# 13 What a Week

This has been one of those weeks. They come along every once in a while, and you have to be ready for them when they show up. I had no expectation on Monday that it would be as great as it was. It'll take a little bit today to work through it all. Bear with me. The thoughts aren't fully formed yet.

Periods of my life seem to define themselves by associations with others - either individual people, or groups. When the marksmanship program started, it was marked by an almost magical time that a unit and I went through. Erica, LD and the whole staff at that unit embraced me and the training and it led to the formation of friendships and many many conversations about training and Soldiers and leadership etc. Now, that time has passed. When I think back on it, I realize that it was 2 years, and a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, ago. People have moved on and the unit is no longer the same. While some folks remain, and those friendships still exist, and I expect that I'll work with the unit again, it won't be exactly the same. New people, new leadership, new expectations. I'll need to remember that when I walk through their doors. Can't live backwards.

There is a new group now, different but just as special. They are a company of folks who have embraced me, and the training philosophy I espouse. It's an exciting time. What started out as the marksmanship program has quickly become much more. We have become friends. Tuesday night, I was invited to a gathering of the officers of the unit to kick around thoughts and ideas and to talk about my thoughts and experiences on why the Army is the way it is today. I had a really great time. I think most of them did too. At least I hope so! Sometime during that conversation - which was pretty far ranging for only 3 hours, the issue came up that these officers don't feel like many of their NCO's are meeting their expectations. That the NCO's aren't quite the "ultimate professionals" that the officers had been told they would be during their commissioning training. In fact, their actions, attitudes and behaviors - in many cases - fell well short of the mark. That led me to ask the question, "Do they know your expectations?" "Do they know what it is that you are looking for them to do or be?" I also went on to explain that today's senior NCO corps came of age - their formative years - were in the mid to late 90's and that Army was very much different from the one we are in today. The old one actually has a name now. It's called the "Legacy" Army. Today, we are trying, in fits and starts, to become an "Expeditionary" Army. Very different focuses for both. The "Legacy" Army was going to fight the former Soviet Union in some grand WW 3 scenario in Europe that would settle once and for all the Democracy / Communism debate. Massive force thrown against massive force in one huge cataclysmic battle for the world's soul. Today, we face multiple, ill-formed, ideological threats from non-nation entities that are not necessarily tied to one national political aim. We have been attacked on our homeland with no way to strike back. While the threat is violent and real, it is amoebic. Hard to define, much less pin down. Even more difficult to explain to the general public. There are as many reasons for insurgencies as their are insurgent groups. The ally themselves together when necessary and break apart when their needs no longer converge. The threat is vague, the fighting is done on every level - military, political, technological, religious, etc - and is marked by rapidly changing realities. The "Legacy" NCO corps was not designed for this fight. Generally speaking, it cannot think fast enough nor broadly enough, nor deep enough. It wasn't trained to. Nor can the institutional Army keep up with the pace of change necessary for this fight. If it takes 2 years to formalize a program of instruction for a class or school, my guess is by the time it gets taught for the first time, it'll be 1 year and 11 months out of date. That's just the nature of this war.

The next day I went to work and started an email chain with the folks who had participated the evening prior. In it I outlined what I thought were the highlights of the conversation. Interestingly, one of the officers responded and replied that he wasn't even sure he could identify clearly what his expectations were. That he didn't know exactly what he was looking for in himself, let alone how to express it to others. His quote is below:

"I'm taught by a book how to be an S6 and what the expectations are of the shop. Nowhere does it say how to deal with people. Nowhere does it say how an Aviation unit operates completely different from an Infantry unit. And they do, different requirements. It's my job to figure out how things need to be. I'm running into an issue of the shop running a score of "par for the course". The NCOs feel that that is enough, just enough to get by. As a leader, how do I empower them to do better and do more even though the mission requirements are being met? I don't know how to communicate very well, I'm not taught how to deal with people."

