The last 2 posts, #26 and #27, have generated more feedback than any of the others I have posted to date. In light of that, and with a suggestion from one of the readers, I printed and read Chapter 3 of Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy. I'm going to attempt to tie some of the various thoughts from these earlier posts together and see if they generate a coherent picture of not only the issue (as I see it) but possible solutions.
A note on the blog itself. One of the things that I have recognized since beginning this, is that it is very easy to sit back and play Monday morning quarterback. Judgment of other people, and their solutions to a particular problem are too easy. And mostly not fair. Most leaders do not intend to fail, waste Soldier's time, or recklessly abandon the requirements of their position. They actually mean well and want to serve the Army to the best of their abilities. While there will always be those who use other people intentionally for self-aggrandizement, I believe that in most cases what happens is the leaders begin to believe a little too much in their personal sense of rightness because they have been repeatedly told or promoted into positions which lead them to believe that their answer is the best answer. It is also true that simply developing another good idea on paper or in a blog like this won't solve the problem either. The best and only possible solution is a combination of accurately recognizing the problem(s), expanding the possible solution set(s) as widely as possible and then being willing to get your hands dirty at the user level to attempt to solve the issue at hand.
I started this blog talking a lot about COL Boyd and the OODA Loop. As Boyd repeatedly pointed out, the hardest part of the OODA cycle is the Orientation phase. This critical second phase - understanding the issue or challenge in light of your understanding of yourself, your adversary and the environment is very difficult. It is an extremely multilayered task and the ability to be able to do it rapidly will not be developed quickly. A good example of the Orientation challenge was a slide show I saw yesterday from 1/5 Marines. In it was a picture of an old Afghan man pushing a wheelbarrow. The caption read "This man's wheelbarrow is the greatest possession he owns. Treat it that way." From a Soldiers perspective, it is simply a wheelbarrow. From the other side of the Orientation it is a livelihood, an ability to provide for his family, a place in a community and a measure of self respect. In another picture, there was a cart filled with poppy plants. The caption read "Without the resin, it's simply cooking fuel." A very powerful message. From one side it is the financing of terror through opium production, from the other a means to boil water and cook meat. All depends upon how you look at it. And the outcome of this war could actually hang in that precarious balance. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies rely upon the support of the local population to be successful. Each day and with each interaction the efforts of both sides will either shorten or prolong this conflict.
I have also mentioned numerous times the need to work from the bottom up, not the top down. By looking at the frustrations, challenges, issues and opportunities from the perspective of those at the bottom, I have contended that we can engage them, challenge them and develop them - and along the way pass along the Army value system and Warrior Ethos in a language and form that they will respond to. This will contribute positively to their Army experience and enhance their well-being and continue their desire to serve.
Chapter 3 of AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, is dedicated to Army Well-being. It incorporates the spiritual / moral / physical needs of all members of the Army community and makes commanders responsible to initiate or sustain programs dedicated to the holistic needs of the entire Army family. In light of the difficulties I have referenced in earlier posts on my installation, and coupled with the tragedy at Ft. Hood this past Thursday, it seems that many of these thoughts are very timely.
In Section 3-3, the Well-being is separated into 2 sub-categories, institutional and individual.
"An Institutional Perspective - Well-being is actually a condition resulting from the effects of a system of individual programs, policies and initiatives."
"An Individual Perspective - Well-being is a personal state experienced by the individual. While there is no formula for describing the personal state, individuals must be self-reliant in order for this experience to be positive. Individuals are ultimately responsible for their own well-being but commanders are responsible for creating and sustaining a climate that contributes positively to the lives of the Army family."
The paragraph dedicated to the individual perspective goes on to outline 4 pillars that contribute to individual wellness: Physical, Material, Mental and Spiritual.
"Physical - The physical state centers on one's health and sense of wellness, satisfying physical needs through a healthy lifestyle."
"Material - The material state centers on essential needs such as shelter, food and financial resources."
"Mental - The mental state centers on basic needs to grow, learn, achieve recognition, and be accepted."
"Spiritual - The spiritual state centers on a person's religious/philosophical needs, providing powerful support for values, morals, strength of character, and endurance in difficult and dangerous circumstances."
It seems to me that the best way to respond to the challenges we face is from the Individual Perspective outlined above. The beauty for commanders and leaders is that the Army has already outlined the requirements for them, they simply have to find ways to implement them that will result in the Soldier believing that their needs are being met across all 4 pillars.
Currently, as the installation tries to come to grip with the various challenges it faces, it is using a rather predictable Institutional Response, which, given it's Orientation, it believes will produce the the desired Individual Response. However, since it does not seem to be working, maybe it's time to relook the Institutional Orientation and concentrate on the Individual one instead. Much like I can look at the poppy plant as a source of terrorist financing or the ability to boil water, I believe I can look at the incident rates of suicide, homicide, spouse abuse, sexual assault, drug and alcohol abuse in the same manner. They are either crimes to be prosecuted, or a outcomes of the Institution failing to meet the Individual needs.
If we see the 'criminal' activities above as the failure of the institution to address one or more of the pillars of individual well-being then instead of focusing on how to stop domestic violence, we can concentrate on fixing that broken need. By recognizing that all of these behaviors are actually a systemic failure to meet the needs of the Soldier at some level, then we can implement policies and programs designed to meet that shortfall.
Now, the critical part of the Individual Response is the statement that "..Individuals must be self reliant.....individuals are ultimately responsible for their own well-being." Accepting that, what if they are not? What if they do not posses a self-reliant skillset? Way back in post #6 I included the following section from the TRADOC Human Dimension Study regarding people born after 1980:
"Their structured lives included parents shuffling them from one activity to another all under the watchful eyes of teachers, coaches, tutors and music instructors. Wide-ranging child protection laws and safety products that came out of the 1980's have made Millennials one of the most sheltered generations."
Ooops. The Soldiers of today may not possess the ability to be self-reliant because the society that raised them spent too much time protecting them. Now, faced with the strain of 8 years of combat, the emotional strain of loss, failed relationships and an inability to process these changes, is it all that hard to see why we are having such a hard time? The TRADOC study also made the following point:
"Findings of three different research organizations indicate that current Army leaders hold different values from those held by the Nation's youth, the next generation of Soldiers. More troubling, the studies show the two sets of values are continuing to diverge."
The top doesn't hold the same values as the bottom, the 2 groups are growing further apart and the Institutional Responses" generated don't seem to be working.
Uniquely, it appears that the Army does seem to recognize this in it's written guidance by differentiating in 600-20 between the "Institution" and the "Individual". While placing the ultimate responsibility for wellness on the Soldier, it requires the the "Institution" to create and mange programs that allow that Soldier to meet their physical, material, mental and spiritual needs. What we appear to be doing is almost the opposite. We are creating programs that the top deems the appropriate response, and forcing the bottom into it. We need to do it the other way around. Create well-being programs that the bottom finds acceptable and meets their needs. It is less critical that the top even understand how or why it works, just that it produces the intended outcome across 1 of the 4 pillars outlined.
As always, I look forward to your input. We have suffered a large scale tragedy this week that touches all who serve, and the nation. Let us all pray for those who were lost and their families. But let us also pray for the wisdom to look very very hard at our Orientation and take a moment to look at things from the opposite side.
# 27 Trust
Throughout these writings I have taken much of my source material from documents written for the Strategic Studies Institute (It's URL is at the top of the page). Normally, if I'm not exactly sure what I want to write about, or my thoughts aren't fully formed yet, I'll dig around there and see if something catches my eye or provokes a thought pattern that helps more clearly define the disparate thoughts of that week. This week was no different, but it requires me to go backward in order to go forward.
On Monday evening, a Soldier who once worked for me and I keep up with on Facebook posted that "Suicide is the only option". It had been posted 8 minutes earlier when I read it and was consistent with less dramatic earlier posts that indicated that she was struggling with some issues that were seemingly out of her control. I immediately contacted the installation Police Department and a mutual friend to begin to try and locate her. After approximately 20 minutes, I was able to get in touch with her by phone, determine her location and go to her to ensure her safety. After another friend took her to the ER to be treated, I returned home, and called the Staff Duty in order to inform her leadership of what had transpired, and the actions I had taken, and why. Her 1SG was present at Staff Duty, but was talking with someone else when I called and could not take my call. I gave the Staff Duty NCO my phone number and requested the 1SG call me back. He did not.
The following morning I sent an email to the battalion commander outlining the events of the evening prior, my actions and my reasoning. I informed him that I had made an attempt to to talk with the 1SG, but that I had not heard back from him. A few hours later, the Company Commander called me to let me know what they were doing to assist the Soldier, and to thank me for helping her the evening prior. Toward the end of the conversation he told me that he would have the 1SG call me so that "Senior NCO to senior NCO we could close the loop." That phone call has not come.
Tuesday I taught a marksmanship class and Wednesday the students went to a training site to practice what they had learned. In the early afternoon one of them mentioned how low the morale was in their unit and outlined some of the reasons why. This lead to a lot of head nodding and agreement by the other students. They all agree that the morale in their separate units is low and that they - in many cases - have stopped caring about the larger purpose of their service and now view much of what they do merely as a job or contractual obligation.
Thursday evening on the drive home, I called my friend from the Monday incident to check in and see how she was doing. I explained my actions to her and expressed my confidence in her and the unit now that they were aware of her difficulties and issues. They have found her a counselor she is comfortable with and she has regularly scheduled appointments to work through her issues and get her life back on track.
Yesterday I met with D.C. and spent the afternoon having a great conversation. D.C. is part of the large installation team trying to find ways to reduce the number of crisis incidents on post. I first met her 3 weeks ago at the Battalion Resiliency Counsel meeting I spoke of in post 26 Our purpose yesterday was to see if there might be a helpful role for me in the larger installation effort. We spent the afternoon discussing a wide range of issues and reasons and possible solutions to some of the issues we are facing. A lot of coffee, even more cigarettes and a thoroughly enjoyable afternoon.
Throughout the week, the word 'trust' kept popping into my head. I'm beginning the think that the genesis of a lot of the issues we face throughout the Army are based on a loss of trust by the Soldiers in their leadership and their purpose. Now, that is an extremely generalized statement. Not every unit, nor every leader fits that mold. Everywhere you look, you can find young leaders - and seniors - who are truly caring for their Soldiers and doing everything they can to prepare for the deployment ahead. However, the rising tide of 'trouble indicators' i.e. suicides (attempted and completed), domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse, arrests etc indicates that there is some larger ill-defined, underlying problem that we have failed to address. Not that extraordinary efforts and resources aren't being made available, but that for all that expenditure of energy, effort and care, we aren't really getting to the root of the issue.
And then yesterday I found a document at the SSI entitled "The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict" published last month. ( http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ )I highly encourage reading it, for it raises some interesting questions regarding the state of the 'ethic' of the Army today. On page 1 you will find the following quotation:
"Leadership is the potent combination of strategy and character. If you must be without one, be without the strategy."
General Norman Schwarzkopf
Further on in the document the authors point out the following with regard to character development discussed in FM 6-22, Leadership:
"Character, a person's moral and ethical qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. An informed ethical conscience consistent with the Army Values strengthens leaders to make the right choices when faced with tough issues. Since Army leaders seek to do what's right and inspire others to do the same, they must embody these values." (italics added by authors) FM 6-22
The authors then state, "In fact, current Army doctrine leaves character development to the individual, specifying no role at all for the institution save for its leaders." This is followed by another quotation from FM 6-22.
"Becoming a person of character and a leader of character is a career-process involving day-to-day experience, education, self-development, developmental counseling, coaching and mentoring. While individuals are responsible for their own character development, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting and assessing the efforts of their people. (bold added by authors) FM 6-22
I spent a lot of the conversation with D.C. yesterday talking about this issue of trust. I can't prove it empirically, but I believe that there has to be a recognition by unit leaders (Company level and higher), that in many ways, we have lost the trust of our Soldiers and we must work very very hard to either gain or regain it if we want to sustain a professional Army. If you see the 'trouble indicators' as greater than average behavioral indicators of a larger problem, then it is not all that difficult to work from small to large. I don't trust my local leader or have faith in their ability to care, protect, and train me. That lack of trust leads to my demoralization because I feel as if I am going into combat or deploying with people who don't care about me. That leads me not to care about the organization that I serve in or its' ideals. That produces behavior that is outside the expected norm because I no longer have faith in the institution anyway. In fact, to demonstrate my lack of caring, I participate in behaviors or actions that are known to be inconsistent with the stated values of the Army. In plain language, I just don't give shit anymore. And, because we are not consistently reinforcing the professional Army ethic - and it's critical moral and ethical and value necessity in leader development training, the local leader does not posses the understanding of the professional Army ethic nor can they put it into practice at the local level - the exact spot where the Soldier in crisis is standing.
The monologue from SSI also spends some time looking at the Army ethic as an institution, and asks whether or not those ethical values have been subsumed in some ways by bureaucratic responses. In essence, the bureaucracy has created it's own ethic - or expected norm of behavior. Is the Army reinforcing the incredibly important moral and ethical value system that it talks about in FM 6-22, or is it merely paying lip-service to them on posters and handouts while creating yet another bureaucratic response to a crisis or problem. "Sir, in response to XYZ issue, we've created a new Task Force to study and recommend to you courses of action. However, we will need a budget, an office, 6 salaried employees and a health care plan before we can begin work. Additionally, Sir, we will continually fight turf wars with other agencies and as soon as we become the flavor of the week then we will fight to change our status from temporary worker to government employee thereby ensuring that we can push another PowerPoint briefing in front of you and your staff once a month so that you shortly you won't remember what the hell the purpose was for creating us in the first place and we will be firmly entrenched in the protective bureaucracy of the Army institution."
And we wonder why Soldiers have lost faith....(Sarcasm included by me)
Throughout the discussions on the installation regarding how we can reduce the number of incidents and better care for our Soldiers I routinely hear the question, "How can we get this to the lowest level?" And then looking at a slideshow produced by Big Army a few days ago, I saw a slide that depicted the different tiers and levels of care providers and resources available. As expected, the Tier 1 folks were Chaplains, Dr.'s, Behavioral Health Specialists etc. At the bottom of Tier 2 were 3 words...First Line Supervisor. And there is no one below them. They were the last in line. This implies that even in the way the institution makes it's own damn slide shows there is a fundamental lack of understanding of who the target audience is and why we need to work from the First Line Supervisor up, not the Commanding General down. The General has to set a visible moral and ethical tone - which I'm sure he does - has to ensure that it doesn't get diluted or changed by the various bureaucrats and sycophants who have a vested interest in continuing their current methods, and reach those who are actually charged with helping and caring and leading Soldiers. The First Line Supervisor.
