Last night I went to Wikipedia to see what the site had on COL John Boyd, the military theorist credited with the development of the OODA loop. For those interested in Boyd, the OODA Loop and his contribution to America, you can find the link here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)
While there I came across a link to the Command and Control Research Program, a Department of Defense sponsored think-tank which describes itself like this:
"The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII) focuses upon (1) improving both the state of the art and the state of the practice of command and control and (2) enhancing DoD's understanding of the national security implications of the Information Age. It provides "Out of the Box" thinking and explores ways to help DoD take full advantage of Information Age opportunities. The CCRP bridges the operational and technical communities and enhances the body of knowledge and research infrastructure needed for future progress."
The link to CCRP is below:
http://www.dodccrp.org/
In that search, I also came across a paper written by Dr. John H. Clippinger entitled "Leadership". Regrettably, I cannot find the exact link again to embed it into this post. Dr. Clippinger's paper however, begins to look at the structural differences between Industrial Age organizations and Network Centric organization with regard to the types of people who comprise them, specifically focusing on the military. The introduction to the paper below makes the case for why we have the military hierarchical structure that we are all familiar with, as well as look at the requirements necessary for leadership in the network-centric era:
"It is very true that I have said that I considered Napoleon’s presence in the field
equal to forty thousand men in the balance. —Duke of Wellington
One bad general does better than two good ones. —Napoleon
Introduction
During the early nineteenth century, Wellington’s and Napoleon’s observations made
sense. With the onset of battle, communications became muddled, artillery was immobilized, and a commander’s ability to control his forces was limited. Consequently,the leadership of a single general could prove decisive in battle by maintaining clarity of command and control.
We are now at a totally different stage of warfare. This not to say that the fog of war has completely lifted, but visibility and synchronized actions, and the speed, precision, and lethality of response is beyond comparison to anything that has preceded it. The battlefield success of the doctrine and technology of Network Centric Warfare was not based upon a single brilliant plan, or a single individual or group, but rather was a property of the network, both technologically and organizationally. As Operation Iraqi Freedom so vividly illustrated,2 battle plans can now be changed very rapidly, affecting all aspects of operations—strategy, tactics, logistics and PSYOPs, operations, kinetics, and all types of forces. The competencies that make NCW a success are network properties; they are no longer solely the province of charismatic leaders or chance, but the result of diverse competencies and a new understanding of the role and growth of network leadership, and how it is learned and rewarded."
Further on in the article, Dr. Clippinger outlines the 8 types of people who exist in a network centered organization and the critical roles they perform. Since most of my posts try to remain 'people' focused, this section inevitably caught my eye. The 8 types and a shortened description of each is listed below.
1. The Exemplar- "These are the role models that others imitate. Sometimes their role can be simply symbolic, even ceremonial, but they are nonetheless important in setting the tone and culture of the organization. Successful and charismatic founders of new organizations, from Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Sam Walton to Osama Bin Laden and Aum Shinrikyo, all embody values and personalities that become the values of their organization. These leaders also exemplify the assessment criteria and set the standards for becoming a member of a network. In the military, each Service has its own types of exemplars: pilots and Seals for the Navy; Green Berets, and Rangers for the Army; and fighter pilots for the Air Force. These exemplars embody what is considered the most difficult and admired professional qualities that set that Service apart."
2. The Gatekeeper - "For every network there are membership rules—criteria for being included, retained, elevated, and excluded. The gatekeeper decides who is in and who is out...Like the doorman to exclusive clubs, the gatekeeper role is a combination of truth-teller, applying the standard for admittance, and enforcer, denying admittance to those parties that fail the test."
3. The Visionary - "Visionaries play a vital and sometimes contentious role within the military. They are often the first to see weaknesses in prevalent military doctrine, to espouse new technologies and doctrines, and therefore, to challenge current leadership and entrenched interests."
4. The Truth Teller - "In every network organization, someone has to keep the network honest....Like the accounting function in a corporation or the judicial function in the legal system, truth-tellers can lose their independence, and hence effectiveness. Since these are often the first roles to go in times of stress, successful leadership is exemplified here by independence, transparency, accuracy, and candor in the face of enormous pressure....The challenges are especially acute and consequential within military organizations. If credibility breaks down, trust soon becomes the next casualty, and then the overall effectiveness of the chain of command....The truth telling goal is to provide authenticated and accurate reporting of the outcomes of missions. It can take enormous courage to resist the inevitable pressures of peers and superiors to report what they want to be known, rather then the truth of the matter. Being a truth-teller can be highly unpopular and a long road to advancement."
5. The Fixer - " This is an individual who knows how to get things done and measures
him or herself not just by how many people they might know, but rather how they can get things done that others cannot. Such individuals are results oriented."
6. The Connector - "These network leaders participate in multiple social networks,
connecting not only with a large number of members, but a highly diverse number of members as well. They are known for having numerous friends, connections, and contacts—for being consummate networkers. Like the visionary leaders, they can introduce variety and options into a network through the diversity of people with whom they interact. They are critical for identifying and accessing new resources and helping to get a message out."
7. The Enforcer - "In smaller networks, this role is often combined with that of the
gatekeeper and even the truth-teller. However, in larger networks it is an independent role. Enforcement can mean physical coercion, but more often entails psychological or peer pressure. Like the truth-teller function, independence and transparency are critical for overall network effectiveness. Clearly, force and military means are the enforcement methods of last resort, but are necessary in order to buttress other forms of enforcement, which can vary from guilt and shame to legal redress. Most networks have their own forms of redress and enforcement that entail exclusion."
8. The Facilitator - "Within the military, this role is filled primarily as a staff function to a commander, and therefore may not appear to have the caché of the connector or visionary leadership roles. However, in networked organizational structures where decision making is be more distributed and less hierarchical, this leadership role is vital to coordinating and enabling other actors and decision makers."
I think one reason that this document caught my eye, was a snippet of the video I posted last week from General Dempsey. Somewhere in that video, I heard him mention "Enabling the edge" or words to that effect, and it struck me, because I think that phrase generates from the title of another CCRP product entitled, "Power to the Edge" which can be found here:
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Power.pdf
All of the above forms the basis for the following: What types of people are required to decentralize command and control? What types of people does it take to make the organization adaptable and responsive? What skills, attributes, and abilities do we need to inculcate in young and developing leaders? What types of awareness's do leaders have to posses in order to make the organization itself function as fluidly and accurately as possible? Many of these questions are being asked at the highest levels of the Army as indicated by the interview with General Dempsey in last week's post. And maybe more importantly, do the answers to these questions require wholesale changes to our current leadership models, or do they require more subtle azimuth adjustments in our organizational priorities? I don't know the answers to these questions, but I do believe that regardless of industry there must be the requirement for someone to continually be searching for them.
Who am I?
Using the labels provided by Dr. Clippinger above, I started to think about which of those labels suited my understanding of my leadership style the best. Quite honestly however, I think the more important question will be is my understanding of me the same as other people's understanding of me, and what is the impact of that on the overall effectiveness of the organization and the mission? Secondly, I think that because we are in the midst of an organizational shift throughout all of society from an industrial age, hierarchical organization to an information age, decentralized one, each of us may find that we serve multiple roles at the same time as we shift from one age to the other. For example, this blog serves as my understanding of the roles of "Visionary" and "Truth-Teller" as described above. However, because I am also a noncommissioned officer, part of a organizational structure that is hierarchical and historic, I also fulfill the role of "Gate Keeper". Due to past achievements and titles and awards, I could also be termed an "Exemplar" My point is that most of us will serve more than one role for awhile as the two organizational models move against each other.
At the smallest unit level though, I think that these descriptions are excellent ways for each of us to look at ourselves, our role in the organization, and those above, below and parallel to us. Ultimately, they help refine our personal Orientation.
Consider this: Go back to each of the labels above and write down the first person who comes to your mind as you read the description: For me, the "Exemplar" right now is General Petraus. For the entire Army (and maybe America) he seems to represent the highest ideals of the organization both by personal behavior and by technical ability. The "Gate Keeper" is the senior noncomissioned officer in my organization. I am the "Visionary", although I am very uncomfortable with that title because it seems too self aggrandizing and because I don't have some defined clear-cut view of the perfect future of the organization. I think the title does fit me however because my circumstance has forced me to question the institutional norms and try to identify what I believe the gaps in current methodologies are. The "Truth Teller" would be someone like Don Vandergriff who has the identified the flaws in the traditional leader development model and has found a way to gain acceptance of his 'truths' with those in positions to drive change in the Army. Don told the truth and kept saying it until the institution recognized it's validity. The "Fixer" is a person I've worked and I've known for years now who, while not necessarily possessing some grand vision, is immensely capable of handling the day-to-day requirements necessary to fulfill the vision of those around him. The "Connector" is another person in our Division who I have known for a long time who has the ability to bring disparate groups together to ensure the vision gets accomplished. The "Enforcer" is someone I struggle with. By the very title, I see this person as a negative part of the organization, resisting change and establishing roadblocks. However, this isn't the connotation that Dr. Clippinger envisioned. The problem of interpretation is mine, and I cannot form a mental picture of who this individual might be. The "Facilitator" for me is an amalgam of people who, while functioning right now to complete someone else's vision, are also thinking very hard about the impacts that differing 'visions' may have. Many people who have commented here come to mind. They are people who have been able to ask hard questions about the task and it's purpose and the impact of those things on the entire organization.
If you do the same thing I just did and search for those people you think fulfill the roles outlined by Dr. Clippinger, you begin to see those people in a new light. A light that enhances their value to the organization equally regardless of where they may sit hierarchically. It also helps inform your vision of you and the role you play. It helps refine your Orientation. These considerations are important to leader development. They force each of us to look at ourselves honestly, and then determine those labels that enhance our self understanding and those that detract from it. By doing this analysis we can then determine our place in the organization that will provide the best fit for our talents, optimize our contributions and recognize the roles that others perform to accomplish the mission.
There are 8 people in your office. What descriptor do you assign them? Do you think they see themselves that way too? Interesting questions. The true leader may be the person who sees him/herself in the very same way that their superiors, peers, and subordinates see them.
The other evening, I was talking to a friend on the phone and questioning whether or not I ever really desired to lead troops again as a First Sergeant or higher. Right now, I enjoy the new role I have have found both here and at work and enjoy the job I have. When I asked my friend what his thoughts were he said that maybe my best contribution to the Army right now is in helping to develop the new leadership requirements that current and future fights will require. Growing up in the Army, all I ever wanted to be was a command sergeant major. Now, without regret or remorse, I may have found a new dream.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#74 Editor's Note
I want to express my gratitude and thanks to all of you who have checked out and commented on my writing over the past 11 months. I was very honored this week to have been asked to submit my postings to the Battle Command Knowledge Systems (BCKS) Leader Net, on Army Knowledge Online. I have been given my own folder in the Professional Reading Room and so far 6 posts have been added. I look forward to adding more as time goes on.
I am deeply appreciative to all who have supported my efforts. In order to learn anything, previous ideas must be challenged and critically reviewed. I am thoroughly enjoying this exercise, and sincerely hope that I have challenged the reader to further explore their own definition of leadership, especially given the dynamic and rapidly changing world we currently live in.
Again, thanks for all your support and feedback and I look forward to the discussions ahead.
I am deeply appreciative to all who have supported my efforts. In order to learn anything, previous ideas must be challenged and critically reviewed. I am thoroughly enjoying this exercise, and sincerely hope that I have challenged the reader to further explore their own definition of leadership, especially given the dynamic and rapidly changing world we currently live in.
Again, thanks for all your support and feedback and I look forward to the discussions ahead.
#73 Risk, Trust and the Future of the Profession
As sometimes happens, I really had no idea what I wanted to comment on this week when suddenly a few things popped up out of nowhere and provided the spark. I am going to try something here that I haven't done before, which is to link to some videos and see if the feedback is worth it. I know the discussion is worthwhile, but if people won't check, (or can't depending on bandwidth) the links, then my thoughts might not make a whole lot of sense.
First, check the link below posted by LTG Robert Caslen of the Combined Arms Center, entitled 'Leading in a Complex Operating Environment':
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYPzRqu7Wvw
LTG Caslen's video post has to do with the potential repercussions of the COP Wanat and COP Keating reports. It talks very plainly about the need to ensure we have command climates that create the conditions for the exchange of information that allows a subordinate to voice his/her concerns regarding tactical risk to those higher in their chain of command. LTG Caslen is principally talking to the young and mid-career Army officers attending various schools that are part of the Combined Arms Center. CAC has done an exceptional job blending new technology and social media together in a manner that allows for the very top of the Army 'corporation' to gain feedback from those whose understanding of their profession has been formed in large part by the last 9 years of conflict. He also makes plain mention of the often blurry, and always subjective line between acceptable risk and risk aversion. Are we becoming risk averse because of the potential implications both personally, and for our Soldiers? These are also some of the same ideas and questions that I was talking about in my post a few weeks back entitled, "Hondo's Parting Gift".
Then check out the second link from General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcVHwpqsLf8
This is part 2 of a 3 part interview with General Dempsey. Not surprisingly, you'll find a lot of similarities, concerns and questions between Gen Dempsey's video and LTG Caslen's, only on a somewhat larger scale. Whereas LTG Caslen seems focused pretty tightly around the practical application of risk acceptance and risk aversion, Gen Dempsey continues that line of thought toward the more esoteric ideas of mentoring, trust development, and the impact of leader development programs that reaffirm the ethic of the profession of arms.
There is a part near the end of the Demspey video where he states:
"Decentralization has become an almost unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine, it's in joint doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge, we talk about enabling the edge, and my concern is that we're also....pushing all the risk. And in pushing all the risk, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the other aspects of our profession, one of the foundational aspects, which is trust. So that if we push all the risk to the edge, and we don't share that risk, and we hold junior leaders accountable for failures, but without sharing that failure with them...then we begin to erode trust. And when we begin to erode trust we begin to erode the profession."