I spent Thursday and Friday with the same unit a rifle range. They were going to run my marksmanship program by themselves with new folks who hadn't done it before, so they asked me to assist them to get things moving and keep everything safe and on track. The LT in charge had been part of the discussion a few nights prior, and was trying very hard to run a successful training event. The first day went fine until late in the afternoon when he and I became aware that maybe some of the results the Soldiers were getting were a little too good. See, it's supposed to be 40 rounds for 40 targets, NOT 45 or 50 rounds. But, it happens. It was easy to see that he was upset. He had put a lot of hard work and energy into the training event, and now he questioned the legitimacy of the whole day. We had both watched NCO's, who were supposed to be coaching the shooters blatantly break the rules. They were helping the Soldier cheat by over-stacking the magazines. Whether the shooter knew that or not was hard to tell. Another people issue. How to deal with the situation? We couldn't force the Soldiers to reshoot - not enough time or ammunition, we couldn't determine how many previous shooters had been "assisted", nor did we want to ruin something that, by all Soldier comments, was an otherwise excellent training event. There was no denying though that this was just another example of the NCO Corps not meeting an officer's expectations. Another nail in the coffin of trust that is essential for units and people to be successful. We made an adjustment for the 2nd day of shooting and the situation was resolved, but in many ways the damage was done.

I mentioned at one point that I felt as if I were somehow defending the incompetencies and failures of the NCO corps to these young officers. That it would appear as if I were making excuses for their lack of ability, or knowledge, or moral short-comings. But although that's how it felt, that's not what I'm doing. I am trying to explain how we got to this place and how some things have gone on for so long that they have become the norm. The "Legacy" Army, with no war to fight and no immediate need to justify it's expense, became an Army of numbers and efficiency ratings. Charts and graphs and green blocks became the standard for the effectiveness of the unit. An indicator of it's combat readiness - since without a fight we had no other benchmark to use. In many ways, even though we have been at war for 7 years now, the same mentality still pervades the institution. It is only slowly beginning to change.

But back to Nick's comments quoted above. I think the key to leading others is having a very clear understanding of yourself first. You have to be comfortable in your own skin. And that takes time. You have to know and understand what you value and what you don't. A sense of self. A willingness to see yourself as both your personal and professional selves. They are not necessarily the same. When you can define for subordinates those qualities, characteristics and traits that you value, then they have an understanding of what your motivations and priorities are. Then you put them into play on a day to day basis. He mentions that his NCO's are willing to settle for "Par for the course". What's wrong with that? Why work harder to improve something that works just fine right now? The issue may be that he values a higher level of personal excellence and professional behavior than they do. He defines himself partially by the comparison of his work against his predecessor's. His NCOs may not. They may see it as a system that works with or without their personalized input. Is it broken, or just not being executed to the high level that he personally desires? If it's actually broken, then change is easy. He will be expected to fix it. And he will have the latitude and backing to do so. If it's not actually broken, though, and is only underperforming based upon his high expectation level, then he's got a tough road ahead of him. How can he effect change when no one else sees a problem?

And so I went searching, as I normally do, to see what's out there in Army cyberspace and found the following link: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/slp2ndEd.pdf . Chapter 7 of this document deals with the human dimension of sustained combat. While the entire document is designed as strategic (global) leader primer, I took particular interest in this chapter. I found some quotes that jumped out at me. "A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved through personal study and contemplation." Chapter 7 goes on to look at leader qualities and requirements as outlined in FM 22-100 "Leadership", and also to look at strategic leader requirements. It identifies 6 competencies that strategic leaders need to focus on. They are Identity, Mental Agility, Cross-Cultural Savy, Interpersonal Maturity, World-Class Warrior, and Professional Astuteness. Since I believe that in the current environment, every single Soldier has the capacity to have strategic importance, these competencies are as relevant to the lieutenants and captains as they are to the colonels and generals. Here is what the document says about identity.

