Ego:
"1. The “I” or self of any person; a person as thinking, feeling, and willing, and distinguishing itself from the selves of others and from objects of its thought.
2. Psychoanalysis. the part of the psychic apparatus that experiences and reacts to the outside world and thus mediates between the primitive drives of the id and the demands of the social and physical environment.
3. Egotism; conceit; self-importance
4. Self-esteem or self-image; feelings"
Dictionary.com
Fear:
" 1. A distressing emotion aroused by impending danger, evil, pain, etc., whether the threat is real or imagined; the feeling or condition of being afraid.
2. A specific instance of or propensity for such a feeling: an abnormal fear of heights.
3. Concern or anxiety; solicitude: a fear for someone's safety.
4. Reverential awe.
5.that which causes a feeling of being afraid; that of which a person is afraid."
Dictionary.com
The words ego and fear popped into my head this afternoon and it struck me that a lot of what happens in the work place, and especially at this time in the Army, seems to be related to those two concepts.
People in leadership positions must posess both of these qualities in order to be effective. They are both healthy and must become part of the personal Orientation of anyone who is responsible for others. I have to believe in myself, and I must also be aware of those things that frighten me or cause me worry and concern. I have to believe that at certain points I am the best person suited to handle the responsibilities assigned to me, and I must also learn to listen to those things that worry me. Both will have an impact on how I Observe the situation I am presented with and the choices I have at my disposal to handle it.
For Army leaders, ego and fear, deserve much more consideration than they currently receive because a leader's ego may allow them to make a decision that they would not normally make, and conversely their fear may drive them to not choose a course of action that might be risky, but successful.
The key it seems, is to keep them in balance. One cannot be lulled into thinking that their past successes are automatic proof of future success, nor can they allow their fear to stop them from acknowledging and taking risk when the situation warrants.
The important realization when looking at ego relative to leadership in the Army is the recognition that the entire military structure is designed, built upon, and rewards those with healthy (maybe even over-healthy) egos who have been placed in positions of authority and handed the power to implement their ideas. As our past successes build upon themselves, we quickly begin to believe that we are the reason for that success. And because the institution routinely rewards, promotes, lauds, and encourages us due to our success, we begin to believe that we have capabilities and judgement that others do not that allow these things to happen. In effect the thought process goes like this: "I have been successful in the past, received praise and promotion due to that success (many times at the expense of others) and have climbed the ladder faster than my peers. What I'm doing must be right, because I keep moving up and others don't." Ego is an automatic by-product of any hierarchical organization because the structure itself validates the decisions and outcomes at every level in a very public manner. The Army does this with awards, decorations, promotions and selections for command at senior levels. If Lieutenant Colonel X is selected to be a battalion commander and Lieutenant Colonel Y is not, and remains a staff officer, then X's past accomplishments are validated and Y's are not. This can often lead to a very serious case of believing your own bullshit. And quite honestly, there isn't much reason for you not to belive your own bullshit, when the system itself is validating you at every step on the hierarchical ladder.
Fear, on the other hand, can be just as disabling as ego is enabling. Fear will stop you from pursuing objectives, or in some cases, even considering different possibilities or outcomes, simply because the possibility of success may not be guaranteed. Fear acts to limit the available solutions to a problem. It also acts as a personal barrier to understanding the situation clearly and objectively because it imposes an emotional response in between the facts presented and the decisions we make. For example, if I fear that personal judgment from my superiors will have a negative effect on me then by definition it limits the possibilities that I can pursue to solve my problem and limits them to only to those that I do not believe will bring me discredit in my bosses' eyes.
"I know what it's like to have failed, baby
With the whole world lookin' on
I know what it's like to have soared
And come crashin' like a drunk on a bar room floor"
'All the Way Home' - Bruce Springsteen
These ideas came to light this week in two different manners. First, on AKO (Army Knowledge On-line) there was a discussion regarding post #77, "A Matter of Interpretation" between two people looking at the background history of Operation Market Garden and it's effect on the Battle of the Bulge. In my post, I alluded to the idea of ego and fear by asking why leaders ignored the signs that the German's were planning on offensive, and why facts supportng the German build-up were ignored by Allied commanders. While both these gentlemen are much more historically astute than I am, my thoughts were more closely centered around the idea of heuristics and ego. I simply made the case that the leaders didn't listen because they believed that the Allied invasion would inevitably lead to success. It had to. Everything said so. They had planned it, executed it, and over-seen it, and the German army was being systematically destroyed by their endeavors. Their self-confidence and firmly held belief that the Germans could not muster an offensive directly led to the Battle of the Bulge. More importantly though, I think it was their individual and collective egos that caused them not to hear or see the indications that an offensive was in fact being mounted. Intergalactic ego collides with tiny facts floating around the battlefield....
The other happened in my small world. A decision has been made to increase the number of personnel my team can train at any one time. That decision has required a lot of other decisions and adjustments with regard to resourcing, and Soldier thru-put. Almost overnight, my little piece of the deployment puzzle went from an afterthought to the flavor of the week. People scrambling for data, others asking questions they never cared about before, others trying to figure out when the whole thing became an issue in the first place (and why they didn't know about it). And the sad part is that no one thought to ask me or my team. We were not asked to attend any of the planning sessions or discussions concerning how we would process 23% more people through the same number of tasks in the same amount of time, with the same number of trainers, while changing the schedule and the classroom, and the range time. In fact, I was expressly informed at one point that my attendance was not required.
[Now, for the sake of argument, if the preceding paragraph sounds like a bit of bruised ego, there is some merit to that and I would only ask that you suspend that for a moment to consider the following:]
From my perspective, a lot of people immediately above me are a little worried now that someone higher than them is going to ask when this issue first came up, and what they did about it. There are others who's ego's are driving the train and are making decisions without all the information.
Ego and fear suddenly seem to be a little more intimately related than they might seem at first blush. As a matter of fact they seem to be sitting right next to each other in the briefing room. You can almost feel the people who have had previous success and have been rewarded for it by increased responsibility and position. They like the way that feels, and it how enhances their sense of self-ability. They have begun to believe that they will get it right every time. That is what their history, their training, and the institution have led them to believe. And now they are faced with the loss of some of that professional faith because, like those who didn't listen to the lady who saw the big German tanks, or Col 'Monk' Dickson, who said the Germans would attack in the Ardennes, they worry that they might have gotten it wrong.
Ego collides with fear.
The purpose of this post isn't to throw stones at anyone. It truly is not. I like the Springsteen quote above because it pretty accurately reflects the middle to latter part of my career. In my ealrier days, I was driven by ego and the belief that I was doing it better than the next guy, that my thought process and decisions were always right. I have also been the guy who came crashing down like a drunk on a barroom floor. I've had my professional value questioned, and my belief system thrown into disarray. I have been on both sides of the fence. And I understand those who believe in their own sense of perpetual rightness because I did the same for many years. And I understand those who no longer trust, and live in fear of being wrong because that was the trap that I could have easily fallen into.
The point of this post was to get you, the reader, to pause for a moment and consider the role ego and fear play in your decision making process. Quite honestly lives depend upon your awareness of these emotions because the decisions you make, carried out by others, often come down to either acting out of ego, or acting out of fear. To truly lead people, especially in combat, you have to be able to suspend both long enough to see the mission clearly and your responsibilities honestly. Believing your own bullshit can get kids killed. So can't being afraid to stand up when necessary. Ego and fear sort of balance each other out, if both can be seen clearly enough to concentrate on the mission - separate from our place in it.
A week ago my boss came to me and informed me of the increase in personnel required. I gathered my team and we sketched some immediate ideas on a white board. At the time, there were more questions than answers. A young Staff Sergeant, stared at the board for awhile, scribbled some stuff down, scratched some stuff out, thought about it over a weekend and developed the new plan. He had a problem to solve and he solved it. He and I worked for 3 days to put it into play, each checking and re-checking the other's work. Without ego or fear, and concentrating only on the mission we were assigned, this plan will be successful. Not because I believe it, and certainly not because my past history guarantees positive results every time, but rather because I have experienced both ego and failure and am learning how to use them to correctly orient myself to my world. E.O. had the answer. My job was to provide his answer to others. No more. No less.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#77 A Matter of Interpretation
"That night no Allied commander seriously feared a major German attack. Yet in Bastogne, Belgium, about twenty miles west of Chervaux, Middleton, whose VIII Corps comprised the bulk of the Ghost Front, was uneasy. A woman had been sent up that morning from the 28th Division. She told of seeing, just the night before, a mass of German troops behind the Seigfried Line east of Clervaux. And their tanks were twice as large as anything the Americans had. Middleton realized that if an attack did fall, his four divisions, two green, two exhausted - would be hard put to defend themselves. So he sent the woman on up the chain of command to his chief, Lieutenent General Courtney Hodges, the commander of the First Army.
But at the famous Belgian resort of Spa, Hodges was too occupied with the slow progress of his own attack toward the Roer Dams to be concerned. It was true that the week before, his intelligence officer, Colonel, 'Monk' Dickson, had surprised everyone by predicting there would soon be an all-out German offensive and the past few days had made a pest of himself by announcing that the attack might possible come where no one expected it - where it had come in 1870, 1914, and 1940 - in the Ardennes. Then at a briefing just the night before, Dickson's hunch had become a conviction as he pounded a map board and said with certainty, "It's the Ardennes!" Hodges' staff had advised the general not to take Dickson too seriously: Monk was a notorious pessimist; also he was overworked, and three days in Paris would perk him up a bit.
The 12th Army Group, which gave orders to Hodges, had also been displeased with Dickson's prediction. Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's intelligence officer announced in rebuttal: "It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front. Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) quickly joined Dickson's critics, Eisenhower's G2 issuing a report that the Germans were all but finished.
Even the British ridiculed fear of any enemy attack. That very afternoon Montgomery had stated flatly that Germans "cannot stage major offensive operations." In fact, things were so dull he asked Eisenhower if there was any objection to his going off to England next week. Reassured by this chorus of confidence from above, Hodges had kept busy with his own offensive. He went to sleep around midnight bothered only by a head cold."
"Battle : The Story of the Bulge", by John Toland (Chap 1 pages 10-11)
What followed is the 'Battle of the Bulge'. A desperate fight against a confluence of overwhelming force and horrible conditions that made the outcome questionable from the very outset. If not for the incredible tenacity of the Soldiers, some divine providence with the weather, and the sheer determination of the Allied command, the result of the 'Bulge' may have been one that ended in infamy instead of one that history has recalled so heroically.
If you serve, or have ever served, in the 101st Airborne Division, a central portion of the heraldry of that storied Division rests with the results of the understandings, interpretations, and decisions outlined above. The Division's headquarters building is named after Brigadier General Anthony MacAuliffe who, surrounded and outnumbered by the German army at Bastogne, famously replied "Nuts!" when offered the opportunity to surrender his forces to the Germans.
As I read those pages this week, I began to wonder what would have happened if someone had listened to the woman who spoke of masses of huge tanks, or if the various commands had paid heed to the over-tired Colonel Dickson? Could the battle that ensued have been avoided? Would the Allies have massed forces earlier and taken the fight to the Germans before coming so perilously close to defeat? Would all those people we lionize today still be considered heroes if the Germans had been successful? Why doesn't anyone know the name of 'Monk' Dickson? Shouldn't some credit be given to the man who got it right to begin with? And what of those who got it wrong and failed to pay attention to the pieces of information that were available, but that they didn't put together correctly or pay enough attention to? Do they shoulder any responsibility for the Soldiers who died because of the decisions they made?
I have been thinking about this in light of the COP Keating and COP Wanat reports that I wrote about in post # 70, "Hondo's Parting Gift". Beyond scale and scope, these two battles, the 'Bulge' and Wanat, have a lot in common. Undermanned and under resourced units. Thin units trying to cover vast amounts of territory. Commands whose priorities lie elsewhere. Staffs who have different interpretations of the situation. Desperate fights that ultimately require huge amounts of resources to repel the enemy. Heroism at the local level where men fought to hold their ground against overwhelming odds. And death. A lot of death and a lot of people injured. And yet the passage of time has changed our understandings to such a degree that the 'Bulge' is considered an iconic battle which demonstrates the best qualities of the American Soldier, and Wanat required 3 reports to put to rest the issue of culpability.
I wonder if the Internet and mass communication and the litigious mindset that is so prevalent today had existed in 1944 would we still see the 'Battle of the Bulge' the way we currently do? Would it still be considered an historic battle? Would the legends like Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Hodges still be seen the same way? If a parent of a dead Soldier in Bastogne had the power to press his case to the U.S. Senate, what would the outcome be? What if MacAuliffe had been over-run by the Germans and instead of his Soldiers simply becoming German prisoners they had been killed by the thousands? Would our headquarters building still bear his name?
These are important questions because they have immense impacts on how we lead and the consequences of the decisions we make. According to Toland, almost every senior leader in Europe got it wrong. The facts existed to indicate that the Germans were planning some form of large scale attack, but no one listened. No one listened to Col Dickson and to those far below him in the chain of command. Middleton was worried, but decided not to act independently on his concerns. Hodges ignored it because his own plan was faltering. Bradley's staff flatly rebuts Dickson's ideas. Montgomery wants to go on leave. Lives will be lost because of these choices. But because the outcome was ultimately successful, these errors in judgement go unnoticed. Had the outcome resulted in a major German victory, I wonder how we would view them then.
Leaders use their best judgments to make decisions. The higher up the chain of command you are, the more you must rely on the judgment of others to help inform your own. As each of these subordinates provides you facts, there must also be a recognition that they are being presented and informed through the prism of the person presenting them. They are being filtered by that person's knowledge, experience and judgement. And all that filtering can have a pronounced impact on your understanding of the 'ground truth'. This is something we need to pay attention to as we develop leaders at all levels. Not that every single Soldier's understanding of the situation is correct, or even valid, but that we, as leaders, must develop an awareness of the 'filtering' that is occurring as information is being presented to us. Someone is telling us something, but they really don't have a large enough context. Someone else is telling us something to enhance their personal standing in the organization. Someone else is telling us only what they think we want to hear. And someone else is saying something that no one else is even considering. All these views will be supported by facts. But only the leader must take all of them and form their own interpretation and make a decision.
What's critical is that the leader have access to all the disparate voices. They cannot be insulated from the ones that others find distasteful. They cannot be removed because of inarticulateness or coarseness. They cannot be ignored due to lack of stature. We must find ways to ensure that the 'ground truth' of the person pulling guard in a remote location in Afghanistan has the same access to the decision-maker as the staff officer that builds the briefing.
This access to various points of view is often termed transparency, or communication flattening. It makes all facts equal at first because it removes the idea that the hierarchy imposes a value on the information. All the facts from the Soldier on the ground go in one pile. The facts from the company or battalion staff go in another. The facts from the brigade go in another. The facts from the 'lone voice' go in yet another. To start, they are all of equal value. Only then can the leader have the greatest access to the various points of view that exist with his/her organization.
What does it take to remove the 'filtering' system? First, it takes leaders who are viscerally aware that the filters exist in the first place. Only with this awareness can structures be put in place that account for it. Second, it requires humility. The leader must be humble enough to understand that even their interpretation of the facts could be incorrect. Third, it requires a voice of dissent. There must be a mechanism for those in the minority opinion to be heard. Finally, and most importantly, it requires leaders whose single most prized quality for leadership is their judgment. Nothing else they may do, battles they may win, or accolades they may have earned, can outweigh the faith and trust the organization places in their judgment. Every leader development system the Army has should be focused at that singular purpose, increasing and developing the judgment of the leader. And in order to development judgment, we must start with development and understanding of the character of the individual. We must force them back into themselves to study what forms, and informs, their decision-making process. By doing that we can take a brand new Sergeant or Lieutenant, make them aware of their filters, then make them understand that the decisions they make are based in part upon information that is also being filtered. Lives depend on this awareness.
The 'Battle of the Bulge' begins with a series of major misjudgments. It is only through the incredible character of thousands of Soldiers that the battle turned out the way it did. I only hope the 'Battle of Wanat' is remembered the same way.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
But at the famous Belgian resort of Spa, Hodges was too occupied with the slow progress of his own attack toward the Roer Dams to be concerned. It was true that the week before, his intelligence officer, Colonel, 'Monk' Dickson, had surprised everyone by predicting there would soon be an all-out German offensive and the past few days had made a pest of himself by announcing that the attack might possible come where no one expected it - where it had come in 1870, 1914, and 1940 - in the Ardennes. Then at a briefing just the night before, Dickson's hunch had become a conviction as he pounded a map board and said with certainty, "It's the Ardennes!" Hodges' staff had advised the general not to take Dickson too seriously: Monk was a notorious pessimist; also he was overworked, and three days in Paris would perk him up a bit.
