In response to last weeks post, I received an email from JD who posed an interesting and thought-provoking question. I emailed him back and asked if he would mind my posting it as a blog itself. He had no issues with that, so here is his response to Post #70, "Hondo's Parting Gift", and my thoughts on the questions he raises:
"I like your perspective and it comes with tons of credibility.....I have followed this incident closely, like yours and others, which leads me to this question... Do you know of ANY battles (not FOB/garrison incidences) in the last 9 years where YOU would have "accused" a company, battalion, or brigade commander of dereliction of duty, incompetence, fault, or culpability?"
Simply put, my answer to JD's question is no. I do not personally know of any battles where I would have accused my leadership (either officer and non-commissioned officer) of dereliction of duty, incompetence or culpability. The reasons for that answer, however, are much more complicated - and sort of bring a lot of my other thoughts into play.
Dereliction of duty, and incompetence are both very subjective labels. I'm sure that none of the people involved in the COP Wanat battle or my incident think that they were negligent in carrying out their duties - as they understood them, and with the facts they had available to them at the time when they made critical decisions. They believed the decisions they made were correct and in-keeping with their understanding of their mission. The accusation of negligence only shows up when an other-than-expected result occurs because of those decisions. And especially if that result ends up with U.S. casualties. Company, battalion, brigade and division level commanders, and their non-commissioned officer counterparts, are generally not dim-witted people. For the most part, they are pretty smart, posses a keen sense of their responsibilities, and care very deeply about those in their charge. While there will always be those leaders who simply use their subordinates for their own self-promotion, they are a very minor exception, and not the overwhelming rule.
The charge of incompetence also leads to another issue. If someone is trained to do a job under a particular understanding and set of circumstances, and then those understandings and circumstances dramatically change, can you then accuse that person on being incompetent? You are fundamentally asking them to do something that they have not been trained, and therefore, may not know how to do. This war has too many examples of this to even recount, but in a generic sense, consider this example. Tthe set of understandings and assumptions that the military planners used to predict what would happen in post-invasion Iraq were woefully incorrect. Those decisions and assumptions had a marked impact on the rise of the insurgency from 2003 - 2006. Does that mean that these planners were incompetent? No. What it means is that the data that they were using to form their understandings and assumptions was flawed. But they could not have known that at the time they built the plan. Basic to the invasion of Iraq was the question of what would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed from power? The American planners assumptions were that Iraqi's would greet the U.S. as liberators and that democracy would surely follow. That the guy on the street would automatically choose peace over violence. That everyone would remain calm and understand that to rebuild would take time and patience. That a desire for Iraqi national unity would trump tribal and religious differences. Obviously, that did not happen and the void that was created by the deposition of Hussein and the de-bathification decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority led directly to the failure of basic services and the upsetting of the 'normal' order that created the anger, frustration and confusion that gave rise to the insurgency. Is Paul Bremer then incompetent? No. His assumptions were incorrect and the decisions made based upon those assumptions had some truly terrifying consequences, but he was certainly not incompetent. His orientation was wrong. If there was any failure, it was a failure to OODA. His inability to orient himself correctly to the real issues and not to impose his own - and America's - filters in the decision-making process may be at fault, but it does not lend itself to the realm of incompetence. It lends itself more accurately to not being prepared for a type of rebuilding effort that the original planners hadn't anticipated and planned for. The game changed, but only a tiny sliver of people were able to see it. Democracy, education, the rule of law and women's rights do not feed a hungry family, or provide clean water and sanitary living conditions. A working government can do those things whether it is tyrannical or democratic. This is where 'what to think' and 'how to think' collide. As a democracy and a free people, Americans do not like tyranny and despotic rule. That is what we are taught to think. It's the American way. However, there are times when something other than the American way may be the best solution to the problem. Remember, at the end of World War II, with the entire European continent needing to be rebuilt, a lot of Nazi's were 'repatriated' to provide the essential services that would aid in the rebuilding effort. In his rise to power, Benito Mussolini promised to make the trains run on time....and he did.
In the case of 1st platoon, there have been accusations of incompetence and dereliction almost since Day 1. "Black Hearts" provides almost 400 pages worth. While I do not think that every person in my Chain of Command correctly understood the environment and working conditions, I also do not think that most of us were incompetent. Obviously as some of the responses to previous postings have pointed out, others do not agree. Which again points out that heroism and success share equal footing with dereliction and incompetence. It's all a matter of your perspective. My opinion is that some people involved started to 'believe their own bullshit' a little too much, and had little understanding of how to 'see' their operating conditions correctly. To be fair, that assertion has been laid at my feet more than once. It's a matter of priorities, orientations (both personal and external) and the picture of the intended outcome.
Fault is a whole different issue. I can most definitely find fault in my situation, but it is not a criminal or culpable fault for the reasons cited above. It is exactly the same type of fault that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. It is a fault of perception, understanding, and priorities. It is a failure to orient correctly and then having the ability to impress that orientation on decision makers. Whenever someone asks the question, "Should he/she have known that X or Y could have happened?", it is almost certain that X or Y has happened, and the signs were missed. Well the truth is that to have perfect situational awareness and to be able to sift through the thousands of pieces of information, both large and trivial, and then align each them in perfect order is almost impossible. No one can do that right every time. That's why we call them mistakes. The signs were there, but they got lost in the various understandings of their importance depending on the perspective and agenda of who's paying attention. Most errors are errors of judgement. In retrospect, Steven Green's stated desire to kill Iraqi's because they had killed his friends was more than an emotional young man venting the day after one of his leaders had died in his arms. But, at the time, it was judged by others as a normal emotive response to a very traumatic incident. To be honest, I don't know too many Soldiers today who at one point or another came to hate Iraqis. Amidst all the anger and rage that many people were experiencing during that time, what was any different about Steven Green? Nothing except that 4 months later he would slaughter 4 people in cold blood.
Fault can be laid at all of our feet for having differing sets of priorities. The battalion commander's priorities were not in line with the company commander's priorities. They did not have a common understanding to work from. My priorities and the priorities of many of my Soldiers were different as well, and I had difficulty explaining those priorities to them in a manner that they could understand. In both cases, you can align the facts and bits of information and reach different conclusions. The weight that I give to something and the weight that one of my Soldiers gives it may be two entirely different things. For example, the battalion Sergeant Major judged entire platoons by their appearance and how they wore their uniforms. If they were shaven, had fresh haircuts, and their uniforms were worn correctly, they were good in his eyes. That was his orientation. My guys had absolutely no use for him and did not think highly of him at all. They thought he only focused on trivial and inconsequential things. I needed to use him to buy time and space to try to change the perception of the platoon at battalion level and take the heat off the platoon. I told the Soldiers to start shaving and getting haircuts and keeping their boots bloused etc. They thought I was as fucked up as he was. They thought my priorities were wrong. From my perspective, I knew that if he saw us cleaned-up and dressed correctly, he would consider it progress (whether it really was or not) and progress would shift his attention away from us and onto something else thereby removing a lot of the stress from the platoon. It worked too. In the middle of May (almost exactly at the mid-point of the cover-up of the March rape/murder) the battalion Sergeant Major said that 1st platoon had become one of the top 5 platoons in the battalion. He was wrong. His perspective and focus was wrong. In fact, they were still the same morally bankrupt platoon they had been since before I took over (which I told him on numerous occasions), but they damn sure looked pretty. And pretty made him back off for awhile which removed some of the pressure from them and helped gain the trust and confidence of the company and battalion, which led to us getting to participate in missions like Rushdi Mullah which made the Soldiers feel like they were real members of the battalion again instead of the red-headed step children as they had been labeled. So whose priorities and orientations were right? The Soldiers were being treated poorly by battalion and came to hate much of the chain of command. The battalion thought the Soldiers were undisciplined and complainers. To the Soldiers, I was just an extension of battalion. To battalion I was there to help restore discipline to the Soldiers. To me, I was there to do everything I could to give that platoon back it's confidence and mission focus at the same time recognizing the losses they had taken and the emotional problems that many of them faced. We all made decisions based upon differing perceptions and orientations. But, while you can find fault with the decisions, they were not derelict or incompetent, and if they were faulty, it was not a fault of willful commission. It was the inability to properly orient in more than one manner simultaneously under combat conditions, on a 3 dimensional human chess board and align the scraps of random information perfectly to achieve the desired outcome.
Consider General Campbell's report from last week again. His was a 'final' review of 3 previous reports, and his came to a much different conclusion than the one previous to it. Does that mean report number 2 was wrong? Are those Generals who rendered it derelict because his report refutes theirs? Are they incompetent? Is their thinking faulty? Or, is it simply a matter or having the same facts available, but emphasising different parts of them and arriving at a different conclusion because of a different orientation?
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome. It is the dialogue that keeps this moving forward, and I appreciate your support and consideration.
#70 Hondo's Parting Gift
Amid all the media frenzy surrounding the replacement of General McChrystal this week, another story quietly made a small blip on the radar screen that will potentially have a far greater impact on the war, and leadership, than the change of commanders at the very top.
On July 13th, 2008, a small group of US Soldiers and their Afghan National Army partners were attacked at a place called Combat Outpost (COP) Wanat. During the fighting which lasted over 13 hours, approximately 200 insurgent fighters attacked and were ultimately repulsed by a small US force of approximately 30 men. During the fighting, 8 American Soldiers lost their lives.
As usual after a major battle such as Wanat, there was an investigation completed looking into the actions of everyone in the chain of command to figure out how such a large number of anti-Afghan Forces had been able to carry out such a complex attack. There have now been 3, and with this final report, 4 reviews of the event over the past 2 years. Principally, this has happened because the father of one of the dead Soldiers is a former Army officer who knew exactly what questions to ask and how to push the Army to provide the most accurate report possible. In this endeavor, he enlisted the office of Senator Jim Webb from Virginia to add weight to his claims.
Earlier reports found fault and culpability with the the leadership of the embattled American unit from company through the battalion, brigade and ultimately Combined Joint Task Force 101 chain of command. These results lead to reprimands and other actions that have career implications. In one case, a senior officer resigned his commission and retired due to the injustices he felt were done to some of his subordinate commanders.
Finally, this past January, Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, asked General Charles C. "Hondo" Campbell to review all of the former reports and decide whether or not members of the chain of command had been derelict in their duties, or made such egregious errors in judgment and leadership that would render them responsible for the deaths of their Soldiers. General Campbell has recently retired after 40 years of service, his final position being FORSCOM Commander. However, prior to his retirement, he completed the task he had been assigned by Secretary McHugh. The redacted version of his findings, published the same day the the President relieved General McChrystal of command, can be found here:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/wanat/downloads/campbellWanatReportRedacted.pdf
Gen. Campbell's report found no criminal, or negligent leadership failures for members of the chain of command from the lowest to the highest levels. It does however raise and highlight some very important ideas and address the implications of trying to lead Soldiers in a complex environment if a leader is constantly worried that someone will hold them criminally liable for their judgments. In section 7 A of the report he states the following:
"During my review of all the materials available to me, I kept several broad principles in mind. First, if a commander makes a decision after reasoned consideration of the facts and circumstances, the existence of alternatives does not make the decision erroneous. Stated otherwise, a commander has broad discretion, and absent an egregious disregard of significant facts, his reasonably considered decision should be presumed to be valid. Second, in evaluating any decision, it is critical to focus on the facts and circumstances as they were known at the time of the decision. With hindsight, with knowledge of later events, it is always possible to arrive at a different decision. If, however, the commander prudently acted on the basis of what he knew and what he reasonably should have known, subsequent events or information, that is developed or interpreted differently at a later time, does not make the original decision unsound or incorrect. Third, if there is evidence of a decision or action that is later considered less than optimal (or even poor), one must ask whether it contributed in some meaningful way to a negative outcome. Fourth, and finally, one must understand that there is no such thing as a perfect decision in war, where complexity, friction, uncertainty, the interlocking effects of the actions of independent individuals, and the enemy all effect the outcome of events."
In his conclusion, Gen Campbell stated the following:
"That U.S casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decisions, planning and actions of the chain of command running from "Redacted Name" to MG Schloesser. The U.S casualties occurred because the enemy decided to attack the COP at Wanat and battle resulted. It is critical that we not mechanically equate U.S. casualties with professional error or misconduct. (emphasis added by me) In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable. Regrettably, they are often the price of victory. When U.S, casualties occur, as at Wanat, we must examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether our Officers, NCO's and Soldiers have performed properly. When, as at Wanat. they have done so, we should learn any lessons the battle teaches and move forward. This reasoned, judicious review process without anger or partiality is the true meaning of accountability."
This report, hopefully the last concerning this particular battle, is critically important as to whether or not leaders have the latitude and ability to prosecute a fight without always having to be fearful that a dead Soldier will automatically invalidate their decision making process. Gen Campbell's final gift to the Army may have been the return of reason to the conduct of war.
There are some very important lessons that we can take from Gen Campbell's report that bear mentioning here. First, in war casualties are inevitable. The fact that we have prosecuted 2 wars over a 10 year span and only lost 4,000 Service members is, in fact, pretty incredible. The American public has been led to believe that with the advent of technology we can fight the 'perfect' war where we take no casualties, no innocent civilians or property are ever damaged, and the only suffering is done by the enemy. This is absolutely untrue. Wars - at their most basic level - are won and lost by men and women trying to kill each other. The relatively small number of deaths (.26 percent using 4000 deaths in a 1.5 million man force) has further enhanced the notion that we can win and not have anyone die. This fallacy needs to be replaced by the reality that if the war is worth fighting, then there will inevitably be a loss of life. While this painful truth is next to impossible to bare for the families and loved ones of those we have lost, it does not make the basic assumption unsound. In my opinion, we have also become so afraid of having Soldier get killed, that the protective measures we take on their behalf may also actually contribute to prolonging the overall conflict. If our leaders are always afraid to have someone die, then every decision they make is inherently defensive in nature. They will or won't take an offensive, they will or won't drive down certain roads, they will or won't hamper their Soldiers ability to kill the enemy solely based upon a fear of taking too high a number of casualties and having another incident like COP Wanat.
Second, the report rightfully claims that just because someone does die, that the decisions that led to that death are not automatically due to some failure on the part of the leadership. The enemy does get a vote. They intend to inflict casualties upon us in order to break our political, military and human will in order to get us to cease fighting. We are doing the same to them. Commanders must be allowed to make those decisions that they have been trained to make, and not constantly have to worry that if their decision has a bad outcome, that they will automatically be found criminally liable or otherwise responsible for the deaths that occur. If we inculcate our leaders with a fear of career ending prosecutions every time a Soldier gets killed, that fear will have a paralyzing effect on the decisions they make and ultimately will likely lead to more deaths and injuries. As I have said before, if General Eisenhower had had to command in the present age, it is not likely that the D Day invasion would ever have occurred. He would never have gotten past the planning stages as soon as he briefed the casualty estimates.
Third, and maybe most importantly, Gen Campbell's report claims that if, and when, investigations into incidents like this are warranted, it is critically important to understand the perspective and orientation of the commander at the time, not with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. In effect, one has to freeze the battlefield at a particular point in time and then try to see the events through the eyes of those who were in charge right there. You cannot go back later and judge men for things they could not have known at that particular point. You cannot say, "Well, why didn't you know that the enemy was going to plan and execute a large scale, multi-pronged attack on your lightly defended outpost?", if in fact, there was no evidence presented by the enemy to inform your thought process or if that knowledge is only one of a thousand pieces of often conflicting information you must decide upon each day.
