On Friday evening I sat for a 5 hour video interview regarding my time as a platoon sergeant in Iraq from February to December 2006. The Center for the Army Professional Ethic is putting together a series of videos in order to look at the "Black Hearts" incident from multiple viewpoints to see what lessons there are for leaders at all levels throughout the Army. This is something I have been pushing for for years, and am glad it is finally coming to fruition. There are many lessons to be learned from that time and I am more than happy to try to help in any way I can. I do not believe that events like this can simply be washed away or written off as anomalies. The extremes of any situation demand as much, or more, consideration as any other point on the spectrum. The extremes create the middle. Any norm must have a left and right limit. While those limits are not often reached, when they are, we are provided an opportunity to look at them and consider whether or not our concept of where the 'middle' is remains true.
As we concluded the interview session, and I was getting ready to leave, the interviewer and I were standing around talking and he asked me if there was anything about that time that I would have done differently. I have been asked that question many times before and it is one that I've considered at least once a day for the last 4, almost 5, years. My answer has always been no, I would make the same decisions now that I made then given the same set of circumstances. You cannot go back after the fact, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, and craft a new response that includes information or knowledge that was not present at the time. You have to make the best choice you can, with what you have available. That's what leaders do. They make, as the TRADOC pamphlet points out, "A series of discretionary judgments." They take the facts and circumstances that are known to them, filter them through Orientation and judgment, arrive at a conclusion, and make a determination. One can never have perfect knowledge, and circumstances are continually changing, so the key becomes to do the best you can, with what you have and then remain aware enough to recognize when the unfolding circumstances require an adjustment.
However, in the past when asked that question, "What would you do differently?", I have always framed it very closely tied to the events surrounding March 12 and the attack on the al-Janabi family. The tactical choices I made when the platoon was assigned the mission to guard the traffic control points during that period. What squad went were, the mission that we were going to accomplish etc. As I have often stated, those choices were mine, they were sound, and if presented with the same set of people and circumstances again, I would choose the same course of action as I did back then. During the course of the interview though, the questions and answers and thoughts and recollections had focused much earlier in my tenure than I had really considered before. So much energy has been focused around the rape/murders etc that it some ways it begins to lose it's context. It becomes a moment in time from which there is no going backwards and everything forward becomes uncharted territory. But now I began to think about the manner and method I chose when taking over the platoon back in early February.
I arrived to 1st platoon of February 5th, 2006. That day is permanently seared in the mind of any member of that company because it is also the day that the living quarters for the American contingent on the Forward Operating Base (FOB) burned completely down in a manner of minutes. Faulty wiring and an overloaded circuit caused the entire U.S. portion of the FOB to go up in flames. In the rush to get all the people out of the building, there was no time to remove equipment, mementos etc. Soldiers lost everything they owned or had been issued. We flew people out that day in Flip-Flops, their PT shorts, and fleece jackets which equaled the sum total of their worldly possessions at that moment.
A few days later was the first time that I could gather the platoon in one place and formally introduce myself to them. And I remember almost word for word what I told them. [It is important to remember that at this point, they had already suffered 4 KIA, had been facing some very intense pressure from their higher headquarters, were on their 3rd platoon sergeant in 45 days and had just had their 'home' burned to the ground.]
I told them that, "There are no more victims in this platoon".
I told them that "We would drive on and complete our missions in honor of those who had perished."
I told them that, "If given a mission to accomplish and someone got killed and after review it was found that the mission was valid, that given the order to do the same mission again, we would."
For the first time last Friday evening, those words came slamming home. And I wondered out loud to the interviewer if I lost that platoon at the very moment that I thought I was gaining them.
From my perspective, by saying, "That there were no more victims in this platoon" meant that we would continue to serve proudly in spite of our losses. In fact, we would use the memories and respect for those who had already perished to provide the motivation and dedication needed to carry on. From their perspective, that statement likely has multiple flaws. First, simply by using the pronoun 'we' I was including myself in something that they felt belonged to them. Their pain, their losses, their hardships. There was no 'we'. There was them and there was me. And who was I to make a claim to their pain and pretend that I understood? Second, they were the ones who (in their minds) were victims. Victims of unfair judgment from higher headquarters, victims of abandonment when they tried to make sense of why they were being singled out. I was not a victim because I hadn't been there long enough. In fact, from their perspective, I was probably part of the problem because I had been sent there from their higher headquarters and sure as hell wasn't the answer. Finally, I spoke in absolutes. This is how it will be. This is how it won't be. There was no gray. And by this time they had already figured out that in reality, everything was gray. The 'black and white' that they had deployed with 4 months earlier simply didn't exist. Now there was nothing but shades of gray. And I was just another part of that equation. While I meant what I said to provide a set of bookends or something they could anchor to, that was not what they heard at all.
The second quote about missions probably damned me in their eyes even more than the first. They had lost 4 people to this point, and both sets of losses had been particularly gruesome and not in the expected context of a firefight or direct combat. Additionally, the road that had caused them casualties had now been closed and deemed of no tactical value. Then why had they gone there and why had their platoon mates been killed there? Tough questions that don't have any good answers if you have had to search for remains after a catastrophic explosion. And to claim that we would do it again if required simply meant that I didn't get it either. While I meant to put things back in operational terms that would focus them on the missions ahead, what they heard was another stupid leader who would consign them to die without thinking through what that meant.
There is an old Army axiom that when taking over an onganization, a leader should sit back for awhile and observe how the group works first before making substantive changes. Sure. In a perfect world with plenty of time, that makes sense. When a unit will go outside the wire and patrol again tomorrow, sometimes there just isn't time. Given the fire and trying to refit everyone and continue to operate, time was a luxury I just didn't feel I had. Things had to be done right now, and those things had to stick. One chance to get the message across and that message had to have staying power. The platoon had had too much change and variation lately, there had to be as much consistency as possible. Structure would help. But structure takes time and time was not available.
We often speak of Task, Purpose and Intent. And we spend a lot of time on the Task and the Purpose. The Intent often ends up being nothing more than an almost step-by-step offering of how the Purpose will be achieved. It ends up being the order in a paragraph form instead of the normal order form. But maybe we need to concentrate our efforts a lot more on Intent and spend a little less time on the Purpose. After all, if you give me a mission, 9 times out of 10, I can already tell you what the Purpose is. What might not be so clear is the Intent. How you perceive success and how I perceive success. How you see the mission being accomplished and how I do. How you understand the environment and how I do. Maybe we need to spend more time developing that understanding of mutual Intent. It might just be the answer.
As I have pondered Friday night's conversation a little piece of my journey became a bit more clear. My platoon and I had a very different understanding of Intent. And that misunderstanding between us caused a lot of friction for the remainder of our tour. And I own a piece of that friction because, most certainly, I created it. What I could not see then was that although my words were very carefully chosen, and were designed to achieve a particular Intent as seen through my eyes, all they really did was further separate me from the men who's trust and loyalty I needed to gain. Even today, it's not what I said that distanced them so, it was the manner in which I said it.
At one point Friday night, the interviewer said that when he first heard of me and then started to read my work on the blog, it seemed as if I had come to enough understanding of that time and place to bring me a sense of closure. After talking with me on the phone and then again the other night he said that what he saw now was that this still lives right underneath the surface for me. That my journey is not complete. He saw how real it still remains. He is right. That time and that place and those circumstances must never move too far from my consciousness. They must never get put on the shelf to gather dust. There are still too many lessons for me to learn.
Thanks, Jamey, for increasing and helping to clarify my understanding of myself. It can only serve to make me a better leader somewhere down the road. I'm grateful for you helping to point that out. Another small piece of the leadership puzzle falls in place.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#107 Do We Really Want Change?
When I have some free time in the evening, I usually try to find articles or websites to use as references here. Normally, I'll download something worth considering and then store it in a work folder on my hard drive. So yesterday I went looking through my archives and came across an interesting article from Small Wars Journal written in September 2010 by COL (Ret) Christopher Paparone entitled "Design and the Prospects for Deviant Leadership". You can find the link here:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/530-paparone.pdf
COL Paparone's article raises some very interesting questions regarding leadership, change agents and the institution. Consider the following:
"Interestingly, Ron Heifetz, in his 1994 book Leadership Without Easy Answers, does not use any version of the word ―follower throughout his 348 pages of text. His thesis is that leaders help others lead themselves through difficult, complex, and even life-threatening circumstances (leaders beget self-leaders). His principal argument is that leadership is adaptive work that occurs where technical definitions and solutions are not available. The implications are clear for the military: if you and your troops are not dealing in adaptive work when faced with unique, novel, and complex situations, you are engaged in something else other than leadership.
According to Heifetz, adaptive work involves influencing others away from reliance on authoritative response. An undesirable feature of the more traditional way of framing leadership is that it creates inappropriate dependencies where others are not motivated to discover or create solutions because they rely on the leader to do it for them. In other words, the traditional (culturally, habit-forming) view is that leadership is a kind of technology that troops depend on as a source for authoritative response. This dependency is a constraint when adaptivity is needed.
Heifetz’s alternative view challenges the values, attitudes, and habits that comprise the military’s proclivity to see leadership as a socially-acceptable form of follower dependency. Heifetz argues that the preferred purpose of leadership is to lessen dependence, promoting a more decentralized adaptivity in individuals, groups and, organizations when faced with novel, highly complex, and ambiguous situations. Instead of authoritative response being the currency of leadership, reorienting the attention of others on creative deviance (or what others have called ―craftwork) becomes the important aspect of leaders’ work. ―Leading without authority‖ displaces the authoritative-technical mindset. From this view, leadership is provocative in nature – spurring the debate while not resolving it (―with no heat, nothing cooks‖). In Heifetz’s terms, ―A sense of purpose is not the same as a clearly defined purpose, and the former (purposeful sensibility) is more efficacious than the traditional norm – that leaders are supposed to provide clarity of purpose. While the difference may be subtle, on deeper reflection, his argument reflects the worldview shift demanded by postpositivism (leadership draws attention to the unsurely) from positivism (where leadership is expected to provide surety)."
In plain terms, our current leadership definition and model creates a dependent nature within the organization and when faced with challenges that do not have a proscribed, preordained, answer, the subordinate has no appropriate response.
I found the following sentences of particular interest:
1. "Leaders help others lead themselves through difficult, complex and even life-threatening situations."
2. "Adaptive work involves influencing others away from reliance on authoritative response."
3. "An undesirable feature of the more traditional way of framing leadership is that it creates inappropriate dependencies where others are not motivated to discover or create solutions because they rely on the leader to do it for them."
4. "Heifetz argues that the preferred purpose of leadership is to lessen dependence, promoting a more decentralized adaptivity in individuals, groups and, organizations when faced with novel, highly complex, and ambiguous situations."
For the last three years or so, the Army has been touting adaptability as a cornerstone for leader development. We need to develop leaders who have the ability to discern unfolding conditional changes in real time, understand the potential implications of those changing conditions and then craft appropriate responses to them that will lead to the organizations larger desired outcome. Much like Gen Dempsey expressed the idea that we have embraced decentralization as an "absolute good" without necessarily considering it's complete impacts, I also believe this is true for the buzzword of adaptability. We say it, that we need adaptive leaders, but have we really embraced what it means? And how long will it take until we come to a consensus on how to achieve it? By the time that we get there, the conditions will have changed again. It becomes a never-ending cycle of playing catch up.
But, here's the real question, do we really want this adaptive change? Are we truly interested in developing the ability to move away an authoritative response? Really? Or are we just playing another set of word games while continuing to reinforce at every level the authoritative structural model that currently exists? Right now I am inclined to say that we are really only dabbling around the edges. True reform of the leader development system is still very threatening to the organization as a whole.
Consider this...Last week a discussion was started on the Army Website that asked people to consider what negative impacts the last decade of war and constant deployment cycles has had on the Army. These forums are going on all over the Army right now as we try to understand the American Profession of Arms after a decade on conflict. One of these forums is for ILE (Intermediate Level Education Program) students - normally Army Majors. Some of their responses appear to demonstrate to me that even if we have a somewhat fuzzy understanding of what adaptability and agility requires, the idea of it is positively scary to many folks.
One student wrote: "With changing economic constraints, it is imperative that we focus our efforts on specific goals and priorities. While we would like to imagine dealing with every possibility, we should adapt to what is "the likely" and build aggressive teams that are grounded in the basics and can think through problems."
Thought: By the time we could determine what those 'likely' possibilities are and develop training mechanisms for them, they undoubtedly will have already changed.
Another: "The past nine to ten years have had the effect of making us jacks of all trades, but masters of none. Although it is advantageous that we are building a diverse skill set, it is presenting a critical challenge as we move forward. How do we, as leaders, begin to resharpen not only our but our Soldier's skills as a conventional Army? Moreover, will we ever be the conventional Army of the past again? As we learned the other day from a speaker doctrine is evolving that will, one would hope, address how we get to the crux of this challenge."
Thought: How can you recognize on one hand that the skill-sets needed for unconventional warfare are advantageous and yet not recognize that they are also critical skills in a conventional conflict?
Another: "We spend a lot of time and energy training our Soldiers and leaders to be prepared to fight the current battle, sometimes to the detriment of basic skills and knowledge sets. Our Soldiers and junior leaders know a lot about the insurgents and how to accomplish this mission, but sometimes tend to forget the basic tenets that set us apart from those we fight."
Thought: What war should we be fighting? If not the current one, then which one?
Sadly, although this discussion forum is posted on a website for all Army leaders, so far, I am the only NCO to reply. Interestingly, although I always include my contact data at the bottom of any posting, no one has bothered to challenge any of my assertions.
What bothered me most about their replies however, was an almost plaintive desire to return to an army that no longer exists. 'Back to the basics'...'Conventional skill sets'...Our Soldier have learned how to fight the insurgents to the detriment of basic skills'. If we accept that counter-insurgent warfare presents a much more complex series of problems for people to solve, then why are so many people wanting to return to a conventional mindset? We have been playing chess for 10 years, why return the checkers?