The 12th Army Group, which gave orders to Hodges, had also been displeased with Dickson's prediction. Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's intelligence officer announced in rebuttal: "It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front. Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) quickly joined Dickson's critics, Eisenhower's G2 issuing a report that the Germans were all but finished.
Even the British ridiculed fear of any enemy attack. That very afternoon Montgomery had stated flatly that Germans "cannot stage major offensive operations." In fact, things were so dull he asked Eisenhower if there was any objection to his going off to England next week. Reassured by this chorus of confidence from above, Hodges had kept busy with his own offensive. He went to sleep around midnight bothered only by a head cold."
"Battle : The Story of the Bulge", by John Toland (Chap 1 pages 10-11)
What followed is the 'Battle of the Bulge'. A desperate fight against a confluence of overwhelming force and horrible conditions that made the outcome questionable from the very outset. If not for the incredible tenacity of the Soldiers, some divine providence with the weather, and the sheer determination of the Allied command, the result of the 'Bulge' may have been one that ended in infamy instead of one that history has recalled so heroically.
If you serve, or have ever served, in the 101st Airborne Division, a central portion of the heraldry of that storied Division rests with the results of the understandings, interpretations, and decisions outlined above. The Division's headquarters building is named after Brigadier General Anthony MacAuliffe who, surrounded and outnumbered by the German army at Bastogne, famously replied "Nuts!" when offered the opportunity to surrender his forces to the Germans.
As I read those pages this week, I began to wonder what would have happened if someone had listened to the woman who spoke of masses of huge tanks, or if the various commands had paid heed to the over-tired Colonel Dickson? Could the battle that ensued have been avoided? Would the Allies have massed forces earlier and taken the fight to the Germans before coming so perilously close to defeat? Would all those people we lionize today still be considered heroes if the Germans had been successful? Why doesn't anyone know the name of 'Monk' Dickson? Shouldn't some credit be given to the man who got it right to begin with? And what of those who got it wrong and failed to pay attention to the pieces of information that were available, but that they didn't put together correctly or pay enough attention to? Do they shoulder any responsibility for the Soldiers who died because of the decisions they made?
I have been thinking about this in light of the COP Keating and COP Wanat reports that I wrote about in post # 70, "Hondo's Parting Gift". Beyond scale and scope, these two battles, the 'Bulge' and Wanat, have a lot in common. Undermanned and under resourced units. Thin units trying to cover vast amounts of territory. Commands whose priorities lie elsewhere. Staffs who have different interpretations of the situation. Desperate fights that ultimately require huge amounts of resources to repel the enemy. Heroism at the local level where men fought to hold their ground against overwhelming odds. And death. A lot of death and a lot of people injured. And yet the passage of time has changed our understandings to such a degree that the 'Bulge' is considered an iconic battle which demonstrates the best qualities of the American Soldier, and Wanat required 3 reports to put to rest the issue of culpability.
I wonder if the Internet and mass communication and the litigious mindset that is so prevalent today had existed in 1944 would we still see the 'Battle of the Bulge' the way we currently do? Would it still be considered an historic battle? Would the legends like Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Hodges still be seen the same way? If a parent of a dead Soldier in Bastogne had the power to press his case to the U.S. Senate, what would the outcome be? What if MacAuliffe had been over-run by the Germans and instead of his Soldiers simply becoming German prisoners they had been killed by the thousands? Would our headquarters building still bear his name?
These are important questions because they have immense impacts on how we lead and the consequences of the decisions we make. According to Toland, almost every senior leader in Europe got it wrong. The facts existed to indicate that the Germans were planning some form of large scale attack, but no one listened. No one listened to Col Dickson and to those far below him in the chain of command. Middleton was worried, but decided not to act independently on his concerns. Hodges ignored it because his own plan was faltering. Bradley's staff flatly rebuts Dickson's ideas. Montgomery wants to go on leave. Lives will be lost because of these choices. But because the outcome was ultimately successful, these errors in judgement go unnoticed. Had the outcome resulted in a major German victory, I wonder how we would view them then.
Leaders use their best judgments to make decisions. The higher up the chain of command you are, the more you must rely on the judgment of others to help inform your own. As each of these subordinates provides you facts, there must also be a recognition that they are being presented and informed through the prism of the person presenting them. They are being filtered by that person's knowledge, experience and judgement. And all that filtering can have a pronounced impact on your understanding of the 'ground truth'. This is something we need to pay attention to as we develop leaders at all levels. Not that every single Soldier's understanding of the situation is correct, or even valid, but that we, as leaders, must develop an awareness of the 'filtering' that is occurring as information is being presented to us. Someone is telling us something, but they really don't have a large enough context. Someone else is telling us something to enhance their personal standing in the organization. Someone else is telling us only what they think we want to hear. And someone else is saying something that no one else is even considering. All these views will be supported by facts. But only the leader must take all of them and form their own interpretation and make a decision.
What's critical is that the leader have access to all the disparate voices. They cannot be insulated from the ones that others find distasteful. They cannot be removed because of inarticulateness or coarseness. They cannot be ignored due to lack of stature. We must find ways to ensure that the 'ground truth' of the person pulling guard in a remote location in Afghanistan has the same access to the decision-maker as the staff officer that builds the briefing.
This access to various points of view is often termed transparency, or communication flattening. It makes all facts equal at first because it removes the idea that the hierarchy imposes a value on the information. All the facts from the Soldier on the ground go in one pile. The facts from the company or battalion staff go in another. The facts from the brigade go in another. The facts from the 'lone voice' go in yet another. To start, they are all of equal value. Only then can the leader have the greatest access to the various points of view that exist with his/her organization.
What does it take to remove the 'filtering' system? First, it takes leaders who are viscerally aware that the filters exist in the first place. Only with this awareness can structures be put in place that account for it. Second, it requires humility. The leader must be humble enough to understand that even their interpretation of the facts could be incorrect. Third, it requires a voice of dissent. There must be a mechanism for those in the minority opinion to be heard. Finally, and most importantly, it requires leaders whose single most prized quality for leadership is their judgment. Nothing else they may do, battles they may win, or accolades they may have earned, can outweigh the faith and trust the organization places in their judgment. Every leader development system the Army has should be focused at that singular purpose, increasing and developing the judgment of the leader. And in order to development judgment, we must start with development and understanding of the character of the individual. We must force them back into themselves to study what forms, and informs, their decision-making process. By doing that we can take a brand new Sergeant or Lieutenant, make them aware of their filters, then make them understand that the decisions they make are based in part upon information that is also being filtered. Lives depend on this awareness.
The 'Battle of the Bulge' begins with a series of major misjudgments. It is only through the incredible character of thousands of Soldiers that the battle turned out the way it did. I only hope the 'Battle of Wanat' is remembered the same way.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#76 Enhacing Others
One of my readers sent me the following article from the Harvard Business Review this week and since it mirrors many of my other thoughts, I thought I would share it here:
http://hbr.org/2010/05/managing-yourself-bringing-out-the-best-in-your-people/ar/1
In many ways, it seems to me that the Army, and many corporations, are holding onto an outdated definition and model for leadership. I think that most people still envision one person, at the top of the organization, who, by force of personality and will is the main driver of success and mission accomplishment. This sort of directive style is still extremely prevalent in the Army and is very easy to spot. The leader will have people streaming on and out of his/her office all day, people will obsess over the slightest approval or disapproval from the boss, no decision will be made without his/her approval etc. This larger-than-life leader becomes the entire 'face' of the organization. The living embodiment of the institution and the mission. This also seems to fit a generalized American appreciation for heroes. The natural born leader...the quarterback who drives the team down field for the winning touchdown. For example, there is a lot of talk right now that the fight in Afghanistan is now General Petraeus' war. As if he alone will be able to affect it's outcome by sheer force of will. Iraq has been called President Bush's war and Afghanistan has been labeled President Obama's war. There is the continued idea that the one individual - a Patton, or Eisenhower, or Westmoreland, or Schwarzkopf, or Franks is the one person capable for providing the purpose, direction and motivation of the entire organization.
It may be time for another option. A more participative leadership model that has been around since I attended my first leadership school in 1994. I remember there being three types of leaders described: Directive, Delagative and Participatory. My recollection is that Directive said, "I make all the decisions". Delagative said, "I let my subordinates make all the decisions". Participative mixed the two. Obviously, even in the way they were labeled in the manual, the Army put a premium on directive leadership. Although it gave credence to the other two models on paper, in real life, it rewarded and prized the directive leader who made all the right calls. That model still exists today and is only now beginning to be challenged and questioned as to it's merits in the current operational environment.
The attachment in Post #75, "Power to the Edge" also dealt with this issue at the unit or corporate level by comparing the industrial age, hierarchical organizational structure and the information age, network-centric model. The idea that any organization is a straight line from top to bottom or bottom to top is rapidly being replaced by a model of circles and affiliations that move through, and around each other, often forming new sub-units and relationships that come together to serve a purpose and then break apart again later on when their purposes diverge. This concept has also been termed 'Team of Teams'. This network-centric model has also been put to very successful use by our adversaries as they bind themselves together in limited partnerships to accomplish a common goal, but then separate again when their aims are no longer consistent. At the personal level however, we still don't seem to understand how to make this network-centric model work. Because our adversaries do this well, they continue to re-orient and move against us by morphing, adapting, and adjusting faster than we can. In effect, they are more agile. And that agility is derived from their ability to form circles, groups, and networks at the user level in order to achieve a larger goal or purpose. It is no longer one person at the top who sets the tone, it is the empowerment of thousands of people at the bottom working in tandem who drives success.
'Power to the Edge' states:
"Power to the edge is about changing the way individuals, organizations,and systems relate to one another and work. Power to the edge involves the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organization (where the organization interacts with its
operating environment to have an impact or effect on that environment) or, in the case of systems, edge devices. Empowerment involves expanding access to information and the elimination of unnecessary constraints. For example, empowerment involves providing access to available information and expertise and the elimination of procedural constraints previously needed to deconflict elements of the force in the absence of quality information."
How are these 2 things related? I think if you look at the hierarchical model of leadership outlined in the following paragraph from the Harvard Business Review article you can easily see many of the archtypical Army leaders today. Simply change the organization from a business model to a brigade combat team model and many will find themselves saying, "Ha! I know that type of organization or boss. I work for that person":
"Some leaders drain all the intelligence and capability out of their teams. Because they need to be the smartest, most capable person in the room, these managers (leaders) often shut down the smarts of others, ultimately stifling the flow of ideas. You know these people, because you’ve worked for and with them.
Consider the senior vice president (battalion commander) of marketing (XYZ unit) who, week after week, suggests new targets and campaigns for your team—forcing you to scurry to keep up with her thinking rather than think for yourself and contribute your own ideas. Or, the vice president (Operations Officer) of product development who, despite having more than 4,000 top-notch software engineers on staff, admits that he listens to only a couple of people at development meetings, claiming “no one else really has anything much to offer.” These leaders—we call them “diminishers”—underutilize people and leave creativity and talent on the table."
What the HBR article and the 'Power to the Edge' document point out, is that the requirements of network-centric organizations (and warfare) require a different type of leader development model. A model that more closely aligns itself with the Delagative and Participative styles outlined above. The HBR article goes on to say:
"We found several critical differences in mind-set between the two types of leaders. The diminisher’s view of intelligence is based on elitism, scarcity, and stasis: That is, you won’t find high levels of brainpower everywhere, in everyone, and if your employees don’t get it now, they never will. The multiplier’s view, meanwhile, is much less cut-and-dried. This type of manager believes smarts are ever evolving and can be cultivated. The critical question for these leaders is not “Is this person smart?” but rather “In what ways is this person smart?” The job, as the multiplier sees it, is to bring the right people together in an environment that unleashes their best thinking—and then stay out of the way.Getting the most from your team is important all the time; but when the economy is weak, it’s even more critical. You can’t solve talent problems by throwing money at them, swapping in “better” talent at higher salaries. No doubt your employees are stretched tight, but many of your top performers would probably admit to feeling underutilized. Their workloads may be at capacity, but they’re sitting on a stockpile of untapped—or, even worse, thwarted—ideas, skills, and interests. So while you may think you can’t ask for more from your people in these tumultuous times, it turns out you can. But only if you are willing to shift the responsibility for thinking from yourself to your employees. Our research suggests you can get much more from your team (even twice as much), without adding resources or overhead, if you lead like a multiplier—something you can achieve no matter where you are on the spectrum of leadership styles."
In my opinion, this is exactly the situation we face in many of our formations today. We still have too many 'diminishers and not enough 'multipliers'. When I talk to young officers they often speak of feeling 'undervalued' or 'disrespected' by the organization and not allowed to be a fully contributing member. In a hierarchical model this makes sense because the 'senior' people simply do not believe that the 'junior' people have the knowledge or experience to be full contributing members. However, it seems to me that after 9 years of war, and with the revolution in technology and information access, we now posses the most knowledgeable 'bottom' we have had in 50 years, since Vietnam.
This recognition also seems to meet the Millennial generation head on. In another HBR article entitled, "Mentoring Millennials" the authors provide the following as to the things that matter most to this generation of young people:
"The Millennials, we saw, did want a constant stream of feedback and were in a hurry for success, but their expectations were not as outsized as many assume. That’s good news for organizations wondering just who will mentor this rising generation. Baby Boomers are retiring, and Gen X may not be large enough to shoulder the responsibility alone. In the U.S., for instance, the 88 million Millennials vastly outnumber Gen Xers, who are just 50 million strong. Millennials view work as a key part of life, not a separate activity that needs to be “balanced” by it. For that reason, they place a strong emphasis on finding work that’s personally fulfilling. They want work to afford them the opportunity to make new friends, learn new skills, and connect to a larger purpose. That sense of purpose is a key factor in their job satisfaction; according to our research, they’re the most socially conscious generation since the 1960s."
You can find the link here:
http://hbr.org/2010/05/mentoring-millennials/ar/1
Here's how I believe the model should work. First, the Army needs to re-examine it's commitment to the opening sentence in FM 1, paragraph 1-1:
"First and foremost, the Army is Soldiers. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is Soldiers who use them to accomplish their mission. Soldiers committed to selfless service to the Nation are the centerpiece of Army organizations. Everything the Army does for the Nation is done by Soldiers supported by Army civilians and family members. Only with quality Soldiers answering the noble call to serve freedom can the Army ensure the victories required on battlefields of today and the future."
That paragraph alone recognizes that for the organization of the Army to be successful, it must place it's primary value on it's people. The ideas of commitment, and selfless service (which the Millennial already has) must be felt at the local level. By providing a sense of inclusion, accepting that leaders must find ways to enhance the existing capabilities of subordinates, and creating circles of inclusion and empowerment, we will fulfill the true nature of paragraph 1-1 in the eyes of those thousands at the bottom who will accomplish the institutional mission.
As usual, free-flowing thoughts seem to work better for me, so here is my latest attempt:
A young Millennial leader has a need for inclusion, value, feedback and service....they demand to be taken seriously as a member of the team....the Army must remain a values based organization that serves the Nation....the pace of technology has changed the rate and situational awareness ability of all levels of the organization simultaneously....the hierarchical nature of the Army is changing to a more circular or 'Team of Teams' model....leader development programs at all levels must adapt themselves to this new reality....our adversaries already use this circular model to get inside and remain inside our OODA loop....they are not defeating the Army, they are defeating the Army structure....the cost of not accepting a more participatory leader model will be the loss of the knowledgeable bottom....an unwillingness to increase responsibility and contribution for those at the bottom will have a detrimental impact of future operations.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome
http://hbr.org/2010/05/managing-yourself-bringing-out-the-best-in-your-people/ar/1
In many ways, it seems to me that the Army, and many corporations, are holding onto an outdated definition and model for leadership. I think that most people still envision one person, at the top of the organization, who, by force of personality and will is the main driver of success and mission accomplishment. This sort of directive style is still extremely prevalent in the Army and is very easy to spot. The leader will have people streaming on and out of his/her office all day, people will obsess over the slightest approval or disapproval from the boss, no decision will be made without his/her approval etc. This larger-than-life leader becomes the entire 'face' of the organization. The living embodiment of the institution and the mission. This also seems to fit a generalized American appreciation for heroes. The natural born leader...the quarterback who drives the team down field for the winning touchdown. For example, there is a lot of talk right now that the fight in Afghanistan is now General Petraeus' war. As if he alone will be able to affect it's outcome by sheer force of will. Iraq has been called President Bush's war and Afghanistan has been labeled President Obama's war. There is the continued idea that the one individual - a Patton, or Eisenhower, or Westmoreland, or Schwarzkopf, or Franks is the one person capable for providing the purpose, direction and motivation of the entire organization.