Obviously this final notion is the one that effects me the most personally with regard to the events of my platoon. I have always claimed that given what I knew, my understanding of the platoon, the environment and the mission, that my decisions and actions were correct. I would also say that had someone else taken a different approach than I chose to, that that approach may have been equally correct. The important part is that you must look at the decisions based upon my interpretation and understanding when judging whether or not my actions were reasonable or sound. While the book and the court proceedings and all of that have tried relentlessly to rewrite the facts using knowledge that was not present at the time of the event, I have maintained that my perspective and that of others in the chain of command must be understood as it was then, not as it might be after the numerous investigations and prosecutions. This also highlights the idea that we need to develop leaders with a much wider and more in-depth perspective. In essence, if we are going to judge them later based upon their knowledge, experience and perspective, we had better spend a lot more time developing these abilities before we send them into command positions.
General Campbell's report to Secretary McHugh is a very important first step toward creating command climates based upon the mission, the circumstance, commander's intent and the expected outcome. To operate in an incredibly decentralized environment such as Afghanistan requires leaders at all levels who are empowered to make the best decisions they know how, given the information and analytical abilities they posses and the removal of fear from prosecution for casualties that are an inevitable outcome of the dirty business at the sharp end of the stick.
As always, your thoughts and comment are welcome. Feedback only serves to enhance the dialogue and we all learn from the experience of others. I look forward to hearing from you.
On July 13th, 2008, a small group of US Soldiers and their Afghan National Army partners were attacked at a place called Combat Outpost (COP) Wanat. During the fighting which lasted over 13 hours, approximately 200 insurgent fighters attacked and were ultimately repulsed by a small US force of approximately 30 men. During the fighting, 8 American Soldiers lost their lives.
As usual after a major battle such as Wanat, there was an investigation completed looking into the actions of everyone in the chain of command to figure out how such a large number of anti-Afghan Forces had been able to carry out such a complex attack. There have now been 3, and with this final report, 4 reviews of the event over the past 2 years. Principally, this has happened because the father of one of the dead Soldiers is a former Army officer who knew exactly what questions to ask and how to push the Army to provide the most accurate report possible. In this endeavor, he enlisted the office of Senator Jim Webb from Virginia to add weight to his claims.
Earlier reports found fault and culpability with the the leadership of the embattled American unit from company through the battalion, brigade and ultimately Combined Joint Task Force 101 chain of command. These results lead to reprimands and other actions that have career implications. In one case, a senior officer resigned his commission and retired due to the injustices he felt were done to some of his subordinate commanders.
Finally, this past January, Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, asked General Charles C. "Hondo" Campbell to review all of the former reports and decide whether or not members of the chain of command had been derelict in their duties, or made such egregious errors in judgment and leadership that would render them responsible for the deaths of their Soldiers. General Campbell has recently retired after 40 years of service, his final position being FORSCOM Commander. However, prior to his retirement, he completed the task he had been assigned by Secretary McHugh. The redacted version of his findings, published the same day the the President relieved General McChrystal of command, can be found here:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/wanat/downloads/campbellWanatReportRedacted.pdf
Gen. Campbell's report found no criminal, or negligent leadership failures for members of the chain of command from the lowest to the highest levels. It does however raise and highlight some very important ideas and address the implications of trying to lead Soldiers in a complex environment if a leader is constantly worried that someone will hold them criminally liable for their judgments. In section 7 A of the report he states the following:
"During my review of all the materials available to me, I kept several broad principles in mind. First, if a commander makes a decision after reasoned consideration of the facts and circumstances, the existence of alternatives does not make the decision erroneous. Stated otherwise, a commander has broad discretion, and absent an egregious disregard of significant facts, his reasonably considered decision should be presumed to be valid. Second, in evaluating any decision, it is critical to focus on the facts and circumstances as they were known at the time of the decision. With hindsight, with knowledge of later events, it is always possible to arrive at a different decision. If, however, the commander prudently acted on the basis of what he knew and what he reasonably should have known, subsequent events or information, that is developed or interpreted differently at a later time, does not make the original decision unsound or incorrect. Third, if there is evidence of a decision or action that is later considered less than optimal (or even poor), one must ask whether it contributed in some meaningful way to a negative outcome. Fourth, and finally, one must understand that there is no such thing as a perfect decision in war, where complexity, friction, uncertainty, the interlocking effects of the actions of independent individuals, and the enemy all effect the outcome of events."
In his conclusion, Gen Campbell stated the following:
"That U.S casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decisions, planning and actions of the chain of command running from "Redacted Name" to MG Schloesser. The U.S casualties occurred because the enemy decided to attack the COP at Wanat and battle resulted. It is critical that we not mechanically equate U.S. casualties with professional error or misconduct. (emphasis added by me) In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable. Regrettably, they are often the price of victory. When U.S, casualties occur, as at Wanat, we must examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether our Officers, NCO's and Soldiers have performed properly. When, as at Wanat. they have done so, we should learn any lessons the battle teaches and move forward. This reasoned, judicious review process without anger or partiality is the true meaning of accountability."
This report, hopefully the last concerning this particular battle, is critically important as to whether or not leaders have the latitude and ability to prosecute a fight without always having to be fearful that a dead Soldier will automatically invalidate their decision making process. Gen Campbell's final gift to the Army may have been the return of reason to the conduct of war.
There are some very important lessons that we can take from Gen Campbell's report that bear mentioning here. First, in war casualties are inevitable. The fact that we have prosecuted 2 wars over a 10 year span and only lost 4,000 Service members is, in fact, pretty incredible. The American public has been led to believe that with the advent of technology we can fight the 'perfect' war where we take no casualties, no innocent civilians or property are ever damaged, and the only suffering is done by the enemy. This is absolutely untrue. Wars - at their most basic level - are won and lost by men and women trying to kill each other. The relatively small number of deaths (.26 percent using 4000 deaths in a 1.5 million man force) has further enhanced the notion that we can win and not have anyone die. This fallacy needs to be replaced by the reality that if the war is worth fighting, then there will inevitably be a loss of life. While this painful truth is next to impossible to bare for the families and loved ones of those we have lost, it does not make the basic assumption unsound. In my opinion, we have also become so afraid of having Soldier get killed, that the protective measures we take on their behalf may also actually contribute to prolonging the overall conflict. If our leaders are always afraid to have someone die, then every decision they make is inherently defensive in nature. They will or won't take an offensive, they will or won't drive down certain roads, they will or won't hamper their Soldiers ability to kill the enemy solely based upon a fear of taking too high a number of casualties and having another incident like COP Wanat.
Second, the report rightfully claims that just because someone does die, that the decisions that led to that death are not automatically due to some failure on the part of the leadership. The enemy does get a vote. They intend to inflict casualties upon us in order to break our political, military and human will in order to get us to cease fighting. We are doing the same to them. Commanders must be allowed to make those decisions that they have been trained to make, and not constantly have to worry that if their decision has a bad outcome, that they will automatically be found criminally liable or otherwise responsible for the deaths that occur. If we inculcate our leaders with a fear of career ending prosecutions every time a Soldier gets killed, that fear will have a paralyzing effect on the decisions they make and ultimately will likely lead to more deaths and injuries. As I have said before, if General Eisenhower had had to command in the present age, it is not likely that the D Day invasion would ever have occurred. He would never have gotten past the planning stages as soon as he briefed the casualty estimates.
Third, and maybe most importantly, Gen Campbell's report claims that if, and when, investigations into incidents like this are warranted, it is critically important to understand the perspective and orientation of the commander at the time, not with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. In effect, one has to freeze the battlefield at a particular point in time and then try to see the events through the eyes of those who were in charge right there. You cannot go back later and judge men for things they could not have known at that particular point. You cannot say, "Well, why didn't you know that the enemy was going to plan and execute a large scale, multi-pronged attack on your lightly defended outpost?", if in fact, there was no evidence presented by the enemy to inform your thought process or if that knowledge is only one of a thousand pieces of often conflicting information you must decide upon each day.
Obviously this final notion is the one that effects me the most personally with regard to the events of my platoon. I have always claimed that given what I knew, my understanding of the platoon, the environment and the mission, that my decisions and actions were correct. I would also say that had someone else taken a different approach than I chose to, that that approach may have been equally correct. The important part is that you must look at the decisions based upon my interpretation and understanding when judging whether or not my actions were reasonable or sound. While the book and the court proceedings and all of that have tried relentlessly to rewrite the facts using knowledge that was not present at the time of the event, I have maintained that my perspective and that of others in the chain of command must be understood as it was then, not as it might be after the numerous investigations and prosecutions. This also highlights the idea that we need to develop leaders with a much wider and more in-depth perspective. In essence, if we are going to judge them later based upon their knowledge, experience and perspective, we had better spend a lot more time developing these abilities before we send them into command positions.
General Campbell's report to Secretary McHugh is a very important first step toward creating command climates based upon the mission, the circumstance, commander's intent and the expected outcome. To operate in an incredibly decentralized environment such as Afghanistan requires leaders at all levels who are empowered to make the best decisions they know how, given the information and analytical abilities they posses and the removal of fear from prosecution for casualties that are an inevitable outcome of the dirty business at the sharp end of the stick.
As always, your thoughts and comment are welcome. Feedback only serves to enhance the dialogue and we all learn from the experience of others. I look forward to hearing from you.
#69 On the Mark?
This week an article on AKO was highlighted on Leader Net entitled, "Achieving Excellence in Small Unit Performance" written by Lieutenant General Michael Vain and COL Robert Toguchi. You can find the link here:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art011.pdf
While I am in no way comparing myself, or my writing ability, to that of the authors, it does seem to me that they are forwarding - in a much more literate fashion - some of the ideas I have been discussing here for the past year or so. Themes such as trust development, decentralization, common ethics and value sets, and decision making ability etc, are in many ways the central focus of their article.
I also find it interesting that the very top layer of Army leadership seems to have a pretty clear understanding of the challenges, changes and adjustments that need to be addressed in our training centers and leader development programs. Instead of the entrenched bureaucracy that we are all accustomed to, as I search and find more material to look at and write about, I continually run into three and four star officers who seem to be adapting to, and embracing, dynamic change and fresh insight and feedback. Consider the interview that LTG Hertling gave to a media round table of bloggers I mentioned awhile back. Or his acceptance that Millennials are a unique generational subset that require new approaches to immersion in the Army. Consider that Gen McChrystal has a Facebook class on COIN operations with a video link to You Tube. Consider that Gen Chiarrelli started a blog to dialogue with students at the Command and General Staff College. Everywhere I look, I am finding senior leaders who are looking for new ways to communicate, who are actively seeking feedback from the rank and file, and who have recognized that we are in a period of dynamic change with regard to both people and technology that requires a hard look at our current method of operating and training. What I do not see is that same desire for feedback and input at the local level. Many units, and Soldiers I talk to relate that it's still 'business as usual' at the battalion level and below. Even after 9 years of war and rotation in and out of a combat zone. Trust at the local level seems at times non-existent they say, staff's have become too bureaucratic and over-loaded, and risk aversion has become the norm. Clearly, there is a disconnect between the top and the bottom, even organizationally.
In light of those thoughts, consider the following paragraph from the article:
"The more decentralized operations are, the greater the reliance on effective leadership and small unit performance. Recent research has revealed that we can best counter a decentralized, network-enabled enemy if our forces too are decentralized and network-enabled. Moreover, the tactics of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to target civilians, schools, and crowded markets have placed a premium on discernment, perspective, and excellence in decision making at the small unit level. The responsibility required of leaders and units at lower levels of command is clearly increasing, as is the potential that small units will continue to bear the brunt of close combat in the years to come. Units will fight separately and operate more independently with a greater need to be self-sustaining. Has the U.S. military done all that it can to improve small-unit performance and to develop small-unit excellence?"
This simple question raises the idea of 'how' we are likely to fight in the near-to-mid future, acknowledges that the human being at the center of the village square is going to be the decision maker at the point of contact, and that leader development will require a much more comprehensive and holistic approach than the current model suggests.
The article then goes on to point out some of the characteristics of high performing units. They are:
1. Effective Leadership
2. Effective use of Information
3. Fostering Innovation
4. Superior Execution
5. Thorough Preparation and Pre-Combat Inspections
6. Thorough Assessment of Performance
7. Executing Full Spectrum Operations
8. Posses a Dynamic Process of Change
9. Peer-to-Peer Integration and development
I will discuss the ones that seemed to jump out at me, or sparked a divergent thought.
Effective Leadership: "Effective leadership is not a journey in pursuit of perfection, but a continuous development process." "Leadership deals with a broad range of skills. While not all-inclusive, leadership involves everything from demonstrating tactical and technical proficiency to motivating and building trust—from exemplifying the Warrior Ethos to fostering teamwork and cohesion. “Be, Know, Do” is a more simplified version of an extremely complex set of characteristics."
These quotes seem very important to me for two distinct reasons. First, the acknowledgement that the formalized officer and non-commissioned officer schooling system is not the end of the game. Leader development is, and must be, a continuous pursuit. I have often thought about that in light of the blog and events in my life. There has always been the assumption that after 20 years of service, I should know what leadership is, how it functions, and the role it plays in developing subordinates. The truth is, that while I may be late to the game, I'm beginning now to have a much more concrete realization that leader development is a actually a life-long process. I only wish I had started this pursuit when I was a corporal. We must develop a system that encourages, and requires, life long adaptation, and personal growth. I am not the same person I was 20 years ago when I joined the Army, so why should my ideas on leadership be the same as they were back then? Hierarchical organizations have an inclination to work this way because we assume that the amount of time required to achieve a certain status equals continued growth and reflection. Many times this isn't the case. The way that we achieved the position of status becomes the modus operandi for the way we think, regardless of changing circumstances or immersion into unfamiliar territory.
Effective Use of Information: "Exceptional small units actively seek and acquire information and use it effectively, an imperative in complex environments today. The rigorous demands of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations require that small units have access to national level databases, especially human intelligence databases. These databases expand the venues for leaders to learn from the edge, since many receive direct feeds from liaison elements on the tactical front. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army is available, but we need to train our Soldiers to leverage these assets.The notion that leveraging is limited to higher-level headquarters units is no longer valid."
This paragraph is the ultimate flattening of the organization I have spoken about often. However, critical to the access to information are two component parts: (1) Knowing what you need and why you need it, and (2) Knowing what to do with it. There may also be a third consideration which is being able to articulate why some information is of little or no value to you and why. If the top or the bottom determines something is 'important' and either one does not agree, not only does there need to be a mechanism to say so, but there also has to be the ability of the both to tell the other why that piece is not relevant to their situation. By doing this, we open the lines of communication and help ensure a common understanding of the commander's intent and purpose.
Competent Decision Making: " Small units demonstrate competence in the art and science of decision making. However, all small units do not necessarily excel in making effective decisions. Certainly core skill sets for decision making involve understanding, visualizing, and assessing the environment and situation. Effective decision makers, however, are also flexible, quick, resilient, adaptive, risk-taking, and accurate. These skill sets require higher-order training in critical thinking, and we must inculcate them into our training. The first core skill set is understanding—it is vital to decision making. Understanding needs to be measured and is related to the small-unit leader’s education, intellect, experience, perception, and the information he receives."
