JD has been an avid supporter of my writings for awhile now and I appreciate very much his support. In response to last weeks post, he sent the following reply which deserves a lot of consideration.
I will state my thesis again....no doubt the guys in jail were/are criminals....and for the sake of my point I will say that even if they were lead by "perfect" leaders (not that they exist) that set "ideal command climates" (not that they exist) they would still be in jail because they were/are criminals..having said that....we need to develop leaders who have a mentality like our Navy (and many allied Navies do) has...."if the ship runs aground, the CO is relieved."
....Of course this is extreme and idealistic....but if we teach and develop leaders to internalize this level of responsibility, we will have more responsible and better leaders, better Soldiers, better units, etc....
Of course leaders can't prevent every DUI, drug taking, wife beating, fratricide, accidental discharge, rape etc etc etc...but maybe, just maybe, if we inculcate and develop this level of responsibility....we might get close to the ideal....as an artillery commander, I used to tell myself that I would "relieve myself from command" if my unit was responsible for an "unsafe" round...."I, commander, am responsible for everything the unit does and/or fails to do."
"I, commander (leader), am responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do." We have taught that mantra to generations of leaders and it has been said so many times that we often fail to recognize it's implications. What I hope to do today is take that premise apart a little bit and explore what I think it really means, and the effect it has on both leader and subordinate behavior.
First, while a laudable idea, as JD pointed out in his reply, the entire concept is a practical impossibility. Since leaders cannot "prevent every DUI, drug taking, wife beating, fratricide, accidental discharge, rape etc etc etc", then the very notion of leader responsibility for individual behavior is an unachievable goal. To then create a situation where we will hold the leader responsible and accountable for something that is ultimately unachievable is completely unfair, and creates behavioral and structural requirements for the unit and its' people that can have a negative overall effect. For example, if a leader is somehow going to be held responsible for each and every individual action of their subordinates, then the only way to 'guarantee' a proper outcome will be to micromanage and baby sit them. If I am constantly afraid that someone I lead is going to act or do something inappropriate, and that their behavior or action will have a negative consequence for me, then I will become inherently distrustful. I am consigning my future to a person who may not have the same values, understandings, or discipline that I have. The distrust created by the requirement for 'zero defect' erodes the faith and confidence that I should be demonstrating to my subordinates and that they reflect back to me. The message I'm sending is that they cannot be trusted to do the right thing, so I am required to create a condition where they cannot do the wrong thing. This is bad business in a decentralized fight where hundreds of critical decisions will be made by junior officers and non-commissioned officers every day. I need to trust that corporal or lieutenant because I can only be in one place at a time, and they will be forced to make decisions in my absence. Trust up and down the line is a baseline requirement. And trust is a by-product of both the leader and the led having been placed in decision making situations and both sides having gained an understanding of the other due to the outcome. I observe the decision you made and gain or lose trust accordingly. If you are never given the opportunity to make choices and decisions then I cannot develop the trust required. Conversely, if my decisions and choices make no sense to you then you will lose faith and trust in me as well.
Another unintended consequence of this concept is the creation of a responsibility 'welfare state.' As long as there is someone or something above me who I can blame, then I am no longer responsible for my actions. It seems sometimes that Privates and young Soldiers are not responsible for anything they do, since they have a 'leader' above them who is responsible for them. It must be the leaders fault, because Junior just doesn't know any better. This is fundamentally flawed. Soldiers are taught how to clear their weapons. People know that spouse abuse is wrong. Every teenager in America is aware of the perils of drinking and driving. My Soldiers knew that raping a 14 year old girl was wrong. They knew that murdering her and her 6 year old sister and their parents was wrong. At some point, we are each of us solely responsible for our individual decisions and their outcomes. This ability to mis-place responsibility on a titular leader makes it very easy to shift the blame. We see this all the time in the Army now, where every little decision at the staff level gets pushed into the boss's in-box. Action passed equals action taken, and more importantly, responsibility shifted. I'm not going to make the decision - especially if it involves risk - so I'll just pass it along. That way, if the outcome is bad, I can absolve myself from blame, but more importantly, the institution won't hold me responsible and I'm protected.
The 'zero defect', 'leader-is-responsible-for-everything' mantra has also created the institutional monster called CYA. We fill out form after form and have Soldiers sign 'behavioral contracts', and counseling statements etc and file them away so we can say "I told you so". This further erodes the trust and faith in the unit and confuses leadership with legalese.
Having said that, I do think JD is right about the need to "internalize this level of responsibility". I just think it has a different starting place. I believe that we must start with teaching individual responsibility from day 1. The inculcation, in each Private and Cadet from the day they enter the Army, that ultimately they are responsible for their own behavior and actions is the critical first step to achieving JD's ideal. Over time, the development and maturity of the individual is enhanced; and as they absorb more and more of the Army's cultural norms and expectations, they will in fact become better leaders.
As I have mentioned before, the Millennial generation is considered one of the most sheltered and protected in history. As parents and communities we have created a condition where, in many ways, the young person has never really been held responsible for their actions. We put them into protective gear as soon as they step outside in order to not make them think about the consequences of riding their bicycle down the hill too fast. We fault the school system for them failing to learn. It has never been their fault. They do not grow up with a solid understanding of cause and effect, or that they are responsible for the decisions they make. In effect we have failed to develop a very necessary leadership skill set. And then we send them out into the Army, promote them after a couple of years for being a good follower, and one day they wake up with a new label called leader and we hang the responsibility for others actions and behaviors on their shoulders. What have we done to actually prepare them for that role?
In order to achieve the level of responsibility internalization that is JD's ideal, here is what I think needs to be done.
First, from the very moment a Soldier arrives at Basic Training, they are told that they are responsible for their successful or unsuccessful outcome in the Army. The Drill Sergeant and the institution will provide them a structure and a way to achieve success, but it is their choice alone to accept or reject it. The institution cannot and will not be held responsible for their behavior, they will. The institutions responsibility is to create the environment for development, internalization, and success. The individual must choose to accept or reject the environment.
Second, and very much in line with the thought above, we have to teach from the earliest stages of their development, cause and effect. Because new Soldiers may not possess this understanding as well as we need them to coming in, we must develop it in them. They should clearly understand the intended outcome, and the possible consequences of not achieving it. This would develop the idea of second and third order effects of actions - a skill set that is critical downrange. The method of doing this we already have. If we were to use Task, Purpose, Intent for everything from Day 1, it would help develop decision making skills that will only be enhanced over time and immersion in the Army culture.
Third, we must completely revamp how we teach the 7 Army Values. The Values themselves are the cornerstone of the Army. They are, and must forever remain, the embodiment of the contract between the Army and the Nation. They are the most important part of the internalization process. However, they must become more than vague words. We must find a concrete way to tie the individuals understanding of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage to the institution's understanding. If we accept that different generations will have different interpretations, then it becomes incumbent on the institution to recognize where the new Soldier is starting from and then provide opportunities for the their personal values to be tested and checked against the Army's. In this manner we provide opportunities for internalization.
In it's simplest form, it works like this: YOU made a choice to join the Army. YOU are responsible for that decision. The Army has a set of values, norms and behaviors that we hold dear and form our contract with the country. YOU will have to choose to accept or reject them. YOUR decisions have consequences both good and bad. The Army will provide the opportunity for YOU to learn from those decisions and learn how to recognize potential good and bad outcomes from the decisions YOU make. The 'welfare state' has been removed and replaced with an individual 'opportunity state'.
On a practical level: I teach Soldiers how to properly clear and carry their weapon. I teach them the steps and explain why they should do each step. But I clearly state that the responsibility to do the steps correctly rests with them. By emphasizing their individual requirement and expectation, they pay more attention. If they have a negligent discharge, they already know that they are responsible for causing it, not me or anyone else. They learn to accept that responsibility and internalize the proper procedures. I have trained over 3000 service members from all 4 branches in this manner and have never had anyone have a negligent discharge yet. Maybe I've just been lucky, but I truly believe that by training the Soldier, explaining why the task and steps are important, holding them accountable for their actions and trusting that they can perform the task correctly these results are almost predictable.
Now, lets take a look at what the outcome of an individual vs institutional approach might be. Accepting JD's contention that we need to get to an internalized understanding of individual responsibility, and by removing any pretense that there is anyone else responsible for my actions except me, we could create individuals with enhanced value systems and the critical decision making skills we need today. As values and ethical decisions are made at the personal level, our actions provide demonstrable results to others in the organization. As those others gain an understanding and appreciation for our ethical / moral decision making process, personal trust is enhanced or lost. If trust is enhanced, then the requirement for micromanagement, babysitting, and CYA is reduced. The titular leader spends less time worrying about which decision made by a subordinate will have career implications for him or her, and can then spend more time focusing their efforts on accomplishing their mission. At every level, the need for gnats ass, step-by-step instruction becomes less required based upon the demonstrated internalization of the the Army Values and Task, Purpose and Intent.
I fundamentally disagree with JD's assertion that "leaders are responsible for everything their unit / people do or fail to do." The people who make up the unit are. As I have said before with regard to my time as platoon sergeant, I am responsible for the decisions I made. Not my Lieutenant, not the Company Commander, not anyone else. Me. So, too, were my Soldiers responsible for their actions. The conditions, the circumstances, the climate of the unit ultimately have nothing to do with the morally bankrupt choices they made. Their moral / ethical breakdown belongs solely to them and no one else. If the institution failed, it failed to provide opportunities throughout their careers to test those morals and ethics against the stated value system in place. It assumed they had internalized them instead of ever challenging whether they had or not. Sadly, and horrifically, they had not.
As an institution and as leaders, we have a responsibility to create the condition or environment in which the development of the ethical / moral / operational decision making ability of the subordinate is the key behavioral outcome of every action both in training and deployed. The leader doesn't tell the subordinate how to think or act morally or ethically, the leader designs training and situations for the subordinate to have to make choices that demonstrate moral or ethical behavior. The very outcome of our current war may depend upon it. Somewhere in Afghanistan today, a young Soldier will face a situation where he/she will have two courses of action. Both of those will have the potential for good and bad outcomes. Those outcomes could have a very large impact on the operation. Are we providing that Soldier the tools to make a decision? More importantly have we provided them the strength to stand by the choice they made? And even more critically than that, do we trust them enough to make it?
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#65 Black Hearts Review
In the May/June issue of Military Review there is a 4 page review of "Black Hearts" written by LTC (Ret) Paul Christipher. You can find the link here:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art017.pdf
To date this is probably the most complete and fair-minded review of the book that I have seen. While not completely accurate, LTC Christopher does a very good job of getting at many of the issues that surround that event and the leadership and command climate that existed during our tour. I highly recommend people read it because it offers some strong insights into leadership in general, not just military. I think LTC Christopher's review also demonstrates that issues such as command climate, and willingness to consider different viewpoints are important in all walks of life. Hopefully, his review will further the discussion of the manner and method by which we train military leaders and the critical importance of creating work climates that enhance and build cohesion and a unified understanding of the purpose of the work, no matter the industry.
My real issue with any of the reviews I have seen is that they all focus on only one thing, the perceived or real leadership 'failures' throughout the command. Since I am often lumped into that category along with others, obviously that is not something that is easy to read time after time. However, what absolutely baffles me is that no one seems to place the responsibility for the atrocities committed by those Soldiers where it truly belongs - on them. Every review ends up almost excusing them and implying that they were somehow victims in this event. Consider the following from LTC Christopher's review:
"Frederick’s commitment to detail and organization are brilliant, allowing the perceptive reader to share the frustration and hardship that members of this unit experienced in a climate of dysfunctional leadership. Black Hearts invites its readers to spend long frightening nights on undermanned and isolated guard posts and to accompany squads on patrols looking for roadside bombs during the most dangerous period of the Iraqi occupation. We, as readers, are invited not only to empathize with members of the 1-502, but to vicariously experience the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger, the rebellion, and occasionally, the palpable fear that members of the battalion experienced daily for a year."
I wonder how many other units in Iraq during 2005-2006 had Soldiers who spent "long frightening nights in undermanned and isolated guard posts"? My guess is most. I wonder, how many other units experienced "the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger" etc etc during that time. Again, the answer is most - if not all. How many of those Soldiers and units committed unspeakable acts of depravity? Few, if any. Search as we may for some way to come to grips with what those Soldiers decided to do, the truth still remains that even if the command climate was the most dysfunctional in the entire Army, nothing mitigates, excuses, or minimizes the responsibility of those individuals for their personal actions. Nothing.
LTC Christopher's review does touch on some very important issues that do need to be discussed however, some of which I have mentioned throughout this blog. For example, he states that:
"An obvious question readers may have upon completing Frederick’s book concerns whether members of the chain of command, especially some of the officers and senior officers from brigade on down, should also bear some culpability for the actions of the four men who were convicted. I don’t believe so. While some members of the chain of command were grossly incompetent, they were not unethical, and this is more of an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question. Unlike the murderers and rapists they led, these leaders were not bad people, just deplorable leaders."
"..they were not unethical, and this is more an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question." A critical point. Our leader development programs currently do not place anywhere near enough emphasis on ethical decision making, nor the behavioral dynamics of unit/team design. We simply label anyone with rank and a title a leader and then send them on their way. Without understanding how teams and units are built (or destroyed), and the absolutely fundamental part that human being interaction plays in that creation or destruction, we are continually putting people in the position of having to command something that they have no understanding of.
As a member of that chain of command, I have tried to look at the events and my decisions fairly and openly over the past year. I have not hidden from this, nor have I tried to shy away from asking hard questions. Some might even say that the blog is my way of holding on to that time and to continually punish myself for what happened. For the record, that is not true. I continue to talk about the events that happened to my platoon for one reason only - to get people to understand that what happened to us can very easily happen to others and that the system of leader development that is currently in place has a lot to do with why that is so. I have been supported and demonized equally throughout and that has been hard. Some people have understood that there are some very important lessons to be learned from the Black Hearts story that should fundamentally change the manner and method by which we grow leaders in the Army. Some fall back on the easy label of leadership failure. In effect saying, "We don't have to study this because that was just a group of shitty leaders, and because I'm not one of them, then I don't have to worry about it." And, certainly, no matter what I write here, some people will never get past the idea that all I'm trying to do is make myself feel better. There have been a lot of responses like that lately. That somehow, even if I'm correct that there are very important leader development skills and ideas that need to be studied, because I am a member of the 'failed leadership' group, that my points are somehow diminished because of it. On the contrary, having studied and thought about it almost every day for the past 4 years, I contend that my thoughts and ideas might be an important starting point. There are many times throughout this blog, where the very questions that I have raised, are also being raised by others. For example, this review - as with every other - paints a picture of an extremely toxic leadership climate. No argument. It was extremely toxic. Every Soldier in the battalion knew it and felt it. The question really is, did the leadership know how toxic it's actions were? The answer is no. Why not? Why could they not see what behavioral conditions were being created? And, importantly, even if they could have seen or were aware of how the Soldiers really felt, what could have been done? As a subordinate, there was only so much I could do to try to mitigate that toxicity when it was directed at my Soldiers. Since I've rarely heard from anyone else, the question becomes, what would you have done differently?
