that we are faced with. The idea that the more structured and rigid command and control methods of the past, which are highly successful against more formalized and structured foes, have not been as effective against the more amorphous and amoebic enemy that we have faced in the past 10 years. That pamphlet also emphasizes the art of command over the science of control, which will be a huge behavioral change for many leaders who grew up in a different era in the Army.
And finally, there is a professional reading forum that is discussing "Black Hearts". In essence, using a moderator, the forum is going through the book one chapter at a time and the moderator posts questions and solicits feedback from others to see what thoughts and ideas are generated. He and I have spoken about this - and I suspect we will talk a lot more in the weeks ahead- but for now, I am just sitting on the sidelines watching the discussions unfold. It will be interesting to see as the weeks go on how many different interpretations of people's actions and decisions (including mine) show up.
How are these things related?
First, there must be the realization that cognitive dissonance equals personal Orientation. That each individual Orients to their world and forms their understanding in a unique and personal manner. This Orientation is the sum total of their lives, their experiences, their knowledge, and their ability to make sense of their environment in light of all of their previous knowledge and experiences. This is critically important. If I am in charge of something and make a decision, that decision is very much informed and influenced by by previous experiences and development. It is unique to me and colored by everything that is me. Therefore, it is also true that my subordinates posses their own Orientation and cannot see the world or problem in exactly the same manner as I do. My decision or the action I wish them to take is being filtered by the sum total of their lives and experiences.
If we accept this filtering mechanism as a constant, then the discussion of the professional ethic becomes incredibly important. We must continually revisit the ethic of the organization to ensure that we can express it to our members in such a manner that they can Orient to. It must be universal. We must push as hard as we can to ensure that everyone's understanding of the institutional value system is in line - or at least within a set of parameters. Without that common understanding, the unique peculiarities of individual Orientation will collide and could produce results outside of the ethic of the profession. I believe that the "Black Hearts" discussion and the unfolding events in 5th brigade, 2nd Infantry Division will be instructive in this manner.
Finally, the idea of mission command over command and control. Command and control is a semi-rigid system that uses the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to generate orders. It is a complicated and difficult staff process that ends up most times with execution and synchronization matrices that put everything into a production line type order. The process continually breaks down the problem into smaller and smaller chunks and then stacks all those small chunks into a particular sequence to provide an expected result. It is very effective when opposing someone who uses roughly the same process - generally another professional Army or enemy. Something with a structure to oppose. Mission command on the other hand will be wholly dependent on the ability of the leader to paint a much broader picture, a mosaic, that describes in more general terms the intended outcome and allows maximum freedom of execution at every subordinate level. All the way down to the individual Soldier. It will be much less rigid and therefore (to use the most overused word in the Army today) more adaptable. Instead of proscribing each and every step of every Soldier and unit, mission command keeps the entire organization focused on the ultimate endstate. To put it another way, while command and control focuses on the trees, mission command focuses on not losing sight of the forest. COL Boyd expressed it like this:
"A system whose secret lies in what's unstated or not communicated to one another (in an explicit sense) - in order to exploit lower level initiative yet realize higher level intent, thereby diminish friction and compress time, hence gain both quickness and security."
In order to be successful at mission command, the Army will have to do a number of things up front. First, it will have to define it's ethic clearly in order to produce a common Orientation within its members. Second, it will have to accept dissonance as a vital part of the dialogue. Every aspect of leader development should be taught in light of an understanding that your subordinates cannot and will not Orient to their world in the same manner you do and that one of your key responsibilities is to ensure that the common understanding is achieved. Third, it will accept and learn to look for those times and places where a particular Orientation has moved outside of the intent and is adaptable enough to intercede earlier than it currently does. Finally, any discussion of decentralization must be informed by all of the above. Central to that discussion will be trust. And what are we trusting? Ultimately I believe that we are trusting that the institution can hear and respond to the cognitive dissonance among its' members, develop a method of dialogue that can reduce it through a commonly held ethic, and enhance the trust that allows for mission command over command and control.
A final very small example of how this all plays out. We had a brand new Soldier on a rifle range the other day who told one of my instructors that he had never fired his rifle without using an optic. That he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights. There are huge dissonance issues here for me. His statement that he didn't know how to shoot with iron sights (but can with an optic) implies that he really doesn't know how to shoot at all. Somewhere along the line he was never taught the real fundamentals of marksmanship. If he had been, then he would have known what successful shooting requires, and that an optic is only an enhancement to it. The principles are the same, the optic simply adds a more precise tool to use. My instructor couldn't believe that this was possible. How could someone be taught to use an optic before being taught to shoot well without one? He has never been a drill sergeant and so cannot Orient to that world. I saw this as a product of a training system where a decision was made to introduce the technology we posses earlier in training to alleviate the need for a lot of training further down the road. The training base would provide the operational Army a Soldier who already knew how to use the equipment attached to his/her rifle. I am certain, however, that not teaching a Soldier the basic requirements of successful target engagement was not part of the training idea. It probably never occurred to those who pushed the technology down to the trainee that the Drill Sergeant would skip over iron sight shooting. They believed they were enhancing the Soldier. Multiple Orientations. A lot of concentration on trees. What got lost in the translation was the forest. The Soldier still doesn't truly understand the fundamentals of marksmanship. My instructor heard something that didn't sound right. He listened to the dissonance. Thankfully, my team has one last chance to get that knowledge across to the Soldier. His next experience with a rifle could very likely be in a firefight.
Learning to listen to the dissonance is critical. People's lives depend upon it. It's that important.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#91 The Future is Now
Throughout my writing there are a few themes that have popped up time after time. Primarily that we lead human beings not organizations, and that the development of the human being should be the primary purpose of all leader development programs. More importantly, we need to force people through those programs to study themselves - who they are, what formed them, how they think, and the potential consequences of those thought processes. That we need to make self-awareness a primary focus of leader development. My contention is that by concentrating our efforts inward, we will develop leaders of known moral character, with the ability to critically view their environment and make decisions consistent with the values of the nation and the Army and that advance the commander's intent and mission accomplishment. They gain the understanding of why they make the choices or decisions they do and then possess the character to stand by them once made, or adapt them when they become aware that they will not work. In my early posts, these ideas didn't generate a lot of discussion or thought mainly because I think that most folks found the ideas to 1) be self evident and 2) they believed that the institution was already doing those things. Obviously, I do not believe that they are self-evident, nor that the institution is doing them. My personal experiences in Iraq had given me a 'front row seat' to the limitations of many of our current leader development programs - including mine, and had awakened me to a different set of possibilities. However, because my experiences are relatively unique and don't happened often, many folks probably didn't see much value in them because they are highly unlikely to occur in their world. And that is a fair assumption. War crimes, while providing high drama, a lot of emotion and capturing people's attention, are extremely rare and therefore are almost an anomaly that can be easily disregarded. Additionally, the posts regarding risk, trust, ethical development, individual responsibility etc didn't get much attention early on because those subjects call for a lot of individual 'gray area' interpretation and no institution likes gray. Institutions like black and white. They like structure and rules and orders and definiteness. They do not like chaos and ambiguity and personal interpretation. Counterinsurgencies, what happened to my platoon, and what is currently going on in 5th brigade, 2nd ID, however, highlight what can happen when we don't make an attempt to understand that we live in an inherently gray world, and one that is becoming more so each day. The Army calls it "..conditions of uncertainty and complexity." Of course, the Army's "..conditions of uncertainty and complexity" are focused outward towards our adversaries while I have often contended that we can use the development of those very same skill sets necessary for counterinsurgencies to look inward at ourselves and our own people.
Recently the Army has published a series of pamphlets outlining how it intends to operate for the next decade or so. What its' projected missions look like, how the system will function, and what it thinks it's requirements will be in different areas. This started with something called the Army Capstone Concept published in Dec 2009, which outlines very broadly what the Army predicts the future will look like in terms of threat, and what will be needed to meet it's requirements. In general, the ACC takes advantage of lessons learned from the last decade of conflict and combines them with the most likely course of events for the next 10 years or more to determine what capabilities the Army must possess in order to remain a predominant power and conduct the nation's land warfare business. The Capstone Concept was followed by The Army Operating Concept which outlined two broad functions that the Army must provide - combined arms maneuver and wide area security. And just two weeks ago, another volume was published entitled "The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command". You can find the link to all of these papers below:
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm
The "Mission Command" pamphlet is a critically important document and well worth the read for both military and non-military alike for it speaks more to the human element of leading people in decentralized environments (business or war) than anything I have seen to date. It moves the discussion from one of command and control, to one of mission command. Two very different things. Importantly, this document begins with an explicit recognition that technology has limitations and wars are fought in and amongst people.
"The renewed emphasis on mission command corrects the 1990s defense transformation view that emerging technologies would lift the fog of war and allow unprecedented awareness of every aspect of future operations. This view argued that operational images and graphics displayed on computer screens, in combination with processes such as system-of-systems analysis and operational net assessment, would permit an all-knowing headquarters to develop detailed plans, make near-perfect decisions, closely control organizations, and direct operations toward mission accomplishment.
In fact, however, operations over the past decade have reminded the Army that armed conflict is first a human undertaking and what matters most are the opaque intentions, dynamic relationships, and covert actions of human groups, mostly invisible to technical intelligence. Additionally, the same technology that provides greater awareness to higher headquarters also enables subordinates to be better informed and to make better and timelier decisions. Thus, the U.S. Army is more committed than ever to the concept of mission command."
It then goes on to say:
"It establishes operational adaptability as its central tenet and asserts success in future armed conflict depends on the ability of Army leaders and forces to understand the situation in breadth, depth, and context; then develop the situation through action in close contact with enemies and civil populations."
and
"TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full-Spectrum Operations 2015-2024 emphasizes optimization of the cognitive, physical, and social components of every Soldier with the objective to improve the acquisition and selection of personnel; maximize leader and organizational development; establish the ability to rapidly adjust, deliver, and provide accessibility of training and education ultimately balancing Soldier knowledge, skills, and abilities with full-spectrum operations mission requirements."
The "Human Dimension" document is one that I referenced very early on in my writings as something we all need to study and use in our daily interactions. I continue to suggest it to all leaders as they attempt to understand their subordinates and how to develop them and make use of their particular skills and abilities.
The "Functional Concept for Mission Command" pamphlet contains a lot of things that also reinforce many of my personal observations and thoughts as the blog has progressed. Consider the following:
"The purpose of military action is never purely destructive. In every case, it is to influence the behavior of various groups of human beings toward some greater purpose. Since humans are products of their genetic inheritance, education, and experience, they perceive the world selectively, making judgments of fact and of value. They continually negotiate their perceptions and interpretations of the world with others. Thus, key individuals in any mission are as influenced from inside this system of humans as much as they are by outside intervention. Not surprisingly, therefore, they do not always behave in a logical and rational way....Prevailing in the contest of wills will require acute understanding of human behavior and place increasing demands on leaders to make decisions and act without the benefit of complete information."
While these statements are generally focused on the idea of understanding with regard to potential adversaries, I believe that their central themes of exercising influence over human beings towards the achievement of a common goal, understanding the vaguaries and individuality of human beings, and decision making in context are equally applicable to leading our own Soldiers. Remember, the Army defines leadership as:
"The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."
Seems the same as "Influencing the behavior of various groups of human beings towards some greater purpose" to me. Only that by Orientation we read the paragraph from the "Mission Command" document as being outward focused and the leadership definition as being inward focused. In fact they are both saying the same thing.
Paragraph 2-3 of the document states the following:
"Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, that fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers subordinate leaders to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively within the commander’s intent."
Suddenly, the idea of leadership, or the role of the leader, begins to shift away from commanding something and more towards themes of trust development, the exercise of initiative and the empowerment of subordinates. A fundamental role of the commander or leader becomes the enhancement of his or her subordinates to be able to act quickly, make ethical decisions and take actions with the faith and confidence of their seniors. This paragraph explicitly affirms the need for leaders to spend significant time and energy in articulating the desired outcomes and allowing their subordinates as much freedom as possible to achieve them, all in support of the mission and the ethical/moral expectations of the institution and the nation. This is a direct refutation of the micro-management and fear based development that many leaders today have experienced. We have finally accepted that the complexities of the decentralized environment are too much for any one person to be able to exert direct command and control over. The changed environment is dictating that we cannot control every action therefore we have to trust that our subordinates can understand what must be done, understand their left and right limits, and can recognize when a changing situation requires a new understanding.
We have come full circle. And whether or not they acknowledge it, the Army has certainly returned to the OODA cycle and the work of John Boyd. The emphasis on "Orientation" is found throughout the "Mission Command" document. Of everything I have read since learning about Boyd two years ago, this pamphlet is a very close interpretation of Boyd's "Organic Design for Command and Control".
Consider the following from Boyd:
"Commanders need insight and vision in order to unveil adversary plans and actions as well as 'foresee our own goals and appropriate plans and actions."
"Commanders need focus and direction to achieve some goal or aim."
"Commanders need adaptability to cope with uncertain and ever-changing circumstances."
"Commanders need security to remain unpredictable."
