Yesterday morning I went searching for a topic for this week's post and came across an article on Management-issues.com entitled, "Breakdown in Trust Heralds Retention Crisis". You can find the link here:
www.management-issues.com/2010/8/6/research/breakdown-in-trust-heralds-retention-crisis.asp
The first two paragraphs really caught my eye:
"According to the fourth annual Ethics & Workplace Survey from consultants Deloitte, 34 per cent of employed Americans plan to look for a new job as the economy picks up, with half of these (48 per cent) citing a loss of trust in their employer as the main reason for wanting to leave.
A similar proportion point to a lack of transparent communication from their company's leadership, while four out of 10 say that they have been treated unfairly or unethically."
Consider that. 34% of the civilian workforce plans to plans to search for new employment when the opportunity arises and 48% of those people cite a lack of trust with their present employer as the reason why. That is roughly 16% of the total workforce not trusting their boss, and another 16% who believe they have been treated unfairly or unethically. Wow!
While there are vast differences between corporate America and the military related to purpose, there are also a lot of similarities as well. In fact, I would contend that at the institutional level, corporations and the Army are actually pretty much the same. If you substitute mission accomplishment for profit margin, and switch General for CEO, and shareholder for taxpayer, in many cases, you can interchange all the rest and aptly describe any large company and any Army organization. The cultures of the two organizations may be different, but generically, the same issues faced by the civilian work place are present in the Army.
The Army is a microcosm of society. A junior corporate executive comes from the same society as the mid-grade officer and noncommissioned officer. They have both been conditioned in roughly the same manner by the world they grew up and presently live in. It stands to reason therefore that if 16% of the workforce doesn't trust the boss, that same 16% is probably present in the Army.
Some questions: Where did the trust go, and how was it lost? Was it ever really present at all, or was it the unbridled optimism of the young executive who believed it was there when it really wasn't? Did the company sell the organization as one who would take care of its' people and then cut and run when the economy turned sour? Did the two groups (company and employee) have fundamentally different interpretations of how trust is demonstrated? For corporate America these are important considerations. Constantly turning over 16% of the middle management workforce cannot help but have a detrimental effect on production and profit. At best, it means that the corporate machine can only work at 84% effectiveness.
For the Army, that 16% is also critical. Consider this: An infantry brigade has approximately 3,500 people divided into 6 battalions. And that's its' base structure. Once deployed, the number can easily reach 5,000 or more. 16% of 3,500 is 560 people. That equals one battalions worth of disenfranchised Soldiers at any one time. In essence, the leadership has within it's ranks one entire infantry battalion that has one eye on the fight in front of it, and one on the door leading to the next opportunity. 560 is a lot of unhappy folks.
How do we regain that trust? Again, corporate America can provide a possible solution. I found an article entitled "How Leaders Build Trust" by George Ambler at (www.thepracticeofleadership.net). You can find the link to the article itself here:
www.thepracticeofleadership.net/2008/09/14/how-leaders-build-trust/
The article starts out by stating that, "Trust is one of the most critical requirements for effective leadership." It then goes on to outline a trust model called 'Transaction Trust'.
Much like the OODA Loop, the Transaction Trust model has 3 main parts which work together in a never-ending cycle. The 3 parts are (1) Contractual Trust or 'trust of character', (2) Communication Trust or 'trust of disclosure', and (3) Competence Trust or 'trust of capability'.
Under Contractual Trust or trust of character, the model lists the following requirements:
1. Manage Expectations
2. Establish boundaries
3. Delegate appropriately
4. Encourage mutually serving intentions
5. Keep agreements
6. Be consistent
Under Communication Trust or trust of disclosure, the model lists the following:
1. Share information
2. Tell the truth
3. Admit mistakes
4. Give and receive constructive feedback
5. Maintain confidentiality
6. Speak with good purpose
Under Competence Trust or Trust of capability. the model list the following:
1. Acknowledge people's skills and abilities
2. Allow people to make decisions
3. Involve others and seek their input
4. Help people learn skills.
The lack of trust in workforce - and the Army - is likely due to the failure of multiple parts of all three. The danger of this model however is that people will believe that by doing all those things in order, they are in fact demonstrating trust. The leader believes that he/she is meeting the requirements of the trust model. The problem is that the subordinate may not see it that way at all. This points out that even in matters of personal interaction, the OODA Loop and an understanding of the Orientation of both the leader and the subordinate are critical. If I were to realign the 16 parts to regain trust in the Army, I would put them in the following order:
Army leaders must:
1. Tell the truth - Good, bad or ugly, the truth must be told. Transparency is the key to credibility both personally and organizationally.
2. Speak with good purpose - Always speak with an eye toward improvement
3. Be consistent - Don't get caught up in following the latest trend, or pandering to popular opinion.
4. Encourage mutually serving intentions - Tie the individual parts to a whole that is larger than them.
5. Acknowledge people's skills and abilities - People are the Army. Value and respect their unique individual talents.
6. Involve others and seek their input - Decentralized operations require this.
7. Share information - There is no value in not sharing. That world doesn't exist anymore.
8. Manage expectations - Clearly lay out the risks and the possibilities for everyone. After all, it's the kid in the truck or on the patrol who's betting his/her life on your credibility.
9. Delegate appropriately - You'll be surprised what a little responsibility can do for a person.
10. Give and receive constructive feedback - Remember, they think you're wrong at least half the time. Give them an opportunity to say so and explain yourself.
11. Allow people to make decisions - Why not trust them? Do you really have any other choice?
12. Establish boundaries - These can be personal, professional or experiential. Nobody has a monopoly on being right, but for the operation to be successful, it has to move. At some point, decisions get made, and it is leaders who make them.
13. Admit mistakes - Your humanity demonstrates more than you know.
14. Keep agreements - Their trust in you is as good as your word to them.
15. Maintain confidentiality - There are no secrets anymore, but you can do your best to protect those you serve from undue humiliation or embarrassment.
16. Help people learn new skills - If you do all of the above, they will hand you their heart, their soul and their intellect and ask you to help them keep growing. Number 16 will be your legacy to the organization and the individual. Understand that and respect it. It is an awesome gift.
My reasoning for aligning the different portions the way I did should be pretty self evident. People trust people. Any discussion of the gaining or losing of trust ultimately boils down to the simple question of how I feel about the people around me. The institution is made up of thousands of people. The myriad interactions and decisions made by those thousands are what ultimately gives it its' ethos and value system. It is very difficult to establish an ethos and then try to cram people into it. It is the people who ultimately define it. To enhance trust, you always have to start with people.
By telling the truth - popular or not - the leader sends a message to the subordinate that honesty in word and deed is prized by the leader. What the subordinate will likely be forming is their understanding of what the leader thinks the 'truth' is. Again, it will always come back to interpretation and any time a leader states what they believe, the subordinate will be trying to match that statement up against their own belief system. Telling the truth leads directly to speaking with good purpose and to encouraging mutually serving intentions. A common understanding of the truth and a shared purpose and vision generally help to align all the parts of the organization and get it moving in a particular direction. For the Army, this equals vision and commander's intent. My commander plainly states what he/she knows to be the truth about our current situation. Then he/she provides the purpose of the operation and how it's success or failure affects everyone. Once that has happened, and I (the subordinate) understand why my individual well-being is tied to the organization's accomplishment of the mission, then I get my part. Now, if the leader then acknowledges my abilities, seeks my input, and shares information with me, then I have become part of the solution to the mission. I am now personally tied to it's success or failure. I am invested. Part of the leaders job however is to recognize my limitations and experience and help manage my expectations, set boundaries and delegate tasks to me that are appropriate to my skills, abilities and experience. Another portion of that will be the interaction I have with my leader in the form of dialogue, feedback and appropriate constructive criticism. Both the leader and I have to have a constant interchange of ideas and possible solutions. We must both be able to listen and adjust as the situation dictates. We both admit our mistakes quickly and thoroughly so that their outcomes don't impact the over-all mission in a negative manner. However, if my mistakes will not dramatically affect the outcome of the mission and can be used to help me learn new skills without demoralizing me or publicly embarrassing me, then when I tell my leader the mistake I've made truthfully, then it should be treated confidentially and used as an opportunity to grow and gain experience and wisdom.
All of which leads to trust. A trust that is returned from the led to the leader ten-fold once earned.
Last week, I included the link to the Army's report on suicide prevention. Because it was part of a different discussion, most people overlooked it and it didn't receive a lot of feedback throughout the week. However, I think the Transaction Trust model outlined above would be a great place for the Army to start dealing with the crisis it faces. However, to do so will require a re-ordering of the different parts of the model in the manner I posited above.
I have a Soldier in crisis. That Soldier has lost hope and can no longer see their personal place among their family, friends and work place and is contemplating suicide. They feel both un-valued and hopeless and have lost their basic trust in the organization to assist them. Using the steps of the model at the personal level in the same manner that they were applied to mission accomplishment however, I believe that we can directly influence this terrible trend and regain the trust of the Soldier in the Army. We will just have to demonstrate it personally. I will always be honest with my Soldier. A Soldier cannot take word games when they are in a dire situation. Simple, plain spoken truth - no matter how bad - works. Scimming around the edges and allowing vague interpretations only makes the situation more confusing and dangerous. I must speak with good purpose and help a Soldier see the mutually serving intention. They must understand that I do not wish them harm and that by assisting them in their crisis, I am trying to help them, and the organization. That the organization will be worse off without them. In effect that they are valued. But that has to be truthful and without guile. I cannot promise them that they will remain with the Army after the crisis ends, but rather that the Army values them right now in a very personal manner. We can deal with the institution later. I also need to share the responsibility for their well-being with them. They must do their part. They must give me as much effort as I give them. They must provide feedback and dialogue. As the leader, I have to suspend my own thoughts and listen to their interpretation of their situation. I must also provide them honestly and forthrightly the limits of my ability to assist them. They cannot become wholly dependant on me for every answer. I must be able to tell them the things I will not be able to provide them as quickly as I tell them the things I can. These boundaries are important because they keep the troubled Soldier inside a manageable box of decisions, not one that has an infinite number of possibilities that they might find overwhelming. And finally, if I make them a promise, I must see that promise through. A Soldier in crisis has placed their trust in me. Why? I don't know, and frankly, at that particular moment it is not important. What is important is that they believe that I can help them. If I tell them I will, then I must follow through on that promise. It may be all they have left to hold onto. And once lost, trust like that cannot be regained.
I believe that the 16% of corporate America that has lost trust and faith in the leadership has a similar, if not higher, percentage in the Army. That loss is demonstrating itself in dangerous and life-threatening decisions being made by Soldiers. The trend is reversible. The Transaction Trust model is a person-based technique for leading others. It also seems to me to have provide a way to help us help ourselves. Soldiers are the reason we get to be leaders. Let's not lose sight of that. Without those below you expressing their faith, trust, and confidence that you can, ate least, meet half of their Transaction needs, you wouldn't have anyone to lead at all.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#79 "Stuff that Scares Me"
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." Aristole
There are times when I am reminded of the reasons why so many people in my profession frighten and disillusion me. This week was one of those times.
I choose to address my subordinates by their first names. This is somewhat unusual for the enlisted corps of the Army. The normal course of action is to address Soldiers by their rank, their last name, the two combined or a nickname that has been given to them by members of the unit. Essentially, while they are obliged by courtesy and custom to address me by my rank, I am not required to do the same to them. I can say, "Go get me Johnson", or "Come here Sergeant" or "Go find Fen" etc, but when they address me, they are required to say, "Yes, Sergeant" or "No Sergeant" etc. They do not get to call me Jeff, or Fen. Most of them address me as Sergeant Fen.
A few weeks back, I was asked about this by my supervisor who disagrees with my approach and I informed him that I believe my choice to address my Soldiers by their first name was supported by regulation. He left it alone but indicated that he wasn't comfortable with it. This week though, he sent me an email that said he couldn't find a regulation supporting my position, so he asked me to find what I could. I also went looking and couldn't find it either. It appears that in the latest regulations the Army does not specifically address the issue.
So I posted the question on the Army's knowledge sharing website to see if others might know of a regulation that clearly defined what's right or wrong so we could settle the issue. And for 2 days my in-box didn't stop ringing with someones opinion on the matter. Not facts mind you, just their opinion.
My first problem with many of the responses was that most people interpreted my question incorrectly to begin with and assumed I was allowing a subordinate to call me by my first name. I was not. I was asking for the regulation that said whether I could, or could not, address them by their first names.
One of the responses I received was from a Sergeant Major. I will call him Sergeant Major X. I am including it below:
"Chief, or should I say Jeff…
I’m not aware of an Army Regulation that says how a Soldier must be addressed, but, the fact is it shows disrespect to the Soldier to address them by their first name. You say you want to call them by their first name, do you expect them to call you by your first name or the rank you have earned? Soldiers should be addressed by their rank as a military courtesy and show of respect to the rank they have earned. You are not their “buddy” you are their leader. When an occurrence happens that the leader is expected to counsel the Soldier in writing often times the leader who is their Soldier’s buddy won’t do it, then they come to the Sergeant Major and ask if the Sergeant Major will counsel the Soldier; that’s the wrong answer. This doesn’t mean the officers appointed over us can’t be friendly and cordial but it does mean there is a separation of rank for a reason and that should be respected. Address them by their rank sir and expect them to do the same for you any time you are in a professional military setting.."
I responded to the Sergeant Major with the following:
"You have the right to call me Jeff (which is in no way disrespectful because it is my given name), Sergeant, Sergeant Fenlason, or Fen (my nickname). that is your option by position. I display my courtesy to your position as a superior by addressing you by your rank. None of the examples I included above would be disrespectful towards me, nor would they be uncommon, nor would they violate any custom or protocol. My guess is that many senior NCO's routinely address their subordinates only by their last name i.e. "Go get me Jones". All I was asking was why shouldn't/couldn't I use "Go get me Fred" the same way? It also does not imply some form of lack of discipline as others have suggested. That would only be the case if using someones first name created an environment where the senior and subordinate engaged in other forms of behavior that diminished the standard.
One of the reasons that the Special Operations community consciously uses first names is to affirm the idea that as a professional and not just a rank I am counting on your contribution to the team and the mission. It's not the rank that matters, it's the competency and sense of mission accomplishment of the individual team members that determines the level of respect they enjoy."
Sergeant Major X's response troubles me. First, he claims it is disrespectful the Soldier to address them by their name. Second, he raises (as others did) the idea that by calling a Soldier Jeff instead of Fenlason I would somehow be opening the organization up to lesser form of discipline. That somehow the use of a first name versus the last has some affect on whether the Soldier does or doesn't do the right thing. Finally, and most importantly for me, I find his response to be hypocritical for I am positive that he does not address each subordinate by their rank every time, nor does always address them in a professional manner. I'm certain, having been in the profession for 20 years, that along the way, he has used only last names, or someones nickname, or even called a Soldier a disparaging term when angry or upset with their behavior. I know I have.
Another Sergeant Major (I'll call her Sergeant Major Y) concluded her comment by stating:
"I agree with all the comments as you are opening yourself up for issues. Calling your peers (same rank) by first name should not be done in front of junior Soldiers, either. I challenge each NCO to get our NCO Corps back to the professional and disciplined Backbone of the Army!"