LTC Christopher brings up another important point that I have tried to look at in past postings as well. Consider the following:
"The commander of the 1-502 is a central figure in Black Hearts, and it is incontrovertible that his behavior was especially dysfunctional. Leaders who refuse to listen to suggestions from their subordinates unhinge any hope of unit cohesion. Even if the commander’s selected courses of action are always the best ones—which
is a preposterous supposition—the arrogance of not listening to team members denigrates them. Leader arrogance is the mortal enemy of unit cohesion, and the disenchantment of subordinates can sometimes do more to destroy a unit than enemy weapons. In this case, the battalion commander did not simply refuse to listen to his company commanders or senior noncommissioned officers, but he berated,abused, and publicly ridiculed them whenever they spoke up. His actions completely destroyed any notion of team."
That quotation is the exact reason that I have been pushing so hard for the last few months for an inclusive leadership design model. However, if I go back to my earliest leader development school, and find the models of leadership outlined in the old leadership manual, I will find 3 types of leaders, (1) Authoritative (2) Delagative (3) Participative. The 1-502 commander was most certainly an authoritative leader. He was following an Army leadership model that had been laid out for him throughout his career and which suits his personality and inclination. What no one had ever pointed out to him before were the positive and negative effects of such a style. The same can be said for me. I believe that I tend to be a more delagative and participative leader, however, just last week someone accused me of being so arrogant that I could not be taught anything. That would imply that either (1) their perception of me is incorrect, or (2) my self-awareness is not as complete as it should be. Either way, there is the beginning of a misunderstanding by either my followers or myself that could potentially have devastating effects.
Some other examples of why this incident demands such serious study by anyone who would ever aspire to leadership positions:
1. The unit was undermanned - Regardless of how we got there, the truth is that an Army must fight with what it has available be it people or equipment. The political situation that called for the manning in 2005-2006 is beyond my purview. However, as a Soldier, I do the best I can with what I have. In post number 10 I included the following quotation:
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell."
General Edward C. Meyer
The battalion and brigade commanders certainly would have been glad to accept more Soldiers into their battlespace during that time, but there weren't any to be had. We were all doing the best we could with the manpower we had available. It wouldn't be until the 'Surge' that an additional 30,000 troops would be pushed into theater. The land that we controlled as a company in 2005 was later controlled by a battalion in 2007.
2. Empathy - Although I did a poor job last week in sorting out my thoughts regarding empathy, it is the critical link to creating climates of understanding and awareness. While it is possible that the battalion commander was correct that the Soldiers who got killed had become lax, to not recognize the effect that his words would have on the remainder of the unit does demonstrate a lack of understanding of the empathy required whenever we ask someone to do something extremely difficult.
3. What makes COIN hard - It should also be remembered that he had demanded that we extend a hand of friendship to the Iraqi people. He was trying to do COIN before COIN was cool. These were the early days of counterinsurgent operations and people didn't really have a good understanding of what was required and the inherent risks involved. Consider that in current operations in Afghanistan, it is encouraged for Soldiers to take off their protective equipment (once security has been emplaced) when meeting with local elders. This demonstrates trust and respect - both crucial aspects of successful COIN operations.
4. A bottom-up approach - As LTC Christopher points out in his review
"Appropriately, Frederick begins his research“from the bottom up.” He conducts extensive
interviews with the members of the platoon, company,and battalion, and without adding his own evaluative commentary, allowing these Soldiers to report actions, outcomes, and feelings in their own words."
I simply cannot state enough that the Army as an institution must keep an ear tuned to the interpretations and understandings of the myriad levels of people throughout the organization and ensure that each group has the same generalized understanding of the intended outcome. As Black Hearts clearly demonstrates at the microcosmic level, when even one small group becomes disenfranchised or does not have the same understanding as their superiors, then the results can be devastating.
5. Comparisons to My Lai - Finally, for those of you who are members of Facebook, there is a 'Black Hearts' group site that has an interview with the Mr. Frederick regarding comparisons between this incident and the one at My Lai that was filmed for inclusion in a PBS documentary. Although there are some similarities between the two events, there are also some major differences as well. As I mentioned in an earlier post, one of the parts of this tragedy that needs to be considered are the behavioral dynamics that would create a situation where 4 people who might normally not consider actions like this, would suddenly take actions well outside any normal human behavior.
At the end of the day, there will be people who see the 'Black Hearts' incident in the simplest form possible - leadership failure. The issue however, is very much more complex than that. From individual human behaviors, emotions, and feelings to geopolitical military strategy, from a scared kid on a patrol to a leader formed by a different time and circumstance, from a lack of individual ethical and moral underpinning to the honorable behavior of so many others, this event demands careful study at all levels.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art017.pdf
To date this is probably the most complete and fair-minded review of the book that I have seen. While not completely accurate, LTC Christopher does a very good job of getting at many of the issues that surround that event and the leadership and command climate that existed during our tour. I highly recommend people read it because it offers some strong insights into leadership in general, not just military. I think LTC Christopher's review also demonstrates that issues such as command climate, and willingness to consider different viewpoints are important in all walks of life. Hopefully, his review will further the discussion of the manner and method by which we train military leaders and the critical importance of creating work climates that enhance and build cohesion and a unified understanding of the purpose of the work, no matter the industry.
My real issue with any of the reviews I have seen is that they all focus on only one thing, the perceived or real leadership 'failures' throughout the command. Since I am often lumped into that category along with others, obviously that is not something that is easy to read time after time. However, what absolutely baffles me is that no one seems to place the responsibility for the atrocities committed by those Soldiers where it truly belongs - on them. Every review ends up almost excusing them and implying that they were somehow victims in this event. Consider the following from LTC Christopher's review:
"Frederick’s commitment to detail and organization are brilliant, allowing the perceptive reader to share the frustration and hardship that members of this unit experienced in a climate of dysfunctional leadership. Black Hearts invites its readers to spend long frightening nights on undermanned and isolated guard posts and to accompany squads on patrols looking for roadside bombs during the most dangerous period of the Iraqi occupation. We, as readers, are invited not only to empathize with members of the 1-502, but to vicariously experience the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger, the rebellion, and occasionally, the palpable fear that members of the battalion experienced daily for a year."
I wonder how many other units in Iraq during 2005-2006 had Soldiers who spent "long frightening nights in undermanned and isolated guard posts"? My guess is most. I wonder, how many other units experienced "the exhaustion, the frustration, the sense of abandonment, the anger" etc etc during that time. Again, the answer is most - if not all. How many of those Soldiers and units committed unspeakable acts of depravity? Few, if any. Search as we may for some way to come to grips with what those Soldiers decided to do, the truth still remains that even if the command climate was the most dysfunctional in the entire Army, nothing mitigates, excuses, or minimizes the responsibility of those individuals for their personal actions. Nothing.
LTC Christopher's review does touch on some very important issues that do need to be discussed however, some of which I have mentioned throughout this blog. For example, he states that:
"An obvious question readers may have upon completing Frederick’s book concerns whether members of the chain of command, especially some of the officers and senior officers from brigade on down, should also bear some culpability for the actions of the four men who were convicted. I don’t believe so. While some members of the chain of command were grossly incompetent, they were not unethical, and this is more of an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question. Unlike the murderers and rapists they led, these leaders were not bad people, just deplorable leaders."
"..they were not unethical, and this is more an indictment of our military training and certification programs than the character of the leaders in question." A critical point. Our leader development programs currently do not place anywhere near enough emphasis on ethical decision making, nor the behavioral dynamics of unit/team design. We simply label anyone with rank and a title a leader and then send them on their way. Without understanding how teams and units are built (or destroyed), and the absolutely fundamental part that human being interaction plays in that creation or destruction, we are continually putting people in the position of having to command something that they have no understanding of.
As a member of that chain of command, I have tried to look at the events and my decisions fairly and openly over the past year. I have not hidden from this, nor have I tried to shy away from asking hard questions. Some might even say that the blog is my way of holding on to that time and to continually punish myself for what happened. For the record, that is not true. I continue to talk about the events that happened to my platoon for one reason only - to get people to understand that what happened to us can very easily happen to others and that the system of leader development that is currently in place has a lot to do with why that is so. I have been supported and demonized equally throughout and that has been hard. Some people have understood that there are some very important lessons to be learned from the Black Hearts story that should fundamentally change the manner and method by which we grow leaders in the Army. Some fall back on the easy label of leadership failure. In effect saying, "We don't have to study this because that was just a group of shitty leaders, and because I'm not one of them, then I don't have to worry about it." And, certainly, no matter what I write here, some people will never get past the idea that all I'm trying to do is make myself feel better. There have been a lot of responses like that lately. That somehow, even if I'm correct that there are very important leader development skills and ideas that need to be studied, because I am a member of the 'failed leadership' group, that my points are somehow diminished because of it. On the contrary, having studied and thought about it almost every day for the past 4 years, I contend that my thoughts and ideas might be an important starting point. There are many times throughout this blog, where the very questions that I have raised, are also being raised by others. For example, this review - as with every other - paints a picture of an extremely toxic leadership climate. No argument. It was extremely toxic. Every Soldier in the battalion knew it and felt it. The question really is, did the leadership know how toxic it's actions were? The answer is no. Why not? Why could they not see what behavioral conditions were being created? And, importantly, even if they could have seen or were aware of how the Soldiers really felt, what could have been done? As a subordinate, there was only so much I could do to try to mitigate that toxicity when it was directed at my Soldiers. Since I've rarely heard from anyone else, the question becomes, what would you have done differently?
LTC Christopher brings up another important point that I have tried to look at in past postings as well. Consider the following:
"The commander of the 1-502 is a central figure in Black Hearts, and it is incontrovertible that his behavior was especially dysfunctional. Leaders who refuse to listen to suggestions from their subordinates unhinge any hope of unit cohesion. Even if the commander’s selected courses of action are always the best ones—which
is a preposterous supposition—the arrogance of not listening to team members denigrates them. Leader arrogance is the mortal enemy of unit cohesion, and the disenchantment of subordinates can sometimes do more to destroy a unit than enemy weapons. In this case, the battalion commander did not simply refuse to listen to his company commanders or senior noncommissioned officers, but he berated,abused, and publicly ridiculed them whenever they spoke up. His actions completely destroyed any notion of team."
That quotation is the exact reason that I have been pushing so hard for the last few months for an inclusive leadership design model. However, if I go back to my earliest leader development school, and find the models of leadership outlined in the old leadership manual, I will find 3 types of leaders, (1) Authoritative (2) Delagative (3) Participative. The 1-502 commander was most certainly an authoritative leader. He was following an Army leadership model that had been laid out for him throughout his career and which suits his personality and inclination. What no one had ever pointed out to him before were the positive and negative effects of such a style. The same can be said for me. I believe that I tend to be a more delagative and participative leader, however, just last week someone accused me of being so arrogant that I could not be taught anything. That would imply that either (1) their perception of me is incorrect, or (2) my self-awareness is not as complete as it should be. Either way, there is the beginning of a misunderstanding by either my followers or myself that could potentially have devastating effects.
Some other examples of why this incident demands such serious study by anyone who would ever aspire to leadership positions:
1. The unit was undermanned - Regardless of how we got there, the truth is that an Army must fight with what it has available be it people or equipment. The political situation that called for the manning in 2005-2006 is beyond my purview. However, as a Soldier, I do the best I can with what I have. In post number 10 I included the following quotation:
"In the Korean War...I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a Corporal as a platoon leader, a Sergeant as a platoon leader and one other Sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to, when called upon, particularly in combat. Understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell."
General Edward C. Meyer
The battalion and brigade commanders certainly would have been glad to accept more Soldiers into their battlespace during that time, but there weren't any to be had. We were all doing the best we could with the manpower we had available. It wouldn't be until the 'Surge' that an additional 30,000 troops would be pushed into theater. The land that we controlled as a company in 2005 was later controlled by a battalion in 2007.
2. Empathy - Although I did a poor job last week in sorting out my thoughts regarding empathy, it is the critical link to creating climates of understanding and awareness. While it is possible that the battalion commander was correct that the Soldiers who got killed had become lax, to not recognize the effect that his words would have on the remainder of the unit does demonstrate a lack of understanding of the empathy required whenever we ask someone to do something extremely difficult.
3. What makes COIN hard - It should also be remembered that he had demanded that we extend a hand of friendship to the Iraqi people. He was trying to do COIN before COIN was cool. These were the early days of counterinsurgent operations and people didn't really have a good understanding of what was required and the inherent risks involved. Consider that in current operations in Afghanistan, it is encouraged for Soldiers to take off their protective equipment (once security has been emplaced) when meeting with local elders. This demonstrates trust and respect - both crucial aspects of successful COIN operations.
4. A bottom-up approach - As LTC Christopher points out in his review
"Appropriately, Frederick begins his research“from the bottom up.” He conducts extensive
interviews with the members of the platoon, company,and battalion, and without adding his own evaluative commentary, allowing these Soldiers to report actions, outcomes, and feelings in their own words."
I simply cannot state enough that the Army as an institution must keep an ear tuned to the interpretations and understandings of the myriad levels of people throughout the organization and ensure that each group has the same generalized understanding of the intended outcome. As Black Hearts clearly demonstrates at the microcosmic level, when even one small group becomes disenfranchised or does not have the same understanding as their superiors, then the results can be devastating.
5. Comparisons to My Lai - Finally, for those of you who are members of Facebook, there is a 'Black Hearts' group site that has an interview with the Mr. Frederick regarding comparisons between this incident and the one at My Lai that was filmed for inclusion in a PBS documentary. Although there are some similarities between the two events, there are also some major differences as well. As I mentioned in an earlier post, one of the parts of this tragedy that needs to be considered are the behavioral dynamics that would create a situation where 4 people who might normally not consider actions like this, would suddenly take actions well outside any normal human behavior.
At the end of the day, there will be people who see the 'Black Hearts' incident in the simplest form possible - leadership failure. The issue however, is very much more complex than that. From individual human behaviors, emotions, and feelings to geopolitical military strategy, from a scared kid on a patrol to a leader formed by a different time and circumstance, from a lack of individual ethical and moral underpinning to the honorable behavior of so many others, this event demands careful study at all levels.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#64 Empathy
As usual, the folks at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) have provided me once again with a great source document which adds another layer to the discussion of those traits and characteristics shared by successful leaders. The article is entitled, "Empathy - A True Leaders Skill" and written by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Harry Garner. You can find it at the link below:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art013.pdf
In the introduction to the piece, LTC Garner asks the following question:
"Why is it so important to see things from the Soldier's point of view, to "identify with and enter into another person's feelings and emotions?"
He then answers with the following:
"The U.S. involvement in extended operations and its focus on counterinsurgency, has brought a renewed awareness of wars human dimension. Humans desire supportive relationships, and empathy is the foundation that builds trusting relationships. The leader who harnesses the power of real empathy fosters better communication, tighter cohesion, stronger discipline and greater morale throughout his or her organization."
That paragraph may form the missing link to many of my earlier thoughts regarding the value of the individual over the role or position in the organization. I think that many leaders, military, corporate, or civic, often forget that the people in their organizations are the real prize. That the men, women, husbands, wives, brothers, sisters, fathers and mothers who work for them to either produce a product or engage the enemy, or lead a community are the reason they exist. They would not be termed a leader if they did not have subordinates to lead. Instead of focusing on the value of the individual, they focus only on how that person adds to or detracts from their pursuit of the goal. Instead of truly understanding 'servant leadership', they exercise power or position based coercive or positional leadership. That may be effective in the short run, but is rarely so in the marathon of a 10 year war. I believe that empathy is a defining characteristic of any person who calls themselves a 'servant' leader. The trait (empathy) and the title (servant) are inextricably linked, and I don't think you can have one without the other.