Compare that to the following:
"Commander tasks. Execute the role of the commander by understanding the problem, visualizing the end state, and nature and design of the operation, describing the time, space, resources, and purpose action, direct the warfighting functions, and constantly assess the process. Develop teams among modular formations, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must build teams with assigned and supporting organizations as well as with joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must lead inform and influence activities by establishing themes and messages and personally engaging key players. Effective full-spectrum operations require commanders to establish and synchronize information themes and messages and integrate with actions to achieve a desired end state."
"Mission command envisions commanders enabling agile and adaptive leaders and organizations to execute dutiful initiative within the commander’s intent as part of unified action in a complex and ambiguous environment. Mission command offers no panacea or rigid formula for success. Instead, it is integral to successful full-spectrum operations, challenging leaders to cultivate a bias for action in subordinates, develop mutual trust and understanding, and exercise moral nerve and restraint."
"(1) Mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative. These are keystones of mission command, energizing subordinates to accomplish assigned missions (tasks) in accord with the commander’s intent (purpose). Mission command thrives where mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative outweigh the sum of all fears."
Insight and Vision = Understanding the problem and its' context
Focus and Direction = Themes and messages
Adaptability = Agility and dutiful initiative
Security = Trust
I blog about human being leader development and how it happens (or does not happen) in the context of the Army. These same processes happen in industry or academia, just with a different vocabulary. The themes themselves are universal. Any industry that wants to survive must see itself clearly, understand the human beings who reside in it, develop them in context with it's expected norms and do the same for the environment it is working in. The acronyms and abbreviations might be different, but the concepts remain the same. That is why you don't have to be in the Army to read this as long as you don't get too wrapped up in the language of the Army.
There will be a return to emphasizing personal leader development throughout the Army in the next 5 to 10 years. The circumstances demand it. Thankfully, we have some leaders in the Army today who recognized this need and are already addressing it. If you follow my work at all, I routinely cite the work of Don Vandergriff, LTG Hertling, and recently, the ideas and comments of LTG Caslen and General Demspey because these are the people who are leading this process. I also hope that my thoughts here contribute a little to that discussion. It is now time for the rest of us to study what has been put out there, embrace the requirements of the next 25 years, and do everything in our power to ensure we provide the next generation of leaders the tools they need and a proper climate to prevail in the 'contest of wills' that is warfare.
The future is now. The development of one young Lieutenant, one young Noncommissioned officer, and one young Soldier is our responsibility. Done correctly, it will become our legacy. Done incorrectly, we will do a disservice to the nation.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. The blog gained an additional 120 viewers this week. I am grateful to everyone who follows it.
Recently the Army has published a series of pamphlets outlining how it intends to operate for the next decade or so. What its' projected missions look like, how the system will function, and what it thinks it's requirements will be in different areas. This started with something called the Army Capstone Concept published in Dec 2009, which outlines very broadly what the Army predicts the future will look like in terms of threat, and what will be needed to meet it's requirements. In general, the ACC takes advantage of lessons learned from the last decade of conflict and combines them with the most likely course of events for the next 10 years or more to determine what capabilities the Army must possess in order to remain a predominant power and conduct the nation's land warfare business. The Capstone Concept was followed by The Army Operating Concept which outlined two broad functions that the Army must provide - combined arms maneuver and wide area security. And just two weeks ago, another volume was published entitled "The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command". You can find the link to all of these papers below:
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm
The "Mission Command" pamphlet is a critically important document and well worth the read for both military and non-military alike for it speaks more to the human element of leading people in decentralized environments (business or war) than anything I have seen to date. It moves the discussion from one of command and control, to one of mission command. Two very different things. Importantly, this document begins with an explicit recognition that technology has limitations and wars are fought in and amongst people.
"The renewed emphasis on mission command corrects the 1990s defense transformation view that emerging technologies would lift the fog of war and allow unprecedented awareness of every aspect of future operations. This view argued that operational images and graphics displayed on computer screens, in combination with processes such as system-of-systems analysis and operational net assessment, would permit an all-knowing headquarters to develop detailed plans, make near-perfect decisions, closely control organizations, and direct operations toward mission accomplishment.
In fact, however, operations over the past decade have reminded the Army that armed conflict is first a human undertaking and what matters most are the opaque intentions, dynamic relationships, and covert actions of human groups, mostly invisible to technical intelligence. Additionally, the same technology that provides greater awareness to higher headquarters also enables subordinates to be better informed and to make better and timelier decisions. Thus, the U.S. Army is more committed than ever to the concept of mission command."
It then goes on to say:
"It establishes operational adaptability as its central tenet and asserts success in future armed conflict depends on the ability of Army leaders and forces to understand the situation in breadth, depth, and context; then develop the situation through action in close contact with enemies and civil populations."
and
"TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full-Spectrum Operations 2015-2024 emphasizes optimization of the cognitive, physical, and social components of every Soldier with the objective to improve the acquisition and selection of personnel; maximize leader and organizational development; establish the ability to rapidly adjust, deliver, and provide accessibility of training and education ultimately balancing Soldier knowledge, skills, and abilities with full-spectrum operations mission requirements."
The "Human Dimension" document is one that I referenced very early on in my writings as something we all need to study and use in our daily interactions. I continue to suggest it to all leaders as they attempt to understand their subordinates and how to develop them and make use of their particular skills and abilities.
The "Functional Concept for Mission Command" pamphlet contains a lot of things that also reinforce many of my personal observations and thoughts as the blog has progressed. Consider the following:
"The purpose of military action is never purely destructive. In every case, it is to influence the behavior of various groups of human beings toward some greater purpose. Since humans are products of their genetic inheritance, education, and experience, they perceive the world selectively, making judgments of fact and of value. They continually negotiate their perceptions and interpretations of the world with others. Thus, key individuals in any mission are as influenced from inside this system of humans as much as they are by outside intervention. Not surprisingly, therefore, they do not always behave in a logical and rational way....Prevailing in the contest of wills will require acute understanding of human behavior and place increasing demands on leaders to make decisions and act without the benefit of complete information."
While these statements are generally focused on the idea of understanding with regard to potential adversaries, I believe that their central themes of exercising influence over human beings towards the achievement of a common goal, understanding the vaguaries and individuality of human beings, and decision making in context are equally applicable to leading our own Soldiers. Remember, the Army defines leadership as:
"The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."
Seems the same as "Influencing the behavior of various groups of human beings towards some greater purpose" to me. Only that by Orientation we read the paragraph from the "Mission Command" document as being outward focused and the leadership definition as being inward focused. In fact they are both saying the same thing.
Paragraph 2-3 of the document states the following:
"Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders, supported by their staffs, that fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers subordinate leaders to develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively within the commander’s intent."
Suddenly, the idea of leadership, or the role of the leader, begins to shift away from commanding something and more towards themes of trust development, the exercise of initiative and the empowerment of subordinates. A fundamental role of the commander or leader becomes the enhancement of his or her subordinates to be able to act quickly, make ethical decisions and take actions with the faith and confidence of their seniors. This paragraph explicitly affirms the need for leaders to spend significant time and energy in articulating the desired outcomes and allowing their subordinates as much freedom as possible to achieve them, all in support of the mission and the ethical/moral expectations of the institution and the nation. This is a direct refutation of the micro-management and fear based development that many leaders today have experienced. We have finally accepted that the complexities of the decentralized environment are too much for any one person to be able to exert direct command and control over. The changed environment is dictating that we cannot control every action therefore we have to trust that our subordinates can understand what must be done, understand their left and right limits, and can recognize when a changing situation requires a new understanding.
We have come full circle. And whether or not they acknowledge it, the Army has certainly returned to the OODA cycle and the work of John Boyd. The emphasis on "Orientation" is found throughout the "Mission Command" document. Of everything I have read since learning about Boyd two years ago, this pamphlet is a very close interpretation of Boyd's "Organic Design for Command and Control".
Consider the following from Boyd:
"Commanders need insight and vision in order to unveil adversary plans and actions as well as 'foresee our own goals and appropriate plans and actions."
"Commanders need focus and direction to achieve some goal or aim."
"Commanders need adaptability to cope with uncertain and ever-changing circumstances."
"Commanders need security to remain unpredictable."
Compare that to the following:
"Commander tasks. Execute the role of the commander by understanding the problem, visualizing the end state, and nature and design of the operation, describing the time, space, resources, and purpose action, direct the warfighting functions, and constantly assess the process. Develop teams among modular formations, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must build teams with assigned and supporting organizations as well as with joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The commander must lead inform and influence activities by establishing themes and messages and personally engaging key players. Effective full-spectrum operations require commanders to establish and synchronize information themes and messages and integrate with actions to achieve a desired end state."
"Mission command envisions commanders enabling agile and adaptive leaders and organizations to execute dutiful initiative within the commander’s intent as part of unified action in a complex and ambiguous environment. Mission command offers no panacea or rigid formula for success. Instead, it is integral to successful full-spectrum operations, challenging leaders to cultivate a bias for action in subordinates, develop mutual trust and understanding, and exercise moral nerve and restraint."
"(1) Mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative. These are keystones of mission command, energizing subordinates to accomplish assigned missions (tasks) in accord with the commander’s intent (purpose). Mission command thrives where mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative outweigh the sum of all fears."
Insight and Vision = Understanding the problem and its' context
Focus and Direction = Themes and messages
Adaptability = Agility and dutiful initiative
Security = Trust
I blog about human being leader development and how it happens (or does not happen) in the context of the Army. These same processes happen in industry or academia, just with a different vocabulary. The themes themselves are universal. Any industry that wants to survive must see itself clearly, understand the human beings who reside in it, develop them in context with it's expected norms and do the same for the environment it is working in. The acronyms and abbreviations might be different, but the concepts remain the same. That is why you don't have to be in the Army to read this as long as you don't get too wrapped up in the language of the Army.
There will be a return to emphasizing personal leader development throughout the Army in the next 5 to 10 years. The circumstances demand it. Thankfully, we have some leaders in the Army today who recognized this need and are already addressing it. If you follow my work at all, I routinely cite the work of Don Vandergriff, LTG Hertling, and recently, the ideas and comments of LTG Caslen and General Demspey because these are the people who are leading this process. I also hope that my thoughts here contribute a little to that discussion. It is now time for the rest of us to study what has been put out there, embrace the requirements of the next 25 years, and do everything in our power to ensure we provide the next generation of leaders the tools they need and a proper climate to prevail in the 'contest of wills' that is warfare.
The future is now. The development of one young Lieutenant, one young Noncommissioned officer, and one young Soldier is our responsibility. Done correctly, it will become our legacy. Done incorrectly, we will do a disservice to the nation.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. The blog gained an additional 120 viewers this week. I am grateful to everyone who follows it.
#90 The Professional Ethic vol. 1
A few weeks back in an earlier post, I attached a video from General Martin Dempsey, the commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, where he mentioned that 2011 was going to be "The Year of the Professional Military Ethic". He had determined that it might be time for the Army to revisit it's ethic - what it stands for, and how it operates; to ask what is it that makes us a profession in the first place? After almost a decade of war, the requirement to rapidly adjust the manner and method by which it has been prosecuted, and in the face of public scrutiny as to it's purpose, he has determined that the Army needs to take a look at itself and ask if we are living up to those requirements that grant us our special place in society. What does it mean to be the 'profession of arms'?
So, as usual, I went looking for source material and I came across a 1989 article by Mark S. Frankel from the American Association for the Advancement of Science entitled, "Professional Codes: Why? How? And With What Impact" which I think provides a great starting point for this post, and the overall discussion. There is almost no part of the article that didn't resonate with me. Although it is not specifically addressed toward the military, Mr. Frankel has provided a very appropriate framework for the discussion of any profession and this could certainly be used by the Army as we look at ourselves in the early part of the 21st century.
You can find the link here:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt675454l5j72v3h/fulltext.pdf
The first paragraph of the introduction says a lot about the changing conditions that we live in:
"Not too long ago, discussions of professional ethics were confined mainly within the professions themselves. This is no longer the case, however. In recent years, a blend of economic, social, legal, and political events has had a profound effect not only on the behavior and performance of professionals, but also on the public's expectations of them. The days of unquestioned trust and admiration on the part of clients or the general public are past."
This is an important consideration. In earlier periods, people had a rather blind faith in their institutions. There was an unspoken and comforting trust that the government was always looking out for the best interests of the citizenry. That the corporation would take care of you after you had given it 20 years of hard work and dedication. That if Walter Cronkite said the world was safe that night, then you could take it to the bank. There was comfort that the we were the 'good guys' and that America always worked altruistically to care for its' people. There was a faith that doctors were diligently working to stop the spread of disease, that the law always possessed some higher ideal of justice, and that our faith organizations were always centered on providing the moral framework by which we lead our lives.
Sadly, none of us are that naive anymore. We know that governments are no better than the people who inhabit them, that both doctors and lawyers keep a steady eye on their bottom line, and that faith organizations often have political agendas well beyond (and sometimes outside of) their moral and spiritual teachings.
The Army is no different. The Army as an institution is inhabited by people whose character and values are no better or no worse than the society that produces them. Due to the proliferation of technology and the availability of information, the institution is no longer allowed to be self-policing and immune from public scrutiny. The moral underpinnings of who we are as an Army, and how we define ourselves both inside the organization and with an eye toward our relationship with the nation have been tested by the requirements of the conflicts we are involved in. General Dempsey is correct, it is time to re-look our professional military ethic.