Now for that trust to be gained or regained, the solutions offered to the Soldier in crisis have to make sense and be accepted by that Soldier. When I called my friend on Thursday I informed her why I took my actions on Monday night in order to help her understand them. From her perspective, she was a little embarrassed and angry that her personal inability to handle her issues was now a public matter. A totally understandable reaction. But, she also knows, understands and acknowledged that she needs assistance and as embarrassing as it is in the short run she has not lost her trust in me. In light of that, I was looking at another document the other day that is in a coaches guide for a concept called "Team of Leaders". There is a quote in there that says:
Leader Team Effectiveness depends upon 3 criteria:
1. Producing a team outcome (product or service) acceptable to whomever the leader-team is serving. (my thought: The larger organization serves downward to the individual)
2. A growth in leader-team capacity which in turn improves capacity of the organization.
3. A group experience which is satisfying and meaningful to members which improves confidence. (my thought: Soldier confidence is mainly based upon trust in their leaders and acceptance of unit norms of behavior)
While this particular document is aimed at Joint and Inter-Agency Strategic levels, the same rules apply to squads, platoons, companies and battalions. Soldiers must accept the expected behaviors and requirements for inclusion in the unit. Those expected norms - the Values and Ethics - must be demonstrated in action by the leadership (at all levels and consistently) which builds individual confidence and trust. The actions derived from the expected norms and behaviors must produce a greater operational capacity for the individual and the unit (mutual growth). Participation is organizations who demonstrate the Ethics and Values must produce an experience meaningful to the member which will increase their confidence in the unit.
If we look at the "trouble indicators" as evidence of a loss of trust and confidence and as rebuttal of the expected ethical norms and values, then it seems clear that what needs to be done is 1) Start educating the First Line Supervisors and junior leaders about the professional Army Ethic, what it is, why it is and how it strengthens and serves as the moral spinal column of the unit. 2) Consistently reinforce what the organization stands for in light of persistent conflict and the physical, emotional and spiritual drain it is taking on Soldiers. 3) Work from the bottom up, not the top down. and 4) Make sure that the bureaucratic ethic has not, cannot, and will not subsume the Army Value ethic of caring, supportive, and disciplined leadership.
As always, your thoughts are critical. The Army is certainly not the only organization to face these challenges and every industry has it's own work ethic that has an effect on how it progresses in light of unexpected challenges.
On Monday evening, a Soldier who once worked for me and I keep up with on Facebook posted that "Suicide is the only option". It had been posted 8 minutes earlier when I read it and was consistent with less dramatic earlier posts that indicated that she was struggling with some issues that were seemingly out of her control. I immediately contacted the installation Police Department and a mutual friend to begin to try and locate her. After approximately 20 minutes, I was able to get in touch with her by phone, determine her location and go to her to ensure her safety. After another friend took her to the ER to be treated, I returned home, and called the Staff Duty in order to inform her leadership of what had transpired, and the actions I had taken, and why. Her 1SG was present at Staff Duty, but was talking with someone else when I called and could not take my call. I gave the Staff Duty NCO my phone number and requested the 1SG call me back. He did not.
The following morning I sent an email to the battalion commander outlining the events of the evening prior, my actions and my reasoning. I informed him that I had made an attempt to to talk with the 1SG, but that I had not heard back from him. A few hours later, the Company Commander called me to let me know what they were doing to assist the Soldier, and to thank me for helping her the evening prior. Toward the end of the conversation he told me that he would have the 1SG call me so that "Senior NCO to senior NCO we could close the loop." That phone call has not come.
Tuesday I taught a marksmanship class and Wednesday the students went to a training site to practice what they had learned. In the early afternoon one of them mentioned how low the morale was in their unit and outlined some of the reasons why. This lead to a lot of head nodding and agreement by the other students. They all agree that the morale in their separate units is low and that they - in many cases - have stopped caring about the larger purpose of their service and now view much of what they do merely as a job or contractual obligation.
Thursday evening on the drive home, I called my friend from the Monday incident to check in and see how she was doing. I explained my actions to her and expressed my confidence in her and the unit now that they were aware of her difficulties and issues. They have found her a counselor she is comfortable with and she has regularly scheduled appointments to work through her issues and get her life back on track.
Yesterday I met with D.C. and spent the afternoon having a great conversation. D.C. is part of the large installation team trying to find ways to reduce the number of crisis incidents on post. I first met her 3 weeks ago at the Battalion Resiliency Counsel meeting I spoke of in post 26 Our purpose yesterday was to see if there might be a helpful role for me in the larger installation effort. We spent the afternoon discussing a wide range of issues and reasons and possible solutions to some of the issues we are facing. A lot of coffee, even more cigarettes and a thoroughly enjoyable afternoon.
Throughout the week, the word 'trust' kept popping into my head. I'm beginning the think that the genesis of a lot of the issues we face throughout the Army are based on a loss of trust by the Soldiers in their leadership and their purpose. Now, that is an extremely generalized statement. Not every unit, nor every leader fits that mold. Everywhere you look, you can find young leaders - and seniors - who are truly caring for their Soldiers and doing everything they can to prepare for the deployment ahead. However, the rising tide of 'trouble indicators' i.e. suicides (attempted and completed), domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse, arrests etc indicates that there is some larger ill-defined, underlying problem that we have failed to address. Not that extraordinary efforts and resources aren't being made available, but that for all that expenditure of energy, effort and care, we aren't really getting to the root of the issue.
And then yesterday I found a document at the SSI entitled "The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict" published last month. ( http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ )I highly encourage reading it, for it raises some interesting questions regarding the state of the 'ethic' of the Army today. On page 1 you will find the following quotation:
"Leadership is the potent combination of strategy and character. If you must be without one, be without the strategy."
General Norman Schwarzkopf
Further on in the document the authors point out the following with regard to character development discussed in FM 6-22, Leadership:
"Character, a person's moral and ethical qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. An informed ethical conscience consistent with the Army Values strengthens leaders to make the right choices when faced with tough issues. Since Army leaders seek to do what's right and inspire others to do the same, they must embody these values." (italics added by authors) FM 6-22
The authors then state, "In fact, current Army doctrine leaves character development to the individual, specifying no role at all for the institution save for its leaders." This is followed by another quotation from FM 6-22.
"Becoming a person of character and a leader of character is a career-process involving day-to-day experience, education, self-development, developmental counseling, coaching and mentoring. While individuals are responsible for their own character development, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting and assessing the efforts of their people. (bold added by authors) FM 6-22
I spent a lot of the conversation with D.C. yesterday talking about this issue of trust. I can't prove it empirically, but I believe that there has to be a recognition by unit leaders (Company level and higher), that in many ways, we have lost the trust of our Soldiers and we must work very very hard to either gain or regain it if we want to sustain a professional Army. If you see the 'trouble indicators' as greater than average behavioral indicators of a larger problem, then it is not all that difficult to work from small to large. I don't trust my local leader or have faith in their ability to care, protect, and train me. That lack of trust leads to my demoralization because I feel as if I am going into combat or deploying with people who don't care about me. That leads me not to care about the organization that I serve in or its' ideals. That produces behavior that is outside the expected norm because I no longer have faith in the institution anyway. In fact, to demonstrate my lack of caring, I participate in behaviors or actions that are known to be inconsistent with the stated values of the Army. In plain language, I just don't give shit anymore. And, because we are not consistently reinforcing the professional Army ethic - and it's critical moral and ethical and value necessity in leader development training, the local leader does not posses the understanding of the professional Army ethic nor can they put it into practice at the local level - the exact spot where the Soldier in crisis is standing.
The monologue from SSI also spends some time looking at the Army ethic as an institution, and asks whether or not those ethical values have been subsumed in some ways by bureaucratic responses. In essence, the bureaucracy has created it's own ethic - or expected norm of behavior. Is the Army reinforcing the incredibly important moral and ethical value system that it talks about in FM 6-22, or is it merely paying lip-service to them on posters and handouts while creating yet another bureaucratic response to a crisis or problem. "Sir, in response to XYZ issue, we've created a new Task Force to study and recommend to you courses of action. However, we will need a budget, an office, 6 salaried employees and a health care plan before we can begin work. Additionally, Sir, we will continually fight turf wars with other agencies and as soon as we become the flavor of the week then we will fight to change our status from temporary worker to government employee thereby ensuring that we can push another PowerPoint briefing in front of you and your staff once a month so that you shortly you won't remember what the hell the purpose was for creating us in the first place and we will be firmly entrenched in the protective bureaucracy of the Army institution."
And we wonder why Soldiers have lost faith....(Sarcasm included by me)
Throughout the discussions on the installation regarding how we can reduce the number of incidents and better care for our Soldiers I routinely hear the question, "How can we get this to the lowest level?" And then looking at a slideshow produced by Big Army a few days ago, I saw a slide that depicted the different tiers and levels of care providers and resources available. As expected, the Tier 1 folks were Chaplains, Dr.'s, Behavioral Health Specialists etc. At the bottom of Tier 2 were 3 words...First Line Supervisor. And there is no one below them. They were the last in line. This implies that even in the way the institution makes it's own damn slide shows there is a fundamental lack of understanding of who the target audience is and why we need to work from the First Line Supervisor up, not the Commanding General down. The General has to set a visible moral and ethical tone - which I'm sure he does - has to ensure that it doesn't get diluted or changed by the various bureaucrats and sycophants who have a vested interest in continuing their current methods, and reach those who are actually charged with helping and caring and leading Soldiers. The First Line Supervisor.
Now for that trust to be gained or regained, the solutions offered to the Soldier in crisis have to make sense and be accepted by that Soldier. When I called my friend on Thursday I informed her why I took my actions on Monday night in order to help her understand them. From her perspective, she was a little embarrassed and angry that her personal inability to handle her issues was now a public matter. A totally understandable reaction. But, she also knows, understands and acknowledged that she needs assistance and as embarrassing as it is in the short run she has not lost her trust in me. In light of that, I was looking at another document the other day that is in a coaches guide for a concept called "Team of Leaders". There is a quote in there that says:
Leader Team Effectiveness depends upon 3 criteria:
1. Producing a team outcome (product or service) acceptable to whomever the leader-team is serving. (my thought: The larger organization serves downward to the individual)
2. A growth in leader-team capacity which in turn improves capacity of the organization.
3. A group experience which is satisfying and meaningful to members which improves confidence. (my thought: Soldier confidence is mainly based upon trust in their leaders and acceptance of unit norms of behavior)
While this particular document is aimed at Joint and Inter-Agency Strategic levels, the same rules apply to squads, platoons, companies and battalions. Soldiers must accept the expected behaviors and requirements for inclusion in the unit. Those expected norms - the Values and Ethics - must be demonstrated in action by the leadership (at all levels and consistently) which builds individual confidence and trust. The actions derived from the expected norms and behaviors must produce a greater operational capacity for the individual and the unit (mutual growth). Participation is organizations who demonstrate the Ethics and Values must produce an experience meaningful to the member which will increase their confidence in the unit.
If we look at the "trouble indicators" as evidence of a loss of trust and confidence and as rebuttal of the expected ethical norms and values, then it seems clear that what needs to be done is 1) Start educating the First Line Supervisors and junior leaders about the professional Army Ethic, what it is, why it is and how it strengthens and serves as the moral spinal column of the unit. 2) Consistently reinforce what the organization stands for in light of persistent conflict and the physical, emotional and spiritual drain it is taking on Soldiers. 3) Work from the bottom up, not the top down. and 4) Make sure that the bureaucratic ethic has not, cannot, and will not subsume the Army Value ethic of caring, supportive, and disciplined leadership.
As always, your thoughts are critical. The Army is certainly not the only organization to face these challenges and every industry has it's own work ethic that has an effect on how it progresses in light of unexpected challenges.
# 26 Different but Related
"Morale is the single greatest factor in successful war....In any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned first and always with the welfare of the troops who do the fighting."
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Crusade in Europe 1948
"The unfailing formula for production of morale is patriotism, self-respect, discipline and self-confidence within a military unit, joined with fair treatment and merited appreciation from without. It cannot be produced by pampering or coddling an Army, and it is not necessarily destroyed by hardship, danger or even calamity. Though it can survive and develop in the adversity that comes as an inescapable incident of service, it will quickly wither and die if Soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice on the part of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or ineptitude on the part of their military leaders"
General Douglas MacArthur
Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, US Army, for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1933
"In war, everything depends on morale; and morale and public opinion comprise the better part of reality"
Napoleon Bonaparte
There are a lot of thoughts running around in my head this morning because it has been an interesting week. I gave the Effective Training Design brief one day, did the fitting and data gathering for the plate carrier prototypes the next and became a member of the Battalion Resiliency Council on Friday.
Effective Training Design is a briefing I developed that turns the standard training design paradigm upside down and instead of concentrating of inputs and numerical metrics, focuses the training effort on achieving the commander's intent from the Soldier's perspective. Using the OODA cycle and using the Task, Purpose, Intent design that's currently in place, I show people that if you concentrate on a very clearly understood intent - what needs to be the end result of the training - and then look at where you are actually starting from, but decentralize as much of the execution as possible, then you can achieve a much better result at the Soldier level. The briefing is long and OODA takes a while to explain, and quite honestly not very many people really get it the first time. I've had one battalion commander hear it 3 different times and he related to me the other day, that each time he listens he comes away with different or new things to consider for training his unit. Since the brief is attached very closely to the marksmanship program however, most folks can only see it in that light. Light bulbs may come on during the brief, but for many folks they remain very dim until they see the program in action.
The plate carrier prototype review is a whole different beast. About 2 years ago it became apparent to me that the introduction of body armor had a very large impact on marksmanship in general, and for women and small statured Soldiers, in particular. This past summer I was able to conduct a fit, form and function study on Ft. Campbell with research scientists from Natick Labs and the office of Soldier Survivability. That relationship led to the program manger allowing me to look at some prototype designs for plate carriers and provide feedback to their office focusing on fit, form and function. This week we looked at 7 different models from 3 different manufacturers on approximately 25 different women. We will do the function portion in November when they will all get a chance to shoot with these vests on and see how much or how little their ability to apply the fundamentals of marksmanship is affected by the different varieties of carrier.
And finally, the Battalion Resiliency Council. Last week I commented on the different disciplinary, health and safety issues that we are struggling with right now. As part of the response to that the unit developed a Resiliency Council to look at what we are doing, whether or not it is working and how we can improve to better care for our Soldiers. The members of the council are all the Commanders, the 1SG's and the Command Sergeant Major, as well as member of the health community, law enforcement and legal, the Family Readiness representative and representative from other outside assistance agencies on post. I volunteered to be on the committee last week after the hearing the Division Command Sergeant Major at the 'Town Hall' meeting described in last weeks post. I am glad I did. The battalion leadership does seem deeply concerned and honestly interested in caring for their Soldiers. I left the room feeling that the leadership is open to suggestion, willing to try new approaches and understands that we will all have to come together collectively to set the conditions for positive change.
Last night I also had a great conversation with my neighbors around a fire bowl that kind of helped to bring a lot of these thoughts together. At one point I said that for me right now, a lot of these things that may appear on the surface to be very different are actually all related, but sometimes I just can't exactly see how. That ETD, body armor and the Resiliency Council share some common characteristics but I'm struggling a little to define exactly what those commonalities are.
I also have to make a correction. Two weeks ago in #24 I looked at how the definition of leadership has evolved over time. I quoted a 1948 manual that defined leadership as "Influencing human behavior" and then contrasted it with the definition that I had been raised with - "Leadership is providing purpose, direction and motivation in order to accomplish the mission while improving the organization." Well, I went back and checked, and I was only half right. The latest definition states that "Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization" I think it's important to recognize that the human component of influencing people has been returned to the forefront. It's a key distinction between the 2 earlier definitions that places people in front of the unit, and recognizes that human factors and behavior are the key components of mission accomplishment and organizational health. Next time, I'll do my homework up front.