Further on in the article there is the following quote from Dr. Carl Rogers:
"Empathy means entering into the private perceptional world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it...To be with another in this way means that for the time being, you lay aside your own views and values in order to enter into another's world without prejudice. In some sense it means that you lay aside yourself."
LTC Garner then goes on to say the following, something that most military leaders do not seem to understand nor often try to do:
"So while empathy is an emotional connection with the other person, it is not based on sorrow, guilt, suffering or weakness, but on developing a mutual relationship."
He also states later in the article:
"...empathy implies risk on the part of the leader. It requires increasing one's level of humility and lowering one's perceived notion of power. As the leader demonstrates empathy, he reveals his feelings and values to the organization."
There is a lot more to this article and it truly deserves reading and consideration by anyone who calls themselves, or is termed a leader by others. The concept here is that there is an innate acceptance that before we are leader and led, before we are superior and subordinate, we are individual people with our own sense of the world, both as it is and as we think it should be. For any leader to be successful in building an organization, there must be an understanding of those emotions, feelings, and perceptions and then using them to enhance the unit, not denying them and painting a one way only picture for subordinates to follow.
I freely admit that I am an emotional leader. I wear my emotions on my sleeve and have difficulty hiding them, even when to do so would probably be in my best interest. People often misconstrue this as not thinking my way through a problem, and reacting before all the facts are known. And while there is some truth to that, in most cases, my emotive response is nothing more than my natural inclination on how to deal with the situation at hand. I would make a lousy poker player. I cannot hide what I'm feeling at the moment, and at this point in my career, I generally don't try. To do so feels almost hypocritical. Like being long winded, I accept that my emotional responses are a part of who and what I am. Some people will perceive that as being a good leader trait, and others will not. One thing it does do however is demonstrate to my subordinates that I am human. They know that if I get fired up about something, that there is probably a good reason for it. Whatever is provoking the emotion has struck some nerve and the human being is now responding, not the positional leader.
I remember about 9 years ago when I was a Drill Sergeant that we had a young trainee whose father died very suddenly of a massive heart attack. After the chaplain and commander had informed her of what had happened, we began to make the plans for her to leave Basic Training and return to her family for the funeral. I remember that the First Sergeant would not let her go home until she had thrown a live hand grenade (one of the few absolutely mandatory requirements of Basic Training back then) and that she could only be gone for 4 days. I was livid. It is one of the very few times in my career that I have totally lost my mind and all military bearing. I was screaming at him for being so cruel. I just couldn't believe that he could be so callous. I remember telling him that if it were he, or one of the cadre, that we would easily get a week or more to be with our families during the funeral etc. He agreed with me but said it was different for cadre or permanent party than it was for trainees. Of course, I fundamentally (at the top of my lungs) disagreed. She was a young woman who had just lost her father. At that point, all other roles or labels need to be put aside. Basic training could be finished at some other time. We failed on that day to exercise the empathy required of the institution to care for its' people.
As I have said many times before the hierarchy of the Army is sometimes it's worst enemy. We scratch and claw for promotion and position and then try to hang on to that title while setting our sights on the next rung on the ladder. Most of corporate America is like this as well. We get to a point where our quest for the bras ring becomes more important than how we get there, or who we step on to do it.
Empathetic leadership is the messy business of leading people. Soldier is a title. We lead human beings. And, seen on that level, we are all very much equal. A person's position should be used to assist his/her subordinates to ensure that that equality is always evident. The leader should work to understand the subordinates viewpoint, even if he/she does not agree with it. The led should develop a deep trust that the leader truly is looking out for them and had their best interest - and the organizations - at heart. When the two conflict, the empathetic leader will have already earned the respect of the subordinate enough that they understand why the decision was made the way it was.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art013.pdf
In the introduction to the piece, LTC Garner asks the following question:
"Why is it so important to see things from the Soldier's point of view, to "identify with and enter into another person's feelings and emotions?"
He then answers with the following:
"The U.S. involvement in extended operations and its focus on counterinsurgency, has brought a renewed awareness of wars human dimension. Humans desire supportive relationships, and empathy is the foundation that builds trusting relationships. The leader who harnesses the power of real empathy fosters better communication, tighter cohesion, stronger discipline and greater morale throughout his or her organization."
That paragraph may form the missing link to many of my earlier thoughts regarding the value of the individual over the role or position in the organization. I think that many leaders, military, corporate, or civic, often forget that the people in their organizations are the real prize. That the men, women, husbands, wives, brothers, sisters, fathers and mothers who work for them to either produce a product or engage the enemy, or lead a community are the reason they exist. They would not be termed a leader if they did not have subordinates to lead. Instead of focusing on the value of the individual, they focus only on how that person adds to or detracts from their pursuit of the goal. Instead of truly understanding 'servant leadership', they exercise power or position based coercive or positional leadership. That may be effective in the short run, but is rarely so in the marathon of a 10 year war. I believe that empathy is a defining characteristic of any person who calls themselves a 'servant' leader. The trait (empathy) and the title (servant) are inextricably linked, and I don't think you can have one without the other.
Further on in the article there is the following quote from Dr. Carl Rogers:
"Empathy means entering into the private perceptional world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it...To be with another in this way means that for the time being, you lay aside your own views and values in order to enter into another's world without prejudice. In some sense it means that you lay aside yourself."
LTC Garner then goes on to say the following, something that most military leaders do not seem to understand nor often try to do:
"So while empathy is an emotional connection with the other person, it is not based on sorrow, guilt, suffering or weakness, but on developing a mutual relationship."
He also states later in the article:
"...empathy implies risk on the part of the leader. It requires increasing one's level of humility and lowering one's perceived notion of power. As the leader demonstrates empathy, he reveals his feelings and values to the organization."
There is a lot more to this article and it truly deserves reading and consideration by anyone who calls themselves, or is termed a leader by others. The concept here is that there is an innate acceptance that before we are leader and led, before we are superior and subordinate, we are individual people with our own sense of the world, both as it is and as we think it should be. For any leader to be successful in building an organization, there must be an understanding of those emotions, feelings, and perceptions and then using them to enhance the unit, not denying them and painting a one way only picture for subordinates to follow.
I freely admit that I am an emotional leader. I wear my emotions on my sleeve and have difficulty hiding them, even when to do so would probably be in my best interest. People often misconstrue this as not thinking my way through a problem, and reacting before all the facts are known. And while there is some truth to that, in most cases, my emotive response is nothing more than my natural inclination on how to deal with the situation at hand. I would make a lousy poker player. I cannot hide what I'm feeling at the moment, and at this point in my career, I generally don't try. To do so feels almost hypocritical. Like being long winded, I accept that my emotional responses are a part of who and what I am. Some people will perceive that as being a good leader trait, and others will not. One thing it does do however is demonstrate to my subordinates that I am human. They know that if I get fired up about something, that there is probably a good reason for it. Whatever is provoking the emotion has struck some nerve and the human being is now responding, not the positional leader.
I remember about 9 years ago when I was a Drill Sergeant that we had a young trainee whose father died very suddenly of a massive heart attack. After the chaplain and commander had informed her of what had happened, we began to make the plans for her to leave Basic Training and return to her family for the funeral. I remember that the First Sergeant would not let her go home until she had thrown a live hand grenade (one of the few absolutely mandatory requirements of Basic Training back then) and that she could only be gone for 4 days. I was livid. It is one of the very few times in my career that I have totally lost my mind and all military bearing. I was screaming at him for being so cruel. I just couldn't believe that he could be so callous. I remember telling him that if it were he, or one of the cadre, that we would easily get a week or more to be with our families during the funeral etc. He agreed with me but said it was different for cadre or permanent party than it was for trainees. Of course, I fundamentally (at the top of my lungs) disagreed. She was a young woman who had just lost her father. At that point, all other roles or labels need to be put aside. Basic training could be finished at some other time. We failed on that day to exercise the empathy required of the institution to care for its' people.
As I have said many times before the hierarchy of the Army is sometimes it's worst enemy. We scratch and claw for promotion and position and then try to hang on to that title while setting our sights on the next rung on the ladder. Most of corporate America is like this as well. We get to a point where our quest for the bras ring becomes more important than how we get there, or who we step on to do it.
Empathetic leadership is the messy business of leading people. Soldier is a title. We lead human beings. And, seen on that level, we are all very much equal. A person's position should be used to assist his/her subordinates to ensure that that equality is always evident. The leader should work to understand the subordinates viewpoint, even if he/she does not agree with it. The led should develop a deep trust that the leader truly is looking out for them and had their best interest - and the organizations - at heart. When the two conflict, the empathetic leader will have already earned the respect of the subordinate enough that they understand why the decision was made the way it was.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#63 Editors Note
When I first started this blog, I made a deal with myself that if anyone commented on something I'd written, that I would generally post it 'as is'. That way, even if someone disagreed with my position or point of view, I was at least being fair to their perspective. The blog itself allows me the option of accepting, editing, or rejecting any response. However, I think that if I do that, then I will surround myself only with like-minded people, and that is not really the purpose of the discussion.
I received a reply this week to post #58, "The Hardest Part". To view it, go to the post itself, click on the title and scroll to the bottom. Form your own thoughts from there. It is interesting that J.D. thinks that this is a worthy discussion that we should be having at every level of Army leader development, and someone who was with me thinks that I am self deluding and a fraud. Back to my friend 'perspective'..... While I do not believe that the name attributed to the person who wrote the last response is actually from that individual, the point of view of whoever contributed it is my attempt at literary honesty.
One thing I have not done in my public postings has been to attack any particular individual. If I have learned anything from the on-going discussion, it has been to attempt to see the situation from some other point of view. That shall remain the policy for as long as I decide to continue this effort.
Thanks.
I received a reply this week to post #58, "The Hardest Part". To view it, go to the post itself, click on the title and scroll to the bottom. Form your own thoughts from there. It is interesting that J.D. thinks that this is a worthy discussion that we should be having at every level of Army leader development, and someone who was with me thinks that I am self deluding and a fraud. Back to my friend 'perspective'..... While I do not believe that the name attributed to the person who wrote the last response is actually from that individual, the point of view of whoever contributed it is my attempt at literary honesty.
One thing I have not done in my public postings has been to attack any particular individual. If I have learned anything from the on-going discussion, it has been to attempt to see the situation from some other point of view. That shall remain the policy for as long as I decide to continue this effort.
Thanks.
#62 Roving Leadership
In 1989, Max DePree authored a book entitled "Leadership is an Art". I picked it up this morning and randomly opened to a page and found the following quote:
"Roving leaders are those indispensable people in our lives who are there when we need them. Roving leaders take charge in varying degrees in many companies every day. More than simple initiative, roving leadership is a key element in the day-to-day expression of a participative process. Participation is the opportunity and responsibility to have a say in your job, to have influence over the management of organizational resources based on your own competence and your willingness to accept problem ownership. No one person is the 'expert' at everything. In many organizations there are two kinds of leaders, both hierarchical leaders and roving leaders. In special situations, the hierarchical leader is obligated to identify the roving leader and then support and follow him or her, and also exhibit the grace that enables the roving leader to lead. It's not easy to else take the lead. To do this demands a special openness and the ability to recognize what is best for the organization and how best to respond to a given issue. Roving leadership is an issue-oriented idea. Roving leadership is the expression of the ability of hierarchical leaders to permit others to share ownership of problems - in effect, to take possession of a situation."
Obviously, the Army is very much a hierarchical organization. By history and necessity its' rank and organization structure creates lines of authority and delegations of responsibility. There has to be a chain of command through which the vision or intent of the organization is achieved. Anything that is comprised of over a million people and expends over 500 billion dollars annually of the nations resources demands some form of structure to keep it moving forward. I am not advocating the removal of the chain of command, nor of the rank structure.
However, I think DePree's paragraph above is very instructive for today's Army and the types of wars we are currently waging. There has been a lot of talk over the past 10 years about decentralization and the empowerment of junior leaders to make decisions based upon the situation they are facing. You often hear of it as the 'Strategic Corporal'. The title alone implies and understanding that on the modern battlefield, in a counterinsurgency war, in an age of instant communication and relentless political punditry, there is a recognition that the actions of one person, in charge of a fire team or squad can have a critical impact on the perception and outcome of the larger national goals.
The question then becomes, how do you blend the hierarchical structure of the chain of command with the recognition that many critical decisions will actually be made by people very far down on the organizational ladder? How do we recognize, grow, and develop the 'Strategic Corporal' without losing the recognized need for structure? Are these two types of leadership styles mutually exclusive, or is it possible to bring them together in a manner that moves the entire organization forward toward achieving it's goals?
I believe that not only is it possible to successfully blend the 2, I think it is absolutely critical that we retain and develop talent in both the hierarchical and roving styles simultaneously. In order to do that however, will probably take some reprioritizing of the current manner of leader development. Here are my thoughts on how to bring these 2 parts together:
1. Start with an emphasis on the Values and institutional Ethos of the organization. For both the hierarchical leader and the roving one, an understanding of the shared Values, Ethos, and Norms sets the framework for success. Both groups remain bound by all 3.
2. Place human being development in the form of trust, responsibility and situational ownership as the first priority at every level. From the moment a Soldier joins the Army there should be problems for him or her to solve that develop trust and confidence and force them to accept and take individual responsibility for themselves, and their decision making process. I think this is beginning to happen in some of our commissioning and Initial Entry training centers right now, through the work of AWG, Don Vandergriff, COL Casey Haskins and others. Developing young Soldiers and leaders are being trusted and allowed to take ownership of a problem and then develop solutions to that problem. If you think about it for a second, the idea of Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E) is to grow roving leaders; people who are capable of understanding the diverse effects of their decisions on a strategic level. By removing institutional roadblocks and keeping the Values, Ethos and Norms ever present, OBT&E develops a Soldier who absorbs the character of the Army, possesses the ability to act accordingly and can think three dimensionally on the modern battlefield.
3. Connect the bottom and the top. Many times throughout this blog I have brought up the idea that the top must value the input of those at the bottom. Since roving leadership is much more likely to be exercised in numbers by people at the bottom of the chain of command, the top of the chain has to ensure that the 'rovers' posses a clear sense of the mission, it's purpose, the intended outcome and their piece in its' success. We are starting to see a lot of this right now as Gen McChrystal and other senior Army leaders are trying to communicate to the bottom most members of the Army and are by-passing a lot of the middle of the hierarchy to do it. Blogs started by the Vice Chief of Staff, the AKO information sharing websites, using modern technology to communicate strategic reasoning, all of these things are examples of the empowerment of the roving leader at the point of impact by the hierarchical leader high in the organization.
As part of the 3 week program that I am in charge of that prepares Soldiers for deployment, one of our events is a driving lane that presents the Soldiers with practice in convoy operations, IED awareness and response drills, and a rudimentary look at operating in a COIN environment. The last time we did this training, we simply drove the students in along a route and then simulated them getting hit with an IED. They really didn't get much from it. After the first week, I challenged my subordinates to build a more comprehensive holistic event that would demonstrate to the Soldier the complexities and ambiguities of operating in a COIN environment. (The hierarchical leader sets the goal). I did not tell them what to do. I simply let them develop the scenario and trusted that they could do it. (Establishing trust and empowerment and reinforcing the Values, Ethics and Norms of the institution).