Consider the following paragraph from a paper entitled "The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict" written by Don Snyder, Paul Oh, and Kevin Toner in October 2009 and published by the Strategic Studies Institute:
"...Release in May 2007 of a Military Health Advisory Team (MHAT-IV) survey of fewer than 2,000 soldiers and Marines who had served in units with “the highest level of combat exposure” in Iraq found that: “approximately 10 percent of soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants or damaging property when it was not necessary. Only 47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Well over a third of all soldiers and Marines reported that torture should be allowed to save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine. And less than half of soldiers or Marines would report a team member for unethical behavior. Although Army doctrine (FM 3-24) specifies an embedded ethic that “preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment” in counterinsurgency, the survey reported that between one-third and one-half of soldiers and Marines who answered the survey dismissed the importance or truth of non-combatants’ dignity and respect."
While that paragraph is attributed in the monologue to an unpublished paper by Maj Celestino Perez, the statistics outlined in it should give us all pause for thought.
The SSI monologue can be found here and is well worth reading:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=895
What is it that makes us a profession and not a gang? What moral, social, behavioral, and structural constructs define us? What mechanisms do we have for policing ourselves and are they effective? What indicators do we have that our ethic is commonly understood by all our members? What method do we use to ensure their understanding? These are all incredibly important and complex questions but I do think that by using the two sources above we can begin to at least frame the discussion.
Since I generally concentrate my writing on the more personal aspects of leadership at the micro level, all of the above may seem to be an extremely long introduction to these ideas:
1. Servitude: We must make a distinction between the institution that serves the nation and the leader who serves the subordinate. They are not interchangeable. While the words we use may be similar, they have vastly different connotations. The dynamics of the interaction between the Army and the nation is structural while the interaction between a leader and the led is much more personal. I am not equipped or knowledgeable enough to understand the mechanics of how the institution works but I can speak to the servitude of leaders toward their subordinates. There must be a renewed sense in our officer and non-commissioned officer corps that a significant portion of a leader's responsibility is to serve their subordinates, not the other way around. This emphasis on servant leadership cannot only be that the individual leader is a servant of the organization or the nation, but that they fulfill that ideal by serving their subordinates.
2. Moral (Ethical) Development: The basis for any application of the warrior's professional skills must be rooted in the ethical and moral framework of the nation. The nation is our client. We need to understand what the nation expects of us and how we respond to it at the personal level. Our Soldiers need to be constantly exposed in training and every day encounters to morally ambiguous situations and forced to make decisions. Much like we practice the same battle drills and maneuvers over and over until we have mastered them, we should make moral and ethical decision making an imperative at all levels. Ethical decision games should share equal (or maybe even higher) footing with tactical decision games. Beating the enemy is easy. Beating the enemy in a manner consistent with the nation's ethical expectations is infinitely more difficult. Because we draw the members of our profession from all walks and stations of society, we must have some mechanism to impress our behavioral requirements and their importance upon our members. The Soldier must understand why and how their behavior as a professional has an impact on how we conduct our business and why those things must remain consistent with the nation's expectations. We must also accept that simply putting on the uniform and reciting an oath does not make one a professional. Only when we absorb the moral and behavioral understandings of the institution do we begin to move from employee to professional. From mercenary to warrior. Ethical decision making, consistent with our charter with the nation is arguably more important than our ability to fight. Without a binding set of acceptable norms and behaviors, we are nothing more than a federally sanctioned gang. What are those norms and behaviors? Are they relevant? Do they reflect the nation's needs? Are they real, or simply entrenched ideas from past generations?
3. The Institution vs Reality: Part of the discussion of any professional ethic must address the self-preservation inclination of the institution itself versus the relevancy of that institution to the current situation. You cannot call yourself a profession if the service you provide has no customer who desires and accepts it. Not only the product, but also the method of delivery. We will certainly need to look at ourselves and ask if our particular set of skills actually do provide the nation what it expects, or are we simply selling a product that the consumer does not want? Have we been oversold to the nation and had promises made on our behalf that we cannot live up to? Principle to that, we must claim as a virtue the requirement for open dialogue, disagreement, and learning as it applies to adaptation and agility. We must create climates that encourage transparency and if the structure doesn't support that, then the structure must be changed. When the needs of the consumer (the nation or the Soldier) are being addressed appropriately by the service provider (the Army, or the leader) in a manner of clear understanding and expectation, then respect and trust are gained. When they are not, the standing of any profession is diminished. In short, we and the nation must see ourselves clearly.
4. Individual Value: We must value each and every member of the profession. Everything we do, say, demonstrate and teach must begin with the recognition that the profession has a responsibility to develop and care for its' members. And since each member is unique, each method of development and caring must be as well. We must require, support, and enhance mental, moral, spiritual and physical growth. We need to hang our hat on the development of just one 18 year old kid.
Servant Leadership at the personal level, based upon a commonly understood ethical and moral construct, coupled with a valued recognition for candor, respect and dialogue, all of which is focused on the development of a citizen soldier into a professional warrior. Although the discussion is much more complex than that, this might be a good place to start.
I titled this post "The Professional Ethic vol. 1" for a reason. As this year progresses, I'm pretty sure there will be a couple more volumes to this series.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. I look forward to hearing from you.
So, as usual, I went looking for source material and I came across a 1989 article by Mark S. Frankel from the American Association for the Advancement of Science entitled, "Professional Codes: Why? How? And With What Impact" which I think provides a great starting point for this post, and the overall discussion. There is almost no part of the article that didn't resonate with me. Although it is not specifically addressed toward the military, Mr. Frankel has provided a very appropriate framework for the discussion of any profession and this could certainly be used by the Army as we look at ourselves in the early part of the 21st century.
You can find the link here:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/xt675454l5j72v3h/fulltext.pdf
The first paragraph of the introduction says a lot about the changing conditions that we live in:
"Not too long ago, discussions of professional ethics were confined mainly within the professions themselves. This is no longer the case, however. In recent years, a blend of economic, social, legal, and political events has had a profound effect not only on the behavior and performance of professionals, but also on the public's expectations of them. The days of unquestioned trust and admiration on the part of clients or the general public are past."
This is an important consideration. In earlier periods, people had a rather blind faith in their institutions. There was an unspoken and comforting trust that the government was always looking out for the best interests of the citizenry. That the corporation would take care of you after you had given it 20 years of hard work and dedication. That if Walter Cronkite said the world was safe that night, then you could take it to the bank. There was comfort that the we were the 'good guys' and that America always worked altruistically to care for its' people. There was a faith that doctors were diligently working to stop the spread of disease, that the law always possessed some higher ideal of justice, and that our faith organizations were always centered on providing the moral framework by which we lead our lives.
Sadly, none of us are that naive anymore. We know that governments are no better than the people who inhabit them, that both doctors and lawyers keep a steady eye on their bottom line, and that faith organizations often have political agendas well beyond (and sometimes outside of) their moral and spiritual teachings.
The Army is no different. The Army as an institution is inhabited by people whose character and values are no better or no worse than the society that produces them. Due to the proliferation of technology and the availability of information, the institution is no longer allowed to be self-policing and immune from public scrutiny. The moral underpinnings of who we are as an Army, and how we define ourselves both inside the organization and with an eye toward our relationship with the nation have been tested by the requirements of the conflicts we are involved in. General Dempsey is correct, it is time to re-look our professional military ethic.
Consider the following paragraph from a paper entitled "The Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict" written by Don Snyder, Paul Oh, and Kevin Toner in October 2009 and published by the Strategic Studies Institute:
"...Release in May 2007 of a Military Health Advisory Team (MHAT-IV) survey of fewer than 2,000 soldiers and Marines who had served in units with “the highest level of combat exposure” in Iraq found that: “approximately 10 percent of soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants or damaging property when it was not necessary. Only 47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Well over a third of all soldiers and Marines reported that torture should be allowed to save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine. And less than half of soldiers or Marines would report a team member for unethical behavior. Although Army doctrine (FM 3-24) specifies an embedded ethic that “preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment” in counterinsurgency, the survey reported that between one-third and one-half of soldiers and Marines who answered the survey dismissed the importance or truth of non-combatants’ dignity and respect."
While that paragraph is attributed in the monologue to an unpublished paper by Maj Celestino Perez, the statistics outlined in it should give us all pause for thought.
The SSI monologue can be found here and is well worth reading:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=895
What is it that makes us a profession and not a gang? What moral, social, behavioral, and structural constructs define us? What mechanisms do we have for policing ourselves and are they effective? What indicators do we have that our ethic is commonly understood by all our members? What method do we use to ensure their understanding? These are all incredibly important and complex questions but I do think that by using the two sources above we can begin to at least frame the discussion.
Since I generally concentrate my writing on the more personal aspects of leadership at the micro level, all of the above may seem to be an extremely long introduction to these ideas:
1. Servitude: We must make a distinction between the institution that serves the nation and the leader who serves the subordinate. They are not interchangeable. While the words we use may be similar, they have vastly different connotations. The dynamics of the interaction between the Army and the nation is structural while the interaction between a leader and the led is much more personal. I am not equipped or knowledgeable enough to understand the mechanics of how the institution works but I can speak to the servitude of leaders toward their subordinates. There must be a renewed sense in our officer and non-commissioned officer corps that a significant portion of a leader's responsibility is to serve their subordinates, not the other way around. This emphasis on servant leadership cannot only be that the individual leader is a servant of the organization or the nation, but that they fulfill that ideal by serving their subordinates.
2. Moral (Ethical) Development: The basis for any application of the warrior's professional skills must be rooted in the ethical and moral framework of the nation. The nation is our client. We need to understand what the nation expects of us and how we respond to it at the personal level. Our Soldiers need to be constantly exposed in training and every day encounters to morally ambiguous situations and forced to make decisions. Much like we practice the same battle drills and maneuvers over and over until we have mastered them, we should make moral and ethical decision making an imperative at all levels. Ethical decision games should share equal (or maybe even higher) footing with tactical decision games. Beating the enemy is easy. Beating the enemy in a manner consistent with the nation's ethical expectations is infinitely more difficult. Because we draw the members of our profession from all walks and stations of society, we must have some mechanism to impress our behavioral requirements and their importance upon our members. The Soldier must understand why and how their behavior as a professional has an impact on how we conduct our business and why those things must remain consistent with the nation's expectations. We must also accept that simply putting on the uniform and reciting an oath does not make one a professional. Only when we absorb the moral and behavioral understandings of the institution do we begin to move from employee to professional. From mercenary to warrior. Ethical decision making, consistent with our charter with the nation is arguably more important than our ability to fight. Without a binding set of acceptable norms and behaviors, we are nothing more than a federally sanctioned gang. What are those norms and behaviors? Are they relevant? Do they reflect the nation's needs? Are they real, or simply entrenched ideas from past generations?
3. The Institution vs Reality: Part of the discussion of any professional ethic must address the self-preservation inclination of the institution itself versus the relevancy of that institution to the current situation. You cannot call yourself a profession if the service you provide has no customer who desires and accepts it. Not only the product, but also the method of delivery. We will certainly need to look at ourselves and ask if our particular set of skills actually do provide the nation what it expects, or are we simply selling a product that the consumer does not want? Have we been oversold to the nation and had promises made on our behalf that we cannot live up to? Principle to that, we must claim as a virtue the requirement for open dialogue, disagreement, and learning as it applies to adaptation and agility. We must create climates that encourage transparency and if the structure doesn't support that, then the structure must be changed. When the needs of the consumer (the nation or the Soldier) are being addressed appropriately by the service provider (the Army, or the leader) in a manner of clear understanding and expectation, then respect and trust are gained. When they are not, the standing of any profession is diminished. In short, we and the nation must see ourselves clearly.
4. Individual Value: We must value each and every member of the profession. Everything we do, say, demonstrate and teach must begin with the recognition that the profession has a responsibility to develop and care for its' members. And since each member is unique, each method of development and caring must be as well. We must require, support, and enhance mental, moral, spiritual and physical growth. We need to hang our hat on the development of just one 18 year old kid.
Servant Leadership at the personal level, based upon a commonly understood ethical and moral construct, coupled with a valued recognition for candor, respect and dialogue, all of which is focused on the development of a citizen soldier into a professional warrior. Although the discussion is much more complex than that, this might be a good place to start.
I titled this post "The Professional Ethic vol. 1" for a reason. As this year progresses, I'm pretty sure there will be a couple more volumes to this series.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. I look forward to hearing from you.