It may be time for another option. A more participative leadership model that has been around since I attended my first leadership school in 1994. I remember there being three types of leaders described: Directive, Delagative and Participatory. My recollection is that Directive said, "I make all the decisions". Delagative said, "I let my subordinates make all the decisions". Participative mixed the two. Obviously, even in the way they were labeled in the manual, the Army put a premium on directive leadership. Although it gave credence to the other two models on paper, in real life, it rewarded and prized the directive leader who made all the right calls. That model still exists today and is only now beginning to be challenged and questioned as to it's merits in the current operational environment.
The attachment in Post #75, "Power to the Edge" also dealt with this issue at the unit or corporate level by comparing the industrial age, hierarchical organizational structure and the information age, network-centric model. The idea that any organization is a straight line from top to bottom or bottom to top is rapidly being replaced by a model of circles and affiliations that move through, and around each other, often forming new sub-units and relationships that come together to serve a purpose and then break apart again later on when their purposes diverge. This concept has also been termed 'Team of Teams'. This network-centric model has also been put to very successful use by our adversaries as they bind themselves together in limited partnerships to accomplish a common goal, but then separate again when their aims are no longer consistent. At the personal level however, we still don't seem to understand how to make this network-centric model work. Because our adversaries do this well, they continue to re-orient and move against us by morphing, adapting, and adjusting faster than we can. In effect, they are more agile. And that agility is derived from their ability to form circles, groups, and networks at the user level in order to achieve a larger goal or purpose. It is no longer one person at the top who sets the tone, it is the empowerment of thousands of people at the bottom working in tandem who drives success.
'Power to the Edge' states:
"Power to the edge is about changing the way individuals, organizations,and systems relate to one another and work. Power to the edge involves the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organization (where the organization interacts with its
operating environment to have an impact or effect on that environment) or, in the case of systems, edge devices. Empowerment involves expanding access to information and the elimination of unnecessary constraints. For example, empowerment involves providing access to available information and expertise and the elimination of procedural constraints previously needed to deconflict elements of the force in the absence of quality information."
How are these 2 things related? I think if you look at the hierarchical model of leadership outlined in the following paragraph from the Harvard Business Review article you can easily see many of the archtypical Army leaders today. Simply change the organization from a business model to a brigade combat team model and many will find themselves saying, "Ha! I know that type of organization or boss. I work for that person":
"Some leaders drain all the intelligence and capability out of their teams. Because they need to be the smartest, most capable person in the room, these managers (leaders) often shut down the smarts of others, ultimately stifling the flow of ideas. You know these people, because you’ve worked for and with them.
Consider the senior vice president (battalion commander) of marketing (XYZ unit) who, week after week, suggests new targets and campaigns for your team—forcing you to scurry to keep up with her thinking rather than think for yourself and contribute your own ideas. Or, the vice president (Operations Officer) of product development who, despite having more than 4,000 top-notch software engineers on staff, admits that he listens to only a couple of people at development meetings, claiming “no one else really has anything much to offer.” These leaders—we call them “diminishers”—underutilize people and leave creativity and talent on the table."
What the HBR article and the 'Power to the Edge' document point out, is that the requirements of network-centric organizations (and warfare) require a different type of leader development model. A model that more closely aligns itself with the Delagative and Participative styles outlined above. The HBR article goes on to say:
"We found several critical differences in mind-set between the two types of leaders. The diminisher’s view of intelligence is based on elitism, scarcity, and stasis: That is, you won’t find high levels of brainpower everywhere, in everyone, and if your employees don’t get it now, they never will. The multiplier’s view, meanwhile, is much less cut-and-dried. This type of manager believes smarts are ever evolving and can be cultivated. The critical question for these leaders is not “Is this person smart?” but rather “In what ways is this person smart?” The job, as the multiplier sees it, is to bring the right people together in an environment that unleashes their best thinking—and then stay out of the way.Getting the most from your team is important all the time; but when the economy is weak, it’s even more critical. You can’t solve talent problems by throwing money at them, swapping in “better” talent at higher salaries. No doubt your employees are stretched tight, but many of your top performers would probably admit to feeling underutilized. Their workloads may be at capacity, but they’re sitting on a stockpile of untapped—or, even worse, thwarted—ideas, skills, and interests. So while you may think you can’t ask for more from your people in these tumultuous times, it turns out you can. But only if you are willing to shift the responsibility for thinking from yourself to your employees. Our research suggests you can get much more from your team (even twice as much), without adding resources or overhead, if you lead like a multiplier—something you can achieve no matter where you are on the spectrum of leadership styles."
In my opinion, this is exactly the situation we face in many of our formations today. We still have too many 'diminishers and not enough 'multipliers'. When I talk to young officers they often speak of feeling 'undervalued' or 'disrespected' by the organization and not allowed to be a fully contributing member. In a hierarchical model this makes sense because the 'senior' people simply do not believe that the 'junior' people have the knowledge or experience to be full contributing members. However, it seems to me that after 9 years of war, and with the revolution in technology and information access, we now posses the most knowledgeable 'bottom' we have had in 50 years, since Vietnam.
This recognition also seems to meet the Millennial generation head on. In another HBR article entitled, "Mentoring Millennials" the authors provide the following as to the things that matter most to this generation of young people:
"The Millennials, we saw, did want a constant stream of feedback and were in a hurry for success, but their expectations were not as outsized as many assume. That’s good news for organizations wondering just who will mentor this rising generation. Baby Boomers are retiring, and Gen X may not be large enough to shoulder the responsibility alone. In the U.S., for instance, the 88 million Millennials vastly outnumber Gen Xers, who are just 50 million strong. Millennials view work as a key part of life, not a separate activity that needs to be “balanced” by it. For that reason, they place a strong emphasis on finding work that’s personally fulfilling. They want work to afford them the opportunity to make new friends, learn new skills, and connect to a larger purpose. That sense of purpose is a key factor in their job satisfaction; according to our research, they’re the most socially conscious generation since the 1960s."
You can find the link here:
http://hbr.org/2010/05/mentoring-millennials/ar/1
Here's how I believe the model should work. First, the Army needs to re-examine it's commitment to the opening sentence in FM 1, paragraph 1-1:
"First and foremost, the Army is Soldiers. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is Soldiers who use them to accomplish their mission. Soldiers committed to selfless service to the Nation are the centerpiece of Army organizations. Everything the Army does for the Nation is done by Soldiers supported by Army civilians and family members. Only with quality Soldiers answering the noble call to serve freedom can the Army ensure the victories required on battlefields of today and the future."
That paragraph alone recognizes that for the organization of the Army to be successful, it must place it's primary value on it's people. The ideas of commitment, and selfless service (which the Millennial already has) must be felt at the local level. By providing a sense of inclusion, accepting that leaders must find ways to enhance the existing capabilities of subordinates, and creating circles of inclusion and empowerment, we will fulfill the true nature of paragraph 1-1 in the eyes of those thousands at the bottom who will accomplish the institutional mission.
As usual, free-flowing thoughts seem to work better for me, so here is my latest attempt:
A young Millennial leader has a need for inclusion, value, feedback and service....they demand to be taken seriously as a member of the team....the Army must remain a values based organization that serves the Nation....the pace of technology has changed the rate and situational awareness ability of all levels of the organization simultaneously....the hierarchical nature of the Army is changing to a more circular or 'Team of Teams' model....leader development programs at all levels must adapt themselves to this new reality....our adversaries already use this circular model to get inside and remain inside our OODA loop....they are not defeating the Army, they are defeating the Army structure....the cost of not accepting a more participatory leader model will be the loss of the knowledgeable bottom....an unwillingness to increase responsibility and contribution for those at the bottom will have a detrimental impact of future operations.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome
#75 The Eight Folks in Your Office
Last night I went to Wikipedia to see what the site had on COL John Boyd, the military theorist credited with the development of the OODA loop. For those interested in Boyd, the OODA Loop and his contribution to America, you can find the link here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)
While there I came across a link to the Command and Control Research Program, a Department of Defense sponsored think-tank which describes itself like this:
"The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII) focuses upon (1) improving both the state of the art and the state of the practice of command and control and (2) enhancing DoD's understanding of the national security implications of the Information Age. It provides "Out of the Box" thinking and explores ways to help DoD take full advantage of Information Age opportunities. The CCRP bridges the operational and technical communities and enhances the body of knowledge and research infrastructure needed for future progress."
The link to CCRP is below:
http://www.dodccrp.org/
In that search, I also came across a paper written by Dr. John H. Clippinger entitled "Leadership". Regrettably, I cannot find the exact link again to embed it into this post. Dr. Clippinger's paper however, begins to look at the structural differences between Industrial Age organizations and Network Centric organization with regard to the types of people who comprise them, specifically focusing on the military. The introduction to the paper below makes the case for why we have the military hierarchical structure that we are all familiar with, as well as look at the requirements necessary for leadership in the network-centric era:
"It is very true that I have said that I considered Napoleon’s presence in the field
equal to forty thousand men in the balance. —Duke of Wellington
One bad general does better than two good ones. —Napoleon
Introduction
During the early nineteenth century, Wellington’s and Napoleon’s observations made
sense. With the onset of battle, communications became muddled, artillery was immobilized, and a commander’s ability to control his forces was limited. Consequently,the leadership of a single general could prove decisive in battle by maintaining clarity of command and control.
We are now at a totally different stage of warfare. This not to say that the fog of war has completely lifted, but visibility and synchronized actions, and the speed, precision, and lethality of response is beyond comparison to anything that has preceded it. The battlefield success of the doctrine and technology of Network Centric Warfare was not based upon a single brilliant plan, or a single individual or group, but rather was a property of the network, both technologically and organizationally. As Operation Iraqi Freedom so vividly illustrated,2 battle plans can now be changed very rapidly, affecting all aspects of operations—strategy, tactics, logistics and PSYOPs, operations, kinetics, and all types of forces. The competencies that make NCW a success are network properties; they are no longer solely the province of charismatic leaders or chance, but the result of diverse competencies and a new understanding of the role and growth of network leadership, and how it is learned and rewarded."
Further on in the article, Dr. Clippinger outlines the 8 types of people who exist in a network centered organization and the critical roles they perform. Since most of my posts try to remain 'people' focused, this section inevitably caught my eye. The 8 types and a shortened description of each is listed below.
1. The Exemplar- "These are the role models that others imitate. Sometimes their role can be simply symbolic, even ceremonial, but they are nonetheless important in setting the tone and culture of the organization. Successful and charismatic founders of new organizations, from Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Sam Walton to Osama Bin Laden and Aum Shinrikyo, all embody values and personalities that become the values of their organization. These leaders also exemplify the assessment criteria and set the standards for becoming a member of a network. In the military, each Service has its own types of exemplars: pilots and Seals for the Navy; Green Berets, and Rangers for the Army; and fighter pilots for the Air Force. These exemplars embody what is considered the most difficult and admired professional qualities that set that Service apart."
2. The Gatekeeper - "For every network there are membership rules—criteria for being included, retained, elevated, and excluded. The gatekeeper decides who is in and who is out...Like the doorman to exclusive clubs, the gatekeeper role is a combination of truth-teller, applying the standard for admittance, and enforcer, denying admittance to those parties that fail the test."
3. The Visionary - "Visionaries play a vital and sometimes contentious role within the military. They are often the first to see weaknesses in prevalent military doctrine, to espouse new technologies and doctrines, and therefore, to challenge current leadership and entrenched interests."
4. The Truth Teller - "In every network organization, someone has to keep the network honest....Like the accounting function in a corporation or the judicial function in the legal system, truth-tellers can lose their independence, and hence effectiveness. Since these are often the first roles to go in times of stress, successful leadership is exemplified here by independence, transparency, accuracy, and candor in the face of enormous pressure....The challenges are especially acute and consequential within military organizations. If credibility breaks down, trust soon becomes the next casualty, and then the overall effectiveness of the chain of command....The truth telling goal is to provide authenticated and accurate reporting of the outcomes of missions. It can take enormous courage to resist the inevitable pressures of peers and superiors to report what they want to be known, rather then the truth of the matter. Being a truth-teller can be highly unpopular and a long road to advancement."
5. The Fixer - " This is an individual who knows how to get things done and measures
him or herself not just by how many people they might know, but rather how they can get things done that others cannot. Such individuals are results oriented."
6. The Connector - "These network leaders participate in multiple social networks,
connecting not only with a large number of members, but a highly diverse number of members as well. They are known for having numerous friends, connections, and contacts—for being consummate networkers. Like the visionary leaders, they can introduce variety and options into a network through the diversity of people with whom they interact. They are critical for identifying and accessing new resources and helping to get a message out."
7. The Enforcer - "In smaller networks, this role is often combined with that of the
gatekeeper and even the truth-teller. However, in larger networks it is an independent role. Enforcement can mean physical coercion, but more often entails psychological or peer pressure. Like the truth-teller function, independence and transparency are critical for overall network effectiveness. Clearly, force and military means are the enforcement methods of last resort, but are necessary in order to buttress other forms of enforcement, which can vary from guilt and shame to legal redress. Most networks have their own forms of redress and enforcement that entail exclusion."
8. The Facilitator - "Within the military, this role is filled primarily as a staff function to a commander, and therefore may not appear to have the caché of the connector or visionary leadership roles. However, in networked organizational structures where decision making is be more distributed and less hierarchical, this leadership role is vital to coordinating and enabling other actors and decision makers."
I think one reason that this document caught my eye, was a snippet of the video I posted last week from General Dempsey. Somewhere in that video, I heard him mention "Enabling the edge" or words to that effect, and it struck me, because I think that phrase generates from the title of another CCRP product entitled, "Power to the Edge" which can be found here:
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Power.pdf
All of the above forms the basis for the following: What types of people are required to decentralize command and control? What types of people does it take to make the organization adaptable and responsive? What skills, attributes, and abilities do we need to inculcate in young and developing leaders? What types of awareness's do leaders have to posses in order to make the organization itself function as fluidly and accurately as possible? Many of these questions are being asked at the highest levels of the Army as indicated by the interview with General Dempsey in last week's post. And maybe more importantly, do the answers to these questions require wholesale changes to our current leadership models, or do they require more subtle azimuth adjustments in our organizational priorities? I don't know the answers to these questions, but I do believe that regardless of industry there must be the requirement for someone to continually be searching for them.
Who am I?
Using the labels provided by Dr. Clippinger above, I started to think about which of those labels suited my understanding of my leadership style the best. Quite honestly however, I think the more important question will be is my understanding of me the same as other people's understanding of me, and what is the impact of that on the overall effectiveness of the organization and the mission? Secondly, I think that because we are in the midst of an organizational shift throughout all of society from an industrial age, hierarchical organization to an information age, decentralized one, each of us may find that we serve multiple roles at the same time as we shift from one age to the other. For example, this blog serves as my understanding of the roles of "Visionary" and "Truth-Teller" as described above. However, because I am also a noncommissioned officer, part of a organizational structure that is hierarchical and historic, I also fulfill the role of "Gate Keeper". Due to past achievements and titles and awards, I could also be termed an "Exemplar" My point is that most of us will serve more than one role for awhile as the two organizational models move against each other.
At the smallest unit level though, I think that these descriptions are excellent ways for each of us to look at ourselves, our role in the organization, and those above, below and parallel to us. Ultimately, they help refine our personal Orientation.
Consider this: Go back to each of the labels above and write down the first person who comes to your mind as you read the description: For me, the "Exemplar" right now is General Petraus. For the entire Army (and maybe America) he seems to represent the highest ideals of the organization both by personal behavior and by technical ability. The "Gate Keeper" is the senior noncomissioned officer in my organization. I am the "Visionary", although I am very uncomfortable with that title because it seems too self aggrandizing and because I don't have some defined clear-cut view of the perfect future of the organization. I think the title does fit me however because my circumstance has forced me to question the institutional norms and try to identify what I believe the gaps in current methodologies are. The "Truth Teller" would be someone like Don Vandergriff who has the identified the flaws in the traditional leader development model and has found a way to gain acceptance of his 'truths' with those in positions to drive change in the Army. Don told the truth and kept saying it until the institution recognized it's validity. The "Fixer" is a person I've worked and I've known for years now who, while not necessarily possessing some grand vision, is immensely capable of handling the day-to-day requirements necessary to fulfill the vision of those around him. The "Connector" is another person in our Division who I have known for a long time who has the ability to bring disparate groups together to ensure the vision gets accomplished. The "Enforcer" is someone I struggle with. By the very title, I see this person as a negative part of the organization, resisting change and establishing roadblocks. However, this isn't the connotation that Dr. Clippinger envisioned. The problem of interpretation is mine, and I cannot form a mental picture of who this individual might be. The "Facilitator" for me is an amalgam of people who, while functioning right now to complete someone else's vision, are also thinking very hard about the impacts that differing 'visions' may have. Many people who have commented here come to mind. They are people who have been able to ask hard questions about the task and it's purpose and the impact of those things on the entire organization.
