Three Questions:
1. Do you believe that all people should be treated equally?
2. Do you believe in equal opportunity for everyone?
3. Do you believe that each individual should be judged and rewarded by their contributions to their organization?
My guess is that most of us will almost reflexively answer "Yes" to all three. It is part of the our American mindset that people are due fair treatment, that no one should be denied the opportunity to succeed, and that as individuals, we want to be judged by our own contributions and abilities, not lumped together with the masses.
A question was once asked of General (Ret) Eric Shinseki, the former Chief of Staff of the Army:
"What is a General Officer's chief responsibility to the institution?"
His answer: "To manage transitions."
(Taken from an interview with General Martin Demspey. You can find the video link below:)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qa425Q8zKiI&feature=channel
I've been thinking a lot about the 3 questions above and transitions this week. Over the last few months there have been two documents produced that could have an impact on the Army (and the entire Armed Forces) for decades ahead. And at the core of both of them are the 3 questions. The two documents are the "Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell":
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130%28secure-hires%29.pdf
and, "From Representation to Inclusion - Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military" produced by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC)
http://mldc.whs.mil/download/documents/Draft%20Report
Obviously, the DADT report deals with the repeal of the ban against openly gay or lesbian service members in the Armed Forces which has already been signed by the President and awaits either an attempted reversal in Congress, or an implementation strategy to be delivered to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The MLDC report looked into issues surrounding diversity and opportunity for service members and, among many other things, recommends a repeal of the combat exclusion policies that forbid women from serving in "direct ground combat" positions. While only a small portion of the overall report, any reversal of that group of restrictive policies would represent a significant change in the current operating model for many Army organizations.
Both of these reports are important, and should be read by everyone to further the dialogue regarding potential policy changes in the years ahead. Why? Because policies are only words on paper. Leadership, good or bad, turns the words into action and reality.
The purpose of this post however is not to argue one way or another on either report. Each reader will have to form their own personal point of view on whether they agree or disagree with the recommendations they contain. And that is something I want people to do. I want you to take a hard look about how you personally feel about both issues because that introspection will ultimately make you a better leader. However, the responsibility to take action rests solely with our elected representatives. As General Dempsey rightly pointed out in his interview, the Armed Forces must remain a servant of the Nation and apolitical. It is the purview of the President and the Congress to enact laws and policies that affect how we operate. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the recommendations, it is correct that our elected leaders request information and recommendations be made. However, I think it is important that leaders begin to determine and inform their own understandings of both reports. To that end, here are mine:
1. I do not care about the private sexual orientation of a Soldier. A persons' sexual orientation is their own business whether they are heterosexual or homosexual. Simply put, it's not my concern on a personal level.
2. Women are already, and have always been, in combat. The Services recognize this. Right now they are all playing in the 'gray' areas of legal interpretation that have an important negative effect on how women are viewed across the force.
So, Fenlason doesn't care about gays in the military, nor does he think that women should be involuntarily excluded from serving in units that are likely to engage in direct ground combat.
Those two statements form my Orientation. However, right now, my Orientation doesn't matter because neither policy has actually been changed, so it only serves to inform others. I include it here as a matter of literary honesty. If you're going to read my work, you might as well know where I stand. And since I write and publish, I think it would be disingenuous to talk all around these two issues without making my own ideas known. But, beyond being my personal feelings on the issues, they have no relevance. Who cares what Fenlason thinks? You can agree or disagree with me and you will be as entitled to your opinions and thoughts as I am to mine. We are equal. From Private to General at this point, we are equal.
The opposite of that however is that the two statements above are very important because I lead an organization. Therefore I have responsibilities to the Army and my unit and my Orientation will help inform and determine my Actions and my Actions will have an effect on those above and below me in the institution. While you may agree or disagree with me personally, and I may agree or disagree with a policy personally, as a leader, I have a responsibility to enforce, enact, enable, and institute whatever policies the elected and appointed leaders over me determine. I also have a responsibility to respect your viewpoint. I may not agree with it, and we may have a vigorous dialogue about it, but I must respect it. That is the essence of both service and discipline.
However, if you go back to General Shinseki's comment that leaders manage transitions then something else becomes apparent as well. There has to be an awareness of the transitional period itself. There has to be someone or something that forces the introspections, reviews, and questions the existing norms to see whether or not they remain relevant. As I was watching General Dempsy's video I kept wondering what drove him to start thinking about our institutional ethic and the profession in the first place. What skill set does he have that allowed him to perceive that we are in entering into a period where many of the things that we have previously done, or held as critical to organizational success, need to be reviewed? What attributes does he possess that allow him to 'feel' that we might be out of sync and then try to put his finger on why he feels that way? More importantly, how can we develop that mindset in our leader development programs? Because, honestly, isn't that a key function of leading any group? To point it in a particular direction and then guide it to achieve its' objective? And then remain perceptive enough to notice when the conditions have changed and require another transition? As we have seen in the private sector recently, the idea that we live in a static world is an antiquated notion of yesteryear. We have now entered a period of dynamic and rapid change. Things are happening very quickly and our ability to perceive and act upon them quickly to take advantage of opportunities when they present themselves is a critical skill. We have been hearing this theme with regard to combat operations and counterinsurgency operations for years - that this is a thinking mans war and that he who can capitalize on his successes faster will ultimately prevail. A classic OODA loop.
But we have not used this process to look at ourselves until now. Both reports make mention of some critical trends that form the Observation:
"Recent statistics from the Pentagon show that three out of four young people ages 17–24 are not eligible to join the military because they do not meet entry requirements related to education level, test scores, citizenship, health status, and criminal record. Racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to meet these eligibility requirements than are non-Hispanic whites, and that gap has
been widening." (MLDC)
"When asked about how having a Service member in their immediate unit who said he or she is gay would affect the unit’s ability to “work together to get the job done,” 70% of Service members predicted it would have a positive, mixed, or no effect." (DADT)
"Despite this record of success, however, the transformation of the Armed Forces remains unfinished. Women and minorities are still underrepresented in leadership positions. Demographic changes in the United States are reshaping the pool from which the Armed Forces may enlist and promote future military leaders. Prolonged conflicts of unprecedented complexity require agile leadership that leverages all the capabilities at its disposal. Like the private sector, the U.S. military recognizes the need for a diverse workforce that includes a greater range of individual competencies, including skills, education, and professional backgrounds." (MLDC)
"Consistently, the survey results revealed a large group of around 50–55% of Service
members who thought that repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would have mixed or no effect; another 15–20% who said repeal would have a positive effect; and about 30% who said it would have a negative effect. The results of the spouse survey are consistent. When spouses were asked about whether repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would affect their preference for their Service member’s future plans to stay in the military, 74% said repeal would have no effect, while only 12% said “I would want my spouse to leave earlier." (DADT)
Both reports also accept that (1) Homosexuals are currently serving in the Armed Forces, and (2) That women have been, and are, engaged in direct combat with the enemy.
So, the type of wars we are likely to be fighting in the next decades are incredibly complex and nuanced, the pool of human resources we have to draw from is shrinking, our leadership is not reflective of the population they serve, and at least half the force doesn't really care about someone's sexual orientation.
Welcome to the world of transitions! And your next leadership challenge...
But if we step back for a moment, the key understanding here may be the phrase "Periods of transition". Periods of transition imply that there will then be a period of stasis. You go through a change to arrive at a new static environment. And that may be the key misinterpretation in all of this. What would happen if we taught not transitional periods of change, but rather transitional periods of stasis? What if everyone we put in leadership positions grew up expecting change - personal, professional, from within the organization and without? Then we would be focusing our development programs around the idea of perceiving change. We would develop people who could rapidly form new understandings in light of new circumstances and leverage dynamic thought to achieve the unit's mission.
The DADT and MLDC reports are important because they can be used to look at ourselves more clearly. On a personal level, everyone who reads them must ask whether or not they agree or disagree with the recommendations and then determine whether they wish to continue their service in light of any contrary personal beliefs. On an institutional level they are remarkable for there recognition of changing conditions and for taking a hard look at possible solutions. At the leader level they represent an opportunity to consider transitional leadership and rapid assimilation of new and emerging requirements.
We have accepted that the ability to rapidly recognize and adapt to change on the battlefield is a critical skill-set. We now have the opportunity through a series of documents to look at ourselves and determine whether or not we need to change the institution as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#102 "The Content of Our Character"
Tomorrow marks the 25th anniversary of our national holiday in honor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and because of that there have been a lot of news programs lately commemorating his life and his work. As I was watching some of them throughout the week, I remembered back to the 8th grade when I was made to memorize and then recite his famous "I Have a Dream" speech. There is a portion of that speech where Dr. King said:
"I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."
I started to think about the words, "..content of their character" and what they mean for leaders. What is your character? What helps create it, define it, and how much time do we spend thinking about it?
And then I got a gift from the gods. Joe D. has been a follower of the blog almost since it's inception. He replies often and he and I have an on-going dialogue, that, although we have never met personally, allows me to call him a friend. I am grateful for all of his support and commentary over the years.