"Identity. This metacompetency is derived from the work of Douglas Hall who heavily influenced the conclusions of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel-Officer (ATLD Panel). According to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather self- feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.” The ATLD describes self-awareness, and describes it as the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. The metacompetency of identity moves beyond simply knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-awareness. It includes the understanding of one’s self-concept as an officer in the Army. Identity also includes an understanding of one’s values and how they match up to the values of the Army. Identity implies maturation beyond self-awareness as officers come to an understanding of who they are, not just how well they do things. Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also brings in aspects of development over a career. As senior leaders gain responsibility, they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others. The metacompetency of identity acknowledges that as an officer develops strategic leadership capability, his role extends beyond personal contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success for subordinates."

I think that both Nick and Leo can be found in that quotation. Nick's thought that he might or might not know what it is he expects from his subordinates might be generated from a not fully formed understanding of what he expects of himself. I think for all leaders, the sentence "As senior leaders gain responsibility they focus less on their own contributions and more on the accomplishments of others", is critical. During your young leader development, it's all about you being better than the other guy/girl. I know it was for me. As you grow, that becomes a zero sum game because there are too many other variables - interpersonal relationships, politics, the structure of the system etc. Eventually, you realize that focusing your efforts on the development of those you serve becomes the truest measure of your leadership. It becomes your legacy and you form your legacy each and every day. One Soldier at a time. But those people who create your legacy might have very little understanding of what you are actually trying to accomplish.

Which brings me back to the rifle range: Identity: A young leader running a new type of training event and wanting to do well. Mental Agility: His ability to see the non-quantifiable goodness in the Soldiers who went through the training. Cross-Cultural Savy: His awareness that the norms of the past are hard to break and ability to see it as a cultural difference, not a moral difference. World-Class Warrior: A very tiny first step taken by a group of people to create a more confident, competent and capable Soldier and person. Professional Astuteness: The gained awareness of training design and where the cracks are in the details.

My Mother sent me a book once. It's title is "And Wisdom Comes Quietly". I didn't get to this place overnight. It took time and people and experiences. I'm looking forward to the future.

5 comments:

  1. A friend mine posted the following comment on FB.

    "Reading some of your back-logs. It's scary how closely tied the military and education are. One comment on the expectations...while it is VITAL that superiors share their expectations before expecting them to be lived up to, we also have to look at a soldier's (student's) background to determine if they will interpret those expectations in the ... Read Moreway that we intend. My personal feelings are that education has, for decades, been encouraging the low to improve while leaving the "good enough" alone. While educationally, this will result in better test scores, it does serious damage to our society. We are, in essence, creating an entire generation of mediocracy. Even the army has gone this route. Look at slogans. We've gone from "Be all that you can be" which encourages excellence, to "An Army of one" - which I've always thought is often interpreted as "You're on your own kid so we don't expect too much." If we are satisfied with getting the job done, how can we learn to excel?

    ReplyDelete
  2. I wasn't sure how to respond to this post earlier but I experienced something yesterday morning during our company / BN staff APFT. It goes along with just doing the minimum to get by.

    First off, before the APFT even started NCOs were asking their Soldiers "how much(pushups, situp, 2mile time) they needed to do to pass. PT seems to be one of the vertebra of the spine that makes a Soldier. Pretty important if you ask me but why do we only expect them to pass. The standard to be a successful Soldier in terms of physical fitness is extremely low. Why isn't the question from NCO to Soldier "how far away are you from scoring 100 in each event? 50 points in pushups? Crap, you have a bunch of work to do." Shouldn't we strive for excellence?

    I am excellent at the physical fitness thing. It tends to be my hobby. I don't train for the APFT at all, in fact, I hate pushups, situps and running. I can do them. Last time I took a APFT was June 09 and I didn't max all the events. First time ever! Since then, I have continued not to practice the APFT and stuck to what I like to do. I went out with the attitude yesterday morning, I am going to bust my ass to do well. I want to show these Soldiers that any one can do PT well. I was hoping to motivate them. I maxed all 3 events and having not been running, my run time went from 13:00 to 12:23. I literally pulled it out of my ass some how. Either way, the Soldiers loved it. They were coming up to me and asking what I do to workout and what not. Problem is, a few junior NCO's chimmed in with, "he's Ranger (tabbed)". I said it was bullshit, we all wore the Airborne tab and that is what mattered. My Ranger tab only showed that I could starve myself, stay up for hours on end, and walk for miles. Problem is, the ranger comment from the NCO's killed the Soldiers motivation totally. Now, I do PT well because I am ranger qualified? If only I would have seen it coming because I wouldn't be wearing it right now. Then the comments would have been "he's signal?!?! if he can do it any one can do it!"