If you do the same thing I just did and search for those people you think fulfill the roles outlined by Dr. Clippinger, you begin to see those people in a new light. A light that enhances their value to the organization equally regardless of where they may sit hierarchically. It also helps inform your vision of you and the role you play. It helps refine your Orientation. These considerations are important to leader development. They force each of us to look at ourselves honestly, and then determine those labels that enhance our self understanding and those that detract from it. By doing this analysis we can then determine our place in the organization that will provide the best fit for our talents, optimize our contributions and recognize the roles that others perform to accomplish the mission.
There are 8 people in your office. What descriptor do you assign them? Do you think they see themselves that way too? Interesting questions. The true leader may be the person who sees him/herself in the very same way that their superiors, peers, and subordinates see them.
The other evening, I was talking to a friend on the phone and questioning whether or not I ever really desired to lead troops again as a First Sergeant or higher. Right now, I enjoy the new role I have have found both here and at work and enjoy the job I have. When I asked my friend what his thoughts were he said that maybe my best contribution to the Army right now is in helping to develop the new leadership requirements that current and future fights will require. Growing up in the Army, all I ever wanted to be was a command sergeant major. Now, without regret or remorse, I may have found a new dream.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)
While there I came across a link to the Command and Control Research Program, a Department of Defense sponsored think-tank which describes itself like this:
"The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII) focuses upon (1) improving both the state of the art and the state of the practice of command and control and (2) enhancing DoD's understanding of the national security implications of the Information Age. It provides "Out of the Box" thinking and explores ways to help DoD take full advantage of Information Age opportunities. The CCRP bridges the operational and technical communities and enhances the body of knowledge and research infrastructure needed for future progress."
The link to CCRP is below:
http://www.dodccrp.org/
In that search, I also came across a paper written by Dr. John H. Clippinger entitled "Leadership". Regrettably, I cannot find the exact link again to embed it into this post. Dr. Clippinger's paper however, begins to look at the structural differences between Industrial Age organizations and Network Centric organization with regard to the types of people who comprise them, specifically focusing on the military. The introduction to the paper below makes the case for why we have the military hierarchical structure that we are all familiar with, as well as look at the requirements necessary for leadership in the network-centric era:
"It is very true that I have said that I considered Napoleon’s presence in the field
equal to forty thousand men in the balance. —Duke of Wellington
One bad general does better than two good ones. —Napoleon
Introduction
During the early nineteenth century, Wellington’s and Napoleon’s observations made
sense. With the onset of battle, communications became muddled, artillery was immobilized, and a commander’s ability to control his forces was limited. Consequently,the leadership of a single general could prove decisive in battle by maintaining clarity of command and control.
We are now at a totally different stage of warfare. This not to say that the fog of war has completely lifted, but visibility and synchronized actions, and the speed, precision, and lethality of response is beyond comparison to anything that has preceded it. The battlefield success of the doctrine and technology of Network Centric Warfare was not based upon a single brilliant plan, or a single individual or group, but rather was a property of the network, both technologically and organizationally. As Operation Iraqi Freedom so vividly illustrated,2 battle plans can now be changed very rapidly, affecting all aspects of operations—strategy, tactics, logistics and PSYOPs, operations, kinetics, and all types of forces. The competencies that make NCW a success are network properties; they are no longer solely the province of charismatic leaders or chance, but the result of diverse competencies and a new understanding of the role and growth of network leadership, and how it is learned and rewarded."
Further on in the article, Dr. Clippinger outlines the 8 types of people who exist in a network centered organization and the critical roles they perform. Since most of my posts try to remain 'people' focused, this section inevitably caught my eye. The 8 types and a shortened description of each is listed below.
1. The Exemplar- "These are the role models that others imitate. Sometimes their role can be simply symbolic, even ceremonial, but they are nonetheless important in setting the tone and culture of the organization. Successful and charismatic founders of new organizations, from Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Sam Walton to Osama Bin Laden and Aum Shinrikyo, all embody values and personalities that become the values of their organization. These leaders also exemplify the assessment criteria and set the standards for becoming a member of a network. In the military, each Service has its own types of exemplars: pilots and Seals for the Navy; Green Berets, and Rangers for the Army; and fighter pilots for the Air Force. These exemplars embody what is considered the most difficult and admired professional qualities that set that Service apart."
2. The Gatekeeper - "For every network there are membership rules—criteria for being included, retained, elevated, and excluded. The gatekeeper decides who is in and who is out...Like the doorman to exclusive clubs, the gatekeeper role is a combination of truth-teller, applying the standard for admittance, and enforcer, denying admittance to those parties that fail the test."
3. The Visionary - "Visionaries play a vital and sometimes contentious role within the military. They are often the first to see weaknesses in prevalent military doctrine, to espouse new technologies and doctrines, and therefore, to challenge current leadership and entrenched interests."
4. The Truth Teller - "In every network organization, someone has to keep the network honest....Like the accounting function in a corporation or the judicial function in the legal system, truth-tellers can lose their independence, and hence effectiveness. Since these are often the first roles to go in times of stress, successful leadership is exemplified here by independence, transparency, accuracy, and candor in the face of enormous pressure....The challenges are especially acute and consequential within military organizations. If credibility breaks down, trust soon becomes the next casualty, and then the overall effectiveness of the chain of command....The truth telling goal is to provide authenticated and accurate reporting of the outcomes of missions. It can take enormous courage to resist the inevitable pressures of peers and superiors to report what they want to be known, rather then the truth of the matter. Being a truth-teller can be highly unpopular and a long road to advancement."
5. The Fixer - " This is an individual who knows how to get things done and measures
him or herself not just by how many people they might know, but rather how they can get things done that others cannot. Such individuals are results oriented."
6. The Connector - "These network leaders participate in multiple social networks,
connecting not only with a large number of members, but a highly diverse number of members as well. They are known for having numerous friends, connections, and contacts—for being consummate networkers. Like the visionary leaders, they can introduce variety and options into a network through the diversity of people with whom they interact. They are critical for identifying and accessing new resources and helping to get a message out."
7. The Enforcer - "In smaller networks, this role is often combined with that of the
gatekeeper and even the truth-teller. However, in larger networks it is an independent role. Enforcement can mean physical coercion, but more often entails psychological or peer pressure. Like the truth-teller function, independence and transparency are critical for overall network effectiveness. Clearly, force and military means are the enforcement methods of last resort, but are necessary in order to buttress other forms of enforcement, which can vary from guilt and shame to legal redress. Most networks have their own forms of redress and enforcement that entail exclusion."
8. The Facilitator - "Within the military, this role is filled primarily as a staff function to a commander, and therefore may not appear to have the caché of the connector or visionary leadership roles. However, in networked organizational structures where decision making is be more distributed and less hierarchical, this leadership role is vital to coordinating and enabling other actors and decision makers."
I think one reason that this document caught my eye, was a snippet of the video I posted last week from General Dempsey. Somewhere in that video, I heard him mention "Enabling the edge" or words to that effect, and it struck me, because I think that phrase generates from the title of another CCRP product entitled, "Power to the Edge" which can be found here:
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Power.pdf
All of the above forms the basis for the following: What types of people are required to decentralize command and control? What types of people does it take to make the organization adaptable and responsive? What skills, attributes, and abilities do we need to inculcate in young and developing leaders? What types of awareness's do leaders have to posses in order to make the organization itself function as fluidly and accurately as possible? Many of these questions are being asked at the highest levels of the Army as indicated by the interview with General Dempsey in last week's post. And maybe more importantly, do the answers to these questions require wholesale changes to our current leadership models, or do they require more subtle azimuth adjustments in our organizational priorities? I don't know the answers to these questions, but I do believe that regardless of industry there must be the requirement for someone to continually be searching for them.
Who am I?
Using the labels provided by Dr. Clippinger above, I started to think about which of those labels suited my understanding of my leadership style the best. Quite honestly however, I think the more important question will be is my understanding of me the same as other people's understanding of me, and what is the impact of that on the overall effectiveness of the organization and the mission? Secondly, I think that because we are in the midst of an organizational shift throughout all of society from an industrial age, hierarchical organization to an information age, decentralized one, each of us may find that we serve multiple roles at the same time as we shift from one age to the other. For example, this blog serves as my understanding of the roles of "Visionary" and "Truth-Teller" as described above. However, because I am also a noncommissioned officer, part of a organizational structure that is hierarchical and historic, I also fulfill the role of "Gate Keeper". Due to past achievements and titles and awards, I could also be termed an "Exemplar" My point is that most of us will serve more than one role for awhile as the two organizational models move against each other.
At the smallest unit level though, I think that these descriptions are excellent ways for each of us to look at ourselves, our role in the organization, and those above, below and parallel to us. Ultimately, they help refine our personal Orientation.
Consider this: Go back to each of the labels above and write down the first person who comes to your mind as you read the description: For me, the "Exemplar" right now is General Petraus. For the entire Army (and maybe America) he seems to represent the highest ideals of the organization both by personal behavior and by technical ability. The "Gate Keeper" is the senior noncomissioned officer in my organization. I am the "Visionary", although I am very uncomfortable with that title because it seems too self aggrandizing and because I don't have some defined clear-cut view of the perfect future of the organization. I think the title does fit me however because my circumstance has forced me to question the institutional norms and try to identify what I believe the gaps in current methodologies are. The "Truth Teller" would be someone like Don Vandergriff who has the identified the flaws in the traditional leader development model and has found a way to gain acceptance of his 'truths' with those in positions to drive change in the Army. Don told the truth and kept saying it until the institution recognized it's validity. The "Fixer" is a person I've worked and I've known for years now who, while not necessarily possessing some grand vision, is immensely capable of handling the day-to-day requirements necessary to fulfill the vision of those around him. The "Connector" is another person in our Division who I have known for a long time who has the ability to bring disparate groups together to ensure the vision gets accomplished. The "Enforcer" is someone I struggle with. By the very title, I see this person as a negative part of the organization, resisting change and establishing roadblocks. However, this isn't the connotation that Dr. Clippinger envisioned. The problem of interpretation is mine, and I cannot form a mental picture of who this individual might be. The "Facilitator" for me is an amalgam of people who, while functioning right now to complete someone else's vision, are also thinking very hard about the impacts that differing 'visions' may have. Many people who have commented here come to mind. They are people who have been able to ask hard questions about the task and it's purpose and the impact of those things on the entire organization.
If you do the same thing I just did and search for those people you think fulfill the roles outlined by Dr. Clippinger, you begin to see those people in a new light. A light that enhances their value to the organization equally regardless of where they may sit hierarchically. It also helps inform your vision of you and the role you play. It helps refine your Orientation. These considerations are important to leader development. They force each of us to look at ourselves honestly, and then determine those labels that enhance our self understanding and those that detract from it. By doing this analysis we can then determine our place in the organization that will provide the best fit for our talents, optimize our contributions and recognize the roles that others perform to accomplish the mission.
There are 8 people in your office. What descriptor do you assign them? Do you think they see themselves that way too? Interesting questions. The true leader may be the person who sees him/herself in the very same way that their superiors, peers, and subordinates see them.
The other evening, I was talking to a friend on the phone and questioning whether or not I ever really desired to lead troops again as a First Sergeant or higher. Right now, I enjoy the new role I have have found both here and at work and enjoy the job I have. When I asked my friend what his thoughts were he said that maybe my best contribution to the Army right now is in helping to develop the new leadership requirements that current and future fights will require. Growing up in the Army, all I ever wanted to be was a command sergeant major. Now, without regret or remorse, I may have found a new dream.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#74 Editor's Note
I want to express my gratitude and thanks to all of you who have checked out and commented on my writing over the past 11 months. I was very honored this week to have been asked to submit my postings to the Battle Command Knowledge Systems (BCKS) Leader Net, on Army Knowledge Online. I have been given my own folder in the Professional Reading Room and so far 6 posts have been added. I look forward to adding more as time goes on.
I am deeply appreciative to all who have supported my efforts. In order to learn anything, previous ideas must be challenged and critically reviewed. I am thoroughly enjoying this exercise, and sincerely hope that I have challenged the reader to further explore their own definition of leadership, especially given the dynamic and rapidly changing world we currently live in.
Again, thanks for all your support and feedback and I look forward to the discussions ahead.
I am deeply appreciative to all who have supported my efforts. In order to learn anything, previous ideas must be challenged and critically reviewed. I am thoroughly enjoying this exercise, and sincerely hope that I have challenged the reader to further explore their own definition of leadership, especially given the dynamic and rapidly changing world we currently live in.
Again, thanks for all your support and feedback and I look forward to the discussions ahead.
#73 Risk, Trust and the Future of the Profession
As sometimes happens, I really had no idea what I wanted to comment on this week when suddenly a few things popped up out of nowhere and provided the spark. I am going to try something here that I haven't done before, which is to link to some videos and see if the feedback is worth it. I know the discussion is worthwhile, but if people won't check, (or can't depending on bandwidth) the links, then my thoughts might not make a whole lot of sense.
First, check the link below posted by LTG Robert Caslen of the Combined Arms Center, entitled 'Leading in a Complex Operating Environment':
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYPzRqu7Wvw
LTG Caslen's video post has to do with the potential repercussions of the COP Wanat and COP Keating reports. It talks very plainly about the need to ensure we have command climates that create the conditions for the exchange of information that allows a subordinate to voice his/her concerns regarding tactical risk to those higher in their chain of command. LTG Caslen is principally talking to the young and mid-career Army officers attending various schools that are part of the Combined Arms Center. CAC has done an exceptional job blending new technology and social media together in a manner that allows for the very top of the Army 'corporation' to gain feedback from those whose understanding of their profession has been formed in large part by the last 9 years of conflict. He also makes plain mention of the often blurry, and always subjective line between acceptable risk and risk aversion. Are we becoming risk averse because of the potential implications both personally, and for our Soldiers? These are also some of the same ideas and questions that I was talking about in my post a few weeks back entitled, "Hondo's Parting Gift".
Then check out the second link from General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcVHwpqsLf8
This is part 2 of a 3 part interview with General Dempsey. Not surprisingly, you'll find a lot of similarities, concerns and questions between Gen Dempsey's video and LTG Caslen's, only on a somewhat larger scale. Whereas LTG Caslen seems focused pretty tightly around the practical application of risk acceptance and risk aversion, Gen Dempsey continues that line of thought toward the more esoteric ideas of mentoring, trust development, and the impact of leader development programs that reaffirm the ethic of the profession of arms.
There is a part near the end of the Demspey video where he states:
"Decentralization has become an almost unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine, it's in joint doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge, we talk about enabling the edge, and my concern is that we're also....pushing all the risk. And in pushing all the risk, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the other aspects of our profession, one of the foundational aspects, which is trust. So that if we push all the risk to the edge, and we don't share that risk, and we hold junior leaders accountable for failures, but without sharing that failure with them...then we begin to erode trust. And when we begin to erode trust we begin to erode the profession."
These two videos fill me with a lot of hope and confidence in our Army's senior leadership. Their acknowledged realization that we are requiring increasingly junior leaders to make very complex decisions, in real-time, that can have strategic consequences, and their willingness to put that into the larger context of leader development and the Army professional ethic is important. I think it also demonstrates that the Army has recognized - in a very public manner - the need for institutional transparency; the need for dialogue over discussion. Intended or not, this reaching out to the force at large also recognizes that previous models built solely on the seniority of the leadership have been surpassed by a new model that recognizes the value of those currently experiencing a new reality. Both of these leaders seem to recognize and are affirming the value of the experiential knowledge of the bottom. They recognize that a lot of their previous knowledge gained over the course of their careers has very little practical application to a young Captain or Major trying to implement a doctrine that is still quite literally in it's infancy. What both are trying to do is find the broader implications of what this period of dramatic change means to the organization as a whole.