The other morning Joe sent me a document written by Vice Admiral James Stockdale entitled, " Courage Under Fire - Testing Epictetus's Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior". (Although I have searched for an on-line copy of the document I cannot find one, so if you are interested in reading it send me a note.)
As people may or may not know, Vice Admiral Stockdale was a fighter pilot in Vietnam who was shot down and then held captive by the North Vietnamese for 8 years. According to the introduction of his paper he was tortured 15 times, kept in leg irons for 2 years and spent over 4 years of his captivity in solitary confinement. He was also a student of philosophy and had been studying the works of Epictetus while serving in Vietnam.
Epictetus was considered one of the Stoic philosophers and the main theme of his works was that there are things that a person can control and there are things that he cannot. Stockdale put it like this:
"As I ejected from that airplane I had the understanding that a Stoic always kept separate files in his mind for (A) those things that are “up to him” and (B) those things that are “not up to him.” Another way of saying it is (A) those things that are “within his power” and (B) those things that are “beyond his power.” Still another way of saying it is (A) those things that are within the grasp of “his Will, his Free Will” and (B) those things that are beyond it. All in category B are “external,” beyond my control, ultimately dooming me to fear and anxiety if I covet them. All in category A are up to me, within my power, within my will, and properly subjects for my total concern and involvement. They include my opinions, my aims, my aversions, my own grief, my own joy, my judgments, my attitude about what is going on, my own good, and my own evil."
I would call these things one's Orientation. They are, at your core, those things that are ultimately yours regardless of circumstance. They cannot be taken, only surrendered. And more importantly, learning to separate what matters - really matters - from that which does not. Stockdale makes an important point here that I believe has real relevance to leader development today:
"What is not up to you? beyond your power? Not subject to your will in the last analysis? For starters, let’s take “your station in life.” As I glide down toward that little town on my short parachute ride, I’m just about to learn how negligible is my control over my station in life. It’s not at all up to me. I’m going right now from being the leader of a hundred-plus pilots and a thousand men and, good-
ness knows, all sorts of symbolic status and goodwill, to being an object of contempt. I’ll be known as a “criminal.” But that’s not half the revelation that is the realization of your own fragility—that you can be reduced by wind and rain and ice and seawater or men to a helpless, sobbing wreck—unable to control even your own bowels in a matter of minutes. And, more than even that, you’re going to face fragilities you never before let yourself believe you could have––like
after mere minutes, in a flurry of action while being bound with tourniquet-tight ropes, with care, by a professional, hands behind, jackknifed forward and down toward your ankles held secure in lugs
attached to an iron bar, that, with the onrush of anxiety, knowing your upper body’s circulation has been stopped and feeling the ever-growing induced pain and the ever-closing-in of claustrophobia, you can be made to blurt out answers, sometimes correct answers, to questions about anything they know you know. “Station in life,” then, can be changed from that of a dignified and competent gentleman of culture to that of a panic-stricken, sobbing, self-loathing wreck in a matter of minutes. So what? To live under the false pretense that you will forever have control of your station in life is to ride for a fall; you’re asking for disappointment. So make sure in your heart of hearts, in your inner self, that you treat your station in life with indifference, not with contempt, only with indifference."
You can lose so many of those things that define you in your present reality. Your title, your place, your possessions, everything. And what will you have then? Who will you be? Without some consideration of those important questions how can you lead others? How can you be led by others? How can you form the content of your character?
Stockdale realized something else during his captivity that I also think is important for leaders to consider which is the idea that once you learn to surrender those "Station in life" things that currently seem so important, the ability of others to define - and gain power over you, is greatly diminished. Because they believe so strongly that they can affect you by changing that status, the methods they employ are aimed incorrectly in that direction. In effect, they are attempting to influence you in ways that will not work, because those ways or methods hold no value to you. If leadership is the ability to influence others, then knowing what others hold most dear becomes even more important to understand. If, as a leader, your method of exerting influence touches something your subordinates care deeply about, then you will be successful in moving them in a particular direction. If the influence does not, then you will fail.
These are important ideas to think about. So much of who we are is actually controlled by forces outside of us. I cannot control what others think about me, how they view me, or how much they value me. That is entirely up to them. I can only present me - in my current form. They will decide to confer, or not confer, their respect and value on me. To chase after their approbation will only exhaust me because I can never stop running. And so the question becomes, what will they see? Whatever that is, that is what is in my control. The rest is up to them. And whatever that may be, I am certain that it equals the content of my character. To put it simply, I used to tell trainees that at the end of the day, all you have is your name. What that means to others you cannot control. What it means to you, you can. Therefore, the goal of all personal development ought to be the refinement and development of our character. You cannot lead others without it. You can force, coerce, or threaten them for sure, but you cannot lead them without the development and understanding of your character. Ultimately, what this idea brings up is that I choose to lead others, and I choose to be led by others. The power of choice is mine. And that power resides with each of us. My Soldiers choose to be led by me. My title and position place me in their path, but it is ultimately their choice to allow themselves to be led by me. If they were to choose one day to say that they did not wish to be led by me anymore, in reality there would be precious little that I could do that would affect them. Have you ever considered that?
Have you ever thought about what would happen if you lost everything that currently defines you? Your home, job, title, money, possessions? What would happen if all of that were stripped away? If you went from commander to private? From CEO to janitor? From ruler to prisoner? Is your sense of self-worth intimately tied to all of these external things? The fear of losing these defining things - especially in a hierarchical military system has an extremely powerful influence. People do and say things everyday that they do not believe out of fear that their station will be reduced and they will lose all the defining labels they currently have. They agree to plans that will not work, they obediently tote the current party line, they get wrapped up entirely in their personal location on the organization's totem pole. At the core of it, they are afraid to be alone with themselves, so they protect at all costs their status identities.
These ideas came together in a powerful way this past week. I have been tasked to develop a program for the entire Division. As we prepare to brief a senior leader, threats have been made that I will get fired if the product is not to his liking. But we are currently playing a guessing game with what he wants. What was originally asked for cannot be delivered correctly in the time allotted. It has been refined many times and we had gained his approval awhile back. But who knows how that has changed since the last briefing. And at every level between he and I people are guessing and reinterpreting what they think he wants to see. We are chasing approbation. But what influence he believes he has over subordinates he truly does not. He might say that everyone will do this or that, but in reality those units have leaders who will choose what their Soldier will or will not do. People around me are very concerned about this potential that we might be fired. They are worried about it and have mentioned it often. And their nervousness for awhile had the effect of making me nervous. What if I get it wrong? What if he doesn't like the product we present? What if he does fire me? What if, what if, what if? And then I really asked myself, "What if?" I know that the product I will deliver will get results, and will be good for the unit. I know that, and I can prove that. I have been doing it for the last 3 years. I know it because over 3,000 Soldiers have benefited from it. So what am I afraid of? And then Epictetus showed up in my in-box. A gift from the gods. Turns out that I was afraid of a loss of station. I might lose my title. I might lose my place in the organization. I might lose the respect of others. But those things were never mine to begin with. They were all external.
I have been here before under much more serious circumstances than these. The lessons of Epictetus were first shown to me in the aftermath of what happened in Iraq, I just wasn't smart enough to see them then. My Orientation was in the wrong place. Little by little my understanding of the depth of these lessons is becoming more clear to me. At 42 years old, I have become a student again. I get a sneaking suspicion that it will never stop.
I will deliver my briefing - the best that I can produce. That is up to me. That cannot be taken from me. What I can control is me, what I demand of myself, and the content of my character. The rest doesn't really matter much. I am not working for his approbation, I am working for mine. The only fear remaining is that any loss of the 'externals' might reduce my ability to assist other people. This is not about me. I will be fine no matter what the outcome is. That is because the choice to be that way is mine alone. I answer only to my expectations of me. Somewhere in there you can judge for yourself the content of my character.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."
I started to think about the words, "..content of their character" and what they mean for leaders. What is your character? What helps create it, define it, and how much time do we spend thinking about it?
And then I got a gift from the gods. Joe D. has been a follower of the blog almost since it's inception. He replies often and he and I have an on-going dialogue, that, although we have never met personally, allows me to call him a friend. I am grateful for all of his support and commentary over the years.
The other morning Joe sent me a document written by Vice Admiral James Stockdale entitled, " Courage Under Fire - Testing Epictetus's Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior". (Although I have searched for an on-line copy of the document I cannot find one, so if you are interested in reading it send me a note.)
As people may or may not know, Vice Admiral Stockdale was a fighter pilot in Vietnam who was shot down and then held captive by the North Vietnamese for 8 years. According to the introduction of his paper he was tortured 15 times, kept in leg irons for 2 years and spent over 4 years of his captivity in solitary confinement. He was also a student of philosophy and had been studying the works of Epictetus while serving in Vietnam.