These two videos fill me with a lot of hope and confidence in our Army's senior leadership. Their acknowledged realization that we are requiring increasingly junior leaders to make very complex decisions, in real-time, that can have strategic consequences, and their willingness to put that into the larger context of leader development and the Army professional ethic is important. I think it also demonstrates that the Army has recognized - in a very public manner - the need for institutional transparency; the need for dialogue over discussion. Intended or not, this reaching out to the force at large also recognizes that previous models built solely on the seniority of the leadership have been surpassed by a new model that recognizes the value of those currently experiencing a new reality. Both of these leaders seem to recognize and are affirming the value of the experiential knowledge of the bottom. They recognize that a lot of their previous knowledge gained over the course of their careers has very little practical application to a young Captain or Major trying to implement a doctrine that is still quite literally in it's infancy. What both are trying to do is find the broader implications of what this period of dramatic change means to the organization as a whole.
How do we develop trust? Where is it's beginning, and where is it's end? These questions are both intensely personal, and institutional, at the same time. On the personal level there is the idea that I trust my friends, my loved ones etc. That they will not intentionally do me harm. I trust that they will help me in my time of need and celebrate my successes. That they will share both my pain and my joy. This feeling of trust on the individual level provides all of us the sense of community that we require to find value in our world. Trust at the individual level fulfills Maslow's 3rd tier of Love, Affection and Belongingness. It begins to build community.
Then there is institutional trust. I trust that my elected leaders will work to serve their communities as best they can. I trust that my retirement plan money will be invested wisely. I trust that my schools will provide a quality education. That my doctor knows what medicine is best for me. I trust that my mail will be delivered on time. I trust that my employer will stand behind me when I have done my best, but the outcome fell short of the mark. I trust that the organizational climate, ethos, and norms will be lived up to by everyone, all the time, and not sacrificed for expediency. These are trusts that occur when we put our faith and belief in things beyond our immediate knowledge and experience or control.
As an entire Army there are a lot of things right now that are beyond our immediate knowledge (the ethical/moral/and hierarchy situations created by counterinsurgency's requirement for decentralization), experience (we have only really been practicing the COIN doctrine for about 3 years) or control (we are learning rapidly that the 'fog' and 'friction' of war creates points where the outcome may be outside of our ability to control it).
And so we have to return to the people actually making the on-the-spot decision. Leaders have to trust that the most junior member of the unit will make his/her decision based upon the best knowledge they have available to them, their personal value system and their understanding of the ethic and priorities of the institution they serve. And the subordinate has to trust that if he/she does that, that their leadership will support them. But how? How can we take a young leader and expand their understandings as broadly as this war requires in an extremely short amount of time? It's akin to trying to get them to understand the entirety of how our government functions in less than a year. And then making them responsible for the decisions they make based upon this 'Cliff's Notes' understanding of the profession itself.
I'm not saying that I have the answers to any of these questions, but I do think that in many ways, my search for personal understanding on these pages has produced an idea of how we might actually go about ensuring that the professional military ethic remains strong, that we develop our young leaders in a manner that ensures a common understanding of the expectations of the organization, and supports active decision-making at the point of impact.
As always, I return to OODA. If you watch both videos, you can see two senior leaders who have Observed something and are trying to Orient to it as quickly and as correctly as possible. Gen Dempsey's 'gut' instinct that we may have blindly accepted and highlighted decentralization without completely understanding it's consequences equals his Observe. His willingness to spend time and resources to study it will affect his Orientation. LTG Caslen's recognition that events like COP Wanat and COP Keating have played a role in upsetting the balance between tactical gains and risk aversion, is the same. Both men have the power to Decide and Act upon their Observations, but both right now seem to be trying to ensure they are correctly Oriented before doing so. We need to teach OODA in every school house we have. It works from the very personal to grand strategic levels. In this fight both of those extremes happen on the same small piece of ground.
Second, go back to the leaders 'philosophy' I gave my organization when they first met me. My first two points were: (1) People are more important than things, and (2) How to think is more important than what to think. These two thoughts place a premium on human being development. The task is not the critical event, the impact on the person who successfully completes the task is. It equals empowerment, growth, and development. It is also moldable. The task can be anything, which means that it could be ethical behavior making exercises just as easily as marksmanship. Either way, the observed development of the person is the prize. Everything else is just the method. At the microcosmic Army level, in my little organization of 14 people this is playing out every day. I trust my subordinates. I told them day 1 that they had 100% of my trust based upon their experience in the job. I told them I would earn theirs. In some ways, I turned their understanding upside down. I gave them a lot of latitude in the beginning that had the possibility of being abused. But that latitude has come with an increased expectation of excellence. Their work, their research, their class development, and their focus provides a institutional experience where they feel valued, cared for, and are invested in. I have taken care of them when necessary, and they have repaid that by truly caring about the people they are sending to combat. Their opinion counts, their voice gets heard, and we all are equally charged in our own way with creating the best training experience we can. They are as 'bought in' as I am. Now that it is truly their 'baby', they demonstrate every day the pride of 'parenthood'.
Third, look at the institution through the eyes of those just starting out. While they may not have much experience, they do have an understanding of the meaning of words. We need to look for those places where the institutional interpretation of the 7 Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage) and the user interpretation have diverged. I'm not implying that one side or the other has the correct interpretation, only that there has to be a recognition that there can be more than one. We may find that on most of the Values, the institution and the user are actually extremely close and we don't need a lot of work to close the gap. But we might find one or two where there is a large gap in understanding that requires us to work hard to close that gap. If we do not re-examine the user-level understanding of the 7 Army Values and how they are playing out on the side of a hill in Afghanistan between a young Sergeant and a scared Soldier, then we cannot fix the issues of ethos, trust, or leader development. Ultimately, any search for answers, will return to the need to enhance/change/create men and women of character who have the same personal understanding of the organization's ethics and norms as the organization itself does. If we fall short at this foundational level, the remainder of the profession will surely collapse.
A final rambling thought: The current battlefield requires folks who can make quick decisions in keeping with the institutional norms and expected behaviors of the Army.....those decisions must be based on a common understanding of the values and ethics of the organization.....the development of people into the leaders of character the profession requires IS the key.....Any training task or combat only provides experience, it is not the key event here. Leader development is.....Trust must be returned.....On both the personal and institutional level. Without it, our contract with the nation we serve is in jeopardy.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
First, check the link below posted by LTG Robert Caslen of the Combined Arms Center, entitled 'Leading in a Complex Operating Environment':
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYPzRqu7Wvw
LTG Caslen's video post has to do with the potential repercussions of the COP Wanat and COP Keating reports. It talks very plainly about the need to ensure we have command climates that create the conditions for the exchange of information that allows a subordinate to voice his/her concerns regarding tactical risk to those higher in their chain of command. LTG Caslen is principally talking to the young and mid-career Army officers attending various schools that are part of the Combined Arms Center. CAC has done an exceptional job blending new technology and social media together in a manner that allows for the very top of the Army 'corporation' to gain feedback from those whose understanding of their profession has been formed in large part by the last 9 years of conflict. He also makes plain mention of the often blurry, and always subjective line between acceptable risk and risk aversion. Are we becoming risk averse because of the potential implications both personally, and for our Soldiers? These are also some of the same ideas and questions that I was talking about in my post a few weeks back entitled, "Hondo's Parting Gift".
Then check out the second link from General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcVHwpqsLf8
This is part 2 of a 3 part interview with General Dempsey. Not surprisingly, you'll find a lot of similarities, concerns and questions between Gen Dempsey's video and LTG Caslen's, only on a somewhat larger scale. Whereas LTG Caslen seems focused pretty tightly around the practical application of risk acceptance and risk aversion, Gen Dempsey continues that line of thought toward the more esoteric ideas of mentoring, trust development, and the impact of leader development programs that reaffirm the ethic of the profession of arms.
There is a part near the end of the Demspey video where he states:
"Decentralization has become an almost unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine, it's in joint doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge, we talk about enabling the edge, and my concern is that we're also....pushing all the risk. And in pushing all the risk, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the other aspects of our profession, one of the foundational aspects, which is trust. So that if we push all the risk to the edge, and we don't share that risk, and we hold junior leaders accountable for failures, but without sharing that failure with them...then we begin to erode trust. And when we begin to erode trust we begin to erode the profession."
These two videos fill me with a lot of hope and confidence in our Army's senior leadership. Their acknowledged realization that we are requiring increasingly junior leaders to make very complex decisions, in real-time, that can have strategic consequences, and their willingness to put that into the larger context of leader development and the Army professional ethic is important. I think it also demonstrates that the Army has recognized - in a very public manner - the need for institutional transparency; the need for dialogue over discussion. Intended or not, this reaching out to the force at large also recognizes that previous models built solely on the seniority of the leadership have been surpassed by a new model that recognizes the value of those currently experiencing a new reality. Both of these leaders seem to recognize and are affirming the value of the experiential knowledge of the bottom. They recognize that a lot of their previous knowledge gained over the course of their careers has very little practical application to a young Captain or Major trying to implement a doctrine that is still quite literally in it's infancy. What both are trying to do is find the broader implications of what this period of dramatic change means to the organization as a whole.
How do we develop trust? Where is it's beginning, and where is it's end? These questions are both intensely personal, and institutional, at the same time. On the personal level there is the idea that I trust my friends, my loved ones etc. That they will not intentionally do me harm. I trust that they will help me in my time of need and celebrate my successes. That they will share both my pain and my joy. This feeling of trust on the individual level provides all of us the sense of community that we require to find value in our world. Trust at the individual level fulfills Maslow's 3rd tier of Love, Affection and Belongingness. It begins to build community.
Then there is institutional trust. I trust that my elected leaders will work to serve their communities as best they can. I trust that my retirement plan money will be invested wisely. I trust that my schools will provide a quality education. That my doctor knows what medicine is best for me. I trust that my mail will be delivered on time. I trust that my employer will stand behind me when I have done my best, but the outcome fell short of the mark. I trust that the organizational climate, ethos, and norms will be lived up to by everyone, all the time, and not sacrificed for expediency. These are trusts that occur when we put our faith and belief in things beyond our immediate knowledge and experience or control.
As an entire Army there are a lot of things right now that are beyond our immediate knowledge (the ethical/moral/and hierarchy situations created by counterinsurgency's requirement for decentralization), experience (we have only really been practicing the COIN doctrine for about 3 years) or control (we are learning rapidly that the 'fog' and 'friction' of war creates points where the outcome may be outside of our ability to control it).
And so we have to return to the people actually making the on-the-spot decision. Leaders have to trust that the most junior member of the unit will make his/her decision based upon the best knowledge they have available to them, their personal value system and their understanding of the ethic and priorities of the institution they serve. And the subordinate has to trust that if he/she does that, that their leadership will support them. But how? How can we take a young leader and expand their understandings as broadly as this war requires in an extremely short amount of time? It's akin to trying to get them to understand the entirety of how our government functions in less than a year. And then making them responsible for the decisions they make based upon this 'Cliff's Notes' understanding of the profession itself.
I'm not saying that I have the answers to any of these questions, but I do think that in many ways, my search for personal understanding on these pages has produced an idea of how we might actually go about ensuring that the professional military ethic remains strong, that we develop our young leaders in a manner that ensures a common understanding of the expectations of the organization, and supports active decision-making at the point of impact.
As always, I return to OODA. If you watch both videos, you can see two senior leaders who have Observed something and are trying to Orient to it as quickly and as correctly as possible. Gen Dempsey's 'gut' instinct that we may have blindly accepted and highlighted decentralization without completely understanding it's consequences equals his Observe. His willingness to spend time and resources to study it will affect his Orientation. LTG Caslen's recognition that events like COP Wanat and COP Keating have played a role in upsetting the balance between tactical gains and risk aversion, is the same. Both men have the power to Decide and Act upon their Observations, but both right now seem to be trying to ensure they are correctly Oriented before doing so. We need to teach OODA in every school house we have. It works from the very personal to grand strategic levels. In this fight both of those extremes happen on the same small piece of ground.
Second, go back to the leaders 'philosophy' I gave my organization when they first met me. My first two points were: (1) People are more important than things, and (2) How to think is more important than what to think. These two thoughts place a premium on human being development. The task is not the critical event, the impact on the person who successfully completes the task is. It equals empowerment, growth, and development. It is also moldable. The task can be anything, which means that it could be ethical behavior making exercises just as easily as marksmanship. Either way, the observed development of the person is the prize. Everything else is just the method. At the microcosmic Army level, in my little organization of 14 people this is playing out every day. I trust my subordinates. I told them day 1 that they had 100% of my trust based upon their experience in the job. I told them I would earn theirs. In some ways, I turned their understanding upside down. I gave them a lot of latitude in the beginning that had the possibility of being abused. But that latitude has come with an increased expectation of excellence. Their work, their research, their class development, and their focus provides a institutional experience where they feel valued, cared for, and are invested in. I have taken care of them when necessary, and they have repaid that by truly caring about the people they are sending to combat. Their opinion counts, their voice gets heard, and we all are equally charged in our own way with creating the best training experience we can. They are as 'bought in' as I am. Now that it is truly their 'baby', they demonstrate every day the pride of 'parenthood'.
Third, look at the institution through the eyes of those just starting out. While they may not have much experience, they do have an understanding of the meaning of words. We need to look for those places where the institutional interpretation of the 7 Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage) and the user interpretation have diverged. I'm not implying that one side or the other has the correct interpretation, only that there has to be a recognition that there can be more than one. We may find that on most of the Values, the institution and the user are actually extremely close and we don't need a lot of work to close the gap. But we might find one or two where there is a large gap in understanding that requires us to work hard to close that gap. If we do not re-examine the user-level understanding of the 7 Army Values and how they are playing out on the side of a hill in Afghanistan between a young Sergeant and a scared Soldier, then we cannot fix the issues of ethos, trust, or leader development. Ultimately, any search for answers, will return to the need to enhance/change/create men and women of character who have the same personal understanding of the organization's ethics and norms as the organization itself does. If we fall short at this foundational level, the remainder of the profession will surely collapse.