There was another response though that really brought this home:
"Those of us who have been in the Army longer than the War on Terror remember being OICs or RSOs at ranges. We remember planning FTXs for our platoons outside of the company, battalion, and brigade-level exercises. We remember police call, mandatory training events, and a myriad other things we don't do as much or at all anymore. Many of these lost skills of garrison leadership and activity are leading to the discipline problems we're now experiencing, because the younger leaders are unfamiliar with what to do in garrison, but let the soldiers do as they did while deployed."
I'm sorry, I guess I forgot that mandatory police calls of the motorpool and mandatory chain teaching events equaled a 'lost' leadership skill. Hands across the motorpool and herding people into an auditorium to watch an Equal Opportunity video isn't leadership at all. And, unless that particular Major is a former enlisted Soldier, it is not very often that officers engage in police calls anyway. While his argument that we have a need to learn how to operate in a garrison environment is true, as I have often stated before, this only requires an understanding of the 'new' environment using the skills that a decade of war have provided us.
Truly adaptive leadership will require that we develop more 'jacks of all trades'. In fact, that would be an expressed purpose. In order to become a 'jack of all trades' one must possess the mental agility to rapidly bring together various pieces of information and arrange them in a manner that provides possible solutions. To be a 'jack', means that we will inherently have to foster an environment that moves away from authoritative responses and moves towards an environment of self-awareness, self-confidence, self-initiative, and self-reasoning. The purpose of the leader becomes not to give the answer, but to help others discover the answer by assisting in developing their awareness. In effect, true adaptive leadership training will require less, not more. It is also true that this type of leader development may suit the Millennial generation more so than their predecessors. Their world is one of rapid changes, instant access, and continually evolving and redefined realities. The Army is already beginning to deal with this with it's reinforcement of the basic tenants of Mission Command, but I truly believe that it is the institution that resists this change. Many people still secretly want to remain a top-down, check with the boss, type organization. They still want operational and personal validation. And coupled with that validation is the idea of responsibility sharing. They don't want to be the only one holding the bag if the outcome of an event is different than what was intended. Especially if it ends up with dead or wounded Soldiers. The current model makes risk aversion and risk sharing the norm. An agility based model would inherently place the burden of risk, it's awareness, and it's mitigation at the singular point of the event itself. I alone would be responsible for the decisions I make. The institutions responsibility is to develop my ability to make them.
Further on in Paparone's article is the following:
"Adaptive (deviant!) leadership is dispersed, linked primarily by common values and sense of purpose. Instead of directing operations, those in senior positions would instead seek to foster support to these diverse and disperse island-communities of action-learning."
First, I find it interesting that he terms the Army's new favorite word 'adaptive' deviant. Since deviance usually has a negative connotation, I'm positive that this was done by design. The idea that we could (and should) have an 'inverted' system that focuses all effort at the bottom and those efforts are supported by the top, instead of our current top down solution would truly be a deviation for many people. Think about all those titles and egos and self-professed leaders who would then have to reorient themselves to the idea that they play second fiddle to a 25 year old Lieutenant or Sergeant who is operating at the point of attack. Generals and Colonels, and Majors and Command Sergeants Major and all other 'senior' people would exist for the singular purpose of clearing space for the smallest element to effectively work in.
Second, notice that the role of the senior is very broad and generalized. The role of the hierarchy becomes to foster common values, build teams, thematically support objectives. It would expressly remove a lot of the directive top down approaches we are all familiar with today.
Col Paparone's article should be mandatory reading for everyone. If we truly desire to build adaptability into our system, and we commit to building leaders who possess mental agility and the ability to rapidly reorient themselves to changing conditions, then we need to study this work. Start with one Soldier - anyone, doesn't matter who. Determine their mental / moral / behavioral start point. Outline, define and demonstrate the institutional values, ethic, and norms. This creates a line with a new Soldier on one side and the Army on the other. Then drive the Soldier's development by constantly challenging them with growth opportunity. Challenge their knowledge - and develop it. Challenge how they think and develop it. Challenge their moral convictions and develop them. Challenge their behaviors and develop them.
The singular purpose of all leaders is to create the conditions by which their subordinates can be successful. If you believe that, then you likely believe that Soldiers are our centerpiece. If you don't believe that then you likely place your faith in systems and structures. Sooner or later we all have to choose. Right now, for all the talk about developing mental agility and adaptability, it still appears that there are many who prefer the systems and structures method. Maybe what this period requires is a whole bunch of deviants. Those who challenge and question, and grow. Count me in that group.
I was watching one of Col Boyd's videos the other day I came across this quote:
"I don't have a problem with doctrine as long as those who write it understand that it is never final. It is doctrine one day and dogma the next."
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/530-paparone.pdf
COL Paparone's article raises some very interesting questions regarding leadership, change agents and the institution. Consider the following:
"Interestingly, Ron Heifetz, in his 1994 book Leadership Without Easy Answers, does not use any version of the word ―follower throughout his 348 pages of text. His thesis is that leaders help others lead themselves through difficult, complex, and even life-threatening circumstances (leaders beget self-leaders). His principal argument is that leadership is adaptive work that occurs where technical definitions and solutions are not available. The implications are clear for the military: if you and your troops are not dealing in adaptive work when faced with unique, novel, and complex situations, you are engaged in something else other than leadership.
According to Heifetz, adaptive work involves influencing others away from reliance on authoritative response. An undesirable feature of the more traditional way of framing leadership is that it creates inappropriate dependencies where others are not motivated to discover or create solutions because they rely on the leader to do it for them. In other words, the traditional (culturally, habit-forming) view is that leadership is a kind of technology that troops depend on as a source for authoritative response. This dependency is a constraint when adaptivity is needed.
Heifetz’s alternative view challenges the values, attitudes, and habits that comprise the military’s proclivity to see leadership as a socially-acceptable form of follower dependency. Heifetz argues that the preferred purpose of leadership is to lessen dependence, promoting a more decentralized adaptivity in individuals, groups and, organizations when faced with novel, highly complex, and ambiguous situations. Instead of authoritative response being the currency of leadership, reorienting the attention of others on creative deviance (or what others have called ―craftwork) becomes the important aspect of leaders’ work. ―Leading without authority‖ displaces the authoritative-technical mindset. From this view, leadership is provocative in nature – spurring the debate while not resolving it (―with no heat, nothing cooks‖). In Heifetz’s terms, ―A sense of purpose is not the same as a clearly defined purpose, and the former (purposeful sensibility) is more efficacious than the traditional norm – that leaders are supposed to provide clarity of purpose. While the difference may be subtle, on deeper reflection, his argument reflects the worldview shift demanded by postpositivism (leadership draws attention to the unsurely) from positivism (where leadership is expected to provide surety)."
In plain terms, our current leadership definition and model creates a dependent nature within the organization and when faced with challenges that do not have a proscribed, preordained, answer, the subordinate has no appropriate response.
I found the following sentences of particular interest:
1. "Leaders help others lead themselves through difficult, complex and even life-threatening situations."
2. "Adaptive work involves influencing others away from reliance on authoritative response."
3. "An undesirable feature of the more traditional way of framing leadership is that it creates inappropriate dependencies where others are not motivated to discover or create solutions because they rely on the leader to do it for them."
4. "Heifetz argues that the preferred purpose of leadership is to lessen dependence, promoting a more decentralized adaptivity in individuals, groups and, organizations when faced with novel, highly complex, and ambiguous situations."
For the last three years or so, the Army has been touting adaptability as a cornerstone for leader development. We need to develop leaders who have the ability to discern unfolding conditional changes in real time, understand the potential implications of those changing conditions and then craft appropriate responses to them that will lead to the organizations larger desired outcome. Much like Gen Dempsey expressed the idea that we have embraced decentralization as an "absolute good" without necessarily considering it's complete impacts, I also believe this is true for the buzzword of adaptability. We say it, that we need adaptive leaders, but have we really embraced what it means? And how long will it take until we come to a consensus on how to achieve it? By the time that we get there, the conditions will have changed again. It becomes a never-ending cycle of playing catch up.
But, here's the real question, do we really want this adaptive change? Are we truly interested in developing the ability to move away an authoritative response? Really? Or are we just playing another set of word games while continuing to reinforce at every level the authoritative structural model that currently exists? Right now I am inclined to say that we are really only dabbling around the edges. True reform of the leader development system is still very threatening to the organization as a whole.
Consider this...Last week a discussion was started on the Army Website that asked people to consider what negative impacts the last decade of war and constant deployment cycles has had on the Army. These forums are going on all over the Army right now as we try to understand the American Profession of Arms after a decade on conflict. One of these forums is for ILE (Intermediate Level Education Program) students - normally Army Majors. Some of their responses appear to demonstrate to me that even if we have a somewhat fuzzy understanding of what adaptability and agility requires, the idea of it is positively scary to many folks.
One student wrote: "With changing economic constraints, it is imperative that we focus our efforts on specific goals and priorities. While we would like to imagine dealing with every possibility, we should adapt to what is "the likely" and build aggressive teams that are grounded in the basics and can think through problems."
Thought: By the time we could determine what those 'likely' possibilities are and develop training mechanisms for them, they undoubtedly will have already changed.
Another: "The past nine to ten years have had the effect of making us jacks of all trades, but masters of none. Although it is advantageous that we are building a diverse skill set, it is presenting a critical challenge as we move forward. How do we, as leaders, begin to resharpen not only our but our Soldier's skills as a conventional Army? Moreover, will we ever be the conventional Army of the past again? As we learned the other day from a speaker doctrine is evolving that will, one would hope, address how we get to the crux of this challenge."
Thought: How can you recognize on one hand that the skill-sets needed for unconventional warfare are advantageous and yet not recognize that they are also critical skills in a conventional conflict?
Another: "We spend a lot of time and energy training our Soldiers and leaders to be prepared to fight the current battle, sometimes to the detriment of basic skills and knowledge sets. Our Soldiers and junior leaders know a lot about the insurgents and how to accomplish this mission, but sometimes tend to forget the basic tenets that set us apart from those we fight."
Thought: What war should we be fighting? If not the current one, then which one?
Sadly, although this discussion forum is posted on a website for all Army leaders, so far, I am the only NCO to reply. Interestingly, although I always include my contact data at the bottom of any posting, no one has bothered to challenge any of my assertions.
What bothered me most about their replies however, was an almost plaintive desire to return to an army that no longer exists. 'Back to the basics'...'Conventional skill sets'...Our Soldier have learned how to fight the insurgents to the detriment of basic skills'. If we accept that counter-insurgent warfare presents a much more complex series of problems for people to solve, then why are so many people wanting to return to a conventional mindset? We have been playing chess for 10 years, why return the checkers?
There was another response though that really brought this home:
"Those of us who have been in the Army longer than the War on Terror remember being OICs or RSOs at ranges. We remember planning FTXs for our platoons outside of the company, battalion, and brigade-level exercises. We remember police call, mandatory training events, and a myriad other things we don't do as much or at all anymore. Many of these lost skills of garrison leadership and activity are leading to the discipline problems we're now experiencing, because the younger leaders are unfamiliar with what to do in garrison, but let the soldiers do as they did while deployed."
I'm sorry, I guess I forgot that mandatory police calls of the motorpool and mandatory chain teaching events equaled a 'lost' leadership skill. Hands across the motorpool and herding people into an auditorium to watch an Equal Opportunity video isn't leadership at all. And, unless that particular Major is a former enlisted Soldier, it is not very often that officers engage in police calls anyway. While his argument that we have a need to learn how to operate in a garrison environment is true, as I have often stated before, this only requires an understanding of the 'new' environment using the skills that a decade of war have provided us.
Truly adaptive leadership will require that we develop more 'jacks of all trades'. In fact, that would be an expressed purpose. In order to become a 'jack of all trades' one must possess the mental agility to rapidly bring together various pieces of information and arrange them in a manner that provides possible solutions. To be a 'jack', means that we will inherently have to foster an environment that moves away from authoritative responses and moves towards an environment of self-awareness, self-confidence, self-initiative, and self-reasoning. The purpose of the leader becomes not to give the answer, but to help others discover the answer by assisting in developing their awareness. In effect, true adaptive leadership training will require less, not more. It is also true that this type of leader development may suit the Millennial generation more so than their predecessors. Their world is one of rapid changes, instant access, and continually evolving and redefined realities. The Army is already beginning to deal with this with it's reinforcement of the basic tenants of Mission Command, but I truly believe that it is the institution that resists this change. Many people still secretly want to remain a top-down, check with the boss, type organization. They still want operational and personal validation. And coupled with that validation is the idea of responsibility sharing. They don't want to be the only one holding the bag if the outcome of an event is different than what was intended. Especially if it ends up with dead or wounded Soldiers. The current model makes risk aversion and risk sharing the norm. An agility based model would inherently place the burden of risk, it's awareness, and it's mitigation at the singular point of the event itself. I alone would be responsible for the decisions I make. The institutions responsibility is to develop my ability to make them.
Further on in Paparone's article is the following:
"Adaptive (deviant!) leadership is dispersed, linked primarily by common values and sense of purpose. Instead of directing operations, those in senior positions would instead seek to foster support to these diverse and disperse island-communities of action-learning."
First, I find it interesting that he terms the Army's new favorite word 'adaptive' deviant. Since deviance usually has a negative connotation, I'm positive that this was done by design. The idea that we could (and should) have an 'inverted' system that focuses all effort at the bottom and those efforts are supported by the top, instead of our current top down solution would truly be a deviation for many people. Think about all those titles and egos and self-professed leaders who would then have to reorient themselves to the idea that they play second fiddle to a 25 year old Lieutenant or Sergeant who is operating at the point of attack. Generals and Colonels, and Majors and Command Sergeants Major and all other 'senior' people would exist for the singular purpose of clearing space for the smallest element to effectively work in.
Second, notice that the role of the senior is very broad and generalized. The role of the hierarchy becomes to foster common values, build teams, thematically support objectives. It would expressly remove a lot of the directive top down approaches we are all familiar with today.