Here is the operation they designed: The mission for the students would be to deliver a Dr. and medical supplies to an Afghan village. The village elders and women were in need of medical care and their various illnesses were preventing them from attending council meetings where they could get needed government assistance to aid in their development. There were insurgent groups in the area who knew of the planned MEDCAP. Although IED activity had been low recently, the announcement of the operation might increase the threat. Once they got to the village, they would then have to find a way to assess what medical care was needed and to provide what assistance they could.
Now lets pull the mission apart:
1. The Dr. on the mission was a woman in order to provide assistance to female villagers. Effect: For US forces this changed a behavioral paradigm by emphasising the strategic importance of providing non-lethal forms of influence. The idea that a woman Dr. was the reason for the patrol in the first place, and that her safe delivery was the expected outcome forced decisions to be made that are outside of normal military thought processes. This wasn't just a mission to hunt bad guys.
2. There was a recognition of the threat environment and previous training in IED awareness was emphasized because the threat is often unseen and random. Effect: Reinforces the idea of situational awareness and threat knowledge at the lowest level.
3. Cultural considerations had to be recognized. Requesting permission from the villae elder to enter the village and the recognition that Afghan women will not be seen and cannot be examined by male personnel. However, language barriers will be created if we do not have a female interpretor. Effect: Emphasize the importance of the political and power constructs that exist in Afghan tribal settings.
4. The lack of participation of the village elders in local council meetings has a strategic impact and must be addressed in order to limit the impact of insurgent forces on local activities. Effect: The strategic impact of enabling the village to connect to the central government in the region thereby helping to reduce the impact of Taliban forces in the area.
Overall, the training event was very successful from both the student and instructor standpoint. The instructors were able to build a mission based upon their considerable knowledge of COIN concepts and environmental understanding. They were given the freedom to operate in a manner that suited both the institutional priorities and the individual Soldier's knowledge requirements. At the very lowest level, the strategic lessons of Gen McChrystal and his intent were being implemented. Roving leadership embedded with hierarchical leadership connecting the bottom to the top in keeping with the Values, Ethics and Norms of the United States Army.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"Roving leaders are those indispensable people in our lives who are there when we need them. Roving leaders take charge in varying degrees in many companies every day. More than simple initiative, roving leadership is a key element in the day-to-day expression of a participative process. Participation is the opportunity and responsibility to have a say in your job, to have influence over the management of organizational resources based on your own competence and your willingness to accept problem ownership. No one person is the 'expert' at everything. In many organizations there are two kinds of leaders, both hierarchical leaders and roving leaders. In special situations, the hierarchical leader is obligated to identify the roving leader and then support and follow him or her, and also exhibit the grace that enables the roving leader to lead. It's not easy to else take the lead. To do this demands a special openness and the ability to recognize what is best for the organization and how best to respond to a given issue. Roving leadership is an issue-oriented idea. Roving leadership is the expression of the ability of hierarchical leaders to permit others to share ownership of problems - in effect, to take possession of a situation."
Obviously, the Army is very much a hierarchical organization. By history and necessity its' rank and organization structure creates lines of authority and delegations of responsibility. There has to be a chain of command through which the vision or intent of the organization is achieved. Anything that is comprised of over a million people and expends over 500 billion dollars annually of the nations resources demands some form of structure to keep it moving forward. I am not advocating the removal of the chain of command, nor of the rank structure.
However, I think DePree's paragraph above is very instructive for today's Army and the types of wars we are currently waging. There has been a lot of talk over the past 10 years about decentralization and the empowerment of junior leaders to make decisions based upon the situation they are facing. You often hear of it as the 'Strategic Corporal'. The title alone implies and understanding that on the modern battlefield, in a counterinsurgency war, in an age of instant communication and relentless political punditry, there is a recognition that the actions of one person, in charge of a fire team or squad can have a critical impact on the perception and outcome of the larger national goals.
The question then becomes, how do you blend the hierarchical structure of the chain of command with the recognition that many critical decisions will actually be made by people very far down on the organizational ladder? How do we recognize, grow, and develop the 'Strategic Corporal' without losing the recognized need for structure? Are these two types of leadership styles mutually exclusive, or is it possible to bring them together in a manner that moves the entire organization forward toward achieving it's goals?
I believe that not only is it possible to successfully blend the 2, I think it is absolutely critical that we retain and develop talent in both the hierarchical and roving styles simultaneously. In order to do that however, will probably take some reprioritizing of the current manner of leader development. Here are my thoughts on how to bring these 2 parts together:
1. Start with an emphasis on the Values and institutional Ethos of the organization. For both the hierarchical leader and the roving one, an understanding of the shared Values, Ethos, and Norms sets the framework for success. Both groups remain bound by all 3.
2. Place human being development in the form of trust, responsibility and situational ownership as the first priority at every level. From the moment a Soldier joins the Army there should be problems for him or her to solve that develop trust and confidence and force them to accept and take individual responsibility for themselves, and their decision making process. I think this is beginning to happen in some of our commissioning and Initial Entry training centers right now, through the work of AWG, Don Vandergriff, COL Casey Haskins and others. Developing young Soldiers and leaders are being trusted and allowed to take ownership of a problem and then develop solutions to that problem. If you think about it for a second, the idea of Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E) is to grow roving leaders; people who are capable of understanding the diverse effects of their decisions on a strategic level. By removing institutional roadblocks and keeping the Values, Ethos and Norms ever present, OBT&E develops a Soldier who absorbs the character of the Army, possesses the ability to act accordingly and can think three dimensionally on the modern battlefield.
3. Connect the bottom and the top. Many times throughout this blog I have brought up the idea that the top must value the input of those at the bottom. Since roving leadership is much more likely to be exercised in numbers by people at the bottom of the chain of command, the top of the chain has to ensure that the 'rovers' posses a clear sense of the mission, it's purpose, the intended outcome and their piece in its' success. We are starting to see a lot of this right now as Gen McChrystal and other senior Army leaders are trying to communicate to the bottom most members of the Army and are by-passing a lot of the middle of the hierarchy to do it. Blogs started by the Vice Chief of Staff, the AKO information sharing websites, using modern technology to communicate strategic reasoning, all of these things are examples of the empowerment of the roving leader at the point of impact by the hierarchical leader high in the organization.
As part of the 3 week program that I am in charge of that prepares Soldiers for deployment, one of our events is a driving lane that presents the Soldiers with practice in convoy operations, IED awareness and response drills, and a rudimentary look at operating in a COIN environment. The last time we did this training, we simply drove the students in along a route and then simulated them getting hit with an IED. They really didn't get much from it. After the first week, I challenged my subordinates to build a more comprehensive holistic event that would demonstrate to the Soldier the complexities and ambiguities of operating in a COIN environment. (The hierarchical leader sets the goal). I did not tell them what to do. I simply let them develop the scenario and trusted that they could do it. (Establishing trust and empowerment and reinforcing the Values, Ethics and Norms of the institution).
Here is the operation they designed: The mission for the students would be to deliver a Dr. and medical supplies to an Afghan village. The village elders and women were in need of medical care and their various illnesses were preventing them from attending council meetings where they could get needed government assistance to aid in their development. There were insurgent groups in the area who knew of the planned MEDCAP. Although IED activity had been low recently, the announcement of the operation might increase the threat. Once they got to the village, they would then have to find a way to assess what medical care was needed and to provide what assistance they could.
Now lets pull the mission apart:
1. The Dr. on the mission was a woman in order to provide assistance to female villagers. Effect: For US forces this changed a behavioral paradigm by emphasising the strategic importance of providing non-lethal forms of influence. The idea that a woman Dr. was the reason for the patrol in the first place, and that her safe delivery was the expected outcome forced decisions to be made that are outside of normal military thought processes. This wasn't just a mission to hunt bad guys.
2. There was a recognition of the threat environment and previous training in IED awareness was emphasized because the threat is often unseen and random. Effect: Reinforces the idea of situational awareness and threat knowledge at the lowest level.
3. Cultural considerations had to be recognized. Requesting permission from the villae elder to enter the village and the recognition that Afghan women will not be seen and cannot be examined by male personnel. However, language barriers will be created if we do not have a female interpretor. Effect: Emphasize the importance of the political and power constructs that exist in Afghan tribal settings.
4. The lack of participation of the village elders in local council meetings has a strategic impact and must be addressed in order to limit the impact of insurgent forces on local activities. Effect: The strategic impact of enabling the village to connect to the central government in the region thereby helping to reduce the impact of Taliban forces in the area.
Overall, the training event was very successful from both the student and instructor standpoint. The instructors were able to build a mission based upon their considerable knowledge of COIN concepts and environmental understanding. They were given the freedom to operate in a manner that suited both the institutional priorities and the individual Soldier's knowledge requirements. At the very lowest level, the strategic lessons of Gen McChrystal and his intent were being implemented. Roving leadership embedded with hierarchical leadership connecting the bottom to the top in keeping with the Values, Ethics and Norms of the United States Army.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#61 Nouns, Verbs and Adjectives
If you spend enough time outside somebodies office in the Army, you will inevitably come across a stack of military journals and other professional reading material. It is our version of the 'coffee table' book. Something to flip through while waiting for your appointment.
Earlier this week I came upon the Jan-Feb 2009 edition of Military Review, a journal produced by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. In it I found an article by MAJ Jason Pape entitled "Reassessing Army Leadership in the 21st Century". The article won 2nd place in the MacArthur Writing Contest and can be found at the link below:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art012.pdf
In the very first paragraph I came across the following which, given the purpose of this blog, and my own thoughts, caught my eye.
"Despite efforts by leaders like retired General Eric Shinseki to evaluate leader development programs and then examine organizational culture as it affects leadership and leader development, our doctrine and practices remain deeply rooted in historical traditions and heavily biased by relatively sophomoric assumptions about what leadership is and how it is best practiced. We lack critical reflection on the subject—an appreciation of other ways to look at leadership and leader development. We need to understand why our leadership doctrine is the way it is rather than simply what it is. "
I couldn't agree more with those statements. For many reasons, most of which I have outlined in other posts, I believe that we are at a defining period in the manner in which the Army thinks about itself, it's place in the greater national dialogue, and the methods we will use to prepare leaders for a rapidly paced and uncertain future. Maj Pape's opening assertions that our current organizational, historical, and educational approaches to leader development are lacking, and that the Army needs to look at what 21st century leader requirements are is a critical first step for preparing for the multi-faceted challenges we will face.
A little later in the introduction, MAJ Pape lays out what he believes the Army currently lacks in it's leader development programs:
"Furthermore, descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22’s discussion of leadership. Fundamentally, the Army lacks the following:
(1) Critical reflection on our assumptions about leadership.
(2) Appropriate emphasis on leadership as a skill and subject that needs to be continually discussed and developed throughout the Army.
(3) Consistency of what we espouse for leadership when looking at our practice, systems, and doctrine across the Army at large."
In another posting on AKO, I opened a discussion by stating that leadership is intensely personal and we each exercise it in our own manner. Because the Army calls every sergeant and higher a 'leader', in essence we have assigned each person a very important title, but have not necessarily provided them the appropriate tools, skills, or understandings required by the title itself.
I think that in order to have a discussion like this, one almost has to look at the word 'leader' as three separate things. A noun, an adjective, and a verb. As a noun, it becomes the person who is in charge (the title). As an adjective it expands it's scope and feel a little bit to include the viewpoint of others (a set of qualities and behaviors observable by others). He or she will be defined by others as a good or bad leader. As a verb, it becomes the vehicle through which the mission and vision get accomplished (The engine).
Part of the Army's problem with leader development is that it often confuses or juxtaposes the word leader with the word manager. MAJ Pape alludes to this when he states that, "Descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22's discussion of leadership." In reality, very few people in the Army are actually serving as leaders. even those who might have what we term 'leadership positions'. Most are managers of assets. For example, in my current position, I am 'in charge' of 12 subordinates. I am termed the 'leader' of the organization. However, most of what I really do is the management of Soldiers through a proscribed system. I make decisions, but they are mostly in the realm of resource allocation (people, time or equipment) to ensure a professional outcome for the Soldier who goes through the program. These are skills that I have been taught over the course of my career. Because most of my formative Army education happened during the mid to late 90's when the Army was going through the 'zero defect' phase, I learned to become an extremely effective manager of assets. The right people and equipment, in the right place, at the right time. Make a list of what you need, put together an effective schedule and supervise the different parts until all the dominoes were in line. What that leaves out however is what happens after you hit the switch and the assets are put in motion. It is an efficiency model better suited to business than an army at war.
One of the outcomes of that development process was an emphasis on timeliness. Because the wars we were preparing to fight would rely on the synchronization of assets, the ability to bring differing parts together all at once became critical. Time became the big player. I still work that way. There is an old phrase that I grew up with that has stuck with me my whole career, "Ten minutes early beats two minutes late." I view time as a commodity just as much as bullets, water or food. The effectiveness of it's use is a measurable way to view my skills as the 'leader'.
My subordinates do not see it this way. They don't see the criticality of timeliness the same way I do. Their Army experience has been characterized by a slow paced, 'ground hog day' reality. COIN operations and the deployment experience is inherently inefficient. It's effectiveness cannot be measured using the western understanding of time as a commodity. If you get held up coming out of the motorpool on the day of a mission, you just slip the mission until the vehicle gets fixed, or pause the whole thing for 24 hours. No problem, the war will still be here tomorrow. They do not see this as a failure like I do. And no matter how efficient you are, or how prepared, you don't get to go home if you get everything done faster than the next guy. In fact, you'll probably end up having more stuff put on your plate. COIN operations require a much longer - almost glacial -view of time. It is not the critical factor that it once was. It has been replaced by the idea of slow, steady, progress characterized by pressure and perseverance rather than one highly focused shot. It is the equivalent of Muhammed Ali's famed 'rope a dope' versus a Mike Tyson knock out punch. Tyson was efficient. Especially if you viewed his fights in a dollars per minute manner. Ali was not as efficient, but is still considered by many to be the best fighter ever.
The efficiency model, institutionalized in the 90's and the cornerstone of my development, makes no sense to my Soldiers. There is no reason for them to count time as a resource, because tomorrow will look the same as today. They are not lazy, they just haven't developed in the same manner I did. And in many ways, their viewpoint is precisely the correct one to fully understand the current manner of waging war.
I also think that MAJ Pape's very first bullet above, "Critical reflections on our assumptions about leadership" is important. Most of you are probably getting tired of my continual emphasis on the world of the Millennial, but Pape's call for a reflection on our assumptions is in large part determined by the perceptions and requirements of our subordinates. I'm not sure why so many people don't seem to understand that how a leader is viewed through his/her subordinates understanding is absolutely critical to the success or failure of the unit. This promotes the idea of the leader as an adjective. Without presupposing that they do, assume for a second that my soldiers now term me a 'good' leader. What does that mean? It means that seen through their eyes, I posses skills, abilities, characteristics and judgement that they see merit in and may want to follow, learn from or emulate. Compare that with my platoon in Iraq who may not have (the majority did not) viewed me that way. Most saw me as a 'bad' leader. That means that they did not see any value in the skills, abilities, characteristics and judgements I possessed. Therefore, they did not want to follow, learn from or emulate me in any manner. The leader as the adjective is much more reliant upon the views and understandings of his/her subordinates than is the leader as the noun. The noun is the title, the adjective becomes the person.