Ahhhh. I knew that one was coming. Somehow, someway, addressing a Soldier by their first name was going to be the death knoll of the NCO Corps. We have to get "back" to some time in the past when supposedly we were a more disciplined and professional force than we are now. I wonder exactly when that time was? Must have been before I joined. The Army of my earliest years was almost completely disrespectful to junior Soldiers and you were very likely to have an extremely degrading nickname....if they even let you have a name at all! Most of the time you were just called "Shit-bird" or some other colorful colloquialism. Ahh yes, the more disciplined and professional Army. Please lets get back to that. Now that I'm a senior NCO, it'll be fun to constantly degrade people. Must be, because my leaders sure did seem to find a lot of joy in it when I was coming up.
So now, two Sergeants Major have responded and stated that using someones given name is disrespectful to them, lowers the standard of the profession, reduces discipline and leads to some unknown-but-scary possibility of opening a leader up for 'issues'.
[By the way, the 'opening yourself up for issues' theme came up more than once although not one respondent could state what the 'issue' might be.]
Is the noncommissioned officer corps so broken and weak that it cannot see one step below the surface to recognize that the professionalism and discipline of the organization had better be built on a much more solid foundation than names and titles if it is to survive and flourish in the future? As I alluded to in my response to Sergeant Major X, if this type of leadership approach is so incredibly detrimental, then why do all of our most elite units commonly work this way? And why does the officer corps not have an issue with it? In fact, on most officers evaluation forms, their superior will routinely comment with something like, "John is one of the top 10% of all the Captains I rate", or "Jane is the most competent Major on my staff." Following the logic of the the Sergeants Major, we must have a broken and undisciplined officer corps as well.
After nearly 10 years of sustained combat in two different theaters and most middle and senior grade Soldiers having multiple combat tours under their belt, I beg to differ. I believe we have potentially the most experienced officer and noncommissioned officer corps we have ever fielded serving right now. We have asked the force to learn on the fly and adapt to two vastly different battlefields, and come to grips with a type of warfare that they were completely ignorant of a decade ago. This Army, at this time, is more adaptable, more lethal, and, importantly, more thought full than it has ever been.
What does all this have to do with leadership? Maybe nothing, and maybe a lot. The cost of insurgent warfare on Soldiers and their families is coming home full force. We have a crisis in the Army right now. We are losing Soldiers to suicide and risky behaviors at an alarming rate. It has rightly been called an epidemic. The Army is imploring leaders at all levels to find ways to break down the barriers to communication and to rebuild the trust and confidence in our Soldiers that their leaders truly care for them. We are all struggling with the myriad of issues that surround almost 10 years of sustained combat and an operational tempo unlike anything we have ever seen. Soldiers are routinely stating that they feel disenfranchised and that their leadership only sees them as a number or a widget, and not a whole person.
[For information on the Army's year long study and response to the suicide and risky behavior issue, please follow the link below.] It as a large file (9MB) and might take a minute to download, but it is important to read and consider:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/HPRRSP/HP-RR-SPReport2010_v00.pdf
On page 31 the report offers the following vignette:
"A Staff Sergeant had a hard childhood. His father was in and out of jail and both parents used illegal drugs. When he joined the Army, he thought he had finally escaped his background. He was promoted through the ranks and was well respected by his leadership. He helped to emancipate his sister and was paying for her college. Following a very violent improvised explosive device (IED) attack, he started having difficulty sleeping and was waking up with nightmares. Shortly after deploying, his parents stole his identity and incurred a large debt in his name. One night, after arguing with his family, he took his life. His action took his leadership by surprise. He was viewed as one of the most resilient Soldiers in his company. "
"He was viewed as one of the most resilient Soldiers in his company...." And yet nobody knew that he had significant personal issues that weighed upon him so heavily that he finally succumbed under his burdens. The Army lost a Soldier. The Nation lost a warrior. The unit lost a leader. Why?
I don't know exactly why this particular leader decided to take his own life. Each suicide is as personal as the person who commits it. But, not uncommonly, it was only after the fact, as the investigation delved more deeply into this person's life and circumstance, did anyone come to understand that there was much more to him than his simple rank and title. That he was a person with a history, a family, with responsibilities and burdens that had nothing to do with the Army or combat. He may have been resilient on the battlefield and at work because his personal life was in such chaos that work was the only place he felt he had any control.
Many of the responses I received this week had to do with the need to maintain some form of barrier between a leader and his/her subordinates. A lot of people said there must be some form of wall put up between the leader and the led in order to maintain good order and discipline. I disagree. These barriers must be torn down if we are to find ways to talk to our Soldiers and communicate with them and share with them, and help them carry their burdens in a healthy way until they can put them down.
Another thought that occurred to me in looking over the responses I got was the vast majority of them came from senior NCO's who have been in the Army during the period of peace and war. They came of age in a time when we weren't at war and their behaviors and norms were formed by that experience. We now have a completely different group of people serving who have been cultured in an Army at war. Their experiences have shown them what is important and what is not. They care little for a title or rank. They require leaders who make sound decisions, can see them as a whole person - not just a subordinate, and honor their service by respecting their contributions to the team and the mission. As I have mentioned many times before, they are also mostly Millennials who have a need to be a valued member of a team. And that value must be of a personal nature. They need to believe that they are individually valued for their particular talents and skills. They cannot and will not be seen as just some interchangeable widget in the Army machine.
I understand tradition and custom and history. I also understand discipline both individual and collective. My Soldiers are no less committed to their responsibilities because I choose to use their first names than they would be if I used their last. In fact, I asked some of them whether or not my form of address enhanced or detracted from their sense of belonging or mission accomplishment. Most said that while overall they didn't feel any more or less sense of mission focus because I use their first name, they did indicate they felt it created an environment where they were more comfortable expressing themselves. If they didn't understand what needed to get done, they weren't too embarrassed to ask. If they had a personal issue they sensed that they could bring it to me and have it listened to. If they needed advice, they felt as if I would give them my best consideration. Whether or not using their first name has anything to do with that feeling I don't know. What is important is that they feel it. That they share a sense of belonging to a team committed to serving Soldiers and that they can bring their concerns and needs to the table and have them addressed.
As the 'backbone' of the Army, the noncommissioned officer corps has a solemn responsibility to accomplish the mission and take care of it's troops. If and when something gets in the way of that, it needs to be considered and, and if necessary, removed or changed. If today's Soldier requires a different style of leadership than previous generations, then it is our responsibility to adapt the way we do business to meet that need. It frightens me that the Army has a 350 page report that is trying to answer the question why so many Soldiers are choosing to kill themselves or engage in behaviors that enhance the chance for injury and death, and so many senior NCO's are running around worried that someone is addressing someone else in a manner that makes them nervous. As one Staff Sergeant replied last week, "Don't we have anything better to do? Like maybe concentrate of preparing our Soldiers for combat?" I couldn't agree more. We also have something better to do by creating environments where our Soldier can come to us with their most intimate issues and problems and have them treated with dignity and respect. That is one way we can stop the epidemic in our ranks. Sometimes, it's not about your rank, your title, or your position. It's about whether or not your people trust you enough to talk to you. That is leadership. That is the essence of the NCO corps. That is what we need to remind ourselves of every day.
I overheard another leader the other day tell a Staff Sergeant that he wasn't one of the smartest Soldiers he'd ever seen. He also called two other folks Dumb and Dumber. In the first case, he told the NCO that "But I don't mean it in a bad way..." Really? What other way is there? And in the second case, I'm sure that Dumb and Dumber aren't their first or last names, and they sure aren't their ranks. I wonder if he thinks he enhanced their sense of belonging and caring about the organization.....just a thought.
My first name is Jeffrey. My last name is Fenlason. Both of those will tell you a hell of a lot more about me than my rank. I have earned that rank and I am proud of it. Not because it is my due, but because it allows me to serve more people in the best manner I know how. Sergeant Fenlason is a by-product of the person that Jeff Fenlason is. I am only due to respect that I have personally earned. If my Soldiers trust me and respect me, it is because they feel that I am living up to the two most important characteristics of a professional noncommissioned officer: Accomplishing the mission, and the welfare of my Soldiers. If I have done those things, then I don't really care what they call me. I will rest easy knowing that I fulfilled my duties. For I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of people, who happen to be Soldiers.
By the way, most people call me Fen. That suits me just fine.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
There are times when I am reminded of the reasons why so many people in my profession frighten and disillusion me. This week was one of those times.
I choose to address my subordinates by their first names. This is somewhat unusual for the enlisted corps of the Army. The normal course of action is to address Soldiers by their rank, their last name, the two combined or a nickname that has been given to them by members of the unit. Essentially, while they are obliged by courtesy and custom to address me by my rank, I am not required to do the same to them. I can say, "Go get me Johnson", or "Come here Sergeant" or "Go find Fen" etc, but when they address me, they are required to say, "Yes, Sergeant" or "No Sergeant" etc. They do not get to call me Jeff, or Fen. Most of them address me as Sergeant Fen.
A few weeks back, I was asked about this by my supervisor who disagrees with my approach and I informed him that I believe my choice to address my Soldiers by their first name was supported by regulation. He left it alone but indicated that he wasn't comfortable with it. This week though, he sent me an email that said he couldn't find a regulation supporting my position, so he asked me to find what I could. I also went looking and couldn't find it either. It appears that in the latest regulations the Army does not specifically address the issue.
So I posted the question on the Army's knowledge sharing website to see if others might know of a regulation that clearly defined what's right or wrong so we could settle the issue. And for 2 days my in-box didn't stop ringing with someones opinion on the matter. Not facts mind you, just their opinion.
My first problem with many of the responses was that most people interpreted my question incorrectly to begin with and assumed I was allowing a subordinate to call me by my first name. I was not. I was asking for the regulation that said whether I could, or could not, address them by their first names.
One of the responses I received was from a Sergeant Major. I will call him Sergeant Major X. I am including it below:
"Chief, or should I say Jeff…
I’m not aware of an Army Regulation that says how a Soldier must be addressed, but, the fact is it shows disrespect to the Soldier to address them by their first name. You say you want to call them by their first name, do you expect them to call you by your first name or the rank you have earned? Soldiers should be addressed by their rank as a military courtesy and show of respect to the rank they have earned. You are not their “buddy” you are their leader. When an occurrence happens that the leader is expected to counsel the Soldier in writing often times the leader who is their Soldier’s buddy won’t do it, then they come to the Sergeant Major and ask if the Sergeant Major will counsel the Soldier; that’s the wrong answer. This doesn’t mean the officers appointed over us can’t be friendly and cordial but it does mean there is a separation of rank for a reason and that should be respected. Address them by their rank sir and expect them to do the same for you any time you are in a professional military setting.."
I responded to the Sergeant Major with the following:
"You have the right to call me Jeff (which is in no way disrespectful because it is my given name), Sergeant, Sergeant Fenlason, or Fen (my nickname). that is your option by position. I display my courtesy to your position as a superior by addressing you by your rank. None of the examples I included above would be disrespectful towards me, nor would they be uncommon, nor would they violate any custom or protocol. My guess is that many senior NCO's routinely address their subordinates only by their last name i.e. "Go get me Jones". All I was asking was why shouldn't/couldn't I use "Go get me Fred" the same way? It also does not imply some form of lack of discipline as others have suggested. That would only be the case if using someones first name created an environment where the senior and subordinate engaged in other forms of behavior that diminished the standard.
One of the reasons that the Special Operations community consciously uses first names is to affirm the idea that as a professional and not just a rank I am counting on your contribution to the team and the mission. It's not the rank that matters, it's the competency and sense of mission accomplishment of the individual team members that determines the level of respect they enjoy."
Sergeant Major X's response troubles me. First, he claims it is disrespectful the Soldier to address them by their name. Second, he raises (as others did) the idea that by calling a Soldier Jeff instead of Fenlason I would somehow be opening the organization up to lesser form of discipline. That somehow the use of a first name versus the last has some affect on whether the Soldier does or doesn't do the right thing. Finally, and most importantly for me, I find his response to be hypocritical for I am positive that he does not address each subordinate by their rank every time, nor does always address them in a professional manner. I'm certain, having been in the profession for 20 years, that along the way, he has used only last names, or someones nickname, or even called a Soldier a disparaging term when angry or upset with their behavior. I know I have.
Another Sergeant Major (I'll call her Sergeant Major Y) concluded her comment by stating:
"I agree with all the comments as you are opening yourself up for issues. Calling your peers (same rank) by first name should not be done in front of junior Soldiers, either. I challenge each NCO to get our NCO Corps back to the professional and disciplined Backbone of the Army!"
Ahhhh. I knew that one was coming. Somehow, someway, addressing a Soldier by their first name was going to be the death knoll of the NCO Corps. We have to get "back" to some time in the past when supposedly we were a more disciplined and professional force than we are now. I wonder exactly when that time was? Must have been before I joined. The Army of my earliest years was almost completely disrespectful to junior Soldiers and you were very likely to have an extremely degrading nickname....if they even let you have a name at all! Most of the time you were just called "Shit-bird" or some other colorful colloquialism. Ahh yes, the more disciplined and professional Army. Please lets get back to that. Now that I'm a senior NCO, it'll be fun to constantly degrade people. Must be, because my leaders sure did seem to find a lot of joy in it when I was coming up.
So now, two Sergeants Major have responded and stated that using someones given name is disrespectful to them, lowers the standard of the profession, reduces discipline and leads to some unknown-but-scary possibility of opening a leader up for 'issues'.
[By the way, the 'opening yourself up for issues' theme came up more than once although not one respondent could state what the 'issue' might be.]
Is the noncommissioned officer corps so broken and weak that it cannot see one step below the surface to recognize that the professionalism and discipline of the organization had better be built on a much more solid foundation than names and titles if it is to survive and flourish in the future? As I alluded to in my response to Sergeant Major X, if this type of leadership approach is so incredibly detrimental, then why do all of our most elite units commonly work this way? And why does the officer corps not have an issue with it? In fact, on most officers evaluation forms, their superior will routinely comment with something like, "John is one of the top 10% of all the Captains I rate", or "Jane is the most competent Major on my staff." Following the logic of the the Sergeants Major, we must have a broken and undisciplined officer corps as well.
After nearly 10 years of sustained combat in two different theaters and most middle and senior grade Soldiers having multiple combat tours under their belt, I beg to differ. I believe we have potentially the most experienced officer and noncommissioned officer corps we have ever fielded serving right now. We have asked the force to learn on the fly and adapt to two vastly different battlefields, and come to grips with a type of warfare that they were completely ignorant of a decade ago. This Army, at this time, is more adaptable, more lethal, and, importantly, more thought full than it has ever been.
What does all this have to do with leadership? Maybe nothing, and maybe a lot. The cost of insurgent warfare on Soldiers and their families is coming home full force. We have a crisis in the Army right now. We are losing Soldiers to suicide and risky behaviors at an alarming rate. It has rightly been called an epidemic. The Army is imploring leaders at all levels to find ways to break down the barriers to communication and to rebuild the trust and confidence in our Soldiers that their leaders truly care for them. We are all struggling with the myriad of issues that surround almost 10 years of sustained combat and an operational tempo unlike anything we have ever seen. Soldiers are routinely stating that they feel disenfranchised and that their leadership only sees them as a number or a widget, and not a whole person.