#89 A Craftsman's Touch
Throughout my Army career, there has always existed the idea that you can 'teach' leadership. All our schooling, both officer and non-commissioned officer, is centered around things that can be learned, memorized and then replicated. The teaching follows a very empirical, scientific and programmatic model. For example, I was raised to believe that there are essentially three types of leaders, directive, delagative, and combined. There were attributes and skills associated with each of the three types and the young NCO was supposed to be able to work with each of them as the situation required. Sometimes I would be required to be directive, sometimes I could be delagative and sometimes the task would require a mix of the two. The complexities of human behavior and interaction had been whittled down to 3 options. Of course, as brand new leaders, we were asked to describe which of those 3 options fit us best. Because no one likes extremes, most of us decided that we mostly worked in a combined manner but one that leaned heavily towards directive. I believe that this has a lot to do with a hidden realization that behaviorally Americans don't like, or respond well to autocratic people, but that the Army is in fact structured to support autocracy (which is clear and clean-cut) better than it supports the less clear forms of delegation or some variable combination of styles. Either way, a delagative style was not perceived to be a very strong option. You would hear a lot of, "I'm pretty directive with my Soldiers, they do what I tell them to do, when I tell them to do it." That statement would then be tempered with something like, "But if they already know the task, then I'll leave them alone and if there's a better way to do it then I'll let them try it." I still hear a lot of those same thoughts today from our youngest leaders. The concept of leadership in our Army is taught very clearly in analytical and scientific terms. Westerners like order, structure, and measurable outcomes. We prefer the assembly line over the craftsman. While there is an appreciation for the craftsman's skill and the beauty of his projects, there still remains the notion that his skill and the time it takes to produce one item is wasteful and that an assembly line approach will be better. I can sell one Rolls Royce, or I can sell one hundred Chevrolets.
This sort of assembly line model pervades everything we do. As soon as someone identifies a need for anything in the Army and that need is institutionally validated, the solution will be crafted in such a manner as to produce an outcome that can be replicated over and over. This is the whole notion of Task, Condition, and Standard. A need to train on this or that task is identified and validated. From that point an arbitrary condition will be created which will allow the developer to create a consistent measurable standard that can be applied uniformly across the entire Army spectrum. Every Soldier will be faced with this task, under these conditions, and be required to achieve this minimum standard. In fact, there is a whole subset of folks who work for the Army and their sole job in life is to develop the Tasks, the Conditions, and the Standards.
In light of this, I came across an article on the Small Wars Journal website last week by Col (Ret) Christopher Paparone entitled, "Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis" that caught my attention. You can find the link here:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/569-paparone.pdf
In general the article states that using an empirical scientific model, most conventional armies attempt to keep dissecting a problem into smaller and smaller bite-sized tasks (missions) that when stacked together become the building blocks that solve a strategic issue. The Soldier maintains his/her rifle. That rifle functions properly as the squad lays in an ambush position. The squad ambushes the enemy. The enemy is killed. The squad fulfills their portion of the platoon mission which fulfills their portion of the company mission, which fulfills their portion of the battalion mission etc until all those blocks together fulfill a national strategic objective. Col Paparone and others describe this as a "scientific method" or "empirical realism" view of problem solving. This is then compared/contrasted with a more personal, intuitive, and behavioral model which is termed "critical realism". The difference between the two as outlined in the article:
"From the viewpoint on left side of the continuum, tasks are ―mission-analyzable, that is they can be pre-programmed or planned. Organization theorist Charles Perrow called these types routine tasks (accomplished by standing, requisite organized capabilities—core competencies or, for the US military, ―METLs) and engineering (planning organized capabilities in combination—task organizations) tasks. Looking from the right side of the continuum, tasks are unpredictable and improvisational; hence, Perrow called these craftwork (the creative, improvisational use of already organized capabilities) or emergent (requiring the localized reforming into novel organizational entities) tasks."
Routine Tasks and Engineering Tasks vs Craftwork or Emergent Tasks
We lead human beings. Individual, emotive, thoughtful, distinct, people. No two are exactly the same. You cannot build an assembly line to produce the exact same model over and over. The 'scientific method' will not work when trying to influence people. People - and their development into leaders - is the work of the craftsman, not the stacking of thousands of parts that all come together to complete the aim of the organization.
This example might make more sense if you see the development of the leader as the 'strategic goal' of the mission. The institutional model of programmatic design stacks blocks on top of each other from the individual Soldier all the way up to the national interest, in the same manner that the scientific leader development model stacks finite options together to achieve some defined view of a 'leader'. What this scientific model leaves out are the idiosyncrasies and vagaries of person, the environment and the point in time that a leadership decision needs to be made.
This is a critically important realization. By using a 'scientific' quantifiable model of leader development we have essentially discarded a learning model that is much more well suited to creating thoughtful, adaptive, unique individual leaders with the skills, abilities and attributes we need for our current conflicts. I don't think most of our leader developers today see themselves as craftsman. They are more likely to view themselves as production line managers.
At this point I'd like you to go to the following link:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/11/the-last-patrol/8266
This article was sent to me this week by a colleague and it struck such a chord that I posted it to Facebook that night and it was picked up by BCKS the next day. Please be careful to both read the article and watch the video. The video will give people a really good view of some of the behaviors I was talking about in post #86, "One Clear Moment", but it should also make everyone consider the leadership methods were used in their own development and ask themselves whether or not those methods would work under the conditions described in the article. As powerful as the video is, the written portion is more important. Take the following paragraph:
"The day after the joint patrol, the 101st leadership met with Gerhart, Knollinger, Farnsworth, and Lachance for an after-action review, to discuss what had gone right and wrong during the mission. Gerhart flipped through index cards on which he’d prepared notes. His suggestions were sound—better hydration, classes on patrolling techniques and using radios, pre-patrol inspections of soldiers’ equipment—but his delivery was abrasive and accusatory. Why, he asked, had it taken the reinforcements from Combat Outpost Tynes six hours to show up after the first casualties were reported?
This sort of assembly line model pervades everything we do. As soon as someone identifies a need for anything in the Army and that need is institutionally validated, the solution will be crafted in such a manner as to produce an outcome that can be replicated over and over. This is the whole notion of Task, Condition, and Standard. A need to train on this or that task is identified and validated. From that point an arbitrary condition will be created which will allow the developer to create a consistent measurable standard that can be applied uniformly across the entire Army spectrum. Every Soldier will be faced with this task, under these conditions, and be required to achieve this minimum standard. In fact, there is a whole subset of folks who work for the Army and their sole job in life is to develop the Tasks, the Conditions, and the Standards.
In light of this, I came across an article on the Small Wars Journal website last week by Col (Ret) Christopher Paparone entitled, "Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis" that caught my attention. You can find the link here:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/569-paparone.pdf
In general the article states that using an empirical scientific model, most conventional armies attempt to keep dissecting a problem into smaller and smaller bite-sized tasks (missions) that when stacked together become the building blocks that solve a strategic issue. The Soldier maintains his/her rifle. That rifle functions properly as the squad lays in an ambush position. The squad ambushes the enemy. The enemy is killed. The squad fulfills their portion of the platoon mission which fulfills their portion of the company mission, which fulfills their portion of the battalion mission etc until all those blocks together fulfill a national strategic objective. Col Paparone and others describe this as a "scientific method" or "empirical realism" view of problem solving. This is then compared/contrasted with a more personal, intuitive, and behavioral model which is termed "critical realism". The difference between the two as outlined in the article:
"From the viewpoint on left side of the continuum, tasks are ―mission-analyzable, that is they can be pre-programmed or planned. Organization theorist Charles Perrow called these types routine tasks (accomplished by standing, requisite organized capabilities—core competencies or, for the US military, ―METLs) and engineering (planning organized capabilities in combination—task organizations) tasks. Looking from the right side of the continuum, tasks are unpredictable and improvisational; hence, Perrow called these craftwork (the creative, improvisational use of already organized capabilities) or emergent (requiring the localized reforming into novel organizational entities) tasks."
Routine Tasks and Engineering Tasks vs Craftwork or Emergent Tasks
We lead human beings. Individual, emotive, thoughtful, distinct, people. No two are exactly the same. You cannot build an assembly line to produce the exact same model over and over. The 'scientific method' will not work when trying to influence people. People - and their development into leaders - is the work of the craftsman, not the stacking of thousands of parts that all come together to complete the aim of the organization.
This example might make more sense if you see the development of the leader as the 'strategic goal' of the mission. The institutional model of programmatic design stacks blocks on top of each other from the individual Soldier all the way up to the national interest, in the same manner that the scientific leader development model stacks finite options together to achieve some defined view of a 'leader'. What this scientific model leaves out are the idiosyncrasies and vagaries of person, the environment and the point in time that a leadership decision needs to be made.
This is a critically important realization. By using a 'scientific' quantifiable model of leader development we have essentially discarded a learning model that is much more well suited to creating thoughtful, adaptive, unique individual leaders with the skills, abilities and attributes we need for our current conflicts. I don't think most of our leader developers today see themselves as craftsman. They are more likely to view themselves as production line managers.
At this point I'd like you to go to the following link:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/11/the-last-patrol/8266
This article was sent to me this week by a colleague and it struck such a chord that I posted it to Facebook that night and it was picked up by BCKS the next day. Please be careful to both read the article and watch the video. The video will give people a really good view of some of the behaviors I was talking about in post #86, "One Clear Moment", but it should also make everyone consider the leadership methods were used in their own development and ask themselves whether or not those methods would work under the conditions described in the article. As powerful as the video is, the written portion is more important. Take the following paragraph:
"The day after the joint patrol, the 101st leadership met with Gerhart, Knollinger, Farnsworth, and Lachance for an after-action review, to discuss what had gone right and wrong during the mission. Gerhart flipped through index cards on which he’d prepared notes. His suggestions were sound—better hydration, classes on patrolling techniques and using radios, pre-patrol inspections of soldiers’ equipment—but his delivery was abrasive and accusatory. Why, he asked, had it taken the reinforcements from Combat Outpost Tynes six hours to show up after the first casualties were reported?
The IED threat was extreme, Tom Banister, the new unit’s first sergeant, said, and he hadn’t wanted to risk more heat casualties while trying to reach the compound on foot. So they ended up waiting for helicopters.
“I guess I’m just used to being out there with hard-charging guys,” Gerhart said.
Since arriving at Tynes, Banister had found himself in the bizarre situation of deferring to men who weren’t yet born when he’d joined the Army, 24 years earlier. He accepted that his and his soldiers’ learning curve was steep. But he couldn’t tolerate Gerhart’s near-constant impertinence, and the general condescension from the 82nd paratroopers toward their replacements. “We appreciate all you guys have done, we really do,” he said. “What I don’t appreciate, what gives me the ass, is your holier-than-thou attitude that we’re incompetent and unprepared for this mission. Roger. I got that. We’re a field artillery unit tasked with an infantry job. Are we going to take casualties? Hell yeah, we are. We know that.” His vocal cords tightened with emotion. He paused. “Don’t count us out,” he said. “We’re a fighting force. We’re not going to leave you hanging. We evacuated our guys, but we brought you 20 more.”
This is only one example from a very powerful piece about why leader development needs to take a much less 'scientific' approach and a much more 'craftsman' approach. For every reason laid out in a schoolhouse that 1SG Banister should have crushed SSG Gerhart's action and attitude, it is only his absolute appreciation of the immense challenges faced by this young leader that prevented him from doing so. He had to choose. The option for a directive style based upon seniority and rank was always available to him. But his ability to recognize that using that approach would not advance anything was critically more important. This speaks volumes about judgment, recognition, respect, value, candor, honesty and real vs perceived power than almost anything else I've read lately. At age 22, SSG Gerhart has seen things that many will never see in a lifetime. He is "One Clear Moment" personified. For Banister to understand that reveals a lot. And none of those revealing things were taught in any leader school he attended. I guarantee it. I've been to those same schools. Banister's ability to read, recognize, respect and move through what could have been a horrible interchange speaks volumes about the craft of leadership and acts as a powerful message about the need to replace in our schoolhouses task driven, black and white, yes or no approaches and start to replace them with an artist's perception, a craftsman's feel for how our leader development programs should be tailored. Gerhart wasn't even born when Banister joined the Army. Their exchange exemplifies what happens when everything else gets stripped away. They were dealing from a position of mutual respect and trust. Two guys, worlds apart trying to accomplish a mission. There is a lot of craftsmanship involved.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#88 It Seems So Simple
Yesterday on Facebook I came across a link to a video presentation by COL (Ret) Jim Helis of the U.S. Army War College given on September 8, 2010, entitled "An Introduction to Clausewitz". I decided to watch it to see what is being taught at the Army's premier senior leader development school. If you are interested you can find the link to the video here:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AA8PUzLcacs
(If for some reason, the link doesn't work, you can go to You Tube and type US Army War College into the search bar. The video will be towards the top of the page.)
Toward the end of Dr. Helis' presentation there are a series of slides that seek to clarify Clausewitz's theories in bullet form. With regard to the role of theory, Clausewitz said:
"Theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that, as it were, have become confused and entangled."
"Theory is used to educate the mind of the commander."
"Theory is used to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry."
The next slide outlined Clausewitz's thoughts on all previous military theory...
"Previous attempts at theory are absolutely useless." "They aim at fixed values, but in war everything is uncertain."
"Dominance of psychological forces and effects."
"War is a continuous interaction of opposites." In the final slide that caught my eye, Dr. Helis outlined some key ideas of Clausewitian theory.
"War is an instrument of policy." "Battle is the decisive means in war which is "An act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." "Friction and fog are inevitable, which together can bring chance and uncertainty into play."