The third part is the leader as the verb. As the vehicle through which the vision of the organization is executed. Again, and especially in the non-commissioned officer corps, we spend little to no time studying this. This is where OODA is so vitally important. If the Noun leader cannot understand, process, communicate or demonstrate the Verb because of built in filters and orientation, then the organization cannot advance. In the article, MAJ Pape is challenging our current orientation and attempting to outline how the institutional filters are getting in the way of successful leader development.
Pape's second point that leadership requires continual study and emphasis cannot be overstated. I believe that studying it and reflecting on it should be the major portion of the time spent in all leader development schools. Instead, we continue to teach 'check list' type items without opening the student to the understanding of those items and their importance and relevance to the leader as a noun, adjective, and verb. Further on in the article he points out that the Army's way of teaching leadership is often through biographical studies of former successful leaders. By studying them, or reading heroic vignettes, we hope by osmosis that the student will then attempt to emulate the former leader and potentially gain similar results. This is a completely flawed argument for several reasons. First context. All great leaders became that way at a particular point in time. Can we definitively state that George Washington would be a great leader today? Would Eisenhower, Patton, or Schwartzkoff? What allows great leaders to be great is their understanding and orientation at a particular place in time. Although exciting to read about in a biography, it has little relevance to the developing leader today. For example, consider COL Joshua Chamberlain in the battle of Little Round Top. Chamberlain exhorts his almost over-run 20th Maine Regiment into a bayonet charge to break the Rebel advance and secure the flank of the Union line at Gettysburg. I can promise you that he would never make that decision, nor would his troops follow that order, today. Time, circumstance, behaviors, and understandings are much too different. COL Chamberlain saved the Union army with his bold move, but beyond it's demonstration of bravery and tactical success, it has little relevance for study on today's battlefield. What does deserve study however, are the characteristics that Chamberlain possessed that earned him the respect of his soldiers. What did a professor from tiny Bowdoin college have that made men want to follow him, and believe in him? Chamberlain the noun may or may not have been any good. Chamberlain the verb possessed the vision to foresee what needed to be done. But it was Chamberlain the adjective that accomplished it.
Finally, Pape's last thought that there must be some common consensus regarding what we consider the necessary institutional requirements for successful leader development across the Army. In many ways, this has been the what a lot of my posts here have centered on. I believe we need a less 'institutional' approach in favor of a more 'personal' one. I think we need to make people who aspire to become leaders more of the Noun, Verb, Adjective portions of the word and how absolutely important their personal orientations will be to the outcomes. Obviously, there are others who will feel differently; that if we do that we are creating thousands upon thousands of individualized views of leadership and the organization requires a common operating system to ensure it's readiness. My contention here is that those thousands upon thousands of viewpoints already exist and are at play every day. What is not recognized is their impact on organizational health and viability.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
Earlier this week I came upon the Jan-Feb 2009 edition of Military Review, a journal produced by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. In it I found an article by MAJ Jason Pape entitled "Reassessing Army Leadership in the 21st Century". The article won 2nd place in the MacArthur Writing Contest and can be found at the link below:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art012.pdf
In the very first paragraph I came across the following which, given the purpose of this blog, and my own thoughts, caught my eye.
"Despite efforts by leaders like retired General Eric Shinseki to evaluate leader development programs and then examine organizational culture as it affects leadership and leader development, our doctrine and practices remain deeply rooted in historical traditions and heavily biased by relatively sophomoric assumptions about what leadership is and how it is best practiced. We lack critical reflection on the subject—an appreciation of other ways to look at leadership and leader development. We need to understand why our leadership doctrine is the way it is rather than simply what it is. "
I couldn't agree more with those statements. For many reasons, most of which I have outlined in other posts, I believe that we are at a defining period in the manner in which the Army thinks about itself, it's place in the greater national dialogue, and the methods we will use to prepare leaders for a rapidly paced and uncertain future. Maj Pape's opening assertions that our current organizational, historical, and educational approaches to leader development are lacking, and that the Army needs to look at what 21st century leader requirements are is a critical first step for preparing for the multi-faceted challenges we will face.
A little later in the introduction, MAJ Pape lays out what he believes the Army currently lacks in it's leader development programs:
"Furthermore, descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22’s discussion of leadership. Fundamentally, the Army lacks the following:
(1) Critical reflection on our assumptions about leadership.
(2) Appropriate emphasis on leadership as a skill and subject that needs to be continually discussed and developed throughout the Army.
(3) Consistency of what we espouse for leadership when looking at our practice, systems, and doctrine across the Army at large."
In another posting on AKO, I opened a discussion by stating that leadership is intensely personal and we each exercise it in our own manner. Because the Army calls every sergeant and higher a 'leader', in essence we have assigned each person a very important title, but have not necessarily provided them the appropriate tools, skills, or understandings required by the title itself.
I think that in order to have a discussion like this, one almost has to look at the word 'leader' as three separate things. A noun, an adjective, and a verb. As a noun, it becomes the person who is in charge (the title). As an adjective it expands it's scope and feel a little bit to include the viewpoint of others (a set of qualities and behaviors observable by others). He or she will be defined by others as a good or bad leader. As a verb, it becomes the vehicle through which the mission and vision get accomplished (The engine).
Part of the Army's problem with leader development is that it often confuses or juxtaposes the word leader with the word manager. MAJ Pape alludes to this when he states that, "Descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22's discussion of leadership." In reality, very few people in the Army are actually serving as leaders. even those who might have what we term 'leadership positions'. Most are managers of assets. For example, in my current position, I am 'in charge' of 12 subordinates. I am termed the 'leader' of the organization. However, most of what I really do is the management of Soldiers through a proscribed system. I make decisions, but they are mostly in the realm of resource allocation (people, time or equipment) to ensure a professional outcome for the Soldier who goes through the program. These are skills that I have been taught over the course of my career. Because most of my formative Army education happened during the mid to late 90's when the Army was going through the 'zero defect' phase, I learned to become an extremely effective manager of assets. The right people and equipment, in the right place, at the right time. Make a list of what you need, put together an effective schedule and supervise the different parts until all the dominoes were in line. What that leaves out however is what happens after you hit the switch and the assets are put in motion. It is an efficiency model better suited to business than an army at war.
One of the outcomes of that development process was an emphasis on timeliness. Because the wars we were preparing to fight would rely on the synchronization of assets, the ability to bring differing parts together all at once became critical. Time became the big player. I still work that way. There is an old phrase that I grew up with that has stuck with me my whole career, "Ten minutes early beats two minutes late." I view time as a commodity just as much as bullets, water or food. The effectiveness of it's use is a measurable way to view my skills as the 'leader'.
My subordinates do not see it this way. They don't see the criticality of timeliness the same way I do. Their Army experience has been characterized by a slow paced, 'ground hog day' reality. COIN operations and the deployment experience is inherently inefficient. It's effectiveness cannot be measured using the western understanding of time as a commodity. If you get held up coming out of the motorpool on the day of a mission, you just slip the mission until the vehicle gets fixed, or pause the whole thing for 24 hours. No problem, the war will still be here tomorrow. They do not see this as a failure like I do. And no matter how efficient you are, or how prepared, you don't get to go home if you get everything done faster than the next guy. In fact, you'll probably end up having more stuff put on your plate. COIN operations require a much longer - almost glacial -view of time. It is not the critical factor that it once was. It has been replaced by the idea of slow, steady, progress characterized by pressure and perseverance rather than one highly focused shot. It is the equivalent of Muhammed Ali's famed 'rope a dope' versus a Mike Tyson knock out punch. Tyson was efficient. Especially if you viewed his fights in a dollars per minute manner. Ali was not as efficient, but is still considered by many to be the best fighter ever.
The efficiency model, institutionalized in the 90's and the cornerstone of my development, makes no sense to my Soldiers. There is no reason for them to count time as a resource, because tomorrow will look the same as today. They are not lazy, they just haven't developed in the same manner I did. And in many ways, their viewpoint is precisely the correct one to fully understand the current manner of waging war.
I also think that MAJ Pape's very first bullet above, "Critical reflections on our assumptions about leadership" is important. Most of you are probably getting tired of my continual emphasis on the world of the Millennial, but Pape's call for a reflection on our assumptions is in large part determined by the perceptions and requirements of our subordinates. I'm not sure why so many people don't seem to understand that how a leader is viewed through his/her subordinates understanding is absolutely critical to the success or failure of the unit. This promotes the idea of the leader as an adjective. Without presupposing that they do, assume for a second that my soldiers now term me a 'good' leader. What does that mean? It means that seen through their eyes, I posses skills, abilities, characteristics and judgement that they see merit in and may want to follow, learn from or emulate. Compare that with my platoon in Iraq who may not have (the majority did not) viewed me that way. Most saw me as a 'bad' leader. That means that they did not see any value in the skills, abilities, characteristics and judgements I possessed. Therefore, they did not want to follow, learn from or emulate me in any manner. The leader as the adjective is much more reliant upon the views and understandings of his/her subordinates than is the leader as the noun. The noun is the title, the adjective becomes the person.
The third part is the leader as the verb. As the vehicle through which the vision of the organization is executed. Again, and especially in the non-commissioned officer corps, we spend little to no time studying this. This is where OODA is so vitally important. If the Noun leader cannot understand, process, communicate or demonstrate the Verb because of built in filters and orientation, then the organization cannot advance. In the article, MAJ Pape is challenging our current orientation and attempting to outline how the institutional filters are getting in the way of successful leader development.
Pape's second point that leadership requires continual study and emphasis cannot be overstated. I believe that studying it and reflecting on it should be the major portion of the time spent in all leader development schools. Instead, we continue to teach 'check list' type items without opening the student to the understanding of those items and their importance and relevance to the leader as a noun, adjective, and verb. Further on in the article he points out that the Army's way of teaching leadership is often through biographical studies of former successful leaders. By studying them, or reading heroic vignettes, we hope by osmosis that the student will then attempt to emulate the former leader and potentially gain similar results. This is a completely flawed argument for several reasons. First context. All great leaders became that way at a particular point in time. Can we definitively state that George Washington would be a great leader today? Would Eisenhower, Patton, or Schwartzkoff? What allows great leaders to be great is their understanding and orientation at a particular place in time. Although exciting to read about in a biography, it has little relevance to the developing leader today. For example, consider COL Joshua Chamberlain in the battle of Little Round Top. Chamberlain exhorts his almost over-run 20th Maine Regiment into a bayonet charge to break the Rebel advance and secure the flank of the Union line at Gettysburg. I can promise you that he would never make that decision, nor would his troops follow that order, today. Time, circumstance, behaviors, and understandings are much too different. COL Chamberlain saved the Union army with his bold move, but beyond it's demonstration of bravery and tactical success, it has little relevance for study on today's battlefield. What does deserve study however, are the characteristics that Chamberlain possessed that earned him the respect of his soldiers. What did a professor from tiny Bowdoin college have that made men want to follow him, and believe in him? Chamberlain the noun may or may not have been any good. Chamberlain the verb possessed the vision to foresee what needed to be done. But it was Chamberlain the adjective that accomplished it.
Finally, Pape's last thought that there must be some common consensus regarding what we consider the necessary institutional requirements for successful leader development across the Army. In many ways, this has been the what a lot of my posts here have centered on. I believe we need a less 'institutional' approach in favor of a more 'personal' one. I think we need to make people who aspire to become leaders more of the Noun, Verb, Adjective portions of the word and how absolutely important their personal orientations will be to the outcomes. Obviously, there are others who will feel differently; that if we do that we are creating thousands upon thousands of individualized views of leadership and the organization requires a common operating system to ensure it's readiness. My contention here is that those thousands upon thousands of viewpoints already exist and are at play every day. What is not recognized is their impact on organizational health and viability.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
#60 Changing the Way We Think
A little over a year ago, I had the opportunity to attend a two day session at Johns Hopkins University where the Asymetric Warfare Group was hosting a conference on Outcome Based Training and Education (OBT&E). One of the principle members of the conference was Maj (Ret) Don Vandergriff, the author of the book "Raising the Bar".
In response to post number #59, Don sent me a note the other day and asked me if I would post a link to an article he had written for the AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare. I am happy to do so, and would ask you to check it out at the link below:
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/LWP/Documents/LWP73_DominantLandForcesv2_04212010.pdf
For just a moment, I would like to comment on 1 particular section of Don's article, because it seems to me that if you understand what I have been saying with regard to OODA loops, then this paragraph makes perfect sense and validates that teaching or mentoring or getting Soldiers to understand the OODA concept is a critical step to developing the leaders we need - in all walks of life - for the 21st centuy world.
Consider the following from the introduction portion of the article:
"The challenge the Army faces today is not one of over-thinking situations; rather, it
is the failure to think clearly in situations that require sound judgment at junior levels,
and leadership’s hesitation to believe that juniors can or will think clearly. Soldiers
and junior leaders who are trained or conditioned to “look” at the situation—i.e., to
assess, exercise judgment and make decisions—are more decisive, deliberate and
correct in their actions. This is particularly important in the complex environment of
full-spectrum operations. The most important capability needed for the Army Future
Force may well be thinking Soldiers and junior leaders who seek after the “why” of a
situation, task or directive, to understand and make better use of the purpose behind
it. And the future is now."
OODA. Pure and simple. People who are "trained or conditioned to 'look' at the situation-i.e, to assess, exercise judgment and make decisions - are more decisive, deliberate and correct in their actions."
In response to post number #59, Don sent me a note the other day and asked me if I would post a link to an article he had written for the AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare. I am happy to do so, and would ask you to check it out at the link below:
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/LWP/Documents/LWP73_DominantLandForcesv2_04212010.pdf
For just a moment, I would like to comment on 1 particular section of Don's article, because it seems to me that if you understand what I have been saying with regard to OODA loops, then this paragraph makes perfect sense and validates that teaching or mentoring or getting Soldiers to understand the OODA concept is a critical step to developing the leaders we need - in all walks of life - for the 21st centuy world.
Consider the following from the introduction portion of the article:
"The challenge the Army faces today is not one of over-thinking situations; rather, it
is the failure to think clearly in situations that require sound judgment at junior levels,
and leadership’s hesitation to believe that juniors can or will think clearly. Soldiers
and junior leaders who are trained or conditioned to “look” at the situation—i.e., to
assess, exercise judgment and make decisions—are more decisive, deliberate and
correct in their actions. This is particularly important in the complex environment of
full-spectrum operations. The most important capability needed for the Army Future
Force may well be thinking Soldiers and junior leaders who seek after the “why” of a
situation, task or directive, to understand and make better use of the purpose behind
it. And the future is now."
OODA. Pure and simple. People who are "trained or conditioned to 'look' at the situation-i.e, to assess, exercise judgment and make decisions - are more decisive, deliberate and correct in their actions."