How do we develop trust? Where is it's beginning, and where is it's end? These questions are both intensely personal, and institutional, at the same time. On the personal level there is the idea that I trust my friends, my loved ones etc. That they will not intentionally do me harm. I trust that they will help me in my time of need and celebrate my successes. That they will share both my pain and my joy. This feeling of trust on the individual level provides all of us the sense of community that we require to find value in our world. Trust at the individual level fulfills Maslow's 3rd tier of Love, Affection and Belongingness. It begins to build community.
Then there is institutional trust. I trust that my elected leaders will work to serve their communities as best they can. I trust that my retirement plan money will be invested wisely. I trust that my schools will provide a quality education. That my doctor knows what medicine is best for me. I trust that my mail will be delivered on time. I trust that my employer will stand behind me when I have done my best, but the outcome fell short of the mark. I trust that the organizational climate, ethos, and norms will be lived up to by everyone, all the time, and not sacrificed for expediency. These are trusts that occur when we put our faith and belief in things beyond our immediate knowledge and experience or control.
As an entire Army there are a lot of things right now that are beyond our immediate knowledge (the ethical/moral/and hierarchy situations created by counterinsurgency's requirement for decentralization), experience (we have only really been practicing the COIN doctrine for about 3 years) or control (we are learning rapidly that the 'fog' and 'friction' of war creates points where the outcome may be outside of our ability to control it).
And so we have to return to the people actually making the on-the-spot decision. Leaders have to trust that the most junior member of the unit will make his/her decision based upon the best knowledge they have available to them, their personal value system and their understanding of the ethic and priorities of the institution they serve. And the subordinate has to trust that if he/she does that, that their leadership will support them. But how? How can we take a young leader and expand their understandings as broadly as this war requires in an extremely short amount of time? It's akin to trying to get them to understand the entirety of how our government functions in less than a year. And then making them responsible for the decisions they make based upon this 'Cliff's Notes' understanding of the profession itself.
I'm not saying that I have the answers to any of these questions, but I do think that in many ways, my search for personal understanding on these pages has produced an idea of how we might actually go about ensuring that the professional military ethic remains strong, that we develop our young leaders in a manner that ensures a common understanding of the expectations of the organization, and supports active decision-making at the point of impact.
As always, I return to OODA. If you watch both videos, you can see two senior leaders who have Observed something and are trying to Orient to it as quickly and as correctly as possible. Gen Dempsey's 'gut' instinct that we may have blindly accepted and highlighted decentralization without completely understanding it's consequences equals his Observe. His willingness to spend time and resources to study it will affect his Orientation. LTG Caslen's recognition that events like COP Wanat and COP Keating have played a role in upsetting the balance between tactical gains and risk aversion, is the same. Both men have the power to Decide and Act upon their Observations, but both right now seem to be trying to ensure they are correctly Oriented before doing so. We need to teach OODA in every school house we have. It works from the very personal to grand strategic levels. In this fight both of those extremes happen on the same small piece of ground.
Second, go back to the leaders 'philosophy' I gave my organization when they first met me. My first two points were: (1) People are more important than things, and (2) How to think is more important than what to think. These two thoughts place a premium on human being development. The task is not the critical event, the impact on the person who successfully completes the task is. It equals empowerment, growth, and development. It is also moldable. The task can be anything, which means that it could be ethical behavior making exercises just as easily as marksmanship. Either way, the observed development of the person is the prize. Everything else is just the method. At the microcosmic Army level, in my little organization of 14 people this is playing out every day. I trust my subordinates. I told them day 1 that they had 100% of my trust based upon their experience in the job. I told them I would earn theirs. In some ways, I turned their understanding upside down. I gave them a lot of latitude in the beginning that had the possibility of being abused. But that latitude has come with an increased expectation of excellence. Their work, their research, their class development, and their focus provides a institutional experience where they feel valued, cared for, and are invested in. I have taken care of them when necessary, and they have repaid that by truly caring about the people they are sending to combat. Their opinion counts, their voice gets heard, and we all are equally charged in our own way with creating the best training experience we can. They are as 'bought in' as I am. Now that it is truly their 'baby', they demonstrate every day the pride of 'parenthood'.
Third, look at the institution through the eyes of those just starting out. While they may not have much experience, they do have an understanding of the meaning of words. We need to look for those places where the institutional interpretation of the 7 Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage) and the user interpretation have diverged. I'm not implying that one side or the other has the correct interpretation, only that there has to be a recognition that there can be more than one. We may find that on most of the Values, the institution and the user are actually extremely close and we don't need a lot of work to close the gap. But we might find one or two where there is a large gap in understanding that requires us to work hard to close that gap. If we do not re-examine the user-level understanding of the 7 Army Values and how they are playing out on the side of a hill in Afghanistan between a young Sergeant and a scared Soldier, then we cannot fix the issues of ethos, trust, or leader development. Ultimately, any search for answers, will return to the need to enhance/change/create men and women of character who have the same personal understanding of the organization's ethics and norms as the organization itself does. If we fall short at this foundational level, the remainder of the profession will surely collapse.
A final rambling thought: The current battlefield requires folks who can make quick decisions in keeping with the institutional norms and expected behaviors of the Army.....those decisions must be based on a common understanding of the values and ethics of the organization.....the development of people into the leaders of character the profession requires IS the key.....Any training task or combat only provides experience, it is not the key event here. Leader development is.....Trust must be returned.....On both the personal and institutional level. Without it, our contract with the nation we serve is in jeopardy.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
First, check the link below posted by LTG Robert Caslen of the Combined Arms Center, entitled 'Leading in a Complex Operating Environment':
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYPzRqu7Wvw
LTG Caslen's video post has to do with the potential repercussions of the COP Wanat and COP Keating reports. It talks very plainly about the need to ensure we have command climates that create the conditions for the exchange of information that allows a subordinate to voice his/her concerns regarding tactical risk to those higher in their chain of command. LTG Caslen is principally talking to the young and mid-career Army officers attending various schools that are part of the Combined Arms Center. CAC has done an exceptional job blending new technology and social media together in a manner that allows for the very top of the Army 'corporation' to gain feedback from those whose understanding of their profession has been formed in large part by the last 9 years of conflict. He also makes plain mention of the often blurry, and always subjective line between acceptable risk and risk aversion. Are we becoming risk averse because of the potential implications both personally, and for our Soldiers? These are also some of the same ideas and questions that I was talking about in my post a few weeks back entitled, "Hondo's Parting Gift".
Then check out the second link from General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcVHwpqsLf8
This is part 2 of a 3 part interview with General Dempsey. Not surprisingly, you'll find a lot of similarities, concerns and questions between Gen Dempsey's video and LTG Caslen's, only on a somewhat larger scale. Whereas LTG Caslen seems focused pretty tightly around the practical application of risk acceptance and risk aversion, Gen Dempsey continues that line of thought toward the more esoteric ideas of mentoring, trust development, and the impact of leader development programs that reaffirm the ethic of the profession of arms.
There is a part near the end of the Demspey video where he states:
"Decentralization has become an almost unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine, it's in joint doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge, we talk about enabling the edge, and my concern is that we're also....pushing all the risk. And in pushing all the risk, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the other aspects of our profession, one of the foundational aspects, which is trust. So that if we push all the risk to the edge, and we don't share that risk, and we hold junior leaders accountable for failures, but without sharing that failure with them...then we begin to erode trust. And when we begin to erode trust we begin to erode the profession."
These two videos fill me with a lot of hope and confidence in our Army's senior leadership. Their acknowledged realization that we are requiring increasingly junior leaders to make very complex decisions, in real-time, that can have strategic consequences, and their willingness to put that into the larger context of leader development and the Army professional ethic is important. I think it also demonstrates that the Army has recognized - in a very public manner - the need for institutional transparency; the need for dialogue over discussion. Intended or not, this reaching out to the force at large also recognizes that previous models built solely on the seniority of the leadership have been surpassed by a new model that recognizes the value of those currently experiencing a new reality. Both of these leaders seem to recognize and are affirming the value of the experiential knowledge of the bottom. They recognize that a lot of their previous knowledge gained over the course of their careers has very little practical application to a young Captain or Major trying to implement a doctrine that is still quite literally in it's infancy. What both are trying to do is find the broader implications of what this period of dramatic change means to the organization as a whole.
How do we develop trust? Where is it's beginning, and where is it's end? These questions are both intensely personal, and institutional, at the same time. On the personal level there is the idea that I trust my friends, my loved ones etc. That they will not intentionally do me harm. I trust that they will help me in my time of need and celebrate my successes. That they will share both my pain and my joy. This feeling of trust on the individual level provides all of us the sense of community that we require to find value in our world. Trust at the individual level fulfills Maslow's 3rd tier of Love, Affection and Belongingness. It begins to build community.
Then there is institutional trust. I trust that my elected leaders will work to serve their communities as best they can. I trust that my retirement plan money will be invested wisely. I trust that my schools will provide a quality education. That my doctor knows what medicine is best for me. I trust that my mail will be delivered on time. I trust that my employer will stand behind me when I have done my best, but the outcome fell short of the mark. I trust that the organizational climate, ethos, and norms will be lived up to by everyone, all the time, and not sacrificed for expediency. These are trusts that occur when we put our faith and belief in things beyond our immediate knowledge and experience or control.
As an entire Army there are a lot of things right now that are beyond our immediate knowledge (the ethical/moral/and hierarchy situations created by counterinsurgency's requirement for decentralization), experience (we have only really been practicing the COIN doctrine for about 3 years) or control (we are learning rapidly that the 'fog' and 'friction' of war creates points where the outcome may be outside of our ability to control it).
And so we have to return to the people actually making the on-the-spot decision. Leaders have to trust that the most junior member of the unit will make his/her decision based upon the best knowledge they have available to them, their personal value system and their understanding of the ethic and priorities of the institution they serve. And the subordinate has to trust that if he/she does that, that their leadership will support them. But how? How can we take a young leader and expand their understandings as broadly as this war requires in an extremely short amount of time? It's akin to trying to get them to understand the entirety of how our government functions in less than a year. And then making them responsible for the decisions they make based upon this 'Cliff's Notes' understanding of the profession itself.
I'm not saying that I have the answers to any of these questions, but I do think that in many ways, my search for personal understanding on these pages has produced an idea of how we might actually go about ensuring that the professional military ethic remains strong, that we develop our young leaders in a manner that ensures a common understanding of the expectations of the organization, and supports active decision-making at the point of impact.
As always, I return to OODA. If you watch both videos, you can see two senior leaders who have Observed something and are trying to Orient to it as quickly and as correctly as possible. Gen Dempsey's 'gut' instinct that we may have blindly accepted and highlighted decentralization without completely understanding it's consequences equals his Observe. His willingness to spend time and resources to study it will affect his Orientation. LTG Caslen's recognition that events like COP Wanat and COP Keating have played a role in upsetting the balance between tactical gains and risk aversion, is the same. Both men have the power to Decide and Act upon their Observations, but both right now seem to be trying to ensure they are correctly Oriented before doing so. We need to teach OODA in every school house we have. It works from the very personal to grand strategic levels. In this fight both of those extremes happen on the same small piece of ground.
Second, go back to the leaders 'philosophy' I gave my organization when they first met me. My first two points were: (1) People are more important than things, and (2) How to think is more important than what to think. These two thoughts place a premium on human being development. The task is not the critical event, the impact on the person who successfully completes the task is. It equals empowerment, growth, and development. It is also moldable. The task can be anything, which means that it could be ethical behavior making exercises just as easily as marksmanship. Either way, the observed development of the person is the prize. Everything else is just the method. At the microcosmic Army level, in my little organization of 14 people this is playing out every day. I trust my subordinates. I told them day 1 that they had 100% of my trust based upon their experience in the job. I told them I would earn theirs. In some ways, I turned their understanding upside down. I gave them a lot of latitude in the beginning that had the possibility of being abused. But that latitude has come with an increased expectation of excellence. Their work, their research, their class development, and their focus provides a institutional experience where they feel valued, cared for, and are invested in. I have taken care of them when necessary, and they have repaid that by truly caring about the people they are sending to combat. Their opinion counts, their voice gets heard, and we all are equally charged in our own way with creating the best training experience we can. They are as 'bought in' as I am. Now that it is truly their 'baby', they demonstrate every day the pride of 'parenthood'.
Third, look at the institution through the eyes of those just starting out. While they may not have much experience, they do have an understanding of the meaning of words. We need to look for those places where the institutional interpretation of the 7 Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage) and the user interpretation have diverged. I'm not implying that one side or the other has the correct interpretation, only that there has to be a recognition that there can be more than one. We may find that on most of the Values, the institution and the user are actually extremely close and we don't need a lot of work to close the gap. But we might find one or two where there is a large gap in understanding that requires us to work hard to close that gap. If we do not re-examine the user-level understanding of the 7 Army Values and how they are playing out on the side of a hill in Afghanistan between a young Sergeant and a scared Soldier, then we cannot fix the issues of ethos, trust, or leader development. Ultimately, any search for answers, will return to the need to enhance/change/create men and women of character who have the same personal understanding of the organization's ethics and norms as the organization itself does. If we fall short at this foundational level, the remainder of the profession will surely collapse.
A final rambling thought: The current battlefield requires folks who can make quick decisions in keeping with the institutional norms and expected behaviors of the Army.....those decisions must be based on a common understanding of the values and ethics of the organization.....the development of people into the leaders of character the profession requires IS the key.....Any training task or combat only provides experience, it is not the key event here. Leader development is.....Trust must be returned.....On both the personal and institutional level. Without it, our contract with the nation we serve is in jeopardy.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
#72 The Pentathelete and the Profession
This post has been kicking around in my head for a few weeks now trying to get out. I have wanted to address it for at least the last 2 posts, but other ideas or incidents would pop up and it would get pushed to the back burner. It has been sitting there, however, tickling my brain and waiting for the thoughts to form themselves coherently enough to put words on the page. I'm going to try today. We'll see how it turns out.
About 3 weeks ago I received an email from one of the readers in response to post #68, "Alone With Yourself". The email came from a person who has become a mentor and one of my greatest mental protagonists throughout my writings. I alluded to him in the post itself like this:
"This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests. "
When I use the word protagonist to describe him, that is not to imply that we are enemies or foes. In fact, the truth is very much the opposite. He is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect and think very highly of. The protagonist label come from his ability and willingness to challenge me and provide another considered opinion besides my own. He pushes me to grow. This type of mental challenge is something that I believe that we must all engage in as leaders if we desire to remain relevant and involved in our professions, whatever they may be. There must be a mechanism in everyone's professional life (and personal too, I would think) that challenges them and their perceptions and vision of their world in order to not become entropic and shut off from new ideas. CR does that for me, and I am grateful for it.
Anyway, shortly after post #68, we exchanged a series of emails where he essentially disagreed with the value of having the professor go to West Point and challenging the cadets to begin examining their moral ethical 'backbone' before they are even fully formed as adults. He doesn't disagree that these considerations are critical, but rather that before the young officers can truly do what the professor suggests, they have to first understand the profession itself. What does the job require of them? He stated it this way:
" But the issues I have with the PHD addressing West Point cadets on how to think for themselves is that I don’t think they are ready for that. It would be a great speech for the Pre-Command Course for Lieutenant Colonels on the command list, but hardly a topic for students who don’t yet know the profession well enough to have an opinion.
For young lieutenants to join the fight against those arrayed against our country, it is necessary for them to first embrace the arts of war, not reinvent them. They must first steep themselves in the knowledge required to wield the tools of war, and they must train their mind and body in the multitude of skills required to accomplish this successfully. Equally, they must be emotionally prepared to fight aggression, to oppose evil, to take action, and to lead men. After all that, let them (and history) take close measure of the “box” before changing it."
And to follow that up, he went back and defined what those requirements are:
"The DA (Dept of the Army) develops competent and multifaceted military who personify the Army values and the warrior ethos in all aspects from warfighting, to statesmanship, to enterprise management. The Army develops qualities in its leaders to enable them to respond effectively to what they will face. The DA describes the leaders it is creating as “Pentathletes,” whose versatility will enable them to learn and adapt in ambiguous situations in a constantly evolving environment. Pentathlete leaders are innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, boldly confront uncertainty, and solve complex problems. They are decisive and prudent risk takers who effectively manage, lead, and change organizations. Pentathletes are professionally educated and dedicated to a lifelong learning process; resilient, mentally and physically agile, empathetic, and self-aware; and confidently lead Soldiers and civilians, build teams, and achieve the Army’s over-arching strategic goals while engendering loyalty and trust.
Pentathlete - Pentathletes are multi-skilled, innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, personify the warrior ethos in all aspects from war fighting to statesmanship to enterprise management, and boldly confront uncertainty and solve complex problems.
a. A Pentathlete—
(1) Is a strategic and creative thinker.