Col Paparone's article should be mandatory reading for everyone. If we truly desire to build adaptability into our system, and we commit to building leaders who possess mental agility and the ability to rapidly reorient themselves to changing conditions, then we need to study this work. Start with one Soldier - anyone, doesn't matter who. Determine their mental / moral / behavioral start point. Outline, define and demonstrate the institutional values, ethic, and norms. This creates a line with a new Soldier on one side and the Army on the other. Then drive the Soldier's development by constantly challenging them with growth opportunity. Challenge their knowledge - and develop it. Challenge how they think and develop it. Challenge their moral convictions and develop them. Challenge their behaviors and develop them.
The singular purpose of all leaders is to create the conditions by which their subordinates can be successful. If you believe that, then you likely believe that Soldiers are our centerpiece. If you don't believe that then you likely place your faith in systems and structures. Sooner or later we all have to choose. Right now, for all the talk about developing mental agility and adaptability, it still appears that there are many who prefer the systems and structures method. Maybe what this period requires is a whole bunch of deviants. Those who challenge and question, and grow. Count me in that group.
I was watching one of Col Boyd's videos the other day I came across this quote:
"I don't have a problem with doctrine as long as those who write it understand that it is never final. It is doctrine one day and dogma the next."
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#106 The Three of You
This idea has been rolling around in my head for some time now but just hasn't quite made it to the blog yet. It centers around self-awareness and the importance of seeing yourself from a somewhat independent view. It came into focus a little more sharply this weekend from two conversations I had with two people at different points in their careers.
On Friday evening I went to dinner with a dear friend who will retire next Summer after 22 years of service. When I first learned of her choice, I doubted its' truth because she has been suffering under a boss lately who has done a lot to change her overall feeling about continuing to stay in the Army. I wondered if she might be taking a long term solution to a short term problem. On her last night in America on leave we went to a quiet restaurant and I asked her why she was hanging it up now. Her answers were truthful, poignant, and I think, reflect the thoughts and feelings that many of us face as we reach the end of our career. Essentially, her comments came down to this: She has served the Army since she was 17 years old. Her entire adult life has been in service to her Nation, her Army, and her Soldiers. She does not know how to do, or be, anything else. A lot of her self-definition comes from her professional being. But now she has started taking stock of that life and found out that along the way, she denied herself a lot of things. While service can provide focus and purpose and meaning, she is now becoming much more aware of the emptiness that sometimes surrounds her life. She desires something more complete. No more 16 hour days and coming home to an empty house. No more weekends where her dogs equal her companionship. No more requirement for 24 hour a day dedication to dealing with what someone else feels is the 'crisis of the moment'. It is time for her to dedicate some time to her in the hope that she can fill some of the empty spaces that her 22 years of service have created. She is not bitter about them, nor angry, nor sad, just aware. She is feeling a more acute need to fill those spaces, and that cannot only be done by the Army. Her definition requires more.
As we were talking, I asked her to consider what message, what legacy, she wanted to leave behind for those Soldiers who look at her as a role model. What message did she have for them?
The second conversation was with a female Drill Sergeant who had asked me for some advice concerning a follow-on assignment after her current tour ends. We had a great talk about a lot of things, but towards the end came upon the question of how her Soldiers view her. What do they see when they remember or think about her? What message does her presence and her service send? She is at a much different place in her career than my other friend. She is in the middle of the fray right now, fighting and searching and learning, and developing. The 'game' of the Army is still challenging and provides her with a lot to do, see, and learn. Her adventure is only just beginning. She is in many ways, the very same person as my first friend - totally absorbed in the requirements of the profession and somewhat unaware of the costs it extracts. She strikes me as willing to think deeply about herself, her awareness, and her roles, she just needs a mentor to foster the discussion.
Those two conversations set the stage for this:
There are 3 distinct people in each of us and as leaders we need to be aware of each of them equally. First, there is you. Who you really are - all alone in the dark by yourself. The you that that no one can see. This one admits your fears, your weaknesses, your hopes, desires and dreams. It admits your failings and foibles and those things that the outside world is generally not privy to. It accepts your idiosyncrasies, and habits. It's the you that only a life-long spouse might know after all the layers have been stripped away. It is the you who is both conceited and contrite, arrogant and fearful, generous and hateful. It is the you who admits it's shallowness and bigotry as equally as it lauds it's importance and contributions.
Then there is the professional you. That person who steps out into the world everyday and presents an image of something. This you is the interaction with the world and is full of judgment and doubt and role-playing. This is also the world of expectation. This you is partially a character created by the 'alone' you to hide those things you do not want others to see, and to navigate your way through the requirements of your outside world. This you generally paints the prettiest, most competent picture for others to consume. This you is often like a movie set where the picture on the screen is of an idyllic view of what the director wants the viewer to see, but it is only the store-front, or paint on canvas. Behind it there really is no structure.
Finally, there is the you as seen by that outside world. How others view you. What they see, hear, and feel through their interaction with you. It equals their interpretation of you. Their Orientation. An understanding of this you is very important because it has a lot to do with how your thoughts, ideas, plans, visisions, orders, directives etc get (or do not get) implemented. A lack of understanding that, who you think they see and interact with can be very different from their understanding of who they see and interact with, might be the least explored (and potentially most important) area of any leader development program. While we spend a lot of time trying to get folks to know themselves and to see the impact of that awareness on how they lead, we generally do not spend a lot of time fostering an awareness that the message we think we are sending might not be close to the message that those around us are receiving. To follow the movie set theme, this is the audience. They sit in their seats and think they are seeing a picture of downtown USA, but do not realize that it is partialy a facade. They are not permitted to look behind the wall. And if that is true, then aren't we selling them that facade? Soldiers follow because they believe in you and what you represent and their understanding of those things. If all we are is a facade of professionalism, haven't we done them a huge disservice?
The goal for true leadership competency should be to gain awareness of these three parts, and to bring them all together as closely as possible. Who I am when I am alone should closely resemble who my world sees as I interact with it, and if that happens, then in all likelihood, my world's interpretation of me will be pretty close as well.
Why does all this matter? Why can't I create two seperate people - the one I am by myself, and the one I give away for public consumption and interpretation? Why can't the professional and the personal me be separate? Simply stated: If you choose to live that way, sooner or later you will be undone by one or the other and then those you lead will never trust you again. Soldiers do not act, have faith in, or follow you because you hold a rank, position, or title. Not really. They may follow originally because they must based upon those things, but ultimately they do so reluctantly and without faith. Soldiers follow because they believe in you and that faith generates from their being able to find things in you that they can relate to. If they cannot find traits and behaviors and ideas to consider in their interaction with you then they are merely employees who will serve for only as long as the cost/benefit ratio makes sense to them. Soldiers who truly believe in you will follow you almost instinctively and with a faith that cannot be quantified or proven. And they cannot do that, and will not do that, if they think you are merely an actor playing a role in some long drawn out drama. Sooner or later they will decide to change the channel.
I try very hard to be honest about who I am with my Soldiers. Sometimes probably too much so. There really aren't too many secrets to my life. If you ask me, I'll likely tell you. My life and my experiences are pretty much an open book. I have found that it is a much more honest and ultimately positive way to lead. While I may not always be proud of myself or things I have done, I have found that there is not too much to be afraid of there. I try very hard not to sell an illusion. I may be a role model, but it is a role model with all the warts and failings and cheapness that can be me. When I speak to them about the roles we each have to play in the organization, it is not about personal acting or role-playing, it is about institutional positions and the expectations of each part of the organization. I play the role of the senior leader. It is the job I have. It has requirements and expectations. I have obligations to it. But it is not completely who I am. My Soldiers have roles to play as well, but they are not completely who they are. These are only one part of the larger awarenesses that we all possess.
My friend who is getting ready to retire appears to me to have recognized this. She gave all she had for a lot of years to her development and to living in the professional world. And now she recognizes the cost of that commitment. My friend the Drill Sergeant isn't fully aware yet, or hasn't totally recognized, the power of the role she is playing. And yet both are outstanding leaders. I wonder what words of wisdom the retiree will leave behind to her young acolytes who look to follow in her footsteps? I wonder if the Drill Sergeant can see that who she is all alone at night is a hell of a lot more powerful as a leader than the role she plays during the day? I wonder if either of them recognizes that they are being looked at, studied and emulated by others. And the greatest message there is that if you recognize that they want to be like you, shouldn't you at least provide them the fullest understanding of who you are?
Sometimes I wonder why I have been able to affect some folks the way that I have. Although I don't fully understand it, I am aware that there are people who look up to me, emulate me, and try to model themselves after me. When it comes up in conversation and I ask them why they feel that way, a lot of them seem to struggle a bit for an answer. They are not quite sure why they feel that way, but most will generally settle on this idea: I am real. I am not acting. My emotions are not crafted or hidden. I am human. Ultimately they find more to look up to in Jeff Fenlason than they do in Master Sergeant Fenlason, and somehow, it seems to me, there is a great lesson in leadership there. If only we all weren't so busy trying to hide all the time.
To my friends - Thank you both for helping me get to this place. I appreciate and celebrate the journeys you both are on. Thanks for letting me spend a small part of it with you.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
On Friday evening I went to dinner with a dear friend who will retire next Summer after 22 years of service. When I first learned of her choice, I doubted its' truth because she has been suffering under a boss lately who has done a lot to change her overall feeling about continuing to stay in the Army. I wondered if she might be taking a long term solution to a short term problem. On her last night in America on leave we went to a quiet restaurant and I asked her why she was hanging it up now. Her answers were truthful, poignant, and I think, reflect the thoughts and feelings that many of us face as we reach the end of our career. Essentially, her comments came down to this: She has served the Army since she was 17 years old. Her entire adult life has been in service to her Nation, her Army, and her Soldiers. She does not know how to do, or be, anything else. A lot of her self-definition comes from her professional being. But now she has started taking stock of that life and found out that along the way, she denied herself a lot of things. While service can provide focus and purpose and meaning, she is now becoming much more aware of the emptiness that sometimes surrounds her life. She desires something more complete. No more 16 hour days and coming home to an empty house. No more weekends where her dogs equal her companionship. No more requirement for 24 hour a day dedication to dealing with what someone else feels is the 'crisis of the moment'. It is time for her to dedicate some time to her in the hope that she can fill some of the empty spaces that her 22 years of service have created. She is not bitter about them, nor angry, nor sad, just aware. She is feeling a more acute need to fill those spaces, and that cannot only be done by the Army. Her definition requires more.
As we were talking, I asked her to consider what message, what legacy, she wanted to leave behind for those Soldiers who look at her as a role model. What message did she have for them?
The second conversation was with a female Drill Sergeant who had asked me for some advice concerning a follow-on assignment after her current tour ends. We had a great talk about a lot of things, but towards the end came upon the question of how her Soldiers view her. What do they see when they remember or think about her? What message does her presence and her service send? She is at a much different place in her career than my other friend. She is in the middle of the fray right now, fighting and searching and learning, and developing. The 'game' of the Army is still challenging and provides her with a lot to do, see, and learn. Her adventure is only just beginning. She is in many ways, the very same person as my first friend - totally absorbed in the requirements of the profession and somewhat unaware of the costs it extracts. She strikes me as willing to think deeply about herself, her awareness, and her roles, she just needs a mentor to foster the discussion.
Those two conversations set the stage for this:
There are 3 distinct people in each of us and as leaders we need to be aware of each of them equally. First, there is you. Who you really are - all alone in the dark by yourself. The you that that no one can see. This one admits your fears, your weaknesses, your hopes, desires and dreams. It admits your failings and foibles and those things that the outside world is generally not privy to. It accepts your idiosyncrasies, and habits. It's the you that only a life-long spouse might know after all the layers have been stripped away. It is the you who is both conceited and contrite, arrogant and fearful, generous and hateful. It is the you who admits it's shallowness and bigotry as equally as it lauds it's importance and contributions.
Then there is the professional you. That person who steps out into the world everyday and presents an image of something. This you is the interaction with the world and is full of judgment and doubt and role-playing. This is also the world of expectation. This you is partially a character created by the 'alone' you to hide those things you do not want others to see, and to navigate your way through the requirements of your outside world. This you generally paints the prettiest, most competent picture for others to consume. This you is often like a movie set where the picture on the screen is of an idyllic view of what the director wants the viewer to see, but it is only the store-front, or paint on canvas. Behind it there really is no structure.
Finally, there is the you as seen by that outside world. How others view you. What they see, hear, and feel through their interaction with you. It equals their interpretation of you. Their Orientation. An understanding of this you is very important because it has a lot to do with how your thoughts, ideas, plans, visisions, orders, directives etc get (or do not get) implemented. A lack of understanding that, who you think they see and interact with can be very different from their understanding of who they see and interact with, might be the least explored (and potentially most important) area of any leader development program. While we spend a lot of time trying to get folks to know themselves and to see the impact of that awareness on how they lead, we generally do not spend a lot of time fostering an awareness that the message we think we are sending might not be close to the message that those around us are receiving. To follow the movie set theme, this is the audience. They sit in their seats and think they are seeing a picture of downtown USA, but do not realize that it is partialy a facade. They are not permitted to look behind the wall. And if that is true, then aren't we selling them that facade? Soldiers follow because they believe in you and what you represent and their understanding of those things. If all we are is a facade of professionalism, haven't we done them a huge disservice?
The goal for true leadership competency should be to gain awareness of these three parts, and to bring them all together as closely as possible. Who I am when I am alone should closely resemble who my world sees as I interact with it, and if that happens, then in all likelihood, my world's interpretation of me will be pretty close as well.