Epictetus was considered one of the Stoic philosophers and the main theme of his works was that there are things that a person can control and there are things that he cannot. Stockdale put it like this:
"As I ejected from that airplane I had the understanding that a Stoic always kept separate files in his mind for (A) those things that are “up to him” and (B) those things that are “not up to him.” Another way of saying it is (A) those things that are “within his power” and (B) those things that are “beyond his power.” Still another way of saying it is (A) those things that are within the grasp of “his Will, his Free Will” and (B) those things that are beyond it. All in category B are “external,” beyond my control, ultimately dooming me to fear and anxiety if I covet them. All in category A are up to me, within my power, within my will, and properly subjects for my total concern and involvement. They include my opinions, my aims, my aversions, my own grief, my own joy, my judgments, my attitude about what is going on, my own good, and my own evil."
I would call these things one's Orientation. They are, at your core, those things that are ultimately yours regardless of circumstance. They cannot be taken, only surrendered. And more importantly, learning to separate what matters - really matters - from that which does not. Stockdale makes an important point here that I believe has real relevance to leader development today:
"What is not up to you? beyond your power? Not subject to your will in the last analysis? For starters, let’s take “your station in life.” As I glide down toward that little town on my short parachute ride, I’m just about to learn how negligible is my control over my station in life. It’s not at all up to me. I’m going right now from being the leader of a hundred-plus pilots and a thousand men and, good-
ness knows, all sorts of symbolic status and goodwill, to being an object of contempt. I’ll be known as a “criminal.” But that’s not half the revelation that is the realization of your own fragility—that you can be reduced by wind and rain and ice and seawater or men to a helpless, sobbing wreck—unable to control even your own bowels in a matter of minutes. And, more than even that, you’re going to face fragilities you never before let yourself believe you could have––like
after mere minutes, in a flurry of action while being bound with tourniquet-tight ropes, with care, by a professional, hands behind, jackknifed forward and down toward your ankles held secure in lugs
attached to an iron bar, that, with the onrush of anxiety, knowing your upper body’s circulation has been stopped and feeling the ever-growing induced pain and the ever-closing-in of claustrophobia, you can be made to blurt out answers, sometimes correct answers, to questions about anything they know you know. “Station in life,” then, can be changed from that of a dignified and competent gentleman of culture to that of a panic-stricken, sobbing, self-loathing wreck in a matter of minutes. So what? To live under the false pretense that you will forever have control of your station in life is to ride for a fall; you’re asking for disappointment. So make sure in your heart of hearts, in your inner self, that you treat your station in life with indifference, not with contempt, only with indifference."
You can lose so many of those things that define you in your present reality. Your title, your place, your possessions, everything. And what will you have then? Who will you be? Without some consideration of those important questions how can you lead others? How can you be led by others? How can you form the content of your character?
Stockdale realized something else during his captivity that I also think is important for leaders to consider which is the idea that once you learn to surrender those "Station in life" things that currently seem so important, the ability of others to define - and gain power over you, is greatly diminished. Because they believe so strongly that they can affect you by changing that status, the methods they employ are aimed incorrectly in that direction. In effect, they are attempting to influence you in ways that will not work, because those ways or methods hold no value to you. If leadership is the ability to influence others, then knowing what others hold most dear becomes even more important to understand. If, as a leader, your method of exerting influence touches something your subordinates care deeply about, then you will be successful in moving them in a particular direction. If the influence does not, then you will fail.
These are important ideas to think about. So much of who we are is actually controlled by forces outside of us. I cannot control what others think about me, how they view me, or how much they value me. That is entirely up to them. I can only present me - in my current form. They will decide to confer, or not confer, their respect and value on me. To chase after their approbation will only exhaust me because I can never stop running. And so the question becomes, what will they see? Whatever that is, that is what is in my control. The rest is up to them. And whatever that may be, I am certain that it equals the content of my character. To put it simply, I used to tell trainees that at the end of the day, all you have is your name. What that means to others you cannot control. What it means to you, you can. Therefore, the goal of all personal development ought to be the refinement and development of our character. You cannot lead others without it. You can force, coerce, or threaten them for sure, but you cannot lead them without the development and understanding of your character. Ultimately, what this idea brings up is that I choose to lead others, and I choose to be led by others. The power of choice is mine. And that power resides with each of us. My Soldiers choose to be led by me. My title and position place me in their path, but it is ultimately their choice to allow themselves to be led by me. If they were to choose one day to say that they did not wish to be led by me anymore, in reality there would be precious little that I could do that would affect them. Have you ever considered that?
Have you ever thought about what would happen if you lost everything that currently defines you? Your home, job, title, money, possessions? What would happen if all of that were stripped away? If you went from commander to private? From CEO to janitor? From ruler to prisoner? Is your sense of self-worth intimately tied to all of these external things? The fear of losing these defining things - especially in a hierarchical military system has an extremely powerful influence. People do and say things everyday that they do not believe out of fear that their station will be reduced and they will lose all the defining labels they currently have. They agree to plans that will not work, they obediently tote the current party line, they get wrapped up entirely in their personal location on the organization's totem pole. At the core of it, they are afraid to be alone with themselves, so they protect at all costs their status identities.
These ideas came together in a powerful way this past week. I have been tasked to develop a program for the entire Division. As we prepare to brief a senior leader, threats have been made that I will get fired if the product is not to his liking. But we are currently playing a guessing game with what he wants. What was originally asked for cannot be delivered correctly in the time allotted. It has been refined many times and we had gained his approval awhile back. But who knows how that has changed since the last briefing. And at every level between he and I people are guessing and reinterpreting what they think he wants to see. We are chasing approbation. But what influence he believes he has over subordinates he truly does not. He might say that everyone will do this or that, but in reality those units have leaders who will choose what their Soldier will or will not do. People around me are very concerned about this potential that we might be fired. They are worried about it and have mentioned it often. And their nervousness for awhile had the effect of making me nervous. What if I get it wrong? What if he doesn't like the product we present? What if he does fire me? What if, what if, what if? And then I really asked myself, "What if?" I know that the product I will deliver will get results, and will be good for the unit. I know that, and I can prove that. I have been doing it for the last 3 years. I know it because over 3,000 Soldiers have benefited from it. So what am I afraid of? And then Epictetus showed up in my in-box. A gift from the gods. Turns out that I was afraid of a loss of station. I might lose my title. I might lose my place in the organization. I might lose the respect of others. But those things were never mine to begin with. They were all external.
I have been here before under much more serious circumstances than these. The lessons of Epictetus were first shown to me in the aftermath of what happened in Iraq, I just wasn't smart enough to see them then. My Orientation was in the wrong place. Little by little my understanding of the depth of these lessons is becoming more clear to me. At 42 years old, I have become a student again. I get a sneaking suspicion that it will never stop.
I will deliver my briefing - the best that I can produce. That is up to me. That cannot be taken from me. What I can control is me, what I demand of myself, and the content of my character. The rest doesn't really matter much. I am not working for his approbation, I am working for mine. The only fear remaining is that any loss of the 'externals' might reduce my ability to assist other people. This is not about me. I will be fine no matter what the outcome is. That is because the choice to be that way is mine alone. I answer only to my expectations of me. Somewhere in there you can judge for yourself the content of my character.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#101 The Qualifying Words and the Profession
I was reading through the Army White Paper entitled "The Profession of Arms" yesterday morning and came across the following paragraph:
"If leaders allow disconnects between word and deed, gaps can be created between espoused values, and values in use—when Soldiers or leaders do not ―'walk the talk' in line with espoused Army beliefs and values. This creates confusion across the ranks and leads to dysfunctional and demoralizing behavior. For example, [emphasis added by me] if the Army espouses the importance of Soldier and leader education and professional development yet does not invest in it adequately, or has selection practices that make leaders who pursue broadening developmental experiences less competitive for advancement, the Army appears hypocritical. However, if the espoused beliefs and values are reasonably congruent with the Army‘s deeper underlying assumptions, then the articulation of those values into a philosophy of operating can be a powerful source to help create cohesion, unity of effort, and identity."
If...should...could...might...can...
In that entire paragraph, one little two letter word makes all the difference. If. "If the Army espouses the importance of Soldier and leader education..." The inclusion of the qualifying word if implies that it is possible that the Army does not actually do this it just says it does. And the world is full of qualifying words such as these and those words have immediate and long-term impacts on the organization. Not can have impacts. Does.
Leaders need to consider qualifying words very carefully. They have a huge impact on every aspect of how their actions and decisions will be interpreted by their subordinates. Qualifying words crack the door open to the disconnects mentioned in the opening sentence. They invite re-interpretation at every level above and below them. They inherently recognize and allow for different Orientations. When was the last time we ever considered a word like 'if' or 'should' in a class on leader development? The more you think about it, the qualifying words truly are the operational difference between success and failure. They are the binding thread of the commanders intent.
Re-write first sentence of that paragraph slightly differently and watch what happens:
"When leaders allow disconnects between word and deed, gaps are created between espoused values and values in use..."