And then this morning I found the quotations above. I think there is a generalized frustration throughout the Army right now and that it manifests itself in a variety of ways. Units - and Soldiers - seem a little at a loss. After 8 years of prolonged conflict, multiple deployments and the attendant human issues that go with time away and reintegration, it's as if everything is so overwhelming that we have lost our ability to see the forest through the trees. For example, with the training element, there is so much that is directed at the units from outside that they have little time to consider it's value or effectiveness. And so they start trying to wade through it and simply accomplish the sheer numbers of events and tasks and then lose sight of what they really need to do to prepare for combat. Generically, the same applies to the body armor review. Women become so frustrated that they cannot accomplish as critical task (shooting) due to ill-fitting equipment that they lose faith in themselves and the ability of their unit, it's leadership, and the Army to properly care for them as they train. This feeling of frustration and being overwhelmed leads to breakdowns in unit cohesion and Soldier morale which lead to the discipline and behavior issues that the Resiliency Council is trying to address.
Consider the Eisenhower quote above. In a protracted campaign, all Soldiers must feel as if their leadership is first and foremost concerned with their welfare. That welfare could be the determination of the tasks that need to be trained to ensure survival and success (and which ones can be skipped), or it could be the recognition of what type of equipment they need to best accomplish their mission, or it could be an appreciation of the difficulties that multiple deployments and the readiness/preparation cycle is placing on them and their loved ones.
Interestingly, MacArthur said essentially the same thing 15 years earlier - well before America became involved in WW II. Morale is the single most important attribute to waging successful war. If Soldiers and units do not feel that their leadership - be it local or national - is working all the time towards ensuring their success and survival then the morale is ruined and the cause will be lost. The key to MacArthur's quote for me though, is that to develop morale, the other requirements - discipline, self confidence and respect, and patriotism are the key component parts. And those are not skill sets with quantifiable numbers. They are attributes that must be inculcated, displayed and modeled until they become the binding fabric of the human beings who make up the organization.
And finally, from Bonaparte, the idea that morale is very closely tied to public opinion and that the 2 parts work to form their own perception, and if believed by enough people, that perception becomes reality. This last one is the main reason I wanted to be part of the Resiliency Council. As the only member who does not have any positional stake in the outcome, it is freeing to be able to provide the Chain of Command another perspective to consider. For example, I told the battalion commander that no matter how well-intentioned he is, if the Soldiers believe that he is only taking these actions to cover his ass, then the actions will be of little worth. I told him him that it is less important what he does, as it is that his Soldiers feel a genuine and thoughtful and empathetic caring about their well-being. If we as the council can work from that place, and treat each Soldier and their concerns as genuine issues that are human being based and consciously work to not apply system responses, then we will achieve a measure of success. If we fail to do that and the perception is of system responses to individual problems then we are wasting our time.
I'm not sure if this post made sense today. It still seems a bit disconnected to me. Feel free to comment and share your thoughts.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Crusade in Europe 1948
"The unfailing formula for production of morale is patriotism, self-respect, discipline and self-confidence within a military unit, joined with fair treatment and merited appreciation from without. It cannot be produced by pampering or coddling an Army, and it is not necessarily destroyed by hardship, danger or even calamity. Though it can survive and develop in the adversity that comes as an inescapable incident of service, it will quickly wither and die if Soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice on the part of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or ineptitude on the part of their military leaders"
General Douglas MacArthur
Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, US Army, for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1933
"In war, everything depends on morale; and morale and public opinion comprise the better part of reality"
Napoleon Bonaparte
There are a lot of thoughts running around in my head this morning because it has been an interesting week. I gave the Effective Training Design brief one day, did the fitting and data gathering for the plate carrier prototypes the next and became a member of the Battalion Resiliency Council on Friday.
Effective Training Design is a briefing I developed that turns the standard training design paradigm upside down and instead of concentrating of inputs and numerical metrics, focuses the training effort on achieving the commander's intent from the Soldier's perspective. Using the OODA cycle and using the Task, Purpose, Intent design that's currently in place, I show people that if you concentrate on a very clearly understood intent - what needs to be the end result of the training - and then look at where you are actually starting from, but decentralize as much of the execution as possible, then you can achieve a much better result at the Soldier level. The briefing is long and OODA takes a while to explain, and quite honestly not very many people really get it the first time. I've had one battalion commander hear it 3 different times and he related to me the other day, that each time he listens he comes away with different or new things to consider for training his unit. Since the brief is attached very closely to the marksmanship program however, most folks can only see it in that light. Light bulbs may come on during the brief, but for many folks they remain very dim until they see the program in action.
The plate carrier prototype review is a whole different beast. About 2 years ago it became apparent to me that the introduction of body armor had a very large impact on marksmanship in general, and for women and small statured Soldiers, in particular. This past summer I was able to conduct a fit, form and function study on Ft. Campbell with research scientists from Natick Labs and the office of Soldier Survivability. That relationship led to the program manger allowing me to look at some prototype designs for plate carriers and provide feedback to their office focusing on fit, form and function. This week we looked at 7 different models from 3 different manufacturers on approximately 25 different women. We will do the function portion in November when they will all get a chance to shoot with these vests on and see how much or how little their ability to apply the fundamentals of marksmanship is affected by the different varieties of carrier.
And finally, the Battalion Resiliency Council. Last week I commented on the different disciplinary, health and safety issues that we are struggling with right now. As part of the response to that the unit developed a Resiliency Council to look at what we are doing, whether or not it is working and how we can improve to better care for our Soldiers. The members of the council are all the Commanders, the 1SG's and the Command Sergeant Major, as well as member of the health community, law enforcement and legal, the Family Readiness representative and representative from other outside assistance agencies on post. I volunteered to be on the committee last week after the hearing the Division Command Sergeant Major at the 'Town Hall' meeting described in last weeks post. I am glad I did. The battalion leadership does seem deeply concerned and honestly interested in caring for their Soldiers. I left the room feeling that the leadership is open to suggestion, willing to try new approaches and understands that we will all have to come together collectively to set the conditions for positive change.
Last night I also had a great conversation with my neighbors around a fire bowl that kind of helped to bring a lot of these thoughts together. At one point I said that for me right now, a lot of these things that may appear on the surface to be very different are actually all related, but sometimes I just can't exactly see how. That ETD, body armor and the Resiliency Council share some common characteristics but I'm struggling a little to define exactly what those commonalities are.
I also have to make a correction. Two weeks ago in #24 I looked at how the definition of leadership has evolved over time. I quoted a 1948 manual that defined leadership as "Influencing human behavior" and then contrasted it with the definition that I had been raised with - "Leadership is providing purpose, direction and motivation in order to accomplish the mission while improving the organization." Well, I went back and checked, and I was only half right. The latest definition states that "Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization" I think it's important to recognize that the human component of influencing people has been returned to the forefront. It's a key distinction between the 2 earlier definitions that places people in front of the unit, and recognizes that human factors and behavior are the key components of mission accomplishment and organizational health. Next time, I'll do my homework up front.
And then this morning I found the quotations above. I think there is a generalized frustration throughout the Army right now and that it manifests itself in a variety of ways. Units - and Soldiers - seem a little at a loss. After 8 years of prolonged conflict, multiple deployments and the attendant human issues that go with time away and reintegration, it's as if everything is so overwhelming that we have lost our ability to see the forest through the trees. For example, with the training element, there is so much that is directed at the units from outside that they have little time to consider it's value or effectiveness. And so they start trying to wade through it and simply accomplish the sheer numbers of events and tasks and then lose sight of what they really need to do to prepare for combat. Generically, the same applies to the body armor review. Women become so frustrated that they cannot accomplish as critical task (shooting) due to ill-fitting equipment that they lose faith in themselves and the ability of their unit, it's leadership, and the Army to properly care for them as they train. This feeling of frustration and being overwhelmed leads to breakdowns in unit cohesion and Soldier morale which lead to the discipline and behavior issues that the Resiliency Council is trying to address.
Consider the Eisenhower quote above. In a protracted campaign, all Soldiers must feel as if their leadership is first and foremost concerned with their welfare. That welfare could be the determination of the tasks that need to be trained to ensure survival and success (and which ones can be skipped), or it could be the recognition of what type of equipment they need to best accomplish their mission, or it could be an appreciation of the difficulties that multiple deployments and the readiness/preparation cycle is placing on them and their loved ones.
Interestingly, MacArthur said essentially the same thing 15 years earlier - well before America became involved in WW II. Morale is the single most important attribute to waging successful war. If Soldiers and units do not feel that their leadership - be it local or national - is working all the time towards ensuring their success and survival then the morale is ruined and the cause will be lost. The key to MacArthur's quote for me though, is that to develop morale, the other requirements - discipline, self confidence and respect, and patriotism are the key component parts. And those are not skill sets with quantifiable numbers. They are attributes that must be inculcated, displayed and modeled until they become the binding fabric of the human beings who make up the organization.
And finally, from Bonaparte, the idea that morale is very closely tied to public opinion and that the 2 parts work to form their own perception, and if believed by enough people, that perception becomes reality. This last one is the main reason I wanted to be part of the Resiliency Council. As the only member who does not have any positional stake in the outcome, it is freeing to be able to provide the Chain of Command another perspective to consider. For example, I told the battalion commander that no matter how well-intentioned he is, if the Soldiers believe that he is only taking these actions to cover his ass, then the actions will be of little worth. I told him him that it is less important what he does, as it is that his Soldiers feel a genuine and thoughtful and empathetic caring about their well-being. If we as the council can work from that place, and treat each Soldier and their concerns as genuine issues that are human being based and consciously work to not apply system responses, then we will achieve a measure of success. If we fail to do that and the perception is of system responses to individual problems then we are wasting our time.
I'm not sure if this post made sense today. It still seems a bit disconnected to me. Feel free to comment and share your thoughts.
#25 An Interesting Week
For a short week, this one sure had it's share of interesting events....
Due to the Columbus Day holiday last weekend, we only had a 3 day work week. Monday and Tuesday were holidays. For me, the big event was preparing to say goodbye to my friend, Chris. He separated from the Army this week and is heading home this morning to CT. I will miss him and wish him the best of luck. Chris has been a constant source of conversation, thoughts, and ideas about people, leadership, how it's being implemented today, and the general state of the Army. He is one of the most thoughtful and educated people I know. He has been a commenter and guest poster on these pages, and I hope that once he gets settled in he'll continue to share his thoughts and insights here. The blog is better off because of him. If we have any renaissance men left in the world, Chris is one of them. Enjoy the journeys ahead my friend.
But, the week was also filled with the usual amount of chaos. The long weekend provided a bunch of drama for the Division with DUI's, suicide attempts, domestic violence incidents, drug overdoses, arrests etc. And so, once again, the Chain of Command "took action". As usual, it started with an order from on high to develop plans to identify and assist 'at-risk' Soldiers. Those who the leadership believed needed extra attention or assistance to help with their issues. Where maybe an ounce of prevention could really equal a pound of cure.
As part of this there was a meeting Thursday afternoon for all the senior NCO's in the Division to have what was termed a 'town hall' meeting. The Division Command Sergeant Major wanted to solicit our input on what might be done to help curb the disturbing - and rising - tide of incidents with our Soldiers. Now, for the sake of the argument, I will take him at his word. He wants to help. I chose to believe that this was not being done only because it's a huge black eye for the organization and we need to show 'big Army' that we're doing something. I'll suspend my cynical doubts about intent and choose to believe that the man really wants to help Soldiers. He was soliciting input on what we were doing, what was working (and what wasn't) and what we needed to do differently, or better, to help.
The first person to speak immediately said that the problem was that we weren't chaptering Soldiers out of the Army quickly enough. The legal system was taking too long and all the problem children were making all the rest of us look bad. Which led to an explanation by the JAG NCO on the whys and wherefores of the perceived backlog. Then a female NCO stood up and wanted to address pregnancy rates and how some women were using pregnancies to avoid deployments. That brought on a bunch of whispering and shuffling and laughing from the mostly male audience. So, instead of being allowed to speak her mind and have her concerns addressed, she was disrespected by the audience and that was not corrected by the Command Sergeant Major. And on and on. After a short while, I stopped listening. At the end, the Command Sergeant Major came back to his never-ending theme of standards and discipline. Got to have standards and discipline. If we only had standards and discipline then these problems will go away. I left more frustrated and angry than I came in. A waste of time.
Then yesterday I received the email below. It's worth including here:
"I went home last night thinking about the ways commanders are trying to mitigate what they term "high risk Soldiers". No matter how I rolled the terms and "action plans" around in my head I couldn't grasp how a company commander could equitably single out Soldiers that he/she deems high risk and then apply an action plan for that Soldier to get back on the "right"path. This morning while I was at Starbucks drinking coffee, the idea of identifying high risk soldiers still troubled me. As I often do, I started talking to an E4 who had just finished PT and was getting a set of drinks and pastries, most likely for him and a buddy. As soon as I talked frankly to him and asked how he was, he told me his unit (with pride), that he was deploying a third time and that it was OK he was deploying because the tour and time away is what you make of it. What was really noticeable, his demeanor changed from neutral to motivated while I was chatting with him.Then it hit me. By singling out Soldiers and crafting action plans, we as leaders are taking the blame and responsibility off our backs and putting it directly on a Soldier. We will increase their personal set of burdens. The solution is one that's existed and been around for decades but due to combat operations, fast promotions, and a decrease in or lack of leader development we(leaders) have lost touch. Here's a complimentary action plan for leaders to mitigate Soldier misconduct: 1. Set the Example; lead from the front (if you're an asshole, most likely your soldiers will be too). 2. Build Teams (empower NCOs and then step back and let them develop solutions for their TMs, squads, platoons. Hold them accountable) 3. Treat Soldiers with respect (know your Soldiers, talk to them, praise them, encourage them, LISTEN to them) 4. Establish programs that make Soldiers winners (very few of your soldiers were high school standouts, they were average kids trying to get by) 5. Train Hard. Your Soldiers joined the Army for its challenges, esprit de corps and traditions. Don't be afraid to meet their expectations."
Finally, yesterday afternoon I had a great conversation with another friend of mine. She had been on the receiving end of a lot of pressure this week and was little beat down. I have not known her long, but she has a critical role as an advisor to the command and I really believe that she is in a unique place to effect change. As we were talking and sharing ideas, we both agreed that the Command Sergeant Major had missed the boat. That the problem isn't the system, it's not the lack of caring, or lack of resources to address the myriad of issues, it's the lack of understanding of the root causes. We keep treating the symptoms and not the disease. We keep seeing crime and suicide and misbehavior as the end result of some failed leadership, instead of seeing them as indicators of a larger problem.