A final rambling thought: The current battlefield requires folks who can make quick decisions in keeping with the institutional norms and expected behaviors of the Army.....those decisions must be based on a common understanding of the values and ethics of the organization.....the development of people into the leaders of character the profession requires IS the key.....Any training task or combat only provides experience, it is not the key event here. Leader development is.....Trust must be returned.....On both the personal and institutional level. Without it, our contract with the nation we serve is in jeopardy.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
#72 The Pentathelete and the Profession
This post has been kicking around in my head for a few weeks now trying to get out. I have wanted to address it for at least the last 2 posts, but other ideas or incidents would pop up and it would get pushed to the back burner. It has been sitting there, however, tickling my brain and waiting for the thoughts to form themselves coherently enough to put words on the page. I'm going to try today. We'll see how it turns out.
About 3 weeks ago I received an email from one of the readers in response to post #68, "Alone With Yourself". The email came from a person who has become a mentor and one of my greatest mental protagonists throughout my writings. I alluded to him in the post itself like this:
"This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests. "
When I use the word protagonist to describe him, that is not to imply that we are enemies or foes. In fact, the truth is very much the opposite. He is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect and think very highly of. The protagonist label come from his ability and willingness to challenge me and provide another considered opinion besides my own. He pushes me to grow. This type of mental challenge is something that I believe that we must all engage in as leaders if we desire to remain relevant and involved in our professions, whatever they may be. There must be a mechanism in everyone's professional life (and personal too, I would think) that challenges them and their perceptions and vision of their world in order to not become entropic and shut off from new ideas. CR does that for me, and I am grateful for it.
Anyway, shortly after post #68, we exchanged a series of emails where he essentially disagreed with the value of having the professor go to West Point and challenging the cadets to begin examining their moral ethical 'backbone' before they are even fully formed as adults. He doesn't disagree that these considerations are critical, but rather that before the young officers can truly do what the professor suggests, they have to first understand the profession itself. What does the job require of them? He stated it this way:
" But the issues I have with the PHD addressing West Point cadets on how to think for themselves is that I don’t think they are ready for that. It would be a great speech for the Pre-Command Course for Lieutenant Colonels on the command list, but hardly a topic for students who don’t yet know the profession well enough to have an opinion.
For young lieutenants to join the fight against those arrayed against our country, it is necessary for them to first embrace the arts of war, not reinvent them. They must first steep themselves in the knowledge required to wield the tools of war, and they must train their mind and body in the multitude of skills required to accomplish this successfully. Equally, they must be emotionally prepared to fight aggression, to oppose evil, to take action, and to lead men. After all that, let them (and history) take close measure of the “box” before changing it."
And to follow that up, he went back and defined what those requirements are:
"The DA (Dept of the Army) develops competent and multifaceted military who personify the Army values and the warrior ethos in all aspects from warfighting, to statesmanship, to enterprise management. The Army develops qualities in its leaders to enable them to respond effectively to what they will face. The DA describes the leaders it is creating as “Pentathletes,” whose versatility will enable them to learn and adapt in ambiguous situations in a constantly evolving environment. Pentathlete leaders are innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, boldly confront uncertainty, and solve complex problems. They are decisive and prudent risk takers who effectively manage, lead, and change organizations. Pentathletes are professionally educated and dedicated to a lifelong learning process; resilient, mentally and physically agile, empathetic, and self-aware; and confidently lead Soldiers and civilians, build teams, and achieve the Army’s over-arching strategic goals while engendering loyalty and trust.
Pentathlete - Pentathletes are multi-skilled, innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, personify the warrior ethos in all aspects from war fighting to statesmanship to enterprise management, and boldly confront uncertainty and solve complex problems.
a. A Pentathlete—
(1) Is a strategic and creative thinker.
(2) Builds leaders and teams.
(3) Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier.
(4) Is effective in managing, leading, and changing large organizations.
(5) Is skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy.
(6) Understands cultural context and works effectively across it.
b. Pentathlete attributes are—
(1) To set the standard for integrity and character.
(2) To be a confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations:
(a) Prudent risk taker.
(b) Innovative.
(c) Adaptive.
(3) Empathetic and always positive.
(4) Professionally educated and dedicated to lifelong learning.
(5) Effective communicator. "
I very much agree with all of the above. Describing Army leaders as pentathletes is very appropriate. Much like their track and field counterparts, pentathlete Army leaders must be masters of all of the events and techniques and implements of war. There is an old saying, 'jack of all trades, master of none'. Army leaders must be 'jacks of all trades' and 'masters' of them as well.
Leading other human beings in combat with the ever-present threat of death requires that military leaders be developed in a wholly different manner than most of their civilian counterparts. The 'finality' of combat becomes an incredible weight upon the people in the contest. At some point, each Soldier has one of those moments when they suddenly realize that this is not a game and that they might actually die. That in order to survive, they may have to take the life of another human being. They also must also accept the randomness of death and come to grips with it. They must either accept these realities and continue to fight, or they succumb to their fears and become too paralyzed to move. Military leadership demands people who can recognize that and use the tools and requirements of the profession outlined above to overcome those fears, and instill the confidence in those they lead to do the same. It's probably no different in civilian business leadership, except that the cost of failure is really not quite as high. Money may be lost, and profits may decrease, but life and death are generally not on the line.
Maybe CR is right. Before we can master ourselves, we must first provide a framework for that mastery to take place. We must immerse ourselves in our professional environment and learn all the tools of our trade before we can begin to understand or look for the deeper implications of our personal role in the profession. Without a sense of what a project requires, and the tools available to solve it, the deeper implications of the project itself might become too difficult to solve. Again, it becomes a matter of perfecting all of one's skills focused towards the accomplishment of the objective. An Army leader must understand the requirements of the job, the structure of the organization, and why it functions the way it does. That leader must learn about, study, and master the intricacies of all the aspects of their profession, the tools available, the people they work with/for, the requirements of the fight itself in order to have a frame of reference with which to study their place in the larger picture.
I don't disagree with any of that. I really don't. However, I think the manner we go about becoming the pentathlete-leader the Army requires doesn't really fulfill this need very well. In fact, I think if you look at the need for mastery of the individual skills and then compare it with the definition of the pentathlete-leader above, you'll find that the professional military education system is generally broken with regard to the development of pentathletes all the way around. For CR's contention that becoming a pentathlete-leader to work, it has to recognize that skill mastery must be seen in a larger context. Consider each part of the pentathlete requirement above:
1. Is a strategic and creative thinker: Are we really developing young lieutenants and captains and sergeant to understand the strategic implications of the decisions they will be forced to make? Do we really reward creativity when a novel solution to a complex problem presents itself? Quite honestly, I don't believe we do this well at the junior level. Maybe in our senior schools we are beginning to, but at the junior level, we are often still telling young leaders what to do instead of developing their capacity for strategic and creative thought.
2. Builds leaders and teams: We used to have a great little manual entitled "Soldier Team Development" that helped developing leader figure out the behavioral and social dynamics of team building, but it is long out of print and is hard to find nowadays. Maybe we need to spend some time in our classrooms getting Soldiers to understand how and why successful teams and organizations work in order to enhance the over-all capability of the unit. This would allow a young leader to understand that the people of their profession are as an important part of mission success as any implement of war or strategy.
3. Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier: Are we really doing that in our professional schooling? Are we making young leaders think hard about what they are doing, why they are doing it, and the second and third order effects of their decisions? I think we might be starting to in some places, such as West Point, and the Sergeants Major Academy, but overall, I'm still not certain that the place near enough emphasis on the difficulties and considerations of the COIN environment at the lower levels.
4. Is effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations: This bullet seems to me to place the pentathlete label only on those leaders who are in charge of large organizations. It implies that the pentathlete starts at the senior level. My opinion is that these particular skills begin immediately at the lowest level as well, and do not only belong to those leaders who have ascended to the upper echelons of the Army.
5. Is skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy: This is another example where simply by the language used, the implication is that it doesn't really apply at the bottom of the leader spectrum and I fundamentally disagree with that premise. Since we have to accept that in a COIN environment, the smallest of decisions made at the lowest level can have extremely large outcomes that can support or detract from the mission in impactful ways, there must be a requirement for all levels the critical nature of diplomacy and statesmanship can impact the outcome.
6. Understands the cultural context and works effectively across it: We have immersed the Army in cultural considerations for the past 3 or 4 years. You cannot turn around these days without running into another cultural awareness class that explains the history and culture of the Afghan people. All of this is meant to provide out Soldiers with an awareness of the similarities and disparities between our 2 cultures. Awesome. I have no argument that this recognition is important. The question becomes, how do we use it? How do we take advantage of the similarities of our cultures to work towards mission accomplishment, and how to we learn to recognize when a dissimilarity will present an opportunity for us to achieve our mission as well?
Overall, I think that the requirements of the pentathlete-leader are quite correct. I just think that when the writers envisioned who this person is, they didn't have in mind those who are just beginning the leader development journey. You can almost see the face of a General Petreaus or other very senior leader is the definition, but can you see the face of a 20 year old farm kid from Iowa?
The attributes portion above caught my eye even more than the requirements portion. Think about what attributes the pentathlete-leader must posses: people of character and integrity, confidence, innovative, adaptive, empathetic and positively focused, professionally educated and good communicators.
Where will that character and integrity be developed? Where does it come from? Are we to assume that everyone has the same understanding of their character, and that theirs and the Army's are the same? Where will the ability to adapt be tested? Where will be let young leaders develop without the fear of strategic failure? Where will empathy and a basic respect for humanity find a place in the discussion of such a brutal contest as war? Where will the ability to communicate effectively be developed? Without a place to develop these attributes we cannot fulfill the higher mission of this war. Without placing the development of the person above the technical requirements of the profession, we cannot achieve the requirements of the pentathlete-leader. In my opinion, it is never too early to start challenging the people who make up the organization with questions like these. Knowing the technical aspects of one's craft will not teach you when or when not to use that tool. Knowing who you are, what you value and the implications for selecting one tool over another will always be the critical difference between 2 leaders.
Generically, CR and I believe in the same requirements of the pentathlete-leader. My point is that without knowing where we come from, what our our values are, possessing a deep and abiding sense of our personal strengths, weaknesses and abilities, we cannot fulfill those requirements because the most basic understanding has not been developed. Who is the unique individual behind the pentathlete-leader.
About 3 weeks ago I received an email from one of the readers in response to post #68, "Alone With Yourself". The email came from a person who has become a mentor and one of my greatest mental protagonists throughout my writings. I alluded to him in the post itself like this:
"This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests. "
When I use the word protagonist to describe him, that is not to imply that we are enemies or foes. In fact, the truth is very much the opposite. He is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect and think very highly of. The protagonist label come from his ability and willingness to challenge me and provide another considered opinion besides my own. He pushes me to grow. This type of mental challenge is something that I believe that we must all engage in as leaders if we desire to remain relevant and involved in our professions, whatever they may be. There must be a mechanism in everyone's professional life (and personal too, I would think) that challenges them and their perceptions and vision of their world in order to not become entropic and shut off from new ideas. CR does that for me, and I am grateful for it.
Anyway, shortly after post #68, we exchanged a series of emails where he essentially disagreed with the value of having the professor go to West Point and challenging the cadets to begin examining their moral ethical 'backbone' before they are even fully formed as adults. He doesn't disagree that these considerations are critical, but rather that before the young officers can truly do what the professor suggests, they have to first understand the profession itself. What does the job require of them? He stated it this way:
" But the issues I have with the PHD addressing West Point cadets on how to think for themselves is that I don’t think they are ready for that. It would be a great speech for the Pre-Command Course for Lieutenant Colonels on the command list, but hardly a topic for students who don’t yet know the profession well enough to have an opinion.
For young lieutenants to join the fight against those arrayed against our country, it is necessary for them to first embrace the arts of war, not reinvent them. They must first steep themselves in the knowledge required to wield the tools of war, and they must train their mind and body in the multitude of skills required to accomplish this successfully. Equally, they must be emotionally prepared to fight aggression, to oppose evil, to take action, and to lead men. After all that, let them (and history) take close measure of the “box” before changing it."
And to follow that up, he went back and defined what those requirements are:
"The DA (Dept of the Army) develops competent and multifaceted military who personify the Army values and the warrior ethos in all aspects from warfighting, to statesmanship, to enterprise management. The Army develops qualities in its leaders to enable them to respond effectively to what they will face. The DA describes the leaders it is creating as “Pentathletes,” whose versatility will enable them to learn and adapt in ambiguous situations in a constantly evolving environment. Pentathlete leaders are innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, boldly confront uncertainty, and solve complex problems. They are decisive and prudent risk takers who effectively manage, lead, and change organizations. Pentathletes are professionally educated and dedicated to a lifelong learning process; resilient, mentally and physically agile, empathetic, and self-aware; and confidently lead Soldiers and civilians, build teams, and achieve the Army’s over-arching strategic goals while engendering loyalty and trust.
Pentathlete - Pentathletes are multi-skilled, innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, personify the warrior ethos in all aspects from war fighting to statesmanship to enterprise management, and boldly confront uncertainty and solve complex problems.
a. A Pentathlete—
(1) Is a strategic and creative thinker.
(2) Builds leaders and teams.
(3) Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier.
(4) Is effective in managing, leading, and changing large organizations.
(5) Is skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy.
(6) Understands cultural context and works effectively across it.
b. Pentathlete attributes are—
(1) To set the standard for integrity and character.
(2) To be a confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations:
(a) Prudent risk taker.
(b) Innovative.
(c) Adaptive.
(3) Empathetic and always positive.
(4) Professionally educated and dedicated to lifelong learning.
(5) Effective communicator. "
I very much agree with all of the above. Describing Army leaders as pentathletes is very appropriate. Much like their track and field counterparts, pentathlete Army leaders must be masters of all of the events and techniques and implements of war. There is an old saying, 'jack of all trades, master of none'. Army leaders must be 'jacks of all trades' and 'masters' of them as well.