[For information on the Army's year long study and response to the suicide and risky behavior issue, please follow the link below.] It as a large file (9MB) and might take a minute to download, but it is important to read and consider:
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e1/HPRRSP/HP-RR-SPReport2010_v00.pdf
On page 31 the report offers the following vignette:
"A Staff Sergeant had a hard childhood. His father was in and out of jail and both parents used illegal drugs. When he joined the Army, he thought he had finally escaped his background. He was promoted through the ranks and was well respected by his leadership. He helped to emancipate his sister and was paying for her college. Following a very violent improvised explosive device (IED) attack, he started having difficulty sleeping and was waking up with nightmares. Shortly after deploying, his parents stole his identity and incurred a large debt in his name. One night, after arguing with his family, he took his life. His action took his leadership by surprise. He was viewed as one of the most resilient Soldiers in his company. "
"He was viewed as one of the most resilient Soldiers in his company...." And yet nobody knew that he had significant personal issues that weighed upon him so heavily that he finally succumbed under his burdens. The Army lost a Soldier. The Nation lost a warrior. The unit lost a leader. Why?
I don't know exactly why this particular leader decided to take his own life. Each suicide is as personal as the person who commits it. But, not uncommonly, it was only after the fact, as the investigation delved more deeply into this person's life and circumstance, did anyone come to understand that there was much more to him than his simple rank and title. That he was a person with a history, a family, with responsibilities and burdens that had nothing to do with the Army or combat. He may have been resilient on the battlefield and at work because his personal life was in such chaos that work was the only place he felt he had any control.
Many of the responses I received this week had to do with the need to maintain some form of barrier between a leader and his/her subordinates. A lot of people said there must be some form of wall put up between the leader and the led in order to maintain good order and discipline. I disagree. These barriers must be torn down if we are to find ways to talk to our Soldiers and communicate with them and share with them, and help them carry their burdens in a healthy way until they can put them down.
Another thought that occurred to me in looking over the responses I got was the vast majority of them came from senior NCO's who have been in the Army during the period of peace and war. They came of age in a time when we weren't at war and their behaviors and norms were formed by that experience. We now have a completely different group of people serving who have been cultured in an Army at war. Their experiences have shown them what is important and what is not. They care little for a title or rank. They require leaders who make sound decisions, can see them as a whole person - not just a subordinate, and honor their service by respecting their contributions to the team and the mission. As I have mentioned many times before, they are also mostly Millennials who have a need to be a valued member of a team. And that value must be of a personal nature. They need to believe that they are individually valued for their particular talents and skills. They cannot and will not be seen as just some interchangeable widget in the Army machine.
I understand tradition and custom and history. I also understand discipline both individual and collective. My Soldiers are no less committed to their responsibilities because I choose to use their first names than they would be if I used their last. In fact, I asked some of them whether or not my form of address enhanced or detracted from their sense of belonging or mission accomplishment. Most said that while overall they didn't feel any more or less sense of mission focus because I use their first name, they did indicate they felt it created an environment where they were more comfortable expressing themselves. If they didn't understand what needed to get done, they weren't too embarrassed to ask. If they had a personal issue they sensed that they could bring it to me and have it listened to. If they needed advice, they felt as if I would give them my best consideration. Whether or not using their first name has anything to do with that feeling I don't know. What is important is that they feel it. That they share a sense of belonging to a team committed to serving Soldiers and that they can bring their concerns and needs to the table and have them addressed.
As the 'backbone' of the Army, the noncommissioned officer corps has a solemn responsibility to accomplish the mission and take care of it's troops. If and when something gets in the way of that, it needs to be considered and, and if necessary, removed or changed. If today's Soldier requires a different style of leadership than previous generations, then it is our responsibility to adapt the way we do business to meet that need. It frightens me that the Army has a 350 page report that is trying to answer the question why so many Soldiers are choosing to kill themselves or engage in behaviors that enhance the chance for injury and death, and so many senior NCO's are running around worried that someone is addressing someone else in a manner that makes them nervous. As one Staff Sergeant replied last week, "Don't we have anything better to do? Like maybe concentrate of preparing our Soldiers for combat?" I couldn't agree more. We also have something better to do by creating environments where our Soldier can come to us with their most intimate issues and problems and have them treated with dignity and respect. That is one way we can stop the epidemic in our ranks. Sometimes, it's not about your rank, your title, or your position. It's about whether or not your people trust you enough to talk to you. That is leadership. That is the essence of the NCO corps. That is what we need to remind ourselves of every day.
I overheard another leader the other day tell a Staff Sergeant that he wasn't one of the smartest Soldiers he'd ever seen. He also called two other folks Dumb and Dumber. In the first case, he told the NCO that "But I don't mean it in a bad way..." Really? What other way is there? And in the second case, I'm sure that Dumb and Dumber aren't their first or last names, and they sure aren't their ranks. I wonder if he thinks he enhanced their sense of belonging and caring about the organization.....just a thought.
My first name is Jeffrey. My last name is Fenlason. Both of those will tell you a hell of a lot more about me than my rank. I have earned that rank and I am proud of it. Not because it is my due, but because it allows me to serve more people in the best manner I know how. Sergeant Fenlason is a by-product of the person that Jeff Fenlason is. I am only due to respect that I have personally earned. If my Soldiers trust me and respect me, it is because they feel that I am living up to the two most important characteristics of a professional noncommissioned officer: Accomplishing the mission, and the welfare of my Soldiers. If I have done those things, then I don't really care what they call me. I will rest easy knowing that I fulfilled my duties. For I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of people, who happen to be Soldiers.
By the way, most people call me Fen. That suits me just fine.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#78 Ego and Fear
Ego:
"1. The “I” or self of any person; a person as thinking, feeling, and willing, and distinguishing itself from the selves of others and from objects of its thought.
2. Psychoanalysis. the part of the psychic apparatus that experiences and reacts to the outside world and thus mediates between the primitive drives of the id and the demands of the social and physical environment.
3. Egotism; conceit; self-importance
4. Self-esteem or self-image; feelings"
Dictionary.com
Fear:
" 1. A distressing emotion aroused by impending danger, evil, pain, etc., whether the threat is real or imagined; the feeling or condition of being afraid.
2. A specific instance of or propensity for such a feeling: an abnormal fear of heights.
3. Concern or anxiety; solicitude: a fear for someone's safety.
4. Reverential awe.
5.that which causes a feeling of being afraid; that of which a person is afraid."
Dictionary.com
The words ego and fear popped into my head this afternoon and it struck me that a lot of what happens in the work place, and especially at this time in the Army, seems to be related to those two concepts.
People in leadership positions must posess both of these qualities in order to be effective. They are both healthy and must become part of the personal Orientation of anyone who is responsible for others. I have to believe in myself, and I must also be aware of those things that frighten me or cause me worry and concern. I have to believe that at certain points I am the best person suited to handle the responsibilities assigned to me, and I must also learn to listen to those things that worry me. Both will have an impact on how I Observe the situation I am presented with and the choices I have at my disposal to handle it.
For Army leaders, ego and fear, deserve much more consideration than they currently receive because a leader's ego may allow them to make a decision that they would not normally make, and conversely their fear may drive them to not choose a course of action that might be risky, but successful.
The key it seems, is to keep them in balance. One cannot be lulled into thinking that their past successes are automatic proof of future success, nor can they allow their fear to stop them from acknowledging and taking risk when the situation warrants.
The important realization when looking at ego relative to leadership in the Army is the recognition that the entire military structure is designed, built upon, and rewards those with healthy (maybe even over-healthy) egos who have been placed in positions of authority and handed the power to implement their ideas. As our past successes build upon themselves, we quickly begin to believe that we are the reason for that success. And because the institution routinely rewards, promotes, lauds, and encourages us due to our success, we begin to believe that we have capabilities and judgement that others do not that allow these things to happen. In effect the thought process goes like this: "I have been successful in the past, received praise and promotion due to that success (many times at the expense of others) and have climbed the ladder faster than my peers. What I'm doing must be right, because I keep moving up and others don't." Ego is an automatic by-product of any hierarchical organization because the structure itself validates the decisions and outcomes at every level in a very public manner. The Army does this with awards, decorations, promotions and selections for command at senior levels. If Lieutenant Colonel X is selected to be a battalion commander and Lieutenant Colonel Y is not, and remains a staff officer, then X's past accomplishments are validated and Y's are not. This can often lead to a very serious case of believing your own bullshit. And quite honestly, there isn't much reason for you not to belive your own bullshit, when the system itself is validating you at every step on the hierarchical ladder.
Fear, on the other hand, can be just as disabling as ego is enabling. Fear will stop you from pursuing objectives, or in some cases, even considering different possibilities or outcomes, simply because the possibility of success may not be guaranteed. Fear acts to limit the available solutions to a problem. It also acts as a personal barrier to understanding the situation clearly and objectively because it imposes an emotional response in between the facts presented and the decisions we make. For example, if I fear that personal judgment from my superiors will have a negative effect on me then by definition it limits the possibilities that I can pursue to solve my problem and limits them to only to those that I do not believe will bring me discredit in my bosses' eyes.
"I know what it's like to have failed, baby
With the whole world lookin' on
I know what it's like to have soared
And come crashin' like a drunk on a bar room floor"
'All the Way Home' - Bruce Springsteen
These ideas came to light this week in two different manners. First, on AKO (Army Knowledge On-line) there was a discussion regarding post #77, "A Matter of Interpretation" between two people looking at the background history of Operation Market Garden and it's effect on the Battle of the Bulge. In my post, I alluded to the idea of ego and fear by asking why leaders ignored the signs that the German's were planning on offensive, and why facts supportng the German build-up were ignored by Allied commanders. While both these gentlemen are much more historically astute than I am, my thoughts were more closely centered around the idea of heuristics and ego. I simply made the case that the leaders didn't listen because they believed that the Allied invasion would inevitably lead to success. It had to. Everything said so. They had planned it, executed it, and over-seen it, and the German army was being systematically destroyed by their endeavors. Their self-confidence and firmly held belief that the Germans could not muster an offensive directly led to the Battle of the Bulge. More importantly though, I think it was their individual and collective egos that caused them not to hear or see the indications that an offensive was in fact being mounted. Intergalactic ego collides with tiny facts floating around the battlefield....
The other happened in my small world. A decision has been made to increase the number of personnel my team can train at any one time. That decision has required a lot of other decisions and adjustments with regard to resourcing, and Soldier thru-put. Almost overnight, my little piece of the deployment puzzle went from an afterthought to the flavor of the week. People scrambling for data, others asking questions they never cared about before, others trying to figure out when the whole thing became an issue in the first place (and why they didn't know about it). And the sad part is that no one thought to ask me or my team. We were not asked to attend any of the planning sessions or discussions concerning how we would process 23% more people through the same number of tasks in the same amount of time, with the same number of trainers, while changing the schedule and the classroom, and the range time. In fact, I was expressly informed at one point that my attendance was not required.
[Now, for the sake of argument, if the preceding paragraph sounds like a bit of bruised ego, there is some merit to that and I would only ask that you suspend that for a moment to consider the following:]
From my perspective, a lot of people immediately above me are a little worried now that someone higher than them is going to ask when this issue first came up, and what they did about it. There are others who's ego's are driving the train and are making decisions without all the information.
Ego and fear suddenly seem to be a little more intimately related than they might seem at first blush. As a matter of fact they seem to be sitting right next to each other in the briefing room. You can almost feel the people who have had previous success and have been rewarded for it by increased responsibility and position. They like the way that feels, and it how enhances their sense of self-ability. They have begun to believe that they will get it right every time. That is what their history, their training, and the institution have led them to believe. And now they are faced with the loss of some of that professional faith because, like those who didn't listen to the lady who saw the big German tanks, or Col 'Monk' Dickson, who said the Germans would attack in the Ardennes, they worry that they might have gotten it wrong.
Ego collides with fear.
The purpose of this post isn't to throw stones at anyone. It truly is not. I like the Springsteen quote above because it pretty accurately reflects the middle to latter part of my career. In my ealrier days, I was driven by ego and the belief that I was doing it better than the next guy, that my thought process and decisions were always right. I have also been the guy who came crashing down like a drunk on a barroom floor. I've had my professional value questioned, and my belief system thrown into disarray. I have been on both sides of the fence. And I understand those who believe in their own sense of perpetual rightness because I did the same for many years. And I understand those who no longer trust, and live in fear of being wrong because that was the trap that I could have easily fallen into.
The point of this post was to get you, the reader, to pause for a moment and consider the role ego and fear play in your decision making process. Quite honestly lives depend upon your awareness of these emotions because the decisions you make, carried out by others, often come down to either acting out of ego, or acting out of fear. To truly lead people, especially in combat, you have to be able to suspend both long enough to see the mission clearly and your responsibilities honestly. Believing your own bullshit can get kids killed. So can't being afraid to stand up when necessary. Ego and fear sort of balance each other out, if both can be seen clearly enough to concentrate on the mission - separate from our place in it.
A week ago my boss came to me and informed me of the increase in personnel required. I gathered my team and we sketched some immediate ideas on a white board. At the time, there were more questions than answers. A young Staff Sergeant, stared at the board for awhile, scribbled some stuff down, scratched some stuff out, thought about it over a weekend and developed the new plan. He had a problem to solve and he solved it. He and I worked for 3 days to put it into play, each checking and re-checking the other's work. Without ego or fear, and concentrating only on the mission we were assigned, this plan will be successful. Not because I believe it, and certainly not because my past history guarantees positive results every time, but rather because I have experienced both ego and failure and am learning how to use them to correctly orient myself to my world. E.O. had the answer. My job was to provide his answer to others. No more. No less.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
"1. The “I” or self of any person; a person as thinking, feeling, and willing, and distinguishing itself from the selves of others and from objects of its thought.
2. Psychoanalysis. the part of the psychic apparatus that experiences and reacts to the outside world and thus mediates between the primitive drives of the id and the demands of the social and physical environment.
3. Egotism; conceit; self-importance
4. Self-esteem or self-image; feelings"
Dictionary.com
Fear:
" 1. A distressing emotion aroused by impending danger, evil, pain, etc., whether the threat is real or imagined; the feeling or condition of being afraid.
2. A specific instance of or propensity for such a feeling: an abnormal fear of heights.
3. Concern or anxiety; solicitude: a fear for someone's safety.
4. Reverential awe.
5.that which causes a feeling of being afraid; that of which a person is afraid."
Dictionary.com
The words ego and fear popped into my head this afternoon and it struck me that a lot of what happens in the work place, and especially at this time in the Army, seems to be related to those two concepts.
People in leadership positions must posess both of these qualities in order to be effective. They are both healthy and must become part of the personal Orientation of anyone who is responsible for others. I have to believe in myself, and I must also be aware of those things that frighten me or cause me worry and concern. I have to believe that at certain points I am the best person suited to handle the responsibilities assigned to me, and I must also learn to listen to those things that worry me. Both will have an impact on how I Observe the situation I am presented with and the choices I have at my disposal to handle it.
For Army leaders, ego and fear, deserve much more consideration than they currently receive because a leader's ego may allow them to make a decision that they would not normally make, and conversely their fear may drive them to not choose a course of action that might be risky, but successful.
The key it seems, is to keep them in balance. One cannot be lulled into thinking that their past successes are automatic proof of future success, nor can they allow their fear to stop them from acknowledging and taking risk when the situation warrants.
The important realization when looking at ego relative to leadership in the Army is the recognition that the entire military structure is designed, built upon, and rewards those with healthy (maybe even over-healthy) egos who have been placed in positions of authority and handed the power to implement their ideas. As our past successes build upon themselves, we quickly begin to believe that we are the reason for that success. And because the institution routinely rewards, promotes, lauds, and encourages us due to our success, we begin to believe that we have capabilities and judgement that others do not that allow these things to happen. In effect the thought process goes like this: "I have been successful in the past, received praise and promotion due to that success (many times at the expense of others) and have climbed the ladder faster than my peers. What I'm doing must be right, because I keep moving up and others don't." Ego is an automatic by-product of any hierarchical organization because the structure itself validates the decisions and outcomes at every level in a very public manner. The Army does this with awards, decorations, promotions and selections for command at senior levels. If Lieutenant Colonel X is selected to be a battalion commander and Lieutenant Colonel Y is not, and remains a staff officer, then X's past accomplishments are validated and Y's are not. This can often lead to a very serious case of believing your own bullshit. And quite honestly, there isn't much reason for you not to belive your own bullshit, when the system itself is validating you at every step on the hierarchical ladder.