Why does all this matter? Why can't I create two seperate people - the one I am by myself, and the one I give away for public consumption and interpretation? Why can't the professional and the personal me be separate? Simply stated: If you choose to live that way, sooner or later you will be undone by one or the other and then those you lead will never trust you again. Soldiers do not act, have faith in, or follow you because you hold a rank, position, or title. Not really. They may follow originally because they must based upon those things, but ultimately they do so reluctantly and without faith. Soldiers follow because they believe in you and that faith generates from their being able to find things in you that they can relate to. If they cannot find traits and behaviors and ideas to consider in their interaction with you then they are merely employees who will serve for only as long as the cost/benefit ratio makes sense to them. Soldiers who truly believe in you will follow you almost instinctively and with a faith that cannot be quantified or proven. And they cannot do that, and will not do that, if they think you are merely an actor playing a role in some long drawn out drama. Sooner or later they will decide to change the channel.
I try very hard to be honest about who I am with my Soldiers. Sometimes probably too much so. There really aren't too many secrets to my life. If you ask me, I'll likely tell you. My life and my experiences are pretty much an open book. I have found that it is a much more honest and ultimately positive way to lead. While I may not always be proud of myself or things I have done, I have found that there is not too much to be afraid of there. I try very hard not to sell an illusion. I may be a role model, but it is a role model with all the warts and failings and cheapness that can be me. When I speak to them about the roles we each have to play in the organization, it is not about personal acting or role-playing, it is about institutional positions and the expectations of each part of the organization. I play the role of the senior leader. It is the job I have. It has requirements and expectations. I have obligations to it. But it is not completely who I am. My Soldiers have roles to play as well, but they are not completely who they are. These are only one part of the larger awarenesses that we all possess.
My friend who is getting ready to retire appears to me to have recognized this. She gave all she had for a lot of years to her development and to living in the professional world. And now she recognizes the cost of that commitment. My friend the Drill Sergeant isn't fully aware yet, or hasn't totally recognized, the power of the role she is playing. And yet both are outstanding leaders. I wonder what words of wisdom the retiree will leave behind to her young acolytes who look to follow in her footsteps? I wonder if the Drill Sergeant can see that who she is all alone at night is a hell of a lot more powerful as a leader than the role she plays during the day? I wonder if either of them recognizes that they are being looked at, studied and emulated by others. And the greatest message there is that if you recognize that they want to be like you, shouldn't you at least provide them the fullest understanding of who you are?
Sometimes I wonder why I have been able to affect some folks the way that I have. Although I don't fully understand it, I am aware that there are people who look up to me, emulate me, and try to model themselves after me. When it comes up in conversation and I ask them why they feel that way, a lot of them seem to struggle a bit for an answer. They are not quite sure why they feel that way, but most will generally settle on this idea: I am real. I am not acting. My emotions are not crafted or hidden. I am human. Ultimately they find more to look up to in Jeff Fenlason than they do in Master Sergeant Fenlason, and somehow, it seems to me, there is a great lesson in leadership there. If only we all weren't so busy trying to hide all the time.
To my friends - Thank you both for helping me get to this place. I appreciate and celebrate the journeys you both are on. Thanks for letting me spend a small part of it with you.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#105 A Fragile First Step
"Boyd's sin was no less than a complete challenge to the way the American people and military were used to doing business. Schooled to prefer formulaic answers, checklists, and school solutions...it shuns openess, non-linearity and auftragstaktik (mission orders) in favor of technology, attrition and mass. It dislikes the political aspects of war and would prefer to apply merely military force to the targets selected. The syllogism works something like this: strategy equals targeting. The number and nature of targets destroyed best measure success. When all the targets are destroyed, the war is over. It is playing checkers, not chess. It's an attrition approach to war. It ignores the reality that it is the adversary who may determine if he will surrender, when, and on what terms. The American military in general sees war as a science and not an art, and are disposed to treat it as such. Despite using terminology stressing strategic effects, the military still tends to focus on the outputs (keeping score on targets) instead of on outcomes (the effects they seek to achieve).
Grant T. Hammond "The Mind at War - John Boyd and American Security"
I found this last night and started thinking about whether or not we have really made a true shift in how the Army thinks and does business despite all of the changes that have occurred over the last 10 years. Are we truly a changed culture? Will the requirements for adaptation firmly take hold, or will they simply be a small asterisk in our history books, "* For a 10 year period surrounding the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army dedicated itself to decentralization and agility. Sadly, with the end of those conflicts, the change did not last." In effect, this period of war has the potential to end too soon. Because change in the Army is so slow, we are only now beginning to see the human development requirements that decentralized warfare demands. If the Army comes home for good and the deployments and requirements for adaptation and development are no longer there, then I fear that a lot of the progress that has been made in leader development might simply fade away.
I lead in a very messy manner. I truly believe in subordinate empowerment and try as hard as I can to encourage and (at times) force my subordinates to provide their input and ideas to a problem. This leads to arguments and frustration and confusion on all sides. Sometimes they do not understand what I'm getting after and many times I do not understand their point of view and we must continually confront each other until we reach some form of common understanding. It can be time consuming and slow. It is inherently inefficient. It often leads to people feeling very frustrated and angry when they don't 'win' the argument, or I don't choose their preferred course of action. In the long run however, I still believe that this is the right method, not only for personal leadership at the one-on-one level, but also for the institution. I believe sincerely that the Army is going to have to fully adopt a more inclusive, a more questioning, and a more argumentative leadership model if it wants to retain any of the positive behavioral changes that the last 10 years have begun.
Why? Why would I choose to believe in a leadership model that encourages dissent, disagreement, and open questioning of authority and knowledge? The answer is actually very simple. In most cases, all of those things equal development. It teaches how to think. By allowing my subordinates to openly challenge me and my assumptions, they are being forced to think harder about the problem itself. They are being forced to question preconceived ideas about a potential solution. They are being required to think more deeply about what might, at first glance, appear to be a very surface level issue. And those same forces are at work from them to me. They make me think and question and challenge. They make me work harder to develop the best solution to the problem. They force me to continue to learn and grow. Success becomes collective, not individual. And of all the things that we need to hold on to that have been outcomes of our decade at war, the ability to think deeply and understand the variety of effects an individual action can have, is certainly the most critical.
Consider this from "The Mind of War":
"The implicit contract in maneuver warfare is mission type orders or auftragstaktik. The subordinate agrees to take near-term actions in keeping with the higher commander's intent. The superior agrees to allow his subordinate the freedom of judgment necessary to determine exactly how that should be accomplished. He is thus empowered to both recognize and take advantage of opportunities that he may encounter. The purpose is to harmonize, as Boyd would say, the actions and initiatives of the subordinate commanders with the superior's intent.....It provides a bottom-up, outside-in, real-world response in real time to transformations on the battlefield and thereby creates operational fluidity." Counterinsurgent warfare requires these things. We know that and have begun to encourage that initiative taking, but only in the last 3 years or so. It has not yet become the model for continued leader development. It is akin to an experiment that has had great results, but does not yet have developed protocols.
What that quote above doesn't say is that the development of those abilities to judge, perceive, and take advantage of situations to create advantage takes time, trust, and above all, a system that encourages initiative and growth. It is slow, inefficient, and extremely personal. The results will be a question mark, rather than empirical data. It is a system that for the Army, is in it's infancy. A system that is still very vulnerable to being discounted and written off only as a short term solution to the unique challenges of this period and type of warfare.
Why am I worried that the changes that have been implemented might not have developed a strong enough root structure yet to withstand the systemic assault that they will soon face? Because the evidence of the attack is everywhere. We are being told now that suddenly money will become scarce, so we will have to act efficiently to make the most of our resources. We are already seeing the return of the Power Point army of endless briefings and charts. We are already programming the expected training levels for units who don't even have a stated mission. I have read document after document that lays out a particular path that must be followed to achieve some arbitrary readiness state. And most disturbing of all, I have seen implementation guidance for personnel strength that extends the periods of service for those at the top of the NCO structure, but shortens the service for those at the bottom. The system is pushing back. It is trying to mount a counter-attack against the gains made by those who favor personal development as the key component in leader development in the years ahead. We have senior leaders stating that we must enhance and expand the educational opportunities of our mid-grade officers and (to a much lessor degree) NCO's, but when the bean-counters say, "Well, you can send X-thousand officers to grad school and hope they come back with expanded knowledge and judgment, or you can buy a new piece of equipment, but you can't do both.", which side do you think will win? And why are we extending the service life of those at the very top of the pile, when at the same time we are closing, compacting, and reducing the sheer number of units and formations, and organizations we have? How many senior NCO's and officers work at Joint Forces Command? If it gets closed, where will they go? If you add only 100 senior NCO's back into the Force, it has a trickle down effect on the entire structure for years to come. Advancements slow down, people become disenchanted because they cannot contribute in a meaningful manner and have their contributions pay off. A move like this almost begs for a return to a CYA, bureaucratic, keep-your-head-down-and-weather-the-storm response. We are headed in the wrong direction. What we should be doing is clearing the top out and elevating the middle while at the same time implementing these nascent leader development strategies we now have and then turning this back to the Force.
The most critical skill or attribute that anyone who would lead Soldiers in battle must possess is judgment. The ability to perceive, and then examine, and then create a course of action that will lead to the desired outcome. As long as war will be fought by men, this requirement is paramount. Without it, the amount of firepower a nation or group possesses won't matter. The key to prevailing in a struggle is knowing when, where, how much, and why you want to use it. And sometimes having the courage to decide not to.
We have taken a fragile first step toward enhancing the personal development of our younger leaders. We must be extremely careful not to have it washed away because we will not be able to accurately measure it's success or failure until the next war comes along.
A final thought: Earlier this week, I came across the following quote from Steven Covey:
"I am personally convinced that one person can be a change catalyst, a transformer in any situation, any organization. Such an individual is yeast that leavens the entire loaf. Ir requires vision, initiative, patience, respect, persistence, courage and faith to be a transforming leader.
To understand the power the system can have as it fights back to against change, consider this. Last week I had a conversation with someone who has been a supporter of my writing from almost the beginning. When I asked if there was a place for me and my ideas on leader development in the Army, he replied, "Not really. What you need to do is go be a First Sergeant. That way you become (my words not his) eligible to stay in the game." 105 straight weeks, hundreds or written pages, and tons of emails telling me to keep thinking, and pushing and writing, and the system has no place for me? That is how the system exerts it's pressure. That is the pressure we all must resist. Messy leadership, defined by mutual respect, a desire to learn, dialogue and the development of increased judgment is the road ahead. Those who think it is only relevant to counterinsurgency operations are simply wrong. If we truly prize adaptability, then we have to develop leaders who possess the ability to discern both sides of an issue, can see emerging trends, and take advantage of opportunities when presented. All in keeping with the trust they have been given by their superiors. This period of leader development is like a new-born baby. There will be a lot of messy nights along the way, but someday we can all look back with pride at a future leader and say, "I helped create that." We owe it to those at the bottom. We most often pay the price for failure at their level.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
Grant T. Hammond "The Mind at War - John Boyd and American Security"
I found this last night and started thinking about whether or not we have really made a true shift in how the Army thinks and does business despite all of the changes that have occurred over the last 10 years. Are we truly a changed culture? Will the requirements for adaptation firmly take hold, or will they simply be a small asterisk in our history books, "* For a 10 year period surrounding the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army dedicated itself to decentralization and agility. Sadly, with the end of those conflicts, the change did not last." In effect, this period of war has the potential to end too soon. Because change in the Army is so slow, we are only now beginning to see the human development requirements that decentralized warfare demands. If the Army comes home for good and the deployments and requirements for adaptation and development are no longer there, then I fear that a lot of the progress that has been made in leader development might simply fade away.
I lead in a very messy manner. I truly believe in subordinate empowerment and try as hard as I can to encourage and (at times) force my subordinates to provide their input and ideas to a problem. This leads to arguments and frustration and confusion on all sides. Sometimes they do not understand what I'm getting after and many times I do not understand their point of view and we must continually confront each other until we reach some form of common understanding. It can be time consuming and slow. It is inherently inefficient. It often leads to people feeling very frustrated and angry when they don't 'win' the argument, or I don't choose their preferred course of action. In the long run however, I still believe that this is the right method, not only for personal leadership at the one-on-one level, but also for the institution. I believe sincerely that the Army is going to have to fully adopt a more inclusive, a more questioning, and a more argumentative leadership model if it wants to retain any of the positive behavioral changes that the last 10 years have begun.
Why? Why would I choose to believe in a leadership model that encourages dissent, disagreement, and open questioning of authority and knowledge? The answer is actually very simple. In most cases, all of those things equal development. It teaches how to think. By allowing my subordinates to openly challenge me and my assumptions, they are being forced to think harder about the problem itself. They are being forced to question preconceived ideas about a potential solution. They are being required to think more deeply about what might, at first glance, appear to be a very surface level issue. And those same forces are at work from them to me. They make me think and question and challenge. They make me work harder to develop the best solution to the problem. They force me to continue to learn and grow. Success becomes collective, not individual. And of all the things that we need to hold on to that have been outcomes of our decade at war, the ability to think deeply and understand the variety of effects an individual action can have, is certainly the most critical.
Consider this from "The Mind of War":
"The implicit contract in maneuver warfare is mission type orders or auftragstaktik. The subordinate agrees to take near-term actions in keeping with the higher commander's intent. The superior agrees to allow his subordinate the freedom of judgment necessary to determine exactly how that should be accomplished. He is thus empowered to both recognize and take advantage of opportunities that he may encounter. The purpose is to harmonize, as Boyd would say, the actions and initiatives of the subordinate commanders with the superior's intent.....It provides a bottom-up, outside-in, real-world response in real time to transformations on the battlefield and thereby creates operational fluidity." Counterinsurgent warfare requires these things. We know that and have begun to encourage that initiative taking, but only in the last 3 years or so. It has not yet become the model for continued leader development. It is akin to an experiment that has had great results, but does not yet have developed protocols.
What that quote above doesn't say is that the development of those abilities to judge, perceive, and take advantage of situations to create advantage takes time, trust, and above all, a system that encourages initiative and growth. It is slow, inefficient, and extremely personal. The results will be a question mark, rather than empirical data. It is a system that for the Army, is in it's infancy. A system that is still very vulnerable to being discounted and written off only as a short term solution to the unique challenges of this period and type of warfare.