Leading other human beings in combat with the ever-present threat of death requires that military leaders be developed in a wholly different manner than most of their civilian counterparts. The 'finality' of combat becomes an incredible weight upon the people in the contest. At some point, each Soldier has one of those moments when they suddenly realize that this is not a game and that they might actually die. That in order to survive, they may have to take the life of another human being. They also must also accept the randomness of death and come to grips with it. They must either accept these realities and continue to fight, or they succumb to their fears and become too paralyzed to move. Military leadership demands people who can recognize that and use the tools and requirements of the profession outlined above to overcome those fears, and instill the confidence in those they lead to do the same. It's probably no different in civilian business leadership, except that the cost of failure is really not quite as high. Money may be lost, and profits may decrease, but life and death are generally not on the line.
Maybe CR is right. Before we can master ourselves, we must first provide a framework for that mastery to take place. We must immerse ourselves in our professional environment and learn all the tools of our trade before we can begin to understand or look for the deeper implications of our personal role in the profession. Without a sense of what a project requires, and the tools available to solve it, the deeper implications of the project itself might become too difficult to solve. Again, it becomes a matter of perfecting all of one's skills focused towards the accomplishment of the objective. An Army leader must understand the requirements of the job, the structure of the organization, and why it functions the way it does. That leader must learn about, study, and master the intricacies of all the aspects of their profession, the tools available, the people they work with/for, the requirements of the fight itself in order to have a frame of reference with which to study their place in the larger picture.
I don't disagree with any of that. I really don't. However, I think the manner we go about becoming the pentathlete-leader the Army requires doesn't really fulfill this need very well. In fact, I think if you look at the need for mastery of the individual skills and then compare it with the definition of the pentathlete-leader above, you'll find that the professional military education system is generally broken with regard to the development of pentathletes all the way around. For CR's contention that becoming a pentathlete-leader to work, it has to recognize that skill mastery must be seen in a larger context. Consider each part of the pentathlete requirement above:
1. Is a strategic and creative thinker: Are we really developing young lieutenants and captains and sergeant to understand the strategic implications of the decisions they will be forced to make? Do we really reward creativity when a novel solution to a complex problem presents itself? Quite honestly, I don't believe we do this well at the junior level. Maybe in our senior schools we are beginning to, but at the junior level, we are often still telling young leaders what to do instead of developing their capacity for strategic and creative thought.
2. Builds leaders and teams: We used to have a great little manual entitled "Soldier Team Development" that helped developing leader figure out the behavioral and social dynamics of team building, but it is long out of print and is hard to find nowadays. Maybe we need to spend some time in our classrooms getting Soldiers to understand how and why successful teams and organizations work in order to enhance the over-all capability of the unit. This would allow a young leader to understand that the people of their profession are as an important part of mission success as any implement of war or strategy.
3. Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier: Are we really doing that in our professional schooling? Are we making young leaders think hard about what they are doing, why they are doing it, and the second and third order effects of their decisions? I think we might be starting to in some places, such as West Point, and the Sergeants Major Academy, but overall, I'm still not certain that the place near enough emphasis on the difficulties and considerations of the COIN environment at the lower levels.
4. Is effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations: This bullet seems to me to place the pentathlete label only on those leaders who are in charge of large organizations. It implies that the pentathlete starts at the senior level. My opinion is that these particular skills begin immediately at the lowest level as well, and do not only belong to those leaders who have ascended to the upper echelons of the Army.
5. Is skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy: This is another example where simply by the language used, the implication is that it doesn't really apply at the bottom of the leader spectrum and I fundamentally disagree with that premise. Since we have to accept that in a COIN environment, the smallest of decisions made at the lowest level can have extremely large outcomes that can support or detract from the mission in impactful ways, there must be a requirement for all levels the critical nature of diplomacy and statesmanship can impact the outcome.
6. Understands the cultural context and works effectively across it: We have immersed the Army in cultural considerations for the past 3 or 4 years. You cannot turn around these days without running into another cultural awareness class that explains the history and culture of the Afghan people. All of this is meant to provide out Soldiers with an awareness of the similarities and disparities between our 2 cultures. Awesome. I have no argument that this recognition is important. The question becomes, how do we use it? How do we take advantage of the similarities of our cultures to work towards mission accomplishment, and how to we learn to recognize when a dissimilarity will present an opportunity for us to achieve our mission as well?
Overall, I think that the requirements of the pentathlete-leader are quite correct. I just think that when the writers envisioned who this person is, they didn't have in mind those who are just beginning the leader development journey. You can almost see the face of a General Petreaus or other very senior leader is the definition, but can you see the face of a 20 year old farm kid from Iowa?
The attributes portion above caught my eye even more than the requirements portion. Think about what attributes the pentathlete-leader must posses: people of character and integrity, confidence, innovative, adaptive, empathetic and positively focused, professionally educated and good communicators.
Where will that character and integrity be developed? Where does it come from? Are we to assume that everyone has the same understanding of their character, and that theirs and the Army's are the same? Where will the ability to adapt be tested? Where will be let young leaders develop without the fear of strategic failure? Where will empathy and a basic respect for humanity find a place in the discussion of such a brutal contest as war? Where will the ability to communicate effectively be developed? Without a place to develop these attributes we cannot fulfill the higher mission of this war. Without placing the development of the person above the technical requirements of the profession, we cannot achieve the requirements of the pentathlete-leader. In my opinion, it is never too early to start challenging the people who make up the organization with questions like these. Knowing the technical aspects of one's craft will not teach you when or when not to use that tool. Knowing who you are, what you value and the implications for selecting one tool over another will always be the critical difference between 2 leaders.
Generically, CR and I believe in the same requirements of the pentathlete-leader. My point is that without knowing where we come from, what our our values are, possessing a deep and abiding sense of our personal strengths, weaknesses and abilities, we cannot fulfill those requirements because the most basic understanding has not been developed. Who is the unique individual behind the pentathlete-leader.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#71 Answering a Question
In response to last weeks post, I received an email from JD who posed an interesting and thought-provoking question. I emailed him back and asked if he would mind my posting it as a blog itself. He had no issues with that, so here is his response to Post #70, "Hondo's Parting Gift", and my thoughts on the questions he raises:
"I like your perspective and it comes with tons of credibility.....I have followed this incident closely, like yours and others, which leads me to this question... Do you know of ANY battles (not FOB/garrison incidences) in the last 9 years where YOU would have "accused" a company, battalion, or brigade commander of dereliction of duty, incompetence, fault, or culpability?"
Simply put, my answer to JD's question is no. I do not personally know of any battles where I would have accused my leadership (either officer and non-commissioned officer) of dereliction of duty, incompetence or culpability. The reasons for that answer, however, are much more complicated - and sort of bring a lot of my other thoughts into play.
Dereliction of duty, and incompetence are both very subjective labels. I'm sure that none of the people involved in the COP Wanat battle or my incident think that they were negligent in carrying out their duties - as they understood them, and with the facts they had available to them at the time when they made critical decisions. They believed the decisions they made were correct and in-keeping with their understanding of their mission. The accusation of negligence only shows up when an other-than-expected result occurs because of those decisions. And especially if that result ends up with U.S. casualties. Company, battalion, brigade and division level commanders, and their non-commissioned officer counterparts, are generally not dim-witted people. For the most part, they are pretty smart, posses a keen sense of their responsibilities, and care very deeply about those in their charge. While there will always be those leaders who simply use their subordinates for their own self-promotion, they are a very minor exception, and not the overwhelming rule.
The charge of incompetence also leads to another issue. If someone is trained to do a job under a particular understanding and set of circumstances, and then those understandings and circumstances dramatically change, can you then accuse that person on being incompetent? You are fundamentally asking them to do something that they have not been trained, and therefore, may not know how to do. This war has too many examples of this to even recount, but in a generic sense, consider this example. Tthe set of understandings and assumptions that the military planners used to predict what would happen in post-invasion Iraq were woefully incorrect. Those decisions and assumptions had a marked impact on the rise of the insurgency from 2003 - 2006. Does that mean that these planners were incompetent? No. What it means is that the data that they were using to form their understandings and assumptions was flawed. But they could not have known that at the time they built the plan. Basic to the invasion of Iraq was the question of what would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed from power? The American planners assumptions were that Iraqi's would greet the U.S. as liberators and that democracy would surely follow. That the guy on the street would automatically choose peace over violence. That everyone would remain calm and understand that to rebuild would take time and patience. That a desire for Iraqi national unity would trump tribal and religious differences. Obviously, that did not happen and the void that was created by the deposition of Hussein and the de-bathification decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority led directly to the failure of basic services and the upsetting of the 'normal' order that created the anger, frustration and confusion that gave rise to the insurgency. Is Paul Bremer then incompetent? No. His assumptions were incorrect and the decisions made based upon those assumptions had some truly terrifying consequences, but he was certainly not incompetent. His orientation was wrong. If there was any failure, it was a failure to OODA. His inability to orient himself correctly to the real issues and not to impose his own - and America's - filters in the decision-making process may be at fault, but it does not lend itself to the realm of incompetence. It lends itself more accurately to not being prepared for a type of rebuilding effort that the original planners hadn't anticipated and planned for. The game changed, but only a tiny sliver of people were able to see it. Democracy, education, the rule of law and women's rights do not feed a hungry family, or provide clean water and sanitary living conditions. A working government can do those things whether it is tyrannical or democratic. This is where 'what to think' and 'how to think' collide. As a democracy and a free people, Americans do not like tyranny and despotic rule. That is what we are taught to think. It's the American way. However, there are times when something other than the American way may be the best solution to the problem. Remember, at the end of World War II, with the entire European continent needing to be rebuilt, a lot of Nazi's were 'repatriated' to provide the essential services that would aid in the rebuilding effort. In his rise to power, Benito Mussolini promised to make the trains run on time....and he did.
In the case of 1st platoon, there have been accusations of incompetence and dereliction almost since Day 1. "Black Hearts" provides almost 400 pages worth. While I do not think that every person in my Chain of Command correctly understood the environment and working conditions, I also do not think that most of us were incompetent. Obviously as some of the responses to previous postings have pointed out, others do not agree. Which again points out that heroism and success share equal footing with dereliction and incompetence. It's all a matter of your perspective. My opinion is that some people involved started to 'believe their own bullshit' a little too much, and had little understanding of how to 'see' their operating conditions correctly. To be fair, that assertion has been laid at my feet more than once. It's a matter of priorities, orientations (both personal and external) and the picture of the intended outcome.
Fault is a whole different issue. I can most definitely find fault in my situation, but it is not a criminal or culpable fault for the reasons cited above. It is exactly the same type of fault that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. It is a fault of perception, understanding, and priorities. It is a failure to orient correctly and then having the ability to impress that orientation on decision makers. Whenever someone asks the question, "Should he/she have known that X or Y could have happened?", it is almost certain that X or Y has happened, and the signs were missed. Well the truth is that to have perfect situational awareness and to be able to sift through the thousands of pieces of information, both large and trivial, and then align each them in perfect order is almost impossible. No one can do that right every time. That's why we call them mistakes. The signs were there, but they got lost in the various understandings of their importance depending on the perspective and agenda of who's paying attention. Most errors are errors of judgement. In retrospect, Steven Green's stated desire to kill Iraqi's because they had killed his friends was more than an emotional young man venting the day after one of his leaders had died in his arms. But, at the time, it was judged by others as a normal emotive response to a very traumatic incident. To be honest, I don't know too many Soldiers today who at one point or another came to hate Iraqis. Amidst all the anger and rage that many people were experiencing during that time, what was any different about Steven Green? Nothing except that 4 months later he would slaughter 4 people in cold blood.
Fault can be laid at all of our feet for having differing sets of priorities. The battalion commander's priorities were not in line with the company commander's priorities. They did not have a common understanding to work from. My priorities and the priorities of many of my Soldiers were different as well, and I had difficulty explaining those priorities to them in a manner that they could understand. In both cases, you can align the facts and bits of information and reach different conclusions. The weight that I give to something and the weight that one of my Soldiers gives it may be two entirely different things. For example, the battalion Sergeant Major judged entire platoons by their appearance and how they wore their uniforms. If they were shaven, had fresh haircuts, and their uniforms were worn correctly, they were good in his eyes. That was his orientation. My guys had absolutely no use for him and did not think highly of him at all. They thought he only focused on trivial and inconsequential things. I needed to use him to buy time and space to try to change the perception of the platoon at battalion level and take the heat off the platoon. I told the Soldiers to start shaving and getting haircuts and keeping their boots bloused etc. They thought I was as fucked up as he was. They thought my priorities were wrong. From my perspective, I knew that if he saw us cleaned-up and dressed correctly, he would consider it progress (whether it really was or not) and progress would shift his attention away from us and onto something else thereby removing a lot of the stress from the platoon. It worked too. In the middle of May (almost exactly at the mid-point of the cover-up of the March rape/murder) the battalion Sergeant Major said that 1st platoon had become one of the top 5 platoons in the battalion. He was wrong. His perspective and focus was wrong. In fact, they were still the same morally bankrupt platoon they had been since before I took over (which I told him on numerous occasions), but they damn sure looked pretty. And pretty made him back off for awhile which removed some of the pressure from them and helped gain the trust and confidence of the company and battalion, which led to us getting to participate in missions like Rushdi Mullah which made the Soldiers feel like they were real members of the battalion again instead of the red-headed step children as they had been labeled. So whose priorities and orientations were right? The Soldiers were being treated poorly by battalion and came to hate much of the chain of command. The battalion thought the Soldiers were undisciplined and complainers. To the Soldiers, I was just an extension of battalion. To battalion I was there to help restore discipline to the Soldiers. To me, I was there to do everything I could to give that platoon back it's confidence and mission focus at the same time recognizing the losses they had taken and the emotional problems that many of them faced. We all made decisions based upon differing perceptions and orientations. But, while you can find fault with the decisions, they were not derelict or incompetent, and if they were faulty, it was not a fault of willful commission. It was the inability to properly orient in more than one manner simultaneously under combat conditions, on a 3 dimensional human chess board and align the scraps of random information perfectly to achieve the desired outcome.