A final bullet that caught my attention was the idea that in war there exists a "Play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam"
What struck me about these quotations is how simple they are. "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" Well, duh! What else would it be? "Friction and fog are inevitable, which together bring chance and uncertainty into play." Welcome to my everyday life! These quotes seemed almost self-evident to me and seemed to beg the question why is Clausewitz considered one of the greatest military theorists of all time? This stuff is pretty obvious. And then it struck me. Like any other scientific theory, the beauty of Clausewitz may lie precisely in it's simplicity and universal appeal. He is speaking much more to the art of observation, consideration and thought and much less to the science of maneuver, mass and structure.
So then I started to turn the idea of simplicity towards leadership. Could it be that leadership is not really all that hard after all? Maybe all we need to look for are the basic principles of leadership and accept that the manner and method is really just technique. Has the Army confused leadership with management and tried to replace the dynamic environment of human interaction with the structural environment of institutional management? Maybe, like Clausewitz stated we could use theory "to clarify concepts that have become confused and entangled." Consider these ideas....
1. You lead people. You manage structures. (Seems pretty obvious)
2. In leading people, there must be an understanding that due to individual free will, there will always be friction, uncertainty, psychological interaction and chance. (This is an intuitive understanding that people do not really think about.)
Pretty simple ideas actually, but they are both layered with complexities that deserve a lot more consideration. For example, the recognition that leadership happens on human terrain, while management happens on structural terrain. If you take that idea and look at the Army or any other large entity, one thing you will find is an effort to impose the structure and it's ethics and norms, on the human terrain. We call it order and discipline. It is, at it's core, a restriction of individual free will by the structure in order to increase efficiency. Willful or not, the structure works against free will. The quest for an orderly structure - the perfect system - works against the the development of individual people. Almost our entire military education system is built upon learning how to manage the structure, not lead the people.
Take the second thought, that in order to lead people there must be an awareness and understanding that they retain some level of individual free will and because of that there will always be confrontations of interaction, uncertainty of understanding and the ability to take advantage of chance and circumstance. This is leadership completely independent of the organizational structure.
I think these ideas are pretty important. As I have mentioned in the last couple of posts, some very senior Army leaders are starting to look at how we lead. The idea that, as Gen Dempsey stated, "There are weak signals out there." Maybe some of our ideas on leadership have become overly confused and entangled but there is beginning to be an awareness that our concentration on structure and roles has had a significant impact on the people. If you look at the Army leader development schools, at least the ones I have attended, they paid scant attention to the difference between leading people and managing structures. What the institution called 'leading' a squad, platoon, company etc was actually a series of classes on how to efficiently manage it. How to use this or that tool, program, or process, to increase it's efficiency and effectiveness. The study of the people was not part of the curriculum. More importantly, neither was the study of ourselves. There was an assumption that each of us was fully formed in our understanding of the human being that we are and the human beings that we led. There was no real recognition that all human beings retain some degree of free will that will effect their interaction with the structure and can lead to friction and confusion. The behavioral problems we are struggling with now may be a result of not providing titular leaders with the ability to recognize and deal with this friction.
To bring this idea forward, go back and look at a lot of the people issues I have been mentioning lately such as suicide, domestic violence, the allure of combat, drug and alcohol abuse etc. It seems to me that there is a possibility that we may be struggling with these human issues because almost all of our study and consideration has been on the structure of the institution and not the basic principle that we lead human beings who posses free will and individual orientations towards their world. Maybe if we spent more time looking at the basic premise that leadership is vastly different than management we could begin to effect some necessary changes that the institution is struggling with. Maybe these are Gen Dempsey's 'weak signals' and LTG Caslen's recognition of the need for candor.
Watch what happens when you replace some words in Clausewitz's theories: Leadership is the continuous interaction of opposites.
In leadership everything is uncertain.
The very first sentence of FM 1, "The Army" is, "First and foremost the Army is Soldiers." That is a very profound sentence because it recognizes the primacy of the human being and recognizes that without the people, there is no institution. We have a tendency to overlook that when we make statements such as "the Army is bigger than the individual." When we do that we are replacing the primacy of the person with the primacy of the institution and thereby rendering the opening line of FM 1 untrue. This has also led directly to the concentration in our leader development programs on the institution and not the people.
Free flowing thought: The Army is people...People possess free will and independent thought...Human interaction leads to the friction and fog of differing orientation's...Leadership may be the continuous interaction of those differing orientations...There must be a primacy of psychological understanding...The outcome of leadership at the human being level is uncertain...The structure imposes it's own force on the individual in the form of management.
If you accept the thoughts above, then the recognition that we need to change our 'leader' development strategies to do three things become clear. First, we need to separate leading and managing. Second, we need to accept that a significant portion of leadership is the recognition of the psychological forces that work upon the individual. Finally, there is need to study the area where human being leadership and institutional management intersect. The solution to most of our current struggles with behavioral issues is most likely hovering around this intersection.
As Clausewitz recognized, a theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused. While my thoughts above are not complete (and have likely added confusion, not clarifying it), they do meet certain criteria for a theory of leadership. They are universal and they are simple. What seems obvious on the surface however, is actually very nuanced and complex. By looking at the institution and its' effect on the people and then looking at the people themselves, and most critically by advancing our self-study and orientation, we can likely gain a wider understanding of leadership and it's applications in a dynamic world.
As always, your thought and comments are welcome.
(If for some reason, the link doesn't work, you can go to You Tube and type US Army War College into the search bar. The video will be towards the top of the page.)
Toward the end of Dr. Helis' presentation there are a series of slides that seek to clarify Clausewitz's theories in bullet form. With regard to the role of theory, Clausewitz said:
"Theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that, as it were, have become confused and entangled."
"Theory is used to educate the mind of the commander."
"Theory is used to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry."
The next slide outlined Clausewitz's thoughts on all previous military theory...
"Dominance of psychological forces and effects."
"War is a continuous interaction of opposites."
"War is an instrument of policy."
A final bullet that caught my attention was the idea that in war there exists a "Play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam"
What struck me about these quotations is how simple they are. "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" Well, duh! What else would it be? "Friction and fog are inevitable, which together bring chance and uncertainty into play." Welcome to my everyday life! These quotes seemed almost self-evident to me and seemed to beg the question why is Clausewitz considered one of the greatest military theorists of all time? This stuff is pretty obvious. And then it struck me. Like any other scientific theory, the beauty of Clausewitz may lie precisely in it's simplicity and universal appeal. He is speaking much more to the art of observation, consideration and thought and much less to the science of maneuver, mass and structure.
So then I started to turn the idea of simplicity towards leadership. Could it be that leadership
1. You lead people. You manage structures. (Seems pretty obvious)
2. In leading people, there must be an understanding that due to individual free will, there will always be friction, uncertainty, psychological interaction and chance. (This is an intuitive understanding that people do not really think about.)
Pretty simple ideas actually, but they are both layered with complexities that deserve a lot more consideration. For example, the recognition that leadership happens on human terrain, while management happens on structural terrain. If you take that idea and look at the Army or any other large entity, one thing you will find is an effort to impose the structure and it's ethics and norms, on the human terrain. We call it order and discipline. It is, at it's core, a restriction of individual free will by the structure in order to increase efficiency. Willful or not, the structure works against free will. The quest for an orderly structure - the perfect system - works against the the development of individual people. Almost our entire military education system is built upon learning how to manage the structure, not lead the people.
Take the second thought, that in order to lead people there must be an awareness and understanding that they retain some level of individual free will and because of that there will always be confrontations of interaction, uncertainty of understanding and the ability to take advantage of chance and circumstance. This is leadership completely independent of the organizational structure.
I think these ideas are pretty important. As I have mentioned in the last couple of posts, some very senior Army leaders are starting to look at how we lead. The idea that, as Gen Dempsey stated, "There are weak signals out there." Maybe some of our ideas on leadership have become overly confused and entangled but there is beginning to be an awareness that our concentration on structure and roles has had a significant impact on the people.
To bring this idea forward, go back and look at a lot of the people issues I have been mentioning lately such as suicide, domestic violence, the allure of combat, drug and alcohol abuse etc. It seems to me that there is a possibility that we may be struggling with these human issues because almost all of our study and consideration has been on the structure of the institution and not the basic principle that we lead human beings who posses free will and individual orientations towards their world. Maybe if we spent more time looking at the basic premise that leadership is vastly different than management we could begin to effect some necessary changes that the institution is struggling with. Maybe these are Gen Dempsey's 'weak signals' and LTG Caslen's recognition of the need for candor.
Watch what happens when you replace some words in Clausewitz's theories:
In leadership everything is uncertain.
The very first sentence of FM 1, "The Army" is, "First and foremost the Army is Soldiers." That is a very profound sentence because it recognizes the primacy of the human being and recognizes that without the people, there is no institution. We have a tendency to overlook that when we make statements such as "the Army is bigger than the individual." When we do that we are replacing the primacy of the person with the primacy of the institution and thereby rendering the opening line of FM 1 untrue. This has also led directly to the concentration in our leader development programs on the institution and not the people.
Free flowing thought: The Army is people...People possess free will and independent thought...Human interaction leads to the friction and fog of differing orientation's...Leadership may be the continuous interaction of those differing orientations...There must be a primacy of psychological understanding...The outcome of leadership at the human being level is uncertain...The structure imposes it's own force on the individual in the form of management.
If you accept the thoughts above, then the recognition that we need to change our 'leader' development strategies to do three things become clear. First, we need to separate leading and managing. Second, we need to accept that a significant portion of leadership is the recognition of the psychological forces that work upon the individual. Finally, there is need to study the area where human being leadership and institutional management intersect. The solution to most of our current struggles with behavioral issues is most likely hovering around this intersection.
As Clausewitz recognized, a theory is used to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused. While my thoughts above are not complete (and have likely added confusion, not clarifying it), they do meet certain criteria for a theory of leadership. They are universal and they are simple. What seems obvious on the surface however, is actually very nuanced and complex. By looking at the institution and its' effect on the people and then looking at the people themselves, and most critically by advancing our self-study and orientation, we can likely gain a wider understanding of leadership and it's applications in a dynamic world.
As always, your thought and comments are welcome.
#87 Candor
"Then we begin to erode trust, and when we begin to erode trust we begin to erode the profession." General Martin Dempsey
In post #73 "Risk, Trust and the Future of the Profession", I spent some time looking at the results from the COP Keating and COP Wanat incidents, and included links to two videos. The first was an interview with General Martin Dempsey, and the second was from Lieutenant General Robert Caslen. The Dempsey video was taken from an interview he conducted with the Army Center for the Professional Military Ethic and described his views on what the Army needs to spend some time looking at as it reviews the profession of arms after a decade of conflict. The Caslen video centered more closely around the events at Wanat and Keating and raised the idea of risk - both its' acceptance and its' aversion - and trust throughout the ranks.
This week, I was watching some of the video presentations from the 2010 Infantry Warfighting Conference and came across another video from LTG Caslen that caught my eye. You can find the link below:
https://www.benning.army.mil/iwc/2010/Downloads.html
What struck me was the following comment:
"If I could add an eighth Army Value, it would be candor."
That jumped out at me because I remember as a young Corporal preparing to go to the promotion board memorizing a list of 4 'C's' that were a requirement to be a non-commissioned officer - Courage, Candor, Competence, Commitment. That was 16 years ago...LTG Caslen's statement begs the question where did those things go? When did we as a profession stop valuing candor as an equal part to our courage and commitment? And, quite honestly, isn't candor a form of courage anyway?
Dictionary.com defines candor as: "The state or quality of being frank, open and sincere in speech or expression; candidness."
Put plainly, a person uses candor when they 'call it like they see it'. And that is a very important statement...calling it like THEY see it. Back we go to Observation.
I find it interesting though that at the end of Gen Dempsey's interview he states the following:
"..And I guess maybe that I could end this session by telling you that's my current anxiety, I suppose, is that I have this, I'm hearing what I would describe to you as weak signals. My instincts borne over 36 years are clamoring about telling me it's time, that we've got some challenges. So what I have to do is understand it." Back we go to Orientation.
In LTG Caslen's video from the Infantry Conference he said this:
"But in order for that conversation to take place there has to be a command climate in that enables candor to occur within the organization. Some of you may wonder what candor is. Candor is nothing more than telling the boss that he doesn't have any clothes on. That "Hey Sir, what you are thinking about doing does not make a lot of sense and I think I'm accepting unacceptable risk." As a result of that discussion, the command climates got to allow a subordinate leader to come up to a senior leader and have that level of discussion. I think if we were going to go relook our Army values and if we had to add an eighth value to the Army Values, my recommendation is we should add candor. And that where subordinate commanders can come up to a more senior commander and say this is something that I think is critically important and we oughta think about it and have a discussion about it."
Observation...Orientation...Risk...Trust...Candor.
These 4 things all go hand in hand. We must create a situation where the subordinate can approach his/her boss and plainly tell them when their personal observation and orientation are vastly different than the one put forth by their superior. Without this critical piece - without this dialogue - you end up with the two groups having a vastly different understanding of the situation and the expected outcome. As LTG Caslen rightly asserts, we must return to valuing candor. Leaders at all levels must start to seek out Gen Dempsey's 'weak signals' in their formations and attune themselves to where they are coming from and why they are steadily growing stronger. In effect, we must start listening.