This is precisely the purpose of the OODA Loop, the Adaptive Leader Methodology, and Outcome Based Training and Education. The process of decision making is important, but understanding why and how you are making it is even more critical. How recognizes you, and why recognizes both need and context. All of which are critical. We have concentrated for too many years on the process, and not put enough emphasis on understanding the why and how. Of all the component parts of this article, I believe this one to be the most important. The insurgent/counter insurgent battlefield is too complex to allow any leader to rely on simplistic black or white answers to problems that are extremely nuanced and have implications that range from local to geopolitical. We must teach dynamic thinking and interaction. To do that we must foster trust, give Soldiers the opportunity to make decisions and learn from them and create feedback mechanisms that demand honesty over political survival at every level.
Thorough Assessment of Performance: "Successful small units habitually use after action reviews to provide a candid assessment of strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement.
The best units are open to embracing change, have open discussions on how to improve, and
support active learning in all ranks. Over time, the technique of “red teaming” has proven to be highly effective at improving practices in higher headquarters. Similar techniques may
prove beneficial at lower echelons with minimal force structure additions."
I have participated in numerous After Action Reviews in my career, and the only contention I have with them is that while total inclusion of all ranks is critical to their success, we often do not use them correctly. While reviewing the outcome of an operation is important, I have long felt that using the AAR process to gain an understanding of an individuals perception of the circumstance and environment may be even more critical than whether or not the operation had a good or bad result. Both results will be the outcome of the choices made by all levels of the organization. As I have mentioned before, it is possible to have bad outcomes from good decisions, and good outcomes from bad decisions. That is why perception, understanding and self-awareness are the critical components that we should be addressing in the AAR process. Red teaming (the idea of having someone in the organization designed to look at you from the adversaries perspective) is a great concept, provided that the Red Team is kept separate from the chain of command with regard to promotion, thereby removing the threat of professional retaliation when harsh judgements of the chain of command are made.
Peer to Peer Integration and Development: "The emergent qualities of high-performing small units have a number of notable attributes—the synergistic capacity to work together; the ability to develop superior leaders (beyond the appointed leadership); the capacity to adapt; the flexibility to handle fast changing situations; and the resilience to maintain these characteristics in the face of adversity, including the death of team members....There is a shared cognition or common understanding that evolves in training together that is closely coupled with trust and interdependence. These attributes are forged and shaped through the development of teamwork and the emotional fulfillment of being a part of a team or a greater whole. The success of the team reflects back on individual success and a sense of belonging, accomplishment, and achievement. The bond created when team members train together and build unit cohesion is valuable, and something we may not replicate otherwise. Small units achieve greatness through this when competence breeds the confidence that cements cohesion. Distributed operations and decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision."
There is a lot to this paragraph that deserves consideration. For me, the last part strikes a particularly painful note. "Decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision" A strength that my platoon did not posses. They certainly did posses a cohesion - one that was strong enough to cover up a horrendous crime for 3 months. They also possessed a sense of belonging, however, that was probably more related to the feeling that they were the 'outcasts' of the battalion. What's important for people to recognize in this final thought, is the the many of the same attributes that the authors consider to be critical components of high performance units can also be found in less well-functioning ones and certainly, in my case, even in criminal ones.
This article is very important and should be read and considered carefully. LTG Vain and COL Toguchi have clearly articulated the recognitions, climates, and behaviors that show up in very successful organizations, be they military, civilian, or corporate. The challenge for us is to take these thematic ideas and find ways to inculcate them into our current activities and units in order to grow more thoughtful, and adaptive leaders than we were when we were coming up. And just maybe, to get some of us old dogs to recognize the value in learning a few new tricks.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art011.pdf
While I am in no way comparing myself, or my writing ability, to that of the authors, it does seem to me that they are forwarding - in a much more literate fashion - some of the ideas I have been discussing here for the past year or so. Themes such as trust development, decentralization, common ethics and value sets, and decision making ability etc, are in many ways the central focus of their article.
I also find it interesting that the very top layer of Army leadership seems to have a pretty clear understanding of the challenges, changes and adjustments that need to be addressed in our training centers and leader development programs. Instead of the entrenched bureaucracy that we are all accustomed to, as I search and find more material to look at and write about, I continually run into three and four star officers who seem to be adapting to, and embracing, dynamic change and fresh insight and feedback. Consider the interview that LTG Hertling gave to a media round table of bloggers I mentioned awhile back. Or his acceptance that Millennials are a unique generational subset that require new approaches to immersion in the Army. Consider that Gen McChrystal has a Facebook class on COIN operations with a video link to You Tube. Consider that Gen Chiarrelli started a blog to dialogue with students at the Command and General Staff College. Everywhere I look, I am finding senior leaders who are looking for new ways to communicate, who are actively seeking feedback from the rank and file, and who have recognized that we are in a period of dynamic change with regard to both people and technology that requires a hard look at our current method of operating and training. What I do not see is that same desire for feedback and input at the local level. Many units, and Soldiers I talk to relate that it's still 'business as usual' at the battalion level and below. Even after 9 years of war and rotation in and out of a combat zone. Trust at the local level seems at times non-existent they say, staff's have become too bureaucratic and over-loaded, and risk aversion has become the norm. Clearly, there is a disconnect between the top and the bottom, even organizationally.
In light of those thoughts, consider the following paragraph from the article:
"The more decentralized operations are, the greater the reliance on effective leadership and small unit performance. Recent research has revealed that we can best counter a decentralized, network-enabled enemy if our forces too are decentralized and network-enabled. Moreover, the tactics of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to target civilians, schools, and crowded markets have placed a premium on discernment, perspective, and excellence in decision making at the small unit level. The responsibility required of leaders and units at lower levels of command is clearly increasing, as is the potential that small units will continue to bear the brunt of close combat in the years to come. Units will fight separately and operate more independently with a greater need to be self-sustaining. Has the U.S. military done all that it can to improve small-unit performance and to develop small-unit excellence?"
This simple question raises the idea of 'how' we are likely to fight in the near-to-mid future, acknowledges that the human being at the center of the village square is going to be the decision maker at the point of contact, and that leader development will require a much more comprehensive and holistic approach than the current model suggests.
The article then goes on to point out some of the characteristics of high performing units. They are:
1. Effective Leadership
2. Effective use of Information
3. Fostering Innovation
4. Superior Execution
5. Thorough Preparation and Pre-Combat Inspections
6. Thorough Assessment of Performance
7. Executing Full Spectrum Operations
8. Posses a Dynamic Process of Change
9. Peer-to-Peer Integration and development
I will discuss the ones that seemed to jump out at me, or sparked a divergent thought.
Effective Leadership: "Effective leadership is not a journey in pursuit of perfection, but a continuous development process." "Leadership deals with a broad range of skills. While not all-inclusive, leadership involves everything from demonstrating tactical and technical proficiency to motivating and building trust—from exemplifying the Warrior Ethos to fostering teamwork and cohesion. “Be, Know, Do” is a more simplified version of an extremely complex set of characteristics."
These quotes seem very important to me for two distinct reasons. First, the acknowledgement that the formalized officer and non-commissioned officer schooling system is not the end of the game. Leader development is, and must be, a continuous pursuit. I have often thought about that in light of the blog and events in my life. There has always been the assumption that after 20 years of service, I should know what leadership is, how it functions, and the role it plays in developing subordinates. The truth is, that while I may be late to the game, I'm beginning now to have a much more concrete realization that leader development is a actually a life-long process. I only wish I had started this pursuit when I was a corporal. We must develop a system that encourages, and requires, life long adaptation, and personal growth. I am not the same person I was 20 years ago when I joined the Army, so why should my ideas on leadership be the same as they were back then? Hierarchical organizations have an inclination to work this way because we assume that the amount of time required to achieve a certain status equals continued growth and reflection. Many times this isn't the case. The way that we achieved the position of status becomes the modus operandi for the way we think, regardless of changing circumstances or immersion into unfamiliar territory.
Effective Use of Information: "Exceptional small units actively seek and acquire information and use it effectively, an imperative in complex environments today. The rigorous demands of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations require that small units have access to national level databases, especially human intelligence databases. These databases expand the venues for leaders to learn from the edge, since many receive direct feeds from liaison elements on the tactical front. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army is available, but we need to train our Soldiers to leverage these assets.The notion that leveraging is limited to higher-level headquarters units is no longer valid."
This paragraph is the ultimate flattening of the organization I have spoken about often. However, critical to the access to information are two component parts: (1) Knowing what you need and why you need it, and (2) Knowing what to do with it. There may also be a third consideration which is being able to articulate why some information is of little or no value to you and why. If the top or the bottom determines something is 'important' and either one does not agree, not only does there need to be a mechanism to say so, but there also has to be the ability of the both to tell the other why that piece is not relevant to their situation. By doing this, we open the lines of communication and help ensure a common understanding of the commander's intent and purpose.
Competent Decision Making: " Small units demonstrate competence in the art and science of decision making. However, all small units do not necessarily excel in making effective decisions. Certainly core skill sets for decision making involve understanding, visualizing, and assessing the environment and situation. Effective decision makers, however, are also flexible, quick, resilient, adaptive, risk-taking, and accurate. These skill sets require higher-order training in critical thinking, and we must inculcate them into our training. The first core skill set is understanding—it is vital to decision making. Understanding needs to be measured and is related to the small-unit leader’s education, intellect, experience, perception, and the information he receives."
This is precisely the purpose of the OODA Loop, the Adaptive Leader Methodology, and Outcome Based Training and Education. The process of decision making is important, but understanding why and how you are making it is even more critical. How recognizes you, and why recognizes both need and context. All of which are critical. We have concentrated for too many years on the process, and not put enough emphasis on understanding the why and how. Of all the component parts of this article, I believe this one to be the most important. The insurgent/counter insurgent battlefield is too complex to allow any leader to rely on simplistic black or white answers to problems that are extremely nuanced and have implications that range from local to geopolitical. We must teach dynamic thinking and interaction. To do that we must foster trust, give Soldiers the opportunity to make decisions and learn from them and create feedback mechanisms that demand honesty over political survival at every level.
Thorough Assessment of Performance: "Successful small units habitually use after action reviews to provide a candid assessment of strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement.
The best units are open to embracing change, have open discussions on how to improve, and
support active learning in all ranks. Over time, the technique of “red teaming” has proven to be highly effective at improving practices in higher headquarters. Similar techniques may
prove beneficial at lower echelons with minimal force structure additions."
I have participated in numerous After Action Reviews in my career, and the only contention I have with them is that while total inclusion of all ranks is critical to their success, we often do not use them correctly. While reviewing the outcome of an operation is important, I have long felt that using the AAR process to gain an understanding of an individuals perception of the circumstance and environment may be even more critical than whether or not the operation had a good or bad result. Both results will be the outcome of the choices made by all levels of the organization. As I have mentioned before, it is possible to have bad outcomes from good decisions, and good outcomes from bad decisions. That is why perception, understanding and self-awareness are the critical components that we should be addressing in the AAR process. Red teaming (the idea of having someone in the organization designed to look at you from the adversaries perspective) is a great concept, provided that the Red Team is kept separate from the chain of command with regard to promotion, thereby removing the threat of professional retaliation when harsh judgements of the chain of command are made.
Peer to Peer Integration and Development: "The emergent qualities of high-performing small units have a number of notable attributes—the synergistic capacity to work together; the ability to develop superior leaders (beyond the appointed leadership); the capacity to adapt; the flexibility to handle fast changing situations; and the resilience to maintain these characteristics in the face of adversity, including the death of team members....There is a shared cognition or common understanding that evolves in training together that is closely coupled with trust and interdependence. These attributes are forged and shaped through the development of teamwork and the emotional fulfillment of being a part of a team or a greater whole. The success of the team reflects back on individual success and a sense of belonging, accomplishment, and achievement. The bond created when team members train together and build unit cohesion is valuable, and something we may not replicate otherwise. Small units achieve greatness through this when competence breeds the confidence that cements cohesion. Distributed operations and decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision."
There is a lot to this paragraph that deserves consideration. For me, the last part strikes a particularly painful note. "Decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision" A strength that my platoon did not posses. They certainly did posses a cohesion - one that was strong enough to cover up a horrendous crime for 3 months. They also possessed a sense of belonging, however, that was probably more related to the feeling that they were the 'outcasts' of the battalion. What's important for people to recognize in this final thought, is the the many of the same attributes that the authors consider to be critical components of high performance units can also be found in less well-functioning ones and certainly, in my case, even in criminal ones.
This article is very important and should be read and considered carefully. LTG Vain and COL Toguchi have clearly articulated the recognitions, climates, and behaviors that show up in very successful organizations, be they military, civilian, or corporate. The challenge for us is to take these thematic ideas and find ways to inculcate them into our current activities and units in order to grow more thoughtful, and adaptive leaders than we were when we were coming up. And just maybe, to get some of us old dogs to recognize the value in learning a few new tricks.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#68 Alone with Yourself
One of the themes that I have talked about a lot on these pages is that anyone who would call themselves, or be termed, a leader had better have a solid understanding of who they are, and what they value before they accept the leadership position or role. They will need to posses a sense of their own history, who and what formed them, and the possible impacts of that formation on how they choose to lead others. In essence, what are their priorities and what will they stand for? These things cannot be dictated to you, they must be discovered through self study and contemplation. Without conceit, ego, or mindless self affirmation, we must all be willing and able to look squarely at ourselves and determine who we are. As I used to tell new Soldiers when I was a Drill Sergeant, at the end of the day, all you have is your name. What do you want it to stand for?
There must also be an awareness that there will be others who vehemently oppose your ideas, values, thoughts and priorities who will have a different set of values and understandings than you. This is OK. You cannot surround yourself will only like-minded people. By definition, doing so is entropic and eventually leads to self-delusion and implosion. There must be the constant friction of two or more ideas or ideologies crashing against each other for growth to occur. Otherwise we all will come to believe our own bullshit.
[As an aside, the paragraph above is why I do not worry about the current state of political affairs in Washington. It should be that way. Every time that one side or the other has become too powerful and able to drown out the voice of the opposition, the institution and the country has failed. Our current political system requires that those with differing views scream at the top of their lungs. It may be distasteful at times, but it is far better than silent supplication to only one thought process.]
In light of this, please check out the link below:
http://www.theamericanscholar.org/solitude-and-leadership/
I found this on Don Vandergriff's blog site yesterday (http://www.donvandergriff.com/), and there is a lot to be learned from Professor Deresiewicz's thoughts. Importantly, he gave these remarks to a class of West Point Cadets in October 2009.
The thrust of Professor Deresiewicz's speech is that we live in a world where we reward mediocrity and 'hoop jumping' rather than the development of one's own thoughts and ideas. That the very way we are conditioning young people to be successful in the world prizes a 'Go along to get along' mentality and that truly creative and introspective thinkers often do not reach the top of the leadership ladder. His call for introspection and the formation of one's own considered point of view struck a chord with me.