One sentence that succinctly defines why the OODA cycle is critical to leader development. The ability to 'look' at the situation equals both the Observe and Orient portions of the equation. A young leader must be able to rapidly see something happening, process what it's potential outcomes are and why it is occurring and then make a decision that will take advantage of the rapidly changing circumstanes to effect the desired result.
While I thoroughly agree with Don's assessment of both the problem, and the solution being offered, I personally believe that we must start this process with a much more thorough understanding of our personal Orientation. Without developing the individual's ability to see himself/herself accurately and then recognize where that Orientation is actually affecting how they view their environment, I believe we there is still the possibility to create negative outcomes based upon a faulty understanding of the operating environment.
My concerns notwithstanding, what this article points out to the rest of the Army is that OBT&E and the Adaptive Leader Methodology are the way the institution will effect leader training for years to come. It is encumbent upon the Operating Force to learn how this shift in training method will impact them, their units and their expectation of Soldiers. OBT&E breifings and workshops are available and anyone with an interest in creating a dynamic leader development program that translates into increased battlefield capability should avail themselves of these resources.
I want to thank Don for taking the time to read my postings. Along with the folks from the Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic, I believe that my place in the discussion is centered around the idea that OODA is a manner of thinking and acting at the individual level that has a place in leader training venues whether they are ethical, tactical, or global. We all live in a complex world. OODA, OBT&E, and ALM are critical ingredients for successful engagement in any forum.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#59 Three Perspectives
This has been an emotionally exhausting week. It has also been a defining one. One of those weeks that crystallizes very neatly many of the points concerning leadership, perception, and the arbitrary nature of human being interaction that I have tried to make at other times throughout the blog.
I received two different emails this week. They are completely opposite in tone and tenor, and yet both are incredibly important.
On Wednesday I received the first from a person who stated that in their opinion I was a complete leadership failure and that I (and others) were responsible for the rape and murders of the Al Janabis, and the death of three members of my platoon.
To be honest, I have always had an awareness that sentiments such as these existed, but to see the words on the page, to have someone finally say out loud what others have thought, to finally be confronted with the 'elephant in the room' was both relieving and frightening. There it was, the accusation that follows me around like a ghost everywhere I go: Fenlason failed and people died.
On Thursday, someone who I served with during that time sent me an email that contained the following: "I think that your leadership has really shaped who I am. I still talk about lessons I learned from you and try to impress them on my Soldiers. I only wish that I could understand how ahead of your time your guidance was. I consider you a friend."
That note came out of the blue and was completely unexpected. No member of 1st platoon from that period has ever reached out to me before. Coming on the heels of the one the night before, I was extremely grateful
As I have said before, I do not expect, nor do I want, any reader of this blog to jump to my defense or to attack either of these people. They have an absolute right to their opinions and their convictions. While I obviously disagree with the former and am grateful for the latter, the important part is that they represent both sides of the equation and raise interesting questions of perspective and perception. Neither of these folks are bad or evil people, they are simply trying to understand and come to grips with that time, much the same way I am. In fact, I have offered to continue a dialogue with both of them. I have no intention of trying to change any one's mind about me. What I am offering is another point of view - mine - to add to their understanding. Whether they choose to accept or reject my opinion is on them. My responsibility is to provide my recollections, my intentions, and my point of view. It might only serve to reaffirm their existing beliefs, or it might add information that changes something they previously believed. I cannot control that. However, I do feel that I have a responsibility to try my best to help them gain insight and understanding by offering my perceptions, my decisions, and my observations. That I feel is something that I have a moral obligation to do. Nobody will learn anything from this if we do not respectfully admit that each person is entitled to their own opinion and that it is only inside of that context will any moral or leadership lessons be learned.
Here then is the question: Is it possible that both of them are correct? If you look at the incident from one point of view, namely that I was in charge and horrible things happened and therefore I am responsible for the failure, then sure. But what of the other point of view? How do you measure that? A former Soldier of mine who now leads troops of his own, found leadership traits and behaviors that he respects, emulates, and has adapted to his own style.
If you start with the first reaction (you failed), then the second might seem naive and the continuation of failed leadership onto the next generation. If you start with the second reaction (you are good leader), then the first seems capricious and mean spirited. In a black and white world, get ready to cast your vote. Fenlason failed to lead, Fenlason is a good leader who was ahead of his time. Check box A or B.
The A or B scenario is why I keep returning to the idea that we must develop leaders who start with a very strong understanding of who they are and what they stand for. It is the only way to live with both sides of the equation. It would be too easy to jump up and scream at the person who thinks I failed and simply say you don't know what you're talking about. It would also be too easy to simply wrap myself up in the warm words sent by a former colleague. For my own health, to run from one side to the other would be a dangerous and futile game. I have to become comfortable with the idea that some people will always hold me responsible for the crimes that were committed and the death of 3 American Soldiers. I also have to become comfortable that there will be others who see value in the manner and method with which I led that platoon despite the atrocities and losses. I cannot tilt at the windmills on either side too strongly. I would lose myself running back and forth between the two. Without a sense of who I am, what I stand for, and the courage of my convictions I will either be crushed by the emotional weight of the consequences of failure, or become blissfully deluded that everyone sees the merit in the choices I made. I will not allow either to happen.
A few months back, a friend of mine brought up that in many of my posts I keep mentioning the word perception. That perception in many cases is stronger than reality because it is yours. It is how your brain interprets what you see and forms your understanding of your environment. It is the most personal thing you have, and because of that, it equals your truth. Not the truth, your truth. I very much agree with that statement but want to emphasize the idea that the truth is yours. This means that everyone has a different view of true. That implies that there is no absolute truth. There is no black and white. There are only shades of grey.
The Army does not recognize this in it's leader development programs. By offering nothing more than 7 Values and saying: "Here they are. Absorb them and live with them. Either you get them or you don't." By doing this, the institution is creating the black and white argument. A choice between A or B. And then situations like the one I faced come up and for the first time a young leader is forced to recognize that a third option really does exist. Grey is a color, and in fact, is the most prevalent one on the morality and values color wheel. For the institution to not recognize and study that does a disservice to all who would lead others. Especially if that leadership includes asking them to do things that might cost them their lives, or the lives of those they lead.
I have opened the correspondence with the person who believes I failed because I do not believe they are malintentioned. In fact, my belief is that they are struggling to come to their own understanding of the events and to come grips with what happened, why, and to be able to proceed with their life. I choose to trust their motives. There is inherent risk is this for me, but it allows me to gain understanding of how other people view the decisions I made. To find a closer view of the truth. Realizing that I will never gain complete understanding, I will at least gain a more complete one. The same can be said for the person who found something to respect in what I did. Their perceptions and understanding will also help move me one step closer to a better understanding. I am grateful for both of them because we do not live in a simple black and white world. Without being pushed, prodded and forced to study ourselves and our version of true, we will never grow.
Finally, a third person weighed in this week. Their perception is wholly different. They bought the book before they ever knew me and now have questions and thoughts about it, but worry that it will change the nature of our current relationship. Balancing what they read against what they see is challenging. Different parts of the book's representation of me and their interpretation of me keep bouncing into one another. Which is true? The book? Me? Maybe both?
Three perspectives. All valid. All fair. All personal. All true.
There are reasons I write each week. First, it is cathartic and helps me come to grips with the vagaries of leading human beings. Second, for those who read it, it is my contribution to leader development. As a nation at war, with young people being given extraordinary responsibility, I feel very strongly that we owe them a character development program that recognizes 'grey', and forces them to gain insight into themselves and their character. Without it, I am afraid that many more people will find themselves in situations such as mine. As the Army and the most public representation of America and her values, we owe them much more than that.
The offer to speak about this, to write about this, and to share my interpretations of the time and the circumstances remains open to all. If we do not study ourselves in times of tragedy, loss, and confusion we will never grow. Not as people. Not as the Army, and not as Americans.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
I received two different emails this week. They are completely opposite in tone and tenor, and yet both are incredibly important.
On Wednesday I received the first from a person who stated that in their opinion I was a complete leadership failure and that I (and others) were responsible for the rape and murders of the Al Janabis, and the death of three members of my platoon.
To be honest, I have always had an awareness that sentiments such as these existed, but to see the words on the page, to have someone finally say out loud what others have thought, to finally be confronted with the 'elephant in the room' was both relieving and frightening. There it was, the accusation that follows me around like a ghost everywhere I go: Fenlason failed and people died.
On Thursday, someone who I served with during that time sent me an email that contained the following: "I think that your leadership has really shaped who I am. I still talk about lessons I learned from you and try to impress them on my Soldiers. I only wish that I could understand how ahead of your time your guidance was. I consider you a friend."
That note came out of the blue and was completely unexpected. No member of 1st platoon from that period has ever reached out to me before. Coming on the heels of the one the night before, I was extremely grateful
As I have said before, I do not expect, nor do I want, any reader of this blog to jump to my defense or to attack either of these people. They have an absolute right to their opinions and their convictions. While I obviously disagree with the former and am grateful for the latter, the important part is that they represent both sides of the equation and raise interesting questions of perspective and perception. Neither of these folks are bad or evil people, they are simply trying to understand and come to grips with that time, much the same way I am. In fact, I have offered to continue a dialogue with both of them. I have no intention of trying to change any one's mind about me. What I am offering is another point of view - mine - to add to their understanding. Whether they choose to accept or reject my opinion is on them. My responsibility is to provide my recollections, my intentions, and my point of view. It might only serve to reaffirm their existing beliefs, or it might add information that changes something they previously believed. I cannot control that. However, I do feel that I have a responsibility to try my best to help them gain insight and understanding by offering my perceptions, my decisions, and my observations. That I feel is something that I have a moral obligation to do. Nobody will learn anything from this if we do not respectfully admit that each person is entitled to their own opinion and that it is only inside of that context will any moral or leadership lessons be learned.
Here then is the question: Is it possible that both of them are correct? If you look at the incident from one point of view, namely that I was in charge and horrible things happened and therefore I am responsible for the failure, then sure. But what of the other point of view? How do you measure that? A former Soldier of mine who now leads troops of his own, found leadership traits and behaviors that he respects, emulates, and has adapted to his own style.
If you start with the first reaction (you failed), then the second might seem naive and the continuation of failed leadership onto the next generation. If you start with the second reaction (you are good leader), then the first seems capricious and mean spirited. In a black and white world, get ready to cast your vote. Fenlason failed to lead, Fenlason is a good leader who was ahead of his time. Check box A or B.
The A or B scenario is why I keep returning to the idea that we must develop leaders who start with a very strong understanding of who they are and what they stand for. It is the only way to live with both sides of the equation. It would be too easy to jump up and scream at the person who thinks I failed and simply say you don't know what you're talking about. It would also be too easy to simply wrap myself up in the warm words sent by a former colleague. For my own health, to run from one side to the other would be a dangerous and futile game. I have to become comfortable with the idea that some people will always hold me responsible for the crimes that were committed and the death of 3 American Soldiers. I also have to become comfortable that there will be others who see value in the manner and method with which I led that platoon despite the atrocities and losses. I cannot tilt at the windmills on either side too strongly. I would lose myself running back and forth between the two. Without a sense of who I am, what I stand for, and the courage of my convictions I will either be crushed by the emotional weight of the consequences of failure, or become blissfully deluded that everyone sees the merit in the choices I made. I will not allow either to happen.
A few months back, a friend of mine brought up that in many of my posts I keep mentioning the word perception. That perception in many cases is stronger than reality because it is yours. It is how your brain interprets what you see and forms your understanding of your environment. It is the most personal thing you have, and because of that, it equals your truth. Not the truth, your truth. I very much agree with that statement but want to emphasize the idea that the truth is yours. This means that everyone has a different view of true. That implies that there is no absolute truth. There is no black and white. There are only shades of grey.
The Army does not recognize this in it's leader development programs. By offering nothing more than 7 Values and saying: "Here they are. Absorb them and live with them. Either you get them or you don't." By doing this, the institution is creating the black and white argument. A choice between A or B. And then situations like the one I faced come up and for the first time a young leader is forced to recognize that a third option really does exist. Grey is a color, and in fact, is the most prevalent one on the morality and values color wheel. For the institution to not recognize and study that does a disservice to all who would lead others. Especially if that leadership includes asking them to do things that might cost them their lives, or the lives of those they lead.
I have opened the correspondence with the person who believes I failed because I do not believe they are malintentioned. In fact, my belief is that they are struggling to come to their own understanding of the events and to come grips with what happened, why, and to be able to proceed with their life. I choose to trust their motives. There is inherent risk is this for me, but it allows me to gain understanding of how other people view the decisions I made. To find a closer view of the truth. Realizing that I will never gain complete understanding, I will at least gain a more complete one. The same can be said for the person who found something to respect in what I did. Their perceptions and understanding will also help move me one step closer to a better understanding. I am grateful for both of them because we do not live in a simple black and white world. Without being pushed, prodded and forced to study ourselves and our version of true, we will never grow.
Finally, a third person weighed in this week. Their perception is wholly different. They bought the book before they ever knew me and now have questions and thoughts about it, but worry that it will change the nature of our current relationship. Balancing what they read against what they see is challenging. Different parts of the book's representation of me and their interpretation of me keep bouncing into one another. Which is true? The book? Me? Maybe both?
Three perspectives. All valid. All fair. All personal. All true.
There are reasons I write each week. First, it is cathartic and helps me come to grips with the vagaries of leading human beings. Second, for those who read it, it is my contribution to leader development. As a nation at war, with young people being given extraordinary responsibility, I feel very strongly that we owe them a character development program that recognizes 'grey', and forces them to gain insight into themselves and their character. Without it, I am afraid that many more people will find themselves in situations such as mine. As the Army and the most public representation of America and her values, we owe them much more than that.
The offer to speak about this, to write about this, and to share my interpretations of the time and the circumstances remains open to all. If we do not study ourselves in times of tragedy, loss, and confusion we will never grow. Not as people. Not as the Army, and not as Americans.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#58 The Hardest Part
In his book "Americans At War", noted military historian Stephen Ambrose wrote the following when offering an historical perspective regarding the incident at My Lai during the Vietnam War:
"This is a painful task - to examine a side of war that is hard to face up to but is always there. When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, twenty years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you wish had never happened. This is a reality that stretches across time and across continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time of the ancient Greeks up to the present. My Lai was not an exception or an aberration. Atrocity is a part of war that needs to be recognized and discussed. It is not the job of historians to condemn or judge, but to describe, try to explain, and, even more so, attempt to understand.
In the case of My Lai, the question is who was responsible? Was it one person? Was it a bad platoon leader who was inadequately trained all his life, including by the Army and by his society? Was it that he just could not handle the responsibility, and he broke? Maybe it is as simple as that. I know a lot of Vietnam War veterans who would take very extreme action if they could get Lt. Calley in their hands. They blame him for besmirching their reputation and the reputation of the United States Army and the reputation of the American armed forces in Vietnam. Then there are others who say: "No, no, you can't blame Calley. What you need to do is look at the U.S. Army as a whole, the Army as an institution, the way the Army was fighting that war, and the things Westmoreland was demanding from his platoon leaders." The problem here is that you have the whole U.S. Army going berserk. Yet others would argue: "No, no, the Army is but a reflection of society, it was American society that made this happen. The racism that permeates all levels of American society is where you look for the cause of what happened at My Lai. It is America's sense of exceptionalism, America's self-appointed task of cleansing the world, that made My Lai happen." In this view, responsibility rests with society as a whole."