In reality, the paragraph above should have removed the word if and simply acknowledged that the Army has not done a very good job on concentrating on Soldier education and leader development over the last two decades or so. We send Soldiers to schools, but they do not return educated. Especially in our NCO schoolhouses. Rote memorization does not equal learning. It only equals a surface level rudimentary skill of being able to regurgitate a fact or statement without the understanding of the deeper requirements of the statement itself. "I will always place the mission first." is a statement of fact. I can memorize it in 2 seconds. However, it takes a lifetime to understand its' meaning. It takes a lifetime to internalize it to such a degree that it can withstand the vaguaries of interpretation and challenges that it makes upon a leader. It takes but a second to understand that "I will always place the mission first" means that I - as an individual Soldier - am prepared to give my life to accomplish the mission, and more importantly, that I, as a leader, am prepared to sacrifice lives in order to accomplish the mission. But it takes much more time to ask "Are you really willing to die for a piece of ground in some far away place?" "Are you really prepared to sacrifice other young men and women on that piece of ground which has been contested for millennium?" In these considerations and understandings the burden of leading Soldiers weighs most heavily. Education confronts those burdens, rote memorization does not. In answering those questions we confront one of the most powerful requirements of the profession and the professional.
The idea for this post came to me the other evening when I received a link to an Atlantic Monthly magazine article written by Tim Kane entitled: "Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving". You can find the link below:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/why-our-best-officers-are-leaving/8346/1/
In the article, Mr. Kane makes the following point:
"From officer evaluations to promotions to job assignments, all branches of the military operate more like a government bureaucracy with a unionized workforce than like a cutting-edge meritocracy."
Now, compare that to the following idea in the White Paper:
"Strategic leaders‘ actions also signal to Soldiers and junior leaders whether they are serving in a profession where, for example, individual merits of competence and character are the sole measures of certification or, instead, in an occupational or bureaucratic system where other measures apply. Such actions determine whether Soldiers see themselves as professionals serving a calling or as time-servers filing a government job.... Some of these systems are now out of balance after nine years of war, making the current challenge more urgent [emphasis added]. In short, strategic leaders ensure that they produce the necessary conditions for the Army to be a profession."
These two sources, one from outside the organization and one from within, both recognize the same truth. In many ways, we have moved away from being a profession seen as a calling or vocation, and have moved towards a bureaucratic system demanding conformity and institutionalized thinking. And that movement has had consequences. Quite honestly, there are no qualifying words needed. We know it to be true. Any hard look at the profession requires the acceptance of facts - an acceptance of current reality. To open the door for inaction by using qualifying words like 'if' does not further the discussion at all.
Why all this time on little words like 'if' and 'should'? Because when any leader is forced to look hard at the outcomes of the multiple courses of action that derive from them, they can then start the education and judgment process which is critical to being a professional. It does not matter what the field is. A young lawyer learns the rules of the law. A young doctor learns the steps to performing a surgical procedure. But they gain an education in could, if, and might. Could, if, and might require the application of judgment and a constant awareness of changing conditions. The education and learning that are critical requirements of any profession begin with the qualifying words. The rest is just rote memorization. Leadership begins with the acknowledgment of the significance of the little words, the recognition of their power to re-orient the intent, and the requirement to speak and act in such a manner that the entire organization has a clear understanding of their operational outcomes.
If this post seems a little disjointed to you, relax. It seems the same to me too. The ideas are there, they are just not quite as articulately presented as I am comfortable with. But maybe that's the point. In struggling to get these thoughts on the page, I am really dealing with the struggles of being a professional. Chronologically, I read the Atlantic Monthly article the other night, and then came across the paragraphs from the White Paper yesterday. What struck me was the difference in tone. Mr. Kane's article speaks definitely while the White Paper equivocates. And since I have received a half a dozen emails or Facebook responses agreeing with most of Kane's piece, I started thinking where is the disconnect? Turns out, it's in all those little qualifying words. Maybe I need to spend more time thinking them. Suddenly, they seem rather important to me.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"If leaders allow disconnects between word and deed, gaps can be created between espoused values, and values in use—when Soldiers or leaders do not ―'walk the talk' in line with espoused Army beliefs and values. This creates confusion across the ranks and leads to dysfunctional and demoralizing behavior. For example, [emphasis added by me] if the Army espouses the importance of Soldier and leader education and professional development yet does not invest in it adequately, or has selection practices that make leaders who pursue broadening developmental experiences less competitive for advancement, the Army appears hypocritical. However, if the espoused beliefs and values are reasonably congruent with the Army‘s deeper underlying assumptions, then the articulation of those values into a philosophy of operating can be a powerful source to help create cohesion, unity of effort, and identity."
If...should...could...might...can...
In that entire paragraph, one little two letter word makes all the difference. If. "If the Army espouses the importance of Soldier and leader education..." The inclusion of the qualifying word if implies that it is possible that the Army does not actually do this it just says it does. And the world is full of qualifying words such as these and those words have immediate and long-term impacts on the organization. Not can have impacts. Does.
Leaders need to consider qualifying words very carefully. They have a huge impact on every aspect of how their actions and decisions will be interpreted by their subordinates. Qualifying words crack the door open to the disconnects mentioned in the opening sentence. They invite re-interpretation at every level above and below them. They inherently recognize and allow for different Orientations. When was the last time we ever considered a word like 'if' or 'should' in a class on leader development? The more you think about it, the qualifying words truly are the operational difference between success and failure. They are the binding thread of the commanders intent.
Re-write first sentence of that paragraph slightly differently and watch what happens:
"When leaders allow disconnects between word and deed, gaps are created between espoused values and values in use..."
In reality, the paragraph above should have removed the word if and simply acknowledged that the Army has not done a very good job on concentrating on Soldier education and leader development over the last two decades or so. We send Soldiers to schools, but they do not return educated. Especially in our NCO schoolhouses. Rote memorization does not equal learning. It only equals a surface level rudimentary skill of being able to regurgitate a fact or statement without the understanding of the deeper requirements of the statement itself. "I will always place the mission first." is a statement of fact. I can memorize it in 2 seconds. However, it takes a lifetime to understand its' meaning. It takes a lifetime to internalize it to such a degree that it can withstand the vaguaries of interpretation and challenges that it makes upon a leader. It takes but a second to understand that "I will always place the mission first" means that I - as an individual Soldier - am prepared to give my life to accomplish the mission, and more importantly, that I, as a leader, am prepared to sacrifice lives in order to accomplish the mission. But it takes much more time to ask "Are you really willing to die for a piece of ground in some far away place?" "Are you really prepared to sacrifice other young men and women on that piece of ground which has been contested for millennium?" In these considerations and understandings the burden of leading Soldiers weighs most heavily. Education confronts those burdens, rote memorization does not. In answering those questions we confront one of the most powerful requirements of the profession and the professional.
The idea for this post came to me the other evening when I received a link to an Atlantic Monthly magazine article written by Tim Kane entitled: "Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving". You can find the link below:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/why-our-best-officers-are-leaving/8346/1/
In the article, Mr. Kane makes the following point:
"From officer evaluations to promotions to job assignments, all branches of the military operate more like a government bureaucracy with a unionized workforce than like a cutting-edge meritocracy."
Now, compare that to the following idea in the White Paper:
"Strategic leaders‘ actions also signal to Soldiers and junior leaders whether they are serving in a profession where, for example, individual merits of competence and character are the sole measures of certification or, instead, in an occupational or bureaucratic system where other measures apply. Such actions determine whether Soldiers see themselves as professionals serving a calling or as time-servers filing a government job.... Some of these systems are now out of balance after nine years of war, making the current challenge more urgent [emphasis added]. In short, strategic leaders ensure that they produce the necessary conditions for the Army to be a profession."
These two sources, one from outside the organization and one from within, both recognize the same truth. In many ways, we have moved away from being a profession seen as a calling or vocation, and have moved towards a bureaucratic system demanding conformity and institutionalized thinking. And that movement has had consequences. Quite honestly, there are no qualifying words needed. We know it to be true. Any hard look at the profession requires the acceptance of facts - an acceptance of current reality. To open the door for inaction by using qualifying words like 'if' does not further the discussion at all.
Why all this time on little words like 'if' and 'should'? Because when any leader is forced to look hard at the outcomes of the multiple courses of action that derive from them, they can then start the education and judgment process which is critical to being a professional. It does not matter what the field is. A young lawyer learns the rules of the law. A young doctor learns the steps to performing a surgical procedure. But they gain an education in could, if, and might. Could, if, and might require the application of judgment and a constant awareness of changing conditions. The education and learning that are critical requirements of any profession begin with the qualifying words. The rest is just rote memorization. Leadership begins with the acknowledgment of the significance of the little words, the recognition of their power to re-orient the intent, and the requirement to speak and act in such a manner that the entire organization has a clear understanding of their operational outcomes.
If this post seems a little disjointed to you, relax. It seems the same to me too. The ideas are there, they are just not quite as articulately presented as I am comfortable with. But maybe that's the point. In struggling to get these thoughts on the page, I am really dealing with the struggles of being a professional. Chronologically, I read the Atlantic Monthly article the other night, and then came across the paragraphs from the White Paper yesterday. What struck me was the difference in tone. Mr. Kane's article speaks definitely while the White Paper equivocates. And since I have received a half a dozen emails or Facebook responses agreeing with most of Kane's piece, I started thinking where is the disconnect? Turns out, it's in all those little qualifying words. Maybe I need to spend more time thinking them. Suddenly, they seem rather important to me.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#100 Why Me?