We have never been in this place before as an Army and we are not prepared to deal with it. That was explained to me by my Dr.yesterday. He said that previously, during the draft-era Army, we conscripted people, used them for the duration of the conflict and them turned them loose. We - as the institution of the Army - never had to deal with the aftermath of war that we participated in. We never had to see the problems the war had created. By the time many of those problems manifested themselves, we had already discharged the conscripted Soldier and he/she became society's problem. With the all-volunteer force, that dynamic has changed. However, because we went for almost 30 years from the inception of the all-volunteer force to fighting and maintaining it in the present conflict, we have no systems in place to deal with the troubling human factors of sustained conflict. It's not that the Command Sergeant Major and other senior NCO's don't want to help, it's that they don't know how to help because they were never really taught or educated about dealing with people and behavior. Not is any real sense. They were given catch phrases and lists of traits to memorize, but not how a 20 something year old is supposed to offer advice and counsel to another 20 something who is struggling to put his/her life back together after the adrenaline rush of combat. After watching a relationship fail, or not being able to come to grips with things that he/she saw or did, or friends lost etc.
My friend spoke of compassion. That struck me because for every leader trait we espouse and value and hold as a requirement for success, you won't find compassion on the list. She made the point, that every other leader quality is wrapped up inside of the word compassion and she is right. Compassion and understanding are the bedrock of trust and trust is the glue that allows people to do things or believe in things that they never would have previously. That can be a goal, objective, cause or Chain of Command. With compassion comes the willingness to see the problem or issue from a perspective other than your own. A willingness to look at the best solution to the problem for the individual, not necessarily for the leader - or even the organization. A willingness to suspend judgement long enough to develop a workable, sustainable course of action for the Soldier.
As an example, my friend pointed out a case where there was a significant rise in marijuana use within an organization. The telling part is that it was among senior NCO's. Under normal circumstances, it's very difficult to believe that these people would endanger their careers to take the chance of getting caught. But, sadly, it happened. Now, the issue here is not whether or not they should receive punishment. If convicted, they should. I have no debate with that. I do have an issue however if we don't pause for a second and ask what conditions have created this situation and then try to address those root causes and not just the symptomatic behavior. Treating the symptom without addressing the causes will not end the spate of issues we face. Is it possible that these folks are having difficulty readjusting to life outside of a combat zone? It is a known fact that after the sustained adrenaline rush of combat, it can be extremely difficult to adjust to life without it. Could it be that they have suffered losses and cannot sleep at night without suspending reality for awhile? Could it be that no matter how hard they try, there aren't enough hours in the day to meet the unreal expectations and demands placed upon them as they prepare for another return to combat? Are these mitigating circumstances that may be contributing factors to their seemingly uncharacteristic behavior? Could we not ask those same questions of the young woman who is considering an intentional pregnancy to avoid an upcoming deployment? Or the destructive behavior of domestic violence?
Compassion does not mean that we don't have to uphold the standards of the organization. In fact, when exercised correctly, it actually makes upholding them easier to accomplish. But punishing people without taking into account the larger issue will not solve the problem. Using involving and caring for those who are struggling proves that the organization cares and wants to assist them with solving their larger issues and is the key to developing trust and faith. It proves that the leadership truly understands the strains they face.
If you look again at the quote above, one of the interesting parts is the contention that the 'plan of action' actually absolves the leadership of real responsibility and places an even greater burden on the Soldier to now have to act in a particular manner in order to convince the leadership that they are no longer 'at risk'. I hadn't thought about it that way. We, as leaders, somehow believe that our solutions are better than those of the person suffering. The problem is that we are not suffering. Our solutions make perfect sense because they have no personal emotional content. Compassion would make the entire command dedicated to - and take ownership - for the recovery of the Soldier, not develop some sort of well intentioned checklist which fails to meet the Soldier where they really are.
Again I come back to knowing yourself and looking for new and people-centered solutions to the tough human problems we face. All of the behavior issues and problems we are facing are ultimately of our own making. By neglecting human factors training in every leadership school we have we have created an Army that in many ways is incapable of dealing with the very people who we pretend to lead. No wonder they lose faith so quickly. As soon as they see that we are incapable of truly caring for them, their families and concerns, they will refuse to follow us and we will be rendered impotent and incapable of earning their trust again.
Thanks D. Compassion may just be the answer. It could be what ultimately saves the Force.
By the way, check out this link: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/10/draft-army-capstone-concept-hi/
Due to the Columbus Day holiday last weekend, we only had a 3 day work week. Monday and Tuesday were holidays. For me, the big event was preparing to say goodbye to my friend, Chris. He separated from the Army this week and is heading home this morning to CT. I will miss him and wish him the best of luck. Chris has been a constant source of conversation, thoughts, and ideas about people, leadership, how it's being implemented today, and the general state of the Army. He is one of the most thoughtful and educated people I know. He has been a commenter and guest poster on these pages, and I hope that once he gets settled in he'll continue to share his thoughts and insights here. The blog is better off because of him. If we have any renaissance men left in the world, Chris is one of them. Enjoy the journeys ahead my friend.
But, the week was also filled with the usual amount of chaos. The long weekend provided a bunch of drama for the Division with DUI's, suicide attempts, domestic violence incidents, drug overdoses, arrests etc. And so, once again, the Chain of Command "took action". As usual, it started with an order from on high to develop plans to identify and assist 'at-risk' Soldiers. Those who the leadership believed needed extra attention or assistance to help with their issues. Where maybe an ounce of prevention could really equal a pound of cure.
As part of this there was a meeting Thursday afternoon for all the senior NCO's in the Division to have what was termed a 'town hall' meeting. The Division Command Sergeant Major wanted to solicit our input on what might be done to help curb the disturbing - and rising - tide of incidents with our Soldiers. Now, for the sake of the argument, I will take him at his word. He wants to help. I chose to believe that this was not being done only because it's a huge black eye for the organization and we need to show 'big Army' that we're doing something. I'll suspend my cynical doubts about intent and choose to believe that the man really wants to help Soldiers. He was soliciting input on what we were doing, what was working (and what wasn't) and what we needed to do differently, or better, to help.
The first person to speak immediately said that the problem was that we weren't chaptering Soldiers out of the Army quickly enough. The legal system was taking too long and all the problem children were making all the rest of us look bad. Which led to an explanation by the JAG NCO on the whys and wherefores of the perceived backlog. Then a female NCO stood up and wanted to address pregnancy rates and how some women were using pregnancies to avoid deployments. That brought on a bunch of whispering and shuffling and laughing from the mostly male audience. So, instead of being allowed to speak her mind and have her concerns addressed, she was disrespected by the audience and that was not corrected by the Command Sergeant Major. And on and on. After a short while, I stopped listening. At the end, the Command Sergeant Major came back to his never-ending theme of standards and discipline. Got to have standards and discipline. If we only had standards and discipline then these problems will go away. I left more frustrated and angry than I came in. A waste of time.
Then yesterday I received the email below. It's worth including here:
"I went home last night thinking about the ways commanders are trying to mitigate what they term "high risk Soldiers". No matter how I rolled the terms and "action plans" around in my head I couldn't grasp how a company commander could equitably single out Soldiers that he/she deems high risk and then apply an action plan for that Soldier to get back on the "right"path. This morning while I was at Starbucks drinking coffee, the idea of identifying high risk soldiers still troubled me. As I often do, I started talking to an E4 who had just finished PT and was getting a set of drinks and pastries, most likely for him and a buddy. As soon as I talked frankly to him and asked how he was, he told me his unit (with pride), that he was deploying a third time and that it was OK he was deploying because the tour and time away is what you make of it. What was really noticeable, his demeanor changed from neutral to motivated while I was chatting with him.Then it hit me. By singling out Soldiers and crafting action plans, we as leaders are taking the blame and responsibility off our backs and putting it directly on a Soldier. We will increase their personal set of burdens. The solution is one that's existed and been around for decades but due to combat operations, fast promotions, and a decrease in or lack of leader development we(leaders) have lost touch. Here's a complimentary action plan for leaders to mitigate Soldier misconduct: 1. Set the Example; lead from the front (if you're an asshole, most likely your soldiers will be too). 2. Build Teams (empower NCOs and then step back and let them develop solutions for their TMs, squads, platoons. Hold them accountable) 3. Treat Soldiers with respect (know your Soldiers, talk to them, praise them, encourage them, LISTEN to them) 4. Establish programs that make Soldiers winners (very few of your soldiers were high school standouts, they were average kids trying to get by) 5. Train Hard. Your Soldiers joined the Army for its challenges, esprit de corps and traditions. Don't be afraid to meet their expectations."
Finally, yesterday afternoon I had a great conversation with another friend of mine. She had been on the receiving end of a lot of pressure this week and was little beat down. I have not known her long, but she has a critical role as an advisor to the command and I really believe that she is in a unique place to effect change. As we were talking and sharing ideas, we both agreed that the Command Sergeant Major had missed the boat. That the problem isn't the system, it's not the lack of caring, or lack of resources to address the myriad of issues, it's the lack of understanding of the root causes. We keep treating the symptoms and not the disease. We keep seeing crime and suicide and misbehavior as the end result of some failed leadership, instead of seeing them as indicators of a larger problem.
We have never been in this place before as an Army and we are not prepared to deal with it. That was explained to me by my Dr.yesterday. He said that previously, during the draft-era Army, we conscripted people, used them for the duration of the conflict and them turned them loose. We - as the institution of the Army - never had to deal with the aftermath of war that we participated in. We never had to see the problems the war had created. By the time many of those problems manifested themselves, we had already discharged the conscripted Soldier and he/she became society's problem. With the all-volunteer force, that dynamic has changed. However, because we went for almost 30 years from the inception of the all-volunteer force to fighting and maintaining it in the present conflict, we have no systems in place to deal with the troubling human factors of sustained conflict. It's not that the Command Sergeant Major and other senior NCO's don't want to help, it's that they don't know how to help because they were never really taught or educated about dealing with people and behavior. Not is any real sense. They were given catch phrases and lists of traits to memorize, but not how a 20 something year old is supposed to offer advice and counsel to another 20 something who is struggling to put his/her life back together after the adrenaline rush of combat. After watching a relationship fail, or not being able to come to grips with things that he/she saw or did, or friends lost etc.
My friend spoke of compassion. That struck me because for every leader trait we espouse and value and hold as a requirement for success, you won't find compassion on the list. She made the point, that every other leader quality is wrapped up inside of the word compassion and she is right. Compassion and understanding are the bedrock of trust and trust is the glue that allows people to do things or believe in things that they never would have previously. That can be a goal, objective, cause or Chain of Command. With compassion comes the willingness to see the problem or issue from a perspective other than your own. A willingness to look at the best solution to the problem for the individual, not necessarily for the leader - or even the organization. A willingness to suspend judgement long enough to develop a workable, sustainable course of action for the Soldier.
As an example, my friend pointed out a case where there was a significant rise in marijuana use within an organization. The telling part is that it was among senior NCO's. Under normal circumstances, it's very difficult to believe that these people would endanger their careers to take the chance of getting caught. But, sadly, it happened. Now, the issue here is not whether or not they should receive punishment. If convicted, they should. I have no debate with that. I do have an issue however if we don't pause for a second and ask what conditions have created this situation and then try to address those root causes and not just the symptomatic behavior. Treating the symptom without addressing the causes will not end the spate of issues we face. Is it possible that these folks are having difficulty readjusting to life outside of a combat zone? It is a known fact that after the sustained adrenaline rush of combat, it can be extremely difficult to adjust to life without it. Could it be that they have suffered losses and cannot sleep at night without suspending reality for awhile? Could it be that no matter how hard they try, there aren't enough hours in the day to meet the unreal expectations and demands placed upon them as they prepare for another return to combat? Are these mitigating circumstances that may be contributing factors to their seemingly uncharacteristic behavior? Could we not ask those same questions of the young woman who is considering an intentional pregnancy to avoid an upcoming deployment? Or the destructive behavior of domestic violence?
Compassion does not mean that we don't have to uphold the standards of the organization. In fact, when exercised correctly, it actually makes upholding them easier to accomplish. But punishing people without taking into account the larger issue will not solve the problem. Using involving and caring for those who are struggling proves that the organization cares and wants to assist them with solving their larger issues and is the key to developing trust and faith. It proves that the leadership truly understands the strains they face.
If you look again at the quote above, one of the interesting parts is the contention that the 'plan of action' actually absolves the leadership of real responsibility and places an even greater burden on the Soldier to now have to act in a particular manner in order to convince the leadership that they are no longer 'at risk'. I hadn't thought about it that way. We, as leaders, somehow believe that our solutions are better than those of the person suffering. The problem is that we are not suffering. Our solutions make perfect sense because they have no personal emotional content. Compassion would make the entire command dedicated to - and take ownership - for the recovery of the Soldier, not develop some sort of well intentioned checklist which fails to meet the Soldier where they really are.
Again I come back to knowing yourself and looking for new and people-centered solutions to the tough human problems we face. All of the behavior issues and problems we are facing are ultimately of our own making. By neglecting human factors training in every leadership school we have we have created an Army that in many ways is incapable of dealing with the very people who we pretend to lead. No wonder they lose faith so quickly. As soon as they see that we are incapable of truly caring for them, their families and concerns, they will refuse to follow us and we will be rendered impotent and incapable of earning their trust again.
Thanks D. Compassion may just be the answer. It could be what ultimately saves the Force.
By the way, check out this link: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/10/draft-army-capstone-concept-hi/
#24 People
As I look back on the first 25 posts it occurs to me that maybe I need to check and see if I'm still meeting the original intent. When I started this blog it's purpose was to stimulate a discussion around the general theme of leadership, its application, and my personal observations regarding it's current state in the Army. Now I've come to post number #25 and somehow this seems a good time to review where the discussion has taken us.
"Leadership in a democratic Army means firmness not harshness; understanding, not weakness; justice, not licence; humanness, not intolerance; generosity, not selfishness; pride, not egotism."
General Omar Bradley
And that may be the essence of both our current successes and our current failures. Those attributes cannot be dictated, they must be imbued. We often speak of 'men and women of character'. We speak of a 'values system' and a 'Warrior Ethos'. But words alone cannot assist us to achieve these things, they must be demonstrated on a daily basis. We must look for, develop and meld them from the values, character and judgements of the citizen-Soldiers who fill our ranks. When we can live with the finer parts General Bradley described - firmness, understanding, justice, humanness, generosity and pride - then we achieve the pinnacle of leading citizen-Soldiers. When we do not, and find ourselves living with harshness, weakness, licence, intolerance, selfishness and egotism, we undoubtedly fail both as leaders in the titular sense and as men and women of character. You will also find both these sets of attributes, good and bad, in the citizenry of every portion of this country, in every ethnic, social or gender group throughout the world. The hard part though is that each of us already sees ourselves as possessing all or most of the former, and very little of the latter. Which implies that we each think that we already posses all the necessary tools to consider ourselves successful leaders. Nothing could be further from the truth. Successful leadership depends upon a constant search for those people and ideas and innovations which allow us to reorient ourselves and to inspire and produce the next generation of men and women of character.
Interestingly, the quotation above was taken from a book entitled "Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition" The book is an anthology of quotations from military and other leaders broken into different sections such as Ability, Attributes, Caring, Discipline, Duty, Leadership etc. The section on Military Leadership begins with a series of quotes from Army leadership manuals over time. The part that struck me was that most of the early quotes (the earliest one here is 1948) deal with the human aspect of leading, that is the definition or quotation is centered around adjusting the behavior of people in order to accomplish some other objective. As a matter of fact, the 1948 version of DA Pam 22-1 "Leadership" states quite simply, "Leadership is the art of influencing human behavior". A very direct statement that places people - Soldiers - at the very heart of the leadership issue.