At the end of another paragraph a little further along, Ambrose finishes with the following:
"In combat, Soldiers are always afraid, always enraged, and very often seeking revenge."
In another place, he stated the following:
"A feature of the contemporary experience which seems to apply to My Lai is that men seldom see their enemy. In the nineteenth century, this was not so true."
Finally, at the very end of the chapter, Ambrose sums up his feelings in this way:
"One of the things that stands out about My Lai in my mind and makes it not only possible for me to live with it but to be once again proud of the institution that I have spent most of my life studying, the United States Army, was that the Army itself investigated the incident, made the investigation public and did it's best to punish the perpetrators of this outrage. I would defy anybody to name another army in the world that would do that."
As I read those opening paragraphs, I was overcome by a sense of, "Yes! Somebody finally gets it! This is exactly how I feel!" While My Lai has been long held as the model of unethical decision making, loss of control, and the singular importance of retaining one's core value system in the midst of combat, in reality, life on the ground is never quite so cut and dry.
As I have done before, I went back and substituted "Mahmudiyah Incident" in every place where Ambrose used My Lai, and re-read the paragraph. I have heard, and had, those very same arguments and questions over the last 4 years. Somehow it seems, 40 years later, and not a single thing has changed. My Lai and the Mahmudiyah incident both raise the same questions of responsibility, accountability, the behavior of men under extreme duress, the value system of the individual, the country, and the institution.
In the book "Black Hearts" the author very clearly chose to focus his efforts on the leadership aspect when searching for an answer to why those Soldiers committed that crime. Why did they decide to leave their post and go commit such a terrible act of violence on that family? He chose to find fault with the leadership, implying that personality struggles and conflicts throughout the battalion created conditions of extreme frustration and anger among the Soldiers and battalion leadership. By portraying the battalion commander as an extremely toxic leader, we get a ready-made villain for the remainder of the story. The truth however, is very much more complicated than that. That condition alone did not create the conditions of this tragedy.
As Ambrose succinctly pointed out, "In combat, men are always afraid, always enraged and very often seeking revenge." When you couple that with his later idea that in 21st century warfare - at least in Iraq and Afghanistan - Soldiers often do not see their enemy, a whole other line of reasoning is raised. When I am surrounded by a faceless enemy who blends in completely with the local populace and it is impossible to discern who is my friend and who isn't, the level of fear and anxiety rises exponentially. To maintain a super-human level of awareness in order to foresee every potential threat is exhausting work. You cannot sustain that indefinitely. I found that for me, I had to choose between believing everyone was friendly until proven otherwise, or the opposite, believing everyone was a threat until proven friendly. Most of my platoon chose the latter as their mode of operating and surviving their environment. By personality and inclination I chose the former. I cannot reconcile being at war and believing that everyone around me is the enemy. Certainly my Soldiers might find that naive, but in reality it is no more absurd than the opposite idea that everyone is trying to kill you. In fact, most people don't really give a damn about you and just want to get on with their lives. If you can help them with that, that's great. If not, go away and don't bother me. In any case, feeling as if you are surrounded by ghosts who wish to harm you and your friends creates a fear that is very difficult to explain. Logic and emotion crash headlong into each other day after day after day until you begin to question the very structure of your beliefs and reasoning. When I was young my father sent me a copy of a document called "The Desiderata". There is a line in it which has always stuck with me. "Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness." Can fear and loneliness create the condition for horrendous crime? Maybe, but then as Ambrose pointed out with regard to Vietnam, it would imply that crime and evil acts would be the norm rather than the exception. Every person in Iraq in 2005 - 2006 had to live under the same conditions my Soldiers did. So, why weren't crimes like these being committed every day?
And then there is the institution. The Army. Can we look to the Army to find accountability and responsibility when something happens that is so squarely outside the realm of believability? Certainly, as I have said before, nothing in my previous training had ever prepared me for the conditions I found myself in. I had never taken a class where the instructor said, "This is how you repair a platoon which has suffered the catastrophic loss of a third of it's leadership in 12 days and had it's home base burn to the ground. Step one do this. Step two do that." The idea that any institution can do 'teach' a prescribed response to every situation is ludicrous. The sheer number of potential responses is astronomical. But, did the Army fail? In a way I think it did because it taught prescribed responses instead of dynamic thought. It led me, and others, to believe that there was a 'correct' answer to every problem and clearly there is not. We have recognized that now and are taking steps in out training centers and commissioning sources to create adaptive and thinking Soldiers, but it will take time to weed out those of us who grew up in the proscribed response world in order to make room for the multi-tasker who is comfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty.
Finally, much like Ambrose, I remain proud of the organization for it's actions when the Mahmudiyah incident came to light. Knowing it would be a black-eye on the entire organization and feed the emotional political drama over the course of the war, the Army did not waiver and went forward with the investigations and prosecutions. While incredibly difficult to live through personally, the fact is that the Army did the right thing. And while the cynics might say that it was only trying to cover it's ass, the truth is that no matter why the Army took responsibility for these events, it did, and in doing so reaffirmed that they are an institution worthy of the trust of the people. To live up to it's charter with America, the Army must always be willing to look very hard at itself when there are lessons to be learned.
I am realizing now that I will never have a complete understanding of that time. That it will be something that happened in my life that I will carry as part of the whole story of Fenlason. There are lessons to be learned from it, tragedies and ruined lives to feel badly about, and triumphs of principle and decency to be honored. Trying to balance all of those things is the hardest part.
"This is a painful task - to examine a side of war that is hard to face up to but is always there. When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, twenty years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you wish had never happened. This is a reality that stretches across time and across continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time of the ancient Greeks up to the present. My Lai was not an exception or an aberration. Atrocity is a part of war that needs to be recognized and discussed. It is not the job of historians to condemn or judge, but to describe, try to explain, and, even more so, attempt to understand.
In the case of My Lai, the question is who was responsible? Was it one person? Was it a bad platoon leader who was inadequately trained all his life, including by the Army and by his society? Was it that he just could not handle the responsibility, and he broke? Maybe it is as simple as that. I know a lot of Vietnam War veterans who would take very extreme action if they could get Lt. Calley in their hands. They blame him for besmirching their reputation and the reputation of the United States Army and the reputation of the American armed forces in Vietnam. Then there are others who say: "No, no, you can't blame Calley. What you need to do is look at the U.S. Army as a whole, the Army as an institution, the way the Army was fighting that war, and the things Westmoreland was demanding from his platoon leaders." The problem here is that you have the whole U.S. Army going berserk. Yet others would argue: "No, no, the Army is but a reflection of society, it was American society that made this happen. The racism that permeates all levels of American society is where you look for the cause of what happened at My Lai. It is America's sense of exceptionalism, America's self-appointed task of cleansing the world, that made My Lai happen." In this view, responsibility rests with society as a whole."
At the end of another paragraph a little further along, Ambrose finishes with the following:
"In combat, Soldiers are always afraid, always enraged, and very often seeking revenge."
In another place, he stated the following:
"A feature of the contemporary experience which seems to apply to My Lai is that men seldom see their enemy. In the nineteenth century, this was not so true."
Finally, at the very end of the chapter, Ambrose sums up his feelings in this way:
"One of the things that stands out about My Lai in my mind and makes it not only possible for me to live with it but to be once again proud of the institution that I have spent most of my life studying, the United States Army, was that the Army itself investigated the incident, made the investigation public and did it's best to punish the perpetrators of this outrage. I would defy anybody to name another army in the world that would do that."
As I read those opening paragraphs, I was overcome by a sense of, "Yes! Somebody finally gets it! This is exactly how I feel!" While My Lai has been long held as the model of unethical decision making, loss of control, and the singular importance of retaining one's core value system in the midst of combat, in reality, life on the ground is never quite so cut and dry.
As I have done before, I went back and substituted "Mahmudiyah Incident" in every place where Ambrose used My Lai, and re-read the paragraph. I have heard, and had, those very same arguments and questions over the last 4 years. Somehow it seems, 40 years later, and not a single thing has changed. My Lai and the Mahmudiyah incident both raise the same questions of responsibility, accountability, the behavior of men under extreme duress, the value system of the individual, the country, and the institution.
In the book "Black Hearts" the author very clearly chose to focus his efforts on the leadership aspect when searching for an answer to why those Soldiers committed that crime. Why did they decide to leave their post and go commit such a terrible act of violence on that family? He chose to find fault with the leadership, implying that personality struggles and conflicts throughout the battalion created conditions of extreme frustration and anger among the Soldiers and battalion leadership. By portraying the battalion commander as an extremely toxic leader, we get a ready-made villain for the remainder of the story. The truth however, is very much more complicated than that. That condition alone did not create the conditions of this tragedy.
As Ambrose succinctly pointed out, "In combat, men are always afraid, always enraged and very often seeking revenge." When you couple that with his later idea that in 21st century warfare - at least in Iraq and Afghanistan - Soldiers often do not see their enemy, a whole other line of reasoning is raised. When I am surrounded by a faceless enemy who blends in completely with the local populace and it is impossible to discern who is my friend and who isn't, the level of fear and anxiety rises exponentially. To maintain a super-human level of awareness in order to foresee every potential threat is exhausting work. You cannot sustain that indefinitely. I found that for me, I had to choose between believing everyone was friendly until proven otherwise, or the opposite, believing everyone was a threat until proven friendly. Most of my platoon chose the latter as their mode of operating and surviving their environment. By personality and inclination I chose the former. I cannot reconcile being at war and believing that everyone around me is the enemy. Certainly my Soldiers might find that naive, but in reality it is no more absurd than the opposite idea that everyone is trying to kill you. In fact, most people don't really give a damn about you and just want to get on with their lives. If you can help them with that, that's great. If not, go away and don't bother me. In any case, feeling as if you are surrounded by ghosts who wish to harm you and your friends creates a fear that is very difficult to explain. Logic and emotion crash headlong into each other day after day after day until you begin to question the very structure of your beliefs and reasoning. When I was young my father sent me a copy of a document called "The Desiderata". There is a line in it which has always stuck with me. "Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness." Can fear and loneliness create the condition for horrendous crime? Maybe, but then as Ambrose pointed out with regard to Vietnam, it would imply that crime and evil acts would be the norm rather than the exception. Every person in Iraq in 2005 - 2006 had to live under the same conditions my Soldiers did. So, why weren't crimes like these being committed every day?
And then there is the institution. The Army. Can we look to the Army to find accountability and responsibility when something happens that is so squarely outside the realm of believability? Certainly, as I have said before, nothing in my previous training had ever prepared me for the conditions I found myself in. I had never taken a class where the instructor said, "This is how you repair a platoon which has suffered the catastrophic loss of a third of it's leadership in 12 days and had it's home base burn to the ground. Step one do this. Step two do that." The idea that any institution can do 'teach' a prescribed response to every situation is ludicrous. The sheer number of potential responses is astronomical. But, did the Army fail? In a way I think it did because it taught prescribed responses instead of dynamic thought. It led me, and others, to believe that there was a 'correct' answer to every problem and clearly there is not. We have recognized that now and are taking steps in out training centers and commissioning sources to create adaptive and thinking Soldiers, but it will take time to weed out those of us who grew up in the proscribed response world in order to make room for the multi-tasker who is comfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty.
Finally, much like Ambrose, I remain proud of the organization for it's actions when the Mahmudiyah incident came to light. Knowing it would be a black-eye on the entire organization and feed the emotional political drama over the course of the war, the Army did not waiver and went forward with the investigations and prosecutions. While incredibly difficult to live through personally, the fact is that the Army did the right thing. And while the cynics might say that it was only trying to cover it's ass, the truth is that no matter why the Army took responsibility for these events, it did, and in doing so reaffirmed that they are an institution worthy of the trust of the people. To live up to it's charter with America, the Army must always be willing to look very hard at itself when there are lessons to be learned.
I am realizing now that I will never have a complete understanding of that time. That it will be something that happened in my life that I will carry as part of the whole story of Fenlason. There are lessons to be learned from it, tragedies and ruined lives to feel badly about, and triumphs of principle and decency to be honored. Trying to balance all of those things is the hardest part.
#57 Mentorship
Two weeks ago over in the Army Knowledge On-line (AKO) blogosphere, a question was posted asking, "Where Have All the Mentors Gone?" I posted a response, as did a few others, but the post itself sat relatively idle for about a week.
Then suddenly, as a result of one of the AKO moderators moving the question to a larger forum, it blew up. Now there are 30 or more responses and the post has taken on a new life. I am glad to see that, since the ideas of leadership and mentorship are very closely related. They are not exactly the same, but share many similarities that should be examined in greater depth.
For me, the writing I do here and on AKO, and my approach to leading my small organization is probably much more mentor oriented than it is leader oriented. I see much of my role in the unit to be the passing along of my experiential knowledge to those who will lead the Army long after I choose to retire. (My Orientation). I'm not quite sure how they perceive this relationship though, because it cannot be denied that by positional authority and rank, they sort of don't have a choice as to whether or not they follow my suggestions. They might very well just see my long-winded homily's as nothing more than a boss who likes to hear himself talk. (Their Orientation). And for the sake of literary honesty, they wouldn't be the only ones. Just ask my family!
Since I was the first person to respond on the AKO site, my thoughts and ideas naturally framed some of the replies that followed. Here is what I originally posted:
"Sir -
In my opinion there are a couple of issues with the mentoring 'program' today.
First, successful mentoring happens in an environment where the mentee accepts and finds something in the mentor that they wish to emulate. It really is a bottom up process. If we try to do it from the top down, we will inevitably end up with a young NCO or officer who can't find any similarities between the mentoring they are requesting, and the mentoring they are receiving.
Second, I think that the amount of change that has taken place throughout the Army over the past 8 years has made mentoring difficult. Instead of a senior person knowing - and therefore passing along - what doctrine etc are all about, both groups are doing a significant amount of experiential learning on the fly. That makes knowledge sharing difficult because it's hard to say whether or not that knowledge has permanence, or is situationally and time dependant.
Third, we spend very little time mentoring people instead of positions. Someone who commanded a company or battalion 10 years ago is attempting to mentor someone who commands a company or battalion today. The emphasis is on the position, not the person. Interestingly, if you read most 'leadership' books by retired military however, they spend most of their time dealing with the people side of leadership. I do not mentor a Squad Leader or Platoon Leader, I actually mentor the person who fills that role. We have lost the ability to see each person as a unique individual who requires individual approaches to their leader development.
Fourth, the current generation of young leaders is significantly different from the last few due to the proliferation of technology. As the older generations are trying to catch up with the digital age, the younger generation has already passed them by. They think, act, communicate, process, and interact differently than their predecessors did. A lot of valuable information gets lost in translation.
Finally, I had a boss once who said to me, "The Army never taught me how to mentor someone." While that struck me as an absurd statement at the time, it does show that there is a generational gap between those whose Army experience has been to follow the directives of those above them and let the system tell them how to do things, and the generation of Soldiers who have come of age during a period of rapid change and advancement.
I have found that taking a very personalized approach and actively looking for the differences in interpretation has assisted me in becoming a mentor for others. By reaching out to them, hearing what they are saying, and validating their Army experience, I can then begin to discuss the human being who is trying to come of age in a rapidly changing Army. That is where mentoring can begin."