(2) Builds leaders and teams.
(3) Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier.
(4) Is effective in managing, leading, and changing large organizations.
(5) Is skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy.
(6) Understands cultural context and works effectively across it.
b. Pentathlete attributes are—
(1) To set the standard for integrity and character.
(2) To be a confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations:
(a) Prudent risk taker.
(b) Innovative.
(c) Adaptive.
(3) Empathetic and always positive.
(4) Professionally educated and dedicated to lifelong learning.
(5) Effective communicator. "
I very much agree with all of the above. Describing Army leaders as pentathletes is very appropriate. Much like their track and field counterparts, pentathlete Army leaders must be masters of all of the events and techniques and implements of war. There is an old saying, 'jack of all trades, master of none'. Army leaders must be 'jacks of all trades' and 'masters' of them as well.
Leading other human beings in combat with the ever-present threat of death requires that military leaders be developed in a wholly different manner than most of their civilian counterparts. The 'finality' of combat becomes an incredible weight upon the people in the contest. At some point, each Soldier has one of those moments when they suddenly realize that this is not a game and that they might actually die. That in order to survive, they may have to take the life of another human being. They also must also accept the randomness of death and come to grips with it. They must either accept these realities and continue to fight, or they succumb to their fears and become too paralyzed to move. Military leadership demands people who can recognize that and use the tools and requirements of the profession outlined above to overcome those fears, and instill the confidence in those they lead to do the same. It's probably no different in civilian business leadership, except that the cost of failure is really not quite as high. Money may be lost, and profits may decrease, but life and death are generally not on the line.
Maybe CR is right. Before we can master ourselves, we must first provide a framework for that mastery to take place. We must immerse ourselves in our professional environment and learn all the tools of our trade before we can begin to understand or look for the deeper implications of our personal role in the profession. Without a sense of what a project requires, and the tools available to solve it, the deeper implications of the project itself might become too difficult to solve. Again, it becomes a matter of perfecting all of one's skills focused towards the accomplishment of the objective. An Army leader must understand the requirements of the job, the structure of the organization, and why it functions the way it does. That leader must learn about, study, and master the intricacies of all the aspects of their profession, the tools available, the people they work with/for, the requirements of the fight itself in order to have a frame of reference with which to study their place in the larger picture.
I don't disagree with any of that. I really don't. However, I think the manner we go about becoming the pentathlete-leader the Army requires doesn't really fulfill this need very well. In fact, I think if you look at the need for mastery of the individual skills and then compare it with the definition of the pentathlete-leader above, you'll find that the professional military education system is generally broken with regard to the development of pentathletes all the way around. For CR's contention that becoming a pentathlete-leader to work, it has to recognize that skill mastery must be seen in a larger context. Consider each part of the pentathlete requirement above:
1. Is a strategic and creative thinker: Are we really developing young lieutenants and captains and sergeant to understand the strategic implications of the decisions they will be forced to make? Do we really reward creativity when a novel solution to a complex problem presents itself? Quite honestly, I don't believe we do this well at the junior level. Maybe in our senior schools we are beginning to, but at the junior level, we are often still telling young leaders what to do instead of developing their capacity for strategic and creative thought.
2. Builds leaders and teams: We used to have a great little manual entitled "Soldier Team Development" that helped developing leader figure out the behavioral and social dynamics of team building, but it is long out of print and is hard to find nowadays. Maybe we need to spend some time in our classrooms getting Soldiers to understand how and why successful teams and organizations work in order to enhance the over-all capability of the unit. This would allow a young leader to understand that the people of their profession are as an important part of mission success as any implement of war or strategy.
3. Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier: Are we really doing that in our professional schooling? Are we making young leaders think hard about what they are doing, why they are doing it, and the second and third order effects of their decisions? I think we might be starting to in some places, such as West Point, and the Sergeants Major Academy, but overall, I'm still not certain that the place near enough emphasis on the difficulties and considerations of the COIN environment at the lower levels.
4. Is effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations: This bullet seems to me to place the pentathlete label only on those leaders who are in charge of large organizations. It implies that the pentathlete starts at the senior level. My opinion is that these particular skills begin immediately at the lowest level as well, and do not only belong to those leaders who have ascended to the upper echelons of the Army.
5. Is skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy: This is another example where simply by the language used, the implication is that it doesn't really apply at the bottom of the leader spectrum and I fundamentally disagree with that premise. Since we have to accept that in a COIN environment, the smallest of decisions made at the lowest level can have extremely large outcomes that can support or detract from the mission in impactful ways, there must be a requirement for all levels the critical nature of diplomacy and statesmanship can impact the outcome.
6. Understands the cultural context and works effectively across it: We have immersed the Army in cultural considerations for the past 3 or 4 years. You cannot turn around these days without running into another cultural awareness class that explains the history and culture of the Afghan people. All of this is meant to provide out Soldiers with an awareness of the similarities and disparities between our 2 cultures. Awesome. I have no argument that this recognition is important. The question becomes, how do we use it? How do we take advantage of the similarities of our cultures to work towards mission accomplishment, and how to we learn to recognize when a dissimilarity will present an opportunity for us to achieve our mission as well?
Overall, I think that the requirements of the pentathlete-leader are quite correct. I just think that when the writers envisioned who this person is, they didn't have in mind those who are just beginning the leader development journey. You can almost see the face of a General Petreaus or other very senior leader is the definition, but can you see the face of a 20 year old farm kid from Iowa?
The attributes portion above caught my eye even more than the requirements portion. Think about what attributes the pentathlete-leader must posses: people of character and integrity, confidence, innovative, adaptive, empathetic and positively focused, professionally educated and good communicators.
Where will that character and integrity be developed? Where does it come from? Are we to assume that everyone has the same understanding of their character, and that theirs and the Army's are the same? Where will the ability to adapt be tested? Where will be let young leaders develop without the fear of strategic failure? Where will empathy and a basic respect for humanity find a place in the discussion of such a brutal contest as war? Where will the ability to communicate effectively be developed? Without a place to develop these attributes we cannot fulfill the higher mission of this war. Without placing the development of the person above the technical requirements of the profession, we cannot achieve the requirements of the pentathlete-leader. In my opinion, it is never too early to start challenging the people who make up the organization with questions like these. Knowing the technical aspects of one's craft will not teach you when or when not to use that tool. Knowing who you are, what you value and the implications for selecting one tool over another will always be the critical difference between 2 leaders.
Generically, CR and I believe in the same requirements of the pentathlete-leader. My point is that without knowing where we come from, what our our values are, possessing a deep and abiding sense of our personal strengths, weaknesses and abilities, we cannot fulfill those requirements because the most basic understanding has not been developed. Who is the unique individual behind the pentathlete-leader.
About 3 weeks ago I received an email from one of the readers in response to post #68, "Alone With Yourself". The email came from a person who has become a mentor and one of my greatest mental protagonists throughout my writings. I alluded to him in the post itself like this:
"This particular mentor is a man of a separate breed not often found in today's world. He is a thinker. He has deeply considered his profession, it's requirements and it's demands. He has dedicated himself to ensuring that those beneath him do the same. While he does not demand it of me, he challenges me to continue to look for it. He strikes me as a man who possesses the capability to stand alone, comfortable in his own skin, simply because he has already done the things that the Professor suggests. "
When I use the word protagonist to describe him, that is not to imply that we are enemies or foes. In fact, the truth is very much the opposite. He is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect and think very highly of. The protagonist label come from his ability and willingness to challenge me and provide another considered opinion besides my own. He pushes me to grow. This type of mental challenge is something that I believe that we must all engage in as leaders if we desire to remain relevant and involved in our professions, whatever they may be. There must be a mechanism in everyone's professional life (and personal too, I would think) that challenges them and their perceptions and vision of their world in order to not become entropic and shut off from new ideas. CR does that for me, and I am grateful for it.
Anyway, shortly after post #68, we exchanged a series of emails where he essentially disagreed with the value of having the professor go to West Point and challenging the cadets to begin examining their moral ethical 'backbone' before they are even fully formed as adults. He doesn't disagree that these considerations are critical, but rather that before the young officers can truly do what the professor suggests, they have to first understand the profession itself. What does the job require of them? He stated it this way:
" But the issues I have with the PHD addressing West Point cadets on how to think for themselves is that I don’t think they are ready for that. It would be a great speech for the Pre-Command Course for Lieutenant Colonels on the command list, but hardly a topic for students who don’t yet know the profession well enough to have an opinion.
For young lieutenants to join the fight against those arrayed against our country, it is necessary for them to first embrace the arts of war, not reinvent them. They must first steep themselves in the knowledge required to wield the tools of war, and they must train their mind and body in the multitude of skills required to accomplish this successfully. Equally, they must be emotionally prepared to fight aggression, to oppose evil, to take action, and to lead men. After all that, let them (and history) take close measure of the “box” before changing it."
And to follow that up, he went back and defined what those requirements are:
"The DA (Dept of the Army) develops competent and multifaceted military who personify the Army values and the warrior ethos in all aspects from warfighting, to statesmanship, to enterprise management. The Army develops qualities in its leaders to enable them to respond effectively to what they will face. The DA describes the leaders it is creating as “Pentathletes,” whose versatility will enable them to learn and adapt in ambiguous situations in a constantly evolving environment. Pentathlete leaders are innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, boldly confront uncertainty, and solve complex problems. They are decisive and prudent risk takers who effectively manage, lead, and change organizations. Pentathletes are professionally educated and dedicated to a lifelong learning process; resilient, mentally and physically agile, empathetic, and self-aware; and confidently lead Soldiers and civilians, build teams, and achieve the Army’s over-arching strategic goals while engendering loyalty and trust.
Pentathlete - Pentathletes are multi-skilled, innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, personify the warrior ethos in all aspects from war fighting to statesmanship to enterprise management, and boldly confront uncertainty and solve complex problems.
a. A Pentathlete—
(1) Is a strategic and creative thinker.
(2) Builds leaders and teams.
(3) Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier.
(4) Is effective in managing, leading, and changing large organizations.
(5) Is skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy.
(6) Understands cultural context and works effectively across it.
b. Pentathlete attributes are—
(1) To set the standard for integrity and character.
(2) To be a confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations:
(a) Prudent risk taker.
(b) Innovative.
(c) Adaptive.
(3) Empathetic and always positive.
(4) Professionally educated and dedicated to lifelong learning.
(5) Effective communicator. "
I very much agree with all of the above. Describing Army leaders as pentathletes is very appropriate. Much like their track and field counterparts, pentathlete Army leaders must be masters of all of the events and techniques and implements of war. There is an old saying, 'jack of all trades, master of none'. Army leaders must be 'jacks of all trades' and 'masters' of them as well.
Leading other human beings in combat with the ever-present threat of death requires that military leaders be developed in a wholly different manner than most of their civilian counterparts. The 'finality' of combat becomes an incredible weight upon the people in the contest. At some point, each Soldier has one of those moments when they suddenly realize that this is not a game and that they might actually die. That in order to survive, they may have to take the life of another human being. They also must also accept the randomness of death and come to grips with it. They must either accept these realities and continue to fight, or they succumb to their fears and become too paralyzed to move. Military leadership demands people who can recognize that and use the tools and requirements of the profession outlined above to overcome those fears, and instill the confidence in those they lead to do the same. It's probably no different in civilian business leadership, except that the cost of failure is really not quite as high. Money may be lost, and profits may decrease, but life and death are generally not on the line.
Maybe CR is right. Before we can master ourselves, we must first provide a framework for that mastery to take place. We must immerse ourselves in our professional environment and learn all the tools of our trade before we can begin to understand or look for the deeper implications of our personal role in the profession. Without a sense of what a project requires, and the tools available to solve it, the deeper implications of the project itself might become too difficult to solve. Again, it becomes a matter of perfecting all of one's skills focused towards the accomplishment of the objective. An Army leader must understand the requirements of the job, the structure of the organization, and why it functions the way it does. That leader must learn about, study, and master the intricacies of all the aspects of their profession, the tools available, the people they work with/for, the requirements of the fight itself in order to have a frame of reference with which to study their place in the larger picture.
I don't disagree with any of that. I really don't. However, I think the manner we go about becoming the pentathlete-leader the Army requires doesn't really fulfill this need very well. In fact, I think if you look at the need for mastery of the individual skills and then compare it with the definition of the pentathlete-leader above, you'll find that the professional military education system is generally broken with regard to the development of pentathletes all the way around. For CR's contention that becoming a pentathlete-leader to work, it has to recognize that skill mastery must be seen in a larger context. Consider each part of the pentathlete requirement above:
1. Is a strategic and creative thinker: Are we really developing young lieutenants and captains and sergeant to understand the strategic implications of the decisions they will be forced to make? Do we really reward creativity when a novel solution to a complex problem presents itself? Quite honestly, I don't believe we do this well at the junior level. Maybe in our senior schools we are beginning to, but at the junior level, we are often still telling young leaders what to do instead of developing their capacity for strategic and creative thought.
2. Builds leaders and teams: We used to have a great little manual entitled "Soldier Team Development" that helped developing leader figure out the behavioral and social dynamics of team building, but it is long out of print and is hard to find nowadays. Maybe we need to spend some time in our classrooms getting Soldiers to understand how and why successful teams and organizations work in order to enhance the over-all capability of the unit. This would allow a young leader to understand that the people of their profession are as an important part of mission success as any implement of war or strategy.
3. Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier: Are we really doing that in our professional schooling? Are we making young leaders think hard about what they are doing, why they are doing it, and the second and third order effects of their decisions? I think we might be starting to in some places, such as West Point, and the Sergeants Major Academy, but overall, I'm still not certain that the place near enough emphasis on the difficulties and considerations of the COIN environment at the lower levels.
4. Is effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations: This bullet seems to me to place the pentathlete label only on those leaders who are in charge of large organizations. It implies that the pentathlete starts at the senior level. My opinion is that these particular skills begin immediately at the lowest level as well, and do not only belong to those leaders who have ascended to the upper echelons of the Army.
5. Is skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy: This is another example where simply by the language used, the implication is that it doesn't really apply at the bottom of the leader spectrum and I fundamentally disagree with that premise. Since we have to accept that in a COIN environment, the smallest of decisions made at the lowest level can have extremely large outcomes that can support or detract from the mission in impactful ways, there must be a requirement for all levels the critical nature of diplomacy and statesmanship can impact the outcome.
6. Understands the cultural context and works effectively across it: We have immersed the Army in cultural considerations for the past 3 or 4 years. You cannot turn around these days without running into another cultural awareness class that explains the history and culture of the Afghan people. All of this is meant to provide out Soldiers with an awareness of the similarities and disparities between our 2 cultures. Awesome. I have no argument that this recognition is important. The question becomes, how do we use it? How do we take advantage of the similarities of our cultures to work towards mission accomplishment, and how to we learn to recognize when a dissimilarity will present an opportunity for us to achieve our mission as well?
Overall, I think that the requirements of the pentathlete-leader are quite correct. I just think that when the writers envisioned who this person is, they didn't have in mind those who are just beginning the leader development journey. You can almost see the face of a General Petreaus or other very senior leader is the definition, but can you see the face of a 20 year old farm kid from Iowa?
The attributes portion above caught my eye even more than the requirements portion. Think about what attributes the pentathlete-leader must posses: people of character and integrity, confidence, innovative, adaptive, empathetic and positively focused, professionally educated and good communicators.
Where will that character and integrity be developed? Where does it come from? Are we to assume that everyone has the same understanding of their character, and that theirs and the Army's are the same? Where will the ability to adapt be tested? Where will be let young leaders develop without the fear of strategic failure? Where will empathy and a basic respect for humanity find a place in the discussion of such a brutal contest as war? Where will the ability to communicate effectively be developed? Without a place to develop these attributes we cannot fulfill the higher mission of this war. Without placing the development of the person above the technical requirements of the profession, we cannot achieve the requirements of the pentathlete-leader. In my opinion, it is never too early to start challenging the people who make up the organization with questions like these. Knowing the technical aspects of one's craft will not teach you when or when not to use that tool. Knowing who you are, what you value and the implications for selecting one tool over another will always be the critical difference between 2 leaders.