Consider today's definition of leadership. "Leadership is providing, purpose, direction and motivation to accomplish the mission while improving the organization." Interesting that mission accomplishment and organizational improvement have - over time - replaced the understanding of people and human behavior as the primary requirements of successful leadership. What about creating improved people? If we only focus on the mission, then we will eventually succeed, but that success will ultimately fail if the human price paid to achieve it becomes too much for the citizen-Soldier to bear. If we only focus on organizational improvement, then we will never truly inspire Soldiers to overcome fear and deprivation for the good of that organization. They will only respond in as much as they feel the organization is supporting them.
And now we are at war and young men and women are leading other young men and women into a very confusing and rapidly changing battle, and most of the struggles we are facing are not rooted in mission accomplishment, nor organizational success, but are most firmly rooted in the difficulties of sustaining people over a long period of time, under rigorous physical and emotional conditions. And we wonder why everyone complains about a lack of good 'Leaders' anymore. It's simple really. We stopped teaching about human behavior and the development of character and a sense of ethos and replaced it with a 'mission over men', 'institution over Soldier' model.
And that was part of my intent behind this. To talk about leading people. And I think in a generic, sort of round about way, we have done that. Using OODA, and marksmanship and a Soldier centered training model, a discussion has begun that looks at the culture of the Army, the motivations of it's Soldiers and a method of inspiring and developing the ethos and character that we all aspire to. At least I hope so. I think it's there somewhere, right behind the mechanical aspects involved in a particular post. Right behind understanding OODA is a way of enhancing a person. A way for us to stay centered and focused on what the purpose of leading people is all about. The 'Women in the Army' posts are certainly people centric and are perhaps the best illustration of the people vs the organization issue. Michelle's comments highlight what can happen when we fail to live up to the high qualities that General Bradley spoke of. A sense of understanding, humanness and generosity. I think at the tactical and strategic level, those same qualities are nicely demonstrated in last weeks post by MG Stone and his treatment of detainees.
I think this week will finish with another quote that is absolutely key to this discussion. "American troops in particular, resent any suggestion that they are ciphers and not people. They want to be known for themselves and will resist any attempt to mold them into an anonymous pattern." General Maxwell D. Taylor
Ahhh, I just knew my Millennials weren't really original after all. Seems that individuality and self-definition has been a part of the American Soldier's character and ethos for a long long time. And those people are who we lead.
As always, feel free to comment.
"Leadership in a democratic Army means firmness not harshness; understanding, not weakness; justice, not licence; humanness, not intolerance; generosity, not selfishness; pride, not egotism."
General Omar Bradley
And that may be the essence of both our current successes and our current failures. Those attributes cannot be dictated, they must be imbued. We often speak of 'men and women of character'. We speak of a 'values system' and a 'Warrior Ethos'. But words alone cannot assist us to achieve these things, they must be demonstrated on a daily basis. We must look for, develop and meld them from the values, character and judgements of the citizen-Soldiers who fill our ranks. When we can live with the finer parts General Bradley described - firmness, understanding, justice, humanness, generosity and pride - then we achieve the pinnacle of leading citizen-Soldiers. When we do not, and find ourselves living with harshness, weakness, licence, intolerance, selfishness and egotism, we undoubtedly fail both as leaders in the titular sense and as men and women of character. You will also find both these sets of attributes, good and bad, in the citizenry of every portion of this country, in every ethnic, social or gender group throughout the world. The hard part though is that each of us already sees ourselves as possessing all or most of the former, and very little of the latter. Which implies that we each think that we already posses all the necessary tools to consider ourselves successful leaders. Nothing could be further from the truth. Successful leadership depends upon a constant search for those people and ideas and innovations which allow us to reorient ourselves and to inspire and produce the next generation of men and women of character.
Interestingly, the quotation above was taken from a book entitled "Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition" The book is an anthology of quotations from military and other leaders broken into different sections such as Ability, Attributes, Caring, Discipline, Duty, Leadership etc. The section on Military Leadership begins with a series of quotes from Army leadership manuals over time. The part that struck me was that most of the early quotes (the earliest one here is 1948) deal with the human aspect of leading, that is the definition or quotation is centered around adjusting the behavior of people in order to accomplish some other objective. As a matter of fact, the 1948 version of DA Pam 22-1 "Leadership" states quite simply, "Leadership is the art of influencing human behavior". A very direct statement that places people - Soldiers - at the very heart of the leadership issue.
Consider today's definition of leadership. "Leadership is providing, purpose, direction and motivation to accomplish the mission while improving the organization." Interesting that mission accomplishment and organizational improvement have - over time - replaced the understanding of people and human behavior as the primary requirements of successful leadership. What about creating improved people? If we only focus on the mission, then we will eventually succeed, but that success will ultimately fail if the human price paid to achieve it becomes too much for the citizen-Soldier to bear. If we only focus on organizational improvement, then we will never truly inspire Soldiers to overcome fear and deprivation for the good of that organization. They will only respond in as much as they feel the organization is supporting them.
And now we are at war and young men and women are leading other young men and women into a very confusing and rapidly changing battle, and most of the struggles we are facing are not rooted in mission accomplishment, nor organizational success, but are most firmly rooted in the difficulties of sustaining people over a long period of time, under rigorous physical and emotional conditions. And we wonder why everyone complains about a lack of good 'Leaders' anymore. It's simple really. We stopped teaching about human behavior and the development of character and a sense of ethos and replaced it with a 'mission over men', 'institution over Soldier' model.
And that was part of my intent behind this. To talk about leading people. And I think in a generic, sort of round about way, we have done that. Using OODA, and marksmanship and a Soldier centered training model, a discussion has begun that looks at the culture of the Army, the motivations of it's Soldiers and a method of inspiring and developing the ethos and character that we all aspire to. At least I hope so. I think it's there somewhere, right behind the mechanical aspects involved in a particular post. Right behind understanding OODA is a way of enhancing a person. A way for us to stay centered and focused on what the purpose of leading people is all about. The 'Women in the Army' posts are certainly people centric and are perhaps the best illustration of the people vs the organization issue. Michelle's comments highlight what can happen when we fail to live up to the high qualities that General Bradley spoke of. A sense of understanding, humanness and generosity. I think at the tactical and strategic level, those same qualities are nicely demonstrated in last weeks post by MG Stone and his treatment of detainees.
I think this week will finish with another quote that is absolutely key to this discussion. "American troops in particular, resent any suggestion that they are ciphers and not people. They want to be known for themselves and will resist any attempt to mold them into an anonymous pattern." General Maxwell D. Taylor
Ahhh, I just knew my Millennials weren't really original after all. Seems that individuality and self-definition has been a part of the American Soldier's character and ethos for a long long time. And those people are who we lead.
As always, feel free to comment.
#23 Circular People
All week long I've been kind of wondering what I was going to write this week. As usual, this thing runs in spurts where there will be a thousand thoughts I want to put down, and then there'll be nothing for awhile. But then yesterday I found 2 articles in Joint Forces Quarterly that caught my eye.
Basically, there is a argument going on throughout the Army, and the defense community in general, between a group who believes that future conflict ( at least for the near future) belongs to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies - variously called 'small wars' or 'long wars' and a group that says that these types of conflicts are not what the Army is intended for, and we cannot lose sight of the need for massive forces in large scale land warfare.
The insurgency/counterinsurgency argument, "Lets Win the Wars We're In" http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/7.pdf is put forth by LTC (R) John Nagl and the large scale war argument "Lets Build and Army to Win All Wars" http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/8.pdf is proffered by COL Gian P. Gentile. Both are very interesting reads and I highly recommend them. Intentionally, these two are pitted against each other to offer a point/counterpoint argument to spur discussion and thought throughout the services. I think this is absolutely the correct manner to look at any change agent. This is the idea of the 'loyal opposition' I put forth in an earlier post (#16).
The point though is that this larger argument is playing itself out everyday in the arena of unit training as well. There are commanders and NCOs who are looking for new ways to achieve our training needs and those who contend that business as usual is the best way to prepare. Obviously, I fall in the camp of looking for new ways to achieve training readiness, but there are those who question the validity of changing a training construct that has worked well for 30 years or more. The issue is balance. When can we continue to train in the manner that has been successful in the past, and when should we look to find new and innovative solutions to solve our training problems? Most importantly, is there a middle ground?
In light of that question, I was reading "Roots of Strategy" last night and there is a section of the book entitled "My Reveries Upon the Art of War" from Marshall Maurice de Saxe, first published in 1757. I found the opening pages to be very interesting - mostly because they are so relevant today. In the opening portion of the manuscript, de Saxe states "Troops are raised by enlistment with a fixed term, without a fixed term, by compulsion sometimes and most frequently by fraud." He then goes on to point out the issues with each method of raising troops. If raised by enlistment, he states it is "unjust and inhumane not to observe the engagement. These men were free when they contracted the enlistment which binds them and it is against all laws, human or divine, not to keep the promises made to them." Seems to me that we are finally figuring that out now with the end of the 'Stop-Loss' program which forced Soldiers to continue their service beyond their contractual end date when the unit was preparing to deploy. The most interesting quote I found in this section however, stated this: "Troops raised by fraud is also odious. Money is slipped into a man's hand and then he is told he is a Soldier." Ahh, there's a good one! Enlistment, or reenlistment, by bribery. Dangling enough money in front of a Soldier that he/she in enticed to join or remain.
de Saxe's commentary goes on and on about different aspects of raising and caring for an Army. Everything from feeding, to clothing, to paying them. The thought struck me that 252 years later and the exact same issues are still faced today. The only thing that has changed are the conditions under which the problem is situated. Hang on to this part...252 years, same problem.
Which, I think, leads me to this thought. The most important part of solving any problem is to understand it first. Building, feeding, paying, training and fighting an Army - or any organization - will always raise the issues of 'how' and 'why'. What is the purpose of the endeavor? And why must it be done this way? These are the universal Task questions that must be answered. The Standard is also equally universal - an army raised must prevail over the adversary. A business must provide a relevant service to its' customer. The Standard, however, must address and answer the 'how' and 'why' portions above. The only thing that appears to continually change are the Conditions under which that Standard is achieved, be it the Army or business. For the Army, that it is currently being done under the insurgency/counterinsurgency viewpoint. Whether or not that is the right answer remains to be seen. However, applying a new solution to a little understood problem won't necessarily be successful, and blind faith in any historically systematic approach is likely at some point to come to a point of irrelevancy.
The key is understanding the problem and looking at all solutions equally. There may be 4 different ways of looking at this: Old problem/Old solution, Old problem/New solution, New problem/Old solution, and New problem/New solution. And the answer to that will be found in the viewpoint of the people in the organization itself. Hang on to this...Old problem/? solution
And so we return to people. As this blog has progressed, at times I have wondered where the hell it's going, or what my point in some of this stuff is. The more I write however, the more some generic themes keep rising to the surface. And they always seem to come back to people. Any organization - an army or a business or the Kiwanis club or faith group has to remain oriented on it's founding principles, and the people that comprise it. I found another example of this 'people first' principle yesterday in "Military Review". http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091031_art011.pdf This article struck me because of the manner in which MG Stone approached the insurgent detainee problem. Instead of viewing the detainee as only an enemy combatant, Stone looked at them from a human standpoint. They are people. Using that view, he found that most were illiterate and under-educated with little or no skill sets and little hope for themselves or their families. Becoming an insurgent combatant was an almost a forgone conclusion given little or no other options coupled with being manipulated by local religious/political leaders due to ignorance. By addressing these underlying conditions - in light if their status as detainees - and implementing education, job skill and religious programs, as well as protecting and providing interaction with family and loved ones, Stone has seen a dramatic decrease in detainee violence and a 1% recidivism rate amongst those detainees who have been released. Interesting. Treat them as people first and whatever other label second. Old problem/New solution
So, people are the binding parts of the organization. The ''how' and 'why' of the Task must meet the expected Standard as seen through changing Conditions by the people who weave the 3 parts together. People are also found inside of the 'existing solution' and 'new solution' parts of the the training problem outlined above. And these two are almost always in conflict. The 2 groups push against each other continuously and that friction of ideas and methods provides a more clear understanding of the problem and its possible solutions under current Conditions.
This may seem like a very long winded way of arriving at the very obvious conclusion that people are the center of gravity for all problem/solution issues. Most of you - all 3 that read this - are probably saying to yourselves, "Duh! I could have said that in 2 sentences instead of 2 pages!" But, if it really is that easy, then why is it so hard to understand? Why do we still face the same issues as de Saxe did 252 years later with no better understanding than he had? Why do we have the same training issues, the same policy issues, the same social issues? Why are Nagl and Gentile slugging it out on the pages of JFQ? Maybe, it's because we don't spend enough time looking at the solutions holistically, that is, not assigning a value to them, and seeing them through the light of the people involved first. Maybe we spend too much time assigning value judgments up front and not enough time trying to understand the problem before we assign a solution.
And, if you look very very carefully there you'll again run into COL Boyd. Orientation of the people is the key to problem solving, and leadership is best described as providing purpose, direction and motivation to the people who will solve the problem under the conditions that confront them. Now go back to the TRADOC Human Dimension study referenced in post #6. Interesting turn of events, no?
Basically, there is a argument going on throughout the Army, and the defense community in general, between a group who believes that future conflict ( at least for the near future) belongs to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies - variously called 'small wars' or 'long wars' and a group that says that these types of conflicts are not what the Army is intended for, and we cannot lose sight of the need for massive forces in large scale land warfare.
The insurgency/counterinsurgency argument, "Lets Win the Wars We're In" http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/7.pdf is put forth by LTC (R) John Nagl and the large scale war argument "Lets Build and Army to Win All Wars" http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/8.pdf is proffered by COL Gian P. Gentile. Both are very interesting reads and I highly recommend them. Intentionally, these two are pitted against each other to offer a point/counterpoint argument to spur discussion and thought throughout the services. I think this is absolutely the correct manner to look at any change agent. This is the idea of the 'loyal opposition' I put forth in an earlier post (#16).
The point though is that this larger argument is playing itself out everyday in the arena of unit training as well. There are commanders and NCOs who are looking for new ways to achieve our training needs and those who contend that business as usual is the best way to prepare. Obviously, I fall in the camp of looking for new ways to achieve training readiness, but there are those who question the validity of changing a training construct that has worked well for 30 years or more. The issue is balance. When can we continue to train in the manner that has been successful in the past, and when should we look to find new and innovative solutions to solve our training problems? Most importantly, is there a middle ground?