    I guess I thought I would be leading by example but NCOs one level down only want to pass and their influence is what is passed on to their Soldiers.

    Now, again back to passing the APFT versus striving for max, why not? I haven't been but I think at basic training and AIT, all that is expected is that you pass the APFT. From day 1 then the goal / mentality is to do just enough to "pass". PT is so basic but if we only require the bare minimum, it spreads to all other aspects of their being a Soldier. I only need to shoot 23/40 to qualify so I only strive for 23. Shouldn't I be like, "shit, I'm 17 targets away from 40, I've got some serious work to do?"

    And lunch is over and it's back to work. Just my thoughts.

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  3. I'd like to comment on the reference to the Magazine stuffers first, and then rebut some of the assumptions made in reference the leadership's response once the cheaters were discovered.

    First, the conduct of those Non Commissioned Officers is appalling, embarassing, and abomidable, but like you said, not surprising. I think we can all agree that NCOs who cheat should not be NCOs or be afforded the level of responsibility and respect that goes with the rank. The NCOs that made the decision to cheat at a test (the range) cheated in a multitude of areas:

    1.) They cheated their own soldiers out of the opportunity to develop and maintain a life-saving/taking skillset. The one skill that could keep these soldiers alive overseas, the one skill that would enable them to defend themselves in combat, and they cheated it. They've unacceptably jeopradized the safety of everyone around them and set a pathetic example for their soldiers, our future leaders of the Army.

    2.) They cheated themselves opportunity to train their own soldiers, their number one task as NCOs.

    3.) They cheated their peers and subordinates who got a fair score by raising the scores of other soldiers who would not have qualified or gotten as high a score. Where a skilled shooter would have stood out among his/her peers, other soldiers who cheated diluted and clouded the results.

    4.) They cheated the battalion and range planners of valuable time, energy and rounds.

    5.) They cheated against their peers across the nation. Inevitably they would have used these stats for NCOER bullets, in the national competition for the next higher rank.

    These NCOs, these leaders of soldiers, ought to be removed from any and all responsibility.
    ___

    Now, I argue against your two assumptions: first, When you said that you couldn't force everyone to reshoot, I argue that you should have. Particularly because you said you had no idea how many soldiers had their magazines stuffed, your results are now completely bogus. You are validating that some of the cheaters will get away it. By nullifying every score from that day, some may argue that it is not fair that those who earned their score will have to retest. But in reality, the cheaters ensured that the test results were unfair to begin with. If they earned their scores, they will be able to reproduce the results at another time when they are not competing with cheaters and will probably not mind another opportunity to shoot. Maybe for this particular range it would not have been feasible given the time and supply limitations, but we have a good 6 months before we are supposed to deploy - plenty of time to replan and re-execute an M4 range.

    Second, when you said that you did not want to ruin something that the soldiers believed was an "excellent training event," I argue the event was already ruined, based on the standard of gaining quantifiable data. It was, however, a complete success under the standard that soldiers were able to train and gain familiarity with their assigned weapon. Once the conditions were changed (magazine stuffing), then the standards and expected outcome should have changed also.

    Throwing out the day's results would be more painful, but is the right thing to do.

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  4. In response to Laura's comment:

    I think you are correct in all of your baseline comments, but maybe it's not quite as simple as that.