Consider General Campbell's report from last week again. His was a 'final' review of 3 previous reports, and his came to a much different conclusion than the one previous to it. Does that mean report number 2 was wrong? Are those Generals who rendered it derelict because his report refutes theirs? Are they incompetent? Is their thinking faulty? Or, is it simply a matter or having the same facts available, but emphasising different parts of them and arriving at a different conclusion because of a different orientation?
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome. It is the dialogue that keeps this moving forward, and I appreciate your support and consideration.
"I like your perspective and it comes with tons of credibility.....I have followed this incident closely, like yours and others, which leads me to this question... Do you know of ANY battles (not FOB/garrison incidences) in the last 9 years where YOU would have "accused" a company, battalion, or brigade commander of dereliction of duty, incompetence, fault, or culpability?"
Simply put, my answer to JD's question is no. I do not personally know of any battles where I would have accused my leadership (either officer and non-commissioned officer) of dereliction of duty, incompetence or culpability. The reasons for that answer, however, are much more complicated - and sort of bring a lot of my other thoughts into play.
Dereliction of duty, and incompetence are both very subjective labels. I'm sure that none of the people involved in the COP Wanat battle or my incident think that they were negligent in carrying out their duties - as they understood them, and with the facts they had available to them at the time when they made critical decisions. They believed the decisions they made were correct and in-keeping with their understanding of their mission. The accusation of negligence only shows up when an other-than-expected result occurs because of those decisions. And especially if that result ends up with U.S. casualties. Company, battalion, brigade and division level commanders, and their non-commissioned officer counterparts, are generally not dim-witted people. For the most part, they are pretty smart, posses a keen sense of their responsibilities, and care very deeply about those in their charge. While there will always be those leaders who simply use their subordinates for their own self-promotion, they are a very minor exception, and not the overwhelming rule.
The charge of incompetence also leads to another issue. If someone is trained to do a job under a particular understanding and set of circumstances, and then those understandings and circumstances dramatically change, can you then accuse that person on being incompetent? You are fundamentally asking them to do something that they have not been trained, and therefore, may not know how to do. This war has too many examples of this to even recount, but in a generic sense, consider this example. Tthe set of understandings and assumptions that the military planners used to predict what would happen in post-invasion Iraq were woefully incorrect. Those decisions and assumptions had a marked impact on the rise of the insurgency from 2003 - 2006. Does that mean that these planners were incompetent? No. What it means is that the data that they were using to form their understandings and assumptions was flawed. But they could not have known that at the time they built the plan. Basic to the invasion of Iraq was the question of what would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed from power? The American planners assumptions were that Iraqi's would greet the U.S. as liberators and that democracy would surely follow. That the guy on the street would automatically choose peace over violence. That everyone would remain calm and understand that to rebuild would take time and patience. That a desire for Iraqi national unity would trump tribal and religious differences. Obviously, that did not happen and the void that was created by the deposition of Hussein and the de-bathification decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority led directly to the failure of basic services and the upsetting of the 'normal' order that created the anger, frustration and confusion that gave rise to the insurgency. Is Paul Bremer then incompetent? No. His assumptions were incorrect and the decisions made based upon those assumptions had some truly terrifying consequences, but he was certainly not incompetent. His orientation was wrong. If there was any failure, it was a failure to OODA. His inability to orient himself correctly to the real issues and not to impose his own - and America's - filters in the decision-making process may be at fault, but it does not lend itself to the realm of incompetence. It lends itself more accurately to not being prepared for a type of rebuilding effort that the original planners hadn't anticipated and planned for. The game changed, but only a tiny sliver of people were able to see it. Democracy, education, the rule of law and women's rights do not feed a hungry family, or provide clean water and sanitary living conditions. A working government can do those things whether it is tyrannical or democratic. This is where 'what to think' and 'how to think' collide. As a democracy and a free people, Americans do not like tyranny and despotic rule. That is what we are taught to think. It's the American way. However, there are times when something other than the American way may be the best solution to the problem. Remember, at the end of World War II, with the entire European continent needing to be rebuilt, a lot of Nazi's were 'repatriated' to provide the essential services that would aid in the rebuilding effort. In his rise to power, Benito Mussolini promised to make the trains run on time....and he did.
In the case of 1st platoon, there have been accusations of incompetence and dereliction almost since Day 1. "Black Hearts" provides almost 400 pages worth. While I do not think that every person in my Chain of Command correctly understood the environment and working conditions, I also do not think that most of us were incompetent. Obviously as some of the responses to previous postings have pointed out, others do not agree. Which again points out that heroism and success share equal footing with dereliction and incompetence. It's all a matter of your perspective. My opinion is that some people involved started to 'believe their own bullshit' a little too much, and had little understanding of how to 'see' their operating conditions correctly. To be fair, that assertion has been laid at my feet more than once. It's a matter of priorities, orientations (both personal and external) and the picture of the intended outcome.
Fault is a whole different issue. I can most definitely find fault in my situation, but it is not a criminal or culpable fault for the reasons cited above. It is exactly the same type of fault that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. It is a fault of perception, understanding, and priorities. It is a failure to orient correctly and then having the ability to impress that orientation on decision makers. Whenever someone asks the question, "Should he/she have known that X or Y could have happened?", it is almost certain that X or Y has happened, and the signs were missed. Well the truth is that to have perfect situational awareness and to be able to sift through the thousands of pieces of information, both large and trivial, and then align each them in perfect order is almost impossible. No one can do that right every time. That's why we call them mistakes. The signs were there, but they got lost in the various understandings of their importance depending on the perspective and agenda of who's paying attention. Most errors are errors of judgement. In retrospect, Steven Green's stated desire to kill Iraqi's because they had killed his friends was more than an emotional young man venting the day after one of his leaders had died in his arms. But, at the time, it was judged by others as a normal emotive response to a very traumatic incident. To be honest, I don't know too many Soldiers today who at one point or another came to hate Iraqis. Amidst all the anger and rage that many people were experiencing during that time, what was any different about Steven Green? Nothing except that 4 months later he would slaughter 4 people in cold blood.
Fault can be laid at all of our feet for having differing sets of priorities. The battalion commander's priorities were not in line with the company commander's priorities. They did not have a common understanding to work from. My priorities and the priorities of many of my Soldiers were different as well, and I had difficulty explaining those priorities to them in a manner that they could understand. In both cases, you can align the facts and bits of information and reach different conclusions. The weight that I give to something and the weight that one of my Soldiers gives it may be two entirely different things. For example, the battalion Sergeant Major judged entire platoons by their appearance and how they wore their uniforms. If they were shaven, had fresh haircuts, and their uniforms were worn correctly, they were good in his eyes. That was his orientation. My guys had absolutely no use for him and did not think highly of him at all. They thought he only focused on trivial and inconsequential things. I needed to use him to buy time and space to try to change the perception of the platoon at battalion level and take the heat off the platoon. I told the Soldiers to start shaving and getting haircuts and keeping their boots bloused etc. They thought I was as fucked up as he was. They thought my priorities were wrong. From my perspective, I knew that if he saw us cleaned-up and dressed correctly, he would consider it progress (whether it really was or not) and progress would shift his attention away from us and onto something else thereby removing a lot of the stress from the platoon. It worked too. In the middle of May (almost exactly at the mid-point of the cover-up of the March rape/murder) the battalion Sergeant Major said that 1st platoon had become one of the top 5 platoons in the battalion. He was wrong. His perspective and focus was wrong. In fact, they were still the same morally bankrupt platoon they had been since before I took over (which I told him on numerous occasions), but they damn sure looked pretty. And pretty made him back off for awhile which removed some of the pressure from them and helped gain the trust and confidence of the company and battalion, which led to us getting to participate in missions like Rushdi Mullah which made the Soldiers feel like they were real members of the battalion again instead of the red-headed step children as they had been labeled. So whose priorities and orientations were right? The Soldiers were being treated poorly by battalion and came to hate much of the chain of command. The battalion thought the Soldiers were undisciplined and complainers. To the Soldiers, I was just an extension of battalion. To battalion I was there to help restore discipline to the Soldiers. To me, I was there to do everything I could to give that platoon back it's confidence and mission focus at the same time recognizing the losses they had taken and the emotional problems that many of them faced. We all made decisions based upon differing perceptions and orientations. But, while you can find fault with the decisions, they were not derelict or incompetent, and if they were faulty, it was not a fault of willful commission. It was the inability to properly orient in more than one manner simultaneously under combat conditions, on a 3 dimensional human chess board and align the scraps of random information perfectly to achieve the desired outcome.
Consider General Campbell's report from last week again. His was a 'final' review of 3 previous reports, and his came to a much different conclusion than the one previous to it. Does that mean report number 2 was wrong? Are those Generals who rendered it derelict because his report refutes theirs? Are they incompetent? Is their thinking faulty? Or, is it simply a matter or having the same facts available, but emphasising different parts of them and arriving at a different conclusion because of a different orientation?
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome. It is the dialogue that keeps this moving forward, and I appreciate your support and consideration.
#70 Hondo's Parting Gift
Amid all the media frenzy surrounding the replacement of General McChrystal this week, another story quietly made a small blip on the radar screen that will potentially have a far greater impact on the war, and leadership, than the change of commanders at the very top.
On July 13th, 2008, a small group of US Soldiers and their Afghan National Army partners were attacked at a place called Combat Outpost (COP) Wanat. During the fighting which lasted over 13 hours, approximately 200 insurgent fighters attacked and were ultimately repulsed by a small US force of approximately 30 men. During the fighting, 8 American Soldiers lost their lives.
As usual after a major battle such as Wanat, there was an investigation completed looking into the actions of everyone in the chain of command to figure out how such a large number of anti-Afghan Forces had been able to carry out such a complex attack. There have now been 3, and with this final report, 4 reviews of the event over the past 2 years. Principally, this has happened because the father of one of the dead Soldiers is a former Army officer who knew exactly what questions to ask and how to push the Army to provide the most accurate report possible. In this endeavor, he enlisted the office of Senator Jim Webb from Virginia to add weight to his claims.
Earlier reports found fault and culpability with the the leadership of the embattled American unit from company through the battalion, brigade and ultimately Combined Joint Task Force 101 chain of command. These results lead to reprimands and other actions that have career implications. In one case, a senior officer resigned his commission and retired due to the injustices he felt were done to some of his subordinate commanders.
Finally, this past January, Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, asked General Charles C. "Hondo" Campbell to review all of the former reports and decide whether or not members of the chain of command had been derelict in their duties, or made such egregious errors in judgment and leadership that would render them responsible for the deaths of their Soldiers. General Campbell has recently retired after 40 years of service, his final position being FORSCOM Commander. However, prior to his retirement, he completed the task he had been assigned by Secretary McHugh. The redacted version of his findings, published the same day the the President relieved General McChrystal of command, can be found here:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/wanat/downloads/campbellWanatReportRedacted.pdf
Gen. Campbell's report found no criminal, or negligent leadership failures for members of the chain of command from the lowest to the highest levels. It does however raise and highlight some very important ideas and address the implications of trying to lead Soldiers in a complex environment if a leader is constantly worried that someone will hold them criminally liable for their judgments. In section 7 A of the report he states the following:
"During my review of all the materials available to me, I kept several broad principles in mind. First, if a commander makes a decision after reasoned consideration of the facts and circumstances, the existence of alternatives does not make the decision erroneous. Stated otherwise, a commander has broad discretion, and absent an egregious disregard of significant facts, his reasonably considered decision should be presumed to be valid. Second, in evaluating any decision, it is critical to focus on the facts and circumstances as they were known at the time of the decision. With hindsight, with knowledge of later events, it is always possible to arrive at a different decision. If, however, the commander prudently acted on the basis of what he knew and what he reasonably should have known, subsequent events or information, that is developed or interpreted differently at a later time, does not make the original decision unsound or incorrect. Third, if there is evidence of a decision or action that is later considered less than optimal (or even poor), one must ask whether it contributed in some meaningful way to a negative outcome. Fourth, and finally, one must understand that there is no such thing as a perfect decision in war, where complexity, friction, uncertainty, the interlocking effects of the actions of independent individuals, and the enemy all effect the outcome of events."
In his conclusion, Gen Campbell stated the following:
"That U.S casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decisions, planning and actions of the chain of command running from "Redacted Name" to MG Schloesser. The U.S casualties occurred because the enemy decided to attack the COP at Wanat and battle resulted. It is critical that we not mechanically equate U.S. casualties with professional error or misconduct. (emphasis added by me) In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable. Regrettably, they are often the price of victory. When U.S, casualties occur, as at Wanat, we must examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether our Officers, NCO's and Soldiers have performed properly. When, as at Wanat. they have done so, we should learn any lessons the battle teaches and move forward. This reasoned, judicious review process without anger or partiality is the true meaning of accountability."
This report, hopefully the last concerning this particular battle, is critically important as to whether or not leaders have the latitude and ability to prosecute a fight without always having to be fearful that a dead Soldier will automatically invalidate their decision making process. Gen Campbell's final gift to the Army may have been the return of reason to the conduct of war.
There are some very important lessons that we can take from Gen Campbell's report that bear mentioning here. First, in war casualties are inevitable. The fact that we have prosecuted 2 wars over a 10 year span and only lost 4,000 Service members is, in fact, pretty incredible. The American public has been led to believe that with the advent of technology we can fight the 'perfect' war where we take no casualties, no innocent civilians or property are ever damaged, and the only suffering is done by the enemy. This is absolutely untrue. Wars - at their most basic level - are won and lost by men and women trying to kill each other. The relatively small number of deaths (.26 percent using 4000 deaths in a 1.5 million man force) has further enhanced the notion that we can win and not have anyone die. This fallacy needs to be replaced by the reality that if the war is worth fighting, then there will inevitably be a loss of life. While this painful truth is next to impossible to bare for the families and loved ones of those we have lost, it does not make the basic assumption unsound. In my opinion, we have also become so afraid of having Soldier get killed, that the protective measures we take on their behalf may also actually contribute to prolonging the overall conflict. If our leaders are always afraid to have someone die, then every decision they make is inherently defensive in nature. They will or won't take an offensive, they will or won't drive down certain roads, they will or won't hamper their Soldiers ability to kill the enemy solely based upon a fear of taking too high a number of casualties and having another incident like COP Wanat.