Fear, on the other hand, can be just as disabling as ego is enabling. Fear will stop you from pursuing objectives, or in some cases, even considering different possibilities or outcomes, simply because the possibility of success may not be guaranteed. Fear acts to limit the available solutions to a problem. It also acts as a personal barrier to understanding the situation clearly and objectively because it imposes an emotional response in between the facts presented and the decisions we make. For example, if I fear that personal judgment from my superiors will have a negative effect on me then by definition it limits the possibilities that I can pursue to solve my problem and limits them to only to those that I do not believe will bring me discredit in my bosses' eyes.
"I know what it's like to have failed, baby
With the whole world lookin' on
I know what it's like to have soared
And come crashin' like a drunk on a bar room floor"
'All the Way Home' - Bruce Springsteen
These ideas came to light this week in two different manners. First, on AKO (Army Knowledge On-line) there was a discussion regarding post #77, "A Matter of Interpretation" between two people looking at the background history of Operation Market Garden and it's effect on the Battle of the Bulge. In my post, I alluded to the idea of ego and fear by asking why leaders ignored the signs that the German's were planning on offensive, and why facts supportng the German build-up were ignored by Allied commanders. While both these gentlemen are much more historically astute than I am, my thoughts were more closely centered around the idea of heuristics and ego. I simply made the case that the leaders didn't listen because they believed that the Allied invasion would inevitably lead to success. It had to. Everything said so. They had planned it, executed it, and over-seen it, and the German army was being systematically destroyed by their endeavors. Their self-confidence and firmly held belief that the Germans could not muster an offensive directly led to the Battle of the Bulge. More importantly though, I think it was their individual and collective egos that caused them not to hear or see the indications that an offensive was in fact being mounted. Intergalactic ego collides with tiny facts floating around the battlefield....
The other happened in my small world. A decision has been made to increase the number of personnel my team can train at any one time. That decision has required a lot of other decisions and adjustments with regard to resourcing, and Soldier thru-put. Almost overnight, my little piece of the deployment puzzle went from an afterthought to the flavor of the week. People scrambling for data, others asking questions they never cared about before, others trying to figure out when the whole thing became an issue in the first place (and why they didn't know about it). And the sad part is that no one thought to ask me or my team. We were not asked to attend any of the planning sessions or discussions concerning how we would process 23% more people through the same number of tasks in the same amount of time, with the same number of trainers, while changing the schedule and the classroom, and the range time. In fact, I was expressly informed at one point that my attendance was not required.
[Now, for the sake of argument, if the preceding paragraph sounds like a bit of bruised ego, there is some merit to that and I would only ask that you suspend that for a moment to consider the following:]
From my perspective, a lot of people immediately above me are a little worried now that someone higher than them is going to ask when this issue first came up, and what they did about it. There are others who's ego's are driving the train and are making decisions without all the information.
Ego and fear suddenly seem to be a little more intimately related than they might seem at first blush. As a matter of fact they seem to be sitting right next to each other in the briefing room. You can almost feel the people who have had previous success and have been rewarded for it by increased responsibility and position. They like the way that feels, and it how enhances their sense of self-ability. They have begun to believe that they will get it right every time. That is what their history, their training, and the institution have led them to believe. And now they are faced with the loss of some of that professional faith because, like those who didn't listen to the lady who saw the big German tanks, or Col 'Monk' Dickson, who said the Germans would attack in the Ardennes, they worry that they might have gotten it wrong.
Ego collides with fear.
The purpose of this post isn't to throw stones at anyone. It truly is not. I like the Springsteen quote above because it pretty accurately reflects the middle to latter part of my career. In my ealrier days, I was driven by ego and the belief that I was doing it better than the next guy, that my thought process and decisions were always right. I have also been the guy who came crashing down like a drunk on a barroom floor. I've had my professional value questioned, and my belief system thrown into disarray. I have been on both sides of the fence. And I understand those who believe in their own sense of perpetual rightness because I did the same for many years. And I understand those who no longer trust, and live in fear of being wrong because that was the trap that I could have easily fallen into.
The point of this post was to get you, the reader, to pause for a moment and consider the role ego and fear play in your decision making process. Quite honestly lives depend upon your awareness of these emotions because the decisions you make, carried out by others, often come down to either acting out of ego, or acting out of fear. To truly lead people, especially in combat, you have to be able to suspend both long enough to see the mission clearly and your responsibilities honestly. Believing your own bullshit can get kids killed. So can't being afraid to stand up when necessary. Ego and fear sort of balance each other out, if both can be seen clearly enough to concentrate on the mission - separate from our place in it.
A week ago my boss came to me and informed me of the increase in personnel required. I gathered my team and we sketched some immediate ideas on a white board. At the time, there were more questions than answers. A young Staff Sergeant, stared at the board for awhile, scribbled some stuff down, scratched some stuff out, thought about it over a weekend and developed the new plan. He had a problem to solve and he solved it. He and I worked for 3 days to put it into play, each checking and re-checking the other's work. Without ego or fear, and concentrating only on the mission we were assigned, this plan will be successful. Not because I believe it, and certainly not because my past history guarantees positive results every time, but rather because I have experienced both ego and failure and am learning how to use them to correctly orient myself to my world. E.O. had the answer. My job was to provide his answer to others. No more. No less.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#77 A Matter of Interpretation
"That night no Allied commander seriously feared a major German attack. Yet in Bastogne, Belgium, about twenty miles west of Chervaux, Middleton, whose VIII Corps comprised the bulk of the Ghost Front, was uneasy. A woman had been sent up that morning from the 28th Division. She told of seeing, just the night before, a mass of German troops behind the Seigfried Line east of Clervaux. And their tanks were twice as large as anything the Americans had. Middleton realized that if an attack did fall, his four divisions, two green, two exhausted - would be hard put to defend themselves. So he sent the woman on up the chain of command to his chief, Lieutenent General Courtney Hodges, the commander of the First Army.
But at the famous Belgian resort of Spa, Hodges was too occupied with the slow progress of his own attack toward the Roer Dams to be concerned. It was true that the week before, his intelligence officer, Colonel, 'Monk' Dickson, had surprised everyone by predicting there would soon be an all-out German offensive and the past few days had made a pest of himself by announcing that the attack might possible come where no one expected it - where it had come in 1870, 1914, and 1940 - in the Ardennes. Then at a briefing just the night before, Dickson's hunch had become a conviction as he pounded a map board and said with certainty, "It's the Ardennes!" Hodges' staff had advised the general not to take Dickson too seriously: Monk was a notorious pessimist; also he was overworked, and three days in Paris would perk him up a bit.
The 12th Army Group, which gave orders to Hodges, had also been displeased with Dickson's prediction. Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's intelligence officer announced in rebuttal: "It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front. Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) quickly joined Dickson's critics, Eisenhower's G2 issuing a report that the Germans were all but finished.
Even the British ridiculed fear of any enemy attack. That very afternoon Montgomery had stated flatly that Germans "cannot stage major offensive operations." In fact, things were so dull he asked Eisenhower if there was any objection to his going off to England next week. Reassured by this chorus of confidence from above, Hodges had kept busy with his own offensive. He went to sleep around midnight bothered only by a head cold."
"Battle : The Story of the Bulge", by John Toland (Chap 1 pages 10-11)
What followed is the 'Battle of the Bulge'. A desperate fight against a confluence of overwhelming force and horrible conditions that made the outcome questionable from the very outset. If not for the incredible tenacity of the Soldiers, some divine providence with the weather, and the sheer determination of the Allied command, the result of the 'Bulge' may have been one that ended in infamy instead of one that history has recalled so heroically.
If you serve, or have ever served, in the 101st Airborne Division, a central portion of the heraldry of that storied Division rests with the results of the understandings, interpretations, and decisions outlined above. The Division's headquarters building is named after Brigadier General Anthony MacAuliffe who, surrounded and outnumbered by the German army at Bastogne, famously replied "Nuts!" when offered the opportunity to surrender his forces to the Germans.
As I read those pages this week, I began to wonder what would have happened if someone had listened to the woman who spoke of masses of huge tanks, or if the various commands had paid heed to the over-tired Colonel Dickson? Could the battle that ensued have been avoided? Would the Allies have massed forces earlier and taken the fight to the Germans before coming so perilously close to defeat? Would all those people we lionize today still be considered heroes if the Germans had been successful? Why doesn't anyone know the name of 'Monk' Dickson? Shouldn't some credit be given to the man who got it right to begin with? And what of those who got it wrong and failed to pay attention to the pieces of information that were available, but that they didn't put together correctly or pay enough attention to? Do they shoulder any responsibility for the Soldiers who died because of the decisions they made?
I have been thinking about this in light of the COP Keating and COP Wanat reports that I wrote about in post # 70, "Hondo's Parting Gift". Beyond scale and scope, these two battles, the 'Bulge' and Wanat, have a lot in common. Undermanned and under resourced units. Thin units trying to cover vast amounts of territory. Commands whose priorities lie elsewhere. Staffs who have different interpretations of the situation. Desperate fights that ultimately require huge amounts of resources to repel the enemy. Heroism at the local level where men fought to hold their ground against overwhelming odds. And death. A lot of death and a lot of people injured. And yet the passage of time has changed our understandings to such a degree that the 'Bulge' is considered an iconic battle which demonstrates the best qualities of the American Soldier, and Wanat required 3 reports to put to rest the issue of culpability.
I wonder if the Internet and mass communication and the litigious mindset that is so prevalent today had existed in 1944 would we still see the 'Battle of the Bulge' the way we currently do? Would it still be considered an historic battle? Would the legends like Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Hodges still be seen the same way? If a parent of a dead Soldier in Bastogne had the power to press his case to the U.S. Senate, what would the outcome be? What if MacAuliffe had been over-run by the Germans and instead of his Soldiers simply becoming German prisoners they had been killed by the thousands? Would our headquarters building still bear his name?
These are important questions because they have immense impacts on how we lead and the consequences of the decisions we make. According to Toland, almost every senior leader in Europe got it wrong. The facts existed to indicate that the Germans were planning some form of large scale attack, but no one listened. No one listened to Col Dickson and to those far below him in the chain of command. Middleton was worried, but decided not to act independently on his concerns. Hodges ignored it because his own plan was faltering. Bradley's staff flatly rebuts Dickson's ideas. Montgomery wants to go on leave. Lives will be lost because of these choices. But because the outcome was ultimately successful, these errors in judgement go unnoticed. Had the outcome resulted in a major German victory, I wonder how we would view them then.
Leaders use their best judgments to make decisions. The higher up the chain of command you are, the more you must rely on the judgment of others to help inform your own. As each of these subordinates provides you facts, there must also be a recognition that they are being presented and informed through the prism of the person presenting them. They are being filtered by that person's knowledge, experience and judgement. And all that filtering can have a pronounced impact on your understanding of the 'ground truth'. This is something we need to pay attention to as we develop leaders at all levels. Not that every single Soldier's understanding of the situation is correct, or even valid, but that we, as leaders, must develop an awareness of the 'filtering' that is occurring as information is being presented to us. Someone is telling us something, but they really don't have a large enough context. Someone else is telling us something to enhance their personal standing in the organization. Someone else is telling us only what they think we want to hear. And someone else is saying something that no one else is even considering. All these views will be supported by facts. But only the leader must take all of them and form their own interpretation and make a decision.
What's critical is that the leader have access to all the disparate voices. They cannot be insulated from the ones that others find distasteful. They cannot be removed because of inarticulateness or coarseness. They cannot be ignored due to lack of stature. We must find ways to ensure that the 'ground truth' of the person pulling guard in a remote location in Afghanistan has the same access to the decision-maker as the staff officer that builds the briefing.
This access to various points of view is often termed transparency, or communication flattening. It makes all facts equal at first because it removes the idea that the hierarchy imposes a value on the information. All the facts from the Soldier on the ground go in one pile. The facts from the company or battalion staff go in another. The facts from the brigade go in another. The facts from the 'lone voice' go in yet another. To start, they are all of equal value. Only then can the leader have the greatest access to the various points of view that exist with his/her organization.
What does it take to remove the 'filtering' system? First, it takes leaders who are viscerally aware that the filters exist in the first place. Only with this awareness can structures be put in place that account for it. Second, it requires humility. The leader must be humble enough to understand that even their interpretation of the facts could be incorrect. Third, it requires a voice of dissent. There must be a mechanism for those in the minority opinion to be heard. Finally, and most importantly, it requires leaders whose single most prized quality for leadership is their judgment. Nothing else they may do, battles they may win, or accolades they may have earned, can outweigh the faith and trust the organization places in their judgment. Every leader development system the Army has should be focused at that singular purpose, increasing and developing the judgment of the leader. And in order to development judgment, we must start with development and understanding of the character of the individual. We must force them back into themselves to study what forms, and informs, their decision-making process. By doing that we can take a brand new Sergeant or Lieutenant, make them aware of their filters, then make them understand that the decisions they make are based in part upon information that is also being filtered. Lives depend on this awareness.
The 'Battle of the Bulge' begins with a series of major misjudgments. It is only through the incredible character of thousands of Soldiers that the battle turned out the way it did. I only hope the 'Battle of Wanat' is remembered the same way.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
But at the famous Belgian resort of Spa, Hodges was too occupied with the slow progress of his own attack toward the Roer Dams to be concerned. It was true that the week before, his intelligence officer, Colonel, 'Monk' Dickson, had surprised everyone by predicting there would soon be an all-out German offensive and the past few days had made a pest of himself by announcing that the attack might possible come where no one expected it - where it had come in 1870, 1914, and 1940 - in the Ardennes. Then at a briefing just the night before, Dickson's hunch had become a conviction as he pounded a map board and said with certainty, "It's the Ardennes!" Hodges' staff had advised the general not to take Dickson too seriously: Monk was a notorious pessimist; also he was overworked, and three days in Paris would perk him up a bit.
The 12th Army Group, which gave orders to Hodges, had also been displeased with Dickson's prediction. Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's intelligence officer announced in rebuttal: "It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front. Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) quickly joined Dickson's critics, Eisenhower's G2 issuing a report that the Germans were all but finished.
Even the British ridiculed fear of any enemy attack. That very afternoon Montgomery had stated flatly that Germans "cannot stage major offensive operations." In fact, things were so dull he asked Eisenhower if there was any objection to his going off to England next week. Reassured by this chorus of confidence from above, Hodges had kept busy with his own offensive. He went to sleep around midnight bothered only by a head cold."
"Battle : The Story of the Bulge", by John Toland (Chap 1 pages 10-11)
What followed is the 'Battle of the Bulge'. A desperate fight against a confluence of overwhelming force and horrible conditions that made the outcome questionable from the very outset. If not for the incredible tenacity of the Soldiers, some divine providence with the weather, and the sheer determination of the Allied command, the result of the 'Bulge' may have been one that ended in infamy instead of one that history has recalled so heroically.