Why am I worried that the changes that have been implemented might not have developed a strong enough root structure yet to withstand the systemic assault that they will soon face? Because the evidence of the attack is everywhere. We are being told now that suddenly money will become scarce, so we will have to act efficiently to make the most of our resources. We are already seeing the return of the Power Point army of endless briefings and charts. We are already programming the expected training levels for units who don't even have a stated mission. I have read document after document that lays out a particular path that must be followed to achieve some arbitrary readiness state. And most disturbing of all, I have seen implementation guidance for personnel strength that extends the periods of service for those at the top of the NCO structure, but shortens the service for those at the bottom. The system is pushing back. It is trying to mount a counter-attack against the gains made by those who favor personal development as the key component in leader development in the years ahead. We have senior leaders stating that we must enhance and expand the educational opportunities of our mid-grade officers and (to a much lessor degree) NCO's, but when the bean-counters say, "Well, you can send X-thousand officers to grad school and hope they come back with expanded knowledge and judgment, or you can buy a new piece of equipment, but you can't do both.", which side do you think will win? And why are we extending the service life of those at the very top of the pile, when at the same time we are closing, compacting, and reducing the sheer number of units and formations, and organizations we have? How many senior NCO's and officers work at Joint Forces Command? If it gets closed, where will they go? If you add only 100 senior NCO's back into the Force, it has a trickle down effect on the entire structure for years to come. Advancements slow down, people become disenchanted because they cannot contribute in a meaningful manner and have their contributions pay off. A move like this almost begs for a return to a CYA, bureaucratic, keep-your-head-down-and-weather-the-storm response. We are headed in the wrong direction. What we should be doing is clearing the top out and elevating the middle while at the same time implementing these nascent leader development strategies we now have and then turning this back to the Force.
The most critical skill or attribute that anyone who would lead Soldiers in battle must possess is judgment. The ability to perceive, and then examine, and then create a course of action that will lead to the desired outcome. As long as war will be fought by men, this requirement is paramount. Without it, the amount of firepower a nation or group possesses won't matter. The key to prevailing in a struggle is knowing when, where, how much, and why you want to use it. And sometimes having the courage to decide not to.
We have taken a fragile first step toward enhancing the personal development of our younger leaders. We must be extremely careful not to have it washed away because we will not be able to accurately measure it's success or failure until the next war comes along.
A final thought: Earlier this week, I came across the following quote from Steven Covey:
"I am personally convinced that one person can be a change catalyst, a transformer in any situation, any organization. Such an individual is yeast that leavens the entire loaf. Ir requires vision, initiative, patience, respect, persistence, courage and faith to be a transforming leader.
To understand the power the system can have as it fights back to against change, consider this. Last week I had a conversation with someone who has been a supporter of my writing from almost the beginning. When I asked if there was a place for me and my ideas on leader development in the Army, he replied, "Not really. What you need to do is go be a First Sergeant. That way you become (my words not his) eligible to stay in the game." 105 straight weeks, hundreds or written pages, and tons of emails telling me to keep thinking, and pushing and writing, and the system has no place for me? That is how the system exerts it's pressure. That is the pressure we all must resist. Messy leadership, defined by mutual respect, a desire to learn, dialogue and the development of increased judgment is the road ahead. Those who think it is only relevant to counterinsurgency operations are simply wrong. If we truly prize adaptability, then we have to develop leaders who possess the ability to discern both sides of an issue, can see emerging trends, and take advantage of opportunities when presented. All in keeping with the trust they have been given by their superiors. This period of leader development is like a new-born baby. There will be a lot of messy nights along the way, but someday we can all look back with pride at a future leader and say, "I helped create that." We owe it to those at the bottom. We most often pay the price for failure at their level.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
# 104 We Already Have the Answers - We Just Don't Listen
As I was looking for source material this week I came across two monologues worth consideration. The first is entitled "C2 for Complex Endeavors - Transitioning From Command and Control to Command and Trust" and the second is "A Behavioral Model of Team Sense-making". Both are from the International Command and Control Research And Technology Symposium. I had downloaded the first awhile back and cannot find the link, but you can find the link to the Command and Control Research Project homepage here:
http://dodccrp.org/
(If you are interested in a copy of the first, just send me an email and I'll send it to you.)
Consider the following quotes from the "C2 for Complex Endeavors" paper:
"Use your people by allowing everyone to do his job. When a subordinate is free to do his job, he perceives the trust and confidence from his superiors and takes pride in his job, himself and the organizations goals and objectives. Delegation of sufficient authority and proper use of subordinates helps develop future leaders. This is a moral responsibility of every commander."
In army-speak, this equals decentralization and trust.
and from George Patton
"No one is thinking if everyone is thinking alike. In too many organizations, toadyism is buried like a cancer. It must be removed with the sharpest bayonet available. All sorts of suggestions, ideas, concepts, and opinions must be allowed to promote an environment of learning and imagination. A fault of many potentially fine commanders is a lack of the ability to admit that other people have good ideas. If younger Soldiers are not allowed to use and cultivate their imaginations and their abilities for abstract thought, where will we get the next generations of qualified, motivated, and confident commanders? Commanders who never ask for an opinion, never listen to suggestions, and think they have the only correct idea find that their Soldiers will stop communicating altogether. They'll begin to sit on their asses and wait for orders before doing anything. No matter how high in the ranks a man goes, he can't know everything. We can always learn from each other. Juniors must learn not only to be allowed to use their imaginations, but they must be encouraged to do so.”
In Army-speak, this is the recognition of the perils of hierarchical thinking and risk-aversion.
Whenever I spend time looking for quotes or bits of wisdom for the blog, it seems to me that time and again, we already have the answers we are looking for, we just need to heed the advice of those who came before us. Does anyone but me think it strange that from the earliest commanders in the field there has been a recognition that trust up and down any chain of command is essential for unit success? It doesn't matter what your professional field is, successful organizations are built around common goals and a trust that the members of the organization from the lowest to the highest understand and are dedicated to them. I could be managing a grocery store, running a high-tech company, organizing a charitable fund-raiser, or leading troops in the field. It simply does not matter what the function of the organization is, it only matters that its' members share a common understanding of the purpose of the endeavor and trust that those above and below them share that same understanding.
Does your organization work that way? Think about it for a moment. How many of the issues you face as a leader are the result of divergent understandings of the tasks that must be completed, the reason they must be done, and the ultimate end-state desired by the organization itself? Do your people trust your understanding of their present reality? Do they even know how you view it? Do they have a mechanism to bring concerns or ideas to you? Is their input valued as equally as your own? Do they believe that you are working in their best interest? In short, do they trust you? And of equal importance, what mechanisms have you put in place to engender or ensure that trust development is critical to organizational success and effectiveness?
Once I started thinking about that, I came across the second document regarding sense-making. The word alone gave me pause and got me to considering how we make sense of our world and then how we ensure that that sense is commonly shared with others. How does it happen? How can two people look at the same problem and then come to a common understanding of its' requirements and outcomes? Can it be done in a manner that satisfies both parties? And, of course, the more people you introduce to the problem, the greater the possibility for discordant views becomes. My wife and I often have enough trouble coming to a common understanding of our priorities. Once we add in my daughter, the reality of simple problem solving and common understanding goes completely out the window! Now consider your office staff, any large corporation, or an army. No wonder it sometimes seems that change happens too slowly. There are so many divergent viewpoints that have to be brought into a common understanding first. And with 1.5 million people in the military, that's going to take awhile!
So any culture of trust and mutual understanding must first be seen through the idea of collective sense-making. Leaders have to have a vision of the final product, without necessarily knowing the challenges of getting there and then ensure that the folks in their organization share that same understanding. I can visualize the outcome of a project or mission, but then I have to also ensure that everyone else shares the same vision. And since those people have to be met individually to ensure that their piece of the puzzle meshes with the desired outcome, it becomes very time consuming.
As defined in the article, sense-making is:
“The result of a never-ending effort to challenge expectations and to consider alternate possibilities” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Sensemaking is said to exhibit
the following properties (Weick 1995): grounded in identity construction; retrospective; enactive of sensible environments; social; ongoing; focused on and by extracted cues; driven by plausibility rather than accuracy."
I think the key to that definition is "never-ending effort to challenge expectations and consider alternate possibilities". From the top to the bottom of any hierarchical unit, there must be a mechanism to continuously check and re-check assumptions and then be able to adapt responses when they do not bear scrutiny. This brings to mind the idea of mental agility and even more importantly, a willingness to let go of previously held assumptions. For any organization to be successful, there must exist - at every level - a mindset that disabuses any thought of entrenched behavior. A truly successful leader must be willing to discard previously held beliefs when they are no longer effective. And organizationally, there must be a challenge mechanism in place throughout. In the Army this would mean that a large portion of any leaders responsibilities would be to require constant feedback from subordinates and then value that feedback enough to challenge their own belief systems for overall unit success. Too many places in the Army right now do not prize this 'friction' of ideas. Their leaders tend to do one of two things: First, they hold on to models of behavior and action that are outdated because they are comfortable with them, or two, they sit on the fence and wait to see which way the prevailing winds will blow before jumping into the ship at the last minute. Both of these trends are not conducive to competent decision making, mental agility, or the long term health of any organization. When a dynamic human being environment is more affected by its' bureaucratic structure' than by its' people, it will ultimately fail.
If you look at a lot of the things the Army is publishing these days you come across the word 'attributes' a lot more than you did in my early career. Suddenly, we are all interested in the required 'attributes' of a Soldier. Not skills, not a technical ability, but behavioral attributes. Things like 'judgment' and 'character'. I wonder why that is? Seems to me that there is a recognition now that our earlier emphasis on the technical skills and abilities did not account very well for the development of judgment. In effect, because we were going to fight an all-out battle to be decided in one crushing blow, it was more important that we develop a Soldier's ability to pull the trigger accurately than it was to imbue in him the ability to decide if he should pull the trigger at all. After a decade at war, we have come to the realization that we must develop both skills in concert. It is not a matter of A or B, it must be AB equally, and the argument can be made that judgment and character are ultimately more important than technical skill and ability.
Consider the following models of positive sense-making and negative sense-making as outlined in the article"
Enable Sensemaking (E) - Positive
॰ E1: Challenges assumptions or takes opposite view
॰ E2: Suggests alternatives
॰ E3: Displays self-questioning or doubt
॰ E4: Displays reliance on other team members
॰ E5: Reveals thought process aloud
॰ E6: Pays attention to others’ views
॰ E7: Openly shares info and opinions
॰ E8: Tells stories of past events or future possibilities
Inhibit Sensemaking (I) - Negative
॰ I1: Shows preference for formal process
॰ I2: Pushes for formal discussion
॰ I3: Rejects complex explanations
॰ I4: Affinity for like-minded thinkers
॰ I5: Attacks others’ contributions
॰ I6: Pushes for conclusions
॰ I7: Shows frustration overtly
॰ I8: Shows occasional disinterest
Which one resonates more with you as being prevalent in your organization? Why? If you look closely at the lists above, you will see that just behind the positive attributes mentioned their is a priority on people. An emphasis on collaboration. A willingness to share knowledge and experience and question norms. If you look at the more negative list, you can plainly see the institution. The organization itself acting as a force independent of the people.
For the positive behaviors of successful organizations to take root, some very basic things must occur. First, there must be an explicit value placed on people. They must be treated as the crown jewels of the organization. Second, trust has got to be imbued from the very first day they enter the it. They must believe and be allowed to demonstrate why their particular talents are of value. They cannot be hired under the pretense that they have value and then have that value stripped from them when they report for work. They must be trusted implicitly as being able to contribute immediately. This is critical. I cannot emphasize it enough. They also must be expected to contribute immediately. Third, their must be an understanding of roles and how those roles affect how individuals view their unfolding reality.
To use my organization as an example, when I came in I told my subordinates that I would earn their trust but by virtue of their knowledge of their jobs and their experience in the organization they already had mine. I trusted them 100% sight unseen. They were explicitly allowed to distrust me. I believe that over time, I have now gained their trust to a greater or lesser degree based upon the individual. I then went about dismantling as much of the structure as I could and replaced it with the understanding of roles and collaboration. I intentionally went about team-building by removing as much of the hierarchy as I could. I have consciously emphasized their value as people rather than mere employees. Whenever possible, I have tried to place their needs ahead of the organizations. Giving a guy or gal some time off on their anniversary may create a small problem on the training schedule, but it pays itself back 1000 fold when a more critical need surfaces. And finally, I truly do not see myself as 'better' than them and they are not only allowed, but almost required, to question my judgment when it doesn't make sense. While some are more comfortable with that than others, overall, it has worked well. They do not hesitate to tell me when they think I'm full of shit. I routinely want their feedback and ideas and have created a learning friction that allows us to solve our challenges much more quickly. Reaching a common consensus has become much easier because we are all stakeholders in the outcome. I have also given them their own projects and supported their personal desires as much as possible. They have pride in ownership and that pride drives them to continually push themselves harder to surpass their own expectations. They have not failed our customers yet. We are peers in the sense that we share a common understanding of what we need to accomplish and the obstacles we face. Now each of us plays our part, does our duty, lives up to our expectations and is beholden to the team over their individual priorities.
We know the answers to leader development. They have not changed much over the millennium. Value people over things, trust that given an opportunity to succeed most of people will, and create organizations driven by mutual respect and collaboration and open and candid communication. If the CEO of Microsoft, Apple, General Motors etc can do it. Then certainly the Army can, and your organization can as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://dodccrp.org/
(If you are interested in a copy of the first, just send me an email and I'll send it to you.)
Consider the following quotes from the "C2 for Complex Endeavors" paper:
"Use your people by allowing everyone to do his job. When a subordinate is free to do his job, he perceives the trust and confidence from his superiors and takes pride in his job, himself and the organizations goals and objectives. Delegation of sufficient authority and proper use of subordinates helps develop future leaders. This is a moral responsibility of every commander."