In light of that question, I was reading "Roots of Strategy" last night and there is a section of the book entitled "My Reveries Upon the Art of War" from Marshall Maurice de Saxe, first published in 1757. I found the opening pages to be very interesting - mostly because they are so relevant today. In the opening portion of the manuscript, de Saxe states "Troops are raised by enlistment with a fixed term, without a fixed term, by compulsion sometimes and most frequently by fraud." He then goes on to point out the issues with each method of raising troops. If raised by enlistment, he states it is "unjust and inhumane not to observe the engagement. These men were free when they contracted the enlistment which binds them and it is against all laws, human or divine, not to keep the promises made to them." Seems to me that we are finally figuring that out now with the end of the 'Stop-Loss' program which forced Soldiers to continue their service beyond their contractual end date when the unit was preparing to deploy. The most interesting quote I found in this section however, stated this: "Troops raised by fraud is also odious. Money is slipped into a man's hand and then he is told he is a Soldier." Ahh, there's a good one! Enlistment, or reenlistment, by bribery. Dangling enough money in front of a Soldier that he/she in enticed to join or remain.
de Saxe's commentary goes on and on about different aspects of raising and caring for an Army. Everything from feeding, to clothing, to paying them. The thought struck me that 252 years later and the exact same issues are still faced today. The only thing that has changed are the conditions under which the problem is situated. Hang on to this part...252 years, same problem.
Which, I think, leads me to this thought. The most important part of solving any problem is to understand it first. Building, feeding, paying, training and fighting an Army - or any organization - will always raise the issues of 'how' and 'why'. What is the purpose of the endeavor? And why must it be done this way? These are the universal Task questions that must be answered. The Standard is also equally universal - an army raised must prevail over the adversary. A business must provide a relevant service to its' customer. The Standard, however, must address and answer the 'how' and 'why' portions above. The only thing that appears to continually change are the Conditions under which that Standard is achieved, be it the Army or business. For the Army, that it is currently being done under the insurgency/counterinsurgency viewpoint. Whether or not that is the right answer remains to be seen. However, applying a new solution to a little understood problem won't necessarily be successful, and blind faith in any historically systematic approach is likely at some point to come to a point of irrelevancy.
The key is understanding the problem and looking at all solutions equally. There may be 4 different ways of looking at this: Old problem/Old solution, Old problem/New solution, New problem/Old solution, and New problem/New solution. And the answer to that will be found in the viewpoint of the people in the organization itself. Hang on to this...Old problem/? solution
And so we return to people. As this blog has progressed, at times I have wondered where the hell it's going, or what my point in some of this stuff is. The more I write however, the more some generic themes keep rising to the surface. And they always seem to come back to people. Any organization - an army or a business or the Kiwanis club or faith group has to remain oriented on it's founding principles, and the people that comprise it. I found another example of this 'people first' principle yesterday in "Military Review". http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091031_art011.pdf This article struck me because of the manner in which MG Stone approached the insurgent detainee problem. Instead of viewing the detainee as only an enemy combatant, Stone looked at them from a human standpoint. They are people. Using that view, he found that most were illiterate and under-educated with little or no skill sets and little hope for themselves or their families. Becoming an insurgent combatant was an almost a forgone conclusion given little or no other options coupled with being manipulated by local religious/political leaders due to ignorance. By addressing these underlying conditions - in light if their status as detainees - and implementing education, job skill and religious programs, as well as protecting and providing interaction with family and loved ones, Stone has seen a dramatic decrease in detainee violence and a 1% recidivism rate amongst those detainees who have been released. Interesting. Treat them as people first and whatever other label second. Old problem/New solution
So, people are the binding parts of the organization. The ''how' and 'why' of the Task must meet the expected Standard as seen through changing Conditions by the people who weave the 3 parts together. People are also found inside of the 'existing solution' and 'new solution' parts of the the training problem outlined above. And these two are almost always in conflict. The 2 groups push against each other continuously and that friction of ideas and methods provides a more clear understanding of the problem and its possible solutions under current Conditions.
This may seem like a very long winded way of arriving at the very obvious conclusion that people are the center of gravity for all problem/solution issues. Most of you - all 3 that read this - are probably saying to yourselves, "Duh! I could have said that in 2 sentences instead of 2 pages!" But, if it really is that easy, then why is it so hard to understand? Why do we still face the same issues as de Saxe did 252 years later with no better understanding than he had? Why do we have the same training issues, the same policy issues, the same social issues? Why are Nagl and Gentile slugging it out on the pages of JFQ? Maybe, it's because we don't spend enough time looking at the solutions holistically, that is, not assigning a value to them, and seeing them through the light of the people involved first. Maybe we spend too much time assigning value judgments up front and not enough time trying to understand the problem before we assign a solution.
And, if you look very very carefully there you'll again run into COL Boyd. Orientation of the people is the key to problem solving, and leadership is best described as providing purpose, direction and motivation to the people who will solve the problem under the conditions that confront them. Now go back to the TRADOC Human Dimension study referenced in post #6. Interesting turn of events, no?
#22 Women in the Army Chapter 3...Ahead of Our Time
One of the conversations I most enjoy when dealing with younger leaders has to do with women in the Army and why they join. In an earlier post (#3 ), I alluded to this and have also made the argument at other times that, in many ways, the Army puts women in a very tough spot. As long as we continue to force her to choose between motherhood and service, we (the Army) will lose. Although strides are being made to improve a woman's ability to both serve her nation and raise a child, not enough is being done.
The attached link is from an article in the New York Times. They have been running a series on women in combat which you can find on their home page. Ultimately, the article highlights the challenge of combining motherhood with service and deployments. Check it out here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/us/27mothers.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss
If I were in charge of the Army for a day, my plan would be pretty simple. Since most women can continue their daily jobs for at least the first 6 - 7 months of their pregnancy, they would do so. Unless a Dr. said otherwise. In that instance, the doctor would win. From month 7 on, they would go on maternity leave for 1 year. That would give them the last 2 months to prepare for the arrival of their child, and another 10 months after the birth to bond, breast feed, nurture their infant and work themselves slowly back into pre-pregnancy physical shape. It would also provide the critical time necessary to plan, and figure out how they will provide for their new family when they go back to work. It would simply be as if the world stopped at a moment in time, and then picked up again 12 months later.
What would the 'cost' of this be? Obviously, there is a risk of some Soldiers intentionally becoming pregnant in order to escape an impending deployment, and certainly there would be those who would do so. But they already exist today. My guess though is that it would be a negligible amount. Another concern is that those Soldiers are on the books, but wouldn't be deployable, so I cannot get a person in exchange for them who can deploy. This is manageable at both local personnel and Army Human Resources Command level, especially given 7 months lead time. If, as has been previously stated, only 15% of the Army is female, it is highly unlikely that all 15% are going to be pregnant at the same time. More likely 3 or 4%. (That's a total guess on my part). This is really a very small total number, and of that, those who serve in absolutely critical positions is less than 1%.
If the Army were to do this, would it be reasonable to extend her contract for the additional year in exchange for a year's paycheck and the health care savings attendant to having a baby? I think so. Right now, the Army offers officers the ability to pursue an advanced degree in whatever field they choose in exchange for an extended service obligation. Free education - making them more marketable - in trade for X amount more years of service. So, why not do it for expectant mothers? Now, I can almost hear people saying that a plan like that amounts to an involuntary extension, because if she does not intend to reenlist and gets pregnant inside of a her last year, then you have actually signed her up for however long she had remaining, plus the incurred obligation. Not necessarily. If she chooses to get out on time, then she still can, but the Army will have no obligation to provide for her health care after she leaves the service. All this would do is provide a better choice, allow for critical planning time, and allow a new mother and her infant to spend the first 10 months of their lives together. In the long run, I think many women would feel like additional incurred service would be well worth it.
The attached link is from an article in the New York Times. They have been running a series on women in combat which you can find on their home page. Ultimately, the article highlights the challenge of combining motherhood with service and deployments. Check it out here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/us/27mothers.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss
If I were in charge of the Army for a day, my plan would be pretty simple. Since most women can continue their daily jobs for at least the first 6 - 7 months of their pregnancy, they would do so. Unless a Dr. said otherwise. In that instance, the doctor would win. From month 7 on, they would go on maternity leave for 1 year. That would give them the last 2 months to prepare for the arrival of their child, and another 10 months after the birth to bond, breast feed, nurture their infant and work themselves slowly back into pre-pregnancy physical shape. It would also provide the critical time necessary to plan, and figure out how they will provide for their new family when they go back to work. It would simply be as if the world stopped at a moment in time, and then picked up again 12 months later.
What would the 'cost' of this be? Obviously, there is a risk of some Soldiers intentionally becoming pregnant in order to escape an impending deployment, and certainly there would be those who would do so. But they already exist today. My guess though is that it would be a negligible amount. Another concern is that those Soldiers are on the books, but wouldn't be deployable, so I cannot get a person in exchange for them who can deploy. This is manageable at both local personnel and Army Human Resources Command level, especially given 7 months lead time. If, as has been previously stated, only 15% of the Army is female, it is highly unlikely that all 15% are going to be pregnant at the same time. More likely 3 or 4%. (That's a total guess on my part). This is really a very small total number, and of that, those who serve in absolutely critical positions is less than 1%.
If the Army were to do this, would it be reasonable to extend her contract for the additional year in exchange for a year's paycheck and the health care savings attendant to having a baby? I think so. Right now, the Army offers officers the ability to pursue an advanced degree in whatever field they choose in exchange for an extended service obligation. Free education - making them more marketable - in trade for X amount more years of service. So, why not do it for expectant mothers? Now, I can almost hear people saying that a plan like that amounts to an involuntary extension, because if she does not intend to reenlist and gets pregnant inside of a her last year, then you have actually signed her up for however long she had remaining, plus the incurred obligation. Not necessarily. If she chooses to get out on time, then she still can, but the Army will have no obligation to provide for her health care after she leaves the service. All this would do is provide a better choice, allow for critical planning time, and allow a new mother and her infant to spend the first 10 months of their lives together. In the long run, I think many women would feel like additional incurred service would be well worth it.
#21 Is McChrystal reading our Blog?
Check out the link below. Could be we have another anonymous reader! Ha! Wouldn't that be cool!
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/26/AR2009092601748.html?wprss=rss_nation
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/26/AR2009092601748.html?wprss=rss_nation
#20 Guest Post from Mac re: #19 and the Lessons We can Learn
Fen, below is a comment to "#19 A Strategic Communication Follow-Up". Sorry it's in an email but I needed to go back and forth between what I'm writing and what was written.
Interesting exchange. As I read the SGM's email, it took a minute to realize who it was as I had read much of what he wrote in the not too distant past. This is, of course, because that SGM gave myself and the other junior enlisted in our office the same messages as "homework" during our brief time in his presence. As an example of mentorship, this particular SGM is perhaps unique from my perspective. I did not have to go to him seeking answers or guidance; He came to me to purposely impart knowledge and experience.
However, in the context of your original post on Gen. Caldwell's piece concerning Strategic Communication, I think he misunderstood what you were saying. I am in total agreement with your thesis that Strategic Communications in this war are not singly the purview of those who wear brass and operate at the CJTF or even Brigade level; That the individual soldier has a role to play in communicating the strategic message. I also think the leaders operating at the CJTF or higher levels of command realize this fact. The problem is at the intermediate and lower level, to include the individual soldier. At those levels, for multiple reasons, the idea that Pvt. Snuffy needs to be just as involved communicating the strategic message as LTG Sniffy is not realized, most critically by Pvt. Snuffy him/herself.
The strategic message is the basis for the overall mission of the organization. It is the purpose in Task, Purpose and Intent at the "Strategic" level. In the context of COIN, the organization's task is to defeat the insurgents by winning over the support of the people. The organization's purpose then is to convince the people that it is safer and more beneficial to work with the organization rather than the insurgents; Thus the message "We are friends, they are foes". The organizations intent is to communicate this message through words and deeds in order to demonstrate the validity of the message. If the words and deeds validate the message, convincing the people of the truth of the message, the people will gravitate to the organization and away from the insurgents thereby reducing the support for the insurgents. Without the support of the people, an insurgency will die thus bringing about the accomplishment of the task. That is a general, theoretical explanation of COIN. It is far more complicated.
The point is that the "words" put out at the strategic level are only validated in the eyes of the people by the "deeds" performed by the soldiers at the tactical/interpersonal level. Therefore, it is vital that ALL members of the organization be aware of and understand the impact their actions have on the accomplishment of the Strategic Mission. This requires more than an abstract awareness of the "message". It requires a constant awareness of the shifting environments the soldier is interacting within.
Having and maintaining that constant situational awareness requires the ability to see beyond your immediate physical and mental environment. In other words, to see the "Big Picture". The soldier, at all levels, will have smaller, individual missions (tasks) to accomplish. Accomplishing these smaller missions all play a part in the organization accomplishing it's overall strategic mission. Thus, it is required that all members of the organization, while accomplishing their immediate tasks, maintain an almost subdued or subliminal awareness of the overall, higher purpose of the organization; The Strategic Mission, the Strategic Message.
Far too often, even those of us who understand the Strategic Mission and Message in the abstract fail to contribute to its communication and success in the physical. We conceptualize it in the sense of, for example, the interactions of a PRT or a patrol in a village. In those instances, the effects of the message to be communicated is easier to visualize. Win the trust of the villagers, turn them to our side, deny the enemy support and sanctuary. You could say we communicate the message "outside the wire". But by limiting our understanding of the Strategic Message through the prism of "outside the wire", we render the implications of our interactions with local nationals "inside the wire" invisible. We hire hundreds, perhaps thousands of LNs to do work on our FOBs. They clean our latrines, mop our floors, build our buildings, wash our dishes and fuel our vehicles. They are paid to do these things. We do this as part of our Strategic Mission to build a viable, stable state part of which is a viable economy. It is better they earn a wage for building something instead of planting an IED. For some reason, because they are on the FOB, we take for granted that they have been "turned" to our side, never stopping to think that our words and deeds "inside the wire" may "turn" them to the other side. Therefore, though they are there, they are not there. They exist physically, we see them and are aware of there presence. But they are invisible in the abstract, larger picture so we fail to see the impact of our conduct on Strategic Communications within the confines of the FOB. I will give you an example.
While at Bagram working in the JOC, I got involved in a small peripheral way in an incident concerning a KBR foreman, the LNs working for him and an Afghan interpreter working for us. The project was the gym under construction on the JOC compound. I'll get into the dynamics of the situation later. For now, let's just say the interpreter had some concerns about the conduct of the KBR foreman and for some reason was directed to the J3 office to address them. He came to the office late at night when only myself and the Chief of Training were in the office. I got involved initially to steer him out of the office and to whoever may actually have been able to address his problem. It was not something that pertained to the operations of the J3 office. First we went to the gym to talk to subcontractor overseeing the project. From there we went to DIVENG for further guidance and found out the person to talk to was an Air Force LTC at the FET. Thinking my job was done I told him where to go the next day and wrote down the LTC's name. However, the interpreter was still lost and asked if I would go with him. I agreed to help him and told him to meet me at my office the next morning and we would walk down to the FET. I realized I had now become the interpreter for the interpreter. Maybe a better description would be the guide through the Byzantine corridors of the military bureaucracy. The next morning, he showed up and I told my immediate superior where I was going and then had to give a quick explanation why. My immediate superior was my NCOIC who told me not to get involved or wrapped up in something that was not my concern but did let me go. Basically, he told me that infamous line "stay in your lane". We went to the FET, talked to the LTC and from there I explained that there wasn't much more I could do to help since I had a job to do and by virtue of my rank would not be all that effective. I returned to my lane.