In order for this important dialogue to take place, we will need a return to trust first. A subordinate has to trust that they can speak their mind and that their observations will be treated openly and fairly. That is not to say that they will get what they want, or even be agreed with. Far from it. But allowing a subordinate to disagree with a senior does two things. First, it allows the senior to see whether or not the subordinate understands the mission, the requirements and the expected outcome. If the senior is listening hard enough they will see whether the two visions are the same. This provides an opportunity before the action to identify those points of disparity. This will ultimately enhance trust. More importantly though, if the senior is looking for the discordant sounds - those things that don't match up, then the organization will grow a lot more. The discord leads to dialogue and the dialogue leads to a more common understanding. We cannot simply surrender to becoming a homogeneous Army. It should come about by the friction of many viewpoints rubbing against each other until a consensus is achieved. We must start listening - as General Dempsey indicates - to the other signals.
LTG Caslen's point that we need a return to candor should not be overlooked. And critical to it's importance is answering the question where did it go? When did we become an Army of 'yes men'? How did we get here? What conditions created the environment where no one would or could stand up and tell the boss, "Sir, you are incorrect. That is not what's going on in my sector. This is what my reality is?" When did we lose that? Or did we?
That answer might be found in the fact that this last decade of war has had a profound effect on the Army. Old models have given way to new realities. Old styles have been replaced by new requirements. The very structure of the Army has been altered, both in how we are actually built, and in how we fight. And along the way, something else changed too. I think a lot of our senior leaders were caught as flat-footed in 2001 as the rest of us were. And that meant that everyone was fighting for the proper orientation at the same time. We were all learning together, and that is something that does not happen much in the Army or many other large organizations. Group learning. We have historically been a top-down, established body of knowledge and experience type organization that is slow to change and built upon the supposed 'knowledge' of those at the top of the hierarchy. However, when a new reality presents itself, the entire organization is effected equally. The new reality confronts the entire width and breadth at the same time. Even today there is the same conversation regarding the efficacy of COIN doctrine and decentralization going on from Private to General. The only thing that changes are the polish of the words themselves. Some people have accepted COIN doctrine as the way ahead for the Army and others have not. Some people have embraced it and others have not. And that discussion has raised the idea of dissent and that dissent inevitably raises confusion and confusion implies a lack of understanding which results in a loss of faith and trust. And our fear of losing faith and trust has resulted in some very homogeneous thinking throughout the force. As General Dempsey stated in his interview, "Decentralization has become kind of an unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine."
If I am not willing to listen to my subordinates view of our shared mission and will not listen to their dissent and different observation/orientation, then I will never learn where those things differ between us. I will never be pushed to view my reality in any other fashion than the one I have developed. And if I use my position and power to impress that reality on my subordinates and don't allow them an opportunity to develop and put forth their own ideas, then I also fail as a mentor and coach and leader developer. I should not be trying to give them my 'way' of thinking, I should be encouraging them to discover their own.
But what does it take to make candor work? I think it takes a lot more than people realize. First, there must be an understanding that a culture that values candor will act in a particular manner. For example: If we suddenly said to the entire Army, "From here on out I want you to be entirely truthful with your leaders whenever you have a disagreement with them, without any regard to the consequences", there would suddenly be a whole bunch of very scared people running around. Does he/she mean it? Am I really allowed to express my opinion? Maybe I'll let someone else go first and see if it's a trick. Wait, do I even have an opinion? Is it truly mine, or just one that I've been conditioned to accept? Have I spent any time actually considering it? These questions and more will race through many people's head as they encounter a boss who actually wants to know their thoughts, ideas, observations and orientations. Second, it will take awhile for that fear to be removed, and the responsibility to remove it rests squarely with the leader. They have to choose to do it and then accept that it will take some time before people believe it. Many many officers and noncomissioned officers are not going to risk their livelihood and future potential for promotion by expressing an unpopular decision. Even if they feel it to the core of their being. Until we remove the threat to someones ability to provide for themselves and their families we cannot expect that there will ever be a completely honest discussions. If my next opportunity depends squarely on whether or not I agree with my boss, then what the hell....go along to get along. I'll get promoted, I'll move on and I won't have to serve with him or her again. I'm not going to jeopardize tomorrow by having an opinion today. Again, as General Dempsey pointed out in his interview, "Well, first and foremost, Soldiers and leaders emulate what they see, the behaviors that they see in those who are senior to them." If my leader is the type who only wants to hear from themselves or like-minded people, then I'll likely emulate that behavior. If he/she is the type of leader who actively solicits dissenting and differing viewpoints, then I'll likely emulate that type of behavior. It is what any development organization would term as role-modeling. So if two of the top senior officers in the Army are worrying about the lack of dialogue and candor - and are both demonstrating a willingness to have some of the tough conversations necessary to effect the entire organization, they are role-modeling for the rest of us a new way of conducting business. Maybe we should be listening.
But it's a tricky business. Take this blog. What does it represent? To me, I am exercising candor. I am expressing my opinion - my observations and orientations on things that I think are critically important and that I think we ought to have a discussion about, namely the state of leadership within the profession. That dialogue is designed to get the reader to consider another point of view besides their own or the homogeneous ones that have been spit out time after time. I'm not saying I'm correct, only that this is how I view my world at this moment. I might be considered one of General Dempsey's 'weak signals'. Others would certainly call my work an act of incredible egotism and hubris. Who do I think I am to write these things week after week? Certainly there are those in the Army much smarter and more articulate than I am, so why do I think I have something important to say? And others might feel a little threatened by this because it I am challenging some of our past practices and making recommendations for improvement. Maybe those are things they think they should be doing and feel uneasy that someone else is doing them. I don't know, but I do know that there can be three different interpretations of what the blog is and what it represents: My attempt at candor and dialogue. A reflection of my ego and arrogance. A threatening pointy stick for those who are comfortable playing the 'get along to go along' game.
As an example, this last month has seen the largest rise in readership and membership since I started writing a year and a half ago. A lot of that has to do with it's inclusion on BCKS, but there are others outside of the Army who are also checking in on a weekly basis. But, that increased readership has not led to increased dialogue. The same people who have been posting replies all along still continue to do so, but the new readers do not. However, since I know and work with many of these folks, they will engage in a private conversations with me regarding a particular post. And, quite honestly, many of them agree with me, they just won't say so in an attributable manner. I might get an email from someone saying they think my arguments are great, or that they feel the same way I do, but they won't say it publicly. So the question arises, what prevents them from responding? What are they afraid of? And, while we're at it, why am I not afraid any more? Why am I willing to do this and others are not? It's actually easier to answer the second part first. First, I am doing this because I love the Army, I love my profession and I think we are in a very vulnerable area with regard to leadership. That is the emotional reason. But there is a practical one as well. I can do this because I have nothing left to lose. I have had my professional abilities and personal actions questioned in a public manner and have seen a side of the Army that many others have not. I have also served for over 20 years. While I would love to serve until I am forced to retire, I am not chasing another promotion. I am somewhat at a point where I can choose what I would like to do. If I want to be a First Sergeant, then I can throw my name in the hat. If I do not, then I won't. I am aware that if I do not serve as a First Sergeant then I will not be able to compete to be selected for Sergeant Major, but that is my choice to make. By removing the competition for the brass ring, and by accepting that I do have some control over my future, then I am free to choose how I express my love and concern for the Army. I am also free to choose when and how I disagree. I have brought this idea up before when speaking of very senior officers. There is a freedom when you have reached the top of the totem pole. What are they going to do, make you retire? Many of the people who read my work are not in that place. They are still working their way up the ladder. There is still too much risk. For me, the blog is not an act of courage because it cannot really effect me. For others, responding to it would be an act of courage because it carries implications that affect them and their families.
LTG Caslen's recognition that we need a return to candor within the profession is troubling. It never should have gone away. However, before we blithely say, "Ok, tomorrow we'll start using candor again, so everyone feel free to express their opinion", we had better look at a few things first. What conditions caused candor to be replaced with fealty in the first place, and what are the short term consequences of opening the flood gates? Both Gen. Dempsey and LTG Caslen are taking that hard look and sounding the warning bell to other senior leaders. It is up to us to start thinking hard about whether or not we want to only surround ourselves with similar thinkers, or are we truly going to open the dialogue box and take advantage of what 10 years of hard combat has provided us in terms of lessons, wisdom and leader development? Since all indications are that this type of warfare will not go away soon, we probably need to learn to value the inputs from everyone in order to develop those who will surely follow us into the fight.
We owe them that much.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
In post #73 "Risk, Trust and the Future of the Profession", I spent some time looking at the results from the COP Keating and COP Wanat incidents, and included links to two videos. The first was an interview with General Martin Dempsey, and the second was from Lieutenant General Robert Caslen. The Dempsey video was taken from an interview he conducted with the Army Center for the Professional Military Ethic and described his views on what the Army needs to spend some time looking at as it reviews the profession of arms after a decade of conflict. The Caslen video centered more closely around the events at Wanat and Keating and raised the idea of risk - both its' acceptance and its' aversion - and trust throughout the ranks.
This week, I was watching some of the video presentations from the 2010 Infantry Warfighting Conference and came across another video from LTG Caslen that caught my eye. You can find the link below:
https://www.benning.army.mil/iwc/2010/Downloads.html
What struck me was the following comment:
"If I could add an eighth Army Value, it would be candor."
That jumped out at me because I remember as a young Corporal preparing to go to the promotion board memorizing a list of 4 'C's' that were a requirement to be a non-commissioned officer - Courage, Candor, Competence, Commitment. That was 16 years ago...LTG Caslen's statement begs the question where did those things go? When did we as a profession stop valuing candor as an equal part to our courage and commitment? And, quite honestly, isn't candor a form of courage anyway?
Dictionary.com defines candor as: "The state or quality of being frank, open and sincere in speech or expression; candidness."
Put plainly, a person uses candor when they 'call it like they see it'. And that is a very important statement...calling it like THEY see it. Back we go to Observation.
I find it interesting though that at the end of Gen Dempsey's interview he states the following:
"..And I guess maybe that I could end this session by telling you that's my current anxiety, I suppose, is that I have this, I'm hearing what I would describe to you as weak signals. My instincts borne over 36 years are clamoring about telling me it's time, that we've got some challenges. So what I have to do is understand it." Back we go to Orientation.
In LTG Caslen's video from the Infantry Conference he said this:
"But in order for that conversation to take place there has to be a command climate in that enables candor to occur within the organization. Some of you may wonder what candor is. Candor is nothing more than telling the boss that he doesn't have any clothes on. That "Hey Sir, what you are thinking about doing does not make a lot of sense and I think I'm accepting unacceptable risk." As a result of that discussion, the command climates got to allow a subordinate leader to come up to a senior leader and have that level of discussion. I think if we were going to go relook our Army values and if we had to add an eighth value to the Army Values, my recommendation is we should add candor. And that where subordinate commanders can come up to a more senior commander and say this is something that I think is critically important and we oughta think about it and have a discussion about it."
Observation...Orientation...Risk...Trust...Candor.
These 4 things all go hand in hand. We must create a situation where the subordinate can approach his/her boss and plainly tell them when their personal observation and orientation are vastly different than the one put forth by their superior. Without this critical piece - without this dialogue - you end up with the two groups having a vastly different understanding of the situation and the expected outcome. As LTG Caslen rightly asserts, we must return to valuing candor. Leaders at all levels must start to seek out Gen Dempsey's 'weak signals' in their formations and attune themselves to where they are coming from and why they are steadily growing stronger. In effect, we must start listening.
In order for this important dialogue to take place, we will need a return to trust first. A subordinate has to trust that they can speak their mind and that their observations will be treated openly and fairly. That is not to say that they will get what they want, or even be agreed with. Far from it. But allowing a subordinate to disagree with a senior does two things. First, it allows the senior to see whether or not the subordinate understands the mission, the requirements and the expected outcome. If the senior is listening hard enough they will see whether the two visions are the same. This provides an opportunity before the action to identify those points of disparity. This will ultimately enhance trust. More importantly though, if the senior is looking for the discordant sounds - those things that don't match up, then the organization will grow a lot more. The discord leads to dialogue and the dialogue leads to a more common understanding. We cannot simply surrender to becoming a homogeneous Army. It should come about by the friction of many viewpoints rubbing against each other until a consensus is achieved. We must start listening - as General Dempsey indicates - to the other signals.
LTG Caslen's point that we need a return to candor should not be overlooked. And critical to it's importance is answering the question where did it go? When did we become an Army of 'yes men'? How did we get here? What conditions created the environment where no one would or could stand up and tell the boss, "Sir, you are incorrect. That is not what's going on in my sector. This is what my reality is?" When did we lose that? Or did we?
That answer might be found in the fact that this last decade of war has had a profound effect on the Army. Old models have given way to new realities. Old styles have been replaced by new requirements. The very structure of the Army has been altered, both in how we are actually built, and in how we fight. And along the way, something else changed too. I think a lot of our senior leaders were caught as flat-footed in 2001 as the rest of us were. And that meant that everyone was fighting for the proper orientation at the same time. We were all learning together, and that is something that does not happen much in the Army or many other large organizations. Group learning. We have historically been a top-down, established body of knowledge and experience type organization that is slow to change and built upon the supposed 'knowledge' of those at the top of the hierarchy. However, when a new reality presents itself, the entire organization is effected equally. The new reality confronts the entire width and breadth at the same time. Even today there is the same conversation regarding the efficacy of COIN doctrine and decentralization going on from Private to General. The only thing that changes are the polish of the words themselves. Some people have accepted COIN doctrine as the way ahead for the Army and others have not. Some people have embraced it and others have not. And that discussion has raised the idea of dissent and that dissent inevitably raises confusion and confusion implies a lack of understanding which results in a loss of faith and trust. And our fear of losing faith and trust has resulted in some very homogeneous thinking throughout the force. As General Dempsey stated in his interview, "Decentralization has become kind of an unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine."