In response to that, I want to share some of the other thoughts that were posted along the way. They are important and point to some larger issues facing the organization:
Ron wrote:
"My philosophy is that partly because we are at war, partly because our military is becoming more and more "corporate" that we have become less about the traditions, customs and courtesies that make us unique as a profession. Most importantly, the changes are generational. As a Lieutenant in Germany in the mid-90's I and my fellow officers had to go to our BN CDR's house and present our personal cards, we had right-army nights, officer calls, dining in and dining out. My company commander in Bosnia took us out on the berm of the basecamp at night after patrols and smoked cigars with us and metered out his leadership philosophy. Incidentally, he was also the first - and sadly, last - to counsel me in writing on a quarterly basis for another ten years. I did not forget his efforts - which, incidentally - made me a better officer and leader."
Robert wrote:
"Concerning a commitment to mentoring. I would challenge that mentoring is occurring. It's happening every day on the streets of Baghdad and the mountains of Afghanistan. However, I think we should all carefully consider the warning that Jeff provides concerning mentoring people serving in positions and not people as professionals. Of course there is varying types of mentorship based on the need of the mentee. I assume the thread we are running is tied to job selection, promotion potential and leadership development. This should consume a majority of the mentors time...assisting mentees in enhancing self awareness and identifying where they can best contribute. I think most senior folks spend a good deal of time engaged in this on an informal level and most commonly when the mentee reaches out. I'm a believer that it works and should be fostered, not formalized, across the force."
Joyce wrote:
"I enjoyed reading all the comments and agree with the views presented. Why? Because we are probably all from the same generation - Baby boomers! The two to three generations that followed us have different values and concerns. No matter what, leadership responsibilities do include coaching and guiding the younger members of their team or unit. Why aren't leaders doing their job? (PS: I am a civilian and do not have military experience. I always thought the military leaders were the ones who set the example for us civilians.)"
Richard wrote:
"I think that all leaders are mentors whether they realize it or not, our actions or lack thereof set examples for others to follow. I believe I am mentoring my peers, superiors and subordinates every day I am very approachable and willing to assist in any way I can. I am approaching my 19th year of service, during these 19 years I have been privileged to work with/for good and bad leaders alike, their actions/words have been something I have carried along the way during my career."
Richard wrote:
"I'm wondering if perhaps part of the problem is a difference of perspective between mentor and mentee. For example, is the mentee consciously aware that he or she is being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is? Likewise, could some mentors have a different definition of mentorship? One might consider technical development to be mentorship while another focuses on personal development."
Tamara wrote:
"First that there is no longer a clear definition of what mentorship is. The responsibilities and expectations for both mentor and mentee are fuzzy at best. As someone else said earlier, it's lost in translation between generations.
Second that the younger generation is so in tuned with email, texting, Facebook, Twitter, the list goes on...that they don't know how to interact with the real people standing right next to them. I see this with my own kids. They've got their buddy sitting right next to them and rather than just talking to one another, they're sending text messages back and forth on their cell phones. (OOO they get mad when I confiscate the cell phones for using them that way. I've stolen their "coolness factor".) I think that this is also part of the problem with our suicide rates as well. The younger leaders don't know how to properly read body language, so they can't spot issues that need to be addressed quickly."
Eric wrote:
"The first thing we all need to do is define mentorship. I think a lot of people mix mentorship with leadership."
Jessica wrote:
"Mentoring is a special bond between a mentor and their mentee. This is a unique and special relationship because in order to become a mentor, you have to be chosen. I believe a person can only realistically mentor three people at any one time – anymore than that and you detract from the value of the mentor/mentee relationship. A mentor does not have to be from your same branch or organization (it’s often helpful if they are not a part of your organization so they can give fresh insight). To be an accomplished mentor, it takes time, effort, and commitment.
If you ask many of our junior NCOs and officers, they will tell you they’ve never been mentored. It seems to be a common theme. However, when you ask for more details, you discover, they haven’t initiated a mentor/mentee relationship. It is a bottom up driven function. Again, you must be chosen."
Here then are some of my follow-up thoughts. The Mentor/Mentee relationship is first and foremost, a bottom-up process. The subordinate seeks out a senior whom they believe possesses qualities, traits and abilities that they would like to emulate. Importantly, however, it must be the senior who creates the opportunity for that to happen. I have to open - and leave open - my door for a subordinate to knock on when they are ready. My responsibility is to create the opportunity, theirs is to seize it. I would also contend that in many cases the subordinates willingness to seize that opportunity will be mostly based upon their interpretation of me as a person, not because of position. This again, seems to highlight the absolutely critical aspect of 'whole person' development. They see me as more than a position, they are seeing me a man, a husband, a father, a son, a brother, a leader, a follower etc.
Second, I believe that accessability and day-to-day interaction within the organization are critical. As Richard asked in a quote above, "Is the mentee consciously aware that they are being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is?" This is an extremely important point, because I might believe that I am mentoring all the time, and if they have no awareness of it, then it might have significantly less value than I think it does. The same is true if they have a different expectation of what mentorship looks like. Again we go back to the idea of the human factors of OODA. My Orientation, and theirs must be at least similar with regard to the developmental environment. I must be aware that I might be perceived as a mentor - and then accept responsibility for protecting the relationship, and they must also be aware that mentoring is taking place and help me create the environment that best suits their ability to receive it.
Finally, it appears that I'm not the only one recognizing that generational differences have a lot to do with successful mentoring processes. I happen to think that this particular generation is significantly different from the preceding 2, but also believe that the large gap that exists right now will slowly close until the next hugely impactful sociological or technological advancement. Historical events such as the Industrial Revolution and the movement away from agrarian society, electricity, women's suffrage, the automobile, mass media etc all create generational bubbles that impact one generation significantly. Over the next 2 or 3 however that change becomes muted as those changes move from novelty to routine. I think it will be interesting to see how leadership and mentorship are affected when all 3 generations who serve in the Army grew up in some form of the digital age. Although I will certainly be too old to be aware of it then, I have a sneaky suspicion that when they are all technologically equal, they will still be looking to be mentored by those who share a common value system. At the end of the day, it will still be our need as human beings for personal growth and affirmation that will drive the Mentor/Mentee realtionship.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
Then suddenly, as a result of one of the AKO moderators moving the question to a larger forum, it blew up. Now there are 30 or more responses and the post has taken on a new life. I am glad to see that, since the ideas of leadership and mentorship are very closely related. They are not exactly the same, but share many similarities that should be examined in greater depth.
For me, the writing I do here and on AKO, and my approach to leading my small organization is probably much more mentor oriented than it is leader oriented. I see much of my role in the unit to be the passing along of my experiential knowledge to those who will lead the Army long after I choose to retire. (My Orientation). I'm not quite sure how they perceive this relationship though, because it cannot be denied that by positional authority and rank, they sort of don't have a choice as to whether or not they follow my suggestions. They might very well just see my long-winded homily's as nothing more than a boss who likes to hear himself talk. (Their Orientation). And for the sake of literary honesty, they wouldn't be the only ones. Just ask my family!
Since I was the first person to respond on the AKO site, my thoughts and ideas naturally framed some of the replies that followed. Here is what I originally posted:
"Sir -
In my opinion there are a couple of issues with the mentoring 'program' today.
First, successful mentoring happens in an environment where the mentee accepts and finds something in the mentor that they wish to emulate. It really is a bottom up process. If we try to do it from the top down, we will inevitably end up with a young NCO or officer who can't find any similarities between the mentoring they are requesting, and the mentoring they are receiving.
Second, I think that the amount of change that has taken place throughout the Army over the past 8 years has made mentoring difficult. Instead of a senior person knowing - and therefore passing along - what doctrine etc are all about, both groups are doing a significant amount of experiential learning on the fly. That makes knowledge sharing difficult because it's hard to say whether or not that knowledge has permanence, or is situationally and time dependant.
Third, we spend very little time mentoring people instead of positions. Someone who commanded a company or battalion 10 years ago is attempting to mentor someone who commands a company or battalion today. The emphasis is on the position, not the person. Interestingly, if you read most 'leadership' books by retired military however, they spend most of their time dealing with the people side of leadership. I do not mentor a Squad Leader or Platoon Leader, I actually mentor the person who fills that role. We have lost the ability to see each person as a unique individual who requires individual approaches to their leader development.
Fourth, the current generation of young leaders is significantly different from the last few due to the proliferation of technology. As the older generations are trying to catch up with the digital age, the younger generation has already passed them by. They think, act, communicate, process, and interact differently than their predecessors did. A lot of valuable information gets lost in translation.
Finally, I had a boss once who said to me, "The Army never taught me how to mentor someone." While that struck me as an absurd statement at the time, it does show that there is a generational gap between those whose Army experience has been to follow the directives of those above them and let the system tell them how to do things, and the generation of Soldiers who have come of age during a period of rapid change and advancement.
I have found that taking a very personalized approach and actively looking for the differences in interpretation has assisted me in becoming a mentor for others. By reaching out to them, hearing what they are saying, and validating their Army experience, I can then begin to discuss the human being who is trying to come of age in a rapidly changing Army. That is where mentoring can begin."
In response to that, I want to share some of the other thoughts that were posted along the way. They are important and point to some larger issues facing the organization:
Ron wrote:
"My philosophy is that partly because we are at war, partly because our military is becoming more and more "corporate" that we have become less about the traditions, customs and courtesies that make us unique as a profession. Most importantly, the changes are generational. As a Lieutenant in Germany in the mid-90's I and my fellow officers had to go to our BN CDR's house and present our personal cards, we had right-army nights, officer calls, dining in and dining out. My company commander in Bosnia took us out on the berm of the basecamp at night after patrols and smoked cigars with us and metered out his leadership philosophy. Incidentally, he was also the first - and sadly, last - to counsel me in writing on a quarterly basis for another ten years. I did not forget his efforts - which, incidentally - made me a better officer and leader."
Robert wrote:
"Concerning a commitment to mentoring. I would challenge that mentoring is occurring. It's happening every day on the streets of Baghdad and the mountains of Afghanistan. However, I think we should all carefully consider the warning that Jeff provides concerning mentoring people serving in positions and not people as professionals. Of course there is varying types of mentorship based on the need of the mentee. I assume the thread we are running is tied to job selection, promotion potential and leadership development. This should consume a majority of the mentors time...assisting mentees in enhancing self awareness and identifying where they can best contribute. I think most senior folks spend a good deal of time engaged in this on an informal level and most commonly when the mentee reaches out. I'm a believer that it works and should be fostered, not formalized, across the force."
Joyce wrote:
"I enjoyed reading all the comments and agree with the views presented. Why? Because we are probably all from the same generation - Baby boomers! The two to three generations that followed us have different values and concerns. No matter what, leadership responsibilities do include coaching and guiding the younger members of their team or unit. Why aren't leaders doing their job? (PS: I am a civilian and do not have military experience. I always thought the military leaders were the ones who set the example for us civilians.)"
Richard wrote:
"I think that all leaders are mentors whether they realize it or not, our actions or lack thereof set examples for others to follow. I believe I am mentoring my peers, superiors and subordinates every day I am very approachable and willing to assist in any way I can. I am approaching my 19th year of service, during these 19 years I have been privileged to work with/for good and bad leaders alike, their actions/words have been something I have carried along the way during my career."
Richard wrote:
"I'm wondering if perhaps part of the problem is a difference of perspective between mentor and mentee. For example, is the mentee consciously aware that he or she is being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is? Likewise, could some mentors have a different definition of mentorship? One might consider technical development to be mentorship while another focuses on personal development."
Tamara wrote:
"First that there is no longer a clear definition of what mentorship is. The responsibilities and expectations for both mentor and mentee are fuzzy at best. As someone else said earlier, it's lost in translation between generations.
Second that the younger generation is so in tuned with email, texting, Facebook, Twitter, the list goes on...that they don't know how to interact with the real people standing right next to them. I see this with my own kids. They've got their buddy sitting right next to them and rather than just talking to one another, they're sending text messages back and forth on their cell phones. (OOO they get mad when I confiscate the cell phones for using them that way. I've stolen their "coolness factor".) I think that this is also part of the problem with our suicide rates as well. The younger leaders don't know how to properly read body language, so they can't spot issues that need to be addressed quickly."
Eric wrote:
"The first thing we all need to do is define mentorship. I think a lot of people mix mentorship with leadership."
Jessica wrote:
"Mentoring is a special bond between a mentor and their mentee. This is a unique and special relationship because in order to become a mentor, you have to be chosen. I believe a person can only realistically mentor three people at any one time – anymore than that and you detract from the value of the mentor/mentee relationship. A mentor does not have to be from your same branch or organization (it’s often helpful if they are not a part of your organization so they can give fresh insight). To be an accomplished mentor, it takes time, effort, and commitment.
If you ask many of our junior NCOs and officers, they will tell you they’ve never been mentored. It seems to be a common theme. However, when you ask for more details, you discover, they haven’t initiated a mentor/mentee relationship. It is a bottom up driven function. Again, you must be chosen."
Here then are some of my follow-up thoughts. The Mentor/Mentee relationship is first and foremost, a bottom-up process. The subordinate seeks out a senior whom they believe possesses qualities, traits and abilities that they would like to emulate. Importantly, however, it must be the senior who creates the opportunity for that to happen. I have to open - and leave open - my door for a subordinate to knock on when they are ready. My responsibility is to create the opportunity, theirs is to seize it. I would also contend that in many cases the subordinates willingness to seize that opportunity will be mostly based upon their interpretation of me as a person, not because of position. This again, seems to highlight the absolutely critical aspect of 'whole person' development. They see me as more than a position, they are seeing me a man, a husband, a father, a son, a brother, a leader, a follower etc.
Second, I believe that accessability and day-to-day interaction within the organization are critical. As Richard asked in a quote above, "Is the mentee consciously aware that they are being mentored? Do they have a different vision of what mentorship is?" This is an extremely important point, because I might believe that I am mentoring all the time, and if they have no awareness of it, then it might have significantly less value than I think it does. The same is true if they have a different expectation of what mentorship looks like. Again we go back to the idea of the human factors of OODA. My Orientation, and theirs must be at least similar with regard to the developmental environment. I must be aware that I might be perceived as a mentor - and then accept responsibility for protecting the relationship, and they must also be aware that mentoring is taking place and help me create the environment that best suits their ability to receive it.
Finally, it appears that I'm not the only one recognizing that generational differences have a lot to do with successful mentoring processes. I happen to think that this particular generation is significantly different from the preceding 2, but also believe that the large gap that exists right now will slowly close until the next hugely impactful sociological or technological advancement. Historical events such as the Industrial Revolution and the movement away from agrarian society, electricity, women's suffrage, the automobile, mass media etc all create generational bubbles that impact one generation significantly. Over the next 2 or 3 however that change becomes muted as those changes move from novelty to routine. I think it will be interesting to see how leadership and mentorship are affected when all 3 generations who serve in the Army grew up in some form of the digital age. Although I will certainly be too old to be aware of it then, I have a sneaky suspicion that when they are all technologically equal, they will still be looking to be mentored by those who share a common value system. At the end of the day, it will still be our need as human beings for personal growth and affirmation that will drive the Mentor/Mentee realtionship.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
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