If you serve, or have ever served, in the 101st Airborne Division, a central portion of the heraldry of that storied Division rests with the results of the understandings, interpretations, and decisions outlined above. The Division's headquarters building is named after Brigadier General Anthony MacAuliffe who, surrounded and outnumbered by the German army at Bastogne, famously replied "Nuts!" when offered the opportunity to surrender his forces to the Germans.
As I read those pages this week, I began to wonder what would have happened if someone had listened to the woman who spoke of masses of huge tanks, or if the various commands had paid heed to the over-tired Colonel Dickson? Could the battle that ensued have been avoided? Would the Allies have massed forces earlier and taken the fight to the Germans before coming so perilously close to defeat? Would all those people we lionize today still be considered heroes if the Germans had been successful? Why doesn't anyone know the name of 'Monk' Dickson? Shouldn't some credit be given to the man who got it right to begin with? And what of those who got it wrong and failed to pay attention to the pieces of information that were available, but that they didn't put together correctly or pay enough attention to? Do they shoulder any responsibility for the Soldiers who died because of the decisions they made?
I have been thinking about this in light of the COP Keating and COP Wanat reports that I wrote about in post # 70, "Hondo's Parting Gift". Beyond scale and scope, these two battles, the 'Bulge' and Wanat, have a lot in common. Undermanned and under resourced units. Thin units trying to cover vast amounts of territory. Commands whose priorities lie elsewhere. Staffs who have different interpretations of the situation. Desperate fights that ultimately require huge amounts of resources to repel the enemy. Heroism at the local level where men fought to hold their ground against overwhelming odds. And death. A lot of death and a lot of people injured. And yet the passage of time has changed our understandings to such a degree that the 'Bulge' is considered an iconic battle which demonstrates the best qualities of the American Soldier, and Wanat required 3 reports to put to rest the issue of culpability.
I wonder if the Internet and mass communication and the litigious mindset that is so prevalent today had existed in 1944 would we still see the 'Battle of the Bulge' the way we currently do? Would it still be considered an historic battle? Would the legends like Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Hodges still be seen the same way? If a parent of a dead Soldier in Bastogne had the power to press his case to the U.S. Senate, what would the outcome be? What if MacAuliffe had been over-run by the Germans and instead of his Soldiers simply becoming German prisoners they had been killed by the thousands? Would our headquarters building still bear his name?
These are important questions because they have immense impacts on how we lead and the consequences of the decisions we make. According to Toland, almost every senior leader in Europe got it wrong. The facts existed to indicate that the Germans were planning some form of large scale attack, but no one listened. No one listened to Col Dickson and to those far below him in the chain of command. Middleton was worried, but decided not to act independently on his concerns. Hodges ignored it because his own plan was faltering. Bradley's staff flatly rebuts Dickson's ideas. Montgomery wants to go on leave. Lives will be lost because of these choices. But because the outcome was ultimately successful, these errors in judgement go unnoticed. Had the outcome resulted in a major German victory, I wonder how we would view them then.
Leaders use their best judgments to make decisions. The higher up the chain of command you are, the more you must rely on the judgment of others to help inform your own. As each of these subordinates provides you facts, there must also be a recognition that they are being presented and informed through the prism of the person presenting them. They are being filtered by that person's knowledge, experience and judgement. And all that filtering can have a pronounced impact on your understanding of the 'ground truth'. This is something we need to pay attention to as we develop leaders at all levels. Not that every single Soldier's understanding of the situation is correct, or even valid, but that we, as leaders, must develop an awareness of the 'filtering' that is occurring as information is being presented to us. Someone is telling us something, but they really don't have a large enough context. Someone else is telling us something to enhance their personal standing in the organization. Someone else is telling us only what they think we want to hear. And someone else is saying something that no one else is even considering. All these views will be supported by facts. But only the leader must take all of them and form their own interpretation and make a decision.
What's critical is that the leader have access to all the disparate voices. They cannot be insulated from the ones that others find distasteful. They cannot be removed because of inarticulateness or coarseness. They cannot be ignored due to lack of stature. We must find ways to ensure that the 'ground truth' of the person pulling guard in a remote location in Afghanistan has the same access to the decision-maker as the staff officer that builds the briefing.
This access to various points of view is often termed transparency, or communication flattening. It makes all facts equal at first because it removes the idea that the hierarchy imposes a value on the information. All the facts from the Soldier on the ground go in one pile. The facts from the company or battalion staff go in another. The facts from the brigade go in another. The facts from the 'lone voice' go in yet another. To start, they are all of equal value. Only then can the leader have the greatest access to the various points of view that exist with his/her organization.
What does it take to remove the 'filtering' system? First, it takes leaders who are viscerally aware that the filters exist in the first place. Only with this awareness can structures be put in place that account for it. Second, it requires humility. The leader must be humble enough to understand that even their interpretation of the facts could be incorrect. Third, it requires a voice of dissent. There must be a mechanism for those in the minority opinion to be heard. Finally, and most importantly, it requires leaders whose single most prized quality for leadership is their judgment. Nothing else they may do, battles they may win, or accolades they may have earned, can outweigh the faith and trust the organization places in their judgment. Every leader development system the Army has should be focused at that singular purpose, increasing and developing the judgment of the leader. And in order to development judgment, we must start with development and understanding of the character of the individual. We must force them back into themselves to study what forms, and informs, their decision-making process. By doing that we can take a brand new Sergeant or Lieutenant, make them aware of their filters, then make them understand that the decisions they make are based in part upon information that is also being filtered. Lives depend on this awareness.
The 'Battle of the Bulge' begins with a series of major misjudgments. It is only through the incredible character of thousands of Soldiers that the battle turned out the way it did. I only hope the 'Battle of Wanat' is remembered the same way.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#76 Enhacing Others
One of my readers sent me the following article from the Harvard Business Review this week and since it mirrors many of my other thoughts, I thought I would share it here:
http://hbr.org/2010/05/managing-yourself-bringing-out-the-best-in-your-people/ar/1
In many ways, it seems to me that the Army, and many corporations, are holding onto an outdated definition and model for leadership. I think that most people still envision one person, at the top of the organization, who, by force of personality and will is the main driver of success and mission accomplishment. This sort of directive style is still extremely prevalent in the Army and is very easy to spot. The leader will have people streaming on and out of his/her office all day, people will obsess over the slightest approval or disapproval from the boss, no decision will be made without his/her approval etc. This larger-than-life leader becomes the entire 'face' of the organization. The living embodiment of the institution and the mission. This also seems to fit a generalized American appreciation for heroes. The natural born leader...the quarterback who drives the team down field for the winning touchdown. For example, there is a lot of talk right now that the fight in Afghanistan is now General Petraeus' war. As if he alone will be able to affect it's outcome by sheer force of will. Iraq has been called President Bush's war and Afghanistan has been labeled President Obama's war. There is the continued idea that the one individual - a Patton, or Eisenhower, or Westmoreland, or Schwarzkopf, or Franks is the one person capable for providing the purpose, direction and motivation of the entire organization.
It may be time for another option. A more participative leadership model that has been around since I attended my first leadership school in 1994. I remember there being three types of leaders described: Directive, Delagative and Participatory. My recollection is that Directive said, "I make all the decisions". Delagative said, "I let my subordinates make all the decisions". Participative mixed the two. Obviously, even in the way they were labeled in the manual, the Army put a premium on directive leadership. Although it gave credence to the other two models on paper, in real life, it rewarded and prized the directive leader who made all the right calls. That model still exists today and is only now beginning to be challenged and questioned as to it's merits in the current operational environment.
The attachment in Post #75, "Power to the Edge" also dealt with this issue at the unit or corporate level by comparing the industrial age, hierarchical organizational structure and the information age, network-centric model. The idea that any organization is a straight line from top to bottom or bottom to top is rapidly being replaced by a model of circles and affiliations that move through, and around each other, often forming new sub-units and relationships that come together to serve a purpose and then break apart again later on when their purposes diverge. This concept has also been termed 'Team of Teams'. This network-centric model has also been put to very successful use by our adversaries as they bind themselves together in limited partnerships to accomplish a common goal, but then separate again when their aims are no longer consistent. At the personal level however, we still don't seem to understand how to make this network-centric model work. Because our adversaries do this well, they continue to re-orient and move against us by morphing, adapting, and adjusting faster than we can. In effect, they are more agile. And that agility is derived from their ability to form circles, groups, and networks at the user level in order to achieve a larger goal or purpose. It is no longer one person at the top who sets the tone, it is the empowerment of thousands of people at the bottom working in tandem who drives success.
'Power to the Edge' states:
"Power to the edge is about changing the way individuals, organizations,and systems relate to one another and work. Power to the edge involves the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organization (where the organization interacts with its
operating environment to have an impact or effect on that environment) or, in the case of systems, edge devices. Empowerment involves expanding access to information and the elimination of unnecessary constraints. For example, empowerment involves providing access to available information and expertise and the elimination of procedural constraints previously needed to deconflict elements of the force in the absence of quality information."
How are these 2 things related? I think if you look at the hierarchical model of leadership outlined in the following paragraph from the Harvard Business Review article you can easily see many of the archtypical Army leaders today. Simply change the organization from a business model to a brigade combat team model and many will find themselves saying, "Ha! I know that type of organization or boss. I work for that person":
"Some leaders drain all the intelligence and capability out of their teams. Because they need to be the smartest, most capable person in the room, these managers (leaders) often shut down the smarts of others, ultimately stifling the flow of ideas. You know these people, because you’ve worked for and with them.
Consider the senior vice president (battalion commander) of marketing (XYZ unit) who, week after week, suggests new targets and campaigns for your team—forcing you to scurry to keep up with her thinking rather than think for yourself and contribute your own ideas. Or, the vice president (Operations Officer) of product development who, despite having more than 4,000 top-notch software engineers on staff, admits that he listens to only a couple of people at development meetings, claiming “no one else really has anything much to offer.” These leaders—we call them “diminishers”—underutilize people and leave creativity and talent on the table."
What the HBR article and the 'Power to the Edge' document point out, is that the requirements of network-centric organizations (and warfare) require a different type of leader development model. A model that more closely aligns itself with the Delagative and Participative styles outlined above. The HBR article goes on to say:
"We found several critical differences in mind-set between the two types of leaders. The diminisher’s view of intelligence is based on elitism, scarcity, and stasis: That is, you won’t find high levels of brainpower everywhere, in everyone, and if your employees don’t get it now, they never will. The multiplier’s view, meanwhile, is much less cut-and-dried. This type of manager believes smarts are ever evolving and can be cultivated. The critical question for these leaders is not “Is this person smart?” but rather “In what ways is this person smart?” The job, as the multiplier sees it, is to bring the right people together in an environment that unleashes their best thinking—and then stay out of the way.Getting the most from your team is important all the time; but when the economy is weak, it’s even more critical. You can’t solve talent problems by throwing money at them, swapping in “better” talent at higher salaries. No doubt your employees are stretched tight, but many of your top performers would probably admit to feeling underutilized. Their workloads may be at capacity, but they’re sitting on a stockpile of untapped—or, even worse, thwarted—ideas, skills, and interests. So while you may think you can’t ask for more from your people in these tumultuous times, it turns out you can. But only if you are willing to shift the responsibility for thinking from yourself to your employees. Our research suggests you can get much more from your team (even twice as much), without adding resources or overhead, if you lead like a multiplier—something you can achieve no matter where you are on the spectrum of leadership styles."
In my opinion, this is exactly the situation we face in many of our formations today. We still have too many 'diminishers and not enough 'multipliers'. When I talk to young officers they often speak of feeling 'undervalued' or 'disrespected' by the organization and not allowed to be a fully contributing member. In a hierarchical model this makes sense because the 'senior' people simply do not believe that the 'junior' people have the knowledge or experience to be full contributing members. However, it seems to me that after 9 years of war, and with the revolution in technology and information access, we now posses the most knowledgeable 'bottom' we have had in 50 years, since Vietnam.
This recognition also seems to meet the Millennial generation head on. In another HBR article entitled, "Mentoring Millennials" the authors provide the following as to the things that matter most to this generation of young people:
"The Millennials, we saw, did want a constant stream of feedback and were in a hurry for success, but their expectations were not as outsized as many assume. That’s good news for organizations wondering just who will mentor this rising generation. Baby Boomers are retiring, and Gen X may not be large enough to shoulder the responsibility alone. In the U.S., for instance, the 88 million Millennials vastly outnumber Gen Xers, who are just 50 million strong. Millennials view work as a key part of life, not a separate activity that needs to be “balanced” by it. For that reason, they place a strong emphasis on finding work that’s personally fulfilling. They want work to afford them the opportunity to make new friends, learn new skills, and connect to a larger purpose. That sense of purpose is a key factor in their job satisfaction; according to our research, they’re the most socially conscious generation since the 1960s."
You can find the link here:
http://hbr.org/2010/05/mentoring-millennials/ar/1
Here's how I believe the model should work. First, the Army needs to re-examine it's commitment to the opening sentence in FM 1, paragraph 1-1:
"First and foremost, the Army is Soldiers. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is Soldiers who use them to accomplish their mission. Soldiers committed to selfless service to the Nation are the centerpiece of Army organizations. Everything the Army does for the Nation is done by Soldiers supported by Army civilians and family members. Only with quality Soldiers answering the noble call to serve freedom can the Army ensure the victories required on battlefields of today and the future."
That paragraph alone recognizes that for the organization of the Army to be successful, it must place it's primary value on it's people. The ideas of commitment, and selfless service (which the Millennial already has) must be felt at the local level. By providing a sense of inclusion, accepting that leaders must find ways to enhance the existing capabilities of subordinates, and creating circles of inclusion and empowerment, we will fulfill the true nature of paragraph 1-1 in the eyes of those thousands at the bottom who will accomplish the institutional mission.
As usual, free-flowing thoughts seem to work better for me, so here is my latest attempt:
A young Millennial leader has a need for inclusion, value, feedback and service....they demand to be taken seriously as a member of the team....the Army must remain a values based organization that serves the Nation....the pace of technology has changed the rate and situational awareness ability of all levels of the organization simultaneously....the hierarchical nature of the Army is changing to a more circular or 'Team of Teams' model....leader development programs at all levels must adapt themselves to this new reality....our adversaries already use this circular model to get inside and remain inside our OODA loop....they are not defeating the Army, they are defeating the Army structure....the cost of not accepting a more participatory leader model will be the loss of the knowledgeable bottom....an unwillingness to increase responsibility and contribution for those at the bottom will have a detrimental impact of future operations.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome
http://hbr.org/2010/05/managing-yourself-bringing-out-the-best-in-your-people/ar/1
In many ways, it seems to me that the Army, and many corporations, are holding onto an outdated definition and model for leadership. I think that most people still envision one person, at the top of the organization, who, by force of personality and will is the main driver of success and mission accomplishment. This sort of directive style is still extremely prevalent in the Army and is very easy to spot. The leader will have people streaming on and out of his/her office all day, people will obsess over the slightest approval or disapproval from the boss, no decision will be made without his/her approval etc. This larger-than-life leader becomes the entire 'face' of the organization. The living embodiment of the institution and the mission. This also seems to fit a generalized American appreciation for heroes. The natural born leader...the quarterback who drives the team down field for the winning touchdown. For example, there is a lot of talk right now that the fight in Afghanistan is now General Petraeus' war. As if he alone will be able to affect it's outcome by sheer force of will. Iraq has been called President Bush's war and Afghanistan has been labeled President Obama's war. There is the continued idea that the one individual - a Patton, or Eisenhower, or Westmoreland, or Schwarzkopf, or Franks is the one person capable for providing the purpose, direction and motivation of the entire organization.