I write for a various reasons. First, it satisfies my need for independent time and space to think about my world, construct my thoughts, and then see if I can articulate them to others. In effect, it is a Internet based conversation with a close friend. Like everyone else, I live in a busy world of competing demands that can become overwhelmed at times with outside noise. I must make time to think and contemplate. Many weeks, I am forming a lot of my ideas that end up here in somewhat real time. I may have an idea that has been scratching at my brain, but rarely are the thoughts fully formed. Writing allows me to explore them a little bit more deeply. Secondly, it is personally cathartic. I have made no apologies that my experiences in Iraq have changed me and that some of those changes have been painful. When my professional life and value was questioned and my known universe shifted, it was very hard. Writing helps me heal. While some may find that distasteful, or a sign of weakness, especially in men, others recognize that expression of my emotions and struggles for understanding on these pages have become part of the recovery process. Finally, I write to inform others. Not from a teacher / student perspective, but rather from an individual one. I do not, and cannot, determine anyone else's answers or solutions for them, but I can advise them that they should spend some time considering them for themselves. Someday they will need them. And, possibly more importantly, their subordinates deserve them. Your subordinates deserve to know that their leader really knows what their value system is. Really knows why they do what they do. Has a real consideration for what's at stake. Those things cannot be easily come by. When something in your life fundamentally changes your perspective about your world, it might be helpful to have already spent some time alone figuring out your values system, your strengths, weaknesses and how you work. As part of that, I forward my thoughts and opinions here and hope they stimulate the reader to start considering their own point of view. Mine are not necessarily better or worse than anyone else's, but they are mine. What are yours?
Consider the following from the end of Professor Deresiewicz's speech:
" You’ve probably heard about the hazing scandal at the U.S. naval base in Bahrain that was all over the news recently. Terrible, abusive stuff that involved an entire unit and was orchestrated, allegedly, by the head of the unit, a senior noncommissioned officer. What are you going to do if you’re confronted with a situation like that going on in your unit? Will you have the courage to do what’s right? Will you even know what the right thing is? It’s easy to read a code of conduct, not so easy to put it into practice, especially if you risk losing the loyalty of the people serving under you, or the trust of your peer officers, or the approval of your superiors. What if you’re not the commanding officer, but you see your superiors condoning something you think is wrong?
How will you find the strength and wisdom to challenge an unwise order or question a wrongheaded policy? What will you do the first time you have to write a letter to the mother of a slain soldier? How will you find words of comfort that are more than just empty formulas?
These are truly formidable dilemmas, more so than most other people will ever have to face in their lives, let alone when they’re 23. The time to start preparing yourself for them is now. And the way to do it is by thinking through these issues for yourself—morality, mortality, honor—so you will have the strength to deal with them when they arise. Waiting until you have to confront them in practice would be like waiting for your first firefight to learn how to shoot your weapon. Once the situation is upon you, it’s too late. You have to be prepared in advance. You need to know, already, who you are and what you believe: not what the Army believes, not what your peers believe (that may be exactly the problem), but what you believe.
How can you know that unless you’ve taken counsel with yourself in solitude? I started by noting that solitude and leadership would seem to be contradictory things. But it seems to me that solitude is the very essence of leadership. The position of the leader is ultimately an intensely solitary, even intensely lonely one. However many people you may consult, you are the one who has to make the hard decisions. And at such moments, all you really have is yourself."
There is much more to the speech than that paragraph, and I would ask that readers very seriously take a moment to consider Professor Deresiewicz's words.
Earlier this week, one of my readers sent me a document that he thought I might be interested in, as it follows very nicely with other writings concerning Boyd and the OODA loop. I was very pleased to receive it. This particular person has become a mentor in some ways even though I have never worked for or with him, and our personal interaction occurred over a very short period of time a few years back. When I sent him a thank you note for the document, I asked him for his opinion on the blog. He was kind enough to write me back last evening. While we agree on many points, we also disagree on others. The absolute key to the relationship isn't either of those. The key is that we have the relationship that allows for those. This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests.
To return to Professor D's words, I was particularly struck by the notion that waiting to consider your moral and ethical decision making process until you need it is akin to learning to fire your rifle during your first firefight - it's way too late by then. You need to know how to do it when you arrive on the battlefield. As my mentor pointed out to me in his email, if you are waiting for, or counting on the institution to provide your character for you, then you will fail. To truly develop, and to earn the privilege of being considered a leader, you have to spend some time with yourself, figuring out who you are. If the journey is worth taking, you'll probably come to the conclusion that you have just started on a lifelong pursuit that will not ever be complete.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
There must also be an awareness that there will be others who vehemently oppose your ideas, values, thoughts and priorities who will have a different set of values and understandings than you. This is OK. You cannot surround yourself will only like-minded people. By definition, doing so is entropic and eventually leads to self-delusion and implosion. There must be the constant friction of two or more ideas or ideologies crashing against each other for growth to occur. Otherwise we all will come to believe our own bullshit.
[As an aside, the paragraph above is why I do not worry about the current state of political affairs in Washington. It should be that way. Every time that one side or the other has become too powerful and able to drown out the voice of the opposition, the institution and the country has failed. Our current political system requires that those with differing views scream at the top of their lungs. It may be distasteful at times, but it is far better than silent supplication to only one thought process.]
In light of this, please check out the link below:
http://www.theamericanscholar.org/solitude-and-leadership/
I found this on Don Vandergriff's blog site yesterday (http://www.donvandergriff.com/), and there is a lot to be learned from Professor Deresiewicz's thoughts. Importantly, he gave these remarks to a class of West Point Cadets in October 2009.
The thrust of Professor Deresiewicz's speech is that we live in a world where we reward mediocrity and 'hoop jumping' rather than the development of one's own thoughts and ideas. That the very way we are conditioning young people to be successful in the world prizes a 'Go along to get along' mentality and that truly creative and introspective thinkers often do not reach the top of the leadership ladder. His call for introspection and the formation of one's own considered point of view struck a chord with me.
I write for a various reasons. First, it satisfies my need for independent time and space to think about my world, construct my thoughts, and then see if I can articulate them to others. In effect, it is a Internet based conversation with a close friend. Like everyone else, I live in a busy world of competing demands that can become overwhelmed at times with outside noise. I must make time to think and contemplate. Many weeks, I am forming a lot of my ideas that end up here in somewhat real time. I may have an idea that has been scratching at my brain, but rarely are the thoughts fully formed. Writing allows me to explore them a little bit more deeply. Secondly, it is personally cathartic. I have made no apologies that my experiences in Iraq have changed me and that some of those changes have been painful. When my professional life and value was questioned and my known universe shifted, it was very hard. Writing helps me heal. While some may find that distasteful, or a sign of weakness, especially in men, others recognize that expression of my emotions and struggles for understanding on these pages have become part of the recovery process. Finally, I write to inform others. Not from a teacher / student perspective, but rather from an individual one. I do not, and cannot, determine anyone else's answers or solutions for them, but I can advise them that they should spend some time considering them for themselves. Someday they will need them. And, possibly more importantly, their subordinates deserve them. Your subordinates deserve to know that their leader really knows what their value system is. Really knows why they do what they do. Has a real consideration for what's at stake. Those things cannot be easily come by. When something in your life fundamentally changes your perspective about your world, it might be helpful to have already spent some time alone figuring out your values system, your strengths, weaknesses and how you work. As part of that, I forward my thoughts and opinions here and hope they stimulate the reader to start considering their own point of view. Mine are not necessarily better or worse than anyone else's, but they are mine. What are yours?
Consider the following from the end of Professor Deresiewicz's speech:
" You’ve probably heard about the hazing scandal at the U.S. naval base in Bahrain that was all over the news recently. Terrible, abusive stuff that involved an entire unit and was orchestrated, allegedly, by the head of the unit, a senior noncommissioned officer. What are you going to do if you’re confronted with a situation like that going on in your unit? Will you have the courage to do what’s right? Will you even know what the right thing is? It’s easy to read a code of conduct, not so easy to put it into practice, especially if you risk losing the loyalty of the people serving under you, or the trust of your peer officers, or the approval of your superiors. What if you’re not the commanding officer, but you see your superiors condoning something you think is wrong?
How will you find the strength and wisdom to challenge an unwise order or question a wrongheaded policy? What will you do the first time you have to write a letter to the mother of a slain soldier? How will you find words of comfort that are more than just empty formulas?
These are truly formidable dilemmas, more so than most other people will ever have to face in their lives, let alone when they’re 23. The time to start preparing yourself for them is now. And the way to do it is by thinking through these issues for yourself—morality, mortality, honor—so you will have the strength to deal with them when they arise. Waiting until you have to confront them in practice would be like waiting for your first firefight to learn how to shoot your weapon. Once the situation is upon you, it’s too late. You have to be prepared in advance. You need to know, already, who you are and what you believe: not what the Army believes, not what your peers believe (that may be exactly the problem), but what you believe.
How can you know that unless you’ve taken counsel with yourself in solitude? I started by noting that solitude and leadership would seem to be contradictory things. But it seems to me that solitude is the very essence of leadership. The position of the leader is ultimately an intensely solitary, even intensely lonely one. However many people you may consult, you are the one who has to make the hard decisions. And at such moments, all you really have is yourself."
There is much more to the speech than that paragraph, and I would ask that readers very seriously take a moment to consider Professor Deresiewicz's words.
Earlier this week, one of my readers sent me a document that he thought I might be interested in, as it follows very nicely with other writings concerning Boyd and the OODA loop. I was very pleased to receive it. This particular person has become a mentor in some ways even though I have never worked for or with him, and our personal interaction occurred over a very short period of time a few years back. When I sent him a thank you note for the document, I asked him for his opinion on the blog. He was kind enough to write me back last evening. While we agree on many points, we also disagree on others. The absolute key to the relationship isn't either of those. The key is that we have the relationship that allows for those. This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests.
To return to Professor D's words, I was particularly struck by the notion that waiting to consider your moral and ethical decision making process until you need it is akin to learning to fire your rifle during your first firefight - it's way too late by then. You need to know how to do it when you arrive on the battlefield. As my mentor pointed out to me in his email, if you are waiting for, or counting on the institution to provide your character for you, then you will fail. To truly develop, and to earn the privilege of being considered a leader, you have to spend some time with yourself, figuring out who you are. If the journey is worth taking, you'll probably come to the conclusion that you have just started on a lifelong pursuit that will not ever be complete.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#67 The Return of the OODA
Earlier this week I came across the following quotes and thought that I could build a post around them:
"There was a time when correction was impersonal, frequently loud, often profane and sometimes demaning. That type of instruction or leadership has long since ceased to be effective in the United States Army. Each leader develops his own style of leadership, which comes naturally from his personality, education and training. But the style must be acceptable to Soldiers molded by a society which is hostile to authority and highly individualistic. Overcoming this conditioning is an important subject for consideration in noncommissioned offer academies and officer schools. "
"Interchange of ideas within the chain of command is essential to the achievement of training goals. Raising standards at every opportunity and correcting errors in a manner that ensures understanding are all part of the leadership process in training."
Those words were written by LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr in a classic book, "Common Sense Training - A Working Philosophy for Leaders" that has been on more Army leaders bookshleves than I can remember. Like a few other military classics, you almost cannot walk into a commander's office and not find a copy of "Common Sense" on the bookshelf or window sill. Interestingly, LTG Collin's book was originally published 32 years ago in 1978, and yet remains incredibly relevant today. I have quoted and talked about article after article over the past months that reinforced or brought up the idea of 'how' we lead and why some things seem to work better than others, and the conditions required to build successful organizations. I have routinely said that the communication and interpersonal style of the leader must be acceptable to the subordinate. I have said often that the autocratic stereotype of an Army leader will generally fail. I have continually pushed to develop learning organizations where the exchange of ideas and methods is the key for unit success. Turns out, LTG Collins beat me, and all the other authors I have quoted, by three decades. Maybe, just maybe, these two themes; individual acceptance of the leader method of providing purpose, direction and motivation, and the idea that leadership is best exercised as a total involvement process of communication and learning provide 2 'thematic' pillars for developing solid leaders for the 21st century.
Turns out we may already being doing it. Earlier this week the Army Capabilities and Integration Center (ARCIC), highlighted an article in the latest edition of Joint Forces Quarterly entitled, "When Do We Teach the Basics" by Maj (Ret) Don Vandergriff. You can find it here:
http://www.arcic.army.mil/Briefings/Vanderfriff_JFQMay2010.pdf
[As some of you will recall, Don sent me a note a short while ago and I was more than pleased in Post #60 to pass along another article he had written for the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare. ]
The OODA Loop is back! For everyone who has laughed at me for the past 2 years and asked me what the hell I was talking about and how it applied, not only to training, but to leading and situational awareness, I highly recommend reading this article. I met Don briefly a year and a half ago at a symposium I attended to discuss Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E) at Johns Hopkins University. He and COL Casey Haskins, the Director of Military Instruction, at West Point were two of the main presenters pushing the idea that 'how' to think is much more criticial to success in a dynamic and ever-changing environment than memorizing 'what' to think. In this article, Don writes:
" The loop gains its power from the leader’s ability to form mental constructs. Timeliness and accuracy of decisions and actions relate directly to the decisionmaker’s ability to orient and reorient to rapidly changing and uncertain situations. Personal experiences, education, and training (also known as knowledge) empower the leader to form these mental constructs. Boyd’s theory thus emphasizes the importance of the leader’s ability to think. By-the-book answers to specific well known situations are not good enough. It is the ability to think that allows a leader to take the knowledge from personal experiences, education, and training and adapt it to the imperfect information of the present situation to arrive at a timely, sound, and
workable solution. Applying the OODA loop faster than the opposition is the essence of situational, or intuitive, decisionmaking."
Further on in the article, there you can find the following quotation from MAJ Chad Foster, the course director at the DMI at West Point:
"At the heart of ALM is the essence of the Boyd Cycle, a 4-step theory of decisionmaking that
was first articulated by Col. John R. Boyd following his study of fighter pilots in combat during the Korean War. . . . Commonly known as “OODA” (observation, orientation, decision, action), the Boyd Cycle is a useful framework for the assessment of students throughout the course. We focus on the critical step of “orientation” because this is where the cadet attempted to make sense out of the information at hand. The decision that the cadet makes is important, but how they arrived at that decision is just as important."
"The decision is important...but how they arrived at that decision is just as important."
I have written a lot in past postings about the Orientation portion of the loop, because it is the critical first step to gaining insight into how we think (and therefore lead), and equally importantly how we are percieved by those we lead. Both have a huge impact on organizational success. As I observe my unfolding circumstances in training, in combat, in my day-to-day existence, I am 'seeing' my world. What is important to understand is that 'how' I see my unfolding world is colored by the many filters Don mentioned in the article, education, experience, training, culture, background, gender, ethnicity etc. Those filters alone will make each of us a unique leader. No two people will exercise leadership the same way because no two people have the same set of Orientation filters. Therefore, there cannot be a 'one-size-fits-all' solution to any leader challenge. The key is to make people aware of their filters as early as possible in the development process in order for them to be able to suspend them when required to re-orient to a situation from another perspective with equal vigor. The other awareness gained by the loop is that the subordinate is 'looping' as well. My actions are not only mine. They are being interpreted, filtered, and put in context by my subordinates.This is a key understanding that many senior military leaders forget and is reflected in my thoughts on the importance of generational understanding. Too many seniors believe that by rank, position, or authority, everyone below them on the food chain sees the problem and it's attendant solution in the same manner they do. This beliefe causes misunderstandings and issues on a rapidly changing battelfield - be it the office, or Afghanistan. The Orientation of the leader and the Orientation of the led have to come together at some point for the unit/mission to be successful. That point should be found in the commander's intent portion of Task, Purpose, Intent.