If I am not willing to listen to my subordinates view of our shared mission and will not listen to their dissent and different observation/orientation, then I will never learn where those things differ between us. I will never be pushed to view my reality in any other fashion than the one I have developed. And if I use my position and power to impress that reality on my subordinates and don't allow them an opportunity to develop and put forth their own ideas, then I also fail as a mentor and coach and leader developer. I should not be trying to give them my 'way' of thinking, I should be encouraging them to discover their own.
But what does it take to make candor work? I think it takes a lot more than people realize. First, there must be an understanding that a culture that values candor will act in a particular manner. For example: If we suddenly said to the entire Army, "From here on out I want you to be entirely truthful with your leaders whenever you have a disagreement with them, without any regard to the consequences", there would suddenly be a whole bunch of very scared people running around. Does he/she mean it? Am I really allowed to express my opinion? Maybe I'll let someone else go first and see if it's a trick. Wait, do I even have an opinion? Is it truly mine, or just one that I've been conditioned to accept? Have I spent any time actually considering it? These questions and more will race through many people's head as they encounter a boss who actually wants to know their thoughts, ideas, observations and orientations. Second, it will take awhile for that fear to be removed, and the responsibility to remove it rests squarely with the leader. They have to choose to do it and then accept that it will take some time before people believe it. Many many officers and noncomissioned officers are not going to risk their livelihood and future potential for promotion by expressing an unpopular decision. Even if they feel it to the core of their being. Until we remove the threat to someones ability to provide for themselves and their families we cannot expect that there will ever be a completely honest discussions. If my next opportunity depends squarely on whether or not I agree with my boss, then what the hell....go along to get along. I'll get promoted, I'll move on and I won't have to serve with him or her again. I'm not going to jeopardize tomorrow by having an opinion today. Again, as General Dempsey pointed out in his interview, "Well, first and foremost, Soldiers and leaders emulate what they see, the behaviors that they see in those who are senior to them." If my leader is the type who only wants to hear from themselves or like-minded people, then I'll likely emulate that behavior. If he/she is the type of leader who actively solicits dissenting and differing viewpoints, then I'll likely emulate that type of behavior. It is what any development organization would term as role-modeling. So if two of the top senior officers in the Army are worrying about the lack of dialogue and candor - and are both demonstrating a willingness to have some of the tough conversations necessary to effect the entire organization, they are role-modeling for the rest of us a new way of conducting business. Maybe we should be listening.
But it's a tricky business. Take this blog. What does it represent? To me, I am exercising candor. I am expressing my opinion - my observations and orientations on things that I think are critically important and that I think we ought to have a discussion about, namely the state of leadership within the profession. That dialogue is designed to get the reader to consider another point of view besides their own or the homogeneous ones that have been spit out time after time. I'm not saying I'm correct, only that this is how I view my world at this moment. I might be considered one of General Dempsey's 'weak signals'. Others would certainly call my work an act of incredible egotism and hubris. Who do I think I am to write these things week after week? Certainly there are those in the Army much smarter and more articulate than I am, so why do I think I have something important to say? And others might feel a little threatened by this because it I am challenging some of our past practices and making recommendations for improvement. Maybe those are things they think they should be doing and feel uneasy that someone else is doing them. I don't know, but I do know that there can be three different interpretations of what the blog is and what it represents: My attempt at candor and dialogue. A reflection of my ego and arrogance. A threatening pointy stick for those who are comfortable playing the 'get along to go along' game.
As an example, this last month has seen the largest rise in readership and membership since I started writing a year and a half ago. A lot of that has to do with it's inclusion on BCKS, but there are others outside of the Army who are also checking in on a weekly basis. But, that increased readership has not led to increased dialogue. The same people who have been posting replies all along still continue to do so, but the new readers do not. However, since I know and work with many of these folks, they will engage in a private conversations with me regarding a particular post. And, quite honestly, many of them agree with me, they just won't say so in an attributable manner. I might get an email from someone saying they think my arguments are great, or that they feel the same way I do, but they won't say it publicly. So the question arises, what prevents them from responding? What are they afraid of? And, while we're at it, why am I not afraid any more? Why am I willing to do this and others are not? It's actually easier to answer the second part first. First, I am doing this because I love the Army, I love my profession and I think we are in a very vulnerable area with regard to leadership. That is the emotional reason. But there is a practical one as well. I can do this because I have nothing left to lose. I have had my professional abilities and personal actions questioned in a public manner and have seen a side of the Army that many others have not. I have also served for over 20 years. While I would love to serve until I am forced to retire, I am not chasing another promotion. I am somewhat at a point where I can choose what I would like to do. If I want to be a First Sergeant, then I can throw my name in the hat. If I do not, then I won't. I am aware that if I do not serve as a First Sergeant then I will not be able to compete to be selected for Sergeant Major, but that is my choice to make. By removing the competition for the brass ring, and by accepting that I do have some control over my future, then I am free to choose how I express my love and concern for the Army. I am also free to choose when and how I disagree. I have brought this idea up before when speaking of very senior officers. There is a freedom when you have reached the top of the totem pole. What are they going to do, make you retire? Many of the people who read my work are not in that place. They are still working their way up the ladder. There is still too much risk. For me, the blog is not an act of courage because it cannot really effect me. For others, responding to it would be an act of courage because it carries implications that affect them and their families.
LTG Caslen's recognition that we need a return to candor within the profession is troubling. It never should have gone away. However, before we blithely say, "Ok, tomorrow we'll start using candor again, so everyone feel free to express their opinion", we had better look at a few things first. What conditions caused candor to be replaced with fealty in the first place, and what are the short term consequences of opening the flood gates? Both Gen. Dempsey and LTG Caslen are taking that hard look and sounding the warning bell to other senior leaders. It is up to us to start thinking hard about whether or not we want to only surround ourselves with similar thinkers, or are we truly going to open the dialogue box and take advantage of what 10 years of hard combat has provided us in terms of lessons, wisdom and leader development? Since all indications are that this type of warfare will not go away soon, we probably need to learn to value the inputs from everyone in order to develop those who will surely follow us into the fight.
We owe them that much.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#86 One Clear Moment
Earlier this week I received a gift in the mail. It was sent to me by a friend I met through my writing here and on the Army's information-sharing website, Battle Command Knowledge System. It is an incredible book entitled, "War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning", written by Chris Hedges. I highly recommend it to everyone. Mr. Hedges has travelled the world as a foreign correspondent for The New York Times, the Dallas Morning News, and the Christian Science Monitor. I have not been able to put it down and it has provided me more moments of clarity and understanding that anything else I have read recently. If you want to understand the allure of combat and the reasons behind it's effect on people, I cannot commend this small masterpiece enough. You can find it on Amazon. It is worth the read and is also the driving force behind today's post.
There has been a huge effort over the last year or so in the Army to reduce the suicide rate among Soldiers and to remove the stigma of reaching out for help when you need it. Much like we used to see signs and posters exhorting us to buy war bonds or support the troops, now there are signs to reassure people that help is available if they need it and that it is a sign of strength and courage to reach out when you are no longer able to make sense of your world anymore. We all have times when we need to rely on others and the Army is trying really hard to get the message out to Soldiers that it will do the best it can to help them in their time of need.
As part of that campaign, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli, commissioned year long study of suicides in the Army to try and find indicators, and to help commanders find resources etc to stem the tide. In late July the results of that study were published in a 350 page report entitled, "Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention Report 2010". You can find a link to the report itself here:
http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/07/28/42934-army-health-promotion-risk-reduction-and-suicide-prevention-report/index.html
Consider the following two items from the report:
"Historically, the Army suicide rate has been significantly lower than the civilian rate (the civilian demographically adjusted rate typically is about 19.2 per 100,000). However, suicide and accidental death rates began trending upward in 2004, and in 2008, the Army suicide rate crested above the national average and reached a record of 20.2 per 100,000.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, 160 active duty Soldiers took their lives, making suicide the third leading cause of death among the Army population. If we include accidental death, which frequently is the result of high risk behavior (drinking and driving, drug overdose, etc.), we find that less young men and women die in combat than die by their own actions. Simply stated, we are often more dangerous to ourselves than the enemy."
And then this:
"At 24 years of age, a Soldier, on average, has moved from home, family and friends and has resided in two other states; has traveled the world (deployed); been promoted four times; bought a car and wrecked it; married and had children; has had relationship and financial problems; seen death; is responsible for dozens of Soldiers; maintains millions of dollars worth of equipment; and gets paid less than $40,000 a year."
Although we do not have all the data from FY 2010 available yet, the indication is that the trend of a higher than average death rate due to suicide and risky behavior will continue. Only time will tell if our recognition of the immense strain on the force and our efforts to combat destructive behaviors will be effective on a large scale, but if even one Soldier is assisted by this report, it's conclusions and recommendations, and the huge increase in resources being applied to the problem, then it will be worth it. This is not a cost analysis issue, it is a human being issue. The trust of the Soldier that the institution will keep it's promise to assist him/her in their hour of need, just as the Soldier did when the Army needed them.
But why do we have this problem in the first place? The Army report talks a lot about engaged leadership and structural issues, and recommends to leaders at all levels things that can be done, but maybe the answer is much more personal than that. Maybe, what needs to be considered is how war effects just one person. What if it's not the structure and bureaucracy of the Army? What if it's not the loss of friends? What if it's not the strain of fighting? Or OPTEMPO. More accurately, what if it is?
A few quotes from "War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning":
"The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with it's destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent. Trivia dominates our conversations and increasingly our airwaves. And war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause."
"When we ingest the anodyne of war we feel what those we seek to destroy feel...It is the same narcotic. I partook of it for many years. And like every recovering addict there is a part of me that remains nostalgic for wars simplicity and high, even as I cope with the scars it left behind, mourn the deaths of those I worked with, and struggle with the bestiality I would have been better off not witnessing. There is a part of me - maybe it is a part of many of us - that decided at certain moments that I would rather die like this than go back to the routine of life. The chance to exist for an intense and overpowering moment, even if it meant certain oblivion, seemed worth it in the midst of war - and very stupid once the war ended."
"The prospect of war is exciting. Many young men schooled in the notion that war is the ultimate definition of manhood, that only in war will they be tested and proven, that they can discover their worth as human beings in battle, willingly join the great enterprise. The admiration of the crowd, the high blown rhetoric, the chance to achieve the glory of the previous generation, the ideal of nobility beckon us forward. And people, ironically, enjoy righteous indignation and an object upon which to unleash their anger. War usually starts with collective euphoria."
These paragraphs and others brought together a lot of loosely connected ideas that have been swimming around the edges for a long time. Even now, though, I cannot bring them into sharp focus. They are only clearer than they were before. Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Ask yourself if it doesn't have a ring of truth to it....
I am a Soldier and I feel the need to serve a cause. I search for purpose and meaning and definition. I want to test myself on the stage of manhood and see how I will measure up against the heroes of my past and history. Will I stand tall in the face of fear? Can I move smoothly between the higher ideal of compassion and respect and the basic animalistic calling of killing and power? Will I become the next history book hero? Or will I not live up to those things? Will I reach the decision point and back down from the fight? Will I give in to my fear and need for self-preservation? Will I be a man?
And so I find a fight. I find a test. I join the Army and put myself in the arena. I grab my gun and start the examination of me. And as I take the test a new reality takes hold. I like it. I like the rush, the clarity, the singularity of purpose. My whole world is right here, right now. It is simple. I must kill him before he kills me. Nothing else exists. My focus is a sharp as a laser beam. And everything else becomes just noise....
A year later, I come back home. I convinced myself that my cause was just and that my actions are in keeping with tradition and honor and all that is expected of the warrior. And I passed the test. But there is an itch in my brain that will not go away. I crave that singular moment. The laser beam clarity. I want it back. But I'm afraid to admit it, for it means accepting something else as well. I miss the violence. I miss the power to end another person's life. I miss the destruction. I miss controlling my universe. Alone at night in the dark, I re-live those moments of perfection. Perfect power, perfect clarity, perfect fear. The adrenaline rush of randomness. But I am home now and the menial tasks of day to day life surround me. My wife and family see importance in things I do not. They are consumed with the daily routine as if it is the critical part of their being. The grass needs to be cut, the kids need school shoes, the car needs an oil change. There is nothing heroic here. It is all so very boring. My purpose has been removed and my addiction to that one crystal clear moment needs feeding. And there is nothing in my world to feed the beast...