It may be time for another option. A more participative leadership model that has been around since I attended my first leadership school in 1994. I remember there being three types of leaders described: Directive, Delagative and Participatory. My recollection is that Directive said, "I make all the decisions". Delagative said, "I let my subordinates make all the decisions". Participative mixed the two. Obviously, even in the way they were labeled in the manual, the Army put a premium on directive leadership. Although it gave credence to the other two models on paper, in real life, it rewarded and prized the directive leader who made all the right calls. That model still exists today and is only now beginning to be challenged and questioned as to it's merits in the current operational environment.
The attachment in Post #75, "Power to the Edge" also dealt with this issue at the unit or corporate level by comparing the industrial age, hierarchical organizational structure and the information age, network-centric model. The idea that any organization is a straight line from top to bottom or bottom to top is rapidly being replaced by a model of circles and affiliations that move through, and around each other, often forming new sub-units and relationships that come together to serve a purpose and then break apart again later on when their purposes diverge. This concept has also been termed 'Team of Teams'. This network-centric model has also been put to very successful use by our adversaries as they bind themselves together in limited partnerships to accomplish a common goal, but then separate again when their aims are no longer consistent. At the personal level however, we still don't seem to understand how to make this network-centric model work. Because our adversaries do this well, they continue to re-orient and move against us by morphing, adapting, and adjusting faster than we can. In effect, they are more agile. And that agility is derived from their ability to form circles, groups, and networks at the user level in order to achieve a larger goal or purpose. It is no longer one person at the top who sets the tone, it is the empowerment of thousands of people at the bottom working in tandem who drives success.
'Power to the Edge' states:
"Power to the edge is about changing the way individuals, organizations,and systems relate to one another and work. Power to the edge involves the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organization (where the organization interacts with its
operating environment to have an impact or effect on that environment) or, in the case of systems, edge devices. Empowerment involves expanding access to information and the elimination of unnecessary constraints. For example, empowerment involves providing access to available information and expertise and the elimination of procedural constraints previously needed to deconflict elements of the force in the absence of quality information."
How are these 2 things related? I think if you look at the hierarchical model of leadership outlined in the following paragraph from the Harvard Business Review article you can easily see many of the archtypical Army leaders today. Simply change the organization from a business model to a brigade combat team model and many will find themselves saying, "Ha! I know that type of organization or boss. I work for that person":
"Some leaders drain all the intelligence and capability out of their teams. Because they need to be the smartest, most capable person in the room, these managers (leaders) often shut down the smarts of others, ultimately stifling the flow of ideas. You know these people, because you’ve worked for and with them.
Consider the senior vice president (battalion commander) of marketing (XYZ unit) who, week after week, suggests new targets and campaigns for your team—forcing you to scurry to keep up with her thinking rather than think for yourself and contribute your own ideas. Or, the vice president (Operations Officer) of product development who, despite having more than 4,000 top-notch software engineers on staff, admits that he listens to only a couple of people at development meetings, claiming “no one else really has anything much to offer.” These leaders—we call them “diminishers”—underutilize people and leave creativity and talent on the table."
What the HBR article and the 'Power to the Edge' document point out, is that the requirements of network-centric organizations (and warfare) require a different type of leader development model. A model that more closely aligns itself with the Delagative and Participative styles outlined above. The HBR article goes on to say:
"We found several critical differences in mind-set between the two types of leaders. The diminisher’s view of intelligence is based on elitism, scarcity, and stasis: That is, you won’t find high levels of brainpower everywhere, in everyone, and if your employees don’t get it now, they never will. The multiplier’s view, meanwhile, is much less cut-and-dried. This type of manager believes smarts are ever evolving and can be cultivated. The critical question for these leaders is not “Is this person smart?” but rather “In what ways is this person smart?” The job, as the multiplier sees it, is to bring the right people together in an environment that unleashes their best thinking—and then stay out of the way.Getting the most from your team is important all the time; but when the economy is weak, it’s even more critical. You can’t solve talent problems by throwing money at them, swapping in “better” talent at higher salaries. No doubt your employees are stretched tight, but many of your top performers would probably admit to feeling underutilized. Their workloads may be at capacity, but they’re sitting on a stockpile of untapped—or, even worse, thwarted—ideas, skills, and interests. So while you may think you can’t ask for more from your people in these tumultuous times, it turns out you can. But only if you are willing to shift the responsibility for thinking from yourself to your employees. Our research suggests you can get much more from your team (even twice as much), without adding resources or overhead, if you lead like a multiplier—something you can achieve no matter where you are on the spectrum of leadership styles."
In my opinion, this is exactly the situation we face in many of our formations today. We still have too many 'diminishers and not enough 'multipliers'. When I talk to young officers they often speak of feeling 'undervalued' or 'disrespected' by the organization and not allowed to be a fully contributing member. In a hierarchical model this makes sense because the 'senior' people simply do not believe that the 'junior' people have the knowledge or experience to be full contributing members. However, it seems to me that after 9 years of war, and with the revolution in technology and information access, we now posses the most knowledgeable 'bottom' we have had in 50 years, since Vietnam.
This recognition also seems to meet the Millennial generation head on. In another HBR article entitled, "Mentoring Millennials" the authors provide the following as to the things that matter most to this generation of young people:
"The Millennials, we saw, did want a constant stream of feedback and were in a hurry for success, but their expectations were not as outsized as many assume. That’s good news for organizations wondering just who will mentor this rising generation. Baby Boomers are retiring, and Gen X may not be large enough to shoulder the responsibility alone. In the U.S., for instance, the 88 million Millennials vastly outnumber Gen Xers, who are just 50 million strong. Millennials view work as a key part of life, not a separate activity that needs to be “balanced” by it. For that reason, they place a strong emphasis on finding work that’s personally fulfilling. They want work to afford them the opportunity to make new friends, learn new skills, and connect to a larger purpose. That sense of purpose is a key factor in their job satisfaction; according to our research, they’re the most socially conscious generation since the 1960s."
You can find the link here:
http://hbr.org/2010/05/mentoring-millennials/ar/1
Here's how I believe the model should work. First, the Army needs to re-examine it's commitment to the opening sentence in FM 1, paragraph 1-1:
"First and foremost, the Army is Soldiers. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is Soldiers who use them to accomplish their mission. Soldiers committed to selfless service to the Nation are the centerpiece of Army organizations. Everything the Army does for the Nation is done by Soldiers supported by Army civilians and family members. Only with quality Soldiers answering the noble call to serve freedom can the Army ensure the victories required on battlefields of today and the future."
That paragraph alone recognizes that for the organization of the Army to be successful, it must place it's primary value on it's people. The ideas of commitment, and selfless service (which the Millennial already has) must be felt at the local level. By providing a sense of inclusion, accepting that leaders must find ways to enhance the existing capabilities of subordinates, and creating circles of inclusion and empowerment, we will fulfill the true nature of paragraph 1-1 in the eyes of those thousands at the bottom who will accomplish the institutional mission.
As usual, free-flowing thoughts seem to work better for me, so here is my latest attempt:
A young Millennial leader has a need for inclusion, value, feedback and service....they demand to be taken seriously as a member of the team....the Army must remain a values based organization that serves the Nation....the pace of technology has changed the rate and situational awareness ability of all levels of the organization simultaneously....the hierarchical nature of the Army is changing to a more circular or 'Team of Teams' model....leader development programs at all levels must adapt themselves to this new reality....our adversaries already use this circular model to get inside and remain inside our OODA loop....they are not defeating the Army, they are defeating the Army structure....the cost of not accepting a more participatory leader model will be the loss of the knowledgeable bottom....an unwillingness to increase responsibility and contribution for those at the bottom will have a detrimental impact of future operations.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome
#75 The Eight Folks in Your Office
Last night I went to Wikipedia to see what the site had on COL John Boyd, the military theorist credited with the development of the OODA loop. For those interested in Boyd, the OODA Loop and his contribution to America, you can find the link here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)
While there I came across a link to the Command and Control Research Program, a Department of Defense sponsored think-tank which describes itself like this:
"The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII) focuses upon (1) improving both the state of the art and the state of the practice of command and control and (2) enhancing DoD's understanding of the national security implications of the Information Age. It provides "Out of the Box" thinking and explores ways to help DoD take full advantage of Information Age opportunities. The CCRP bridges the operational and technical communities and enhances the body of knowledge and research infrastructure needed for future progress."
The link to CCRP is below:
http://www.dodccrp.org/
In that search, I also came across a paper written by Dr. John H. Clippinger entitled "Leadership". Regrettably, I cannot find the exact link again to embed it into this post. Dr. Clippinger's paper however, begins to look at the structural differences between Industrial Age organizations and Network Centric organization with regard to the types of people who comprise them, specifically focusing on the military. The introduction to the paper below makes the case for why we have the military hierarchical structure that we are all familiar with, as well as look at the requirements necessary for leadership in the network-centric era:
"It is very true that I have said that I considered Napoleon’s presence in the field
equal to forty thousand men in the balance. —Duke of Wellington
One bad general does better than two good ones. —Napoleon
Introduction
During the early nineteenth century, Wellington’s and Napoleon’s observations made
sense. With the onset of battle, communications became muddled, artillery was immobilized, and a commander’s ability to control his forces was limited. Consequently,the leadership of a single general could prove decisive in battle by maintaining clarity of command and control.
We are now at a totally different stage of warfare. This not to say that the fog of war has completely lifted, but visibility and synchronized actions, and the speed, precision, and lethality of response is beyond comparison to anything that has preceded it. The battlefield success of the doctrine and technology of Network Centric Warfare was not based upon a single brilliant plan, or a single individual or group, but rather was a property of the network, both technologically and organizationally. As Operation Iraqi Freedom so vividly illustrated,2 battle plans can now be changed very rapidly, affecting all aspects of operations—strategy, tactics, logistics and PSYOPs, operations, kinetics, and all types of forces. The competencies that make NCW a success are network properties; they are no longer solely the province of charismatic leaders or chance, but the result of diverse competencies and a new understanding of the role and growth of network leadership, and how it is learned and rewarded."
Further on in the article, Dr. Clippinger outlines the 8 types of people who exist in a network centered organization and the critical roles they perform. Since most of my posts try to remain 'people' focused, this section inevitably caught my eye. The 8 types and a shortened description of each is listed below.
1. The Exemplar- "These are the role models that others imitate. Sometimes their role can be simply symbolic, even ceremonial, but they are nonetheless important in setting the tone and culture of the organization. Successful and charismatic founders of new organizations, from Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Sam Walton to Osama Bin Laden and Aum Shinrikyo, all embody values and personalities that become the values of their organization. These leaders also exemplify the assessment criteria and set the standards for becoming a member of a network. In the military, each Service has its own types of exemplars: pilots and Seals for the Navy; Green Berets, and Rangers for the Army; and fighter pilots for the Air Force. These exemplars embody what is considered the most difficult and admired professional qualities that set that Service apart."
2. The Gatekeeper - "For every network there are membership rules—criteria for being included, retained, elevated, and excluded. The gatekeeper decides who is in and who is out...Like the doorman to exclusive clubs, the gatekeeper role is a combination of truth-teller, applying the standard for admittance, and enforcer, denying admittance to those parties that fail the test."
3. The Visionary - "Visionaries play a vital and sometimes contentious role within the military. They are often the first to see weaknesses in prevalent military doctrine, to espouse new technologies and doctrines, and therefore, to challenge current leadership and entrenched interests."
4. The Truth Teller - "In every network organization, someone has to keep the network honest....Like the accounting function in a corporation or the judicial function in the legal system, truth-tellers can lose their independence, and hence effectiveness. Since these are often the first roles to go in times of stress, successful leadership is exemplified here by independence, transparency, accuracy, and candor in the face of enormous pressure....The challenges are especially acute and consequential within military organizations. If credibility breaks down, trust soon becomes the next casualty, and then the overall effectiveness of the chain of command....The truth telling goal is to provide authenticated and accurate reporting of the outcomes of missions. It can take enormous courage to resist the inevitable pressures of peers and superiors to report what they want to be known, rather then the truth of the matter. Being a truth-teller can be highly unpopular and a long road to advancement."
5. The Fixer - " This is an individual who knows how to get things done and measures
him or herself not just by how many people they might know, but rather how they can get things done that others cannot. Such individuals are results oriented."
6. The Connector - "These network leaders participate in multiple social networks,
connecting not only with a large number of members, but a highly diverse number of members as well. They are known for having numerous friends, connections, and contacts—for being consummate networkers. Like the visionary leaders, they can introduce variety and options into a network through the diversity of people with whom they interact. They are critical for identifying and accessing new resources and helping to get a message out."
7. The Enforcer - "In smaller networks, this role is often combined with that of the
gatekeeper and even the truth-teller. However, in larger networks it is an independent role. Enforcement can mean physical coercion, but more often entails psychological or peer pressure. Like the truth-teller function, independence and transparency are critical for overall network effectiveness. Clearly, force and military means are the enforcement methods of last resort, but are necessary in order to buttress other forms of enforcement, which can vary from guilt and shame to legal redress. Most networks have their own forms of redress and enforcement that entail exclusion."
8. The Facilitator - "Within the military, this role is filled primarily as a staff function to a commander, and therefore may not appear to have the caché of the connector or visionary leadership roles. However, in networked organizational structures where decision making is be more distributed and less hierarchical, this leadership role is vital to coordinating and enabling other actors and decision makers."
I think one reason that this document caught my eye, was a snippet of the video I posted last week from General Dempsey. Somewhere in that video, I heard him mention "Enabling the edge" or words to that effect, and it struck me, because I think that phrase generates from the title of another CCRP product entitled, "Power to the Edge" which can be found here:
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Power.pdf
All of the above forms the basis for the following: What types of people are required to decentralize command and control? What types of people does it take to make the organization adaptable and responsive? What skills, attributes, and abilities do we need to inculcate in young and developing leaders? What types of awareness's do leaders have to posses in order to make the organization itself function as fluidly and accurately as possible? Many of these questions are being asked at the highest levels of the Army as indicated by the interview with General Dempsey in last week's post. And maybe more importantly, do the answers to these questions require wholesale changes to our current leadership models, or do they require more subtle azimuth adjustments in our organizational priorities? I don't know the answers to these questions, but I do believe that regardless of industry there must be the requirement for someone to continually be searching for them.
Who am I?
Using the labels provided by Dr. Clippinger above, I started to think about which of those labels suited my understanding of my leadership style the best. Quite honestly however, I think the more important question will be is my understanding of me the same as other people's understanding of me, and what is the impact of that on the overall effectiveness of the organization and the mission? Secondly, I think that because we are in the midst of an organizational shift throughout all of society from an industrial age, hierarchical organization to an information age, decentralized one, each of us may find that we serve multiple roles at the same time as we shift from one age to the other. For example, this blog serves as my understanding of the roles of "Visionary" and "Truth-Teller" as described above. However, because I am also a noncommissioned officer, part of a organizational structure that is hierarchical and historic, I also fulfill the role of "Gate Keeper". Due to past achievements and titles and awards, I could also be termed an "Exemplar" My point is that most of us will serve more than one role for awhile as the two organizational models move against each other.
At the smallest unit level though, I think that these descriptions are excellent ways for each of us to look at ourselves, our role in the organization, and those above, below and parallel to us. Ultimately, they help refine our personal Orientation.