In army-speak, this equals decentralization and trust.
and from George Patton
"No one is thinking if everyone is thinking alike. In too many organizations, toadyism is buried like a cancer. It must be removed with the sharpest bayonet available. All sorts of suggestions, ideas, concepts, and opinions must be allowed to promote an environment of learning and imagination. A fault of many potentially fine commanders is a lack of the ability to admit that other people have good ideas. If younger Soldiers are not allowed to use and cultivate their imaginations and their abilities for abstract thought, where will we get the next generations of qualified, motivated, and confident commanders? Commanders who never ask for an opinion, never listen to suggestions, and think they have the only correct idea find that their Soldiers will stop communicating altogether. They'll begin to sit on their asses and wait for orders before doing anything. No matter how high in the ranks a man goes, he can't know everything. We can always learn from each other. Juniors must learn not only to be allowed to use their imaginations, but they must be encouraged to do so.”
In Army-speak, this is the recognition of the perils of hierarchical thinking and risk-aversion.
Whenever I spend time looking for quotes or bits of wisdom for the blog, it seems to me that time and again, we already have the answers we are looking for, we just need to heed the advice of those who came before us. Does anyone but me think it strange that from the earliest commanders in the field there has been a recognition that trust up and down any chain of command is essential for unit success? It doesn't matter what your professional field is, successful organizations are built around common goals and a trust that the members of the organization from the lowest to the highest understand and are dedicated to them. I could be managing a grocery store, running a high-tech company, organizing a charitable fund-raiser, or leading troops in the field. It simply does not matter what the function of the organization is, it only matters that its' members share a common understanding of the purpose of the endeavor and trust that those above and below them share that same understanding.
Does your organization work that way? Think about it for a moment. How many of the issues you face as a leader are the result of divergent understandings of the tasks that must be completed, the reason they must be done, and the ultimate end-state desired by the organization itself? Do your people trust your understanding of their present reality? Do they even know how you view it? Do they have a mechanism to bring concerns or ideas to you? Is their input valued as equally as your own? Do they believe that you are working in their best interest? In short, do they trust you? And of equal importance, what mechanisms have you put in place to engender or ensure that trust development is critical to organizational success and effectiveness?
Once I started thinking about that, I came across the second document regarding sense-making. The word alone gave me pause and got me to considering how we make sense of our world and then how we ensure that that sense is commonly shared with others. How does it happen? How can two people look at the same problem and then come to a common understanding of its' requirements and outcomes? Can it be done in a manner that satisfies both parties? And, of course, the more people you introduce to the problem, the greater the possibility for discordant views becomes. My wife and I often have enough trouble coming to a common understanding of our priorities. Once we add in my daughter, the reality of simple problem solving and common understanding goes completely out the window! Now consider your office staff, any large corporation, or an army. No wonder it sometimes seems that change happens too slowly. There are so many divergent viewpoints that have to be brought into a common understanding first. And with 1.5 million people in the military, that's going to take awhile!
So any culture of trust and mutual understanding must first be seen through the idea of collective sense-making. Leaders have to have a vision of the final product, without necessarily knowing the challenges of getting there and then ensure that the folks in their organization share that same understanding. I can visualize the outcome of a project or mission, but then I have to also ensure that everyone else shares the same vision. And since those people have to be met individually to ensure that their piece of the puzzle meshes with the desired outcome, it becomes very time consuming.
As defined in the article, sense-making is:
“The result of a never-ending effort to challenge expectations and to consider alternate possibilities” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Sensemaking is said to exhibit
the following properties (Weick 1995): grounded in identity construction; retrospective; enactive of sensible environments; social; ongoing; focused on and by extracted cues; driven by plausibility rather than accuracy."
I think the key to that definition is "never-ending effort to challenge expectations and consider alternate possibilities". From the top to the bottom of any hierarchical unit, there must be a mechanism to continuously check and re-check assumptions and then be able to adapt responses when they do not bear scrutiny. This brings to mind the idea of mental agility and even more importantly, a willingness to let go of previously held assumptions. For any organization to be successful, there must exist - at every level - a mindset that disabuses any thought of entrenched behavior. A truly successful leader must be willing to discard previously held beliefs when they are no longer effective. And organizationally, there must be a challenge mechanism in place throughout. In the Army this would mean that a large portion of any leaders responsibilities would be to require constant feedback from subordinates and then value that feedback enough to challenge their own belief systems for overall unit success. Too many places in the Army right now do not prize this 'friction' of ideas. Their leaders tend to do one of two things: First, they hold on to models of behavior and action that are outdated because they are comfortable with them, or two, they sit on the fence and wait to see which way the prevailing winds will blow before jumping into the ship at the last minute. Both of these trends are not conducive to competent decision making, mental agility, or the long term health of any organization. When a dynamic human being environment is more affected by its' bureaucratic structure' than by its' people, it will ultimately fail.
If you look at a lot of the things the Army is publishing these days you come across the word 'attributes' a lot more than you did in my early career. Suddenly, we are all interested in the required 'attributes' of a Soldier. Not skills, not a technical ability, but behavioral attributes. Things like 'judgment' and 'character'. I wonder why that is? Seems to me that there is a recognition now that our earlier emphasis on the technical skills and abilities did not account very well for the development of judgment. In effect, because we were going to fight an all-out battle to be decided in one crushing blow, it was more important that we develop a Soldier's ability to pull the trigger accurately than it was to imbue in him the ability to decide if he should pull the trigger at all. After a decade at war, we have come to the realization that we must develop both skills in concert. It is not a matter of A or B, it must be AB equally, and the argument can be made that judgment and character are ultimately more important than technical skill and ability.
Consider the following models of positive sense-making and negative sense-making as outlined in the article"
Enable Sensemaking (E) - Positive
॰ E1: Challenges assumptions or takes opposite view
॰ E2: Suggests alternatives
॰ E3: Displays self-questioning or doubt
॰ E4: Displays reliance on other team members
॰ E5: Reveals thought process aloud
॰ E6: Pays attention to others’ views
॰ E7: Openly shares info and opinions
॰ E8: Tells stories of past events or future possibilities
Inhibit Sensemaking (I) - Negative
॰ I1: Shows preference for formal process
॰ I2: Pushes for formal discussion
॰ I3: Rejects complex explanations
॰ I4: Affinity for like-minded thinkers
॰ I5: Attacks others’ contributions
॰ I6: Pushes for conclusions
॰ I7: Shows frustration overtly
॰ I8: Shows occasional disinterest
Which one resonates more with you as being prevalent in your organization? Why? If you look closely at the lists above, you will see that just behind the positive attributes mentioned their is a priority on people. An emphasis on collaboration. A willingness to share knowledge and experience and question norms. If you look at the more negative list, you can plainly see the institution. The organization itself acting as a force independent of the people.
For the positive behaviors of successful organizations to take root, some very basic things must occur. First, there must be an explicit value placed on people. They must be treated as the crown jewels of the organization. Second, trust has got to be imbued from the very first day they enter the it. They must believe and be allowed to demonstrate why their particular talents are of value. They cannot be hired under the pretense that they have value and then have that value stripped from them when they report for work. They must be trusted implicitly as being able to contribute immediately. This is critical. I cannot emphasize it enough. They also must be expected to contribute immediately. Third, their must be an understanding of roles and how those roles affect how individuals view their unfolding reality.
To use my organization as an example, when I came in I told my subordinates that I would earn their trust but by virtue of their knowledge of their jobs and their experience in the organization they already had mine. I trusted them 100% sight unseen. They were explicitly allowed to distrust me. I believe that over time, I have now gained their trust to a greater or lesser degree based upon the individual. I then went about dismantling as much of the structure as I could and replaced it with the understanding of roles and collaboration. I intentionally went about team-building by removing as much of the hierarchy as I could. I have consciously emphasized their value as people rather than mere employees. Whenever possible, I have tried to place their needs ahead of the organizations. Giving a guy or gal some time off on their anniversary may create a small problem on the training schedule, but it pays itself back 1000 fold when a more critical need surfaces. And finally, I truly do not see myself as 'better' than them and they are not only allowed, but almost required, to question my judgment when it doesn't make sense. While some are more comfortable with that than others, overall, it has worked well. They do not hesitate to tell me when they think I'm full of shit. I routinely want their feedback and ideas and have created a learning friction that allows us to solve our challenges much more quickly. Reaching a common consensus has become much easier because we are all stakeholders in the outcome. I have also given them their own projects and supported their personal desires as much as possible. They have pride in ownership and that pride drives them to continually push themselves harder to surpass their own expectations. They have not failed our customers yet. We are peers in the sense that we share a common understanding of what we need to accomplish and the obstacles we face. Now each of us plays our part, does our duty, lives up to our expectations and is beholden to the team over their individual priorities.
We know the answers to leader development. They have not changed much over the millennium. Value people over things, trust that given an opportunity to succeed most of people will, and create organizations driven by mutual respect and collaboration and open and candid communication. If the CEO of Microsoft, Apple, General Motors etc can do it. Then certainly the Army can, and your organization can as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#103 Leadership, Transitions and Change
Three Questions:
1. Do you believe that all people should be treated equally?
2. Do you believe in equal opportunity for everyone?
3. Do you believe that each individual should be judged and rewarded by their contributions to their organization?
My guess is that most of us will almost reflexively answer "Yes" to all three. It is part of the our American mindset that people are due fair treatment, that no one should be denied the opportunity to succeed, and that as individuals, we want to be judged by our own contributions and abilities, not lumped together with the masses.
A question was once asked of General (Ret) Eric Shinseki, the former Chief of Staff of the Army:
"What is a General Officer's chief responsibility to the institution?"
His answer: "To manage transitions."
(Taken from an interview with General Martin Demspey. You can find the video link below:)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qa425Q8zKiI&feature=channel
I've been thinking a lot about the 3 questions above and transitions this week. Over the last few months there have been two documents produced that could have an impact on the Army (and the entire Armed Forces) for decades ahead. And at the core of both of them are the 3 questions. The two documents are the "Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell":
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130%28secure-hires%29.pdf
and, "From Representation to Inclusion - Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military" produced by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC)
http://mldc.whs.mil/download/documents/Draft%20Report
Obviously, the DADT report deals with the repeal of the ban against openly gay or lesbian service members in the Armed Forces which has already been signed by the President and awaits either an attempted reversal in Congress, or an implementation strategy to be delivered to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The MLDC report looked into issues surrounding diversity and opportunity for service members and, among many other things, recommends a repeal of the combat exclusion policies that forbid women from serving in "direct ground combat" positions. While only a small portion of the overall report, any reversal of that group of restrictive policies would represent a significant change in the current operating model for many Army organizations.
Both of these reports are important, and should be read by everyone to further the dialogue regarding potential policy changes in the years ahead. Why? Because policies are only words on paper. Leadership, good or bad, turns the words into action and reality.
The purpose of this post however is not to argue one way or another on either report. Each reader will have to form their own personal point of view on whether they agree or disagree with the recommendations they contain. And that is something I want people to do. I want you to take a hard look about how you personally feel about both issues because that introspection will ultimately make you a better leader. However, the responsibility to take action rests solely with our elected representatives. As General Dempsey rightly pointed out in his interview, the Armed Forces must remain a servant of the Nation and apolitical. It is the purview of the President and the Congress to enact laws and policies that affect how we operate. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the recommendations, it is correct that our elected leaders request information and recommendations be made. However, I think it is important that leaders begin to determine and inform their own understandings of both reports. To that end, here are mine:
1. I do not care about the private sexual orientation of a Soldier. A persons' sexual orientation is their own business whether they are heterosexual or homosexual. Simply put, it's not my concern on a personal level.
2. Women are already, and have always been, in combat. The Services recognize this. Right now they are all playing in the 'gray' areas of legal interpretation that have an important negative effect on how women are viewed across the force.
So, Fenlason doesn't care about gays in the military, nor does he think that women should be involuntarily excluded from serving in units that are likely to engage in direct ground combat.
Those two statements form my Orientation. However, right now, my Orientation doesn't matter because neither policy has actually been changed, so it only serves to inform others. I include it here as a matter of literary honesty. If you're going to read my work, you might as well know where I stand. And since I write and publish, I think it would be disingenuous to talk all around these two issues without making my own ideas known. But, beyond being my personal feelings on the issues, they have no relevance. Who cares what Fenlason thinks? You can agree or disagree with me and you will be as entitled to your opinions and thoughts as I am to mine. We are equal. From Private to General at this point, we are equal.
The opposite of that however is that the two statements above are very important because I lead an organization. Therefore I have responsibilities to the Army and my unit and my Orientation will help inform and determine my Actions and my Actions will have an effect on those above and below me in the institution. While you may agree or disagree with me personally, and I may agree or disagree with a policy personally, as a leader, I have a responsibility to enforce, enact, enable, and institute whatever policies the elected and appointed leaders over me determine. I also have a responsibility to respect your viewpoint. I may not agree with it, and we may have a vigorous dialogue about it, but I must respect it. That is the essence of both service and discipline.
However, if you go back to General Shinseki's comment that leaders manage transitions then something else becomes apparent as well. There has to be an awareness of the transitional period itself. There has to be someone or something that forces the introspections, reviews, and questions the existing norms to see whether or not they remain relevant. As I was watching General Dempsy's video I kept wondering what drove him to start thinking about our institutional ethic and the profession in the first place. What skill set does he have that allowed him to perceive that we are in entering into a period where many of the things that we have previously done, or held as critical to organizational success, need to be reviewed? What attributes does he possess that allow him to 'feel' that we might be out of sync and then try to put his finger on why he feels that way? More importantly, how can we develop that mindset in our leader development programs? Because, honestly, isn't that a key function of leading any group? To point it in a particular direction and then guide it to achieve its' objective? And then remain perceptive enough to notice when the conditions have changed and require another transition? As we have seen in the private sector recently, the idea that we live in a static world is an antiquated notion of yesteryear. We have now entered a period of dynamic and rapid change. Things are happening very quickly and our ability to perceive and act upon them quickly to take advantage of opportunities when they present themselves is a critical skill. We have been hearing this theme with regard to combat operations and counterinsurgency operations for years - that this is a thinking mans war and that he who can capitalize on his successes faster will ultimately prevail. A classic OODA loop.