I think if you go back to LTG Collin's first quote above you will find a perfect demonstration of the loop at work. Collins' view is formed by his 'Orientation'. However, it is his ability to understand his filters that allows him to recognize that different generations of Soldiers will have to be lead differently based upon their filters. He recognized 33 years ago that directive, autocratic, abusive leadership would not work well for the Soldier of the late '70's and early '80's. By being able to re-orient himself to the problem without imposing filter judgements he was able to find ways to develop viable learning and training solutions for successful units.
However, Collin's second quotation above may be even more improtant than the first. Collins understood that the "Interchange of ideas within the chain of command is essential to the achievement of training goals." This idea is brought forward to the present by MAJ Foster's thought that ensuring Cadets learn to recognize how they make decisions is critical to their development. Without the interchange mentioned by LTG Collins, there cannot be the 'how they decided' understanding mentioned by MAJ Foster.
Collins and Foster naturally come together again when both recognize that, "Each leader develps his own style of leadership, which comes naturally from his personality, education and training." This recognition of individuality is a basic fundamental of successful leader development. Training programs and institutional schoolhouses that attempt to package any type of leader development program that does not recognize the individuality of each leader and the impact of that individuality on the led will inevitable fail.
Ever since I was introduced to the OODA Loop by JM two years ago, I have been convinced that it is what has been missing in our leader development programs since I joined the Army and possibly even before that. My beliefe is that OODA happens at personal, professional, and societal levels all the time. Recognizing how it works and impacts units is critical to both personal and unit success. On the few occassions that I have been asked to present my ideas on how to use OODA to develop worthwhile training solutions, the reception has almost always been positive. I had one battalion commander who has seen the presentation multiple times comment to me that "Each time I walk away with something new to think about." His unit has adopted a more OODA-like style for developing training and have had some good success. He commented to me that his junior leaders seem to be taking to the ideas well and that it is having a positive impact on the unit as a whole.
In order to build thought-full, adaptive leaders who can rapidly adjust to changing circumstances we must create leader programs that begin with self awareness. We must concentrate our efforts on learning about ourselves before we can ever lead others. By recognizing our Orientation, and accepting that our followers also have their own Orientation we can begin to close the gaps in perception and understanding that will allow the entire organization to see itself clearly and will harbinger a return to being able to act upon intent and capitalize on the talents and abilities of each of the individuals in the organization. If you think about so many of the issues and problems that I have mentioned in light if the "Black Hearts" incident, you can clearly see why teaching OODA, focusing on gaining a common understanding of the institutions values, and fostering dialogue over discussion have become critical parts of my views on leadership.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"There was a time when correction was impersonal, frequently loud, often profane and sometimes demaning. That type of instruction or leadership has long since ceased to be effective in the United States Army. Each leader develops his own style of leadership, which comes naturally from his personality, education and training. But the style must be acceptable to Soldiers molded by a society which is hostile to authority and highly individualistic. Overcoming this conditioning is an important subject for consideration in noncommissioned offer academies and officer schools. "
"Interchange of ideas within the chain of command is essential to the achievement of training goals. Raising standards at every opportunity and correcting errors in a manner that ensures understanding are all part of the leadership process in training."
Those words were written by LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr in a classic book, "Common Sense Training - A Working Philosophy for Leaders" that has been on more Army leaders bookshleves than I can remember. Like a few other military classics, you almost cannot walk into a commander's office and not find a copy of "Common Sense" on the bookshelf or window sill. Interestingly, LTG Collin's book was originally published 32 years ago in 1978, and yet remains incredibly relevant today. I have quoted and talked about article after article over the past months that reinforced or brought up the idea of 'how' we lead and why some things seem to work better than others, and the conditions required to build successful organizations. I have routinely said that the communication and interpersonal style of the leader must be acceptable to the subordinate. I have said often that the autocratic stereotype of an Army leader will generally fail. I have continually pushed to develop learning organizations where the exchange of ideas and methods is the key for unit success. Turns out, LTG Collins beat me, and all the other authors I have quoted, by three decades. Maybe, just maybe, these two themes; individual acceptance of the leader method of providing purpose, direction and motivation, and the idea that leadership is best exercised as a total involvement process of communication and learning provide 2 'thematic' pillars for developing solid leaders for the 21st century.
Turns out we may already being doing it. Earlier this week the Army Capabilities and Integration Center (ARCIC), highlighted an article in the latest edition of Joint Forces Quarterly entitled, "When Do We Teach the Basics" by Maj (Ret) Don Vandergriff. You can find it here:
http://www.arcic.army.mil/Briefings/Vanderfriff_JFQMay2010.pdf
[As some of you will recall, Don sent me a note a short while ago and I was more than pleased in Post #60 to pass along another article he had written for the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare. ]
The OODA Loop is back! For everyone who has laughed at me for the past 2 years and asked me what the hell I was talking about and how it applied, not only to training, but to leading and situational awareness, I highly recommend reading this article. I met Don briefly a year and a half ago at a symposium I attended to discuss Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E) at Johns Hopkins University. He and COL Casey Haskins, the Director of Military Instruction, at West Point were two of the main presenters pushing the idea that 'how' to think is much more criticial to success in a dynamic and ever-changing environment than memorizing 'what' to think. In this article, Don writes:
" The loop gains its power from the leader’s ability to form mental constructs. Timeliness and accuracy of decisions and actions relate directly to the decisionmaker’s ability to orient and reorient to rapidly changing and uncertain situations. Personal experiences, education, and training (also known as knowledge) empower the leader to form these mental constructs. Boyd’s theory thus emphasizes the importance of the leader’s ability to think. By-the-book answers to specific well known situations are not good enough. It is the ability to think that allows a leader to take the knowledge from personal experiences, education, and training and adapt it to the imperfect information of the present situation to arrive at a timely, sound, and
workable solution. Applying the OODA loop faster than the opposition is the essence of situational, or intuitive, decisionmaking."
Further on in the article, there you can find the following quotation from MAJ Chad Foster, the course director at the DMI at West Point:
"At the heart of ALM is the essence of the Boyd Cycle, a 4-step theory of decisionmaking that
was first articulated by Col. John R. Boyd following his study of fighter pilots in combat during the Korean War. . . . Commonly known as “OODA” (observation, orientation, decision, action), the Boyd Cycle is a useful framework for the assessment of students throughout the course. We focus on the critical step of “orientation” because this is where the cadet attempted to make sense out of the information at hand. The decision that the cadet makes is important, but how they arrived at that decision is just as important."
"The decision is important...but how they arrived at that decision is just as important."
I have written a lot in past postings about the Orientation portion of the loop, because it is the critical first step to gaining insight into how we think (and therefore lead), and equally importantly how we are percieved by those we lead. Both have a huge impact on organizational success. As I observe my unfolding circumstances in training, in combat, in my day-to-day existence, I am 'seeing' my world. What is important to understand is that 'how' I see my unfolding world is colored by the many filters Don mentioned in the article, education, experience, training, culture, background, gender, ethnicity etc. Those filters alone will make each of us a unique leader. No two people will exercise leadership the same way because no two people have the same set of Orientation filters. Therefore, there cannot be a 'one-size-fits-all' solution to any leader challenge. The key is to make people aware of their filters as early as possible in the development process in order for them to be able to suspend them when required to re-orient to a situation from another perspective with equal vigor. The other awareness gained by the loop is that the subordinate is 'looping' as well. My actions are not only mine. They are being interpreted, filtered, and put in context by my subordinates.This is a key understanding that many senior military leaders forget and is reflected in my thoughts on the importance of generational understanding. Too many seniors believe that by rank, position, or authority, everyone below them on the food chain sees the problem and it's attendant solution in the same manner they do. This beliefe causes misunderstandings and issues on a rapidly changing battelfield - be it the office, or Afghanistan. The Orientation of the leader and the Orientation of the led have to come together at some point for the unit/mission to be successful. That point should be found in the commander's intent portion of Task, Purpose, Intent.
I think if you go back to LTG Collin's first quote above you will find a perfect demonstration of the loop at work. Collins' view is formed by his 'Orientation'. However, it is his ability to understand his filters that allows him to recognize that different generations of Soldiers will have to be lead differently based upon their filters. He recognized 33 years ago that directive, autocratic, abusive leadership would not work well for the Soldier of the late '70's and early '80's. By being able to re-orient himself to the problem without imposing filter judgements he was able to find ways to develop viable learning and training solutions for successful units.
However, Collin's second quotation above may be even more improtant than the first. Collins understood that the "Interchange of ideas within the chain of command is essential to the achievement of training goals." This idea is brought forward to the present by MAJ Foster's thought that ensuring Cadets learn to recognize how they make decisions is critical to their development. Without the interchange mentioned by LTG Collins, there cannot be the 'how they decided' understanding mentioned by MAJ Foster.
Collins and Foster naturally come together again when both recognize that, "Each leader develps his own style of leadership, which comes naturally from his personality, education and training." This recognition of individuality is a basic fundamental of successful leader development. Training programs and institutional schoolhouses that attempt to package any type of leader development program that does not recognize the individuality of each leader and the impact of that individuality on the led will inevitable fail.
Ever since I was introduced to the OODA Loop by JM two years ago, I have been convinced that it is what has been missing in our leader development programs since I joined the Army and possibly even before that. My beliefe is that OODA happens at personal, professional, and societal levels all the time. Recognizing how it works and impacts units is critical to both personal and unit success. On the few occassions that I have been asked to present my ideas on how to use OODA to develop worthwhile training solutions, the reception has almost always been positive. I had one battalion commander who has seen the presentation multiple times comment to me that "Each time I walk away with something new to think about." His unit has adopted a more OODA-like style for developing training and have had some good success. He commented to me that his junior leaders seem to be taking to the ideas well and that it is having a positive impact on the unit as a whole.
In order to build thought-full, adaptive leaders who can rapidly adjust to changing circumstances we must create leader programs that begin with self awareness. We must concentrate our efforts on learning about ourselves before we can ever lead others. By recognizing our Orientation, and accepting that our followers also have their own Orientation we can begin to close the gaps in perception and understanding that will allow the entire organization to see itself clearly and will harbinger a return to being able to act upon intent and capitalize on the talents and abilities of each of the individuals in the organization. If you think about so many of the issues and problems that I have mentioned in light if the "Black Hearts" incident, you can clearly see why teaching OODA, focusing on gaining a common understanding of the institutions values, and fostering dialogue over discussion have become critical parts of my views on leadership.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#66 Maybe in a Perfect World
JD has been an avid supporter of my writings for awhile now and I appreciate very much his support. In response to last weeks post, he sent the following reply which deserves a lot of consideration.
I will state my thesis again....no doubt the guys in jail were/are criminals....and for the sake of my point I will say that even if they were lead by "perfect" leaders (not that they exist) that set "ideal command climates" (not that they exist) they would still be in jail because they were/are criminals..having said that....we need to develop leaders who have a mentality like our Navy (and many allied Navies do) has...."if the ship runs aground, the CO is relieved."
....Of course this is extreme and idealistic....but if we teach and develop leaders to internalize this level of responsibility, we will have more responsible and better leaders, better Soldiers, better units, etc....
Of course leaders can't prevent every DUI, drug taking, wife beating, fratricide, accidental discharge, rape etc etc etc...but maybe, just maybe, if we inculcate and develop this level of responsibility....we might get close to the ideal....as an artillery commander, I used to tell myself that I would "relieve myself from command" if my unit was responsible for an "unsafe" round...."I, commander, am responsible for everything the unit does and/or fails to do."
"I, commander (leader), am responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do." We have taught that mantra to generations of leaders and it has been said so many times that we often fail to recognize it's implications. What I hope to do today is take that premise apart a little bit and explore what I think it really means, and the effect it has on both leader and subordinate behavior.
First, while a laudable idea, as JD pointed out in his reply, the entire concept is a practical impossibility. Since leaders cannot "prevent every DUI, drug taking, wife beating, fratricide, accidental discharge, rape etc etc etc", then the very notion of leader responsibility for individual behavior is an unachievable goal. To then create a situation where we will hold the leader responsible and accountable for something that is ultimately unachievable is completely unfair, and creates behavioral and structural requirements for the unit and its' people that can have a negative overall effect. For example, if a leader is somehow going to be held responsible for each and every individual action of their subordinates, then the only way to 'guarantee' a proper outcome will be to micromanage and baby sit them. If I am constantly afraid that someone I lead is going to act or do something inappropriate, and that their behavior or action will have a negative consequence for me, then I will become inherently distrustful. I am consigning my future to a person who may not have the same values, understandings, or discipline that I have. The distrust created by the requirement for 'zero defect' erodes the faith and confidence that I should be demonstrating to my subordinates and that they reflect back to me. The message I'm sending is that they cannot be trusted to do the right thing, so I am required to create a condition where they cannot do the wrong thing. This is bad business in a decentralized fight where hundreds of critical decisions will be made by junior officers and non-commissioned officers every day. I need to trust that corporal or lieutenant because I can only be in one place at a time, and they will be forced to make decisions in my absence. Trust up and down the line is a baseline requirement. And trust is a by-product of both the leader and the led having been placed in decision making situations and both sides having gained an understanding of the other due to the outcome. I observe the decision you made and gain or lose trust accordingly. If you are never given the opportunity to make choices and decisions then I cannot develop the trust required. Conversely, if my decisions and choices make no sense to you then you will lose faith and trust in me as well.
Another unintended consequence of this concept is the creation of a responsibility 'welfare state.' As long as there is someone or something above me who I can blame, then I am no longer responsible for my actions. It seems sometimes that Privates and young Soldiers are not responsible for anything they do, since they have a 'leader' above them who is responsible for them. It must be the leaders fault, because Junior just doesn't know any better. This is fundamentally flawed. Soldiers are taught how to clear their weapons. People know that spouse abuse is wrong. Every teenager in America is aware of the perils of drinking and driving. My Soldiers knew that raping a 14 year old girl was wrong. They knew that murdering her and her 6 year old sister and their parents was wrong. At some point, we are each of us solely responsible for our individual decisions and their outcomes. This ability to mis-place responsibility on a titular leader makes it very easy to shift the blame. We see this all the time in the Army now, where every little decision at the staff level gets pushed into the boss's in-box. Action passed equals action taken, and more importantly, responsibility shifted. I'm not going to make the decision - especially if it involves risk - so I'll just pass it along. That way, if the outcome is bad, I can absolve myself from blame, but more importantly, the institution won't hold me responsible and I'm protected.
The 'zero defect', 'leader-is-responsible-for-everything' mantra has also created the institutional monster called CYA. We fill out form after form and have Soldiers sign 'behavioral contracts', and counseling statements etc and file them away so we can say "I told you so". This further erodes the trust and faith in the unit and confuses leadership with legalese.
Having said that, I do think JD is right about the need to "internalize this level of responsibility". I just think it has a different starting place. I believe that we must start with teaching individual responsibility from day 1. The inculcation, in each Private and Cadet from the day they enter the Army, that ultimately they are responsible for their own behavior and actions is the critical first step to achieving JD's ideal. Over time, the development and maturity of the individual is enhanced; and as they absorb more and more of the Army's cultural norms and expectations, they will in fact become better leaders.