Second, the report rightfully claims that just because someone does die, that the decisions that led to that death are not automatically due to some failure on the part of the leadership. The enemy does get a vote. They intend to inflict casualties upon us in order to break our political, military and human will in order to get us to cease fighting. We are doing the same to them. Commanders must be allowed to make those decisions that they have been trained to make, and not constantly have to worry that if their decision has a bad outcome, that they will automatically be found criminally liable or otherwise responsible for the deaths that occur. If we inculcate our leaders with a fear of career ending prosecutions every time a Soldier gets killed, that fear will have a paralyzing effect on the decisions they make and ultimately will likely lead to more deaths and injuries. As I have said before, if General Eisenhower had had to command in the present age, it is not likely that the D Day invasion would ever have occurred. He would never have gotten past the planning stages as soon as he briefed the casualty estimates.
Third, and maybe most importantly, Gen Campbell's report claims that if, and when, investigations into incidents like this are warranted, it is critically important to understand the perspective and orientation of the commander at the time, not with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. In effect, one has to freeze the battlefield at a particular point in time and then try to see the events through the eyes of those who were in charge right there. You cannot go back later and judge men for things they could not have known at that particular point. You cannot say, "Well, why didn't you know that the enemy was going to plan and execute a large scale, multi-pronged attack on your lightly defended outpost?", if in fact, there was no evidence presented by the enemy to inform your thought process or if that knowledge is only one of a thousand pieces of often conflicting information you must decide upon each day.
Obviously this final notion is the one that effects me the most personally with regard to the events of my platoon. I have always claimed that given what I knew, my understanding of the platoon, the environment and the mission, that my decisions and actions were correct. I would also say that had someone else taken a different approach than I chose to, that that approach may have been equally correct. The important part is that you must look at the decisions based upon my interpretation and understanding when judging whether or not my actions were reasonable or sound. While the book and the court proceedings and all of that have tried relentlessly to rewrite the facts using knowledge that was not present at the time of the event, I have maintained that my perspective and that of others in the chain of command must be understood as it was then, not as it might be after the numerous investigations and prosecutions. This also highlights the idea that we need to develop leaders with a much wider and more in-depth perspective. In essence, if we are going to judge them later based upon their knowledge, experience and perspective, we had better spend a lot more time developing these abilities before we send them into command positions.
General Campbell's report to Secretary McHugh is a very important first step toward creating command climates based upon the mission, the circumstance, commander's intent and the expected outcome. To operate in an incredibly decentralized environment such as Afghanistan requires leaders at all levels who are empowered to make the best decisions they know how, given the information and analytical abilities they posses and the removal of fear from prosecution for casualties that are an inevitable outcome of the dirty business at the sharp end of the stick.
As always, your thoughts and comment are welcome. Feedback only serves to enhance the dialogue and we all learn from the experience of others. I look forward to hearing from you.
On July 13th, 2008, a small group of US Soldiers and their Afghan National Army partners were attacked at a place called Combat Outpost (COP) Wanat. During the fighting which lasted over 13 hours, approximately 200 insurgent fighters attacked and were ultimately repulsed by a small US force of approximately 30 men. During the fighting, 8 American Soldiers lost their lives.
As usual after a major battle such as Wanat, there was an investigation completed looking into the actions of everyone in the chain of command to figure out how such a large number of anti-Afghan Forces had been able to carry out such a complex attack. There have now been 3, and with this final report, 4 reviews of the event over the past 2 years. Principally, this has happened because the father of one of the dead Soldiers is a former Army officer who knew exactly what questions to ask and how to push the Army to provide the most accurate report possible. In this endeavor, he enlisted the office of Senator Jim Webb from Virginia to add weight to his claims.
Earlier reports found fault and culpability with the the leadership of the embattled American unit from company through the battalion, brigade and ultimately Combined Joint Task Force 101 chain of command. These results lead to reprimands and other actions that have career implications. In one case, a senior officer resigned his commission and retired due to the injustices he felt were done to some of his subordinate commanders.
Finally, this past January, Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, asked General Charles C. "Hondo" Campbell to review all of the former reports and decide whether or not members of the chain of command had been derelict in their duties, or made such egregious errors in judgment and leadership that would render them responsible for the deaths of their Soldiers. General Campbell has recently retired after 40 years of service, his final position being FORSCOM Commander. However, prior to his retirement, he completed the task he had been assigned by Secretary McHugh. The redacted version of his findings, published the same day the the President relieved General McChrystal of command, can be found here:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/wanat/downloads/campbellWanatReportRedacted.pdf
Gen. Campbell's report found no criminal, or negligent leadership failures for members of the chain of command from the lowest to the highest levels. It does however raise and highlight some very important ideas and address the implications of trying to lead Soldiers in a complex environment if a leader is constantly worried that someone will hold them criminally liable for their judgments. In section 7 A of the report he states the following:
"During my review of all the materials available to me, I kept several broad principles in mind. First, if a commander makes a decision after reasoned consideration of the facts and circumstances, the existence of alternatives does not make the decision erroneous. Stated otherwise, a commander has broad discretion, and absent an egregious disregard of significant facts, his reasonably considered decision should be presumed to be valid. Second, in evaluating any decision, it is critical to focus on the facts and circumstances as they were known at the time of the decision. With hindsight, with knowledge of later events, it is always possible to arrive at a different decision. If, however, the commander prudently acted on the basis of what he knew and what he reasonably should have known, subsequent events or information, that is developed or interpreted differently at a later time, does not make the original decision unsound or incorrect. Third, if there is evidence of a decision or action that is later considered less than optimal (or even poor), one must ask whether it contributed in some meaningful way to a negative outcome. Fourth, and finally, one must understand that there is no such thing as a perfect decision in war, where complexity, friction, uncertainty, the interlocking effects of the actions of independent individuals, and the enemy all effect the outcome of events."
In his conclusion, Gen Campbell stated the following:
"That U.S casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decisions, planning and actions of the chain of command running from "Redacted Name" to MG Schloesser. The U.S casualties occurred because the enemy decided to attack the COP at Wanat and battle resulted. It is critical that we not mechanically equate U.S. casualties with professional error or misconduct. (emphasis added by me) In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable. Regrettably, they are often the price of victory. When U.S, casualties occur, as at Wanat, we must examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether our Officers, NCO's and Soldiers have performed properly. When, as at Wanat. they have done so, we should learn any lessons the battle teaches and move forward. This reasoned, judicious review process without anger or partiality is the true meaning of accountability."
This report, hopefully the last concerning this particular battle, is critically important as to whether or not leaders have the latitude and ability to prosecute a fight without always having to be fearful that a dead Soldier will automatically invalidate their decision making process. Gen Campbell's final gift to the Army may have been the return of reason to the conduct of war.
There are some very important lessons that we can take from Gen Campbell's report that bear mentioning here. First, in war casualties are inevitable. The fact that we have prosecuted 2 wars over a 10 year span and only lost 4,000 Service members is, in fact, pretty incredible. The American public has been led to believe that with the advent of technology we can fight the 'perfect' war where we take no casualties, no innocent civilians or property are ever damaged, and the only suffering is done by the enemy. This is absolutely untrue. Wars - at their most basic level - are won and lost by men and women trying to kill each other. The relatively small number of deaths (.26 percent using 4000 deaths in a 1.5 million man force) has further enhanced the notion that we can win and not have anyone die. This fallacy needs to be replaced by the reality that if the war is worth fighting, then there will inevitably be a loss of life. While this painful truth is next to impossible to bare for the families and loved ones of those we have lost, it does not make the basic assumption unsound. In my opinion, we have also become so afraid of having Soldier get killed, that the protective measures we take on their behalf may also actually contribute to prolonging the overall conflict. If our leaders are always afraid to have someone die, then every decision they make is inherently defensive in nature. They will or won't take an offensive, they will or won't drive down certain roads, they will or won't hamper their Soldiers ability to kill the enemy solely based upon a fear of taking too high a number of casualties and having another incident like COP Wanat.
Second, the report rightfully claims that just because someone does die, that the decisions that led to that death are not automatically due to some failure on the part of the leadership. The enemy does get a vote. They intend to inflict casualties upon us in order to break our political, military and human will in order to get us to cease fighting. We are doing the same to them. Commanders must be allowed to make those decisions that they have been trained to make, and not constantly have to worry that if their decision has a bad outcome, that they will automatically be found criminally liable or otherwise responsible for the deaths that occur. If we inculcate our leaders with a fear of career ending prosecutions every time a Soldier gets killed, that fear will have a paralyzing effect on the decisions they make and ultimately will likely lead to more deaths and injuries. As I have said before, if General Eisenhower had had to command in the present age, it is not likely that the D Day invasion would ever have occurred. He would never have gotten past the planning stages as soon as he briefed the casualty estimates.
Third, and maybe most importantly, Gen Campbell's report claims that if, and when, investigations into incidents like this are warranted, it is critically important to understand the perspective and orientation of the commander at the time, not with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. In effect, one has to freeze the battlefield at a particular point in time and then try to see the events through the eyes of those who were in charge right there. You cannot go back later and judge men for things they could not have known at that particular point. You cannot say, "Well, why didn't you know that the enemy was going to plan and execute a large scale, multi-pronged attack on your lightly defended outpost?", if in fact, there was no evidence presented by the enemy to inform your thought process or if that knowledge is only one of a thousand pieces of often conflicting information you must decide upon each day.
Obviously this final notion is the one that effects me the most personally with regard to the events of my platoon. I have always claimed that given what I knew, my understanding of the platoon, the environment and the mission, that my decisions and actions were correct. I would also say that had someone else taken a different approach than I chose to, that that approach may have been equally correct. The important part is that you must look at the decisions based upon my interpretation and understanding when judging whether or not my actions were reasonable or sound. While the book and the court proceedings and all of that have tried relentlessly to rewrite the facts using knowledge that was not present at the time of the event, I have maintained that my perspective and that of others in the chain of command must be understood as it was then, not as it might be after the numerous investigations and prosecutions. This also highlights the idea that we need to develop leaders with a much wider and more in-depth perspective. In essence, if we are going to judge them later based upon their knowledge, experience and perspective, we had better spend a lot more time developing these abilities before we send them into command positions.
General Campbell's report to Secretary McHugh is a very important first step toward creating command climates based upon the mission, the circumstance, commander's intent and the expected outcome. To operate in an incredibly decentralized environment such as Afghanistan requires leaders at all levels who are empowered to make the best decisions they know how, given the information and analytical abilities they posses and the removal of fear from prosecution for casualties that are an inevitable outcome of the dirty business at the sharp end of the stick.
As always, your thoughts and comment are welcome. Feedback only serves to enhance the dialogue and we all learn from the experience of others. I look forward to hearing from you.
#69 On the Mark?
This week an article on AKO was highlighted on Leader Net entitled, "Achieving Excellence in Small Unit Performance" written by Lieutenant General Michael Vain and COL Robert Toguchi. You can find the link here:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art011.pdf
While I am in no way comparing myself, or my writing ability, to that of the authors, it does seem to me that they are forwarding - in a much more literate fashion - some of the ideas I have been discussing here for the past year or so. Themes such as trust development, decentralization, common ethics and value sets, and decision making ability etc, are in many ways the central focus of their article.
I also find it interesting that the very top layer of Army leadership seems to have a pretty clear understanding of the challenges, changes and adjustments that need to be addressed in our training centers and leader development programs. Instead of the entrenched bureaucracy that we are all accustomed to, as I search and find more material to look at and write about, I continually run into three and four star officers who seem to be adapting to, and embracing, dynamic change and fresh insight and feedback. Consider the interview that LTG Hertling gave to a media round table of bloggers I mentioned awhile back. Or his acceptance that Millennials are a unique generational subset that require new approaches to immersion in the Army. Consider that Gen McChrystal has a Facebook class on COIN operations with a video link to You Tube. Consider that Gen Chiarrelli started a blog to dialogue with students at the Command and General Staff College. Everywhere I look, I am finding senior leaders who are looking for new ways to communicate, who are actively seeking feedback from the rank and file, and who have recognized that we are in a period of dynamic change with regard to both people and technology that requires a hard look at our current method of operating and training. What I do not see is that same desire for feedback and input at the local level. Many units, and Soldiers I talk to relate that it's still 'business as usual' at the battalion level and below. Even after 9 years of war and rotation in and out of a combat zone. Trust at the local level seems at times non-existent they say, staff's have become too bureaucratic and over-loaded, and risk aversion has become the norm. Clearly, there is a disconnect between the top and the bottom, even organizationally.
In light of those thoughts, consider the following paragraph from the article:
"The more decentralized operations are, the greater the reliance on effective leadership and small unit performance. Recent research has revealed that we can best counter a decentralized, network-enabled enemy if our forces too are decentralized and network-enabled. Moreover, the tactics of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to target civilians, schools, and crowded markets have placed a premium on discernment, perspective, and excellence in decision making at the small unit level. The responsibility required of leaders and units at lower levels of command is clearly increasing, as is the potential that small units will continue to bear the brunt of close combat in the years to come. Units will fight separately and operate more independently with a greater need to be self-sustaining. Has the U.S. military done all that it can to improve small-unit performance and to develop small-unit excellence?"
This simple question raises the idea of 'how' we are likely to fight in the near-to-mid future, acknowledges that the human being at the center of the village square is going to be the decision maker at the point of contact, and that leader development will require a much more comprehensive and holistic approach than the current model suggests.
The article then goes on to point out some of the characteristics of high performing units. They are:
1. Effective Leadership
2. Effective use of Information
3. Fostering Innovation
4. Superior Execution
5. Thorough Preparation and Pre-Combat Inspections
6. Thorough Assessment of Performance
7. Executing Full Spectrum Operations
8. Posses a Dynamic Process of Change
9. Peer-to-Peer Integration and development
I will discuss the ones that seemed to jump out at me, or sparked a divergent thought.