Consider this: Go back to each of the labels above and write down the first person who comes to your mind as you read the description: For me, the "Exemplar" right now is General Petraus. For the entire Army (and maybe America) he seems to represent the highest ideals of the organization both by personal behavior and by technical ability. The "Gate Keeper" is the senior noncomissioned officer in my organization. I am the "Visionary", although I am very uncomfortable with that title because it seems too self aggrandizing and because I don't have some defined clear-cut view of the perfect future of the organization. I think the title does fit me however because my circumstance has forced me to question the institutional norms and try to identify what I believe the gaps in current methodologies are. The "Truth Teller" would be someone like Don Vandergriff who has the identified the flaws in the traditional leader development model and has found a way to gain acceptance of his 'truths' with those in positions to drive change in the Army. Don told the truth and kept saying it until the institution recognized it's validity. The "Fixer" is a person I've worked and I've known for years now who, while not necessarily possessing some grand vision, is immensely capable of handling the day-to-day requirements necessary to fulfill the vision of those around him. The "Connector" is another person in our Division who I have known for a long time who has the ability to bring disparate groups together to ensure the vision gets accomplished. The "Enforcer" is someone I struggle with. By the very title, I see this person as a negative part of the organization, resisting change and establishing roadblocks. However, this isn't the connotation that Dr. Clippinger envisioned. The problem of interpretation is mine, and I cannot form a mental picture of who this individual might be. The "Facilitator" for me is an amalgam of people who, while functioning right now to complete someone else's vision, are also thinking very hard about the impacts that differing 'visions' may have. Many people who have commented here come to mind. They are people who have been able to ask hard questions about the task and it's purpose and the impact of those things on the entire organization.
If you do the same thing I just did and search for those people you think fulfill the roles outlined by Dr. Clippinger, you begin to see those people in a new light. A light that enhances their value to the organization equally regardless of where they may sit hierarchically. It also helps inform your vision of you and the role you play. It helps refine your Orientation. These considerations are important to leader development. They force each of us to look at ourselves honestly, and then determine those labels that enhance our self understanding and those that detract from it. By doing this analysis we can then determine our place in the organization that will provide the best fit for our talents, optimize our contributions and recognize the roles that others perform to accomplish the mission.
There are 8 people in your office. What descriptor do you assign them? Do you think they see themselves that way too? Interesting questions. The true leader may be the person who sees him/herself in the very same way that their superiors, peers, and subordinates see them.
The other evening, I was talking to a friend on the phone and questioning whether or not I ever really desired to lead troops again as a First Sergeant or higher. Right now, I enjoy the new role I have have found both here and at work and enjoy the job I have. When I asked my friend what his thoughts were he said that maybe my best contribution to the Army right now is in helping to develop the new leadership requirements that current and future fights will require. Growing up in the Army, all I ever wanted to be was a command sergeant major. Now, without regret or remorse, I may have found a new dream.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)
While there I came across a link to the Command and Control Research Program, a Department of Defense sponsored think-tank which describes itself like this:
"The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII) focuses upon (1) improving both the state of the art and the state of the practice of command and control and (2) enhancing DoD's understanding of the national security implications of the Information Age. It provides "Out of the Box" thinking and explores ways to help DoD take full advantage of Information Age opportunities. The CCRP bridges the operational and technical communities and enhances the body of knowledge and research infrastructure needed for future progress."
The link to CCRP is below:
http://www.dodccrp.org/
In that search, I also came across a paper written by Dr. John H. Clippinger entitled "Leadership". Regrettably, I cannot find the exact link again to embed it into this post. Dr. Clippinger's paper however, begins to look at the structural differences between Industrial Age organizations and Network Centric organization with regard to the types of people who comprise them, specifically focusing on the military. The introduction to the paper below makes the case for why we have the military hierarchical structure that we are all familiar with, as well as look at the requirements necessary for leadership in the network-centric era:
"It is very true that I have said that I considered Napoleon’s presence in the field
equal to forty thousand men in the balance. —Duke of Wellington
One bad general does better than two good ones. —Napoleon
Introduction
During the early nineteenth century, Wellington’s and Napoleon’s observations made
sense. With the onset of battle, communications became muddled, artillery was immobilized, and a commander’s ability to control his forces was limited. Consequently,the leadership of a single general could prove decisive in battle by maintaining clarity of command and control.
We are now at a totally different stage of warfare. This not to say that the fog of war has completely lifted, but visibility and synchronized actions, and the speed, precision, and lethality of response is beyond comparison to anything that has preceded it. The battlefield success of the doctrine and technology of Network Centric Warfare was not based upon a single brilliant plan, or a single individual or group, but rather was a property of the network, both technologically and organizationally. As Operation Iraqi Freedom so vividly illustrated,2 battle plans can now be changed very rapidly, affecting all aspects of operations—strategy, tactics, logistics and PSYOPs, operations, kinetics, and all types of forces. The competencies that make NCW a success are network properties; they are no longer solely the province of charismatic leaders or chance, but the result of diverse competencies and a new understanding of the role and growth of network leadership, and how it is learned and rewarded."
Further on in the article, Dr. Clippinger outlines the 8 types of people who exist in a network centered organization and the critical roles they perform. Since most of my posts try to remain 'people' focused, this section inevitably caught my eye. The 8 types and a shortened description of each is listed below.
1. The Exemplar- "These are the role models that others imitate. Sometimes their role can be simply symbolic, even ceremonial, but they are nonetheless important in setting the tone and culture of the organization. Successful and charismatic founders of new organizations, from Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Sam Walton to Osama Bin Laden and Aum Shinrikyo, all embody values and personalities that become the values of their organization. These leaders also exemplify the assessment criteria and set the standards for becoming a member of a network. In the military, each Service has its own types of exemplars: pilots and Seals for the Navy; Green Berets, and Rangers for the Army; and fighter pilots for the Air Force. These exemplars embody what is considered the most difficult and admired professional qualities that set that Service apart."
2. The Gatekeeper - "For every network there are membership rules—criteria for being included, retained, elevated, and excluded. The gatekeeper decides who is in and who is out...Like the doorman to exclusive clubs, the gatekeeper role is a combination of truth-teller, applying the standard for admittance, and enforcer, denying admittance to those parties that fail the test."
3. The Visionary - "Visionaries play a vital and sometimes contentious role within the military. They are often the first to see weaknesses in prevalent military doctrine, to espouse new technologies and doctrines, and therefore, to challenge current leadership and entrenched interests."
4. The Truth Teller - "In every network organization, someone has to keep the network honest....Like the accounting function in a corporation or the judicial function in the legal system, truth-tellers can lose their independence, and hence effectiveness. Since these are often the first roles to go in times of stress, successful leadership is exemplified here by independence, transparency, accuracy, and candor in the face of enormous pressure....The challenges are especially acute and consequential within military organizations. If credibility breaks down, trust soon becomes the next casualty, and then the overall effectiveness of the chain of command....The truth telling goal is to provide authenticated and accurate reporting of the outcomes of missions. It can take enormous courage to resist the inevitable pressures of peers and superiors to report what they want to be known, rather then the truth of the matter. Being a truth-teller can be highly unpopular and a long road to advancement."
5. The Fixer - " This is an individual who knows how to get things done and measures
him or herself not just by how many people they might know, but rather how they can get things done that others cannot. Such individuals are results oriented."
6. The Connector - "These network leaders participate in multiple social networks,
connecting not only with a large number of members, but a highly diverse number of members as well. They are known for having numerous friends, connections, and contacts—for being consummate networkers. Like the visionary leaders, they can introduce variety and options into a network through the diversity of people with whom they interact. They are critical for identifying and accessing new resources and helping to get a message out."
7. The Enforcer - "In smaller networks, this role is often combined with that of the
gatekeeper and even the truth-teller. However, in larger networks it is an independent role. Enforcement can mean physical coercion, but more often entails psychological or peer pressure. Like the truth-teller function, independence and transparency are critical for overall network effectiveness. Clearly, force and military means are the enforcement methods of last resort, but are necessary in order to buttress other forms of enforcement, which can vary from guilt and shame to legal redress. Most networks have their own forms of redress and enforcement that entail exclusion."
8. The Facilitator - "Within the military, this role is filled primarily as a staff function to a commander, and therefore may not appear to have the caché of the connector or visionary leadership roles. However, in networked organizational structures where decision making is be more distributed and less hierarchical, this leadership role is vital to coordinating and enabling other actors and decision makers."
I think one reason that this document caught my eye, was a snippet of the video I posted last week from General Dempsey. Somewhere in that video, I heard him mention "Enabling the edge" or words to that effect, and it struck me, because I think that phrase generates from the title of another CCRP product entitled, "Power to the Edge" which can be found here:
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Power.pdf
All of the above forms the basis for the following: What types of people are required to decentralize command and control? What types of people does it take to make the organization adaptable and responsive? What skills, attributes, and abilities do we need to inculcate in young and developing leaders? What types of awareness's do leaders have to posses in order to make the organization itself function as fluidly and accurately as possible? Many of these questions are being asked at the highest levels of the Army as indicated by the interview with General Dempsey in last week's post. And maybe more importantly, do the answers to these questions require wholesale changes to our current leadership models, or do they require more subtle azimuth adjustments in our organizational priorities? I don't know the answers to these questions, but I do believe that regardless of industry there must be the requirement for someone to continually be searching for them.
Who am I?
Using the labels provided by Dr. Clippinger above, I started to think about which of those labels suited my understanding of my leadership style the best. Quite honestly however, I think the more important question will be is my understanding of me the same as other people's understanding of me, and what is the impact of that on the overall effectiveness of the organization and the mission? Secondly, I think that because we are in the midst of an organizational shift throughout all of society from an industrial age, hierarchical organization to an information age, decentralized one, each of us may find that we serve multiple roles at the same time as we shift from one age to the other. For example, this blog serves as my understanding of the roles of "Visionary" and "Truth-Teller" as described above. However, because I am also a noncommissioned officer, part of a organizational structure that is hierarchical and historic, I also fulfill the role of "Gate Keeper". Due to past achievements and titles and awards, I could also be termed an "Exemplar" My point is that most of us will serve more than one role for awhile as the two organizational models move against each other.
At the smallest unit level though, I think that these descriptions are excellent ways for each of us to look at ourselves, our role in the organization, and those above, below and parallel to us. Ultimately, they help refine our personal Orientation.
Consider this: Go back to each of the labels above and write down the first person who comes to your mind as you read the description: For me, the "Exemplar" right now is General Petraus. For the entire Army (and maybe America) he seems to represent the highest ideals of the organization both by personal behavior and by technical ability. The "Gate Keeper" is the senior noncomissioned officer in my organization. I am the "Visionary", although I am very uncomfortable with that title because it seems too self aggrandizing and because I don't have some defined clear-cut view of the perfect future of the organization. I think the title does fit me however because my circumstance has forced me to question the institutional norms and try to identify what I believe the gaps in current methodologies are. The "Truth Teller" would be someone like Don Vandergriff who has the identified the flaws in the traditional leader development model and has found a way to gain acceptance of his 'truths' with those in positions to drive change in the Army. Don told the truth and kept saying it until the institution recognized it's validity. The "Fixer" is a person I've worked and I've known for years now who, while not necessarily possessing some grand vision, is immensely capable of handling the day-to-day requirements necessary to fulfill the vision of those around him. The "Connector" is another person in our Division who I have known for a long time who has the ability to bring disparate groups together to ensure the vision gets accomplished. The "Enforcer" is someone I struggle with. By the very title, I see this person as a negative part of the organization, resisting change and establishing roadblocks. However, this isn't the connotation that Dr. Clippinger envisioned. The problem of interpretation is mine, and I cannot form a mental picture of who this individual might be. The "Facilitator" for me is an amalgam of people who, while functioning right now to complete someone else's vision, are also thinking very hard about the impacts that differing 'visions' may have. Many people who have commented here come to mind. They are people who have been able to ask hard questions about the task and it's purpose and the impact of those things on the entire organization.
If you do the same thing I just did and search for those people you think fulfill the roles outlined by Dr. Clippinger, you begin to see those people in a new light. A light that enhances their value to the organization equally regardless of where they may sit hierarchically. It also helps inform your vision of you and the role you play. It helps refine your Orientation. These considerations are important to leader development. They force each of us to look at ourselves honestly, and then determine those labels that enhance our self understanding and those that detract from it. By doing this analysis we can then determine our place in the organization that will provide the best fit for our talents, optimize our contributions and recognize the roles that others perform to accomplish the mission.
There are 8 people in your office. What descriptor do you assign them? Do you think they see themselves that way too? Interesting questions. The true leader may be the person who sees him/herself in the very same way that their superiors, peers, and subordinates see them.
The other evening, I was talking to a friend on the phone and questioning whether or not I ever really desired to lead troops again as a First Sergeant or higher. Right now, I enjoy the new role I have have found both here and at work and enjoy the job I have. When I asked my friend what his thoughts were he said that maybe my best contribution to the Army right now is in helping to develop the new leadership requirements that current and future fights will require. Growing up in the Army, all I ever wanted to be was a command sergeant major. Now, without regret or remorse, I may have found a new dream.
As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome.
#74 Editor's Note
I want to express my gratitude and thanks to all of you who have checked out and commented on my writing over the past 11 months. I was very honored this week to have been asked to submit my postings to the Battle Command Knowledge Systems (BCKS) Leader Net, on Army Knowledge Online. I have been given my own folder in the Professional Reading Room and so far 6 posts have been added. I look forward to adding more as time goes on.
I am deeply appreciative to all who have supported my efforts. In order to learn anything, previous ideas must be challenged and critically reviewed. I am thoroughly enjoying this exercise, and sincerely hope that I have challenged the reader to further explore their own definition of leadership, especially given the dynamic and rapidly changing world we currently live in.
Again, thanks for all your support and feedback and I look forward to the discussions ahead.
I am deeply appreciative to all who have supported my efforts. In order to learn anything, previous ideas must be challenged and critically reviewed. I am thoroughly enjoying this exercise, and sincerely hope that I have challenged the reader to further explore their own definition of leadership, especially given the dynamic and rapidly changing world we currently live in.
Again, thanks for all your support and feedback and I look forward to the discussions ahead.
#73 Risk, Trust and the Future of the Profession
As sometimes happens, I really had no idea what I wanted to comment on this week when suddenly a few things popped up out of nowhere and provided the spark. I am going to try something here that I haven't done before, which is to link to some videos and see if the feedback is worth it. I know the discussion is worthwhile, but if people won't check, (or can't depending on bandwidth) the links, then my thoughts might not make a whole lot of sense.
First, check the link below posted by LTG Robert Caslen of the Combined Arms Center, entitled 'Leading in a Complex Operating Environment':
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYPzRqu7Wvw
LTG Caslen's video post has to do with the potential repercussions of the COP Wanat and COP Keating reports. It talks very plainly about the need to ensure we have command climates that create the conditions for the exchange of information that allows a subordinate to voice his/her concerns regarding tactical risk to those higher in their chain of command. LTG Caslen is principally talking to the young and mid-career Army officers attending various schools that are part of the Combined Arms Center. CAC has done an exceptional job blending new technology and social media together in a manner that allows for the very top of the Army 'corporation' to gain feedback from those whose understanding of their profession has been formed in large part by the last 9 years of conflict. He also makes plain mention of the often blurry, and always subjective line between acceptable risk and risk aversion. Are we becoming risk averse because of the potential implications both personally, and for our Soldiers? These are also some of the same ideas and questions that I was talking about in my post a few weeks back entitled, "Hondo's Parting Gift".