As I have mentioned before, the Millennial generation is considered one of the most sheltered and protected in history. As parents and communities we have created a condition where, in many ways, the young person has never really been held responsible for their actions. We put them into protective gear as soon as they step outside in order to not make them think about the consequences of riding their bicycle down the hill too fast. We fault the school system for them failing to learn. It has never been their fault. They do not grow up with a solid understanding of cause and effect, or that they are responsible for the decisions they make. In effect we have failed to develop a very necessary leadership skill set. And then we send them out into the Army, promote them after a couple of years for being a good follower, and one day they wake up with a new label called leader and we hang the responsibility for others actions and behaviors on their shoulders. What have we done to actually prepare them for that role?
In order to achieve the level of responsibility internalization that is JD's ideal, here is what I think needs to be done.
First, from the very moment a Soldier arrives at Basic Training, they are told that they are responsible for their successful or unsuccessful outcome in the Army. The Drill Sergeant and the institution will provide them a structure and a way to achieve success, but it is their choice alone to accept or reject it. The institution cannot and will not be held responsible for their behavior, they will. The institutions responsibility is to create the environment for development, internalization, and success. The individual must choose to accept or reject the environment.
Second, and very much in line with the thought above, we have to teach from the earliest stages of their development, cause and effect. Because new Soldiers may not possess this understanding as well as we need them to coming in, we must develop it in them. They should clearly understand the intended outcome, and the possible consequences of not achieving it. This would develop the idea of second and third order effects of actions - a skill set that is critical downrange. The method of doing this we already have. If we were to use Task, Purpose, Intent for everything from Day 1, it would help develop decision making skills that will only be enhanced over time and immersion in the Army culture.
Third, we must completely revamp how we teach the 7 Army Values. The Values themselves are the cornerstone of the Army. They are, and must forever remain, the embodiment of the contract between the Army and the Nation. They are the most important part of the internalization process. However, they must become more than vague words. We must find a concrete way to tie the individuals understanding of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage to the institution's understanding. If we accept that different generations will have different interpretations, then it becomes incumbent on the institution to recognize where the new Soldier is starting from and then provide opportunities for the their personal values to be tested and checked against the Army's. In this manner we provide opportunities for internalization.
In it's simplest form, it works like this: YOU made a choice to join the Army. YOU are responsible for that decision. The Army has a set of values, norms and behaviors that we hold dear and form our contract with the country. YOU will have to choose to accept or reject them. YOUR decisions have consequences both good and bad. The Army will provide the opportunity for YOU to learn from those decisions and learn how to recognize potential good and bad outcomes from the decisions YOU make. The 'welfare state' has been removed and replaced with an individual 'opportunity state'.
On a practical level: I teach Soldiers how to properly clear and carry their weapon. I teach them the steps and explain why they should do each step. But I clearly state that the responsibility to do the steps correctly rests with them. By emphasizing their individual requirement and expectation, they pay more attention. If they have a negligent discharge, they already know that they are responsible for causing it, not me or anyone else. They learn to accept that responsibility and internalize the proper procedures. I have trained over 3000 service members from all 4 branches in this manner and have never had anyone have a negligent discharge yet. Maybe I've just been lucky, but I truly believe that by training the Soldier, explaining why the task and steps are important, holding them accountable for their actions and trusting that they can perform the task correctly these results are almost predictable.
Now, lets take a look at what the outcome of an individual vs institutional approach might be. Accepting JD's contention that we need to get to an internalized understanding of individual responsibility, and by removing any pretense that there is anyone else responsible for my actions except me, we could create individuals with enhanced value systems and the critical decision making skills we need today. As values and ethical decisions are made at the personal level, our actions provide demonstrable results to others in the organization. As those others gain an understanding and appreciation for our ethical / moral decision making process, personal trust is enhanced or lost. If trust is enhanced, then the requirement for micromanagement, babysitting, and CYA is reduced. The titular leader spends less time worrying about which decision made by a subordinate will have career implications for him or her, and can then spend more time focusing their efforts on accomplishing their mission. At every level, the need for gnats ass, step-by-step instruction becomes less required based upon the demonstrated internalization of the the Army Values and Task, Purpose and Intent.
I fundamentally disagree with JD's assertion that "leaders are responsible for everything their unit / people do or fail to do." The people who make up the unit are. As I have said before with regard to my time as platoon sergeant, I am responsible for the decisions I made. Not my Lieutenant, not the Company Commander, not anyone else. Me. So, too, were my Soldiers responsible for their actions. The conditions, the circumstances, the climate of the unit ultimately have nothing to do with the morally bankrupt choices they made. Their moral / ethical breakdown belongs solely to them and no one else. If the institution failed, it failed to provide opportunities throughout their careers to test those morals and ethics against the stated value system in place. It assumed they had internalized them instead of ever challenging whether they had or not. Sadly, and horrifically, they had not.
As an institution and as leaders, we have a responsibility to create the condition or environment in which the development of the ethical / moral / operational decision making ability of the subordinate is the key behavioral outcome of every action both in training and deployed. The leader doesn't tell the subordinate how to think or act morally or ethically, the leader designs training and situations for the subordinate to have to make choices that demonstrate moral or ethical behavior. The very outcome of our current war may depend upon it. Somewhere in Afghanistan today, a young Soldier will face a situation where he/she will have two courses of action. Both of those will have the potential for good and bad outcomes. Those outcomes could have a very large impact on the operation. Are we providing that Soldier the tools to make a decision? More importantly have we provided them the strength to stand by the choice they made? And even more critically than that, do we trust them enough to make it?
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
I will state my thesis again....no doubt the guys in jail were/are criminals....and for the sake of my point I will say that even if they were lead by "perfect" leaders (not that they exist) that set "ideal command climates" (not that they exist) they would still be in jail because they were/are criminals..having said that....we need to develop leaders who have a mentality like our Navy (and many allied Navies do) has...."if the ship runs aground, the CO is relieved."
....Of course this is extreme and idealistic....but if we teach and develop leaders to internalize this level of responsibility, we will have more responsible and better leaders, better Soldiers, better units, etc....
Of course leaders can't prevent every DUI, drug taking, wife beating, fratricide, accidental discharge, rape etc etc etc...but maybe, just maybe, if we inculcate and develop this level of responsibility....we might get close to the ideal....as an artillery commander, I used to tell myself that I would "relieve myself from command" if my unit was responsible for an "unsafe" round...."I, commander, am responsible for everything the unit does and/or fails to do."
"I, commander (leader), am responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do." We have taught that mantra to generations of leaders and it has been said so many times that we often fail to recognize it's implications. What I hope to do today is take that premise apart a little bit and explore what I think it really means, and the effect it has on both leader and subordinate behavior.
First, while a laudable idea, as JD pointed out in his reply, the entire concept is a practical impossibility. Since leaders cannot "prevent every DUI, drug taking, wife beating, fratricide, accidental discharge, rape etc etc etc", then the very notion of leader responsibility for individual behavior is an unachievable goal. To then create a situation where we will hold the leader responsible and accountable for something that is ultimately unachievable is completely unfair, and creates behavioral and structural requirements for the unit and its' people that can have a negative overall effect. For example, if a leader is somehow going to be held responsible for each and every individual action of their subordinates, then the only way to 'guarantee' a proper outcome will be to micromanage and baby sit them. If I am constantly afraid that someone I lead is going to act or do something inappropriate, and that their behavior or action will have a negative consequence for me, then I will become inherently distrustful. I am consigning my future to a person who may not have the same values, understandings, or discipline that I have. The distrust created by the requirement for 'zero defect' erodes the faith and confidence that I should be demonstrating to my subordinates and that they reflect back to me. The message I'm sending is that they cannot be trusted to do the right thing, so I am required to create a condition where they cannot do the wrong thing. This is bad business in a decentralized fight where hundreds of critical decisions will be made by junior officers and non-commissioned officers every day. I need to trust that corporal or lieutenant because I can only be in one place at a time, and they will be forced to make decisions in my absence. Trust up and down the line is a baseline requirement. And trust is a by-product of both the leader and the led having been placed in decision making situations and both sides having gained an understanding of the other due to the outcome. I observe the decision you made and gain or lose trust accordingly. If you are never given the opportunity to make choices and decisions then I cannot develop the trust required. Conversely, if my decisions and choices make no sense to you then you will lose faith and trust in me as well.
Another unintended consequence of this concept is the creation of a responsibility 'welfare state.' As long as there is someone or something above me who I can blame, then I am no longer responsible for my actions. It seems sometimes that Privates and young Soldiers are not responsible for anything they do, since they have a 'leader' above them who is responsible for them. It must be the leaders fault, because Junior just doesn't know any better. This is fundamentally flawed. Soldiers are taught how to clear their weapons. People know that spouse abuse is wrong. Every teenager in America is aware of the perils of drinking and driving. My Soldiers knew that raping a 14 year old girl was wrong. They knew that murdering her and her 6 year old sister and their parents was wrong. At some point, we are each of us solely responsible for our individual decisions and their outcomes. This ability to mis-place responsibility on a titular leader makes it very easy to shift the blame. We see this all the time in the Army now, where every little decision at the staff level gets pushed into the boss's in-box. Action passed equals action taken, and more importantly, responsibility shifted. I'm not going to make the decision - especially if it involves risk - so I'll just pass it along. That way, if the outcome is bad, I can absolve myself from blame, but more importantly, the institution won't hold me responsible and I'm protected.
The 'zero defect', 'leader-is-responsible-for-everything' mantra has also created the institutional monster called CYA. We fill out form after form and have Soldiers sign 'behavioral contracts', and counseling statements etc and file them away so we can say "I told you so". This further erodes the trust and faith in the unit and confuses leadership with legalese.
Having said that, I do think JD is right about the need to "internalize this level of responsibility". I just think it has a different starting place. I believe that we must start with teaching individual responsibility from day 1. The inculcation, in each Private and Cadet from the day they enter the Army, that ultimately they are responsible for their own behavior and actions is the critical first step to achieving JD's ideal. Over time, the development and maturity of the individual is enhanced; and as they absorb more and more of the Army's cultural norms and expectations, they will in fact become better leaders.
As I have mentioned before, the Millennial generation is considered one of the most sheltered and protected in history. As parents and communities we have created a condition where, in many ways, the young person has never really been held responsible for their actions. We put them into protective gear as soon as they step outside in order to not make them think about the consequences of riding their bicycle down the hill too fast. We fault the school system for them failing to learn. It has never been their fault. They do not grow up with a solid understanding of cause and effect, or that they are responsible for the decisions they make. In effect we have failed to develop a very necessary leadership skill set. And then we send them out into the Army, promote them after a couple of years for being a good follower, and one day they wake up with a new label called leader and we hang the responsibility for others actions and behaviors on their shoulders. What have we done to actually prepare them for that role?
In order to achieve the level of responsibility internalization that is JD's ideal, here is what I think needs to be done.
First, from the very moment a Soldier arrives at Basic Training, they are told that they are responsible for their successful or unsuccessful outcome in the Army. The Drill Sergeant and the institution will provide them a structure and a way to achieve success, but it is their choice alone to accept or reject it. The institution cannot and will not be held responsible for their behavior, they will. The institutions responsibility is to create the environment for development, internalization, and success. The individual must choose to accept or reject the environment.
Second, and very much in line with the thought above, we have to teach from the earliest stages of their development, cause and effect. Because new Soldiers may not possess this understanding as well as we need them to coming in, we must develop it in them. They should clearly understand the intended outcome, and the possible consequences of not achieving it. This would develop the idea of second and third order effects of actions - a skill set that is critical downrange. The method of doing this we already have. If we were to use Task, Purpose, Intent for everything from Day 1, it would help develop decision making skills that will only be enhanced over time and immersion in the Army culture.
Third, we must completely revamp how we teach the 7 Army Values. The Values themselves are the cornerstone of the Army. They are, and must forever remain, the embodiment of the contract between the Army and the Nation. They are the most important part of the internalization process. However, they must become more than vague words. We must find a concrete way to tie the individuals understanding of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage to the institution's understanding. If we accept that different generations will have different interpretations, then it becomes incumbent on the institution to recognize where the new Soldier is starting from and then provide opportunities for the their personal values to be tested and checked against the Army's. In this manner we provide opportunities for internalization.
In it's simplest form, it works like this: YOU made a choice to join the Army. YOU are responsible for that decision. The Army has a set of values, norms and behaviors that we hold dear and form our contract with the country. YOU will have to choose to accept or reject them. YOUR decisions have consequences both good and bad. The Army will provide the opportunity for YOU to learn from those decisions and learn how to recognize potential good and bad outcomes from the decisions YOU make. The 'welfare state' has been removed and replaced with an individual 'opportunity state'.
On a practical level: I teach Soldiers how to properly clear and carry their weapon. I teach them the steps and explain why they should do each step. But I clearly state that the responsibility to do the steps correctly rests with them. By emphasizing their individual requirement and expectation, they pay more attention. If they have a negligent discharge, they already know that they are responsible for causing it, not me or anyone else. They learn to accept that responsibility and internalize the proper procedures. I have trained over 3000 service members from all 4 branches in this manner and have never had anyone have a negligent discharge yet. Maybe I've just been lucky, but I truly believe that by training the Soldier, explaining why the task and steps are important, holding them accountable for their actions and trusting that they can perform the task correctly these results are almost predictable.
Now, lets take a look at what the outcome of an individual vs institutional approach might be. Accepting JD's contention that we need to get to an internalized understanding of individual responsibility, and by removing any pretense that there is anyone else responsible for my actions except me, we could create individuals with enhanced value systems and the critical decision making skills we need today. As values and ethical decisions are made at the personal level, our actions provide demonstrable results to others in the organization. As those others gain an understanding and appreciation for our ethical / moral decision making process, personal trust is enhanced or lost. If trust is enhanced, then the requirement for micromanagement, babysitting, and CYA is reduced. The titular leader spends less time worrying about which decision made by a subordinate will have career implications for him or her, and can then spend more time focusing their efforts on accomplishing their mission. At every level, the need for gnats ass, step-by-step instruction becomes less required based upon the demonstrated internalization of the the Army Values and Task, Purpose and Intent.
I fundamentally disagree with JD's assertion that "leaders are responsible for everything their unit / people do or fail to do." The people who make up the unit are. As I have said before with regard to my time as platoon sergeant, I am responsible for the decisions I made. Not my Lieutenant, not the Company Commander, not anyone else. Me. So, too, were my Soldiers responsible for their actions. The conditions, the circumstances, the climate of the unit ultimately have nothing to do with the morally bankrupt choices they made. Their moral / ethical breakdown belongs solely to them and no one else. If the institution failed, it failed to provide opportunities throughout their careers to test those morals and ethics against the stated value system in place. It assumed they had internalized them instead of ever challenging whether they had or not. Sadly, and horrifically, they had not.
As an institution and as leaders, we have a responsibility to create the condition or environment in which the development of the ethical / moral / operational decision making ability of the subordinate is the key behavioral outcome of every action both in training and deployed. The leader doesn't tell the subordinate how to think or act morally or ethically, the leader designs training and situations for the subordinate to have to make choices that demonstrate moral or ethical behavior. The very outcome of our current war may depend upon it. Somewhere in Afghanistan today, a young Soldier will face a situation where he/she will have two courses of action. Both of those will have the potential for good and bad outcomes. Those outcomes could have a very large impact on the operation. Are we providing that Soldier the tools to make a decision? More importantly have we provided them the strength to stand by the choice they made? And even more critically than that, do we trust them enough to make it?