Generically, CR and I believe in the same requirements of the pentathlete-leader. My point is that without knowing where we come from, what our our values are, possessing a deep and abiding sense of our personal strengths, weaknesses and abilities, we cannot fulfill those requirements because the most basic understanding has not been developed. Who is the unique individual behind the pentathlete-leader.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#71 Answering a Question
In response to last weeks post, I received an email from JD who posed an interesting and thought-provoking question. I emailed him back and asked if he would mind my posting it as a blog itself. He had no issues with that, so here is his response to Post #70, "Hondo's Parting Gift", and my thoughts on the questions he raises:
"I like your perspective and it comes with tons of credibility.....I have followed this incident closely, like yours and others, which leads me to this question... Do you know of ANY battles (not FOB/garrison incidences) in the last 9 years where YOU would have "accused" a company, battalion, or brigade commander of dereliction of duty, incompetence, fault, or culpability?"
Simply put, my answer to JD's question is no. I do not personally know of any battles where I would have accused my leadership (either officer and non-commissioned officer) of dereliction of duty, incompetence or culpability. The reasons for that answer, however, are much more complicated - and sort of bring a lot of my other thoughts into play.
Dereliction of duty, and incompetence are both very subjective labels. I'm sure that none of the people involved in the COP Wanat battle or my incident think that they were negligent in carrying out their duties - as they understood them, and with the facts they had available to them at the time when they made critical decisions. They believed the decisions they made were correct and in-keeping with their understanding of their mission. The accusation of negligence only shows up when an other-than-expected result occurs because of those decisions. And especially if that result ends up with U.S. casualties. Company, battalion, brigade and division level commanders, and their non-commissioned officer counterparts, are generally not dim-witted people. For the most part, they are pretty smart, posses a keen sense of their responsibilities, and care very deeply about those in their charge. While there will always be those leaders who simply use their subordinates for their own self-promotion, they are a very minor exception, and not the overwhelming rule.
The charge of incompetence also leads to another issue. If someone is trained to do a job under a particular understanding and set of circumstances, and then those understandings and circumstances dramatically change, can you then accuse that person on being incompetent? You are fundamentally asking them to do something that they have not been trained, and therefore, may not know how to do. This war has too many examples of this to even recount, but in a generic sense, consider this example. Tthe set of understandings and assumptions that the military planners used to predict what would happen in post-invasion Iraq were woefully incorrect. Those decisions and assumptions had a marked impact on the rise of the insurgency from 2003 - 2006. Does that mean that these planners were incompetent? No. What it means is that the data that they were using to form their understandings and assumptions was flawed. But they could not have known that at the time they built the plan. Basic to the invasion of Iraq was the question of what would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed from power? The American planners assumptions were that Iraqi's would greet the U.S. as liberators and that democracy would surely follow. That the guy on the street would automatically choose peace over violence. That everyone would remain calm and understand that to rebuild would take time and patience. That a desire for Iraqi national unity would trump tribal and religious differences. Obviously, that did not happen and the void that was created by the deposition of Hussein and the de-bathification decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority led directly to the failure of basic services and the upsetting of the 'normal' order that created the anger, frustration and confusion that gave rise to the insurgency. Is Paul Bremer then incompetent? No. His assumptions were incorrect and the decisions made based upon those assumptions had some truly terrifying consequences, but he was certainly not incompetent. His orientation was wrong. If there was any failure, it was a failure to OODA. His inability to orient himself correctly to the real issues and not to impose his own - and America's - filters in the decision-making process may be at fault, but it does not lend itself to the realm of incompetence. It lends itself more accurately to not being prepared for a type of rebuilding effort that the original planners hadn't anticipated and planned for. The game changed, but only a tiny sliver of people were able to see it. Democracy, education, the rule of law and women's rights do not feed a hungry family, or provide clean water and sanitary living conditions. A working government can do those things whether it is tyrannical or democratic. This is where 'what to think' and 'how to think' collide. As a democracy and a free people, Americans do not like tyranny and despotic rule. That is what we are taught to think. It's the American way. However, there are times when something other than the American way may be the best solution to the problem. Remember, at the end of World War II, with the entire European continent needing to be rebuilt, a lot of Nazi's were 'repatriated' to provide the essential services that would aid in the rebuilding effort. In his rise to power, Benito Mussolini promised to make the trains run on time....and he did.
In the case of 1st platoon, there have been accusations of incompetence and dereliction almost since Day 1. "Black Hearts" provides almost 400 pages worth. While I do not think that every person in my Chain of Command correctly understood the environment and working conditions, I also do not think that most of us were incompetent. Obviously as some of the responses to previous postings have pointed out, others do not agree. Which again points out that heroism and success share equal footing with dereliction and incompetence. It's all a matter of your perspective. My opinion is that some people involved started to 'believe their own bullshit' a little too much, and had little understanding of how to 'see' their operating conditions correctly. To be fair, that assertion has been laid at my feet more than once. It's a matter of priorities, orientations (both personal and external) and the picture of the intended outcome.
Fault is a whole different issue. I can most definitely find fault in my situation, but it is not a criminal or culpable fault for the reasons cited above. It is exactly the same type of fault that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. It is a fault of perception, understanding, and priorities. It is a failure to orient correctly and then having the ability to impress that orientation on decision makers. Whenever someone asks the question, "Should he/she have known that X or Y could have happened?", it is almost certain that X or Y has happened, and the signs were missed. Well the truth is that to have perfect situational awareness and to be able to sift through the thousands of pieces of information, both large and trivial, and then align each them in perfect order is almost impossible. No one can do that right every time. That's why we call them mistakes. The signs were there, but they got lost in the various understandings of their importance depending on the perspective and agenda of who's paying attention. Most errors are errors of judgement. In retrospect, Steven Green's stated desire to kill Iraqi's because they had killed his friends was more than an emotional young man venting the day after one of his leaders had died in his arms. But, at the time, it was judged by others as a normal emotive response to a very traumatic incident. To be honest, I don't know too many Soldiers today who at one point or another came to hate Iraqis. Amidst all the anger and rage that many people were experiencing during that time, what was any different about Steven Green? Nothing except that 4 months later he would slaughter 4 people in cold blood.
Fault can be laid at all of our feet for having differing sets of priorities. The battalion commander's priorities were not in line with the company commander's priorities. They did not have a common understanding to work from. My priorities and the priorities of many of my Soldiers were different as well, and I had difficulty explaining those priorities to them in a manner that they could understand. In both cases, you can align the facts and bits of information and reach different conclusions. The weight that I give to something and the weight that one of my Soldiers gives it may be two entirely different things. For example, the battalion Sergeant Major judged entire platoons by their appearance and how they wore their uniforms. If they were shaven, had fresh haircuts, and their uniforms were worn correctly, they were good in his eyes. That was his orientation. My guys had absolutely no use for him and did not think highly of him at all. They thought he only focused on trivial and inconsequential things. I needed to use him to buy time and space to try to change the perception of the platoon at battalion level and take the heat off the platoon. I told the Soldiers to start shaving and getting haircuts and keeping their boots bloused etc. They thought I was as fucked up as he was. They thought my priorities were wrong. From my perspective, I knew that if he saw us cleaned-up and dressed correctly, he would consider it progress (whether it really was or not) and progress would shift his attention away from us and onto something else thereby removing a lot of the stress from the platoon. It worked too. In the middle of May (almost exactly at the mid-point of the cover-up of the March rape/murder) the battalion Sergeant Major said that 1st platoon had become one of the top 5 platoons in the battalion. He was wrong. His perspective and focus was wrong. In fact, they were still the same morally bankrupt platoon they had been since before I took over (which I told him on numerous occasions), but they damn sure looked pretty. And pretty made him back off for awhile which removed some of the pressure from them and helped gain the trust and confidence of the company and battalion, which led to us getting to participate in missions like Rushdi Mullah which made the Soldiers feel like they were real members of the battalion again instead of the red-headed step children as they had been labeled. So whose priorities and orientations were right? The Soldiers were being treated poorly by battalion and came to hate much of the chain of command. The battalion thought the Soldiers were undisciplined and complainers. To the Soldiers, I was just an extension of battalion. To battalion I was there to help restore discipline to the Soldiers. To me, I was there to do everything I could to give that platoon back it's confidence and mission focus at the same time recognizing the losses they had taken and the emotional problems that many of them faced. We all made decisions based upon differing perceptions and orientations. But, while you can find fault with the decisions, they were not derelict or incompetent, and if they were faulty, it was not a fault of willful commission. It was the inability to properly orient in more than one manner simultaneously under combat conditions, on a 3 dimensional human chess board and align the scraps of random information perfectly to achieve the desired outcome.
Consider General Campbell's report from last week again. His was a 'final' review of 3 previous reports, and his came to a much different conclusion than the one previous to it. Does that mean report number 2 was wrong? Are those Generals who rendered it derelict because his report refutes theirs? Are they incompetent? Is their thinking faulty? Or, is it simply a matter or having the same facts available, but emphasising different parts of them and arriving at a different conclusion because of a different orientation?
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome. It is the dialogue that keeps this moving forward, and I appreciate your support and consideration.
"I like your perspective and it comes with tons of credibility.....I have followed this incident closely, like yours and others, which leads me to this question... Do you know of ANY battles (not FOB/garrison incidences) in the last 9 years where YOU would have "accused" a company, battalion, or brigade commander of dereliction of duty, incompetence, fault, or culpability?"
Simply put, my answer to JD's question is no. I do not personally know of any battles where I would have accused my leadership (either officer and non-commissioned officer) of dereliction of duty, incompetence or culpability. The reasons for that answer, however, are much more complicated - and sort of bring a lot of my other thoughts into play.
Dereliction of duty, and incompetence are both very subjective labels. I'm sure that none of the people involved in the COP Wanat battle or my incident think that they were negligent in carrying out their duties - as they understood them, and with the facts they had available to them at the time when they made critical decisions. They believed the decisions they made were correct and in-keeping with their understanding of their mission. The accusation of negligence only shows up when an other-than-expected result occurs because of those decisions. And especially if that result ends up with U.S. casualties. Company, battalion, brigade and division level commanders, and their non-commissioned officer counterparts, are generally not dim-witted people. For the most part, they are pretty smart, posses a keen sense of their responsibilities, and care very deeply about those in their charge. While there will always be those leaders who simply use their subordinates for their own self-promotion, they are a very minor exception, and not the overwhelming rule.
The charge of incompetence also leads to another issue. If someone is trained to do a job under a particular understanding and set of circumstances, and then those understandings and circumstances dramatically change, can you then accuse that person on being incompetent? You are fundamentally asking them to do something that they have not been trained, and therefore, may not know how to do. This war has too many examples of this to even recount, but in a generic sense, consider this example. Tthe set of understandings and assumptions that the military planners used to predict what would happen in post-invasion Iraq were woefully incorrect. Those decisions and assumptions had a marked impact on the rise of the insurgency from 2003 - 2006. Does that mean that these planners were incompetent? No. What it means is that the data that they were using to form their understandings and assumptions was flawed. But they could not have known that at the time they built the plan. Basic to the invasion of Iraq was the question of what would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed from power? The American planners assumptions were that Iraqi's would greet the U.S. as liberators and that democracy would surely follow. That the guy on the street would automatically choose peace over violence. That everyone would remain calm and understand that to rebuild would take time and patience. That a desire for Iraqi national unity would trump tribal and religious differences. Obviously, that did not happen and the void that was created by the deposition of Hussein and the de-bathification decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority led directly to the failure of basic services and the upsetting of the 'normal' order that created the anger, frustration and confusion that gave rise to the insurgency. Is Paul Bremer then incompetent? No. His assumptions were incorrect and the decisions made based upon those assumptions had some truly terrifying consequences, but he was certainly not incompetent. His orientation was wrong. If there was any failure, it was a failure to OODA. His inability to orient himself correctly to the real issues and not to impose his own - and America's - filters in the decision-making process may be at fault, but it does not lend itself to the realm of incompetence. It lends itself more accurately to not being prepared for a type of rebuilding effort that the original planners hadn't anticipated and planned for. The game changed, but only a tiny sliver of people were able to see it. Democracy, education, the rule of law and women's rights do not feed a hungry family, or provide clean water and sanitary living conditions. A working government can do those things whether it is tyrannical or democratic. This is where 'what to think' and 'how to think' collide. As a democracy and a free people, Americans do not like tyranny and despotic rule. That is what we are taught to think. It's the American way. However, there are times when something other than the American way may be the best solution to the problem. Remember, at the end of World War II, with the entire European continent needing to be rebuilt, a lot of Nazi's were 'repatriated' to provide the essential services that would aid in the rebuilding effort. In his rise to power, Benito Mussolini promised to make the trains run on time....and he did.
In the case of 1st platoon, there have been accusations of incompetence and dereliction almost since Day 1. "Black Hearts" provides almost 400 pages worth. While I do not think that every person in my Chain of Command correctly understood the environment and working conditions, I also do not think that most of us were incompetent. Obviously as some of the responses to previous postings have pointed out, others do not agree. Which again points out that heroism and success share equal footing with dereliction and incompetence. It's all a matter of your perspective. My opinion is that some people involved started to 'believe their own bullshit' a little too much, and had little understanding of how to 'see' their operating conditions correctly. To be fair, that assertion has been laid at my feet more than once. It's a matter of priorities, orientations (both personal and external) and the picture of the intended outcome.
Fault is a whole different issue. I can most definitely find fault in my situation, but it is not a criminal or culpable fault for the reasons cited above. It is exactly the same type of fault that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. It is a fault of perception, understanding, and priorities. It is a failure to orient correctly and then having the ability to impress that orientation on decision makers. Whenever someone asks the question, "Should he/she have known that X or Y could have happened?", it is almost certain that X or Y has happened, and the signs were missed. Well the truth is that to have perfect situational awareness and to be able to sift through the thousands of pieces of information, both large and trivial, and then align each them in perfect order is almost impossible. No one can do that right every time. That's why we call them mistakes. The signs were there, but they got lost in the various understandings of their importance depending on the perspective and agenda of who's paying attention. Most errors are errors of judgement. In retrospect, Steven Green's stated desire to kill Iraqi's because they had killed his friends was more than an emotional young man venting the day after one of his leaders had died in his arms. But, at the time, it was judged by others as a normal emotive response to a very traumatic incident. To be honest, I don't know too many Soldiers today who at one point or another came to hate Iraqis. Amidst all the anger and rage that many people were experiencing during that time, what was any different about Steven Green? Nothing except that 4 months later he would slaughter 4 people in cold blood.
Fault can be laid at all of our feet for having differing sets of priorities. The battalion commander's priorities were not in line with the company commander's priorities. They did not have a common understanding to work from. My priorities and the priorities of many of my Soldiers were different as well, and I had difficulty explaining those priorities to them in a manner that they could understand. In both cases, you can align the facts and bits of information and reach different conclusions. The weight that I give to something and the weight that one of my Soldiers gives it may be two entirely different things. For example, the battalion Sergeant Major judged entire platoons by their appearance and how they wore their uniforms. If they were shaven, had fresh haircuts, and their uniforms were worn correctly, they were good in his eyes. That was his orientation. My guys had absolutely no use for him and did not think highly of him at all. They thought he only focused on trivial and inconsequential things. I needed to use him to buy time and space to try to change the perception of the platoon at battalion level and take the heat off the platoon. I told the Soldiers to start shaving and getting haircuts and keeping their boots bloused etc. They thought I was as fucked up as he was. They thought my priorities were wrong. From my perspective, I knew that if he saw us cleaned-up and dressed correctly, he would consider it progress (whether it really was or not) and progress would shift his attention away from us and onto something else thereby removing a lot of the stress from the platoon. It worked too. In the middle of May (almost exactly at the mid-point of the cover-up of the March rape/murder) the battalion Sergeant Major said that 1st platoon had become one of the top 5 platoons in the battalion. He was wrong. His perspective and focus was wrong. In fact, they were still the same morally bankrupt platoon they had been since before I took over (which I told him on numerous occasions), but they damn sure looked pretty. And pretty made him back off for awhile which removed some of the pressure from them and helped gain the trust and confidence of the company and battalion, which led to us getting to participate in missions like Rushdi Mullah which made the Soldiers feel like they were real members of the battalion again instead of the red-headed step children as they had been labeled. So whose priorities and orientations were right? The Soldiers were being treated poorly by battalion and came to hate much of the chain of command. The battalion thought the Soldiers were undisciplined and complainers. To the Soldiers, I was just an extension of battalion. To battalion I was there to help restore discipline to the Soldiers. To me, I was there to do everything I could to give that platoon back it's confidence and mission focus at the same time recognizing the losses they had taken and the emotional problems that many of them faced. We all made decisions based upon differing perceptions and orientations. But, while you can find fault with the decisions, they were not derelict or incompetent, and if they were faulty, it was not a fault of willful commission. It was the inability to properly orient in more than one manner simultaneously under combat conditions, on a 3 dimensional human chess board and align the scraps of random information perfectly to achieve the desired outcome.