I mentioned the dynamics of the situation which were influential to my getting further involved than I normally would. The interpreter had witnessed the KBR foreman, an Iraqi-American oddly enough, verbally abusing and berating the Afghan workers. He tried to intervene to explain to the foreman that what he was doing was, in Afghan culture, insulting and humiliating and even offered to help talk to the workers to get the Foreman's point across in a more calmer manner. The foreman's response was belligerent and berating to the interpreter. It was also in front of the Afghan workers. Interestingly, the interpreter's concern was not about the treatment he received but the impact it and the the treatment of the workers might have on a wider level. In other words, how it effected the Strategic Message. You see, as he explained, those workers go home at night and they talk to the other Afghans who don't work on the FOB. The Taliban's Strategic Message is that the Americans and their allies are not in Afghanistan to help but to subjugate and exploit the Afghan people. The actions of that foreman had the potential to validate the Talibans message and invalidate ours. If those of us in uniform allowed that to happen with no repercussions on the foreman, not only would we help the enemy but we also might demoralize and turn our ally; i.e the interpreter. So I saw it as part of my duty in accomplishing the Strategic Mission to help the interpreter address his concerns. If I had followed the guidance of my NCOIC, I would have been shirking my part in accomplishing that mission.
My NCOIC at the time was SFC Fenlason who is now MSG Fenlason writng posts on a blog about Strategic Communication. Hmm...sooo tempting. But seriously, the purpose of this story is not as an indictment or attack on MSG Fenlason. It's more of an AAR or Lessons Learned purpose. I don't know if you were even considering Strategic Communication at the time. If so, it was probably in the context of what happened in Iraq or "outside the wire", which is understandable. Personally, I think far too many of us, myself included, who worked in the JOC far too often contextualized the Strategic Mission and Message in the framework of "outside the wire". It was that incident with the interpreter that made me more conscious of the Afghans working on Bagram thus more conscious of how our actions on the FOB effected the Strategic Mission. So I bring this story up more for the sake of contemplation.
The SGM wrote:
" Army leaders adopt and internalize Army values and develop the requisite mental, physical, and emotional attributes. They learn the interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills required to lead soldiers and accomplish missions. Leaders motivate subordinates, conduct operations, and continually develop and improve their units, their Soldiers, and themselves. Leadership is a life-long learning process—in the classroom, in personal study, and in practice.• Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment."
As a soldier and an NCO, I need to know my mission, both my immediate and strategic mission. How can I adapt, how can I motivate subordinates if I don't know the "why" of what I'm being ordered to do? The same applies to those NCOs and Officers above me. How do they motivate me without explaining to me the "why" of what they want me to do? We are told in the Army that shit rolls downhill. Is it too much to ask that a little info follow it?
There is much more to discuss in terms of what the SGM wrote. I hope others join the conversation. For now, I'm signing off. I've already spent all day, two packs of cigarettes, and not enough coffee writing this. I'm almost dreading Monday morning.
Interesting exchange. As I read the SGM's email, it took a minute to realize who it was as I had read much of what he wrote in the not too distant past. This is, of course, because that SGM gave myself and the other junior enlisted in our office the same messages as "homework" during our brief time in his presence. As an example of mentorship, this particular SGM is perhaps unique from my perspective. I did not have to go to him seeking answers or guidance; He came to me to purposely impart knowledge and experience.
However, in the context of your original post on Gen. Caldwell's piece concerning Strategic Communication, I think he misunderstood what you were saying. I am in total agreement with your thesis that Strategic Communications in this war are not singly the purview of those who wear brass and operate at the CJTF or even Brigade level; That the individual soldier has a role to play in communicating the strategic message. I also think the leaders operating at the CJTF or higher levels of command realize this fact. The problem is at the intermediate and lower level, to include the individual soldier. At those levels, for multiple reasons, the idea that Pvt. Snuffy needs to be just as involved communicating the strategic message as LTG Sniffy is not realized, most critically by Pvt. Snuffy him/herself.
The strategic message is the basis for the overall mission of the organization. It is the purpose in Task, Purpose and Intent at the "Strategic" level. In the context of COIN, the organization's task is to defeat the insurgents by winning over the support of the people. The organization's purpose then is to convince the people that it is safer and more beneficial to work with the organization rather than the insurgents; Thus the message "We are friends, they are foes". The organizations intent is to communicate this message through words and deeds in order to demonstrate the validity of the message. If the words and deeds validate the message, convincing the people of the truth of the message, the people will gravitate to the organization and away from the insurgents thereby reducing the support for the insurgents. Without the support of the people, an insurgency will die thus bringing about the accomplishment of the task. That is a general, theoretical explanation of COIN. It is far more complicated.
The point is that the "words" put out at the strategic level are only validated in the eyes of the people by the "deeds" performed by the soldiers at the tactical/interpersonal level. Therefore, it is vital that ALL members of the organization be aware of and understand the impact their actions have on the accomplishment of the Strategic Mission. This requires more than an abstract awareness of the "message". It requires a constant awareness of the shifting environments the soldier is interacting within.
Having and maintaining that constant situational awareness requires the ability to see beyond your immediate physical and mental environment. In other words, to see the "Big Picture". The soldier, at all levels, will have smaller, individual missions (tasks) to accomplish. Accomplishing these smaller missions all play a part in the organization accomplishing it's overall strategic mission. Thus, it is required that all members of the organization, while accomplishing their immediate tasks, maintain an almost subdued or subliminal awareness of the overall, higher purpose of the organization; The Strategic Mission, the Strategic Message.
Far too often, even those of us who understand the Strategic Mission and Message in the abstract fail to contribute to its communication and success in the physical. We conceptualize it in the sense of, for example, the interactions of a PRT or a patrol in a village. In those instances, the effects of the message to be communicated is easier to visualize. Win the trust of the villagers, turn them to our side, deny the enemy support and sanctuary. You could say we communicate the message "outside the wire". But by limiting our understanding of the Strategic Message through the prism of "outside the wire", we render the implications of our interactions with local nationals "inside the wire" invisible. We hire hundreds, perhaps thousands of LNs to do work on our FOBs. They clean our latrines, mop our floors, build our buildings, wash our dishes and fuel our vehicles. They are paid to do these things. We do this as part of our Strategic Mission to build a viable, stable state part of which is a viable economy. It is better they earn a wage for building something instead of planting an IED. For some reason, because they are on the FOB, we take for granted that they have been "turned" to our side, never stopping to think that our words and deeds "inside the wire" may "turn" them to the other side. Therefore, though they are there, they are not there. They exist physically, we see them and are aware of there presence. But they are invisible in the abstract, larger picture so we fail to see the impact of our conduct on Strategic Communications within the confines of the FOB. I will give you an example.
While at Bagram working in the JOC, I got involved in a small peripheral way in an incident concerning a KBR foreman, the LNs working for him and an Afghan interpreter working for us. The project was the gym under construction on the JOC compound. I'll get into the dynamics of the situation later. For now, let's just say the interpreter had some concerns about the conduct of the KBR foreman and for some reason was directed to the J3 office to address them. He came to the office late at night when only myself and the Chief of Training were in the office. I got involved initially to steer him out of the office and to whoever may actually have been able to address his problem. It was not something that pertained to the operations of the J3 office. First we went to the gym to talk to subcontractor overseeing the project. From there we went to DIVENG for further guidance and found out the person to talk to was an Air Force LTC at the FET. Thinking my job was done I told him where to go the next day and wrote down the LTC's name. However, the interpreter was still lost and asked if I would go with him. I agreed to help him and told him to meet me at my office the next morning and we would walk down to the FET. I realized I had now become the interpreter for the interpreter. Maybe a better description would be the guide through the Byzantine corridors of the military bureaucracy. The next morning, he showed up and I told my immediate superior where I was going and then had to give a quick explanation why. My immediate superior was my NCOIC who told me not to get involved or wrapped up in something that was not my concern but did let me go. Basically, he told me that infamous line "stay in your lane". We went to the FET, talked to the LTC and from there I explained that there wasn't much more I could do to help since I had a job to do and by virtue of my rank would not be all that effective. I returned to my lane.
I mentioned the dynamics of the situation which were influential to my getting further involved than I normally would. The interpreter had witnessed the KBR foreman, an Iraqi-American oddly enough, verbally abusing and berating the Afghan workers. He tried to intervene to explain to the foreman that what he was doing was, in Afghan culture, insulting and humiliating and even offered to help talk to the workers to get the Foreman's point across in a more calmer manner. The foreman's response was belligerent and berating to the interpreter. It was also in front of the Afghan workers. Interestingly, the interpreter's concern was not about the treatment he received but the impact it and the the treatment of the workers might have on a wider level. In other words, how it effected the Strategic Message. You see, as he explained, those workers go home at night and they talk to the other Afghans who don't work on the FOB. The Taliban's Strategic Message is that the Americans and their allies are not in Afghanistan to help but to subjugate and exploit the Afghan people. The actions of that foreman had the potential to validate the Talibans message and invalidate ours. If those of us in uniform allowed that to happen with no repercussions on the foreman, not only would we help the enemy but we also might demoralize and turn our ally; i.e the interpreter. So I saw it as part of my duty in accomplishing the Strategic Mission to help the interpreter address his concerns. If I had followed the guidance of my NCOIC, I would have been shirking my part in accomplishing that mission.
My NCOIC at the time was SFC Fenlason who is now MSG Fenlason writng posts on a blog about Strategic Communication. Hmm...sooo tempting. But seriously, the purpose of this story is not as an indictment or attack on MSG Fenlason. It's more of an AAR or Lessons Learned purpose. I don't know if you were even considering Strategic Communication at the time. If so, it was probably in the context of what happened in Iraq or "outside the wire", which is understandable. Personally, I think far too many of us, myself included, who worked in the JOC far too often contextualized the Strategic Mission and Message in the framework of "outside the wire". It was that incident with the interpreter that made me more conscious of the Afghans working on Bagram thus more conscious of how our actions on the FOB effected the Strategic Mission. So I bring this story up more for the sake of contemplation.
The SGM wrote:
" Army leaders adopt and internalize Army values and develop the requisite mental, physical, and emotional attributes. They learn the interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills required to lead soldiers and accomplish missions. Leaders motivate subordinates, conduct operations, and continually develop and improve their units, their Soldiers, and themselves. Leadership is a life-long learning process—in the classroom, in personal study, and in practice.• Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment."
As a soldier and an NCO, I need to know my mission, both my immediate and strategic mission. How can I adapt, how can I motivate subordinates if I don't know the "why" of what I'm being ordered to do? The same applies to those NCOs and Officers above me. How do they motivate me without explaining to me the "why" of what they want me to do? We are told in the Army that shit rolls downhill. Is it too much to ask that a little info follow it?
There is much more to discuss in terms of what the SGM wrote. I hope others join the conversation. For now, I'm signing off. I've already spent all day, two packs of cigarettes, and not enough coffee writing this. I'm almost dreading Monday morning.
#19 A Strategic Communication Follow-Up
Below is an email response that I received from a retired Sergeant Major who I met for a short while in Afghanistan. He is replying to my comments regarding "Strategic Communication" in a blog by General Campbell (See Post #11):
MSG Fenlason,
Two things a leader is supposed to do: 1. Lead Soldiers and units during battle; 2. Prepare Soldiers and units to fight the battle.
COL Mike Malone
Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations are part of our Doctrine. We don't like to participate or take the lead in these operations, favoring offensive and defensive operations instead, but it doesn't mean we don't have competent doctrine to effectively manage and accomplish Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations. I hate what occurred with your element, and especially the outcome, but I can't see blaming the highest levels of command for this breakdown.
As you read these excerpts from FM-1, Chapter 1, remember the opening to the NCO Creed: I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of Soldiers. No one is more professional than I.
• Army professionalism is intellectual, physical, and moral in nature; it requires expert knowledge of the concepts and tools of its trade. It is intellectual because the unique body of expertise required in military operations is extensive. The conduct of war, its technology, and the execution of military strategy, operations, and tactics are complex matters, certainly as demanding as the practice of any other profession. Moreover, Army professionals must exercise their expertise against intelligent adversaries. The consequences of failure in our profession—both for the Soldier and the Nation—are more dire than those in any other.
• The need to master the intellectual, physical, and moral aspects of warfare forms the basis for our system of professional military education. Every Army leader must master all aspects of warfare, personally committing to the career-long process of learning, evaluating, and adapting to changing security environments, technologies, and military operations. Through this process, The Army professional continually develops expertise in the practice of the art and science of war.
• Leadership is vital to maintaining an agile and versatile force. Leaders inspire Soldiers to behave professionally and to accomplish missions effectively.
• Army leaders adopt and internalize Army values and develop the requisite mental, physical, and emotional attributes. They learn the interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills required to lead soldiers and accomplish missions. Leaders motivate subordinates, conduct operations, and continually develop and improve their units, their Soldiers, and themselves. Leadership is a life-long learning process—in the classroom, in personal study, and in practice.
• Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.
• Today's environment demands more from Army leaders then ever before. The Army needs adaptive leaders—leaders that can successfully operate across the range of military operations. It needs adaptive leaders who can be home one day and, within hours, conduct military operations anywhere in the world. The Army needs adaptive leaders who can operate in all technological environments—from hand-to-hand combat to offensive information operations.
FM 3-0, the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations, presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience. It was published several months before 9/11 occurred, but we didn't focus on or teach in our institutions more than Offensive or Defensive Operations in chapters 7 and 8.
The answer to the current dilemma was always in FM 3-0, chapter 9, just as it was in FM 101-5 beforehand.
9-16. Stability operations are inherently complex and place great demands on small units. Small unit leaders are required to develop interpersonal skills such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and critical language phrases while maintaining warfighting skills. They must also remain calm and exercise good judgment under considerable pressure. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. Often, stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.
Considerations for Stability Operations
• Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions
• Display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner
• Act decisively to prevent escalation
• Apply force selectively and discriminately
The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, the Soldier’s soul, are everything. Unless the Soldier’s soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.
General George C. Marshall
What you had was a leadership breakdown. Where it occurred is open to debate. The pillars of leader development include operational assignments, institutional learning, and self development. I know ANCOC didn’t focus on these skill sets and I am convinced your previous assignments didn’t adequately prepare you or your troops for this type of combat. The same is probably true for your commander. In retrospect, you now have the insight to be a better Platoon Sergeant and would no doubt train and prepare your soldiers differently.
If I remember right, you took the helm of that platoon shortly before the deployment, so nothing may have made a difference. Still, I think you underestimated the gravity of your leadership responsibilities and are still failing to come to grips with your own shortcomings, or the shortcomings of the entire NCO development system.
Your argument is 75 years out of date:
"The commander who lacks the moral courage and the professional skill to develop and maintain a thoroughly competent corps of noncommissioned officers throughout his command thereby demonstrates his inability to assume the responsibilities of leadership in combat. Such a commander forfeits the confidence and respect of his subordinates. He destroys the morale of his organization. He will surely fail in battle. Success in combat depends upon the character and qualifications of the noncommissioned officers commanding small units. They must be outstanding leaders with a high sense of duty and a strong will. They must be resourceful and willing to assume responsibility. In order to insure that our noncommissioned officers are equal to the tasks that lie ahead of them, commanders of all echelons will give their personal attention to improving the quality and prestige of those noncommissioned officers who exercise command responsibilities." -1944 War Department Circular 70
Today, that is a leader responsibility, not a commanders.