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#65 Black Hearts Review
In the May/June issue of Military Review there is a 4 page review of "Black Hearts" written by LTC (Ret) Paul Christipher. You can find the link here:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art017.pdf
To date this is probably the most complete and fair-minded review of the book that I have seen. While not completely accurate, LTC Christopher does a very good job of getting at many of the issues that surround that event and the leadership and command climate that existed during our tour. I highly recommend people read it because it offers some strong insights into leadership in general, not just military. I think LTC Christopher's review also demonstrates that issues such as command climate, and willingness to consider different viewpoints are important in all walks of life. Hopefully, his review will further the discussion of the manner and method by which we train military leaders and the critical importance of creating work climates that enhance and build cohesion and a unified understanding of the purpose of the work, no matter the industry.
My real issue with any of the reviews I have seen is that they all focus on only one thing, the perceived or real leadership 'failures' throughout the command. Since I am often lumped into that category along with others, obviously that is not something that is easy to read time after time. However, what absolutely baffles me is that no one seems to place the responsibility for the atrocities committed by those Soldiers where it truly belongs - on them. Every review ends up almost excusing them and implying that they were somehow victims in this event. Consider the following from LTC Christopher's review:
"Frederick’s commitment to detail and organization are brilliant, allowing the perceptive reader to share the frustration and hardship that members of this unit experienced in a climate of dysfunctional leadership. Black Hearts invites its readers to spend long frightening nights on undermanned and isolated guard posts and to accompany squads on patrols looking for roadside bombs during the most dangerous period of the Iraqi occupation. We, as readers, are invited not only to empathize with members of the 1-502, but to vicariously experience the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger, the rebellion, and occasionally, the palpable fear that members of the battalion experienced daily for a year."
I wonder how many other units in Iraq during 2005-2006 had Soldiers who spent "long frightening nights in undermanned and isolated guard posts"? My guess is most. I wonder, how many other units experienced "the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger" etc etc during that time. Again, the answer is most - if not all. How many of those Soldiers and units committed unspeakable acts of depravity? Few, if any. Search as we may for some way to come to grips with what those Soldiers decided to do, the truth still remains that even if the command climate was the most dysfunctional in the entire Army, nothing mitigates, excuses, or minimizes the responsibility of those individuals for their personal actions. Nothing.
LTC Christopher's review does touch on some very important issues that do need to be discussed however, some of which I have mentioned throughout this blog. For example, he states that:
"An obvious question readers may have upon completing Frederick’s book concerns whether members of the chain of command, especially some of the officers and senior officers from brigade on down, should also bear some culpability for the actions of the four men who were convicted. I don’t believe so. While some members of the chain of command were grossly incompetent, they were not unethical, and this is more of an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question. Unlike the murderers and rapists they led, these leaders were not bad people, just deplorable leaders."
"..they were not unethical, and this is more an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question." A critical point. Our leader development programs currently do not place anywhere near enough emphasis on ethical decision making, nor the behavioral dynamics of unit/team design. We simply label anyone with rank and a title a leader and then send them on their way. Without understanding how teams and units are built (or destroyed), and the absolutely fundamental part that human being interaction plays in that creation or destruction, we are continually putting people in the position of having to command something that they have no understanding of.
As a member of that chain of command, I have tried to look at the events and my decisions fairly and openly over the past year. I have not hidden from this, nor have I tried to shy away from asking hard questions. Some might even say that the blog is my way of holding on to that time and to continually punish myself for what happened. For the record, that is not true. I continue to talk about the events that happened to my platoon for one reason only - to get people to understand that what happened to us can very easily happen to others and that the system of leader development that is currently in place has a lot to do with why that is so. I have been supported and demonized equally throughout and that has been hard. Some people have understood that there are some very important lessons to be learned from the Black Hearts story that should fundamentally change the manner and method by which we grow leaders in the Army. Some fall back on the easy label of leadership failure. In effect saying, "We don't have to study this because that was just a group of shitty leaders, and because I'm not one of them, then I don't have to worry about it." And, certainly, no matter what I write here, some people will never get past the idea that all I'm trying to do is make myself feel better. There have been a lot of responses like that lately. That somehow, even if I'm correct that there are very important leader development skills and ideas that need to be studied, because I am a member of the 'failed leadership' group, that my points are somehow diminished because of it. On the contrary, having studied and thought about it almost every day for the past 4 years, I contend that my thoughts and ideas might be an important starting point. There are many times throughout this blog, where the very questions that I have raised, are also being raised by others. For example, this review - as with every other - paints a picture of an extremely toxic leadership climate. No argument. It was extremely toxic. Every Soldier in the battalion knew it and felt it. The question really is, did the leadership know how toxic it's actions were? The answer is no. Why not? Why could they not see what behavioral conditions were being created? And, importantly, even if they could have seen or were aware of how the Soldiers really felt, what could have been done? As a subordinate, there was only so much I could do to try to mitigate that toxicity when it was directed at my Soldiers. Since I've rarely heard from anyone else, the question becomes, what would you have done differently?
LTC Christopher brings up another important point that I have tried to look at in past postings as well. Consider the following:
"The commander of the 1-502 is a central figure in Black Hearts, and it is incontrovertible that his behavior was especially dysfunctional. Leaders who refuse to listen to suggestions from their subordinates unhinge any hope of unit cohesion. Even if the commander’s selected courses of action are always the best ones—which
is a preposterous supposition—the arrogance of not listening to team members denigrates them. Leader arrogance is the mortal enemy of unit cohesion, and the disenchantment of subordinates can sometimes do more to destroy a unit than enemy weapons. In this case, the battalion commander did not simply refuse to listen to his company commanders or senior noncommissioned officers, but he berated,abused, and publicly ridiculed them whenever they spoke up. His actions completely destroyed any notion of team."
That quotation is the exact reason that I have been pushing so hard for the last few months for an inclusive leadership design model. However, if I go back to my earliest leader development school, and find the models of leadership outlined in the old leadership manual, I will find 3 types of leaders, (1) Authoritative (2) Delagative (3) Participative. The 1-502 commander was most certainly an authoritative leader. He was following an Army leadership model that had been laid out for him throughout his career and which suits his personality and inclination. What no one had ever pointed out to him before were the positive and negative effects of such a style. The same can be said for me. I believe that I tend to be a more delagative and participative leader, however, just last week someone accused me of being so arrogant that I could not be taught anything. That would imply that either (1) their perception of me is incorrect, or (2) my self-awareness is not as complete as it should be. Either way, there is the beginning of a misunderstanding by either my followers or myself that could potentially have devastating effects.
Some other examples of why this incident demands such serious study by anyone who would ever aspire to leadership positions:
1. The unit was undermanned - Regardless of how we got there, the truth is that an Army must fight with what it has available be it people or equipment. The political situation that called for the manning in 2005-2006 is beyond my purview. However, as a Soldier, I do the best I can with what I have. In post number 10 I included the following quotation:
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell."
General Edward C. Meyer
The battalion and brigade commanders certainly would have been glad to accept more Soldiers into their battlespace during that time, but there weren't any to be had. We were all doing the best we could with the manpower we had available. It wouldn't be until the 'Surge' that an additional 30,000 troops would be pushed into theater. The land that we controlled as a company in 2005 was later controlled by a battalion in 2007.
2. Empathy - Although I did a poor job last week in sorting out my thoughts regarding empathy, it is the critical link to creating climates of understanding and awareness. While it is possible that the battalion commander was correct that the Soldiers who got killed had become lax, to not recognize the effect that his words would have on the remainder of the unit does demonstrate a lack of understanding of the empathy required whenever we ask someone to do something extremely difficult.
3. What makes COIN hard - It should also be remembered that he had demanded that we extend a hand of friendship to the Iraqi people. He was trying to do COIN before COIN was cool. These were the early days of counterinsurgent operations and people didn't really have a good understanding of what was required and the inherent risks involved. Consider that in current operations in Afghanistan, it is encouraged for Soldiers to take off their protective equipment (once security has been emplaced) when meeting with local elders. This demonstrates trust and respect - both crucial aspects of successful COIN operations.
4. A bottom-up approach - As LTC Christopher points out in his review
"Appropriately, Frederick begins his research“from the bottom up.” He conducts extensive
interviews with the members of the platoon, company,and battalion, and without adding his own evaluative commentary, allowing these Soldiers to report actions, outcomes, and feelings in their own words."
I simply cannot state enough that the Army as an institution must keep an ear tuned to the interpretations and understandings of the myriad levels of people throughout the organization and ensure that each group has the same generalized understanding of the intended outcome. As Black Hearts clearly demonstrates at the microcosmic level, when even one small group becomes disenfranchised or does not have the same understanding as their superiors, then the results can be devastating.
5. Comparisons to My Lai - Finally, for those of you who are members of Facebook, there is a 'Black Hearts' group site that has an interview with the Mr. Frederick regarding comparisons between this incident and the one at My Lai that was filmed for inclusion in a PBS documentary. Although there are some similarities between the two events, there are also some major differences as well. As I mentioned in an earlier post, one of the parts of this tragedy that needs to be considered are the behavioral dynamics that would create a situation where 4 people who might normally not consider actions like this, would suddenly take actions well outside any normal human behavior.
At the end of the day, there will be people who see the 'Black Hearts' incident in the simplest form possible - leadership failure. The issue however, is very much more complex than that. From individual human behaviors, emotions, and feelings to geopolitical military strategy, from a scared kid on a patrol to a leader formed by a different time and circumstance, from a lack of individual ethical and moral underpinning to the honorable behavior of so many others, this event demands careful study at all levels.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art017.pdf
To date this is probably the most complete and fair-minded review of the book that I have seen. While not completely accurate, LTC Christopher does a very good job of getting at many of the issues that surround that event and the leadership and command climate that existed during our tour. I highly recommend people read it because it offers some strong insights into leadership in general, not just military. I think LTC Christopher's review also demonstrates that issues such as command climate, and willingness to consider different viewpoints are important in all walks of life. Hopefully, his review will further the discussion of the manner and method by which we train military leaders and the critical importance of creating work climates that enhance and build cohesion and a unified understanding of the purpose of the work, no matter the industry.
My real issue with any of the reviews I have seen is that they all focus on only one thing, the perceived or real leadership 'failures' throughout the command. Since I am often lumped into that category along with others, obviously that is not something that is easy to read time after time. However, what absolutely baffles me is that no one seems to place the responsibility for the atrocities committed by those Soldiers where it truly belongs - on them. Every review ends up almost excusing them and implying that they were somehow victims in this event. Consider the following from LTC Christopher's review:
"Frederick’s commitment to detail and organization are brilliant, allowing the perceptive reader to share the frustration and hardship that members of this unit experienced in a climate of dysfunctional leadership. Black Hearts invites its readers to spend long frightening nights on undermanned and isolated guard posts and to accompany squads on patrols looking for roadside bombs during the most dangerous period of the Iraqi occupation. We, as readers, are invited not only to empathize with members of the 1-502, but to vicariously experience the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger, the rebellion, and occasionally, the palpable fear that members of the battalion experienced daily for a year."
I wonder how many other units in Iraq during 2005-2006 had Soldiers who spent "long frightening nights in undermanned and isolated guard posts"? My guess is most. I wonder, how many other units experienced "the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger" etc etc during that time. Again, the answer is most - if not all. How many of those Soldiers and units committed unspeakable acts of depravity? Few, if any. Search as we may for some way to come to grips with what those Soldiers decided to do, the truth still remains that even if the command climate was the most dysfunctional in the entire Army, nothing mitigates, excuses, or minimizes the responsibility of those individuals for their personal actions. Nothing.
LTC Christopher's review does touch on some very important issues that do need to be discussed however, some of which I have mentioned throughout this blog. For example, he states that:
"An obvious question readers may have upon completing Frederick’s book concerns whether members of the chain of command, especially some of the officers and senior officers from brigade on down, should also bear some culpability for the actions of the four men who were convicted. I don’t believe so. While some members of the chain of command were grossly incompetent, they were not unethical, and this is more of an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question. Unlike the murderers and rapists they led, these leaders were not bad people, just deplorable leaders."
"..they were not unethical, and this is more an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question." A critical point. Our leader development programs currently do not place anywhere near enough emphasis on ethical decision making, nor the behavioral dynamics of unit/team design. We simply label anyone with rank and a title a leader and then send them on their way. Without understanding how teams and units are built (or destroyed), and the absolutely fundamental part that human being interaction plays in that creation or destruction, we are continually putting people in the position of having to command something that they have no understanding of.
As a member of that chain of command, I have tried to look at the events and my decisions fairly and openly over the past year. I have not hidden from this, nor have I tried to shy away from asking hard questions. Some might even say that the blog is my way of holding on to that time and to continually punish myself for what happened. For the record, that is not true. I continue to talk about the events that happened to my platoon for one reason only - to get people to understand that what happened to us can very easily happen to others and that the system of leader development that is currently in place has a lot to do with why that is so. I have been supported and demonized equally throughout and that has been hard. Some people have understood that there are some very important lessons to be learned from the Black Hearts story that should fundamentally change the manner and method by which we grow leaders in the Army. Some fall back on the easy label of leadership failure. In effect saying, "We don't have to study this because that was just a group of shitty leaders, and because I'm not one of them, then I don't have to worry about it." And, certainly, no matter what I write here, some people will never get past the idea that all I'm trying to do is make myself feel better. There have been a lot of responses like that lately. That somehow, even if I'm correct that there are very important leader development skills and ideas that need to be studied, because I am a member of the 'failed leadership' group, that my points are somehow diminished because of it. On the contrary, having studied and thought about it almost every day for the past 4 years, I contend that my thoughts and ideas might be an important starting point. There are many times throughout this blog, where the very questions that I have raised, are also being raised by others. For example, this review - as with every other - paints a picture of an extremely toxic leadership climate. No argument. It was extremely toxic. Every Soldier in the battalion knew it and felt it. The question really is, did the leadership know how toxic it's actions were? The answer is no. Why not? Why could they not see what behavioral conditions were being created? And, importantly, even if they could have seen or were aware of how the Soldiers really felt, what could have been done? As a subordinate, there was only so much I could do to try to mitigate that toxicity when it was directed at my Soldiers. Since I've rarely heard from anyone else, the question becomes, what would you have done differently?
LTC Christopher brings up another important point that I have tried to look at in past postings as well. Consider the following:
"The commander of the 1-502 is a central figure in Black Hearts, and it is incontrovertible that his behavior was especially dysfunctional. Leaders who refuse to listen to suggestions from their subordinates unhinge any hope of unit cohesion. Even if the commander’s selected courses of action are always the best ones—which
is a preposterous supposition—the arrogance of not listening to team members denigrates them. Leader arrogance is the mortal enemy of unit cohesion, and the disenchantment of subordinates can sometimes do more to destroy a unit than enemy weapons. In this case, the battalion commander did not simply refuse to listen to his company commanders or senior noncommissioned officers, but he berated,abused, and publicly ridiculed them whenever they spoke up. His actions completely destroyed any notion of team."