Effective Leadership: "Effective leadership is not a journey in pursuit of perfection, but a continuous development process." "Leadership deals with a broad range of skills. While not all-inclusive, leadership involves everything from demonstrating tactical and technical proficiency to motivating and building trust—from exemplifying the Warrior Ethos to fostering teamwork and cohesion. “Be, Know, Do” is a more simplified version of an extremely complex set of characteristics."
These quotes seem very important to me for two distinct reasons. First, the acknowledgement that the formalized officer and non-commissioned officer schooling system is not the end of the game. Leader development is, and must be, a continuous pursuit. I have often thought about that in light of the blog and events in my life. There has always been the assumption that after 20 years of service, I should know what leadership is, how it functions, and the role it plays in developing subordinates. The truth is, that while I may be late to the game, I'm beginning now to have a much more concrete realization that leader development is a actually a life-long process. I only wish I had started this pursuit when I was a corporal. We must develop a system that encourages, and requires, life long adaptation, and personal growth. I am not the same person I was 20 years ago when I joined the Army, so why should my ideas on leadership be the same as they were back then? Hierarchical organizations have an inclination to work this way because we assume that the amount of time required to achieve a certain status equals continued growth and reflection. Many times this isn't the case. The way that we achieved the position of status becomes the modus operandi for the way we think, regardless of changing circumstances or immersion into unfamiliar territory.
Effective Use of Information: "Exceptional small units actively seek and acquire information and use it effectively, an imperative in complex environments today. The rigorous demands of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations require that small units have access to national level databases, especially human intelligence databases. These databases expand the venues for leaders to learn from the edge, since many receive direct feeds from liaison elements on the tactical front. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army is available, but we need to train our Soldiers to leverage these assets.The notion that leveraging is limited to higher-level headquarters units is no longer valid."
This paragraph is the ultimate flattening of the organization I have spoken about often. However, critical to the access to information are two component parts: (1) Knowing what you need and why you need it, and (2) Knowing what to do with it. There may also be a third consideration which is being able to articulate why some information is of little or no value to you and why. If the top or the bottom determines something is 'important' and either one does not agree, not only does there need to be a mechanism to say so, but there also has to be the ability of the both to tell the other why that piece is not relevant to their situation. By doing this, we open the lines of communication and help ensure a common understanding of the commander's intent and purpose.
Competent Decision Making: " Small units demonstrate competence in the art and science of decision making. However, all small units do not necessarily excel in making effective decisions. Certainly core skill sets for decision making involve understanding, visualizing, and assessing the environment and situation. Effective decision makers, however, are also flexible, quick, resilient, adaptive, risk-taking, and accurate. These skill sets require higher-order training in critical thinking, and we must inculcate them into our training. The first core skill set is understanding—it is vital to decision making. Understanding needs to be measured and is related to the small-unit leader’s education, intellect, experience, perception, and the information he receives."
This is precisely the purpose of the OODA Loop, the Adaptive Leader Methodology, and Outcome Based Training and Education. The process of decision making is important, but understanding why and how you are making it is even more critical. How recognizes you, and why recognizes both need and context. All of which are critical. We have concentrated for too many years on the process, and not put enough emphasis on understanding the why and how. Of all the component parts of this article, I believe this one to be the most important. The insurgent/counter insurgent battlefield is too complex to allow any leader to rely on simplistic black or white answers to problems that are extremely nuanced and have implications that range from local to geopolitical. We must teach dynamic thinking and interaction. To do that we must foster trust, give Soldiers the opportunity to make decisions and learn from them and create feedback mechanisms that demand honesty over political survival at every level.
Thorough Assessment of Performance: "Successful small units habitually use after action reviews to provide a candid assessment of strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement.
The best units are open to embracing change, have open discussions on how to improve, and
support active learning in all ranks. Over time, the technique of “red teaming” has proven to be highly effective at improving practices in higher headquarters. Similar techniques may
prove beneficial at lower echelons with minimal force structure additions."
I have participated in numerous After Action Reviews in my career, and the only contention I have with them is that while total inclusion of all ranks is critical to their success, we often do not use them correctly. While reviewing the outcome of an operation is important, I have long felt that using the AAR process to gain an understanding of an individuals perception of the circumstance and environment may be even more critical than whether or not the operation had a good or bad result. Both results will be the outcome of the choices made by all levels of the organization. As I have mentioned before, it is possible to have bad outcomes from good decisions, and good outcomes from bad decisions. That is why perception, understanding and self-awareness are the critical components that we should be addressing in the AAR process. Red teaming (the idea of having someone in the organization designed to look at you from the adversaries perspective) is a great concept, provided that the Red Team is kept separate from the chain of command with regard to promotion, thereby removing the threat of professional retaliation when harsh judgements of the chain of command are made.
Peer to Peer Integration and Development: "The emergent qualities of high-performing small units have a number of notable attributes—the synergistic capacity to work together; the ability to develop superior leaders (beyond the appointed leadership); the capacity to adapt; the flexibility to handle fast changing situations; and the resilience to maintain these characteristics in the face of adversity, including the death of team members....There is a shared cognition or common understanding that evolves in training together that is closely coupled with trust and interdependence. These attributes are forged and shaped through the development of teamwork and the emotional fulfillment of being a part of a team or a greater whole. The success of the team reflects back on individual success and a sense of belonging, accomplishment, and achievement. The bond created when team members train together and build unit cohesion is valuable, and something we may not replicate otherwise. Small units achieve greatness through this when competence breeds the confidence that cements cohesion. Distributed operations and decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision."
There is a lot to this paragraph that deserves consideration. For me, the last part strikes a particularly painful note. "Decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision" A strength that my platoon did not posses. They certainly did posses a cohesion - one that was strong enough to cover up a horrendous crime for 3 months. They also possessed a sense of belonging, however, that was probably more related to the feeling that they were the 'outcasts' of the battalion. What's important for people to recognize in this final thought, is the the many of the same attributes that the authors consider to be critical components of high performance units can also be found in less well-functioning ones and certainly, in my case, even in criminal ones.
This article is very important and should be read and considered carefully. LTG Vain and COL Toguchi have clearly articulated the recognitions, climates, and behaviors that show up in very successful organizations, be they military, civilian, or corporate. The challenge for us is to take these thematic ideas and find ways to inculcate them into our current activities and units in order to grow more thoughtful, and adaptive leaders than we were when we were coming up. And just maybe, to get some of us old dogs to recognize the value in learning a few new tricks.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art011.pdf
While I am in no way comparing myself, or my writing ability, to that of the authors, it does seem to me that they are forwarding - in a much more literate fashion - some of the ideas I have been discussing here for the past year or so. Themes such as trust development, decentralization, common ethics and value sets, and decision making ability etc, are in many ways the central focus of their article.
I also find it interesting that the very top layer of Army leadership seems to have a pretty clear understanding of the challenges, changes and adjustments that need to be addressed in our training centers and leader development programs. Instead of the entrenched bureaucracy that we are all accustomed to, as I search and find more material to look at and write about, I continually run into three and four star officers who seem to be adapting to, and embracing, dynamic change and fresh insight and feedback. Consider the interview that LTG Hertling gave to a media round table of bloggers I mentioned awhile back. Or his acceptance that Millennials are a unique generational subset that require new approaches to immersion in the Army. Consider that Gen McChrystal has a Facebook class on COIN operations with a video link to You Tube. Consider that Gen Chiarrelli started a blog to dialogue with students at the Command and General Staff College. Everywhere I look, I am finding senior leaders who are looking for new ways to communicate, who are actively seeking feedback from the rank and file, and who have recognized that we are in a period of dynamic change with regard to both people and technology that requires a hard look at our current method of operating and training. What I do not see is that same desire for feedback and input at the local level. Many units, and Soldiers I talk to relate that it's still 'business as usual' at the battalion level and below. Even after 9 years of war and rotation in and out of a combat zone. Trust at the local level seems at times non-existent they say, staff's have become too bureaucratic and over-loaded, and risk aversion has become the norm. Clearly, there is a disconnect between the top and the bottom, even organizationally.
In light of those thoughts, consider the following paragraph from the article:
"The more decentralized operations are, the greater the reliance on effective leadership and small unit performance. Recent research has revealed that we can best counter a decentralized, network-enabled enemy if our forces too are decentralized and network-enabled. Moreover, the tactics of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to target civilians, schools, and crowded markets have placed a premium on discernment, perspective, and excellence in decision making at the small unit level. The responsibility required of leaders and units at lower levels of command is clearly increasing, as is the potential that small units will continue to bear the brunt of close combat in the years to come. Units will fight separately and operate more independently with a greater need to be self-sustaining. Has the U.S. military done all that it can to improve small-unit performance and to develop small-unit excellence?"
This simple question raises the idea of 'how' we are likely to fight in the near-to-mid future, acknowledges that the human being at the center of the village square is going to be the decision maker at the point of contact, and that leader development will require a much more comprehensive and holistic approach than the current model suggests.
The article then goes on to point out some of the characteristics of high performing units. They are:
1. Effective Leadership
2. Effective use of Information
3. Fostering Innovation
4. Superior Execution
5. Thorough Preparation and Pre-Combat Inspections
6. Thorough Assessment of Performance
7. Executing Full Spectrum Operations
8. Posses a Dynamic Process of Change
9. Peer-to-Peer Integration and development
I will discuss the ones that seemed to jump out at me, or sparked a divergent thought.
Effective Leadership: "Effective leadership is not a journey in pursuit of perfection, but a continuous development process." "Leadership deals with a broad range of skills. While not all-inclusive, leadership involves everything from demonstrating tactical and technical proficiency to motivating and building trust—from exemplifying the Warrior Ethos to fostering teamwork and cohesion. “Be, Know, Do” is a more simplified version of an extremely complex set of characteristics."
These quotes seem very important to me for two distinct reasons. First, the acknowledgement that the formalized officer and non-commissioned officer schooling system is not the end of the game. Leader development is, and must be, a continuous pursuit. I have often thought about that in light of the blog and events in my life. There has always been the assumption that after 20 years of service, I should know what leadership is, how it functions, and the role it plays in developing subordinates. The truth is, that while I may be late to the game, I'm beginning now to have a much more concrete realization that leader development is a actually a life-long process. I only wish I had started this pursuit when I was a corporal. We must develop a system that encourages, and requires, life long adaptation, and personal growth. I am not the same person I was 20 years ago when I joined the Army, so why should my ideas on leadership be the same as they were back then? Hierarchical organizations have an inclination to work this way because we assume that the amount of time required to achieve a certain status equals continued growth and reflection. Many times this isn't the case. The way that we achieved the position of status becomes the modus operandi for the way we think, regardless of changing circumstances or immersion into unfamiliar territory.
Effective Use of Information: "Exceptional small units actively seek and acquire information and use it effectively, an imperative in complex environments today. The rigorous demands of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations require that small units have access to national level databases, especially human intelligence databases. These databases expand the venues for leaders to learn from the edge, since many receive direct feeds from liaison elements on the tactical front. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army is available, but we need to train our Soldiers to leverage these assets.The notion that leveraging is limited to higher-level headquarters units is no longer valid."
This paragraph is the ultimate flattening of the organization I have spoken about often. However, critical to the access to information are two component parts: (1) Knowing what you need and why you need it, and (2) Knowing what to do with it. There may also be a third consideration which is being able to articulate why some information is of little or no value to you and why. If the top or the bottom determines something is 'important' and either one does not agree, not only does there need to be a mechanism to say so, but there also has to be the ability of the both to tell the other why that piece is not relevant to their situation. By doing this, we open the lines of communication and help ensure a common understanding of the commander's intent and purpose.
Competent Decision Making: " Small units demonstrate competence in the art and science of decision making. However, all small units do not necessarily excel in making effective decisions. Certainly core skill sets for decision making involve understanding, visualizing, and assessing the environment and situation. Effective decision makers, however, are also flexible, quick, resilient, adaptive, risk-taking, and accurate. These skill sets require higher-order training in critical thinking, and we must inculcate them into our training. The first core skill set is understanding—it is vital to decision making. Understanding needs to be measured and is related to the small-unit leader’s education, intellect, experience, perception, and the information he receives."
This is precisely the purpose of the OODA Loop, the Adaptive Leader Methodology, and Outcome Based Training and Education. The process of decision making is important, but understanding why and how you are making it is even more critical. How recognizes you, and why recognizes both need and context. All of which are critical. We have concentrated for too many years on the process, and not put enough emphasis on understanding the why and how. Of all the component parts of this article, I believe this one to be the most important. The insurgent/counter insurgent battlefield is too complex to allow any leader to rely on simplistic black or white answers to problems that are extremely nuanced and have implications that range from local to geopolitical. We must teach dynamic thinking and interaction. To do that we must foster trust, give Soldiers the opportunity to make decisions and learn from them and create feedback mechanisms that demand honesty over political survival at every level.
Thorough Assessment of Performance: "Successful small units habitually use after action reviews to provide a candid assessment of strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement.
The best units are open to embracing change, have open discussions on how to improve, and
support active learning in all ranks. Over time, the technique of “red teaming” has proven to be highly effective at improving practices in higher headquarters. Similar techniques may
prove beneficial at lower echelons with minimal force structure additions."
I have participated in numerous After Action Reviews in my career, and the only contention I have with them is that while total inclusion of all ranks is critical to their success, we often do not use them correctly. While reviewing the outcome of an operation is important, I have long felt that using the AAR process to gain an understanding of an individuals perception of the circumstance and environment may be even more critical than whether or not the operation had a good or bad result. Both results will be the outcome of the choices made by all levels of the organization. As I have mentioned before, it is possible to have bad outcomes from good decisions, and good outcomes from bad decisions. That is why perception, understanding and self-awareness are the critical components that we should be addressing in the AAR process. Red teaming (the idea of having someone in the organization designed to look at you from the adversaries perspective) is a great concept, provided that the Red Team is kept separate from the chain of command with regard to promotion, thereby removing the threat of professional retaliation when harsh judgements of the chain of command are made.