But we have not used this process to look at ourselves until now. Both reports make mention of some critical trends that form the Observation:
"Recent statistics from the Pentagon show that three out of four young people ages 17–24 are not eligible to join the military because they do not meet entry requirements related to education level, test scores, citizenship, health status, and criminal record. Racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to meet these eligibility requirements than are non-Hispanic whites, and that gap has
been widening." (MLDC)
"When asked about how having a Service member in their immediate unit who said he or she is gay would affect the unit’s ability to “work together to get the job done,” 70% of Service members predicted it would have a positive, mixed, or no effect." (DADT)
"Despite this record of success, however, the transformation of the Armed Forces remains unfinished. Women and minorities are still underrepresented in leadership positions. Demographic changes in the United States are reshaping the pool from which the Armed Forces may enlist and promote future military leaders. Prolonged conflicts of unprecedented complexity require agile leadership that leverages all the capabilities at its disposal. Like the private sector, the U.S. military recognizes the need for a diverse workforce that includes a greater range of individual competencies, including skills, education, and professional backgrounds." (MLDC)
"Consistently, the survey results revealed a large group of around 50–55% of Service
members who thought that repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would have mixed or no effect; another 15–20% who said repeal would have a positive effect; and about 30% who said it would have a negative effect. The results of the spouse survey are consistent. When spouses were asked about whether repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would affect their preference for their Service member’s future plans to stay in the military, 74% said repeal would have no effect, while only 12% said “I would want my spouse to leave earlier." (DADT)
Both reports also accept that (1) Homosexuals are currently serving in the Armed Forces, and (2) That women have been, and are, engaged in direct combat with the enemy.
So, the type of wars we are likely to be fighting in the next decades are incredibly complex and nuanced, the pool of human resources we have to draw from is shrinking, our leadership is not reflective of the population they serve, and at least half the force doesn't really care about someone's sexual orientation.
Welcome to the world of transitions! And your next leadership challenge...
But if we step back for a moment, the key understanding here may be the phrase "Periods of transition". Periods of transition imply that there will then be a period of stasis. You go through a change to arrive at a new static environment. And that may be the key misinterpretation in all of this. What would happen if we taught not transitional periods of change, but rather transitional periods of stasis? What if everyone we put in leadership positions grew up expecting change - personal, professional, from within the organization and without? Then we would be focusing our development programs around the idea of perceiving change. We would develop people who could rapidly form new understandings in light of new circumstances and leverage dynamic thought to achieve the unit's mission.
The DADT and MLDC reports are important because they can be used to look at ourselves more clearly. On a personal level, everyone who reads them must ask whether or not they agree or disagree with the recommendations and then determine whether they wish to continue their service in light of any contrary personal beliefs. On an institutional level they are remarkable for there recognition of changing conditions and for taking a hard look at possible solutions. At the leader level they represent an opportunity to consider transitional leadership and rapid assimilation of new and emerging requirements.
We have accepted that the ability to rapidly recognize and adapt to change on the battlefield is a critical skill-set. We now have the opportunity through a series of documents to look at ourselves and determine whether or not we need to change the institution as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
1. Do you believe that all people should be treated equally?
2. Do you believe in equal opportunity for everyone?
3. Do you believe that each individual should be judged and rewarded by their contributions to their organization?
My guess is that most of us will almost reflexively answer "Yes" to all three. It is part of the our American mindset that people are due fair treatment, that no one should be denied the opportunity to succeed, and that as individuals, we want to be judged by our own contributions and abilities, not lumped together with the masses.
A question was once asked of General (Ret) Eric Shinseki, the former Chief of Staff of the Army:
"What is a General Officer's chief responsibility to the institution?"
His answer: "To manage transitions."
(Taken from an interview with General Martin Demspey. You can find the video link below:)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qa425Q8zKiI&feature=channel
I've been thinking a lot about the 3 questions above and transitions this week. Over the last few months there have been two documents produced that could have an impact on the Army (and the entire Armed Forces) for decades ahead. And at the core of both of them are the 3 questions. The two documents are the "Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell":
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130%28secure-hires%29.pdf
and, "From Representation to Inclusion - Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military" produced by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC)
http://mldc.whs.mil/download/documents/Draft%20Report
Obviously, the DADT report deals with the repeal of the ban against openly gay or lesbian service members in the Armed Forces which has already been signed by the President and awaits either an attempted reversal in Congress, or an implementation strategy to be delivered to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The MLDC report looked into issues surrounding diversity and opportunity for service members and, among many other things, recommends a repeal of the combat exclusion policies that forbid women from serving in "direct ground combat" positions. While only a small portion of the overall report, any reversal of that group of restrictive policies would represent a significant change in the current operating model for many Army organizations.
Both of these reports are important, and should be read by everyone to further the dialogue regarding potential policy changes in the years ahead. Why? Because policies are only words on paper. Leadership, good or bad, turns the words into action and reality.
The purpose of this post however is not to argue one way or another on either report. Each reader will have to form their own personal point of view on whether they agree or disagree with the recommendations they contain. And that is something I want people to do. I want you to take a hard look about how you personally feel about both issues because that introspection will ultimately make you a better leader. However, the responsibility to take action rests solely with our elected representatives. As General Dempsey rightly pointed out in his interview, the Armed Forces must remain a servant of the Nation and apolitical. It is the purview of the President and the Congress to enact laws and policies that affect how we operate. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the recommendations, it is correct that our elected leaders request information and recommendations be made. However, I think it is important that leaders begin to determine and inform their own understandings of both reports. To that end, here are mine:
1. I do not care about the private sexual orientation of a Soldier. A persons' sexual orientation is their own business whether they are heterosexual or homosexual. Simply put, it's not my concern on a personal level.
2. Women are already, and have always been, in combat. The Services recognize this. Right now they are all playing in the 'gray' areas of legal interpretation that have an important negative effect on how women are viewed across the force.
So, Fenlason doesn't care about gays in the military, nor does he think that women should be involuntarily excluded from serving in units that are likely to engage in direct ground combat.
Those two statements form my Orientation. However, right now, my Orientation doesn't matter because neither policy has actually been changed, so it only serves to inform others. I include it here as a matter of literary honesty. If you're going to read my work, you might as well know where I stand. And since I write and publish, I think it would be disingenuous to talk all around these two issues without making my own ideas known. But, beyond being my personal feelings on the issues, they have no relevance. Who cares what Fenlason thinks? You can agree or disagree with me and you will be as entitled to your opinions and thoughts as I am to mine. We are equal. From Private to General at this point, we are equal.
The opposite of that however is that the two statements above are very important because I lead an organization. Therefore I have responsibilities to the Army and my unit and my Orientation will help inform and determine my Actions and my Actions will have an effect on those above and below me in the institution. While you may agree or disagree with me personally, and I may agree or disagree with a policy personally, as a leader, I have a responsibility to enforce, enact, enable, and institute whatever policies the elected and appointed leaders over me determine. I also have a responsibility to respect your viewpoint. I may not agree with it, and we may have a vigorous dialogue about it, but I must respect it. That is the essence of both service and discipline.
However, if you go back to General Shinseki's comment that leaders manage transitions then something else becomes apparent as well. There has to be an awareness of the transitional period itself. There has to be someone or something that forces the introspections, reviews, and questions the existing norms to see whether or not they remain relevant. As I was watching General Dempsy's video I kept wondering what drove him to start thinking about our institutional ethic and the profession in the first place. What skill set does he have that allowed him to perceive that we are in entering into a period where many of the things that we have previously done, or held as critical to organizational success, need to be reviewed? What attributes does he possess that allow him to 'feel' that we might be out of sync and then try to put his finger on why he feels that way? More importantly, how can we develop that mindset in our leader development programs? Because, honestly, isn't that a key function of leading any group? To point it in a particular direction and then guide it to achieve its' objective? And then remain perceptive enough to notice when the conditions have changed and require another transition? As we have seen in the private sector recently, the idea that we live in a static world is an antiquated notion of yesteryear. We have now entered a period of dynamic and rapid change. Things are happening very quickly and our ability to perceive and act upon them quickly to take advantage of opportunities when they present themselves is a critical skill. We have been hearing this theme with regard to combat operations and counterinsurgency operations for years - that this is a thinking mans war and that he who can capitalize on his successes faster will ultimately prevail. A classic OODA loop.
But we have not used this process to look at ourselves until now. Both reports make mention of some critical trends that form the Observation:
"Recent statistics from the Pentagon show that three out of four young people ages 17–24 are not eligible to join the military because they do not meet entry requirements related to education level, test scores, citizenship, health status, and criminal record. Racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to meet these eligibility requirements than are non-Hispanic whites, and that gap has
been widening." (MLDC)
"When asked about how having a Service member in their immediate unit who said he or she is gay would affect the unit’s ability to “work together to get the job done,” 70% of Service members predicted it would have a positive, mixed, or no effect." (DADT)
"Despite this record of success, however, the transformation of the Armed Forces remains unfinished. Women and minorities are still underrepresented in leadership positions. Demographic changes in the United States are reshaping the pool from which the Armed Forces may enlist and promote future military leaders. Prolonged conflicts of unprecedented complexity require agile leadership that leverages all the capabilities at its disposal. Like the private sector, the U.S. military recognizes the need for a diverse workforce that includes a greater range of individual competencies, including skills, education, and professional backgrounds." (MLDC)
"Consistently, the survey results revealed a large group of around 50–55% of Service
members who thought that repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would have mixed or no effect; another 15–20% who said repeal would have a positive effect; and about 30% who said it would have a negative effect. The results of the spouse survey are consistent. When spouses were asked about whether repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would affect their preference for their Service member’s future plans to stay in the military, 74% said repeal would have no effect, while only 12% said “I would want my spouse to leave earlier." (DADT)
Both reports also accept that (1) Homosexuals are currently serving in the Armed Forces, and (2) That women have been, and are, engaged in direct combat with the enemy.
So, the type of wars we are likely to be fighting in the next decades are incredibly complex and nuanced, the pool of human resources we have to draw from is shrinking, our leadership is not reflective of the population they serve, and at least half the force doesn't really care about someone's sexual orientation.
Welcome to the world of transitions! And your next leadership challenge...
But if we step back for a moment, the key understanding here may be the phrase "Periods of transition". Periods of transition imply that there will then be a period of stasis. You go through a change to arrive at a new static environment. And that may be the key misinterpretation in all of this. What would happen if we taught not transitional periods of change, but rather transitional periods of stasis? What if everyone we put in leadership positions grew up expecting change - personal, professional, from within the organization and without? Then we would be focusing our development programs around the idea of perceiving change. We would develop people who could rapidly form new understandings in light of new circumstances and leverage dynamic thought to achieve the unit's mission.
The DADT and MLDC reports are important because they can be used to look at ourselves more clearly. On a personal level, everyone who reads them must ask whether or not they agree or disagree with the recommendations and then determine whether they wish to continue their service in light of any contrary personal beliefs. On an institutional level they are remarkable for there recognition of changing conditions and for taking a hard look at possible solutions. At the leader level they represent an opportunity to consider transitional leadership and rapid assimilation of new and emerging requirements.
We have accepted that the ability to rapidly recognize and adapt to change on the battlefield is a critical skill-set. We now have the opportunity through a series of documents to look at ourselves and determine whether or not we need to change the institution as well.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#102 "The Content of Our Character"
Tomorrow marks the 25th anniversary of our national holiday in honor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and because of that there have been a lot of news programs lately commemorating his life and his work. As I was watching some of them throughout the week, I remembered back to the 8th grade when I was made to memorize and then recite his famous "I Have a Dream" speech. There is a portion of that speech where Dr. King said:
"I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."
I started to think about the words, "..content of their character" and what they mean for leaders. What is your character? What helps create it, define it, and how much time do we spend thinking about it?
And then I got a gift from the gods. Joe D. has been a follower of the blog almost since it's inception. He replies often and he and I have an on-going dialogue, that, although we have never met personally, allows me to call him a friend. I am grateful for all of his support and commentary over the years.
The other morning Joe sent me a document written by Vice Admiral James Stockdale entitled, " Courage Under Fire - Testing Epictetus's Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior". (Although I have searched for an on-line copy of the document I cannot find one, so if you are interested in reading it send me a note.)
As people may or may not know, Vice Admiral Stockdale was a fighter pilot in Vietnam who was shot down and then held captive by the North Vietnamese for 8 years. According to the introduction of his paper he was tortured 15 times, kept in leg irons for 2 years and spent over 4 years of his captivity in solitary confinement. He was also a student of philosophy and had been studying the works of Epictetus while serving in Vietnam.
Epictetus was considered one of the Stoic philosophers and the main theme of his works was that there are things that a person can control and there are things that he cannot. Stockdale put it like this:
"As I ejected from that airplane I had the understanding that a Stoic always kept separate files in his mind for (A) those things that are “up to him” and (B) those things that are “not up to him.” Another way of saying it is (A) those things that are “within his power” and (B) those things that are “beyond his power.” Still another way of saying it is (A) those things that are within the grasp of “his Will, his Free Will” and (B) those things that are beyond it. All in category B are “external,” beyond my control, ultimately dooming me to fear and anxiety if I covet them. All in category A are up to me, within my power, within my will, and properly subjects for my total concern and involvement. They include my opinions, my aims, my aversions, my own grief, my own joy, my judgments, my attitude about what is going on, my own good, and my own evil."