That quotation is the exact reason that I have been pushing so hard for the last few months for an inclusive leadership design model. However, if I go back to my earliest leader development school, and find the models of leadership outlined in the old leadership manual, I will find 3 types of leaders, (1) Authoritative (2) Delagative (3) Participative. The 1-502 commander was most certainly an authoritative leader. He was following an Army leadership model that had been laid out for him throughout his career and which suits his personality and inclination. What no one had ever pointed out to him before were the positive and negative effects of such a style. The same can be said for me. I believe that I tend to be a more delagative and participative leader, however, just last week someone accused me of being so arrogant that I could not be taught anything. That would imply that either (1) their perception of me is incorrect, or (2) my self-awareness is not as complete as it should be. Either way, there is the beginning of a misunderstanding by either my followers or myself that could potentially have devastating effects.
Some other examples of why this incident demands such serious study by anyone who would ever aspire to leadership positions:
1. The unit was undermanned - Regardless of how we got there, the truth is that an Army must fight with what it has available be it people or equipment. The political situation that called for the manning in 2005-2006 is beyond my purview. However, as a Soldier, I do the best I can with what I have. In post number 10 I included the following quotation:
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell."
General Edward C. Meyer
The battalion and brigade commanders certainly would have been glad to accept more Soldiers into their battlespace during that time, but there weren't any to be had. We were all doing the best we could with the manpower we had available. It wouldn't be until the 'Surge' that an additional 30,000 troops would be pushed into theater. The land that we controlled as a company in 2005 was later controlled by a battalion in 2007.
2. Empathy - Although I did a poor job last week in sorting out my thoughts regarding empathy, it is the critical link to creating climates of understanding and awareness. While it is possible that the battalion commander was correct that the Soldiers who got killed had become lax, to not recognize the effect that his words would have on the remainder of the unit does demonstrate a lack of understanding of the empathy required whenever we ask someone to do something extremely difficult.
3. What makes COIN hard - It should also be remembered that he had demanded that we extend a hand of friendship to the Iraqi people. He was trying to do COIN before COIN was cool. These were the early days of counterinsurgent operations and people didn't really have a good understanding of what was required and the inherent risks involved. Consider that in current operations in Afghanistan, it is encouraged for Soldiers to take off their protective equipment (once security has been emplaced) when meeting with local elders. This demonstrates trust and respect - both crucial aspects of successful COIN operations.
4. A bottom-up approach - As LTC Christopher points out in his review
"Appropriately, Frederick begins his research“from the bottom up.” He conducts extensive
interviews with the members of the platoon, company,and battalion, and without adding his own evaluative commentary, allowing these Soldiers to report actions, outcomes, and feelings in their own words."
I simply cannot state enough that the Army as an institution must keep an ear tuned to the interpretations and understandings of the myriad levels of people throughout the organization and ensure that each group has the same generalized understanding of the intended outcome. As Black Hearts clearly demonstrates at the microcosmic level, when even one small group becomes disenfranchised or does not have the same understanding as their superiors, then the results can be devastating.
5. Comparisons to My Lai - Finally, for those of you who are members of Facebook, there is a 'Black Hearts' group site that has an interview with the Mr. Frederick regarding comparisons between this incident and the one at My Lai that was filmed for inclusion in a PBS documentary. Although there are some similarities between the two events, there are also some major differences as well. As I mentioned in an earlier post, one of the parts of this tragedy that needs to be considered are the behavioral dynamics that would create a situation where 4 people who might normally not consider actions like this, would suddenly take actions well outside any normal human behavior.
At the end of the day, there will be people who see the 'Black Hearts' incident in the simplest form possible - leadership failure. The issue however, is very much more complex than that. From individual human behaviors, emotions, and feelings to geopolitical military strategy, from a scared kid on a patrol to a leader formed by a different time and circumstance, from a lack of individual ethical and moral underpinning to the honorable behavior of so many others, this event demands careful study at all levels.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#64 Empathy
As usual, the folks at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) have provided me once again with a great source document which adds another layer to the discussion of those traits and characteristics shared by successful leaders. The article is entitled, "Empathy - A True Leaders Skill" and written by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Harry Garner. You can find it at the link below:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art013.pdf
In the introduction to the piece, LTC Garner asks the following question:
"Why is it so important to see things from the Soldier's point of view, to "identify with and enter into another person's feelings and emotions?"
He then answers with the following:
"The U.S. involvement in extended operations and its focus on counterinsurgency, has brought a renewed awareness of wars human dimension. Humans desire supportive relationships, and empathy is the foundation that builds trusting relationships. The leader who harnesses the power of real empathy fosters better communication, tighter cohesion, stronger discipline and greater morale throughout his or her organization."
That paragraph may form the missing link to many of my earlier thoughts regarding the value of the individual over the role or position in the organization. I think that many leaders, military, corporate, or civic, often forget that the people in their organizations are the real prize. That the men, women, husbands, wives, brothers, sisters, fathers and mothers who work for them to either produce a product or engage the enemy, or lead a community are the reason they exist. They would not be termed a leader if they did not have subordinates to lead. Instead of focusing on the value of the individual, they focus only on how that person adds to or detracts from their pursuit of the goal. Instead of truly understanding 'servant leadership', they exercise power or position based coercive or positional leadership. That may be effective in the short run, but is rarely so in the marathon of a 10 year war. I believe that empathy is a defining characteristic of any person who calls themselves a 'servant' leader. The trait (empathy) and the title (servant) are inextricably linked, and I don't think you can have one without the other.
Further on in the article there is the following quote from Dr. Carl Rogers:
"Empathy means entering into the private perceptional world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it...To be with another in this way means that for the time being, you lay aside your own views and values in order to enter into another's world without prejudice. In some sense it means that you lay aside yourself."
LTC Garner then goes on to say the following, something that most military leaders do not seem to understand nor often try to do:
"So while empathy is an emotional connection with the other person, it is not based on sorrow, guilt, suffering or weakness, but on developing a mutual relationship."
He also states later in the article:
"...empathy implies risk on the part of the leader. It requires increasing one's level of humility and lowering one's perceived notion of power. As the leader demonstrates empathy, he reveals his feelings and values to the organization."
There is a lot more to this article and it truly deserves reading and consideration by anyone who calls themselves, or is termed a leader by others. The concept here is that there is an innate acceptance that before we are leader and led, before we are superior and subordinate, we are individual people with our own sense of the world, both as it is and as we think it should be. For any leader to be successful in building an organization, there must be an understanding of those emotions, feelings, and perceptions and then using them to enhance the unit, not denying them and painting a one way only picture for subordinates to follow.
I freely admit that I am an emotional leader. I wear my emotions on my sleeve and have difficulty hiding them, even when to do so would probably be in my best interest. People often misconstrue this as not thinking my way through a problem, and reacting before all the facts are known. And while there is some truth to that, in most cases, my emotive response is nothing more than my natural inclination on how to deal with the situation at hand. I would make a lousy poker player. I cannot hide what I'm feeling at the moment, and at this point in my career, I generally don't try. To do so feels almost hypocritical. Like being long winded, I accept that my emotional responses are a part of who and what I am. Some people will perceive that as being a good leader trait, and others will not. One thing it does do however is demonstrate to my subordinates that I am human. They know that if I get fired up about something, that there is probably a good reason for it. Whatever is provoking the emotion has struck some nerve and the human being is now responding, not the positional leader.
I remember about 9 years ago when I was a Drill Sergeant that we had a young trainee whose father died very suddenly of a massive heart attack. After the chaplain and commander had informed her of what had happened, we began to make the plans for her to leave Basic Training and return to her family for the funeral. I remember that the First Sergeant would not let her go home until she had thrown a live hand grenade (one of the few absolutely mandatory requirements of Basic Training back then) and that she could only be gone for 4 days. I was livid. It is one of the very few times in my career that I have totally lost my mind and all military bearing. I was screaming at him for being so cruel. I just couldn't believe that he could be so callous. I remember telling him that if it were he, or one of the cadre, that we would easily get a week or more to be with our families during the funeral etc. He agreed with me but said it was different for cadre or permanent party than it was for trainees. Of course, I fundamentally (at the top of my lungs) disagreed. She was a young woman who had just lost her father. At that point, all other roles or labels need to be put aside. Basic training could be finished at some other time. We failed on that day to exercise the empathy required of the institution to care for its' people.
As I have said many times before the hierarchy of the Army is sometimes it's worst enemy. We scratch and claw for promotion and position and then try to hang on to that title while setting our sights on the next rung on the ladder. Most of corporate America is like this as well. We get to a point where our quest for the bras ring becomes more important than how we get there, or who we step on to do it.
Empathetic leadership is the messy business of leading people. Soldier is a title. We lead human beings. And, seen on that level, we are all very much equal. A person's position should be used to assist his/her subordinates to ensure that that equality is always evident. The leader should work to understand the subordinates viewpoint, even if he/she does not agree with it. The led should develop a deep trust that the leader truly is looking out for them and had their best interest - and the organizations - at heart. When the two conflict, the empathetic leader will have already earned the respect of the subordinate enough that they understand why the decision was made the way it was.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art013.pdf
In the introduction to the piece, LTC Garner asks the following question:
"Why is it so important to see things from the Soldier's point of view, to "identify with and enter into another person's feelings and emotions?"
He then answers with the following:
"The U.S. involvement in extended operations and its focus on counterinsurgency, has brought a renewed awareness of wars human dimension. Humans desire supportive relationships, and empathy is the foundation that builds trusting relationships. The leader who harnesses the power of real empathy fosters better communication, tighter cohesion, stronger discipline and greater morale throughout his or her organization."
That paragraph may form the missing link to many of my earlier thoughts regarding the value of the individual over the role or position in the organization. I think that many leaders, military, corporate, or civic, often forget that the people in their organizations are the real prize. That the men, women, husbands, wives, brothers, sisters, fathers and mothers who work for them to either produce a product or engage the enemy, or lead a community are the reason they exist. They would not be termed a leader if they did not have subordinates to lead. Instead of focusing on the value of the individual, they focus only on how that person adds to or detracts from their pursuit of the goal. Instead of truly understanding 'servant leadership', they exercise power or position based coercive or positional leadership. That may be effective in the short run, but is rarely so in the marathon of a 10 year war. I believe that empathy is a defining characteristic of any person who calls themselves a 'servant' leader. The trait (empathy) and the title (servant) are inextricably linked, and I don't think you can have one without the other.
Further on in the article there is the following quote from Dr. Carl Rogers:
"Empathy means entering into the private perceptional world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it...To be with another in this way means that for the time being, you lay aside your own views and values in order to enter into another's world without prejudice. In some sense it means that you lay aside yourself."
LTC Garner then goes on to say the following, something that most military leaders do not seem to understand nor often try to do:
"So while empathy is an emotional connection with the other person, it is not based on sorrow, guilt, suffering or weakness, but on developing a mutual relationship."
He also states later in the article:
"...empathy implies risk on the part of the leader. It requires increasing one's level of humility and lowering one's perceived notion of power. As the leader demonstrates empathy, he reveals his feelings and values to the organization."
There is a lot more to this article and it truly deserves reading and consideration by anyone who calls themselves, or is termed a leader by others. The concept here is that there is an innate acceptance that before we are leader and led, before we are superior and subordinate, we are individual people with our own sense of the world, both as it is and as we think it should be. For any leader to be successful in building an organization, there must be an understanding of those emotions, feelings, and perceptions and then using them to enhance the unit, not denying them and painting a one way only picture for subordinates to follow.
I freely admit that I am an emotional leader. I wear my emotions on my sleeve and have difficulty hiding them, even when to do so would probably be in my best interest. People often misconstrue this as not thinking my way through a problem, and reacting before all the facts are known. And while there is some truth to that, in most cases, my emotive response is nothing more than my natural inclination on how to deal with the situation at hand. I would make a lousy poker player. I cannot hide what I'm feeling at the moment, and at this point in my career, I generally don't try. To do so feels almost hypocritical. Like being long winded, I accept that my emotional responses are a part of who and what I am. Some people will perceive that as being a good leader trait, and others will not. One thing it does do however is demonstrate to my subordinates that I am human. They know that if I get fired up about something, that there is probably a good reason for it. Whatever is provoking the emotion has struck some nerve and the human being is now responding, not the positional leader.
I remember about 9 years ago when I was a Drill Sergeant that we had a young trainee whose father died very suddenly of a massive heart attack. After the chaplain and commander had informed her of what had happened, we began to make the plans for her to leave Basic Training and return to her family for the funeral. I remember that the First Sergeant would not let her go home until she had thrown a live hand grenade (one of the few absolutely mandatory requirements of Basic Training back then) and that she could only be gone for 4 days. I was livid. It is one of the very few times in my career that I have totally lost my mind and all military bearing. I was screaming at him for being so cruel. I just couldn't believe that he could be so callous. I remember telling him that if it were he, or one of the cadre, that we would easily get a week or more to be with our families during the funeral etc. He agreed with me but said it was different for cadre or permanent party than it was for trainees. Of course, I fundamentally (at the top of my lungs) disagreed. She was a young woman who had just lost her father. At that point, all other roles or labels need to be put aside. Basic training could be finished at some other time. We failed on that day to exercise the empathy required of the institution to care for its' people.
As I have said many times before the hierarchy of the Army is sometimes it's worst enemy. We scratch and claw for promotion and position and then try to hang on to that title while setting our sights on the next rung on the ladder. Most of corporate America is like this as well. We get to a point where our quest for the bras ring becomes more important than how we get there, or who we step on to do it.
Empathetic leadership is the messy business of leading people. Soldier is a title. We lead human beings. And, seen on that level, we are all very much equal. A person's position should be used to assist his/her subordinates to ensure that that equality is always evident. The leader should work to understand the subordinates viewpoint, even if he/she does not agree with it. The led should develop a deep trust that the leader truly is looking out for them and had their best interest - and the organizations - at heart. When the two conflict, the empathetic leader will have already earned the respect of the subordinate enough that they understand why the decision was made the way it was.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#63 Editors Note
When I first started this blog, I made a deal with myself that if anyone commented on something I'd written, that I would generally post it 'as is'. That way, even if someone disagreed with my position or point of view, I was at least being fair to their perspective. The blog itself allows me the option of accepting, editing, or rejecting any response. However, I think that if I do that, then I will surround myself only with like-minded people, and that is not really the purpose of the discussion.
I received a reply this week to post #58, "The Hardest Part". To view it, go to the post itself, click on the title and scroll to the bottom. Form your own thoughts from there. It is interesting that J.D. thinks that this is a worthy discussion that we should be having at every level of Army leader development, and someone who was with me thinks that I am self deluding and a fraud. Back to my friend 'perspective'..... While I do not believe that the name attributed to the person who wrote the last response is actually from that individual, the point of view of whoever contributed it is my attempt at literary honesty.
One thing I have not done in my public postings has been to attack any particular individual. If I have learned anything from the on-going discussion, it has been to attempt to see the situation from some other point of view. That shall remain the policy for as long as I decide to continue this effort.
Thanks.
I received a reply this week to post #58, "The Hardest Part". To view it, go to the post itself, click on the title and scroll to the bottom. Form your own thoughts from there. It is interesting that J.D. thinks that this is a worthy discussion that we should be having at every level of Army leader development, and someone who was with me thinks that I am self deluding and a fraud. Back to my friend 'perspective'..... While I do not believe that the name attributed to the person who wrote the last response is actually from that individual, the point of view of whoever contributed it is my attempt at literary honesty.
One thing I have not done in my public postings has been to attack any particular individual. If I have learned anything from the on-going discussion, it has been to attempt to see the situation from some other point of view. That shall remain the policy for as long as I decide to continue this effort.
Thanks.
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