What follows is my reply to him.
Thanks for replying to my post. It surprises me how few NCOs are paying attention to the discussions going on in higher echelons of the Army. I see that you are retired now, congratulations. I also see that you are back at Bagram, so I know that you will continue to assist leaders with the development tools they need. With regard to your specific comments regarding my post, I must admit on first reading to have become angry. However, as I read it again and again, those emotions passed and I would like to address it as best I can. Forgive me if my thoughts become somewhat disjointed.
First, there is no doubt that there were many leadership failures in 1st platoon and many people (investigators, lawyers, reporters, Senior Army Leaders etc) have all tried to place the correct accountability in the right places. All of us who were a part of that leadership team own a portion of that responsibility, not only the commissioned officer corps. As you rightfully stated though, nothing in my previous 16 years in the Army - operational, or institutional prepared me adequately for that particular set of circumstances. In fact, I and others, did the best we knew how to do under the circumstances. In the end, the were no Army "approved" solutions to those events except for people taking what they believed to be the morally correct actions when the incident came to light. Others are allowed to have their own opinions of our actions and decisions, and we have to live with their judgements. It is also pertinent to state that I took over the platoon in-country, after they had suffered 4 KIA (PL, SL, TL and Soldier), had a PSG quit, and another get fired. I was the 3rd Platoon Sergeant in a 45 day period. The day of my arrival, the American portion of their FOB burned to the ground. The murders of the Iraqi family happened on my 5th week in charge. On that day, I was short my Platoon Leader and 2 Squad Leaders due to EML. I am not making excuses here, those are statements of fact that represent the conditions at the time.
Having said that, my purpose in responding to that particular blog and bringing up the 1st platoon war crime was not to "blame" the Chain of Command, as you suggested, but to highlight the fact that there can be tactical, operational, and strategic impacts of an individual Soldier's action(s) and yet we do nothing to train the Soldier to be aware of this. In the case of first platoon, there is evidence that when my Soldiers were attacked and abducted at the AVLB in June, that that attack was in retaliation for the actions of the other Soldiers in March. Additionally, the 2BDE, 10th Mtn unit that replaced us in Sep 06 had 4 Soldiers abducted in the same general area. It was reported in the international press at the time of the attack against the Iraqi family that a local Imam stated that "It will take 10 American lives to avenge the rape and murder of that Iraqi girl." That message was reiterated when the video of the abduction of my Soldiers was released on the Internet. Today, I read an article in INFANTRY Magazine (Marcgh-June 09 issue) that outlined the efforts of C 1/187 who replaced the 2/10 unit in Yusifiyah. There, the actions of my Soldiers continued to have locally strategic effect on the decisions and actions of both AIF and US forces. So, 4 Soldiers commit a heinous crime in early 2006, the effect of which is felt in '07 by the 2/10 unit and has operational implications for the 187 unit that followed them. Being that the Sunni Triangle was also considered the southern route into Bagdad, and that the incident galvanized and solidified tribal support for AQI against US and Iraqi Army forces, it seems reasonable that there can be theater strategic consequences to local actions.
I think what bothered me the most about the blog was the post that followed mine where it was implied that Strategic Communication is the pervue of CJTF or 3 star officers. That I take offense to. As Admiral Mullen, General McChrystal and others have said, it's not what we say, it our actions that count. That is a lesson that can be taught to all Soldiers, and something recognized by the 1/187 article. The unit took special pains to remind Soldiers that even if they suffered casualties etc, that random violence or a disproportionate response was not going to lead to mission success. In fact, that is exactly the same message that General McChrystal published recently in his guidance to US forces in Afghanistan - it is our actions at the local level that will carry the day and provide the concrete proof of the loftier "Strategic Communication" of senior leaders. I found it interesting that none of the other posters picked up on that idea. Maybe because they were too interested in the theoretical implications etc. It really is a simple message. Why should it be a sort of cottage industry for senior leaders?
We live in an instant communication world. The actions of a Soldier at any point on the battlefield can have immediate world-wide impact. The actions of 1st platoon both in the March incident involving the Iraqi family and the June incident involving the Soldiers at the AVLB were reported internationally overnight, and caused responses at the very highest levels of the Army and our government. In light of that, the idea that message sculpting can only be done by very senior leaders in almost laughable. In my case it was done by Steven Dale Green, a 23 year old kid from Midland Texas.
Finally, the only part of your reply that personally bugged me was your assertion that I have not accepted personal responsibility for what happened. I will tell you that not a day has gone by in the intervening 3 years that I have not asked myself what, if anything, I could have done differently. I have paid an emotionally heavy price for my time as the Platoon Sergeant of 1st platoon, and believe that I did the best I could do, with the Soldiers I had, under the circumstances I was faced with. Others may have done things differently than I did - with potentially different results. We will never know. That is the burden of leadership and command. It is the burden that with neither pride nor regret I carry daily. You are correct when you said that that time has made me a better leader. Crucibles have a way of doing that.
I would very much like to continue this dialogue with you if you are so inclined. In the short time we shared in Bagram during RIP/TOA, I was very impressed by you, your actions and your committment to the NCO Corps. Thanks for your time. Jeff Fenlason
There is a lot of really good stuff in this exchange. Please read it and absorb what he said. All that doctrine and manual stuff is important. How you accomplish those things is critical. That is the very hard work of leadership.
MSG Fenlason,
Two things a leader is supposed to do: 1. Lead Soldiers and units during battle; 2. Prepare Soldiers and units to fight the battle.
COL Mike Malone
Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations are part of our Doctrine. We don't like to participate or take the lead in these operations, favoring offensive and defensive operations instead, but it doesn't mean we don't have competent doctrine to effectively manage and accomplish Stability and Counter Insurgency Operations. I hate what occurred with your element, and especially the outcome, but I can't see blaming the highest levels of command for this breakdown.
As you read these excerpts from FM-1, Chapter 1, remember the opening to the NCO Creed: I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of Soldiers. No one is more professional than I.
• Army professionalism is intellectual, physical, and moral in nature; it requires expert knowledge of the concepts and tools of its trade. It is intellectual because the unique body of expertise required in military operations is extensive. The conduct of war, its technology, and the execution of military strategy, operations, and tactics are complex matters, certainly as demanding as the practice of any other profession. Moreover, Army professionals must exercise their expertise against intelligent adversaries. The consequences of failure in our profession—both for the Soldier and the Nation—are more dire than those in any other.
• The need to master the intellectual, physical, and moral aspects of warfare forms the basis for our system of professional military education. Every Army leader must master all aspects of warfare, personally committing to the career-long process of learning, evaluating, and adapting to changing security environments, technologies, and military operations. Through this process, The Army professional continually develops expertise in the practice of the art and science of war.
• Leadership is vital to maintaining an agile and versatile force. Leaders inspire Soldiers to behave professionally and to accomplish missions effectively.
• Army leaders adopt and internalize Army values and develop the requisite mental, physical, and emotional attributes. They learn the interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills required to lead soldiers and accomplish missions. Leaders motivate subordinates, conduct operations, and continually develop and improve their units, their Soldiers, and themselves. Leadership is a life-long learning process—in the classroom, in personal study, and in practice.
• Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.
• Today's environment demands more from Army leaders then ever before. The Army needs adaptive leaders—leaders that can successfully operate across the range of military operations. It needs adaptive leaders who can be home one day and, within hours, conduct military operations anywhere in the world. The Army needs adaptive leaders who can operate in all technological environments—from hand-to-hand combat to offensive information operations.
FM 3-0, the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations, presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience. It was published several months before 9/11 occurred, but we didn't focus on or teach in our institutions more than Offensive or Defensive Operations in chapters 7 and 8.
The answer to the current dilemma was always in FM 3-0, chapter 9, just as it was in FM 101-5 beforehand.
9-16. Stability operations are inherently complex and place great demands on small units. Small unit leaders are required to develop interpersonal skills such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and critical language phrases while maintaining warfighting skills. They must also remain calm and exercise good judgment under considerable pressure. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. Often, stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.
Considerations for Stability Operations
• Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions
• Display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner
• Act decisively to prevent escalation
• Apply force selectively and discriminately
The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, the Soldier’s soul, are everything. Unless the Soldier’s soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.
General George C. Marshall
What you had was a leadership breakdown. Where it occurred is open to debate. The pillars of leader development include operational assignments, institutional learning, and self development. I know ANCOC didn’t focus on these skill sets and I am convinced your previous assignments didn’t adequately prepare you or your troops for this type of combat. The same is probably true for your commander. In retrospect, you now have the insight to be a better Platoon Sergeant and would no doubt train and prepare your soldiers differently.
If I remember right, you took the helm of that platoon shortly before the deployment, so nothing may have made a difference. Still, I think you underestimated the gravity of your leadership responsibilities and are still failing to come to grips with your own shortcomings, or the shortcomings of the entire NCO development system.
Your argument is 75 years out of date:
"The commander who lacks the moral courage and the professional skill to develop and maintain a thoroughly competent corps of noncommissioned officers throughout his command thereby demonstrates his inability to assume the responsibilities of leadership in combat. Such a commander forfeits the confidence and respect of his subordinates. He destroys the morale of his organization. He will surely fail in battle. Success in combat depends upon the character and qualifications of the noncommissioned officers commanding small units. They must be outstanding leaders with a high sense of duty and a strong will. They must be resourceful and willing to assume responsibility. In order to insure that our noncommissioned officers are equal to the tasks that lie ahead of them, commanders of all echelons will give their personal attention to improving the quality and prestige of those noncommissioned officers who exercise command responsibilities." -1944 War Department Circular 70
Today, that is a leader responsibility, not a commanders.
What follows is my reply to him.
Thanks for replying to my post. It surprises me how few NCOs are paying attention to the discussions going on in higher echelons of the Army. I see that you are retired now, congratulations. I also see that you are back at Bagram, so I know that you will continue to assist leaders with the development tools they need. With regard to your specific comments regarding my post, I must admit on first reading to have become angry. However, as I read it again and again, those emotions passed and I would like to address it as best I can. Forgive me if my thoughts become somewhat disjointed.
First, there is no doubt that there were many leadership failures in 1st platoon and many people (investigators, lawyers, reporters, Senior Army Leaders etc) have all tried to place the correct accountability in the right places. All of us who were a part of that leadership team own a portion of that responsibility, not only the commissioned officer corps. As you rightfully stated though, nothing in my previous 16 years in the Army - operational, or institutional prepared me adequately for that particular set of circumstances. In fact, I and others, did the best we knew how to do under the circumstances. In the end, the were no Army "approved" solutions to those events except for people taking what they believed to be the morally correct actions when the incident came to light. Others are allowed to have their own opinions of our actions and decisions, and we have to live with their judgements. It is also pertinent to state that I took over the platoon in-country, after they had suffered 4 KIA (PL, SL, TL and Soldier), had a PSG quit, and another get fired. I was the 3rd Platoon Sergeant in a 45 day period. The day of my arrival, the American portion of their FOB burned to the ground. The murders of the Iraqi family happened on my 5th week in charge. On that day, I was short my Platoon Leader and 2 Squad Leaders due to EML. I am not making excuses here, those are statements of fact that represent the conditions at the time.
Having said that, my purpose in responding to that particular blog and bringing up the 1st platoon war crime was not to "blame" the Chain of Command, as you suggested, but to highlight the fact that there can be tactical, operational, and strategic impacts of an individual Soldier's action(s) and yet we do nothing to train the Soldier to be aware of this. In the case of first platoon, there is evidence that when my Soldiers were attacked and abducted at the AVLB in June, that that attack was in retaliation for the actions of the other Soldiers in March. Additionally, the 2BDE, 10th Mtn unit that replaced us in Sep 06 had 4 Soldiers abducted in the same general area. It was reported in the international press at the time of the attack against the Iraqi family that a local Imam stated that "It will take 10 American lives to avenge the rape and murder of that Iraqi girl." That message was reiterated when the video of the abduction of my Soldiers was released on the Internet. Today, I read an article in INFANTRY Magazine (Marcgh-June 09 issue) that outlined the efforts of C 1/187 who replaced the 2/10 unit in Yusifiyah. There, the actions of my Soldiers continued to have locally strategic effect on the decisions and actions of both AIF and US forces. So, 4 Soldiers commit a heinous crime in early 2006, the effect of which is felt in '07 by the 2/10 unit and has operational implications for the 187 unit that followed them. Being that the Sunni Triangle was also considered the southern route into Bagdad, and that the incident galvanized and solidified tribal support for AQI against US and Iraqi Army forces, it seems reasonable that there can be theater strategic consequences to local actions.
I think what bothered me the most about the blog was the post that followed mine where it was implied that Strategic Communication is the pervue of CJTF or 3 star officers. That I take offense to. As Admiral Mullen, General McChrystal and others have said, it's not what we say, it our actions that count. That is a lesson that can be taught to all Soldiers, and something recognized by the 1/187 article. The unit took special pains to remind Soldiers that even if they suffered casualties etc, that random violence or a disproportionate response was not going to lead to mission success. In fact, that is exactly the same message that General McChrystal published recently in his guidance to US forces in Afghanistan - it is our actions at the local level that will carry the day and provide the concrete proof of the loftier "Strategic Communication" of senior leaders. I found it interesting that none of the other posters picked up on that idea. Maybe because they were too interested in the theoretical implications etc. It really is a simple message. Why should it be a sort of cottage industry for senior leaders?
We live in an instant communication world. The actions of a Soldier at any point on the battlefield can have immediate world-wide impact. The actions of 1st platoon both in the March incident involving the Iraqi family and the June incident involving the Soldiers at the AVLB were reported internationally overnight, and caused responses at the very highest levels of the Army and our government. In light of that, the idea that message sculpting can only be done by very senior leaders in almost laughable. In my case it was done by Steven Dale Green, a 23 year old kid from Midland Texas.
Finally, the only part of your reply that personally bugged me was your assertion that I have not accepted personal responsibility for what happened. I will tell you that not a day has gone by in the intervening 3 years that I have not asked myself what, if anything, I could have done differently. I have paid an emotionally heavy price for my time as the Platoon Sergeant of 1st platoon, and believe that I did the best I could do, with the Soldiers I had, under the circumstances I was faced with. Others may have done things differently than I did - with potentially different results. We will never know. That is the burden of leadership and command. It is the burden that with neither pride nor regret I carry daily. You are correct when you said that that time has made me a better leader. Crucibles have a way of doing that.
I would very much like to continue this dialogue with you if you are so inclined. In the short time we shared in Bagram during RIP/TOA, I was very impressed by you, your actions and your committment to the NCO Corps. Thanks for your time. Jeff Fenlason
There is a lot of really good stuff in this exchange. Please read it and absorb what he said. All that doctrine and manual stuff is important. How you accomplish those things is critical. That is the very hard work of leadership.
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