Then check out the second link from General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcVHwpqsLf8
This is part 2 of a 3 part interview with General Dempsey. Not surprisingly, you'll find a lot of similarities, concerns and questions between Gen Dempsey's video and LTG Caslen's, only on a somewhat larger scale. Whereas LTG Caslen seems focused pretty tightly around the practical application of risk acceptance and risk aversion, Gen Dempsey continues that line of thought toward the more esoteric ideas of mentoring, trust development, and the impact of leader development programs that reaffirm the ethic of the profession of arms.
There is a part near the end of the Demspey video where he states:
"Decentralization has become an almost unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine, it's in joint doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge, we talk about enabling the edge, and my concern is that we're also....pushing all the risk. And in pushing all the risk, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the other aspects of our profession, one of the foundational aspects, which is trust. So that if we push all the risk to the edge, and we don't share that risk, and we hold junior leaders accountable for failures, but without sharing that failure with them...then we begin to erode trust. And when we begin to erode trust we begin to erode the profession."
These two videos fill me with a lot of hope and confidence in our Army's senior leadership. Their acknowledged realization that we are requiring increasingly junior leaders to make very complex decisions, in real-time, that can have strategic consequences, and their willingness to put that into the larger context of leader development and the Army professional ethic is important. I think it also demonstrates that the Army has recognized - in a very public manner - the need for institutional transparency; the need for dialogue over discussion. Intended or not, this reaching out to the force at large also recognizes that previous models built solely on the seniority of the leadership have been surpassed by a new model that recognizes the value of those currently experiencing a new reality. Both of these leaders seem to recognize and are affirming the value of the experiential knowledge of the bottom. They recognize that a lot of their previous knowledge gained over the course of their careers has very little practical application to a young Captain or Major trying to implement a doctrine that is still quite literally in it's infancy. What both are trying to do is find the broader implications of what this period of dramatic change means to the organization as a whole.
How do we develop trust? Where is it's beginning, and where is it's end? These questions are both intensely personal, and institutional, at the same time. On the personal level there is the idea that I trust my friends, my loved ones etc. That they will not intentionally do me harm. I trust that they will help me in my time of need and celebrate my successes. That they will share both my pain and my joy. This feeling of trust on the individual level provides all of us the sense of community that we require to find value in our world. Trust at the individual level fulfills Maslow's 3rd tier of Love, Affection and Belongingness. It begins to build community.
Then there is institutional trust. I trust that my elected leaders will work to serve their communities as best they can. I trust that my retirement plan money will be invested wisely. I trust that my schools will provide a quality education. That my doctor knows what medicine is best for me. I trust that my mail will be delivered on time. I trust that my employer will stand behind me when I have done my best, but the outcome fell short of the mark. I trust that the organizational climate, ethos, and norms will be lived up to by everyone, all the time, and not sacrificed for expediency. These are trusts that occur when we put our faith and belief in things beyond our immediate knowledge and experience or control.
As an entire Army there are a lot of things right now that are beyond our immediate knowledge (the ethical/moral/and hierarchy situations created by counterinsurgency's requirement for decentralization), experience (we have only really been practicing the COIN doctrine for about 3 years) or control (we are learning rapidly that the 'fog' and 'friction' of war creates points where the outcome may be outside of our ability to control it).
And so we have to return to the people actually making the on-the-spot decision. Leaders have to trust that the most junior member of the unit will make his/her decision based upon the best knowledge they have available to them, their personal value system and their understanding of the ethic and priorities of the institution they serve. And the subordinate has to trust that if he/she does that, that their leadership will support them. But how? How can we take a young leader and expand their understandings as broadly as this war requires in an extremely short amount of time? It's akin to trying to get them to understand the entirety of how our government functions in less than a year. And then making them responsible for the decisions they make based upon this 'Cliff's Notes' understanding of the profession itself.
I'm not saying that I have the answers to any of these questions, but I do think that in many ways, my search for personal understanding on these pages has produced an idea of how we might actually go about ensuring that the professional military ethic remains strong, that we develop our young leaders in a manner that ensures a common understanding of the expectations of the organization, and supports active decision-making at the point of impact.
As always, I return to OODA. If you watch both videos, you can see two senior leaders who have Observed something and are trying to Orient to it as quickly and as correctly as possible. Gen Dempsey's 'gut' instinct that we may have blindly accepted and highlighted decentralization without completely understanding it's consequences equals his Observe. His willingness to spend time and resources to study it will affect his Orientation. LTG Caslen's recognition that events like COP Wanat and COP Keating have played a role in upsetting the balance between tactical gains and risk aversion, is the same. Both men have the power to Decide and Act upon their Observations, but both right now seem to be trying to ensure they are correctly Oriented before doing so. We need to teach OODA in every school house we have. It works from the very personal to grand strategic levels. In this fight both of those extremes happen on the same small piece of ground.
Second, go back to the leaders 'philosophy' I gave my organization when they first met me. My first two points were: (1) People are more important than things, and (2) How to think is more important than what to think. These two thoughts place a premium on human being development. The task is not the critical event, the impact on the person who successfully completes the task is. It equals empowerment, growth, and development. It is also moldable. The task can be anything, which means that it could be ethical behavior making exercises just as easily as marksmanship. Either way, the observed development of the person is the prize. Everything else is just the method. At the microcosmic Army level, in my little organization of 14 people this is playing out every day. I trust my subordinates. I told them day 1 that they had 100% of my trust based upon their experience in the job. I told them I would earn theirs. In some ways, I turned their understanding upside down. I gave them a lot of latitude in the beginning that had the possibility of being abused. But that latitude has come with an increased expectation of excellence. Their work, their research, their class development, and their focus provides a institutional experience where they feel valued, cared for, and are invested in. I have taken care of them when necessary, and they have repaid that by truly caring about the people they are sending to combat. Their opinion counts, their voice gets heard, and we all are equally charged in our own way with creating the best training experience we can. They are as 'bought in' as I am. Now that it is truly their 'baby', they demonstrate every day the pride of 'parenthood'.
Third, look at the institution through the eyes of those just starting out. While they may not have much experience, they do have an understanding of the meaning of words. We need to look for those places where the institutional interpretation of the 7 Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage) and the user interpretation have diverged. I'm not implying that one side or the other has the correct interpretation, only that there has to be a recognition that there can be more than one. We may find that on most of the Values, the institution and the user are actually extremely close and we don't need a lot of work to close the gap. But we might find one or two where there is a large gap in understanding that requires us to work hard to close that gap. If we do not re-examine the user-level understanding of the 7 Army Values and how they are playing out on the side of a hill in Afghanistan between a young Sergeant and a scared Soldier, then we cannot fix the issues of ethos, trust, or leader development. Ultimately, any search for answers, will return to the need to enhance/change/create men and women of character who have the same personal understanding of the organization's ethics and norms as the organization itself does. If we fall short at this foundational level, the remainder of the profession will surely collapse.
A final rambling thought: The current battlefield requires folks who can make quick decisions in keeping with the institutional norms and expected behaviors of the Army.....those decisions must be based on a common understanding of the values and ethics of the organization.....the development of people into the leaders of character the profession requires IS the key.....Any training task or combat only provides experience, it is not the key event here. Leader development is.....Trust must be returned.....On both the personal and institutional level. Without it, our contract with the nation we serve is in jeopardy.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
First, check the link below posted by LTG Robert Caslen of the Combined Arms Center, entitled 'Leading in a Complex Operating Environment':
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYPzRqu7Wvw
LTG Caslen's video post has to do with the potential repercussions of the COP Wanat and COP Keating reports. It talks very plainly about the need to ensure we have command climates that create the conditions for the exchange of information that allows a subordinate to voice his/her concerns regarding tactical risk to those higher in their chain of command. LTG Caslen is principally talking to the young and mid-career Army officers attending various schools that are part of the Combined Arms Center. CAC has done an exceptional job blending new technology and social media together in a manner that allows for the very top of the Army 'corporation' to gain feedback from those whose understanding of their profession has been formed in large part by the last 9 years of conflict. He also makes plain mention of the often blurry, and always subjective line between acceptable risk and risk aversion. Are we becoming risk averse because of the potential implications both personally, and for our Soldiers? These are also some of the same ideas and questions that I was talking about in my post a few weeks back entitled, "Hondo's Parting Gift".
Then check out the second link from General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcVHwpqsLf8
This is part 2 of a 3 part interview with General Dempsey. Not surprisingly, you'll find a lot of similarities, concerns and questions between Gen Dempsey's video and LTG Caslen's, only on a somewhat larger scale. Whereas LTG Caslen seems focused pretty tightly around the practical application of risk acceptance and risk aversion, Gen Dempsey continues that line of thought toward the more esoteric ideas of mentoring, trust development, and the impact of leader development programs that reaffirm the ethic of the profession of arms.
There is a part near the end of the Demspey video where he states:
"Decentralization has become an almost unquestioned good. It's in all of our doctrine, it's in joint doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge, we talk about enabling the edge, and my concern is that we're also....pushing all the risk. And in pushing all the risk, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the other aspects of our profession, one of the foundational aspects, which is trust. So that if we push all the risk to the edge, and we don't share that risk, and we hold junior leaders accountable for failures, but without sharing that failure with them...then we begin to erode trust. And when we begin to erode trust we begin to erode the profession."
These two videos fill me with a lot of hope and confidence in our Army's senior leadership. Their acknowledged realization that we are requiring increasingly junior leaders to make very complex decisions, in real-time, that can have strategic consequences, and their willingness to put that into the larger context of leader development and the Army professional ethic is important. I think it also demonstrates that the Army has recognized - in a very public manner - the need for institutional transparency; the need for dialogue over discussion. Intended or not, this reaching out to the force at large also recognizes that previous models built solely on the seniority of the leadership have been surpassed by a new model that recognizes the value of those currently experiencing a new reality. Both of these leaders seem to recognize and are affirming the value of the experiential knowledge of the bottom. They recognize that a lot of their previous knowledge gained over the course of their careers has very little practical application to a young Captain or Major trying to implement a doctrine that is still quite literally in it's infancy. What both are trying to do is find the broader implications of what this period of dramatic change means to the organization as a whole.
How do we develop trust? Where is it's beginning, and where is it's end? These questions are both intensely personal, and institutional, at the same time. On the personal level there is the idea that I trust my friends, my loved ones etc. That they will not intentionally do me harm. I trust that they will help me in my time of need and celebrate my successes. That they will share both my pain and my joy. This feeling of trust on the individual level provides all of us the sense of community that we require to find value in our world. Trust at the individual level fulfills Maslow's 3rd tier of Love, Affection and Belongingness. It begins to build community.
Then there is institutional trust. I trust that my elected leaders will work to serve their communities as best they can. I trust that my retirement plan money will be invested wisely. I trust that my schools will provide a quality education. That my doctor knows what medicine is best for me. I trust that my mail will be delivered on time. I trust that my employer will stand behind me when I have done my best, but the outcome fell short of the mark. I trust that the organizational climate, ethos, and norms will be lived up to by everyone, all the time, and not sacrificed for expediency. These are trusts that occur when we put our faith and belief in things beyond our immediate knowledge and experience or control.
As an entire Army there are a lot of things right now that are beyond our immediate knowledge (the ethical/moral/and hierarchy situations created by counterinsurgency's requirement for decentralization), experience (we have only really been practicing the COIN doctrine for about 3 years) or control (we are learning rapidly that the 'fog' and 'friction' of war creates points where the outcome may be outside of our ability to control it).
And so we have to return to the people actually making the on-the-spot decision. Leaders have to trust that the most junior member of the unit will make his/her decision based upon the best knowledge they have available to them, their personal value system and their understanding of the ethic and priorities of the institution they serve. And the subordinate has to trust that if he/she does that, that their leadership will support them. But how? How can we take a young leader and expand their understandings as broadly as this war requires in an extremely short amount of time? It's akin to trying to get them to understand the entirety of how our government functions in less than a year. And then making them responsible for the decisions they make based upon this 'Cliff's Notes' understanding of the profession itself.
I'm not saying that I have the answers to any of these questions, but I do think that in many ways, my search for personal understanding on these pages has produced an idea of how we might actually go about ensuring that the professional military ethic remains strong, that we develop our young leaders in a manner that ensures a common understanding of the expectations of the organization, and supports active decision-making at the point of impact.
As always, I return to OODA. If you watch both videos, you can see two senior leaders who have Observed something and are trying to Orient to it as quickly and as correctly as possible. Gen Dempsey's 'gut' instinct that we may have blindly accepted and highlighted decentralization without completely understanding it's consequences equals his Observe. His willingness to spend time and resources to study it will affect his Orientation. LTG Caslen's recognition that events like COP Wanat and COP Keating have played a role in upsetting the balance between tactical gains and risk aversion, is the same. Both men have the power to Decide and Act upon their Observations, but both right now seem to be trying to ensure they are correctly Oriented before doing so. We need to teach OODA in every school house we have. It works from the very personal to grand strategic levels. In this fight both of those extremes happen on the same small piece of ground.
Second, go back to the leaders 'philosophy' I gave my organization when they first met me. My first two points were: (1) People are more important than things, and (2) How to think is more important than what to think. These two thoughts place a premium on human being development. The task is not the critical event, the impact on the person who successfully completes the task is. It equals empowerment, growth, and development. It is also moldable. The task can be anything, which means that it could be ethical behavior making exercises just as easily as marksmanship. Either way, the observed development of the person is the prize. Everything else is just the method. At the microcosmic Army level, in my little organization of 14 people this is playing out every day. I trust my subordinates. I told them day 1 that they had 100% of my trust based upon their experience in the job. I told them I would earn theirs. In some ways, I turned their understanding upside down. I gave them a lot of latitude in the beginning that had the possibility of being abused. But that latitude has come with an increased expectation of excellence. Their work, their research, their class development, and their focus provides a institutional experience where they feel valued, cared for, and are invested in. I have taken care of them when necessary, and they have repaid that by truly caring about the people they are sending to combat. Their opinion counts, their voice gets heard, and we all are equally charged in our own way with creating the best training experience we can. They are as 'bought in' as I am. Now that it is truly their 'baby', they demonstrate every day the pride of 'parenthood'.
Third, look at the institution through the eyes of those just starting out. While they may not have much experience, they do have an understanding of the meaning of words. We need to look for those places where the institutional interpretation of the 7 Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage) and the user interpretation have diverged. I'm not implying that one side or the other has the correct interpretation, only that there has to be a recognition that there can be more than one. We may find that on most of the Values, the institution and the user are actually extremely close and we don't need a lot of work to close the gap. But we might find one or two where there is a large gap in understanding that requires us to work hard to close that gap. If we do not re-examine the user-level understanding of the 7 Army Values and how they are playing out on the side of a hill in Afghanistan between a young Sergeant and a scared Soldier, then we cannot fix the issues of ethos, trust, or leader development. Ultimately, any search for answers, will return to the need to enhance/change/create men and women of character who have the same personal understanding of the organization's ethics and norms as the organization itself does. If we fall short at this foundational level, the remainder of the profession will surely collapse.
A final rambling thought: The current battlefield requires folks who can make quick decisions in keeping with the institutional norms and expected behaviors of the Army.....those decisions must be based on a common understanding of the values and ethics of the organization.....the development of people into the leaders of character the profession requires IS the key.....Any training task or combat only provides experience, it is not the key event here. Leader development is.....Trust must be returned.....On both the personal and institutional level. Without it, our contract with the nation we serve is in jeopardy.
As always, your thoughts and comments are more than welcome.
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