This is my 100th post to Fen's Thoughts. I wrote my first message on August 2nd, 2009 and have pretty much written every week since then. I want to thank everyone for taking the time to consider the work on these pages. I truly do enjoy your feedback and am glad that you are finding something here worth reading, considering, and furthering the discussion on. It has been a very gratifying experience, one that I intend to continue for years ahead.
A special debt of thanks goes to those who have become members or followers on the site itself, and to those who have provided me with commentary, suggestions, and support over the last year and a half. What started out as a small mental exercise on Sunday mornings has grown substantially and now averages about 100 page views per week here, another 50 or so on the Army's website, and is followed by 45 different people or organizations on Twitter. Hopefully 2011 will continue to bring new members and input from a variety of sources.
100 posts equals a body of work. There is now enough material here that it can be looked at holistically to search for themes and trends. And I think that it's good every once in awhile to do that - to take time to see exactly what those main points are. This past year's posts have helped to narrow that field down. As my Dad told me one week, it seems as if you're talking about the same things over and over, just using a different source piece to buttress the argument. Essentially, he is correct. There are 4 main themes to this blog and what I write about.
*Self awareness and the impact it has on 'how' you think, act, and lead.
*The critical importance of your personal value system and Orientation and where and how it interacts and intersects with the institution.
*The choice to be a servant leader, or to be served by those you lead.
*The effect that organizational structure has on leadership - how the hierarchy moves the person.
These four themes have consumed a lot of my thinking this year, and hopefully, have done the same for the reader as well.
And maybe I have been just fortunate enough to start writing at this particular point, because it appears that many of these topics are ones the Army is starting to delve into as well. I am extremely grateful for the support of CC, RS, and BF at BCKS/CALL for helping me to get my work published there as well. It has certainly allowed me to expand my audience inside the organization and to add my two cents to the larger body of ideas and knowledge that drives thoughtful consideration and dialogue.
Why me? Why am I doing this? I've been thinking a lot about that recently and I think it comes down to this: I believe that I am uniquely suited for many of these discussions because I have actually experienced many of these situations. For me they are not theoretical or academic, they are real and they are personal. But more than that, I think that I possess an ability that does set me apart from many others. I am passionate, intelligent, and articulate about what I do. My life, my calling, is to serve the Army as best as I can. I do not know how to do anything else. But, (and this is important) I also doubt myself often as well. During those times when it feels as if I am swimming against the tide, I often wonder whether or not I'm seeing my world correctly. Am I Oriented correctly, or are those who view the problem and the solutions differently than I do? And I think that's important. I think that after awhile, a lot of folks simply keep doing what they have always done because it doesn't require any more thought or energy. Because they are no longer worried about their place in the organization. Because they have reached a point where they are protected. I have never felt that way - at least not for long. I have always felt that tomorrow could bring some new problem that I cannot Orient to. That is the reason that I keep pushing so hard. I have no real desire for accolades or promotions anymore, now I am trying to follow my dreams and do what makes me happy. Which is, I think, to write, and participate in these discussions which will help shape the organization I have devoted my entire adult life to. As we enter into 2011, I would ask the same question of each of you, are you simply working? Or are you following and contributing to something that is your passion? Believe me, it is not an academic question. Someday, somewhere, what you do for a living will put you in a box where all that you know and trust will be called into question. Only then will you be faced with yourself and your passion. Think about it...The study of leadership, and the profession of arms, calls to me because while others write blithe statements in professional journals about moral imperatives, or ethical character, I have walked those roads and they are not academic at all. Not on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. There, we entrust both the character of our Nation and the ethical decision making of modern warfare to a young person who deserves nothing less than our fullest efforts towards their development. That is where I want to be.
These thoughts came to me the other day while reading a magazine article. My parents send me a yearly subscription to Yankee Magazine - a coffee table publication which highlights the variety and beauty of the New England states. In the Jan/Feb 2011 edition there is an article entitled "The Restorer" which chronicles the work of Jon Wilson. Wilson is an aficionado of wooden boat building and started a highly successful magazine "Wooden Boat". Wilson then became interested in something called Victim Offender Dialogue (VOD) which brings together the family members of those lost to violent crimes with those who committed the crimes in order to help bring closure to both sides. It is a compelling article and captured my interest right away. First, because Wilson's success with "Wooden Boat" has a sort of Horatio Alger feel to it, but more importantly, because of the following paragraph:
"...in 1989, Wilson was feeling the pangs to do something different with his life. "I feel like I'm taking up space on the planet, " He says. "For me it's how do I make myself worthy enough? It's kind of a flaw, but it drives my work, and has always driven my work. I could never quite do well enough, so I kept trying to do it better."
Exactly. Precisely. I read those words and they sank in deep. In fact, I had about half of this post written and erased all of it to start again.
When we talk about the profession of arms over the months ahead, the ethic, the calling, the service...these are the things that I want to confront. These are the issues that matter. Everything we do to prepare Soldiers to serve their country must generate from that place in their heart where the calling is felt most deeply. There must be risk. If there is a question about moral courage then it must be answered by the nervousness of the gut, the recognition that there are multiple choices to select from, but that ultimately, you will have to choose and then live with the outcomes of the choices you make.
These first 100 posts ultimately may have only set the stage for the discussions ahead. It may have taken every one of them for me to get it down to four themes. If so, I hope I haven't wasted your time and I appreciate that many of you still take the time to check it out. This is my passion. I hope it continues to provide you material worthy of consideration. I look forward to the year ahead.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
A special debt of thanks goes to those who have become members or followers on the site itself, and to those who have provided me with commentary, suggestions, and support over the last year and a half. What started out as a small mental exercise on Sunday mornings has grown substantially and now averages about 100 page views per week here, another 50 or so on the Army's website, and is followed by 45 different people or organizations on Twitter. Hopefully 2011 will continue to bring new members and input from a variety of sources.
100 posts equals a body of work. There is now enough material here that it can be looked at holistically to search for themes and trends. And I think that it's good every once in awhile to do that - to take time to see exactly what those main points are. This past year's posts have helped to narrow that field down. As my Dad told me one week, it seems as if you're talking about the same things over and over, just using a different source piece to buttress the argument. Essentially, he is correct. There are 4 main themes to this blog and what I write about.
*Self awareness and the impact it has on 'how' you think, act, and lead.
*The critical importance of your personal value system and Orientation and where and how it interacts and intersects with the institution.
*The choice to be a servant leader, or to be served by those you lead.
*The effect that organizational structure has on leadership - how the hierarchy moves the person.
These four themes have consumed a lot of my thinking this year, and hopefully, have done the same for the reader as well.
And maybe I have been just fortunate enough to start writing at this particular point, because it appears that many of these topics are ones the Army is starting to delve into as well. I am extremely grateful for the support of CC, RS, and BF at BCKS/CALL for helping me to get my work published there as well. It has certainly allowed me to expand my audience inside the organization and to add my two cents to the larger body of ideas and knowledge that drives thoughtful consideration and dialogue.
Why me? Why am I doing this? I've been thinking a lot about that recently and I think it comes down to this: I believe that I am uniquely suited for many of these discussions because I have actually experienced many of these situations. For me they are not theoretical or academic, they are real and they are personal. But more than that, I think that I possess an ability that does set me apart from many others. I am passionate, intelligent, and articulate about what I do. My life, my calling, is to serve the Army as best as I can. I do not know how to do anything else. But, (and this is important) I also doubt myself often as well. During those times when it feels as if I am swimming against the tide, I often wonder whether or not I'm seeing my world correctly. Am I Oriented correctly, or are those who view the problem and the solutions differently than I do? And I think that's important. I think that after awhile, a lot of folks simply keep doing what they have always done because it doesn't require any more thought or energy. Because they are no longer worried about their place in the organization. Because they have reached a point where they are protected. I have never felt that way - at least not for long. I have always felt that tomorrow could bring some new problem that I cannot Orient to. That is the reason that I keep pushing so hard. I have no real desire for accolades or promotions anymore, now I am trying to follow my dreams and do what makes me happy. Which is, I think, to write, and participate in these discussions which will help shape the organization I have devoted my entire adult life to. As we enter into 2011, I would ask the same question of each of you, are you simply working? Or are you following and contributing to something that is your passion? Believe me, it is not an academic question. Someday, somewhere, what you do for a living will put you in a box where all that you know and trust will be called into question. Only then will you be faced with yourself and your passion. Think about it...The study of leadership, and the profession of arms, calls to me because while others write blithe statements in professional journals about moral imperatives, or ethical character, I have walked those roads and they are not academic at all. Not on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. There, we entrust both the character of our Nation and the ethical decision making of modern warfare to a young person who deserves nothing less than our fullest efforts towards their development. That is where I want to be.