Consider General Campbell's report from last week again. His was a 'final' review of 3 previous reports, and his came to a much different conclusion than the one previous to it. Does that mean report number 2 was wrong? Are those Generals who rendered it derelict because his report refutes theirs? Are they incompetent? Is their thinking faulty? Or, is it simply a matter or having the same facts available, but emphasising different parts of them and arriving at a different conclusion because of a different orientation?
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome. It is the dialogue that keeps this moving forward, and I appreciate your support and consideration.
#70 Hondo's Parting Gift
Amid all the media frenzy surrounding the replacement of General McChrystal this week, another story quietly made a small blip on the radar screen that will potentially have a far greater impact on the war, and leadership, than the change of commanders at the very top.
On July 13th, 2008, a small group of US Soldiers and their Afghan National Army partners were attacked at a place called Combat Outpost (COP) Wanat. During the fighting which lasted over 13 hours, approximately 200 insurgent fighters attacked and were ultimately repulsed by a small US force of approximately 30 men. During the fighting, 8 American Soldiers lost their lives.
As usual after a major battle such as Wanat, there was an investigation completed looking into the actions of everyone in the chain of command to figure out how such a large number of anti-Afghan Forces had been able to carry out such a complex attack. There have now been 3, and with this final report, 4 reviews of the event over the past 2 years. Principally, this has happened because the father of one of the dead Soldiers is a former Army officer who knew exactly what questions to ask and how to push the Army to provide the most accurate report possible. In this endeavor, he enlisted the office of Senator Jim Webb from Virginia to add weight to his claims.
Earlier reports found fault and culpability with the the leadership of the embattled American unit from company through the battalion, brigade and ultimately Combined Joint Task Force 101 chain of command. These results lead to reprimands and other actions that have career implications. In one case, a senior officer resigned his commission and retired due to the injustices he felt were done to some of his subordinate commanders.
Finally, this past January, Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, asked General Charles C. "Hondo" Campbell to review all of the former reports and decide whether or not members of the chain of command had been derelict in their duties, or made such egregious errors in judgment and leadership that would render them responsible for the deaths of their Soldiers. General Campbell has recently retired after 40 years of service, his final position being FORSCOM Commander. However, prior to his retirement, he completed the task he had been assigned by Secretary McHugh. The redacted version of his findings, published the same day the the President relieved General McChrystal of command, can be found here:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/wanat/downloads/campbellWanatReportRedacted.pdf
Gen. Campbell's report found no criminal, or negligent leadership failures for members of the chain of command from the lowest to the highest levels. It does however raise and highlight some very important ideas and address the implications of trying to lead Soldiers in a complex environment if a leader is constantly worried that someone will hold them criminally liable for their judgments. In section 7 A of the report he states the following:
"During my review of all the materials available to me, I kept several broad principles in mind. First, if a commander makes a decision after reasoned consideration of the facts and circumstances, the existence of alternatives does not make the decision erroneous. Stated otherwise, a commander has broad discretion, and absent an egregious disregard of significant facts, his reasonably considered decision should be presumed to be valid. Second, in evaluating any decision, it is critical to focus on the facts and circumstances as they were known at the time of the decision. With hindsight, with knowledge of later events, it is always possible to arrive at a different decision. If, however, the commander prudently acted on the basis of what he knew and what he reasonably should have known, subsequent events or information, that is developed or interpreted differently at a later time, does not make the original decision unsound or incorrect. Third, if there is evidence of a decision or action that is later considered less than optimal (or even poor), one must ask whether it contributed in some meaningful way to a negative outcome. Fourth, and finally, one must understand that there is no such thing as a perfect decision in war, where complexity, friction, uncertainty, the interlocking effects of the actions of independent individuals, and the enemy all effect the outcome of events."
In his conclusion, Gen Campbell stated the following:
"That U.S casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decisions, planning and actions of the chain of command running from "Redacted Name" to MG Schloesser. The U.S casualties occurred because the enemy decided to attack the COP at Wanat and battle resulted. It is critical that we not mechanically equate U.S. casualties with professional error or misconduct. (emphasis added by me) In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable. Regrettably, they are often the price of victory. When U.S, casualties occur, as at Wanat, we must examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether our Officers, NCO's and Soldiers have performed properly. When, as at Wanat. they have done so, we should learn any lessons the battle teaches and move forward. This reasoned, judicious review process without anger or partiality is the true meaning of accountability."
This report, hopefully the last concerning this particular battle, is critically important as to whether or not leaders have the latitude and ability to prosecute a fight without always having to be fearful that a dead Soldier will automatically invalidate their decision making process. Gen Campbell's final gift to the Army may have been the return of reason to the conduct of war.
There are some very important lessons that we can take from Gen Campbell's report that bear mentioning here. First, in war casualties are inevitable. The fact that we have prosecuted 2 wars over a 10 year span and only lost 4,000 Service members is, in fact, pretty incredible. The American public has been led to believe that with the advent of technology we can fight the 'perfect' war where we take no casualties, no innocent civilians or property are ever damaged, and the only suffering is done by the enemy. This is absolutely untrue. Wars - at their most basic level - are won and lost by men and women trying to kill each other. The relatively small number of deaths (.26 percent using 4000 deaths in a 1.5 million man force) has further enhanced the notion that we can win and not have anyone die. This fallacy needs to be replaced by the reality that if the war is worth fighting, then there will inevitably be a loss of life. While this painful truth is next to impossible to bare for the families and loved ones of those we have lost, it does not make the basic assumption unsound. In my opinion, we have also become so afraid of having Soldier get killed, that the protective measures we take on their behalf may also actually contribute to prolonging the overall conflict. If our leaders are always afraid to have someone die, then every decision they make is inherently defensive in nature. They will or won't take an offensive, they will or won't drive down certain roads, they will or won't hamper their Soldiers ability to kill the enemy solely based upon a fear of taking too high a number of casualties and having another incident like COP Wanat.
Second, the report rightfully claims that just because someone does die, that the decisions that led to that death are not automatically due to some failure on the part of the leadership. The enemy does get a vote. They intend to inflict casualties upon us in order to break our political, military and human will in order to get us to cease fighting. We are doing the same to them. Commanders must be allowed to make those decisions that they have been trained to make, and not constantly have to worry that if their decision has a bad outcome, that they will automatically be found criminally liable or otherwise responsible for the deaths that occur. If we inculcate our leaders with a fear of career ending prosecutions every time a Soldier gets killed, that fear will have a paralyzing effect on the decisions they make and ultimately will likely lead to more deaths and injuries. As I have said before, if General Eisenhower had had to command in the present age, it is not likely that the D Day invasion would ever have occurred. He would never have gotten past the planning stages as soon as he briefed the casualty estimates.
Third, and maybe most importantly, Gen Campbell's report claims that if, and when, investigations into incidents like this are warranted, it is critically important to understand the perspective and orientation of the commander at the time, not with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. In effect, one has to freeze the battlefield at a particular point in time and then try to see the events through the eyes of those who were in charge right there. You cannot go back later and judge men for things they could not have known at that particular point. You cannot say, "Well, why didn't you know that the enemy was going to plan and execute a large scale, multi-pronged attack on your lightly defended outpost?", if in fact, there was no evidence presented by the enemy to inform your thought process or if that knowledge is only one of a thousand pieces of often conflicting information you must decide upon each day.
Obviously this final notion is the one that effects me the most personally with regard to the events of my platoon. I have always claimed that given what I knew, my understanding of the platoon, the environment and the mission, that my decisions and actions were correct. I would also say that had someone else taken a different approach than I chose to, that that approach may have been equally correct. The important part is that you must look at the decisions based upon my interpretation and understanding when judging whether or not my actions were reasonable or sound. While the book and the court proceedings and all of that have tried relentlessly to rewrite the facts using knowledge that was not present at the time of the event, I have maintained that my perspective and that of others in the chain of command must be understood as it was then, not as it might be after the numerous investigations and prosecutions. This also highlights the idea that we need to develop leaders with a much wider and more in-depth perspective. In essence, if we are going to judge them later based upon their knowledge, experience and perspective, we had better spend a lot more time developing these abilities before we send them into command positions.
General Campbell's report to Secretary McHugh is a very important first step toward creating command climates based upon the mission, the circumstance, commander's intent and the expected outcome. To operate in an incredibly decentralized environment such as Afghanistan requires leaders at all levels who are empowered to make the best decisions they know how, given the information and analytical abilities they posses and the removal of fear from prosecution for casualties that are an inevitable outcome of the dirty business at the sharp end of the stick.
As always, your thoughts and comment are welcome. Feedback only serves to enhance the dialogue and we all learn from the experience of others. I look forward to hearing from you.
On July 13th, 2008, a small group of US Soldiers and their Afghan National Army partners were attacked at a place called Combat Outpost (COP) Wanat. During the fighting which lasted over 13 hours, approximately 200 insurgent fighters attacked and were ultimately repulsed by a small US force of approximately 30 men. During the fighting, 8 American Soldiers lost their lives.
As usual after a major battle such as Wanat, there was an investigation completed looking into the actions of everyone in the chain of command to figure out how such a large number of anti-Afghan Forces had been able to carry out such a complex attack. There have now been 3, and with this final report, 4 reviews of the event over the past 2 years. Principally, this has happened because the father of one of the dead Soldiers is a former Army officer who knew exactly what questions to ask and how to push the Army to provide the most accurate report possible. In this endeavor, he enlisted the office of Senator Jim Webb from Virginia to add weight to his claims.
Earlier reports found fault and culpability with the the leadership of the embattled American unit from company through the battalion, brigade and ultimately Combined Joint Task Force 101 chain of command. These results lead to reprimands and other actions that have career implications. In one case, a senior officer resigned his commission and retired due to the injustices he felt were done to some of his subordinate commanders.
Finally, this past January, Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, asked General Charles C. "Hondo" Campbell to review all of the former reports and decide whether or not members of the chain of command had been derelict in their duties, or made such egregious errors in judgment and leadership that would render them responsible for the deaths of their Soldiers. General Campbell has recently retired after 40 years of service, his final position being FORSCOM Commander. However, prior to his retirement, he completed the task he had been assigned by Secretary McHugh. The redacted version of his findings, published the same day the the President relieved General McChrystal of command, can be found here:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/wanat/downloads/campbellWanatReportRedacted.pdf
Gen. Campbell's report found no criminal, or negligent leadership failures for members of the chain of command from the lowest to the highest levels. It does however raise and highlight some very important ideas and address the implications of trying to lead Soldiers in a complex environment if a leader is constantly worried that someone will hold them criminally liable for their judgments. In section 7 A of the report he states the following:
"During my review of all the materials available to me, I kept several broad principles in mind. First, if a commander makes a decision after reasoned consideration of the facts and circumstances, the existence of alternatives does not make the decision erroneous. Stated otherwise, a commander has broad discretion, and absent an egregious disregard of significant facts, his reasonably considered decision should be presumed to be valid. Second, in evaluating any decision, it is critical to focus on the facts and circumstances as they were known at the time of the decision. With hindsight, with knowledge of later events, it is always possible to arrive at a different decision. If, however, the commander prudently acted on the basis of what he knew and what he reasonably should have known, subsequent events or information, that is developed or interpreted differently at a later time, does not make the original decision unsound or incorrect. Third, if there is evidence of a decision or action that is later considered less than optimal (or even poor), one must ask whether it contributed in some meaningful way to a negative outcome. Fourth, and finally, one must understand that there is no such thing as a perfect decision in war, where complexity, friction, uncertainty, the interlocking effects of the actions of independent individuals, and the enemy all effect the outcome of events."
In his conclusion, Gen Campbell stated the following:
"That U.S casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decisions, planning and actions of the chain of command running from "Redacted Name" to MG Schloesser. The U.S casualties occurred because the enemy decided to attack the COP at Wanat and battle resulted. It is critical that we not mechanically equate U.S. casualties with professional error or misconduct. (emphasis added by me) In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable. Regrettably, they are often the price of victory. When U.S, casualties occur, as at Wanat, we must examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether our Officers, NCO's and Soldiers have performed properly. When, as at Wanat. they have done so, we should learn any lessons the battle teaches and move forward. This reasoned, judicious review process without anger or partiality is the true meaning of accountability."
This report, hopefully the last concerning this particular battle, is critically important as to whether or not leaders have the latitude and ability to prosecute a fight without always having to be fearful that a dead Soldier will automatically invalidate their decision making process. Gen Campbell's final gift to the Army may have been the return of reason to the conduct of war.
There are some very important lessons that we can take from Gen Campbell's report that bear mentioning here. First, in war casualties are inevitable. The fact that we have prosecuted 2 wars over a 10 year span and only lost 4,000 Service members is, in fact, pretty incredible. The American public has been led to believe that with the advent of technology we can fight the 'perfect' war where we take no casualties, no innocent civilians or property are ever damaged, and the only suffering is done by the enemy. This is absolutely untrue. Wars - at their most basic level - are won and lost by men and women trying to kill each other. The relatively small number of deaths (.26 percent using 4000 deaths in a 1.5 million man force) has further enhanced the notion that we can win and not have anyone die. This fallacy needs to be replaced by the reality that if the war is worth fighting, then there will inevitably be a loss of life. While this painful truth is next to impossible to bare for the families and loved ones of those we have lost, it does not make the basic assumption unsound. In my opinion, we have also become so afraid of having Soldier get killed, that the protective measures we take on their behalf may also actually contribute to prolonging the overall conflict. If our leaders are always afraid to have someone die, then every decision they make is inherently defensive in nature. They will or won't take an offensive, they will or won't drive down certain roads, they will or won't hamper their Soldiers ability to kill the enemy solely based upon a fear of taking too high a number of casualties and having another incident like COP Wanat.
Second, the report rightfully claims that just because someone does die, that the decisions that led to that death are not automatically due to some failure on the part of the leadership. The enemy does get a vote. They intend to inflict casualties upon us in order to break our political, military and human will in order to get us to cease fighting. We are doing the same to them. Commanders must be allowed to make those decisions that they have been trained to make, and not constantly have to worry that if their decision has a bad outcome, that they will automatically be found criminally liable or otherwise responsible for the deaths that occur. If we inculcate our leaders with a fear of career ending prosecutions every time a Soldier gets killed, that fear will have a paralyzing effect on the decisions they make and ultimately will likely lead to more deaths and injuries. As I have said before, if General Eisenhower had had to command in the present age, it is not likely that the D Day invasion would ever have occurred. He would never have gotten past the planning stages as soon as he briefed the casualty estimates.
Third, and maybe most importantly, Gen Campbell's report claims that if, and when, investigations into incidents like this are warranted, it is critically important to understand the perspective and orientation of the commander at the time, not with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. In effect, one has to freeze the battlefield at a particular point in time and then try to see the events through the eyes of those who were in charge right there. You cannot go back later and judge men for things they could not have known at that particular point. You cannot say, "Well, why didn't you know that the enemy was going to plan and execute a large scale, multi-pronged attack on your lightly defended outpost?", if in fact, there was no evidence presented by the enemy to inform your thought process or if that knowledge is only one of a thousand pieces of often conflicting information you must decide upon each day.
Obviously this final notion is the one that effects me the most personally with regard to the events of my platoon. I have always claimed that given what I knew, my understanding of the platoon, the environment and the mission, that my decisions and actions were correct. I would also say that had someone else taken a different approach than I chose to, that that approach may have been equally correct. The important part is that you must look at the decisions based upon my interpretation and understanding when judging whether or not my actions were reasonable or sound. While the book and the court proceedings and all of that have tried relentlessly to rewrite the facts using knowledge that was not present at the time of the event, I have maintained that my perspective and that of others in the chain of command must be understood as it was then, not as it might be after the numerous investigations and prosecutions. This also highlights the idea that we need to develop leaders with a much wider and more in-depth perspective. In essence, if we are going to judge them later based upon their knowledge, experience and perspective, we had better spend a lot more time developing these abilities before we send them into command positions.
General Campbell's report to Secretary McHugh is a very important first step toward creating command climates based upon the mission, the circumstance, commander's intent and the expected outcome. To operate in an incredibly decentralized environment such as Afghanistan requires leaders at all levels who are empowered to make the best decisions they know how, given the information and analytical abilities they posses and the removal of fear from prosecution for casualties that are an inevitable outcome of the dirty business at the sharp end of the stick.
As always, your thoughts and comment are welcome. Feedback only serves to enhance the dialogue and we all learn from the experience of others. I look forward to hearing from you.
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