Peer to Peer Integration and Development: "The emergent qualities of high-performing small units have a number of notable attributes—the synergistic capacity to work together; the ability to develop superior leaders (beyond the appointed leadership); the capacity to adapt; the flexibility to handle fast changing situations; and the resilience to maintain these characteristics in the face of adversity, including the death of team members....There is a shared cognition or common understanding that evolves in training together that is closely coupled with trust and interdependence. These attributes are forged and shaped through the development of teamwork and the emotional fulfillment of being a part of a team or a greater whole. The success of the team reflects back on individual success and a sense of belonging, accomplishment, and achievement. The bond created when team members train together and build unit cohesion is valuable, and something we may not replicate otherwise. Small units achieve greatness through this when competence breeds the confidence that cements cohesion. Distributed operations and decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision."
There is a lot to this paragraph that deserves consideration. For me, the last part strikes a particularly painful note. "Decentralized command may force small units to excel while being isolated, but it also requires a special strength to avoid creating their own rules in the absence of higher headquarters supervision" A strength that my platoon did not posses. They certainly did posses a cohesion - one that was strong enough to cover up a horrendous crime for 3 months. They also possessed a sense of belonging, however, that was probably more related to the feeling that they were the 'outcasts' of the battalion. What's important for people to recognize in this final thought, is the the many of the same attributes that the authors consider to be critical components of high performance units can also be found in less well-functioning ones and certainly, in my case, even in criminal ones.
This article is very important and should be read and considered carefully. LTG Vain and COL Toguchi have clearly articulated the recognitions, climates, and behaviors that show up in very successful organizations, be they military, civilian, or corporate. The challenge for us is to take these thematic ideas and find ways to inculcate them into our current activities and units in order to grow more thoughtful, and adaptive leaders than we were when we were coming up. And just maybe, to get some of us old dogs to recognize the value in learning a few new tricks.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#68 Alone with Yourself
One of the themes that I have talked about a lot on these pages is that anyone who would call themselves, or be termed, a leader had better have a solid understanding of who they are, and what they value before they accept the leadership position or role. They will need to posses a sense of their own history, who and what formed them, and the possible impacts of that formation on how they choose to lead others. In essence, what are their priorities and what will they stand for? These things cannot be dictated to you, they must be discovered through self study and contemplation. Without conceit, ego, or mindless self affirmation, we must all be willing and able to look squarely at ourselves and determine who we are. As I used to tell new Soldiers when I was a Drill Sergeant, at the end of the day, all you have is your name. What do you want it to stand for?
There must also be an awareness that there will be others who vehemently oppose your ideas, values, thoughts and priorities who will have a different set of values and understandings than you. This is OK. You cannot surround yourself will only like-minded people. By definition, doing so is entropic and eventually leads to self-delusion and implosion. There must be the constant friction of two or more ideas or ideologies crashing against each other for growth to occur. Otherwise we all will come to believe our own bullshit.
[As an aside, the paragraph above is why I do not worry about the current state of political affairs in Washington. It should be that way. Every time that one side or the other has become too powerful and able to drown out the voice of the opposition, the institution and the country has failed. Our current political system requires that those with differing views scream at the top of their lungs. It may be distasteful at times, but it is far better than silent supplication to only one thought process.]
In light of this, please check out the link below:
http://www.theamericanscholar.org/solitude-and-leadership/
I found this on Don Vandergriff's blog site yesterday (http://www.donvandergriff.com/), and there is a lot to be learned from Professor Deresiewicz's thoughts. Importantly, he gave these remarks to a class of West Point Cadets in October 2009.
The thrust of Professor Deresiewicz's speech is that we live in a world where we reward mediocrity and 'hoop jumping' rather than the development of one's own thoughts and ideas. That the very way we are conditioning young people to be successful in the world prizes a 'Go along to get along' mentality and that truly creative and introspective thinkers often do not reach the top of the leadership ladder. His call for introspection and the formation of one's own considered point of view struck a chord with me.
I write for a various reasons. First, it satisfies my need for independent time and space to think about my world, construct my thoughts, and then see if I can articulate them to others. In effect, it is a Internet based conversation with a close friend. Like everyone else, I live in a busy world of competing demands that can become overwhelmed at times with outside noise. I must make time to think and contemplate. Many weeks, I am forming a lot of my ideas that end up here in somewhat real time. I may have an idea that has been scratching at my brain, but rarely are the thoughts fully formed. Writing allows me to explore them a little bit more deeply. Secondly, it is personally cathartic. I have made no apologies that my experiences in Iraq have changed me and that some of those changes have been painful. When my professional life and value was questioned and my known universe shifted, it was very hard. Writing helps me heal. While some may find that distasteful, or a sign of weakness, especially in men, others recognize that expression of my emotions and struggles for understanding on these pages have become part of the recovery process. Finally, I write to inform others. Not from a teacher / student perspective, but rather from an individual one. I do not, and cannot, determine anyone else's answers or solutions for them, but I can advise them that they should spend some time considering them for themselves. Someday they will need them. And, possibly more importantly, their subordinates deserve them. Your subordinates deserve to know that their leader really knows what their value system is. Really knows why they do what they do. Has a real consideration for what's at stake. Those things cannot be easily come by. When something in your life fundamentally changes your perspective about your world, it might be helpful to have already spent some time alone figuring out your values system, your strengths, weaknesses and how you work. As part of that, I forward my thoughts and opinions here and hope they stimulate the reader to start considering their own point of view. Mine are not necessarily better or worse than anyone else's, but they are mine. What are yours?
Consider the following from the end of Professor Deresiewicz's speech:
" You’ve probably heard about the hazing scandal at the U.S. naval base in Bahrain that was all over the news recently. Terrible, abusive stuff that involved an entire unit and was orchestrated, allegedly, by the head of the unit, a senior noncommissioned officer. What are you going to do if you’re confronted with a situation like that going on in your unit? Will you have the courage to do what’s right? Will you even know what the right thing is? It’s easy to read a code of conduct, not so easy to put it into practice, especially if you risk losing the loyalty of the people serving under you, or the trust of your peer officers, or the approval of your superiors. What if you’re not the commanding officer, but you see your superiors condoning something you think is wrong?
How will you find the strength and wisdom to challenge an unwise order or question a wrongheaded policy? What will you do the first time you have to write a letter to the mother of a slain soldier? How will you find words of comfort that are more than just empty formulas?
These are truly formidable dilemmas, more so than most other people will ever have to face in their lives, let alone when they’re 23. The time to start preparing yourself for them is now. And the way to do it is by thinking through these issues for yourself—morality, mortality, honor—so you will have the strength to deal with them when they arise. Waiting until you have to confront them in practice would be like waiting for your first firefight to learn how to shoot your weapon. Once the situation is upon you, it’s too late. You have to be prepared in advance. You need to know, already, who you are and what you believe: not what the Army believes, not what your peers believe (that may be exactly the problem), but what you believe.
How can you know that unless you’ve taken counsel with yourself in solitude? I started by noting that solitude and leadership would seem to be contradictory things. But it seems to me that solitude is the very essence of leadership. The position of the leader is ultimately an intensely solitary, even intensely lonely one. However many people you may consult, you are the one who has to make the hard decisions. And at such moments, all you really have is yourself."
There is much more to the speech than that paragraph, and I would ask that readers very seriously take a moment to consider Professor Deresiewicz's words.
Earlier this week, one of my readers sent me a document that he thought I might be interested in, as it follows very nicely with other writings concerning Boyd and the OODA loop. I was very pleased to receive it. This particular person has become a mentor in some ways even though I have never worked for or with him, and our personal interaction occurred over a very short period of time a few years back. When I sent him a thank you note for the document, I asked him for his opinion on the blog. He was kind enough to write me back last evening. While we agree on many points, we also disagree on others. The absolute key to the relationship isn't either of those. The key is that we have the relationship that allows for those. This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests.
To return to Professor D's words, I was particularly struck by the notion that waiting to consider your moral and ethical decision making process until you need it is akin to learning to fire your rifle during your first firefight - it's way too late by then. You need to know how to do it when you arrive on the battlefield. As my mentor pointed out to me in his email, if you are waiting for, or counting on the institution to provide your character for you, then you will fail. To truly develop, and to earn the privilege of being considered a leader, you have to spend some time with yourself, figuring out who you are. If the journey is worth taking, you'll probably come to the conclusion that you have just started on a lifelong pursuit that will not ever be complete.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
There must also be an awareness that there will be others who vehemently oppose your ideas, values, thoughts and priorities who will have a different set of values and understandings than you. This is OK. You cannot surround yourself will only like-minded people. By definition, doing so is entropic and eventually leads to self-delusion and implosion. There must be the constant friction of two or more ideas or ideologies crashing against each other for growth to occur. Otherwise we all will come to believe our own bullshit.
[As an aside, the paragraph above is why I do not worry about the current state of political affairs in Washington. It should be that way. Every time that one side or the other has become too powerful and able to drown out the voice of the opposition, the institution and the country has failed. Our current political system requires that those with differing views scream at the top of their lungs. It may be distasteful at times, but it is far better than silent supplication to only one thought process.]
In light of this, please check out the link below:
http://www.theamericanscholar.org/solitude-and-leadership/
I found this on Don Vandergriff's blog site yesterday (http://www.donvandergriff.com/), and there is a lot to be learned from Professor Deresiewicz's thoughts. Importantly, he gave these remarks to a class of West Point Cadets in October 2009.
The thrust of Professor Deresiewicz's speech is that we live in a world where we reward mediocrity and 'hoop jumping' rather than the development of one's own thoughts and ideas. That the very way we are conditioning young people to be successful in the world prizes a 'Go along to get along' mentality and that truly creative and introspective thinkers often do not reach the top of the leadership ladder. His call for introspection and the formation of one's own considered point of view struck a chord with me.
I write for a various reasons. First, it satisfies my need for independent time and space to think about my world, construct my thoughts, and then see if I can articulate them to others. In effect, it is a Internet based conversation with a close friend. Like everyone else, I live in a busy world of competing demands that can become overwhelmed at times with outside noise. I must make time to think and contemplate. Many weeks, I am forming a lot of my ideas that end up here in somewhat real time. I may have an idea that has been scratching at my brain, but rarely are the thoughts fully formed. Writing allows me to explore them a little bit more deeply. Secondly, it is personally cathartic. I have made no apologies that my experiences in Iraq have changed me and that some of those changes have been painful. When my professional life and value was questioned and my known universe shifted, it was very hard. Writing helps me heal. While some may find that distasteful, or a sign of weakness, especially in men, others recognize that expression of my emotions and struggles for understanding on these pages have become part of the recovery process. Finally, I write to inform others. Not from a teacher / student perspective, but rather from an individual one. I do not, and cannot, determine anyone else's answers or solutions for them, but I can advise them that they should spend some time considering them for themselves. Someday they will need them. And, possibly more importantly, their subordinates deserve them. Your subordinates deserve to know that their leader really knows what their value system is. Really knows why they do what they do. Has a real consideration for what's at stake. Those things cannot be easily come by. When something in your life fundamentally changes your perspective about your world, it might be helpful to have already spent some time alone figuring out your values system, your strengths, weaknesses and how you work. As part of that, I forward my thoughts and opinions here and hope they stimulate the reader to start considering their own point of view. Mine are not necessarily better or worse than anyone else's, but they are mine. What are yours?
Consider the following from the end of Professor Deresiewicz's speech:
" You’ve probably heard about the hazing scandal at the U.S. naval base in Bahrain that was all over the news recently. Terrible, abusive stuff that involved an entire unit and was orchestrated, allegedly, by the head of the unit, a senior noncommissioned officer. What are you going to do if you’re confronted with a situation like that going on in your unit? Will you have the courage to do what’s right? Will you even know what the right thing is? It’s easy to read a code of conduct, not so easy to put it into practice, especially if you risk losing the loyalty of the people serving under you, or the trust of your peer officers, or the approval of your superiors. What if you’re not the commanding officer, but you see your superiors condoning something you think is wrong?
How will you find the strength and wisdom to challenge an unwise order or question a wrongheaded policy? What will you do the first time you have to write a letter to the mother of a slain soldier? How will you find words of comfort that are more than just empty formulas?
These are truly formidable dilemmas, more so than most other people will ever have to face in their lives, let alone when they’re 23. The time to start preparing yourself for them is now. And the way to do it is by thinking through these issues for yourself—morality, mortality, honor—so you will have the strength to deal with them when they arise. Waiting until you have to confront them in practice would be like waiting for your first firefight to learn how to shoot your weapon. Once the situation is upon you, it’s too late. You have to be prepared in advance. You need to know, already, who you are and what you believe: not what the Army believes, not what your peers believe (that may be exactly the problem), but what you believe.
How can you know that unless you’ve taken counsel with yourself in solitude? I started by noting that solitude and leadership would seem to be contradictory things. But it seems to me that solitude is the very essence of leadership. The position of the leader is ultimately an intensely solitary, even intensely lonely one. However many people you may consult, you are the one who has to make the hard decisions. And at such moments, all you really have is yourself."
There is much more to the speech than that paragraph, and I would ask that readers very seriously take a moment to consider Professor Deresiewicz's words.
Earlier this week, one of my readers sent me a document that he thought I might be interested in, as it follows very nicely with other writings concerning Boyd and the OODA loop. I was very pleased to receive it. This particular person has become a mentor in some ways even though I have never worked for or with him, and our personal interaction occurred over a very short period of time a few years back. When I sent him a thank you note for the document, I asked him for his opinion on the blog. He was kind enough to write me back last evening. While we agree on many points, we also disagree on others. The absolute key to the relationship isn't either of those. The key is that we have the relationship that allows for those. This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests.
To return to Professor D's words, I was particularly struck by the notion that waiting to consider your moral and ethical decision making process until you need it is akin to learning to fire your rifle during your first firefight - it's way too late by then. You need to know how to do it when you arrive on the battlefield. As my mentor pointed out to me in his email, if you are waiting for, or counting on the institution to provide your character for you, then you will fail. To truly develop, and to earn the privilege of being considered a leader, you have to spend some time with yourself, figuring out who you are. If the journey is worth taking, you'll probably come to the conclusion that you have just started on a lifelong pursuit that will not ever be complete.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
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