These thoughts came to me the other day while reading a magazine article. My parents send me a yearly subscription to Yankee Magazine - a coffee table publication which highlights the variety and beauty of the New England states. In the Jan/Feb 2011 edition there is an article entitled "The Restorer" which chronicles the work of Jon Wilson. Wilson is an aficionado of wooden boat building and started a highly successful magazine "Wooden Boat". Wilson then became interested in something called Victim Offender Dialogue (VOD) which brings together the family members of those lost to violent crimes with those who committed the crimes in order to help bring closure to both sides. It is a compelling article and captured my interest right away. First, because Wilson's success with "Wooden Boat" has a sort of Horatio Alger feel to it, but more importantly, because of the following paragraph:
"...in 1989, Wilson was feeling the pangs to do something different with his life. "I feel like I'm taking up space on the planet, " He says. "For me it's how do I make myself worthy enough? It's kind of a flaw, but it drives my work, and has always driven my work. I could never quite do well enough, so I kept trying to do it better."
Exactly. Precisely. I read those words and they sank in deep. In fact, I had about half of this post written and erased all of it to start again.
When we talk about the profession of arms over the months ahead, the ethic, the calling, the service...these are the things that I want to confront. These are the issues that matter. Everything we do to prepare Soldiers to serve their country must generate from that place in their heart where the calling is felt most deeply. There must be risk. If there is a question about moral courage then it must be answered by the nervousness of the gut, the recognition that there are multiple choices to select from, but that ultimately, you will have to choose and then live with the outcomes of the choices you make.
These first 100 posts ultimately may have only set the stage for the discussions ahead. It may have taken every one of them for me to get it down to four themes. If so, I hope I haven't wasted your time and I appreciate that many of you still take the time to check it out. This is my passion. I hope it continues to provide you material worthy of consideration. I look forward to the year ahead.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
#99 Moral Autonomy
I was searching around the Net this morning to see what was new and came across the an article in last Fall's issue of Joint Forces Quarterly that caught my eye. The article is titled, "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional" written by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Milburn, United States Marine Corps. You can find a copy of it here:
http://www.ndu.edu/press/breaking-ranks.html
About half-way through the piece, I found the following paragraph:
"A survey conducted among students at the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) in January 2010 reveals a view of the military profession that contrasts sharply with the Huntingtonian model espoused in "Salute and Disobey?" The sample is admittedly small; nevertheless, it represents a cross section of 20 senior field-grade officers from all Services and two foreign countries. Without exception, they agreed that there are circumstances under which they would disobey a lawful order. Their criteria vary little, as these excerpts illustrate:
As we study the profession, and what it means to be a professional, we might consider LTC Milburn's point about moral autonomy very closely. I too have sworn to defend the Constitution. I too have a responsibility to safeguard the welfare of my subordinates. I too have an obligation to challenge orders whose consequences would threaten either. Ultimately, I too possess moral autonomy. If we are to have 1.5 million morally autonomous people running around making decisions from local to strategic in scale, then we might want to spend some time in their development process along the way to provide them the tools and framework to make such decisions. It cannot simply be something the profession takes for granted. There is too much at stake.
A final thought. This article was written before 'Don't Ask Don't Tell' was repealed. Consider the thoughts above in that light. Moral and ethical decision making is not only a battlefield requirement. In the months and years ahead as the military comes to grips on a day-to-day basis with implementation of the repeal, many leaders and Soldiers will be forced to make potentially large moral and ethical decisions. What tools will we provide them to make those choices? Go back to Milburn's 3rd quotation from the interviews, "If I believe it to be morally wrong..." Those 20 senior officers he interviewed have direct influence over between 70,000 and 100,000 servicemembers. Something to consider.
Thank you for your service, Sir. Have nice day. I swore to uphold the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. You do not have the right nor the authority to reinterpret that. I respect your moral choice to resign over this, I really do. However, I will not let you make decisions for the rest of us. For I too retain the right of moral autonomy - as do each of my Soldiers, regardless of race, color, gender, creed or orientation.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/breaking-ranks.html
About half-way through the piece, I found the following paragraph:
"A survey conducted among students at the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) in January 2010 reveals a view of the military profession that contrasts sharply with the Huntingtonian model espoused in "Salute and Disobey?" The sample is admittedly small; nevertheless, it represents a cross section of 20 senior field-grade officers from all Services and two foreign countries. Without exception, they agreed that there are circumstances under which they would disobey a lawful order. Their criteria vary little, as these excerpts illustrate:
- "If the officer cannot live with obeying the order, then he must disobey and accept the consequences."
- "When I cannot look at myself in the mirror afterwards."
- "When I deem the order to be immoral."
- "When it is going to lead to mission failure."
- "When it will get someone injured or killed needlessly."
- "When it will cause military or institutional disaster."5
These comments reflect the view that the military professional has moral obligations more fundamental than obedience and loyalty to their leaders, civilian or military. Myers and Kohn imply that the term moral is too subjective to be defendable. However, I argue that the military profession is founded on clearly defined moral principles.
For the purposes of this article, I use the term military professional to apply to military officers. I make this distinction based on the nature of the officer's professional military education, which focuses on developing an abstract body of knowledge; his code of ethics, which reflect the "special trust and confidence" conferred on him by the President and Congress in his commission; and his oath of office, which differs in an important aspect from the enlisted oath. These defining characteristics of the military profession impose on him obligations beyond obedience."
It is a widely held belief that all Soldiers have an inherent right and a moral responsibility to disobey an unlawful order. For example, I cannot direct someone to shoot an unarmed noncombatant. I cannot order someone to deny an enemy prisoner of war food or water or basic sanitary needs. Even more so, I cannot order someone to shoot a combatant who has laid down his rifle and no longer poses a direct threat to me or my Soldiers - even if that combatant has killed or wounded some of my people. It is further understood that following orders such as these do not enhance the standing of the American Soldier in the eyes of our enemies, the population of the country we are fighting in, or with the American public. The Soldier is always expected to take the higher moral ground. The question becomes, where is that 'higher' ground? Does it have limits? And critical to the study of any profession, who gets to be the judge?
If you look at the bullet comments above, something else becomes very apparent: The senior officers interviewed, almost without exception, have decided that they, individually, are the arbiters of what is moral. Consider the first three quotes:
"If the officer (I) cannot obey the order then he (I) must disobey and accept the consequences."
"If I cannot look myself in the mirror afterwards."
"When I deem the order to be immoral."
That final bullet troubles me greatly. Suddenly a brigade commander in charge of 3,500 - 5,000 troops gets to decide for his/her organization what proper moral order is? What qualifies him/her for that, and more importantly, who gave them that type of authority in the first place? Their oath reposed special trust and confidence in them granted by the President, it did not grant them the ability to impart any particular moral belief system except that of the Nation to their subordinates.
As we study the ethic of our profession over the next year or so, questions such as these quotes raise, must be answered first. Are we, or are we not going to cede control of the moral / ethical decision making of the institution and it's members to leaders who may, or may not, share the same moral / ethical values as the organization does?
My point here is not as much about not doing something because it is wrong as it is moving in the opposite direction, doing too much. Going further than the norm expects. For example, we have leaders in the Army today who believe that we are engaged in a type of holy war against radical Islam. They believe that they have a moral obligation to fight - almost crusade-like - not against a country, or a terrorist group, but rather against a faith. I worked for a leader once who, when speaking before large groups, would espouse Christian crusade-like language to buttress the reasons for going to war. If we are to give leaders such as these the power to define the actions of their units in their own personal moral code, then we had better ensure that we know what that code is. Is any action permissible if the commander finds it morally sound? What happens when the leader's personal code is not one that the Nation, the Army, nor their Soldiers can live with. A commander who targets all males between certain ages, a commander who publicly states he does not believe in counterinsurgency techniques and needs to conduct counterguerrilla operations instead. These are real examples and in both cases, the commanders ability to define the moral / ethical landscape led to tragic outcomes. Both these commanders used their position within the organization, and their ability to persuade those beneath them that theirs was a noble calling to rid the battle space of radical fundamentalists who were oppressing others. The methods used however, fell far outside the scope of the expected or accepted.
The paragraph that follows the thoughts of those interviewed also caused an almost visceral reaction in me. LTC Milburn's decision to only talk about the officer corps in his discussion of professional military members I found completely offensive. At the point of attack, it is not he who will routinely have to make the tough ethical / moral choices that can happen in an instant, it is the enlisted personnel beneath him that will need to be able to do so. And do so quickly. To imply that due to education, schooling, and their oath of commissioning that only officers must contend with moral / ethical decision making is not only untrue, but flat out incorrect, naive, and dangerous. If anything, there must be an even greater effort at the lower levels to get Soldiers to really look at their decision making process specifically because it is likely to get called into question more often than those further up the chain of command. Consider the following: An infantry battalion commander controls approximately 20 - 25 subordinate squads. On any given day in combat, the likelihood of one or more of those squads making contact and those Soldiers having to make tough moral and ethical choices is infinitely higher than it is for the commander or his staff. Apparently, LTC Milburn believes that somehow an officer's rank and station within the organization confer upon him a special set of skills and judgment abilities that those below him in the organization do not possess. If this belief is widely held throughout the institution, then we are certainly in for some tough times ahead.
Let me paint the picture this way: A brigade or battalion commander believes that he is waging some form of a cataclysmic battle between right and wrong, good vs evil etc, pitting his own moral code against those of the enemy. He then uses operational terms and the discipline of his Soldiers to gain acceptance of his moral understandings and designs operations in furtherance of those aims. His 25 squads patrolling the battlefield now believe that they too have the moral certitude to conduct operations and act in a manner that they believe to be morally sound. Can anyone but me see the potential messy outcome? Check the latest Courts Martial proceedings and watch what happens.