And so I look around for things that will help me cope. Will remove the ache that the addiction has created. Alcohol, drugs - things like this ease the sharp need, but only for a little while. Fast cars, motorcycles, risk taking behaviors etc replicate the adrenaline rush, but without the sense of randomness that combat brings. I can drive as fast as the machine will go, but the decision to throttle back remains with me. In combat, that decision is not mine. It belongs to my adversary. And that is the critical difference. I quickly realize that I will never be able to replicate that crystal clear moment until I am once again in the fight. Until I can feed the beast. And the need to feed the beast drives me further away from those things that used to matter so very much. My original need for testing, for honor, for glory has now become nothing more than a need for a moment.
After 10 years of moving through this cycle 365 days at a time it all becomes too hard to take. I cannot move back and forth anymore. I cannot live in this world of trivial encounters and meaningless platitudes. And yet I realize that I have given myself over to the addiction of one clear moment and now my purpose in fighting is no longer for some higher noble purpose, but rather to feed my addiction. My struggle is that I cannot admit that I enjoy the requirements of the moment. I get off on the rush. I accept fate. I like physical power. I enjoyed trying to destroy another person who was trying to destroy me. I have embraced the lesser angels of my nature. I moved downward on Mazlow's hierarchy....and I like it. But to admit these things will only drive me further from the society that I return home to. I become a nomad sliding between two worlds and neither will accept me as their own.
In the Army study, you can find a lot of demographic data that searches for common causes to the issues that confront us. You'll find that the average suicide victim is this old, of that ethnicity, has served X long etc. You will find that facts that the investigations have revealed. But maybe something critical is missing. Maybe it's not the financial problems, or the children's issues, or the marital strife. Maybe those aren't the issues at all. Because we all have those types of problems. Soldier or civilian. We all have stress. What then might be the difference for the Soldier? It's actually pretty simple. The Soldier has experienced that one clear moment. He/She is twenty something years old and recognizes that they cannot feed the addiction any more. The entire world becomes mundane and boring. It's not that my wife is yapping at me, it's that what she is yapping about doesn't matter in the context of one clear moment. It's not that my kids are crying, it's that I cannot control my universe and exercise power. It's not that the grass needs cutting, it's that I no longer give a damn about what my neighbors may say about me because I know that I have experienced the test and I have passed it. I have survived and prospered in one clear moment. Their opinion no longer matters. I beat randomness, fate, the enemy and fear. I felt every emotion more sharply than anyone who hadn't been there possibly can. How do you think you can help me Mr. Behavioral Health guy? Mr. Civilian? Mama family member? Really, how do you think you can help? Because when I look at you I do not see in your eyes someone who has experienced one clear moment. I really don't. Thanks for your time.
As leaders, we need to see things like this on a personal level. Without moral judgement. Somewhere, there is a group of people sitting around telling war stories. And those stories will likely hover around but never admit that they miss that moment. When we can have a Soldier come to us and say, "Sergeant, I miss the clarity of combat. I miss the excitement of a firefight. I miss the chance to measure up. I miss the power of ending a life" When we create leader conditions for that to occur, then we can begin to get to the root cause of many Soldier issues.
Most Soldiers do not want to hurt themselves. The just cannot take being nomads. Maybe the answer to the problem is to accept their addiction and slowly replace it over time with the beauty of the mundane. To turn their family and friends from a ideal to their reality.
Our problem with suicide and reckless behavior is real. It deserves nothing less than our full efforts to reduce it. But, just as real must be our acceptance that war is a very powerful behavior agent. It cannot be replicated anywhere else. When a person gets to a point where they have either measured up, or finds they cannot, that is the most vulnerable point. For those who have we must replace that crystal clear purpose. For those who cannot, we must help them redefine their individual value and meaning. For both groups, we must remain aware that they have been fundamentally changed for the rest of their lives. For both the ability to stand in the arena and the inability to do so will be decided very quickly, but it will have everlasting effects. That choice will happen in one clear moment.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. I look forward to hearing from you.
There has been a huge effort over the last year or so in the Army to reduce the suicide rate among Soldiers and to remove the stigma of reaching out for help when you need it. Much like we used to see signs and posters exhorting us to buy war bonds or support the troops, now there are signs to reassure people that help is available if they need it and that it is a sign of strength and courage to reach out when you are no longer able to make sense of your world anymore. We all have times when we need to rely on others and the Army is trying really hard to get the message out to Soldiers that it will do the best it can to help them in their time of need.
As part of that campaign, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli, commissioned year long study of suicides in the Army to try and find indicators, and to help commanders find resources etc to stem the tide. In late July the results of that study were published in a 350 page report entitled, "Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention Report 2010". You can find a link to the report itself here:
http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/07/28/42934-army-health-promotion-risk-reduction-and-suicide-prevention-report/index.html
Consider the following two items from the report:
"Historically, the Army suicide rate has been significantly lower than the civilian rate (the civilian demographically adjusted rate typically is about 19.2 per 100,000). However, suicide and accidental death rates began trending upward in 2004, and in 2008, the Army suicide rate crested above the national average and reached a record of 20.2 per 100,000.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, 160 active duty Soldiers took their lives, making suicide the third leading cause of death among the Army population. If we include accidental death, which frequently is the result of high risk behavior (drinking and driving, drug overdose, etc.), we find that less young men and women die in combat than die by their own actions. Simply stated, we are often more dangerous to ourselves than the enemy."
And then this:
"At 24 years of age, a Soldier, on average, has moved from home, family and friends and has resided in two other states; has traveled the world (deployed); been promoted four times; bought a car and wrecked it; married and had children; has had relationship and financial problems; seen death; is responsible for dozens of Soldiers; maintains millions of dollars worth of equipment; and gets paid less than $40,000 a year."
Although we do not have all the data from FY 2010 available yet, the indication is that the trend of a higher than average death rate due to suicide and risky behavior will continue. Only time will tell if our recognition of the immense strain on the force and our efforts to combat destructive behaviors will be effective on a large scale, but if even one Soldier is assisted by this report, it's conclusions and recommendations, and the huge increase in resources being applied to the problem, then it will be worth it. This is not a cost analysis issue, it is a human being issue. The trust of the Soldier that the institution will keep it's promise to assist him/her in their hour of need, just as the Soldier did when the Army needed them.
But why do we have this problem in the first place? The Army report talks a lot about engaged leadership and structural issues, and recommends to leaders at all levels things that can be done, but maybe the answer is much more personal than that. Maybe, what needs to be considered is how war effects just one person. What if it's not the structure and bureaucracy of the Army? What if it's not the loss of friends? What if it's not the strain of fighting? Or OPTEMPO. More accurately, what if it is?
A few quotes from "War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning":
"The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with it's destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent. Trivia dominates our conversations and increasingly our airwaves. And war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause."
"When we ingest the anodyne of war we feel what those we seek to destroy feel...It is the same narcotic. I partook of it for many years. And like every recovering addict there is a part of me that remains nostalgic for wars simplicity and high, even as I cope with the scars it left behind, mourn the deaths of those I worked with, and struggle with the bestiality I would have been better off not witnessing. There is a part of me - maybe it is a part of many of us - that decided at certain moments that I would rather die like this than go back to the routine of life. The chance to exist for an intense and overpowering moment, even if it meant certain oblivion, seemed worth it in the midst of war - and very stupid once the war ended."
"The prospect of war is exciting. Many young men schooled in the notion that war is the ultimate definition of manhood, that only in war will they be tested and proven, that they can discover their worth as human beings in battle, willingly join the great enterprise. The admiration of the crowd, the high blown rhetoric, the chance to achieve the glory of the previous generation, the ideal of nobility beckon us forward. And people, ironically, enjoy righteous indignation and an object upon which to unleash their anger. War usually starts with collective euphoria."
These paragraphs and others brought together a lot of loosely connected ideas that have been swimming around the edges for a long time. Even now, though, I cannot bring them into sharp focus. They are only clearer than they were before. Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Ask yourself if it doesn't have a ring of truth to it....
I am a Soldier and I feel the need to serve a cause. I search for purpose and meaning and definition. I want to test myself on the stage of manhood and see how I will measure up against the heroes of my past and history. Will I stand tall in the face of fear? Can I move smoothly between the higher ideal of compassion and respect and the basic animalistic calling of killing and power? Will I become the next history book hero? Or will I not live up to those things? Will I reach the decision point and back down from the fight? Will I give in to my fear and need for self-preservation? Will I be a man?
And so I find a fight. I find a test. I join the Army and put myself in the arena. I grab my gun and start the examination of me. And as I take the test a new reality takes hold. I like it. I like the rush, the clarity, the singularity of purpose. My whole world is right here, right now. It is simple. I must kill him before he kills me. Nothing else exists. My focus is a sharp as a laser beam. And everything else becomes just noise....
A year later, I come back home. I convinced myself that my cause was just and that my actions are in keeping with tradition and honor and all that is expected of the warrior. And I passed the test. But there is an itch in my brain that will not go away. I crave that singular moment. The laser beam clarity. I want it back. But I'm afraid to admit it, for it means accepting something else as well. I miss the violence. I miss the power to end another person's life. I miss the destruction. I miss controlling my universe. Alone at night in the dark, I re-live those moments of perfection. Perfect power, perfect clarity, perfect fear. The adrenaline rush of randomness. But I am home now and the menial tasks of day to day life surround me. My wife and family see importance in things I do not. They are consumed with the daily routine as if it is the critical part of their being. The grass needs to be cut, the kids need school shoes, the car needs an oil change. There is nothing heroic here. It is all so very boring. My purpose has been removed and my addiction to that one crystal clear moment needs feeding. And there is nothing in my world to feed the beast...
And so I look around for things that will help me cope. Will remove the ache that the addiction has created. Alcohol, drugs - things like this ease the sharp need, but only for a little while. Fast cars, motorcycles, risk taking behaviors etc replicate the adrenaline rush, but without the sense of randomness that combat brings. I can drive as fast as the machine will go, but the decision to throttle back remains with me. In combat, that decision is not mine. It belongs to my adversary. And that is the critical difference. I quickly realize that I will never be able to replicate that crystal clear moment until I am once again in the fight. Until I can feed the beast. And the need to feed the beast drives me further away from those things that used to matter so very much. My original need for testing, for honor, for glory has now become nothing more than a need for a moment.
After 10 years of moving through this cycle 365 days at a time it all becomes too hard to take. I cannot move back and forth anymore. I cannot live in this world of trivial encounters and meaningless platitudes. And yet I realize that I have given myself over to the addiction of one clear moment and now my purpose in fighting is no longer for some higher noble purpose, but rather to feed my addiction. My struggle is that I cannot admit that I enjoy the requirements of the moment. I get off on the rush. I accept fate. I like physical power. I enjoyed trying to destroy another person who was trying to destroy me. I have embraced the lesser angels of my nature. I moved downward on Mazlow's hierarchy....and I like it. But to admit these things will only drive me further from the society that I return home to. I become a nomad sliding between two worlds and neither will accept me as their own.
In the Army study, you can find a lot of demographic data that searches for common causes to the issues that confront us. You'll find that the average suicide victim is this old, of that ethnicity, has served X long etc. You will find that facts that the investigations have revealed. But maybe something critical is missing. Maybe it's not the financial problems, or the children's issues, or the marital strife. Maybe those aren't the issues at all. Because we all have those types of problems. Soldier or civilian. We all have stress. What then might be the difference for the Soldier? It's actually pretty simple. The Soldier has experienced that one clear moment. He/She is twenty something years old and recognizes that they cannot feed the addiction any more. The entire world becomes mundane and boring. It's not that my wife is yapping at me, it's that what she is yapping about doesn't matter in the context of one clear moment. It's not that my kids are crying, it's that I cannot control my universe and exercise power. It's not that the grass needs cutting, it's that I no longer give a damn about what my neighbors may say about me because I know that I have experienced the test and I have passed it. I have survived and prospered in one clear moment. Their opinion no longer matters. I beat randomness, fate, the enemy and fear. I felt every emotion more sharply than anyone who hadn't been there possibly can. How do you think you can help me Mr. Behavioral Health guy? Mr. Civilian? Mama family member? Really, how do you think you can help? Because when I look at you I do not see in your eyes someone who has experienced one clear moment. I really don't. Thanks for your time.
As leaders, we need to see things like this on a personal level. Without moral judgement. Somewhere, there is a group of people sitting around telling war stories. And those stories will likely hover around but never admit that they miss that moment. When we can have a Soldier come to us and say, "Sergeant, I miss the clarity of combat. I miss the excitement of a firefight. I miss the chance to measure up. I miss the power of ending a life" When we create leader conditions for that to occur, then we can begin to get to the root cause of many Soldier issues.
Most Soldiers do not want to hurt themselves. The just cannot take being nomads. Maybe the answer to the problem is to accept their addiction and slowly replace it over time with the beauty of the mundane. To turn their family and friends from a ideal to their reality.
Our problem with suicide and reckless behavior is real. It deserves nothing less than our full efforts to reduce it. But, just as real must be our acceptance that war is a very powerful behavior agent. It cannot be replicated anywhere else. When a person gets to a point where they have either measured up, or finds they cannot, that is the most vulnerable point. For those who have we must replace that crystal clear purpose. For those who cannot, we must help them redefine their individual value and meaning. For both groups, we must remain aware that they have been fundamentally changed for the rest of their lives. For both the ability to stand in the arena and the inability to do so will be decided very quickly, but it will have everlasting effects. That choice will happen in one clear moment.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome. I look forward to hearing from you.
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