    First, The larger purpose of the training event has always been to show units a method of training that can instill "Confidence, Competence and Capability", (the 3C's) into a Soldier at a higher level, with roughly the same resources as were used previously. The numerical results are used to (1) get the job in the first place so that the training discussion can even be had, and (2) to provide some form of quantifiable result to continue it's life within the organization. Having done this for a long time, I can safely say that at best there was a 1% inflation and at worst, a 6& inflation over all previous units. The question that needs to be asked, is whether or not the trade-off of that 1-6% was worth the potential loss of value to the other Soldiers and leaders who either were the reciever of the 3C's, or those who learned how to implement training in a manner that allows for the 3C's in the first place and replaces "check-the-block" training.

    This is very closely related to the Army culture issues that have been raised throughout the blog. When you are only looking at readiness through the prism of numeric quantification (most of the 90's)versus actual competency required for combat, you will build that type of culture within the organization. Think about it this way, we've been at war for 8 years and much of what I'm talking about still remains outside the reality for many commanders and senior NCO's. That culture is extremely difficult to remove. Just by catching a 'cheater' will not remove it. It has to be replaced by Soldiers who have gained the knowledge and self-confidence that they can now accomplish the task without outside interference, and leaders who now know a method of training that can lead to combat readiness.

    If over the course of 2 days, 100 Soldiers went through the event, and somewhere between 94 and 98 of them successfully accomplished the task, and the unit now can see it's training methods in a better manner, then the cultural change has begun.

    As a corrollary, a basic Army leadership requirement is trust. None of us can accomplish anything without it. If that trust is betrayed by one person, should I now distrust everyone? I, as a leader, have to extend the hand of trust to all, and only remove it from those who have demonstrated they are not worthy of it - not as a mass assumption for all others.

    ReplyDelete
  5. I'd like to comment on the reference to the Magazine stuffers first, and then rebut some of the assumptions made in reference the leadership's response once the cheaters were discovered.

    First, the conduct of those Non Commissioned Officers is appalling, embarassing, and abomidable, but like you said, not surprising. I think we can all agree that NCOs who cheat should not be NCOs or be afforded the level of responsibility and respect that goes with the rank. The NCOs that made the decision to cheat at a test (the range) cheated in a multitude of areas:

    1.) They cheated their own soldiers out of the opportunity to develop and maintain a life-saving/taking skillset. The one skill that could keep these soldiers alive overseas, the one skill that would enable them to defend themselves in combat, and they cheated it. They've unacceptably jeopradized the safety of everyone around them and set a pathetic example for their soldiers, our future leaders of the Army.

    2.) They cheated themselves the opportunity to train their own soldiers, their number one task as NCOs.

    3.) They cheated their peers and subordinates who got a fair score by raising the scores of other soldiers who would not have qualified or gotten as high a score. Where a skilled shooter would have stood out among his/her peers, other soldiers who cheated diluted and clouded the results.

    4.) They cheated the battalion and range planners of valuable time, energy and rounds.

    5.) They cheated against their peers across the nation. Inevitably they would have used these stats for NCOER bullets, in the national competition for the next higher rank.

    These NCOs, these leaders of soldiers, ought to be removed from any and all responsibility.
    ___

    Now, I argue against your two assumptions: first, When you said that you couldn't force everyone to reshoot, I argue that you should have. Particularly because you said you had no idea how many soldiers had their magazines stuffed, your results are now completely bogus. You are validating that some of the cheaters will get away it. By nullifying every score from that day, some may argue that it is not fair that those who earned their score will have to retest. But in reality, the cheaters ensured that the test results were unfair to begin with. If they earned their scores, they will be able to reproduce the results at another time when they are not competing with cheaters and will probably not mind another opportunity to shoot. Maybe for this particular range it would not have been feasible given the time and supply limitations, but we have a good 6 months before we are supposed to deploy - plenty of time to replan and re-execute an M4 range.

    Second, when you said that you did not want to ruin something that the soldiers believed was an "excellent training event," I argue the event was already ruined, based on the standard of gaining quantifiable data. It was, however, a complete success under the standard that soldiers were able to train and gain familiarity with their assigned weapon. Once the conditions were changed (magazine stuffing), then the standards and expected outcome should have changed also.

    Throwing out the day's results would be more painful, but is the right thing to do.

    ReplyDelete