While LTC Milburn's article was written to discuss the role of civil-military operations and the methods of dissent that military leaders have available to them, it also raises some very interesting thoughts at the individual level. What equals an immoral order? When does a behavior, although militarily justifiable, become unethical? And, most importantly, at what level does one get to decide these questions? Is it really an unalienable right of a Soldier to disagree on moral grounds?
If the Army is to call itself a true profession, one thing that it must concentrate it's efforts on is the development of ethical decision-making at the lowest level. It cannot take these abilities for granted and assume that every Soldier possesses the same understandings and ability to act with commonly held moral beliefs. They must be tested, checked, educated, and challenged. If we are to grant the immutable right of refusal to the Soldier, then we owe them an understanding of the decision itself - a way or process to choose - and we owe them an understanding of the potential consequences for their actions. Either way, there must be a baseline understanding that each Soldier is a person who possesses within them the ability to make (for better or worse) moral judgments. This is not the purview of only the officer corps. Responsibility for our personal moral decisions belongs solely to each of us.
A little further on in the piece is the following quote:
"The military professional's core values and oath of office demand the exercise of moral autonomy in carrying out orders. He has sworn to defend the Constitution and safeguard the welfare of his subordinates. Implicit is the obligation to challenge orders whose consequences threaten either without apparent good reason."As we study the profession, and what it means to be a professional, we might consider LTC Milburn's point about moral autonomy very closely. I too have sworn to defend the Constitution. I too have a responsibility to safeguard the welfare of my subordinates. I too have an obligation to challenge orders whose consequences would threaten either. Ultimately, I too possess moral autonomy. If we are to have 1.5 million morally autonomous people running around making decisions from local to strategic in scale, then we might want to spend some time in their development process along the way to provide them the tools and framework to make such decisions. It cannot simply be something the profession takes for granted. There is too much at stake.
A final thought. This article was written before 'Don't Ask Don't Tell' was repealed. Consider the thoughts above in that light. Moral and ethical decision making is not only a battlefield requirement. In the months and years ahead as the military comes to grips on a day-to-day basis with implementation of the repeal, many leaders and Soldiers will be forced to make potentially large moral and ethical decisions. What tools will we provide them to make those choices? Go back to Milburn's 3rd quotation from the interviews, "If I believe it to be morally wrong..." Those 20 senior officers he interviewed have direct influence over between 70,000 and 100,000 servicemembers. Something to consider.
Thank you for your service, Sir. Have nice day. I swore to uphold the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. You do not have the right nor the authority to reinterpret that. I respect your moral choice to resign over this, I really do. However, I will not let you make decisions for the rest of us. For I too retain the right of moral autonomy - as do each of my Soldiers, regardless of race, color, gender, creed or orientation.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#98 Failure is an Option...Kind of
Last week I received an email from a friend of mine who posed an interesting question, one that lies at the heart of many of the ideas being floated around regarding leadership, risk and adaptability. He asked me the following:
"When is it OK to accept failure for the sake of learning? More importantly, is failure acceptable in the Army or in any institution? How does the Army leadership view failure?"
He then went on to state the following:
I came of age in the 'Zero Defect' Army of the 1990's. Although I didn't realize it at the time, the idea that there were "No accidents, only failures of leadership" would play a large role in many of the behavioral and institutional struggles we are experiencing today. 'Zero Defect' gave rise to the idea that every Soldier action was completely controllable. That by putting enough mandated control measures in place, we could literally protect people from themselves and their lack of judgment. Like an over-protective parent, the Army was determined to wipe out any act that might endanger a Soldier. What was never considered was the effect of removing responsibility for mistakes in judgment from the individual. We wouldn't have to worry about developing that critical skillset because there would always be Uncle Sam to tell us what to do. If we didn't follow his edicts, we were punished not for the act of misjudgment itself, but for failure to follow his instructions.
Sadly, that mentality is still extremely prevalent in many places throughout the Army and has put an undue burden on all levels of leadership to ensure a successful outcome for each and every action. It is an ingrained cultural problem. It makes risk something to be avoided, and does not enhance decentralized operations. In fact, it works in the opposite manner. It makes passing the buck - and therefore avoiding responsibility for the outcome - a norm, and further centralizes all decision making at higher and higher levels within the organization. Without a cultural change that accepts that combat and leadership happen in an extremely dynamic environment where thousands of decisions must be stacked one upon the other in quick succession and then adapted and changed in the face of decisions made by the enemy, we will never be able to gain the critical experiential knowledge at the ground level that will allow people to take advantage of new and unfolding opportunities. We have unwittingly enhanced bureaucracy and degraded the capacity for critical judgment just at the time we need it most.
The central problem with risk-taking and experiencing failure in military leadership is that the price is so very high. Unlike the corporate world where the only real loss is money, when one fails in combat, there is a great possibility that a Soldier will die or be severely injured. The central question then becomes, is that Soldier's death worth the learning that occurred because of the decision made by the leader?
If you sit back for a moment and look at how the Army is manned it is simply amazing to me that we have succeeded as often as we have. Take an infantry platoon for instance. We take a 24 year old Lieutenant and place him in charge of 38 people and send him off to war. He has no experience in this realm, has very little self-awareness, and his grasp of the tools and requirements of the profession is almost completely theoretical. He has never taken a class in human behavior, let alone the behavioral dynamics of high stress situations. Then we place him in incredibly complex situations which demand quick judgments that can have life or death consequences for people on both sides of the equation. If you had to draw it up on paper, that wouldn't be the way you would do it. In fact, you would likely do it in the completely opposite manner. We would take the most senior amongst us and place them where the most critical decisions would have to be made. Lieutenant Colonels would lead companies, Colonels would lead battalions and Generals would lead brigades. That way we would have the greatest levels of experience and judgment at the place where it is needed the most - that piece of ground between success and failure, between risk and reward, between life and death. It would be on the battlefield.
Since we are not aligned that way, how do we answer the three questions posed above? How do we provide our youngest leaders the opportunity to fail and learn from their mistakes? First, I think that just as we must paint a picture of what success looks like for our missions, it is equally as important that there is a common picture of what failure looks like. When a leader gives only the intended outcome (success) and does not address it's opposite, then the 'operating box' for the subordinate becomes too large. If I am the subordinate and I lack the experiential knowledge that alerts me to when a decision might lead to failure, then how do I learn to recognize those signs of impending doom? Who will provide me those warning signs to look out for? I also think that by adopting this 'mission command' style we would begin to eliminate a lot of the worries and concerns subordinate leaders have about whether or not they will be held accountable for deaths, injuries or outcomes based upon the decisions they make. This alone will allow them to focus more clearly on the mission and not worry as much about the personal impact of failure. For example: If I am the senior leader and I assign a mission to a subordinate and I give him/her my intent - the expected outcome - that helps clarify the tasks and purposes of the mission. This is what I want to happen, this is why I want it to happen, and this is the outcome I expect to achieve when it happens. Just as critical though, will be my understanding that things rarely go as planned. Therefore, the subordinate and I would then have to address what might go wrong. We would have to look at those things that could cause the mission to fail. As part of that we would inevitably have to address casualties and losses. I might say to him/her, "Look, this is enemy held territory. You must expect to take casualties. I think you can still accomplish the mission and achieve my intent as long as you lose no more than X% of your unit, or Y% of your leadership." By simply stating this, I have done a lot for the subordinate. He/she recognizes that I have a tacit awareness of the potential for things to go badly. They also recognize my judgment that the mission can survive a percentage of casualties and still be successful. It also pays credence to and acknowledges the old saying that, "No plan survives first contact." Now I share some of the burden of execution with my subordinate. They aren't out there on their own wondering if every decision they make will get them relieved or worse.
My friends second question above, "Is failure acceptable in the Army?", is actually more important than the first. As long as there is a belief throughout the force that failure of any type will have a detrimental effect on careers etc, then we can never change. Although there is a lot of evidence that in reality, the Army is pretty forgiving in its' judgment of failure, there is still the widely held belief that one failure leads to career suicide. This is especially true in the officer corps. Too many young leaders buy into the "I'm responsible for everything my Soldiers do or fail to do" mentality, while at the same time recognizing that they cannot actually control these behaviors 24 hours a day. That puts the leader in a perpetual bind. They end up spending as much time worrying about their subordinates as they do about the enemy. I have brought this idea up in earlier posts, referencing concerns by both General Dempsey and Lieutenant General Caslen regarding risk and candor. And it is exactly the point that General (Ret) Campbell brought up in his report on the battle of COP Wanat. Institutionally, we need to move away from the notion that one young leader is collectively responsible for every action of their subordinates and emphasize individual accountability from the first moment a Soldier enters the profession.
Failures are individual acts of willful disobedience to expected norms and behaviors and standards. One cannot 'fail' at a task they do not know how to accomplish, nor can they 'fail' by making a decision for which they have no frame of reference. Failure only occurs when one is faced with a situation that they do know how to accomplish, or have a frame of reference for, and willfully choose to abdicate their best judgment.