I would call these things one's Orientation. They are, at your core, those things that are ultimately yours regardless of circumstance. They cannot be taken, only surrendered. And more importantly, learning to separate what matters - really matters - from that which does not. Stockdale makes an important point here that I believe has real relevance to leader development today:
"What is not up to you? beyond your power? Not subject to your will in the last analysis? For starters, let’s take “your station in life.” As I glide down toward that little town on my short parachute ride, I’m just about to learn how negligible is my control over my station in life. It’s not at all up to me. I’m going right now from being the leader of a hundred-plus pilots and a thousand men and, good-
ness knows, all sorts of symbolic status and goodwill, to being an object of contempt. I’ll be known as a “criminal.” But that’s not half the revelation that is the realization of your own fragility—that you can be reduced by wind and rain and ice and seawater or men to a helpless, sobbing wreck—unable to control even your own bowels in a matter of minutes. And, more than even that, you’re going to face fragilities you never before let yourself believe you could have––like
after mere minutes, in a flurry of action while being bound with tourniquet-tight ropes, with care, by a professional, hands behind, jackknifed forward and down toward your ankles held secure in lugs
attached to an iron bar, that, with the onrush of anxiety, knowing your upper body’s circulation has been stopped and feeling the ever-growing induced pain and the ever-closing-in of claustrophobia, you can be made to blurt out answers, sometimes correct answers, to questions about anything they know you know. “Station in life,” then, can be changed from that of a dignified and competent gentleman of culture to that of a panic-stricken, sobbing, self-loathing wreck in a matter of minutes. So what? To live under the false pretense that you will forever have control of your station in life is to ride for a fall; you’re asking for disappointment. So make sure in your heart of hearts, in your inner self, that you treat your station in life with indifference, not with contempt, only with indifference."
You can lose so many of those things that define you in your present reality. Your title, your place, your possessions, everything. And what will you have then? Who will you be? Without some consideration of those important questions how can you lead others? How can you be led by others? How can you form the content of your character?
Stockdale realized something else during his captivity that I also think is important for leaders to consider which is the idea that once you learn to surrender those "Station in life" things that currently seem so important, the ability of others to define - and gain power over you, is greatly diminished. Because they believe so strongly that they can affect you by changing that status, the methods they employ are aimed incorrectly in that direction. In effect, they are attempting to influence you in ways that will not work, because those ways or methods hold no value to you. If leadership is the ability to influence others, then knowing what others hold most dear becomes even more important to understand. If, as a leader, your method of exerting influence touches something your subordinates care deeply about, then you will be successful in moving them in a particular direction. If the influence does not, then you will fail.
These are important ideas to think about. So much of who we are is actually controlled by forces outside of us. I cannot control what others think about me, how they view me, or how much they value me. That is entirely up to them. I can only present me - in my current form. They will decide to confer, or not confer, their respect and value on me. To chase after their approbation will only exhaust me because I can never stop running. And so the question becomes, what will they see? Whatever that is, that is what is in my control. The rest is up to them. And whatever that may be, I am certain that it equals the content of my character. To put it simply, I used to tell trainees that at the end of the day, all you have is your name. What that means to others you cannot control. What it means to you, you can. Therefore, the goal of all personal development ought to be the refinement and development of our character. You cannot lead others without it. You can force, coerce, or threaten them for sure, but you cannot lead them without the development and understanding of your character. Ultimately, what this idea brings up is that I choose to lead others, and I choose to be led by others. The power of choice is mine. And that power resides with each of us. My Soldiers choose to be led by me. My title and position place me in their path, but it is ultimately their choice to allow themselves to be led by me. If they were to choose one day to say that they did not wish to be led by me anymore, in reality there would be precious little that I could do that would affect them. Have you ever considered that?
Have you ever thought about what would happen if you lost everything that currently defines you? Your home, job, title, money, possessions? What would happen if all of that were stripped away? If you went from commander to private? From CEO to janitor? From ruler to prisoner? Is your sense of self-worth intimately tied to all of these external things? The fear of losing these defining things - especially in a hierarchical military system has an extremely powerful influence. People do and say things everyday that they do not believe out of fear that their station will be reduced and they will lose all the defining labels they currently have. They agree to plans that will not work, they obediently tote the current party line, they get wrapped up entirely in their personal location on the organization's totem pole. At the core of it, they are afraid to be alone with themselves, so they protect at all costs their status identities.
These ideas came together in a powerful way this past week. I have been tasked to develop a program for the entire Division. As we prepare to brief a senior leader, threats have been made that I will get fired if the product is not to his liking. But we are currently playing a guessing game with what he wants. What was originally asked for cannot be delivered correctly in the time allotted. It has been refined many times and we had gained his approval awhile back. But who knows how that has changed since the last briefing. And at every level between he and I people are guessing and reinterpreting what they think he wants to see. We are chasing approbation. But what influence he believes he has over subordinates he truly does not. He might say that everyone will do this or that, but in reality those units have leaders who will choose what their Soldier will or will not do. People around me are very concerned about this potential that we might be fired. They are worried about it and have mentioned it often. And their nervousness for awhile had the effect of making me nervous. What if I get it wrong? What if he doesn't like the product we present? What if he does fire me? What if, what if, what if? And then I really asked myself, "What if?" I know that the product I will deliver will get results, and will be good for the unit. I know that, and I can prove that. I have been doing it for the last 3 years. I know it because over 3,000 Soldiers have benefited from it. So what am I afraid of? And then Epictetus showed up in my in-box. A gift from the gods. Turns out that I was afraid of a loss of station. I might lose my title. I might lose my place in the organization. I might lose the respect of others. But those things were never mine to begin with. They were all external.
I have been here before under much more serious circumstances than these. The lessons of Epictetus were first shown to me in the aftermath of what happened in Iraq, I just wasn't smart enough to see them then. My Orientation was in the wrong place. Little by little my understanding of the depth of these lessons is becoming more clear to me. At 42 years old, I have become a student again. I get a sneaking suspicion that it will never stop.
I will deliver my briefing - the best that I can produce. That is up to me. That cannot be taken from me. What I can control is me, what I demand of myself, and the content of my character. The rest doesn't really matter much. I am not working for his approbation, I am working for mine. The only fear remaining is that any loss of the 'externals' might reduce my ability to assist other people. This is not about me. I will be fine no matter what the outcome is. That is because the choice to be that way is mine alone. I answer only to my expectations of me. Somewhere in there you can judge for yourself the content of my character.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."
I started to think about the words, "..content of their character" and what they mean for leaders. What is your character? What helps create it, define it, and how much time do we spend thinking about it?
And then I got a gift from the gods. Joe D. has been a follower of the blog almost since it's inception. He replies often and he and I have an on-going dialogue, that, although we have never met personally, allows me to call him a friend. I am grateful for all of his support and commentary over the years.
The other morning Joe sent me a document written by Vice Admiral James Stockdale entitled, " Courage Under Fire - Testing Epictetus's Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior". (Although I have searched for an on-line copy of the document I cannot find one, so if you are interested in reading it send me a note.)
As people may or may not know, Vice Admiral Stockdale was a fighter pilot in Vietnam who was shot down and then held captive by the North Vietnamese for 8 years. According to the introduction of his paper he was tortured 15 times, kept in leg irons for 2 years and spent over 4 years of his captivity in solitary confinement. He was also a student of philosophy and had been studying the works of Epictetus while serving in Vietnam.
Epictetus was considered one of the Stoic philosophers and the main theme of his works was that there are things that a person can control and there are things that he cannot. Stockdale put it like this:
"As I ejected from that airplane I had the understanding that a Stoic always kept separate files in his mind for (A) those things that are “up to him” and (B) those things that are “not up to him.” Another way of saying it is (A) those things that are “within his power” and (B) those things that are “beyond his power.” Still another way of saying it is (A) those things that are within the grasp of “his Will, his Free Will” and (B) those things that are beyond it. All in category B are “external,” beyond my control, ultimately dooming me to fear and anxiety if I covet them. All in category A are up to me, within my power, within my will, and properly subjects for my total concern and involvement. They include my opinions, my aims, my aversions, my own grief, my own joy, my judgments, my attitude about what is going on, my own good, and my own evil."
I would call these things one's Orientation. They are, at your core, those things that are ultimately yours regardless of circumstance. They cannot be taken, only surrendered. And more importantly, learning to separate what matters - really matters - from that which does not. Stockdale makes an important point here that I believe has real relevance to leader development today:
"What is not up to you? beyond your power? Not subject to your will in the last analysis? For starters, let’s take “your station in life.” As I glide down toward that little town on my short parachute ride, I’m just about to learn how negligible is my control over my station in life. It’s not at all up to me. I’m going right now from being the leader of a hundred-plus pilots and a thousand men and, good-
ness knows, all sorts of symbolic status and goodwill, to being an object of contempt. I’ll be known as a “criminal.” But that’s not half the revelation that is the realization of your own fragility—that you can be reduced by wind and rain and ice and seawater or men to a helpless, sobbing wreck—unable to control even your own bowels in a matter of minutes. And, more than even that, you’re going to face fragilities you never before let yourself believe you could have––like
after mere minutes, in a flurry of action while being bound with tourniquet-tight ropes, with care, by a professional, hands behind, jackknifed forward and down toward your ankles held secure in lugs
attached to an iron bar, that, with the onrush of anxiety, knowing your upper body’s circulation has been stopped and feeling the ever-growing induced pain and the ever-closing-in of claustrophobia, you can be made to blurt out answers, sometimes correct answers, to questions about anything they know you know. “Station in life,” then, can be changed from that of a dignified and competent gentleman of culture to that of a panic-stricken, sobbing, self-loathing wreck in a matter of minutes. So what? To live under the false pretense that you will forever have control of your station in life is to ride for a fall; you’re asking for disappointment. So make sure in your heart of hearts, in your inner self, that you treat your station in life with indifference, not with contempt, only with indifference."
You can lose so many of those things that define you in your present reality. Your title, your place, your possessions, everything. And what will you have then? Who will you be? Without some consideration of those important questions how can you lead others? How can you be led by others? How can you form the content of your character?
Stockdale realized something else during his captivity that I also think is important for leaders to consider which is the idea that once you learn to surrender those "Station in life" things that currently seem so important, the ability of others to define - and gain power over you, is greatly diminished. Because they believe so strongly that they can affect you by changing that status, the methods they employ are aimed incorrectly in that direction. In effect, they are attempting to influence you in ways that will not work, because those ways or methods hold no value to you. If leadership is the ability to influence others, then knowing what others hold most dear becomes even more important to understand. If, as a leader, your method of exerting influence touches something your subordinates care deeply about, then you will be successful in moving them in a particular direction. If the influence does not, then you will fail.
These are important ideas to think about. So much of who we are is actually controlled by forces outside of us. I cannot control what others think about me, how they view me, or how much they value me. That is entirely up to them. I can only present me - in my current form. They will decide to confer, or not confer, their respect and value on me. To chase after their approbation will only exhaust me because I can never stop running. And so the question becomes, what will they see? Whatever that is, that is what is in my control. The rest is up to them. And whatever that may be, I am certain that it equals the content of my character. To put it simply, I used to tell trainees that at the end of the day, all you have is your name. What that means to others you cannot control. What it means to you, you can. Therefore, the goal of all personal development ought to be the refinement and development of our character. You cannot lead others without it. You can force, coerce, or threaten them for sure, but you cannot lead them without the development and understanding of your character. Ultimately, what this idea brings up is that I choose to lead others, and I choose to be led by others. The power of choice is mine. And that power resides with each of us. My Soldiers choose to be led by me. My title and position place me in their path, but it is ultimately their choice to allow themselves to be led by me. If they were to choose one day to say that they did not wish to be led by me anymore, in reality there would be precious little that I could do that would affect them. Have you ever considered that?
Have you ever thought about what would happen if you lost everything that currently defines you? Your home, job, title, money, possessions? What would happen if all of that were stripped away? If you went from commander to private? From CEO to janitor? From ruler to prisoner? Is your sense of self-worth intimately tied to all of these external things? The fear of losing these defining things - especially in a hierarchical military system has an extremely powerful influence. People do and say things everyday that they do not believe out of fear that their station will be reduced and they will lose all the defining labels they currently have. They agree to plans that will not work, they obediently tote the current party line, they get wrapped up entirely in their personal location on the organization's totem pole. At the core of it, they are afraid to be alone with themselves, so they protect at all costs their status identities.
These ideas came together in a powerful way this past week. I have been tasked to develop a program for the entire Division. As we prepare to brief a senior leader, threats have been made that I will get fired if the product is not to his liking. But we are currently playing a guessing game with what he wants. What was originally asked for cannot be delivered correctly in the time allotted. It has been refined many times and we had gained his approval awhile back. But who knows how that has changed since the last briefing. And at every level between he and I people are guessing and reinterpreting what they think he wants to see. We are chasing approbation. But what influence he believes he has over subordinates he truly does not. He might say that everyone will do this or that, but in reality those units have leaders who will choose what their Soldier will or will not do. People around me are very concerned about this potential that we might be fired. They are worried about it and have mentioned it often. And their nervousness for awhile had the effect of making me nervous. What if I get it wrong? What if he doesn't like the product we present? What if he does fire me? What if, what if, what if? And then I really asked myself, "What if?" I know that the product I will deliver will get results, and will be good for the unit. I know that, and I can prove that. I have been doing it for the last 3 years. I know it because over 3,000 Soldiers have benefited from it. So what am I afraid of? And then Epictetus showed up in my in-box. A gift from the gods. Turns out that I was afraid of a loss of station. I might lose my title. I might lose my place in the organization. I might lose the respect of others. But those things were never mine to begin with. They were all external.
I have been here before under much more serious circumstances than these. The lessons of Epictetus were first shown to me in the aftermath of what happened in Iraq, I just wasn't smart enough to see them then. My Orientation was in the wrong place. Little by little my understanding of the depth of these lessons is becoming more clear to me. At 42 years old, I have become a student again. I get a sneaking suspicion that it will never stop.
I will deliver my briefing - the best that I can produce. That is up to me. That cannot be taken from me. What I can control is me, what I demand of myself, and the content of my character. The rest doesn't really matter much. I am not working for his approbation, I am working for mine. The only fear remaining is that any loss of the 'externals' might reduce my ability to assist other people. This is not about me. I will be fine no matter what the outcome is. That is because the choice to be that way is mine alone. I answer only to my expectations of me. Somewhere in there you can judge for yourself the content of my character.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
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