Finally, I think that, collectively, the Army has to practice a little more candor with the American public and our elected leaders. The language of the Army is an active one. We state "We will" or "We can". We don't speak in a passive voice. Sometimes that very choice of words can have an effect. "The Army will drive the Taliban from it's strongholds in Afghanistan" is an unequivocal statement. It guarantees something that in truth cannot be guaranteed. What we are really saying is, "The Army will do everything it can, with the resources it is given, in the time allotted to it, to hopefully kill or capture as many insurgents as possible in order to create space for a legitimate government to be able to defend its' borders."
My friends questions raise a lot of interrelated ideas concerning learning, experience, risk, trust, candor and culture. The first step will be to view failure differently than we currently do. The second will be to change the method of discussion between commander and subordinate to include the possibility of unforeseen outcomes to an assigned mission. The third will be to begin to drive home individual accountability to each and every Soldier that will, over time, break down the need for institutional cover-your-ass policies. Finally, there must be a better method than persecution and prosecution to learn from events that have unintended outcomes.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"When is it OK to accept failure for the sake of learning? More importantly, is failure acceptable in the Army or in any institution? How does the Army leadership view failure?"
He then went on to state the following:
“If you are allowed to fail, then you learn from your mistakes…hopefully. We need to experience failure somewhere so that when it comes we, as leaders, don’t get to far away from our overall objective. We also as leaders need to understand that we will not be crucified for failure. Everything in the Army is success oriented. Army mentality…If you don’t succeed, then you are an ineffective leader and no one listens to you anymore.”
His thoughts are a very important consideration for our leader development programs and one the Army should spend significant time thinking about. In order to gain experiential knowledge, three things must occur. First, we must be given the latitude to experience something new. While it might not be new to our superiors, it is new for us. Second, there must be a recognition that simply because it does not have the intended outcome does not mean that failure has occurred, and finally, there must be a mechanism to learn from the experience. To figure out where, when, how and (most importantly) why the outcome was not the one that was intended. Without this experience we do not gain another important leadership trait called judgment.I came of age in the 'Zero Defect' Army of the 1990's. Although I didn't realize it at the time, the idea that there were "No accidents, only failures of leadership" would play a large role in many of the behavioral and institutional struggles we are experiencing today. 'Zero Defect' gave rise to the idea that every Soldier action was completely controllable. That by putting enough mandated control measures in place, we could literally protect people from themselves and their lack of judgment. Like an over-protective parent, the Army was determined to wipe out any act that might endanger a Soldier. What was never considered was the effect of removing responsibility for mistakes in judgment from the individual. We wouldn't have to worry about developing that critical skillset because there would always be Uncle Sam to tell us what to do. If we didn't follow his edicts, we were punished not for the act of misjudgment itself, but for failure to follow his instructions.
Sadly, that mentality is still extremely prevalent in many places throughout the Army and has put an undue burden on all levels of leadership to ensure a successful outcome for each and every action. It is an ingrained cultural problem. It makes risk something to be avoided, and does not enhance decentralized operations. In fact, it works in the opposite manner. It makes passing the buck - and therefore avoiding responsibility for the outcome - a norm, and further centralizes all decision making at higher and higher levels within the organization. Without a cultural change that accepts that combat and leadership happen in an extremely dynamic environment where thousands of decisions must be stacked one upon the other in quick succession and then adapted and changed in the face of decisions made by the enemy, we will never be able to gain the critical experiential knowledge at the ground level that will allow people to take advantage of new and unfolding opportunities. We have unwittingly enhanced bureaucracy and degraded the capacity for critical judgment just at the time we need it most.
The central problem with risk-taking and experiencing failure in military leadership is that the price is so very high. Unlike the corporate world where the only real loss is money, when one fails in combat, there is a great possibility that a Soldier will die or be severely injured. The central question then becomes, is that Soldier's death worth the learning that occurred because of the decision made by the leader?
If you sit back for a moment and look at how the Army is manned it is simply amazing to me that we have succeeded as often as we have. Take an infantry platoon for instance. We take a 24 year old Lieutenant and place him in charge of 38 people and send him off to war. He has no experience in this realm, has very little self-awareness, and his grasp of the tools and requirements of the profession is almost completely theoretical. He has never taken a class in human behavior, let alone the behavioral dynamics of high stress situations. Then we place him in incredibly complex situations which demand quick judgments that can have life or death consequences for people on both sides of the equation. If you had to draw it up on paper, that wouldn't be the way you would do it. In fact, you would likely do it in the completely opposite manner. We would take the most senior amongst us and place them where the most critical decisions would have to be made. Lieutenant Colonels would lead companies, Colonels would lead battalions and Generals would lead brigades. That way we would have the greatest levels of experience and judgment at the place where it is needed the most - that piece of ground between success and failure, between risk and reward, between life and death. It would be on the battlefield.
Since we are not aligned that way, how do we answer the three questions posed above? How do we provide our youngest leaders the opportunity to fail and learn from their mistakes? First, I think that just as we must paint a picture of what success looks like for our missions, it is equally as important that there is a common picture of what failure looks like. When a leader gives only the intended outcome (success) and does not address it's opposite, then the 'operating box' for the subordinate becomes too large. If I am the subordinate and I lack the experiential knowledge that alerts me to when a decision might lead to failure, then how do I learn to recognize those signs of impending doom? Who will provide me those warning signs to look out for? I also think that by adopting this 'mission command' style we would begin to eliminate a lot of the worries and concerns subordinate leaders have about whether or not they will be held accountable for deaths, injuries or outcomes based upon the decisions they make. This alone will allow them to focus more clearly on the mission and not worry as much about the personal impact of failure. For example: If I am the senior leader and I assign a mission to a subordinate and I give him/her my intent - the expected outcome - that helps clarify the tasks and purposes of the mission. This is what I want to happen, this is why I want it to happen, and this is the outcome I expect to achieve when it happens. Just as critical though, will be my understanding that things rarely go as planned. Therefore, the subordinate and I would then have to address what might go wrong. We would have to look at those things that could cause the mission to fail. As part of that we would inevitably have to address casualties and losses. I might say to him/her, "Look, this is enemy held territory. You must expect to take casualties. I think you can still accomplish the mission and achieve my intent as long as you lose no more than X% of your unit, or Y% of your leadership." By simply stating this, I have done a lot for the subordinate. He/she recognizes that I have a tacit awareness of the potential for things to go badly. They also recognize my judgment that the mission can survive a percentage of casualties and still be successful. It also pays credence to and acknowledges the old saying that, "No plan survives first contact." Now I share some of the burden of execution with my subordinate. They aren't out there on their own wondering if every decision they make will get them relieved or worse.
My friends second question above, "Is failure acceptable in the Army?", is actually more important than the first. As long as there is a belief throughout the force that failure of any type will have a detrimental effect on careers etc, then we can never change. Although there is a lot of evidence that in reality, the Army is pretty forgiving in its' judgment of failure, there is still the widely held belief that one failure leads to career suicide. This is especially true in the officer corps. Too many young leaders buy into the "I'm responsible for everything my Soldiers do or fail to do" mentality, while at the same time recognizing that they cannot actually control these behaviors 24 hours a day. That puts the leader in a perpetual bind. They end up spending as much time worrying about their subordinates as they do about the enemy. I have brought this idea up in earlier posts, referencing concerns by both General Dempsey and Lieutenant General Caslen regarding risk and candor. And it is exactly the point that General (Ret) Campbell brought up in his report on the battle of COP Wanat. Institutionally, we need to move away from the notion that one young leader is collectively responsible for every action of their subordinates and emphasize individual accountability from the first moment a Soldier enters the profession.
Failures are individual acts of willful disobedience to expected norms and behaviors and standards. One cannot 'fail' at a task they do not know how to accomplish, nor can they 'fail' by making a decision for which they have no frame of reference. Failure only occurs when one is faced with a situation that they do know how to accomplish, or have a frame of reference for, and willfully choose to abdicate their best judgment.
Finally, I think that, collectively, the Army has to practice a little more candor with the American public and our elected leaders. The language of the Army is an active one. We state "We will" or "We can". We don't speak in a passive voice. Sometimes that very choice of words can have an effect. "The Army will drive the Taliban from it's strongholds in Afghanistan" is an unequivocal statement. It guarantees something that in truth cannot be guaranteed. What we are really saying is, "The Army will do everything it can, with the resources it is given, in the time allotted to it, to hopefully kill or capture as many insurgents as possible in order to create space for a legitimate government to be able to defend its' borders."
My friends questions raise a lot of interrelated ideas concerning learning, experience, risk, trust, candor and culture. The first step will be to view failure differently than we currently do. The second will be to change the method of discussion between commander and subordinate to include the possibility of unforeseen outcomes to an assigned mission. The third will be to begin to drive home individual accountability to each and every Soldier that will, over time, break down the need for institutional cover-your-ass policies. Finally, there must be a better method than persecution and prosecution to learn from events that have unintended outcomes.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
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